Você está na página 1de 20

See

discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270528215

Post-Divorce Maintenance for Muslim Women


in Pakistan and Bangladesh: A Comparative
Perspective

Article in International Journal of Law Policy and the Family June 2013
DOI: 10.1093/lawfam/ebt004

CITATIONS READS

0 860

1 author:

Ayesha Shahid
Brunel University London
11 PUBLICATIONS 6 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Ayesha Shahid on 08 January 2015.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. All in-text references underlined in blue are added to the original document
and are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately.
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 27(2), (2013), 197215
doi:10.1093/lawfam/ebt004
Advance Access publication 2 May 2013

POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE FOR


MUSLIM WOMEN IN PAKISTAN AND
BANGLADESH: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE
AYESHA SHAHID*
*Law Lecturer, Brunel Law School, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH, UK.

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


ABSTRACT

Islamic family law, more often referred to as Muslim personal law in the South
Asian context, is influenced by formal and informal plural normative orders, as
secular, religious, customary, and patriarchal norms (Menski, 1998; Ali, 2002;
Mehdi, 2005; Shah, 2005).The presence of such plural normative orders has
given rise to tensions and conflict between these norms, including various
publicly stated commitments and goals of the states to promote gender equal-
ity. Islamic family law has thus become a highly contested and politicized issue
making change in this area of law difficult. Post-divorce maintenance (Mataa)
for women is one such area where classical interpretation of Islamic law,
restricting such maintenance to the Iddat only, continues to apply. Engaging
with plural sources of the Islamic legal tradition, this article discusses the po-
tential of employing these to make the case for awarding post-divorce main-
tenance to Muslim women.

INTRODUCTION

Marriage in Islamic law is a civil contract that gives rise to certain rights
and obligations between husband and wife (Coulson, 1964; Esposito,
1982; Pearl and Menski, 1998; Tucker, 2007). In Islamic law it partakes
both the nature of Ibadat, or devotional acts, as well as Muamalaat, or
dealings among men (Rahim, 1972). As Ibadat, marriage is the fulfill-
ment of a moral imperative for leading a good Muslim life, and as
Muamalaat, it is the binding legal contractual nature of marriage that
requires the fulfillment of certain obligations including Nafaqah, or
maintenance, which the husband is bound to provide to his wife and

I am highly indebted to Professor Shaheen Sardar Ali, School of Law, University of Warwick for her
generous comments and thoughtful reflections on this article. I would also like to express my
gratitude to Martin Parry, Law School, University of Hull and Nick Foster, School of Oriental and
African Studies for giving me constructive feedback that has helped in shaping this article. I would
also like to gratefully acknowledge the editorial guidance given by Professor John Eekelaar.
The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions,
please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
198 POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE FOR MUSLIM WOMEN

children during marriage. In case of divorce, a wife is also entitled to


receive maintenance during the Iddat1 period from her husband and
there are provisions in the Quran which make it obligatory for the
husband to provide maintenance to her.2 While there is no dispute
among Islamic scholars regarding the provision of maintenance to
the wife during her Iddat, there is no unanimity of opinion regarding
this beyond the Iddat period in the form of Mataa (Moosa and Karbani,
2010).3
In the Quran the word Mataa has been used in the context of main-
tenance and gift; however, it should not be confused with Nafaqah
(maintenance during marriage) or Mahr (dower), as the three are in-

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


dependent concepts of Islamic law (El-Alami, 1995). The support in
favour of Mataa (post-divorce maintenance) for a divorced wife after
the expiry of Iddat, is based upon Quranic verses 236, 240, 241 in
Chapter II and verse 49 in Chapter 33.4
Central to the debate on Mataa is Verse 241 which states that For
divorced women maintenance (should be provided) on a reasonable
(scale). This is a duty on the righteous. Verse 241 does not set any time
limit for maintenance to divorced women, nor does it lay a specific limit
to the amount of Mataa, mentioning reasonable maintenance only.
In other words, the Quranic legislation lays down a minimum require-
ment, and nowhere in the Quran is there a prohibition on providing
more than the minimum (Esposito and Delong-Bas, 2002). Thus Mataa
is to be given to the wife with kindness and humility.
The application of post-divorce maintenance or Mataa, has been
restricted to the period of Iddat in Pakistan and Bangladesh based on
the classical interpretation of Islamic law. There has been an overall
silence on the subject of extending this right beyond this. Absence of a
public debate by human rights groups, women activists, religious scho-
lars and even at the state level by representatives sitting in legislative
assemblies of the two countries is also noticeable. The aim of this article
is to explore reasons why the issue of post-divorce maintenance is not
raised by the civil society and why it has received scant attention by
womens activism in Pakistan and Bangladesh.5 Why is it that the
ruling elite, the religious scholars as well as the womens rights activists
have failed to engage in any discussion on reforming the law on
post-divorce maintenance? And finally, at a general level of state and
society, why is the discourse of justice, equality, and accountability in
Islamic law not addressed when it comes to women-related issues? I
argue that a strategic reliance on different sources of plural norms
can facilitate the law reform process in relation to the implementation
of Mataa. I further argue that the framework of plural sources of both
formal and informal normative orders can be an important resource for
enhancing the effective implementation of gender equality and for
AYESHA SHAHID 199

providing protection to destitute women. It is this vision of legal plur-


ality that I have attempted to explore in this article.

UNDERSTANDING POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE THROUGH


PLURALITY OF NORMS

Scholars of early legal pluralism have highlighted important ways in


which formal and informal normative orders intersect and interact.
Mauss (1906) formulated the idea that, within a society, there can be

