Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
MARTINEZ J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Order 1 dated
January 24, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch
V, in Civil Case No. 262, which reversed its earlier Decision2 dated July
31, 1985 dismissing the complaint filed by respondents.
1. Ordering the spouses Arsenio Lopez, Jr. and Ofelia Lopez to pay
the Traders Commercial Bank jointly and severally the amount of
P578,025.23, inclusive of interest and other bank charges as of April
30, 1971, and, thereafter, plus all interest and bank charges until full
payment is made and, to pay to the bank the amount of P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On December 28, 1983, Traders Royal Bank assigned 5 its rights to the
mortgage to petitioner Angel L. Bautista. By virtue of the said
assignment, petitioner on March 19, 1984 wrote the City Sheriff of
Iligan City requesting that the mortgaged properties be foreclosed for
non-payment of the loan obligation. To thwart the pending foreclosure,
respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte,
Branch V, a complaint for cancellation of lien with preliminary
injunction against petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
262.
On January 24, 1986, the trial court modified its earlier decision
disposing thus:
Premises considered, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have made out
a preponderating case against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
On December 29, 1987, petitioner filed this present petition for review
contending that the trial court erred in modifying its earlier decision; in
declaring that he has no right to foreclose the mortgaged property; in
declaring the temporary restraining order into a permanent preliminary
injunction and in ordering the Register of Deeds of Iligan City to cancel
entry No. 451 on TCT No. 3041.
The resolution of the basic issue of whether or not the petitioner has
the right to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage is no longer
necessary in view of the release of the mortgage as shown in the
certified true copy thereof. No useful purpose would be served by
passing on the merits of the petition. Any ruling in this case could
hardly be of any practical or useful purpose in the premises. It is a well-
settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question or abstract
proposition nor express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief
can be granted. 11
Atty. Abrogena should bear in mind that a lawyer is, first and foremost,
an officer of the court. His duties to the court are more significant than
those which he owes to his client. His first duty is not to his client but
to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is
wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession. 12
ANTONIO, J.:p
The gross value of the estate of the late William C. Ogan subject
matter of the probate proceeding in Sp. Proc. No. 423 is more than P2
million. Petitioners, Atty. Jesus V. Occea and Atty. Samuel C. Occea,
are the lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan Occea,
and they had been representing the said executrix since 1963,
defending the estate against claims and protecting the interests of the
estate. In order to expedite the settlement of their deceased father's
estate, the seven instituted heirs decided to enter into compromise
with the claimants, as a result of which the total amount of
P220,000.00 in cash was awarded to the claimants, including co-
executor Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, his lawyers and his wife. A partial
distribution of the corpus and income of the estate was made to the
heirs in the total amount of P450,000.00. On November 18, 1966, the
estate and inheritance taxes were completely settled by the executrix
and the requisite tax clearance and discharge from liability was issued
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
We shall now consider the merits of the basic petition and the petitions
for contempt.
The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the
executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust, his
attorney's fees may be allowed as expenses of administration. The
estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability for
payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If the
administrator had paid the fees, he would be entitled to
reimbursement from the estate. The procedure to be followed by
counsel in order to collect his fees is to request the administrator to
make payment, and should the latter fail to pay, either to (a) file an
action against him in his personal capacity, and not as administrator, 1
or (b) file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings asking the
court, after notice to all the heirs and interested parties, to direct the
payment of his fees as expenses of administration. 2 Whichever course
is adopted, the heirs and other persons interested in the estate will
have the right to inquire into the value, of the services of the lawyer
and on the necessity of his employment. In the case at bar, petitioner
filed his petition directly with the probate court.
What petitioners filed with the lower court was a motion for partial
payment of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00 as lawyers for
the executrix for the period February, 1963, up to the date of filing of
the motion on or about November 18, 1965. Five of the seven heirs had
manifested conformity to petitioners' motion, while the remaining two
merely requested deferment of the resolution of the motion "until the
total amount for Executrix's fees and attorney's fees of her counsel is
agreed upon by all the heirs." The court, however, in spite of such
conformity, and without affording petitioners the opportunity to
establish how much attorney's fees they are entitled to for their entire
legal services to the executrix, issued an order fixing at P20,000.00 the
entire attorney's fees of petitioners.
The records of this case are before the Court and the work rendered by
Atty. Samuel Occea, within each given period, is easily visible from
them; his work as revealed by those records is the factual basis for this
Court's orders as to attorney's fees.
