Gertrude Arquillo
GAMBOA V TEVES
Topic: Bill of Rights; self-executing
Short Title: Sumobrang controlling shares sa foreigners case
DOCTRINE: Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the
Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the
development of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and
advertising business, is self-executing. There is no need for legislation to implement
these self-executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale why these
constitutional provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS,66 thus:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore
and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.
That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that. . . in case of doubt, the
Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would
give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body,
which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
In Manila Prince Hotel, even the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno, later Chief Justice, agreed that constitutional provisions are
presumed to be self-executing. Justice Puno stated:
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, rather
than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult to
discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and
nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule
that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but
congressional inaction should not suffocate them.
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests,
searches and seizures, the rights of a person under custodial investigation, the rights
of an accused, and the privilege against self-incrimination. It is recognized that
legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection of property. The
same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or
damaging of property for public use without just compensation. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in numerous cases,67 this Court, even in the absence of implementing
legislation, applied directly the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
limiting land ownership to Filipinos. In Soriano v. Ong Hoo,68 this Court ruled:
x x x As the Constitution is silent as to the effects or consequences of a sale by a
citizen of his land to an alien, and as both the citizen and the alien have violated the
law, none of them should have a recourse against the other, and it should only be the
State that should be allowed to intervene and determine what is to be done with the
property subject of the violation. We have said that what the State should do or could
do in such matters is a matter of public policy, entirely beyond the scope of judicial
authority. (Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee Bun Ting, et al., 6 G. R. No. L-5996, June 27,
1956.) While the legislature has not definitely decided what policy should be
followed in cases of violations against the constitutional prohibition, courts of
justice cannot go beyond by declaring the disposition to be null and void
as violative of the Constitution. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
To treat Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution as not self-executing would mean
that since the 1935 Constitution, or over the last 75 years, not one of the
constitutional provisions expressly reserving specific areas of investments to
corporations, at least 60 percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos, was
enforceable. In short, the framers of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
miserably failed to effectively reserve to Filipinos specific areas of investment, like the
operation by corporations of public utilities, the exploitation by corporations of mineral
Gertrude Arquillo
resources, the ownership by corporations of real estate, and the ownership of
educational institutions. All the legislatures that convened since 1935 also miserably
failed to enact legislations to implement these vital constitutional provisions that
determine who will effectively control the national economy, Filipinos or foreigners.
This Court cannot allow such an absurd interpretation of the Constitution.
AQUINO V MUNICIPALITY OF AKLAN
Topic: Overbreadth Doctrine
Short Title: Boracay West Cove in no-build zone
DOCTRINE:
1. [ADJUDICATORY POWERS] The CA fell into a trap when it ruled that a mayor, an
officer from the executive department, exercises an executive function whenever he
issues an Executive Order. This is tad too presumptive for it is the nature of the act to
be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that
determines whether or not a particular act is a discharge of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The first requirement for certiorari is satisfied if the officers act judicially in
making their decision, whatever may be their public character.
It is not essential that the challenged proceedings should be strictly and technically
judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but
it is sufficient if they are quasi-judicial.7 To contrast, a party is said to be exercising
a judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law is and what
legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties, whereas quasi-judicial function is a term
which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies x x x required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature.8cralawlawlibrary
In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the respondent mayors
finding that Boracay West Coves construction, expansion, and operation of its hotel
in Malay, Aklan is illegal. Such a finding of illegality required the respondent mayors
exercise of quasi-judicial functions, against which the special writ of certiorari may lie.
Apropos hereto is Our ruling in City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued: There is no
gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing
demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. In determining whether or not a
structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby
needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally
guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to
exercise quasi-judicial powers.
The CA erred in ruling that the respondent mayor was merely exercising his
executive functions, for clearly, the first requisite for the special writ has been
satisfied.
Aside from the first requisite, the third element, i.e., the unavailability of a plain,
speedy, or adequate remedy, is also present herein. While it may be argued that,
under the LGC, Executive Orders issued by mayors are subject to review by
provincial governors,10 this cannot be considered as an adequate remedy given the
exigencies of petitioners predicament.
2. [NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS] As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two
kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens. The first is recognized as a
nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to
public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the
undefined law of necessity. The second is that which depends upon certain
conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be
abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a
thing does in law constitute a nuisance.14cralawlawlibrary
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per
se since this type of nuisance is generally defined as an act, occupation,