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


many legal systems interacting with each other. Ehrlich (1913)
developed the theory of living law in reaction to the ideology of an
exclusively state-centered law. By providing a descriptive theory of legal
pluralism he argued that peoples behaviour is not necessarily ordered
by the all-encompassing state law but by the inner orderings of associ-
ations which he termed Living law. Pospisil (1978) argued that society
is made up of a collection of subgroups with their own legal systems
which are different from those of other groups. In this way, there are
different legal levels in every society and every subgroup is associated
with that legal system which regulates the conduct of its members.
Merry (1988) suggests that debates concerning legal pluralism are no
longer confined to indigenous law of the colonized but have moved
into discussing the pluralist qualities of law in capitalist societies as well.
Proponents of this form of pluralism have studied the pluralistic quali-
ties of law in capitalist, urban, industrial, and modern societies.6 Among
them, Santos (2002) argues that contemporary societies in todays
world system are legal constellations in which law has become a com-
plex and richer landscape operating in local, national, and global time
spaces and has both a regulatory or repressive and emancipatory po-
tential. The law from each of the three time spaces overlaps with and
interpenetrates law from the other time space. Thus modern societies
are being regulated by plurality of legal orders, which are interrelated.
More recently the early tone of legal pluralism has been criticized for
its lack of moral and political direction, specifically in relation to em-
pirical description of multiplicity of norms that are at work in different
contexts (Banda, 2005; Baxi, 2005). In his analysis of the plurality of
norms, Dupret (2007) emphasizes the practice of law, which has been
ignored by the legal pluralists. By practice of law he refers to the
practicalities, contingencies, background expectations, situational
constraints and orientations of people engaged in legal activities
(Dupret, 2007: 25). Legal pluralism is also criticized for not providing
a normative path for reforming the various systems to allow them to
work together in a better way. Forsyth (2009) proposes a new process by
which any jurisdiction may maximize the chances of coexistence of the
200 POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE FOR MUSLIM WOMEN

various legal systems within it. This new process focuses on combining
pluralist theory and methodology which will assist any jurisdictions
justice system to become one and will also allow the legal systems to
work together in a more supportive and mutually accountable manner.
By drawing upon insights provided by these scholars, I will use the
notion of plurality of norms to assess whether by moving away from
rigid interpretations of Islamic law and engaging with plural norms,
the courts in Pakistan and Bangladesh protect the right of the divorced
Muslim women to receive Mataa.
South Asia has a richly documented ancient experience of complex
systems of plural normative orders, to which centuries of Muslim rule

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


and British colonial domination have added further layers of plurality.
Scholars of South Asian Muslim communities, where more than one
normative order operate, tend to use legal pluralism as a tool for ana-
lysis (Menski, 1990; Mehdi, 1994; Menski, 2001). Along with the formal
norms, multiple and overlapping informal/normative orders are at play
in the form of customary, religious, and cultural norms. Womens lives
are shaped and influenced by these formal and informal plural norma-
tive orders, despite the availability of formal court system informal dis-
pute resolution institutions in the form of jirgahs, panchayat, salishdars,
lok adalats, operate to implement these normative orders.7
In the context of Pakistan and Bangladesh, the plurality of norms is
visible at the formal state level in the form of legal protections for
equality and non-discrimination. At an informal level, plurality is re-
flected in the varying interpretations of the religious text, as well as in
patriarchal norms and structures. Constitutional commitments are
made for achieving gender equality, eliminating discrimination against
women and for providing protection to women and children. The
Constitution of Pakistan provides that All Citizens are equal before
law and are entitled to equal protection of law. Article 25 provides
that There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone.
Clause 3 of Article 25 provides that Nothing in this article shall prevent
the state from making any special provision for the protection of
women and children. Article 35 ensures that the state shall take
every measure to protect the marriage, family, mother, and child.
Under Article 37(d), the state shall ensure inexpensive and expeditious
justice; thus the fundamental rights and principles of policy clearly
empower the state to protect women, children, and family. The
Constitution of Bangladesh includes specific equality provisions similar
to those in the Pakistan Constitution.
At the same time in this age of globalization there is more reliance on
international human rights norms emanating from multiple plural
sources of international treaties, conventions, and covenants
(Sheppard, 2010). By ratifying international human rights documents,
states undertake the obligation to bring their laws into line with
AYESHA SHAHID 201

international human rights standards. References to these interna-


tional norms are found at the domestic/national level in the judge-
ments given by the courts. These norms have also become a
legitimate basis for demanding gender equality by civil society organ-
izations and community-based groups. However, in the words of Ali
(2006: 2), constitutional documents, legislative enactments and
human rights treaty regimes present a fractured reality and fragile
framework for womens human rights. Despite such provisions at the
state level, formal law is used to marginalize disadvantaged groups and
reinforces certain social injustices. In the realm of womens rights, cer-
tain laws discriminate against women and the legal system itself be-

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


comes an obstacle when change is required in legal rules,
procedures, and institutions to remove inequality. These commitments
have become mere rhetoric and in reality have failed to protect women.
There are injustices intertwined within the legal and judicial systems
making it difficult to achieve gender equality. This suggests that the
modern state law, based on Islamic and local cultural values, does not
achieve what a plain reading of the statute would seem to suggest
(Menski, 1996: 10). Polygamy, for instance, is restricted under section
6 of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance 1961. The husband has to seek
the permission of the wife and if he enters into another polygamous
marriage without seeking the permission, he is liable to punishment
in the form of fines and imprisonment. However, in reality a number
of court cases have shown that husbands are not put to rigorous tests
over the issue of permission of an existing wife or wives (Menski, 1996:
10). One can thus argue that there is a wide gap between rhetoric and
reality and achieving gender equality and non-discrimination is a dis-
tant goal.
Plurality is also reflected in the various judgements given by courts
dealing with family law matters. On the one hand, in matters relating to
divorce, custody of children and payment of dower, the courts have
taken a broader perspective by considering the ethical, moral, and uni-
versal principles of Islamic law. By doing so, the courts have avoided the
literal interpretation of the Quranic text and have deviated from the
strict/classical interpretation of Islamic law.8 However, when it comes
to the issue of post-divorce maintenance, the response of the judges has
not been very sympathetic towards women. There is a silence on the
part of the states legislative assemblies, and the judges have refused to
extend the principle of Mataa beyond the expiry of the Iddat. This
raises a number of questions regarding the courts response to the
issue of post-divorce maintenance. Is the reluctance to award
post-divorce maintenance because of the long-term financial implica-
tions for the husband? Is it because of the fact that, if made part of the
law, the husband would be bound to provide the former wife mainten-
ance until her death or her remarriage to another man? Is there a fear
202 POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE FOR MUSLIM WOMEN

of losing control over women or a threat to patriarchal norms of male


domination and control? Finally, is the response of the judiciary a
restatement and reinforcement of the patriarchal structure of a society
where male domination and protection of mens interests are still a
norm?
Plurality of understandings becomes more evident in the form of
divergent opinions of Islamic scholars on post-divorce maintenance.
Despite Quranic verses on the subject, varying interpretations have
been given by scholars from the four schools of thought. Hanafi
scholars have adopted a stricter approach, recognizing payment of
Mataa as mandatory only in those marriages where dower (Mahr) is