II
We note that no further action was taken on the petition for contempt
filed by petitioners against Generoso L. Pacquiao, who executed the
affidavit attached to intervenor's Answer to Supplemental Petition, the
contents of which petitioners claim to be deliberate falsehoods. The
said respondent Pacquiao not having been afforded an opportunity to
defend himself against the contempt charge, the charge must be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, (1) the petition for certiorari is granted, and the court a
quo is directed to hold a hearing to determine how much the total
attorney's fees petitioners are entitled to, and (2) Atty. Isabelo V.
Binamira, who appeared as intervenor in this case, is hereby declared
guilty of contempt and sentenced to pay to this Court within ten (10)
days from notice hereof a fine in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00). Costs against intervenor.
It appears that the foreshore land being occupied by the Alvendias was
part of the communal fishing ground reserved by Republic Act No. 470.
On 8 November 1977, respondent filed, on behalf of the Alvendias,
Amended Application for Original Registration of Title 8 in Land
Registration Case ("LRC") No. 3711-M with the then CFI of Bulacan
praying that the land covered by Psu-141243, Amd. 2 9 be registered
in the name of the spouses Alvendias. Respondent alleged in the
Amended Application that the applicant Alvendias were the owners of
the land, they having acquired the same from one Teresita Vistan by
sale sometime in 1929.
". . . Your respondent, not content with just having conferred with Atty.
Montesclaro when he took over, even went to the extent of verifying
from the Bureau of Lands if the application was proper. The Legal
Department of the Bureau of Lands assured your respondent that it
was. He was informed that judicial application for registration is one of
the methods of acquiring such lands, said lands being alienable and
disposable. There are, however, other means of obtaining the said
lands, but the applicants (with Atty. Montesclaro) chose the present
action for land registration.
Undersigned wishes to point out that he merely took over from the
original lawyer when said counsel withdrew his appearance. Your
respondent, hence, was in good faith when he took over the land
registration case, subject matter of this present administrative
investigation."cralaw virtua1aw library
"In his answer to the letter complaint, respondent avers that his
clients, i.e., the Alvendias, have the right to apply for registration of
the land in question. However, respondent does not deny that he
prepared and signed the Amended Application for Original Registration
of Title in Land Reg. Case No. 3711-M wherein he alleged that the
Alvendias are the owners of the land covered by Psu 141243, Amd. 2.
Respondent does not offer any explanation at all as to why his
submission in said application was diametrically opposite to his
allegations in the complaint in the earlier Civil Case No. 3330-M that
the Alvendias were permittees and later the lessees of the same
property.
It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. 15 One of those requirements is the
observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that
candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only
complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to
satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would
gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all. It is essential that
lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their
clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all officers of court
sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and
only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their
clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court. 16
It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola violated his lawyers oath
and as well Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which stated
that" [t]he conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other
lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness" (now Canon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribing that" [a]
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts"). He has
been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as a member of
the Bar and an officer of the court. In his apparent zeal to secure the
title to the property involved for his clients, he disregarded his
overriding duty to the court and to the law itself.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
Arising from the same transaction is Criminal Case No. 67752, People
vs. Chan Kian (herein plaintiff) before the same court, wherein herein
defendant is the complainant, who accuses herein plaintiff with estafa
involving the same 400 drums of monosodium glutamate and the sum
of P120,000.00.
On defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, which was
opposed by plaintiff, and in view of the pendency of both criminal and
civil cases between the same parties and over the same subject
matter, the lower court ruled that the trial of the criminal case should
take precedence over the civil case, "not only because the procedure
provided for the prosecution of offenses is more adequate than civil
procedure, but because the judgment which may be rendered in the
criminal action may dispose of the civil action." The lower court also
opined that giving preference to the criminal case would avoid
multiplicity of suits and the possibility of a conflict of decision on the
same issues, for it would be anomalous if the civil case is decided in
favor of plaintiff and thereafter he gets convicted in the criminal case.
Concluding that "only if the criminal case is tried first and the accused
is acquitted would it be proper for him to continue with this civil case,"
the lower court finally said that this ruling is in accordance with
Paragraph (c)of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court providing that "after a
criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted."
(1) That the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 107,
Section 1, have no application in the case at bar; .