or structure, which is a nuisance at all times and under any
circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding.15 Here, it is merely the hotels
particular incidentits locationand not its inherent qualities that rendered it a
nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone,
Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As
such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is
still a nuisance per accidens.
Gertrude Arquillo
HACIENDA LUISITA V PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
Topic: Power of Eminent Domain
Short Title: land distribution to farmers
DOCTRINE:
1. As regards the 80.51-hectare land transferred to the government for use as part of
the SCTEX, this should also be excluded from the compulsory agrarian reform
coverage considering that the transfer was consistent with the governments exercise
of the power of eminent domain[159] and none of the parties actually questioned the
transfer.
While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita subject of
PARC Resolution Nos. 2005-32-01 and 2006-34-01, the Court cannot close its eyes
to certain operative facts that had occurred in the interim. Pertinently, the operative
fact doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or executive action null and void, or, by
extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting
unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be, since rights might
have accrued in favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in
the meantime.[160] The actual existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a
determination, an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. [161]
The oft-cited De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank[162] discussed the effect
to be given to a legislative or executive act subsequently declared invalid: x x x It
does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged
legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This
is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have
changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent
litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act
was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a
doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with.
This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
government organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power
of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the
law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of [unconstitutionality], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official. x x x
2. A view, however, has been advanced that the operative fact doctrine is of minimal
or altogether without relevance to the instant case as it applies only in considering
the effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute, and not of a declaration
of nullity of a contract. This is incorrect, for this view failed to consider is that it is NOT
the SDOA dated May 11, 1989 which was revoked in the instant case. Rather, it is
PARCs approval of the HLIs Proposal for Stock Distribution under CARP which
embodied the SDP that was nullified.
That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive acts in this
case, the approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distribution is well-settled in
our jurisprudence. In Chavez v. National Housing Authority,[163] We held: Petitioner
postulates that the operative fact doctrine is inapplicable to the present case because
it is an equitable doctrine which could not be used to countenance an inequitable
result that is contrary to its proper office. On the other hand, the petitioner Solicitor
General argues that the existence of the various agreements implementing the
Gertrude Arquillo
SMDRP is an operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored,
citing Rieta v. People of the Philippines.
The argument of the Solicitor General is meritorious. The operative fact
doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a
legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the
courts, is valid and must be complied with, thus: xxx xxx xxx This doctrine was
reiterated in the more recent case of City of Makati v. Civil Service Commission,
wherein we ruled that: Moreover, we certainly cannot nullify the City Government's
order of suspension, as we have no reason to do so, much less retroactively apply
such nullification to deprive private respondent of a compelling and valid reason for
not filing the leave application. For as we have held, a void act though in law a
mere scrap of paper nonetheless confers legitimacy upon past acts or
omissions done in reliance thereof. Consequently, the existence of a statute
or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached. It would indeed be ghastly unfair to prevent private
respondent from relying upon the order of suspension in lieu of a formal leave
application. (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)
The applicability of the operative fact doctrine to executive acts was further
explicated by this Court in Rieta v. People,[164] thus: Petitioner contends that his arrest
by virtue of Arrest Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4754 was invalid, as the
law upon which it was predicated General Order No. 60, issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos was subsequently declared by the Court, in Taada v. Tuvera, 33
to have no force and effect. Thus, he asserts, any evidence obtained pursuant
thereto is inadmissible in evidence.
We do not agree. In Taada, the Court addressed the possible effects of its
declaration of the invalidity of various presidential issuances. Discussing therein how
such a declaration might affect acts done on a presumption of their validity, the Court
said:. . .. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and
realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of
those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. xxx xxx xxx
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to
their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration . . . that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
The Chicot doctrine cited in Taada advocates that, prior to the nullification of
a statute, there is an imperative necessity of taking into account its actual existence
as an operative fact negating the acceptance of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity. Whatever was done while the legislative or the executive act was in
operation should be duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects. The
ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60 long before our
Decision in Taada and the arrest of petitioner is an operative fact that can no
longer be disturbed or simply ignored. (Citations omitted; Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, although the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01 states that it
revokes or recalls the SDP, what it actually revoked or recalled was the PARCs
approval of the SDP embodied in Resolution No. 89-12-2. Consequently, what was
actually declared null and void was an executive act, PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2,
[165]
and not a contract (SDOA). It is, therefore, wrong to say that it was the SDOA
which was annulled in the instant case. Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is
applicable.
While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying the Hacienda
Luisita SDP are upheld, the revocation must, by application of the operative fact
Gertrude Arquillo

principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose whether
they want to remain as HLI stockholders or not. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to
the fact that in 1989, 93% of the FWBs agreed to the SDOA (or the MOA), which
became the basis of the SDP approved by PARC per its Resolution No. 89-12-2
dated November 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the FWBs were said to have received
from HLI salaries and cash benefits, hospital and medical benefits, 240-square meter
homelots, 3% of the gross produce from agricultural lands, and 3% of the proceeds of
the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and the 80.51-hectare lot sold to SCTEX.
HLI shares totaling 118,391,976.85 were distributed as of April 22, 2005. [166] On
August 6, 20l0, HLI and private respondents submitted a Compromise Agreement, in
which HLI gave the FWBs the option of acquiring a piece of agricultural land or
remain as HLI stockholders, and as a matter of fact, most FWBs indicated their
choice of remaining as stockholders. These facts and circumstances tend to indicate
that some, if not all, of the FWBs may actually desire to continue as HLI
shareholders. A matter best left to their own discretion.
Gertrude Arquillo
POE-LLAMANZARES V COMELEC
Topic: Citizenship
Short Title: Candidacy issue ni Grace Poe kay Tony Lavs Consti 1
DOCTRINE: 1. [FOUNDLINGS] The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a
class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive
policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution.
Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II,
Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to
defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an
intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee.
Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the
Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No.
8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino
Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of
1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly
refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may
be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading
to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said
certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the
foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2
"Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first
place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the
citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child
but by the authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of
the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a
Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution,
an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as
binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
Gertrude Arquillo
element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 126 "General principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of
reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems
generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is
embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in
Respect of Employment and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles
which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines
to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of
nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the
application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least
eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth,"
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are
not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a
signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1)
ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the
1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives
effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South
America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen.
Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only
thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26)
are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016
Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%),
foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice
of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the
country in which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted
principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this
Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them,
foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has
been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law,
issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting
through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of
foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at
more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
2. [REPATRIATION] results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that
a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as a natural-born Filipino.
Gertrude Arquillo

The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens
as implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain
uninterrupted and continuous from birth."
COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already
rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean
at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or
perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there
are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and
naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue." 150 That law
also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in
the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any
other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept
strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive
parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth
certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records,
petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
.

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2)
those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized
Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons
for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof

3. [ADOPTION] Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that
petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her
application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents,
and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been
contended that the data required were the names of her biological parents which are
precisely unknown.

This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of
the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and
the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth
certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and
Gertrude Arquillo

DOCTRINE: 1. [DUE PROCESS] It is needless to add that the publication of

presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice
Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7: In a time of proliferating decrees,
orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as
the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their
official and specific contents.

2. [OPERATIVE FACT] The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of

general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect
this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential
decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication.

The implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in

the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot
be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ...
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot
be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939,
inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
TANADA V TUVERA these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever
their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has
Topic: Substantive Due Process ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is
Short Title: Presidential decrees ni Marcos na hindi published
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the
said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding
Gertrude Arquillo

is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their

comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official
Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that
they shall take effect immediately.