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


not fixed at the time of Nikah (marriage) and where a woman is
divorced before the marriage is consummated.9 Hanafi scholars
argue that post-divorce financial support is mandatory only in this situ-
ation because it is a substitute for a womans right to 50 per cent of the
dower (Mahr). The Hanafi scholars do not, however, consider verse 241
which refers to giving reasonable maintenance to the wife. The Hanbali
school also adopted a similar position and refused to recognize
post-divorce maintenance beyond Iddat. Compared to Hanafi and
Hanbali scholars, the Shaafi school has adopted a more balanced
view, considering that any divorced woman who is not responsible for
the divorce is entitled to post-divorce support. Shaafi provided a list of
those who are eligible for post-divorce maintenance.10 The position
adopted by the Shaafi and Maliki scholars is liberal and flexible com-
pared to the strict approach followed by the other two schools of
thought. One possible reason for this could be that Islamic law was
developed as a discourse and discussion between the founders of the
schools. There were no hard and fast statutory rules and a case by case
approach was taken by the early jurists to resolve disputes. The positions
taken by the early scholars were to construct fair and just decisions. The
followers of these schools of thought later adopted stricter positions
and ignored the egalitarian message of the Quran. In Pakistan and
Bangladesh, the Hanafi school is predominant and this may be the
reason for the absence of debate on the subject in these two countries.
This suggests that general verses are overlooked to accommodate patri-
archal values and to support male interests. These scholars in the
second and third centuries of the Islamic calendar were heavily influ-
enced by the socio-economic, political, and indigenous tribal values of
the prevailing times, and who frequently adopted a male-centric
approach (Rehman, 2007). As a result, the original egalitarian text
which referred to providing reasonable maintenance was ignored
and reinterpreted under the patriarchal influences within different
cultural and historical contexts, particularly during the Umayyad and
Abbasid Caliphates (Mernissi, 1991). To please the ruling elite, male
jurists misread the verse that extended this inalienable right to women.
AYESHA SHAHID 203

As a result, the egalitarianism once associated with the Quran lost its
revolutionary voice (Coulson, 1964).
In the context of South Asia, Al-Hidayah (11521197) and Fatawa-i-
Alamgiri (1890), the two authoritative texts based on the Hanafi school,
state that maintenance to the wife should be determined only on the
basis of the husbands social and financial circumstances. The two texts
do not allow the payment of maintenance after the Iddat.
Compared to South Asian Muslim scholars, scholars from the Middle
East have challenged these centuries old and narrow interpretations.
They have interpreted verses dealing with post-divorce maintenance
more liberally. Abu al Fidaa Ismail-ibn-Kathir is of the view that

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


Mataa should be paid in accordance with the husbands means, so as
to compensate the divorced woman for what she lost because of the
divorce (Kathir, 2000). Imam al-Fakhr al-Razy, considered Mataa to be
mandatory Fakhral-Razy (1927) and Al Tabari (1987) strongly advo-
cated a divorced womans right to post-divorce maintenance. After care-
fully deliberating upon the views of various Islamic scholars, he drew the
conclusion that payment of Mataa to a divorced woman is an obligation
on the husband by virtue of the Quranic verse 2: 240. He went as far as
saying that the husband is liable to pay Mataa just as he is liable to pay to
the wife her due dower, and he will never be exonerated from such an
obligation until he pays her or her proxies or heirs. In his view Mataa is
like other debts that are due to the wife, and the husband is subject to
incarceration and his property can be sold if he does not pay his
divorced wife her post-divorce due or Mataa (Al Tabari, 1987).
Shaikh Rashid Rida (1981) also endorsed the eligibility and the right
of divorced women to be paid post-divorce support as a mandatory duty
on the divorcing husband. Later Fazlur Rahman (1983) emphasized
that reform would be possible only if scholars could return to the
moral guidelines given in the Quran. A number of early 20th century
scholars like Al Tahir al Hadadd, Mahmud Shaltut, and Mohammad
al-Ghazali have also advocated legal reform and stressed the importance
of methodology that the independent jurist might employ to improve
the status of women (Tucker, 2008).
It is interesting to note that post-divorce maintenance has been
included within the family law of countries like Iran, Qatar, Egypt,
Malaysia, and Morocco. In Qatar, post-divorce maintenance can be
awarded to women for 3 years (Section 115 of the Family Reform
Code 2005). In Iran, the concept of Ujrat Ul Misl is equivalent to
post-divorce maintenance under which the husband is bound to pay
to the wife compensation for 3 years if she is not at fault and not re-
sponsible for divorce (Article 11301133 of the Civil Code). The object-
ive of such legislation is on the one hand to deter the husband from
arbitrarily pronouncing a unilateral divorce and on the other to com-
pensate the wife for the injury she has sustained and increasing the
204 POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE FOR MUSLIM WOMEN

financial obligations on the husband to his divorcee wife beyond the


payment of dower and maintenance during Iddat (Welchman, 2004) It
is therefore argued that these examples show that Mataa can also be
given to women in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

CONTEXTUALIZING PLURALITY OF NORMS: AN OVERVIEW OF


THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS OF
PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


Pakistan gained independence from British colonial rule in
1947. Pakistan was created as a state for Muslims of the Indian subcon-
tinent and it constituted of two parts, West Pakistan and East Pakistan.
As a result of ethnic diversity of Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan and
Bengali East Pakistan, political differences and numerous other
complications as regards to the sharing and distribution of political
power arose between the two wings. This led to the secession of the
East wing of Pakistan (now Bangladesh) that gained independent
status as a new nation state with a large Muslim majority on 26 March
1971.
The people of these two countries share the same cultural values,
having lived together for centuries in the past. The principles of
gender equality, non-discrimination, and equal protection before the
law are enshrined in both Constitutions. The two countries have also
signed and ratified international treaties for the protection of women
and have enacted particular laws and policies to accommodate Islamic
law alongside other secular laws.11 To maintain its Islamic identity soon
after independence the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan passed
the Objectives Resolution.12 It was reiterated in the Resolution that
sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Almighty God alone
and efforts shall be made to enable Muslims to order their lives in
accord with the teaching and requirements of Islam.
Pakistan was declared an Islamic Republic under the 1956
Constitution. Article 198 of the Constitution provided that the legisla-
ture would bring all laws into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam.
It also prohibited the enactment of any law repugnant to Islam. As
compared to the 1956 Constitution, any reference to the Injunctions
of Islam in the 1962 Constitution was initially excluded. However, fol-
lowing protests from the National Assembly, the Islamic provisions of
the 1956 Constitution were reinserted and the word Islamic was also
reinserted into the official name of the State. The 1973 Constitution of
Pakistan, in its preamble also reiterated the same principle that all laws
have to be in conformity with the Quran and Sunnah. Islam was officially
declared as the state religion in the 1973 Constitution.
AYESHA SHAHID 205