The record of said Criminal Case No. 67752 thus shows the following
sequence of events:
3. The criminal case thus proceeded to trial and on July 10, 1964,
Judge Kapunan promulgated his decision dated July 9, 1964 finding the
accused (therein plaintiff) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and sentencing him to serve an indeterminate penalty ranging
from not less than ten (10) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision mayor as minimum, to not more than fourteen (14)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P120,000.00 and to pay the
costs. 6
The Court notes with regret that had the counsels, 10 as officers of the
courts, but faithfully complied with their duty to deal with the courts in
truth and candor, and promptly manifested to the appellate court the
above developments, all by June, 1965, which have made the principal
issue at bar moot and academic, 11 this case would then have been
disposed of and need not have been certified to this Court, and the
time needed by it to devote to the prompt disposition of meritorious
cases need not have been thus
dissipated. 12
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition at bar for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court
as per its resolution of November 9, 1972 resolved, without giving due
course to the petition, to require respondents to comment thereon
within ten days from notice and to issue a temporary restraining order
restraining respondent court inter alia from proceeding with the
hearing of the case 1 pending before it below.
Under date of December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C. Delante filed a third
motion for "a last extension of fifteen days from December 29, 1972 to
submit the required comment, stating "That the undersigned counsel
has already prepared the final draft of the desired comments, but due
to pressure of work in his office and matters occasioned by the
Christmas season, the same has not been finalized and typed out in a
clean copy," for filing by the expiry date on December 28, 1972.
The Court per its resolution of January 15, 1973 granted the said
extensions totalling twenty-five days. Having noted respondents'
failure to file their comment notwithstanding the numerous extensions
sought by and granted to their counsel, which expired on January 12,
1973, the Court as per its resolution of April 12, 1973 resolved to
require Atty. Delante as counsel for respondents to explain and show
cause within ten days from notice why they failed to file the required
comment.
Atty. Delante filed in due course his explanation dated May 7, 1973,
wherein he claimed for the first time that "in view of (his) pressing
professional commitments," he requested his clients "to have the
answer ... prepared by another lawyer for which reason (respondents)
took delivery of the records of the said case from his office and
contracted the services of Atty. Antonio Fernandez."
Atty. Delante goes on to claim that it was only upon receipt of the
Court's resolution of April 12, 1973 requiring his explanation that he
learned that Atty. Fernandez who had contracted "to prepare an
answer, underwent a surgical operation," attaching a copy of Atty.
Fernandez' affidavit together with a medical certificate which certified
however to the latter's confinement at the Davao Doctors' Hospital
only from "Dec. 23-26, 1972" and "(D)aily follow up: Dec. 26, 1972 Jan.
15, 1973." Atty. Fernandez in his affidavit however stated that after his
services had been retained by respondents "sometime on December
12, 1972" he "had been confined in the Davao Doctors' Hospital and
subsequently operated on for sinusitis" (on December 23-26, 1972)
and that Gregorio Caeda, president of respondent Grecan Co. Inc.
"saw me in the hospital and asked from me the answer and I told him
that I may not be able to proceed and prepare the answer because of
the operation that I just had, hence he got the records of the case G.R.
No. L-35766 from me."
Atty. Delante pleads that "it is far from (his) intention to cause any
undue delay in the disposition of the above-entitled case," and "(T)hat
this is the first time it happened to him, and that if given an
opportunity to prepare the answer, he will try his best to do it within
the period granted by this Honorable Tribunal, and that he assures this
Honorable Tribunal that there would be no repetition of this similar
incident in the future." He prays that his explanation be accepted and
without blinking an eye notwithstanding that the required comment
has long been overdue for almost four months at the time that he
"be given an opportunity to prepare the necessary answer for the
respondents."
Counsel for petitioners promptly filed their comments dated May 11,
1973 citing the inconsistencies and contradictions in Atty. Delante's
explanation, opposing his plea to still be allowed to file respondents'
comment after his "gross and inexcusable negligence" and praying
that the petition be considered submitted for resolution by the Court.
In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty. Delante's law office
cited as reason the fact that he had gotten sick on December 6, 1972
and had just recovered and needed the additional 10-day extension "in
order to enable him to finish the comments for the respondents;"
In his third motion for a last 15-day extension, Delante assured the
Court "that (he) has already prepared the final draft of the desired
comments" and cited "pressure of work in his office" and the Christmas
Season for not having "finalized and typed out (the comments) in a
clean copy" which comments never came to be submitted to this
Court;
The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation for his
having allowed his extended period to lapse without submitting the
required comment nor extending to the Court the courtesy of any
explanation or manifestation for his failure to do so. His inaction unduly
prevented and delayed for a considerable period the Court's prompt
disposition of the petition. Worse, when this was noted and the Court
required his explanation, he gave an explanation that is devious and
unworthy of belief since it is contradicted by his own previous
representations of record as well as by the "supporting" documents
submitted by him therewith, as shown hereinabove.
