G.R. No.

174143, November 23, 2011

SPOUSES RICARDO HIPOLITO, JR. and LIZA HIPOLITO, vs, TERESITA CINCO,CARLOTA
BALDE CINCO and ATTY. CARLOS CINCO,

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner-spouses Ricardo Hipolito, Jr. and Liza Hipolito (petitioners) allege that on June 15, 1989,
Edeltrudis Hipolito y Mariano (Edeltrudis) entered into an agreement with Francisco Villena (now deceased) to rent
a portion of the property located at 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila and to construct an apartment-
style building adjacent to the existing house thereon. The contract was for a period of 20 years. Pursuant to the
agreement, Edeltrudis built a three-storey apartment building without securing a building permit. Petitioners
inherited the apartment building upon the death of Edeltrudis.

In 2002 or 13 years after the execution of the agreement, petitioners and the heirs of Francisco Villena, all
residing in the property, were informed that respondent Atty. Carlos D. Cinco (Atty. Cinco) acquired the subject
property through a deed of sale sometime in 1976.

On June 17, 2002, herein respondents Atty. Cinco, Teresita Cinco and Dr. Carlota Balde Cinco
(respondents) filed with the OBO a verified request for structural inspection of an old structure located at 2176
Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila.

Acting on the request, Building Inspector Engineer Leonardo B. Rico (Engr. Rico) conducted an initial
inspection. In his memorandum Engr. Rico reported that two old and dilapidated buildings made of wooden
materials were found in the premises and recommended that the matter be referred to the Committee on Buildings
(Committee) for further appropriate action and disposition.
With prior notices to the parties and the tenants, three hearings were subsequently held from August 12,
2002 to September 20, 2002 for purposes of resolving the focal issue of the structural stability, architectural
presentability, electrical and fire safety aspect to determine [whether] or not the subject buildings are still safe for
continued occupancy. On September 20, 2002, Victoria Villena, wife and heir of Francisco Villena and owner of
one of the two buildings, filed a counter manifestation questioning respondents personality to file the petition for
condemnation, and refuting the technical evaluation reports of Engr. Rico and respondents commissioned
engineer. Whereupon, the Committee was constrained to schedule an ocular inspection of the subject buildings on
October 7, 2002. A report on the ocular inspection conducted was thereafter submitted through a
Memorandumdated October 8, 2002, which states:

III. RECOMMENDATION:

From the foregoing, the subject buildings [appear] to have incurred extensive
deterioration/[dilapidation] [attributed] mainly to long weather exposure, poor maintenance and
termite infestation on its architectural and structural components by 60-80% which constitutes an
Architectural eyesore, structurally unsafe as well as fire and electrical hazard thereby endangering
the life, safety, health and welfare [of] the general public specifically the tenants thereat, hence, it
is strongly recommended that the subject building be declared dangerous and ruinous in
pursuance of Sec. 214 and 215 and Rules VII and Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of P.D. 1096.

A Demolition Order addressed to the respondents was accordingly issued on even date with petitioners and
their tenants duly furnished with a copy thereof.
 Petitioners thus appealed to the DPWH.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the CA, petitioners again raised the issues they advanced before the administrative bodies,
particularly the issue regarding the ownership of the lot vis--vis their right as builders in good faith.

However, the CA dismissed the petition for review and affirmed the OP Resolution without addressing the
issue of ownership. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but same was denied in a Resolution dated
August 15, 2006 for being a mere rehash or repetition of the issues raised in the petition.