Bangladeshs original constitution of 1972 was secular, but secular-


ism, enshrined in Article 12, was dropped in 1977 in favour of Islam.
The preamble of the Bangladesh Constitution states the high ideals of
absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah and article 2A declares Islam
as the state religion of the republic.
The two countries inherited the same legislative framework from
British Colonial India. All personal laws enforced in pre-partitioned
India are still valid and operative in Bangladesh and Pakistan, such as
the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1929, the Child Marriage
Restraint Act 1929, and the Shariat Application Act 1937. In the first
14 years of Pakistans history no reforms were made in family law. The

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


first attempt in this direction was made by the Punjab Legislative
Assembly, which passed a reform in the Shariat Application Act of
1937. The New West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)
Application Act (ix of 1948) enlarged the scope of personal law to
questions relating to succession, including succession to agricultural
land (whereas the previous Act applied only to intestate succession).
However, these changes were not welcomed in all parts of the country as
men were still not willing to give women their share in property. As a
result, to deprive women of their inheritance rights, amendments were
made to the same Act in the Province of Sindh and the following words
were deleted from section 2 of the Shariat Application Act save ques-
tions relating to agricultural land and other than charitable institutions
and charitable and religious endowments (The Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat) Application (Sindh Amendment) Act, 1950).
In Pakistan, on the recommendations of the Commission on
Marriage and Family Laws, the government enacted the Muslim
Family Laws Ordinance 1961 (hereafter referred to as MFLO 1961).
This Ordinance made registration of marriages and divorces manda-
tory, reformed the principles relating to payment of dower and main-
tenance to wives, prohibited polygamy, and ensured the inheritance
rights of orphaned grandchildren of deceased persons in their estates.
The courts in these two countries have played an important role in
interpreting and applying Muslim Personal law. Through judicial activ-
ism, judges have attempted to meet the challenges of social justice by
allowing the law to be interpreted liberally, instead of following the
views of classical ninth century jurists. In Mst Khurshid Bibi vs Mohd
Amin,13 the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the judges have com-
petence to reinterpret Islamic law in light of present day situations and
that they could depart from the ancient jurists, if the opinions of the
jurists conflict with the Quran and the Sunnah, and that such opinions
are not binding on the courts.14
The judiciary in Bangladesh is developing Islamic family law jurispru-
dence that is increasingly informed by social realities as well as by the
predicaments of under privileged and marginalized sections of the
206 POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE FOR MUSLIM WOMEN

Muslim community (Haque and Khan, 2007). A number of cases


decided by the courts reflect a liberal interpretation of the Shariah in
matters relating to divorce, child custody, and maintenance of wives
and children.15 In Hasina Ahmad v Syed Abul Fazl,16 the court ruled
that the wife could obtain a Khula divorce without the consent of the
husband. The court emphasized that Muslim law should be adapted
according to the needs of a changing society and is beneficial for the
society as a whole. However, due to protests from religious and conser-
vative groups, the ruling governments blocked the reform process. As a
result, some areas of family law continue to be disadvantageous to
women and leave them in a vulnerable position.

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


In the following sections, decisions of courts on the issue
of post-divorce maintenance are examined. These decisions
exemplify that the courts are willing to use Islamic law only to a
certain limit, stopping short of engaging with evolving the concept of
Mataa.

1. POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE IN PAKISTAN


After the passage of the MFLO 1961, a number of cases were reported in
which the wives were given past maintenance as well as maintenance for
the period of Iddat under section 9 of the MFLO.17 However, the courts
refused to award maintenance to wives after the Iddat. The main prob-
lem with section 9 is its silence on the subject of post-divorce mainten-
ance. In the absence of any legal provision on post-divorce
maintenance, women are left with no financial support after the com-
pletion of Iddat. The courts have refused to consider awarding Mataa to
the extent that in Inamul Ahsan v Hussien Bano18 and later in Saadia
Begum v Jangreez19 the court stated that maintenance beyond the period
of Iddat is illegal and without lawful authority.20 While a consistent
sympathetic approach has been followed by the superior judiciary in
Pakistan towards women in other family law matters, but in post-divorce
maintenance cases, the courts have refrained from making any radical
reform to the existing provisions.
Moreover, the poor socio-economic position of the wife has not been
considered by the courts in such cases. Their response suggests that in
the absence of any legislative provision for post-divorce maintenance,
the courts in Pakistan are restricted to the payment of maintenance
only for the period of Iddat and for the arrears of maintenance, if the
wife was not given any maintenance during marriage.
The issue of giving Mataa to the wife came under scrutiny in 1955,
when the Commission on Marriage and Family Laws21 in its Report on
Marriage and Family Laws, made recommendations regarding the
plight of women who are arbitrarily divorced and rendered destitute.
The Commission recommended that the wife should have the right to
AYESHA SHAHID 207

sue her husband for maintenance and that the order of the court
should be executable in a summary manner as arrears of land revenue.
It also recommended that a wife could claim past maintenance for at
least 3 years before the institution of the suit for maintenance. On the
issue of post-divorce maintenance, the question put to the Commission
was:
Should it be open to a Matrimonial and Family Laws Court, when approached
to lay down that a husband shall pay maintenance to the divorced wife for life
or till her remarriage? (Report of the Commission, 1956: 121920)
The Commission recommended that in such cases the Matrimonial