In Pajares vs. Abad Santos 2 the Court reminded attorneys that "There
must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of
his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and expressly admonishes
that "for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action."
The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to honor his
oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not a failure of the
administration of justice if courts could not rely on the submissions and
representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a case. As stated by
the Court in one case, "Time and time again, lawyers have been
admonished to remember that they are officers of the court, and that
while they owe their clients the duty of complete fidelity and the
utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar
as candor and honesty towards the court is concerned." 4
Hence, the Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from the
practice of law for failure to file appellants' briefs in criminal cases
despite repeated extensions of time obtained by them, (except to file
the missing briefs), with the reminder that "the trust imposed on
counsel in accordance not only with the canons of legal ethics but with
the soundest traditions of the profession would require fidelity on their
part."
vs.
The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari with
mandamus is whether R.A. No. 7691 1 has divested Regional Trial
Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses, which are punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years.
[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged for
[sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under
Sec. 264 of the same Code carries a penalty of not less than one (1)
year but not more than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject
to Probation plus disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of
the right of suffrage.
Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129
as Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec.
32. Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases Except [in] cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan
Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has
divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where
the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of imprisonment;
moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all laws, decrees, and
orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed repealed or modified
accordingly. They then conclude that since the election offense in
question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it
is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.
Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal
action or proceedings for violation of the Code except those relating to
the offense of failure to register or failure to vote. 6 It reads as follows:
Sec. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. The regional trial court shall have
the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action
or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the
offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the
jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the
decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.
Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those
enumerated in Section 261 thereof. The offense allegedly committed
by private respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of said Section,
thus:
Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense
under the Code, except that of failure to register or failure to vote, is
"imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years"
and the offender shall not be subject to probation and shall suffer
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage.
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening
sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an
opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his
duty to be studious of the principles of law, 10 to administer his office
with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, 11 to be
faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence. 12
As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in
the case of Alberto Naldeza -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-
94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the Supreme Court succinctly held:
16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of "Alberto -vs- Judge
Juan Lavilles, Jr.," 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction
between the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses,
has ruled, thus:
If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the
correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neither
Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor
Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA.
Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the
paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA.
Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty.
Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were
findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth
is, the quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court
Administrator quoted in the decision.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as
respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and
in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to
insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance
the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the
entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Taada, et al" which
was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973,
for lack of merit.
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in
Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided
by Hon. Santiago O. Taada but the Court of First Instance upheld the
decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the Court of
Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it
was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del
Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of
the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust
judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the
innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When
the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution of October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the
motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust
judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be
deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and
abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant
reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second
motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another
threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the
jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171,
204 and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the
AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that
will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines."
The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that
notwithstanding its admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for
Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats, he
reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to assert
its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days
(and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for
contempt of court.
A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any
man, just or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb,
if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether the
threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference
to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to his Excellency, complaining
against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was under the
Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the
constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than abuse, there was
arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the authorities,
including the courts, not excluding even the President; it is this
anarchy that is the program to cure in the New.
Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against
Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon
Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in
Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying to
hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the
case for damages (R-13277)was terminated by compromise agreement
after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint
apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and
agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-
justices. This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did
not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he
actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making
them change their minds in the case they decided in accordance with
the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction.
To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his
motion on October 10, 1973, before Us, asking that his suspension
from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored
because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages
filed against the three Justices of the Appellate Court.
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of
frustration, turned against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his
petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court,
G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for
reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court
requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the
resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices
favoring his motion for reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration
We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He,
then, filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating
brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that,
had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the
last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of
the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge
Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same,
civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals
who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica,
reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment
therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding
evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and
work for their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in
a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to
Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of retribution
aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R.
No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.
Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse
of placing on a pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity and honor of
this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice, was to require
by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the
contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation.
On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G.
R. No. 46504-R, became final and executory and the Court of Appeals
was so informed.
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed
the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts concerning the order
of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the
practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration
on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In
Our resolution dated December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he
had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to
submit a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of
respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further
investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of
Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed submitted for
decision.
The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of
the Supreme Court a case for damages against them. He answered in
the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a
justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines cannot be civilly held
liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in the
Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American
laws. But the Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the
Penal Code still remains incorporated therein for observance and
fulfillment. Up to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of the
Supreme Court thereon
With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court
facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to voluntarily
retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent
power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its
integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to
deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making
arrangement directly with his clients.