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


Courts should have jurisdiction to order a husband to pay maintenance
to his divorced wife for the rest of her life, or till she remarried. The
Commission stated that . . . a large number of middle aged women who
are being divorced without rhyme and reason should not be thrown on
the streets without a roof over their heads and without any means of
sustaining themselves and their children (Report of the Commission,
1956: 1215). The Commission emphasized the importance of reinter-
preting Islamic law as no progressive legislation is possible if Muslim
assemblies remain only interpreters and blind adherents of ancient
schools of law (Report of the Commission, 1956: 1231). However,
the recommendation of the Commission was opposed by one of its
members who considered that payment of post-divorce maintenance
to the divorced wife was a deprivation of the existing or present wifes
rights and her due share. He said: The grant of maintenance to the
divorced wife would not only mean monetary injustice to the present
wife but also lead to the moral degeneration of the beneficiary. The aid
from a man who has lived as a husband for a long time would mean a
standing threat to the chastity of the divorced woman . . . The members
of the Commission look only to the monetary aid while Islam aims
above all at safeguarding the chastity of the divorced woman.
Moreover, the continued payment of maintenance to the divorced
wife would keep the mind of the present wife constantly vexed with
suspicion. The proposal thus is ill advised and harmful (Report of
the Commission, 1956: 1235). The recommendation was also criticized
by Maulana Maududi, a renowned religious scholar who considered
post-divorce maintenance to be an undue burden on the husband. In
Maulanas words: It seems quite unreasonable that a person who has
divorced his wife and is no more entitled to have any rights over her
should be compelled to bear the burden of her expenses for the whole
of her life or till her re-marriage (Report of the Commission, 1956:
1240). The views expressed by these religious scholars demonstrate
their efforts at protecting former husbands from any further financial
obligation by using the chastity argument and showing concern for the
new wife. As a result, the recommendation of the Commission on
208 POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE FOR MUSLIM WOMEN

post-divorce maintenance was not incorporated in the Muslim Family


Law Ordinance 1961.
The matter was taken up by the Pakistan Law and Justice Commission
in 1998.22 The Commission held that Mataa has been referred to as a
parting gift, consolatory gift, or indemnity by various translators and
scholars of Islamic law. The Commission also noted that the provisions
of Mataa are in force in other Muslim countries where it is to be paid in
addition to the payment of dower and maintenance during the Iddat.
Members of the Commission also expressed the view that the Quranic
revelations are neither time or space limited but universal and eternal
so that there is always a need for law reform (Amendment in Section 9

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 and Schedule of the Family
Courts Act 1964 (Report No. 77: 113).
In 2009 the Commission again discussed in detail a Working Paper
Post-Divorce Mataa for a Wife (Law and Justice Commission, 2009:
520). The Attorney-General observed that Pakistan is being criticized
all over the world for violations of human rights and supported the
recommendations made in the working paper by contending that it
will raise the image of the country in the world community. The
Commission also proposed to include a column in the marriage con-
tract (Nikahnama) and an amount may be fixed as Mataa to protect
women after divorce. It proposed that no time limit or period may be
specified for Mataa, and an interim Mataa may also be awarded. It is
worth noting that when the Commission sought the opinion of the
Council of Islamic Ideology on the issue, the Council laid the respon-
sibility of awarding post-divorce maintenance on the Aulia (male rela-
tives of the wife), and in their absence, on the state. The Council of
Islamic Ideology refused to accept the payment of Mataa after the
expiry of Iddat. By doing so it absolved the husband from any such
obligation towards the former wife. Instead, it proposed a draft legisla-
tive bill for providing Nafaqaa or support to destitute family members
including mentally or physically disabled. This bill did not specifically
mention divorced women who have no support available after the Iddat.
Despite the contrary views expressed by the Council of Islamic Ideology,
the Commission submitted its own draft bill, the Muslim Family Law
(Amendment) Bill 2009 which has a clause on post-divorce mainten-
ance. This draft bill is a positive initiative but no progress has yet been
made as no law has been passed by the Parliament.
In the past decade the divorce rate has been on the rise in Pakistan.23
Significantly, after 2002 when the Muslim Family Courts Amendment
Ordinance came into force, female initiated divorce rose by almost 50
per cent.24 One possible reason for not introducing post-divorce pro-
vision in law could be that making post-divorce maintenance provision
might encourage divorce or at the very least reduce economic uncer-
tainty for women associated with divorce. Despite the rise in the divorce
AYESHA SHAHID 209

rates, there are also women who do not want divorce and continue to
live in abusive and failed marriages.25 In 2010 out of 8,000 reported
cases of domestic violence 4,545 involved married women.26 One of the
main reasons why women continue living in such violent relationships is
their weak financial position. They are aware of the fact that if divorced,
they have no prospects of receiving post-divorce maintenance. Judges,
legislators, and scholars have failed to consider that very few women
have independent means of income or financial assets to support them-
selves. Besides, women are denied the right to inherit. Due to the cus-
tomary practice of giving inheritance rights to male heirs only, women
are not given their share in ancestral property (Ali, 2006; Mehdi, 2007).

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


In such situations, women who do not have any source of income are
left in a precarious situation. One may argue that as more women are
entering into formal and informal employment sectors they are not
financially dependent on their husbands and do not need post-divorce
maintenance. However, the reality is that the number of women in the
formal and informal employment sector is low. Women workers in
formal sectors stand at 13.45 per cent, occupying less than a quarter
of 1 per cent in the combined categories of legislators, senior officials,
managers, one half of 1 per cent as technicians and associate profes-
sionals and 0.83 per cent of professionals. Female participation in the
labour market is 21.7 per cent compared to 84.9 per cent for men
(Inquiry Report on the Status of Women Employment in Public
Sector Organizations, by National Commission on the Status of
Women Government of Pakistan: 6). Pervasive patriarchal attitudes
and deep-rooted traditional and cultural stereotypes regarding the
roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family, in the work-
place and in society constitute serious obstacles and as a result women
do not have full control over their earnings and when the marriage
breaks down, all property and accumulated assets go to the husband
(Shadow Country Report Discrimination lingers on . . . A Report on
The Compliance of CEDAW In Pakistan, submitted by Democratic
Commission for Human Development and National Commission for
Justice and Peace, 2007: 46).
In Pakistan, unlike western welfare states, there is no social security
system to support women who are unable to support themselves finan-
cially. The reality is that 62 per cent of the population is living below the
poverty line and earn less than $2 a day (Pakistan Social And Living
Standard Measurement Survey 201011, Government of Pakistan,
Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad). Pakistans
Gender Development Index (GDI) value, 0.525 reflects gender-based
inequalities in education, empowerment, and economic activity. Only
23.5 per cent of adult women have reached a secondary or higher level
of education (2011 UN Human Development Report Index). These
statistics clearly indicate womens weak financial position and
210 POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE FOR MUSLIM WOMEN

vulnerability. Besides the joint family system is diminishing and trad-


itional family support is no longer available to divorced women
(Pakistans Fourth Periodic Country Report to CEDAW Committee
CEDAW/C/PAK/4:5). In the absence of such safety networks and
lack of a state welfare system, it would be unfair to deprive women of
their right to seek post-divorce maintenance. One can thus argue that
Mataa in such cases is a safety net where women have no means to
support themselves.