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that
second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the
Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b)
Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to
emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A
lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court
exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of
administering justice.
As We stated before:
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the
court so essential to the proper administration of justice (Emphasis
supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs.
C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two
highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in
deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts
by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross
ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and
mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity and
honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have
nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the
book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with
honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those
who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose
to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for
them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to
himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for
the stability of our democratic institutions.
Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the
Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice
of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect
immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p.
562.)
The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the indefinite
suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent
MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to
our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L.
Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto,
members of the Bar, with the suggestion that disciplinary action be
taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-
cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth
in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law
due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners'
counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated
Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a
gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used
by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a
government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the
light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the
incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to
create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute
manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968).
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been
declared unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-
entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the
right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of
this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first
place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is
neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a wholesome
development of the law but only served to delay respondent for the
benefit of the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the
status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that
it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at all.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise
in previous decisions, and the main issue "right to reject any or all
bids" is being treated on a double standard basis by the Honorable
Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme
Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said
decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred
million dollars by said decision without an effort by the Honorable
Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through the
trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and
Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing
pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor
General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were
comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern he expressed for the
fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if
MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client would
be deprived of due process of law. However, counsel sought to change
the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7,
paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily
deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion, which in full reads:
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early
as October 7, 1968, he insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this
case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did
not agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices.
According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic) now being taken is against
counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains
to say that the questioned statements he made were also taken out of
context and were necessary for the defense of his client MacArthur. He
made the admission, though, that those statements lifted out of
context would indeed be sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f),
Rule 138, had been violated.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969,
requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five (5) days
from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for
contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there
alleged that the said fourth motion for reconsideration was already
finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and
requested him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that
he turned down said request twice on the ground that he did not know
anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated
in the motion; that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently
explained to the undersigned counsel together with the background of
the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F.
Meads"; that upon assurance that there was nothing wrong with the
motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same; that he was
misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not
revealed to him especially the oral argument allegedly made in the
case.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the
quotation from the Rules of Court set forth in the fourth motion for
reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said
quotation is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a
complete quotation and that it is a common practice in court pleadings
to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that the
announced plan to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. In
fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and
Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to the
second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and second
contempt incidents seriatim.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is
easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a
court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words
are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are
thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a
lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there
could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof.
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms,
spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon
of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of
the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against
'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly
binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the
courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the
courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any
disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that
it was necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not
permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license.
Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince
lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society,
their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the
administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly
subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics."5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice
Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his
position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and
no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary
and the incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice
Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for
attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to
the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of
the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides over the
court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges
may grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-
restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse conditions are
necessary for the orderly administration of
justice."7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not
unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty.
Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of
justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against
improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice8
is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the
statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore
quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and
wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against
MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He
describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying
bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges
petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not
only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case.
Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling
of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is
made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of
context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They
do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the
pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be
dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession."9 It is
Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is
charged." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702,
708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder made use of
the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a
poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has
never owned a thousand pesos in his own name. Now, here comes a
chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life.
A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would
transform him into a new man. Once in a small nipa shack, now in a
palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of
wealth, protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed."
We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and an affront
to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his
assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. This
Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should
be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt
under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o
control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers,
and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it,
in every manner appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved,
under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the
court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has
committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct
tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty
of contempt.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said
Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may take part. ...
only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..."
However, the provision in its entire thought should be read thus
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. All matters submitted to the
court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be
submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the
Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when
such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether
such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission;
however, only those members present when any matter is submitted
for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if
the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing
filed with the clerk at the date of
submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to
explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted
quotation came about the portion left out was anyway marked by
"XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct
with candor and fairness, and specifically states that "it is not candid
nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is
admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate
deception that is being foisted upon this Court. There was a
qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally
omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the
World Court and/or the United States government. It must be
remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were injected. More specifically, the motion
announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and
corruption of [the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May
12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would invoke "the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the
Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting
to more than fifty million dollars annually ... ."
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that
he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He
knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the
fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has
been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to
have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings
contemptuous in character.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only
for one reason, this Court had really no alternative but to decide the
main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of
July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and
conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly
warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And
We repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had
been submitted without the requisite bond." 13 It would not require the
adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond.,
contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any
consideration.