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE IN
BANGLADESH

As in Pakistan, the majority of Muslims in Bangladesh are followers of


the Hanafi school. The issue of post-divorce maintenance was raised in
Hafiz-ur-Rehman vs Shamun Nehar Begum.27 The Division Bench of the
High Court considered the question whether a divorced wife could
claim maintenance beyond the Iddat. The two presiding judges,28
after establishing their jurisdiction to interpret the Quran, stated that
maintenance is applicable not only during Iddat, but also for the rest of
divorced womans life or remarriage. They emphasized that the ruling
was in accordance with the will of Allah, as expressed in the Quran, and
as such, should be understandable to the public. The Court further
held that a person divorcing his wife is bound to maintain her for an
indefinite period, that is to so say, till she loses the status of a divorcee by
marrying another person.29 This decision created some hope that
Muslim law in South Asia was capable of reforms by reference to the
Quran itself. It was an example of judicial activism and was considered
as a landmark and an enlightened judgement (Sirajuddin, 2011).
However, Islamic conservative groups criticized this decision and
blamed those who supported it as anti-Islamic and propagating western
agendas. They were of the view that the judgement was delivered in a
rush without seeking any legal advice or opinion of religious scholars on
a very sensitive matter.
As a consequence of such criticism, the decision of the High Court
was overruled by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
Bangladesh in Hafiz ur Rehman v Shamsus Nihar Begum.30 The issue
before the Appellate Division was to decide whether the High
Courts interpretation of and decision to follow the aforesaid verse of
the Quran to maintain his ex-wife on a reasonable scale beyond the
period of Iddat, for an indefinite period, unless she remarries another
person, was supportable or otherwise, on merit as well as (purely) in
terms of the facts and circumstances of the case. The Appellate Court
relied on the commentaries of Hanafi law, particularly the Hedaya and
AYESHA SHAHID 211

Fatawa-i-Alamgiri and the judges held that the word Mataa, as used in
the Quranic Verse 2:241, was never understood as regular maintenance.
Rather, it was deemed to be a parting gift to a divorced woman. It was a
gesture of comfort for the trauma she had suffered on account of the
divorce. Justice Mustafa Kamal further held that on the basis of section
2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, no
change could be made to Muslim Personal law, and the husband was
liable to pay maintenance only during the Iddat.31 He further stated
that the provision of the 1937 Act is supported by Article 8 (1A) of the
Constitution, which says that, [t]he principles of absolute trust and

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


faith in the Almighty Allah . . . shall be the basis of all actions.
By suggesting that there is no room for change in the Quranic text,
the courts narrow interpretation of Islamic law reflects patriarchal
norms and male domination. The court has failed to support an inter-
pretation of the Quran that addresses womens needs and did not fore-
see the situation where many women live by themselves and do not have
a legal guardian. Such views also raise doubts insofar as they contradict
other provisions of the Quran which insist upon treating women and
children with kindness and compassion. It is clear from all the Quranic
verses on maintenance that the attitude of the Quran towards divorced
women is one of compassion and concern. Judges should therefore
emphasize the egalitarian principles of the Quran as they apply to
those who are destitute and in impecunious circumstances. Although
the Court accepted Mataa as a compensatory or consolatory gift to the
wife, it appears that the judges in the Appellate Division missed an
historic opportunity to take judicial action on post-divorce mainten-
ance as other countries did through legislation (Sirajuddin, 2011).

CONCLUSION

The multiplicity of views of Islamic scholars reflects how Islamic norms


vary within and among countries and different schools of
juristic thought. It is also indicative of the interpretative plurality
evident in most aspects of Islamic law. In identifying what is Islamic
it is necessary to make a distinction between the primary sources of
Islam and legal opinions of scholars on specific issues, which may vary
and be influenced by their times, circumstances, and cultures. Such
opinions and verdicts do not enjoy the infallibility accorded to the pri-
mary and revelatory sources and can therefore be subject to reform and
change.
In both Pakistan and Bangladesh, the patriarchal ordering at the
state, judicial and societal levels exacerbates this situation. In the
words of Ali (2003: 10), patriarchy has silenced the more egalitarian
212 POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE FOR MUSLIM WOMEN

aspects of Islam, by adopting a literalist, as opposed to a progressive


interpretation of sources of Islam. In the case of post-divorce
maintenance, men have absolved themselves from the responsibil-
ity of paying Mataa to the ex-wife. It is therefore pertinent to maintain
a clear distinction between the normative teachings of Islam
and the male dominated patriarchal norms prevalent in Muslim
societies.
Finally, it is submitted that as the two countries share the same con-
stitutional and legislative history and socio-cultural backgrounds with
India, the judiciary in Pakistan and Bangladesh can learn from the
experiences of the courts in India. The Supreme Court of India in

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


Shah Bano v Mohd Ahmad Khan32 and Daniyal Latifi v Union of India33
took upon itself to interpret the Quranic verses by reviewing a range of
Islamic sources of law as well as Constitutional Provisions of the Indian
Constitution. In doing so it drew on the egalitarian ethics of Islam to
ensure that Muslim women are protected from falling into destitution
(Mullally, 2004). By assessing the provisions of the Muslim Women
Protection of Divorce Act 1986 Act vis-a-vis constitutional mandates, a
definitive interpretation of the vague clauses of the Act was provided,
that created room for providing post-divorce maintenance on the basis
of fair and reasonable provision. These judgements clearly suggest
how judges in India have skillfully paved a way forward to provide
post-divorce maintenance to Muslim women without abolishing the
Muslim personal law system. In the light of Indian judgements, the
judiciary and legislative bodies in Pakistan and Bangladesh can take
steps to provide legal protection to divorced women. To achieve this
end, an appreciation of the interaction between plural of norms will
help in promoting the concept of Mataa. By drawing upon the sources
of plural norms which include the Quranic text, constitutional protec-
tions and international human rights standards, the judges can make
provision for awarding post-divorce maintenance to Muslim women in
Pakistan and Bangladesh.

NOTES
1
A waiting period, observed by a woman after the death of her spouse or after a divorce. During
this period she cannot remarry. The waiting period is 3 months after a divorce and 4 months and
10 days after the death of a spouse. The Iddat of a pregnant woman is up to the time of delivery,
irrespective of the fact whether the marriage was ended by divorce or death of the husband. The
primary object of Iddat is to find out if the woman is pregnant so that the paternity of the child can
be ascertained.
2
The Quran 65:6.
3
Post-divorce maintenance beyond Iddat is also referred as Mutat-al-Talaq or Nafaqat-al-Muta, ie
a payment by the former husband to his ex-wife after the expiry of the Iddat period. The word
Mataa has been used in the Quran at least in 14 places. As there is no standard method of
transliteration from Arabic to English, there are numerous ways to spell certain key words. For
consistency, in this article the word is herein spelt as Mataa.
AYESHA SHAHID 213
4
Verse 236 refers to a suitable gift according to the means of the husband to the wife at the time
of divorce. Verse 240 deals with the provision of maintenance for widows, and requires Muslim
men to make a bequest for 1 years maintenance and residence for the wife after their death. Verse
240 states that maintenance can be provided for up to 1 year, if the marriage has ended not because
of any fault on part of the wife. Whereas verse 49 states that if a marriage ends before consumma-
tion, men should make provision for women and release them in an honourable manner.
5
For the purpose of this article, I looked into the aannual reports of two major organizations,
the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and Aurat Foundation and post-divorce maintenance
has not been addressed in their reports.
6
Some of the literature on this new form of legal pluralism includes; Green House, C. and
Strijbosch, F. (1998) Legal pluralism in industrialized societies, Journal of Legal Pluralism 33, 19.
7
Jirgahs, Panchayats, and Salish are informal alternate dispute resolution forums established at
the community level. Usually the head of the tribe or community or any other respectable male
member sits as the leader of the forum and decides matters along with other male members of the

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


forum according to the customs and cultural norms of the community.
8
The general trend of the courts has been favourable to women in matters relating to the
dissolution of marriage and payment/repayment of dower. The judiciary in Pakistan has taken
a positive and liberal approach in interpreting Islamic principles related to these issues. The
courts, for instance, have refused to accept the husbands plea for the recovery of dower in
cases of Khula. Similarly, in cases where the husband in return has filed a case for the restitution
of conjugal rights, the husbands demand was not allowed by the Courts in view of his behaviour,
and the mistreatment of his wife.
9
A sum payable by the husband to the wife at the time of marriage. It may either be prompt or
deferred dower. It is a womans unconditional and unrestricted right to receive Mahr from her
husband and has been guaranteed in Quranic verses 33:50, 2:237, 4:4 and 4:20.
10
The list included a woman divorced without any fault on her part; the divorce occurred before
fixing her Mahr and before the consummation of marriage; divorce due to the husbands impo-
tence, bad attitude, physical and mental cruelty and desertion; the husbands failure to secure the
necessary maintenance for her and if divorced due to llah (that is chronic sickness) or zihar (an
ancient Arab custom, where the husband fore swears any marital relations with his wife, declaring
her to be like the back of his mother).
11
Pakistan and Bangladesh are parties to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, International Convention on the Rights of the Child and
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
12
The Constituent Assembly in March 1949, passed The Objectives Resolution. It subse-
quently became the Preamble to Pakistans three successive constitutions (1956, 1962, and 1973).
Under General Zia-ul-Haq military rule in the 1980s, Presidential Order No. 14 of 1985 turned the
Objectives Resolution into a substantive provision of the 1973 Constitution, now found in
Article 2A.
13
PLD (1967), SC 97.
14
At 99.
15
See Kausar Chaudary v Latifa Sultana 54 DLR (2002) 175; Gul Nawaz Khan v Mahrunnesa Begum
17 DLR (1965) 199, Hasina Ahmedv SyedAbul fazl 32 DLR (1980) 294 in which Dhaka High court
departed from classical interpretation of Islamic law.
16
(1980) 32 DLR (HCD) 294.
17
Under section 9 of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 a wife is entitled to claim mainten-
ance for the period of Iddat and past maintenance (ie for the period during the subsistence of
marriage when wife was not maintained).18The period for filing of a suit for maintenance is 6 years
under Section 120 Limitation Act, 1908.
18
PLD (1976) Lah 1466.
19
(2004) Vol. LVI, Pesh 213.
20
At 215.
21
Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, 20 June 1956.
22
It discussed in detail the draft proposal submitted by the Commissions secretariat in 1994.
23
According to the statistical survey by the Federal Bureau of Statistics POPULATION BY AGE,
SEX, MARITAL STATUS AND URBAN RURAL RESIDENCE Table, the total number of female
divorcees in 2007 in both rural and urban areas was 131,865. In rural areas the female divorcees
were 90,562, in urban areas 41,303. Total divorcees aged 60 years and above 7,143, between the age
of 5054 years 8,106, between the age of 5559 years 5,004. In all, 2,358 were divorced between the
214 POST-DIVORCE MAINTENANCE FOR MUSLIM WOMEN
age of 1419 years. For further details visit http://www.statpak.gov.pk/fbs/sites/default/files/
population_satistics/publications/pds2007/tables/t02.pdf.
24
Ibid.
25
JanuaryDecember 2010 Annual Report: Violence against Women in Pakistan: A Qualitative
Review of Statistics for 2010 Aurat Foundation.
26
Ibid, p. 26.
27
47 DLR (1995) 54.
28
Justice Mohammad Golam Rabbani and Justice Syed Aminul Haque.
29
p. 56.
30
4 MLRAD (1999) 41.
31
2. Application of Personal Law to Muslims.- Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the
contrary, in all questions (save questions relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate succes-
sion, special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under con-
tract or gift or any other provision of Personal Law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