FERNANDO, J.:
As no return of the writ had been filed on the date set for hearing by
respondent wardens, a resolution of the following tenor was adopted
by this Court: "When this case was called for hearing this morning,
Atty. Salvador N. Beltran appeared for the petitioner while Assistant
Provincial 'Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and Major o Maristela
appeared for the respondents. Thereafter, the Court Resolved (a) to
require Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. to file a
[return] of the writ for the respondent wardens not later than 10:30
a.m. of Wednesday, December 17, 1975; and (b) to [reset] the hearing
of this case on the aforesaid date and time. 9 It should be stated
likewise that Major Edgardo Maristela assured the Court that petitioner
had been release What was declared orally by him was thereafter set
forth in writing in accordance with his return dated December 16,
1975: II That on Sept. 18, 1975, the Office of the Provincial Warden
received a commitment order issued by Judge Reynaldo Honrado,
dated 16 September 1975, ...; IV. That by virtue 6f that commitment
order which the petitioner was sentenced to suffer the penalty of from
four (4) months and one (1) day, he was transferred to Makati
Municipal Jail, on Sept. 18, 1975, to service his prison term thereat
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 29 as said prisoner is classified as
Municipal prisoner; V That the petitioner was brought back and
confined again to the Rizal Provincial Jail on Dec. 3, 1975, by virtue of
Remittance order issued by Judge Pedro Revilla, Executive Judge CFI
Rizal dated Dec. 3, 1975, ...; VI. That on December 12, 1975, the Office
of the Provincial Warden of Rizal received an Order from the Court of
First Instance of Rizal presided by Honorable Judge Reynaldo Honrado,
directing him to release Manuel de Gracia, the petitioner in this case;
VII. That by virtue of odd order ... and the Order of Release, ... the
undersigned respondent released on said date the petitioner as
evidenced by certificate of discharge from prison and that is the reason
why he cannot produce the body of said person before this Honorable
Court; VIII That he was not able to make the return of the writ
immediately on the ground that he was at that time confined in the
hospital, and he was d only on December 13, 1975." 10 There was
likewise a return of the writ on such a date on behalf of respondent
Cresencio T. Pimentel, Municipal Warden of Makati, Rizal. It was therein
declared: "1. That the petitioner was not in his custody when he
received copy of the petition as the petitioner was transferred to 'the
Rizal Provincial Jail on December 3, 1975, as he was going to be
charged with the crime of homicide and 'therefore, his confinement has
to be in the Rizal Provincial Jail and that by virtue of said transfer,
respondent Municipal Warden could not produce the body of the
'petitioner before this- Honorable Court." 11
QUIASON, J.:
According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the
recommendation of Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-
Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to controvert the
charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify
Director Arnaw and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and
bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).
On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents' Comment on
the petition.
It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last
peaceable uncontested status which preceded the present controversy
was the situation obtaining at the time of the filing of the petition at
bar on September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners were then actually
occupying their respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that
petitioners be allowed to perform the duties of their respective
positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they may be
lawfully entitled to, and that respondents and/or any and all persons
acting under their authority desist and refrain from performing any act
in violation of the aforementioned Resolution of September 22, 1992
until further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p. 615
thereof).
The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power
to suspend government officials and employees working in offices
other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of
the administrative complaints filed against said officials and
employees.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that
under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to
the heads of the departments and other agencies the preventive
suspension of officials and employees facing administrative
investigation conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the
preventive suspension himself.
They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function,
and duty to:
The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can
easily mislead, unless one bears in mind that what the Ombudsman
imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but only a preventive
suspension.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power
to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing
administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute.
The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the
requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the
administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to
recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of
erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent
determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman
has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct
such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need
to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes,
among them, the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the
possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The
Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the
persons facing administrative charges should be preventively
suspended.
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers
as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by
the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, particularly its
provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation
that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution.
Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should
be avoided.
In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a
preventive suspension is not a penalty, said:
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which dealt with preventive suspension and
which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any
subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending
an investigation . . . ."
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which
superseded Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code also
authorized the chief of a bureau or office to "suspend any subordinate
officer or employees, in his bureau or under his authority."
Under these circumstances, it can not be said that Director Raul Arnaw
and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted with manifest partiality and
bias in recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be
said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
acting favorably on their recommendation.
The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with
unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy
and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman
and the Secretary of Health can not prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The
Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was filed, with the
Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the acts alleged to constitute
indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to
question the validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of
their clients.