Talaq, Ila, Zihar, Lian, Khula and Mubaraat, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and
trust properties, and wakfs (other than charities and charitable institutions and charitable and
religious endowments) the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).
32
AIR 1985 SC 94. The controversy over post-divorce maintenance began in India after the
Indian Supreme Courts judgement in the much celebrated Shah Bano case. In this case, the court
held that divorced Muslim women have the right to maintenance even after the Iddat is over and
that there is no conflict between classical Hanafi requirement of maintaining divorced wife during
Iddat and obligation of maintaining former wife unable to support herself so long as she remains a
divorcee.
33
2007 SC 740. In Daniyal Latifi case, the Supreme Court of India upheld the validity of the
Muslim Women Protection of Divorce Act 1986 stating that its provisions do not offend Article 14,
15, and 21 of the Constitution. It further held that the duty to secure social justice was universally
recognized by all religions and vagrancy and destitution were societal problems that need to be
resolved within a basic human rights framework. The decision in Daniyal Latifi has affirmed the
judgment in Shah Bano as well as in other decisions given by the various High courts in India that
confirm awarding post-divorce maintenance to Muslim women such as Ali v Sufaira 1988 (3)
Crimes 147.

REFERENCES
Ali, S. S. (2002). Testing the Limits of Family Law Reform in Pakistan: A Critical Analysis
of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 in A. Bainham (ed), International Survey of Family
Law, Bristol: Jordans, 335.
Ali, S. S. (2006). Conceptualizing Islamic Law, CEDAW and Womens Human Rights in Plural Legal
Settings: A Comparative Analysis of Applications of CEDAW in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, New
Delhi: UNIFEM, 26.
Al-Razi. (1981). AlTafsir AlFakhr Al Razi (Tafsir Kabir), Lebanon: Maktuba Uloom ul Islamia, 11,
6556.
Al Tabari. (1987). The Commentary on the Quran, USA: Oxford University Press, 1 (abridged
edition), 546.
Banda, F. (2005). Women, Law and Human Rights: An African Perspective, Oxford: Hart Publishers.
Baxi, U. (2005). Legal Pluralism in India, Indian Socio-Legal Journal 13, 14.
Coulson, N. J. (1964). A History of Islamic Law, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Democratic Commission for Human Development and National Commission for Justice and
Peace. (2007). Shadow Country Report Discrimination lingers on . . . A Report on The Compliance
of CEDAW In Pakistan, 46.
Dupret, B. (2007). Legal Pluralism, Plurality of Law and Legal Practices: Theories, Critique and
Praxialogical re-specification, European Journal of Legal Studies 1, 6.
Ehrlich, E. (1913, 2001). Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, transl. W. Moll, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 24.
El-Alami, D. (1995). Mutat al-Talaq under Egyptian and Jordanian Law, Yearbook of Islamic and
Middle Eastern Law, 5460.
Esposito, J. L. (1982). Women in Muslim Family Law, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 155.
AYESHA SHAHID 215
Esposito, J. L. and DeLong-Bas (2002). Women in Muslim Family Law, Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press.
Forsyth, M. (2009). A Bird that Flies with Two Wings: Kastom and State Justice Systems in Vanuatu,
Canberra: ANU E Press, 18.
Government of Pakistan. (2009). Fourth Periodic Country Report to CEDAW Committee
CEDAW/C/PAK/4:5.
Government of Pakistan. (20102011). Social And Living Standard Measurement Survey,
Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics, Islamabad.
Haque, R. and Khan, M. (2007). Judicial activism and Islamic family law: a socio-legal evaluation of
recent trends in Bangladesh, Islamic Law and Society 14 (2), 204.
Kathir, I. I. (2000). Tafseer Ibn-i-Kathir, Riyadh: Dar-us-Salam Publications, 4, 3200.
Mannan, M. A. (1991). D.F. Mullas Principles of Mohamedan Law, Lahore: PLD Publishers.
Mehdi, R. (1994). The Islamization of the Law in Pakistan, Richmond: Curzon Press.
Menski, W. F. (1990). The Reform of Islamic Family Law and A Uniform Civil Code for India in C.

Downloaded from http://lawfam.oxfordjournals.org/ at Brunel University on March 7, 2014


Mallat and J. Connors (eds), Islamic Family Law, London: Graham & Trotman, 287.
Menski, W. F. (1996). South-Asian Muslim Law Today: An Overview. See http://eprints.soas.ac.
uk/10149/1/southasianlaw.pdf.
Menski, W. F. (2001). Modern Indian Family Law, Richmond: Curzon Press.
Mernissi, F. (1991). Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Merry, S. A. (1988). Legal pluralism, Law and Society Review 5 (22), 869.
Mullally, S. (2004). Feminism and multicultural dilemmas in India: revisiting the Shah Bano
Case, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24, 67192.
National Commission on the Status of Women Government of Pakistan. (2003). Inquiry Report
on the Status of Women Employment in Public Sector Organizations, 6.
Pakistan Law and Justice Commission. (1956). Report on Marriage and Family Laws, Gazette of
Pakistan, Extraordinary, 20 June 1956.
Pearl, D. and Menski, F. (1998). Muslim Family Law, London: Sweet and Maxwell.
Pospisil, L. (1978). The structure of society and its multiple legal systems in P. H. Gulliver (ed),
Cross Examinations: Essays in Memory of Max Gluckman, Leiden: EJ Brill.
Rahim, A. (1995). Mohammadan Jurisprudence, New Delhi: Mansoor Publishing House.
Rehman, J. (2007). The Sharia, Islamic Family Law and International Human Rights Law: exam-
ining the theory and practice of polygamy and Talaq, International Journal of Law, Policy and the
Family 21, 10827.
Rida, R. A. (1927). Tafseer Al Manar, Tafsir Manar (repr.1954-61) as Tafsir Al Quran ul Hakim al
Mustahir bi Tafsir al- Manar, Cairo.
Santos, B. (2002). Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and Emancipation, London:
Butterworths, 38494.
Sheppard, C. (2010). Reducing group-based inequalities in a legally plural world, CRISE Working
Paper 2 (75), 12.
Shehab, R. (1986). Rights of Women in Islamic Shariah, Lahore: Indus Publishing House, 221.
Serajuddin, M. A. (2011). Muslim Family Law, Secular Courts and Muslim Women of South Asia, Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 11.
Tucker, J. (2008). Women, Family, and Gender in Islamic Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Welchman, L. (2004). Womens Rights and Islamic Family Law: Perspectives on Reform, London: Zed
Books, 11.

View publication stats

Você também pode gostar