Unwilling to concede, petitioners now come before this Court by way of Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
A.
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RESOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES SUSTAINING THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL OF MANILA.
B.
WHETHER X X X THE OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT OBSERVING THE CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS/DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE HEARING AND IN THE CONTENTS OF
THE INSPECTION REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE INSPECTION TEAM INCLUDING
THE RESOLUTION OF THE OBO
C.
WHETHER X X X [THE] OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL (OBO)
OF MANILA OVERSTEPPED THE BOUNDS OF ITS AUTHORITY IN NOT APPLYING
ARTICLE 482 AND ARTICLES 694 TO 707 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IN
IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 215 OF THE BUILDING CODE P.D.
1096 IN THIS CASE.
D.
WHETHER X X X THE PETITIONER[S] OR THEIR PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST
[ARE]/IS A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH OF THE 3[-]STOREY APARTMENT BUILDING
LOCATED AT THE REAR PORTION OF THE PROPERTY AND REFERRED TO AS
BLDG. 2.
E.
WHETHER X X X THE ACTION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE
IS PROPER IN THIS CASE.
Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

At the outset, it bears stressing that in a petition for review on certiorari [under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court], the scope of this Courts judicial review of decisions of the [CA] is generally confined only to errors of law,
and questions of fact are not entertained. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and it is not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. More so, this Court is not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh evidence pertaining to factual issues which have not been subject of any proper proceedings
below. Well-entrenched and settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court adequately and on time need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing
court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The determination of who owns the subject property, the
authenticity of the evidence of both parties, and whether petitioners are builders in good faith are questions of fact,
the resolution of which requires the examination of evidence that should be ventilated in a separate action brought
before a proper forum.

As correctly stated by the Secretary of the DPWH in its Resolution, the administrative agencies
jurisdiction in this case is confined to the assessment of the physical condition of the building sought to be
condemned and the issuance of the appropriate order relative thereto. Issues affecting contract involving the
property or of the buildings subject of the case are not within their competence to rule upon. Lest this Court
becomes a court of first instance instead of a court of last resort, we decline to act on matters that have not run the
proper legal course.

Nevertheless, we note that petitioners purported right to occupy the property has already ended two years
ago when the 20-year period of the lease agreement expired in year 2009. There being no provision in the contract,
tacit or otherwise, for renewal or extension of the lease, petitioners no longer have basis to keep hold of Building
2. Hence, the determination of whether petitioners are builders in good faith is no longer necessary.

There is, therefore, no question as to the authority of the OBO to render the challenged issuances. Here, the
Building Official was authorized to issue the questioned Demolition Order in view of his finding that the disputed
structures are dangerous and ruinous buildings within the purview of P.D. No. 1096, in relation to its Implementing
Rules and Regulations. Correspondingly, no irregularity in the process in which the resolution and demolition order
were issued is evident. As found by the CA, the records show that the OBO issued the resolution and Demolition
Order only after ocular inspections and hearings were conducted. Notably, the Inspectorate Team of the DPWH
came up with the same conclusion as the OBO when it conducted its own ocular inspection of the premises, that is
both Buildings 1 and 2 had structural, sanitary, plumbing and electrical defects of up to 80%.

We take this opportunity to inform petitioners that the appellate court cannot be expected to actually
perform the inspection itself for purposes of validating the findings of the administrative bodies. Reliance on
findings of fact of the lower courts or, in this case, administrative bodies, does not mean that the appellate court does
not conduct its own review. In fact, the appellate court painstakingly studies every piece of document that comes
into its hands, putting together every piece of the puzzle to come up with the whole picture of the controversy
brought before it. That is no easy task.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 19, 2006 and the Resolution dated
August 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89783 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
SMART VS. NTC; G.R. No. 151908

PARTIES:
SMART & PILTEL petitioners,
GLOBE & ISLACOM petitioners,
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) respondent.

PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) issued Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and
regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued
a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained
measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units.
This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public
telecommunications entities, which reads:

This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and
beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use pursuant to MC 13-
6-2000.

In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs used by subscribers of
prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2)
years from date of first use. Also, the billing unit shall be on a six (6) seconds pulse
effective 07 October 2000. For strict compliance.

On October 20, 2000, petitioners ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against the NTC, Commissioner
Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor
C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000
(the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order at the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.

Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the
Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing
Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against
deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment
of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of
the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card
buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing
Circular be declared null and void ab initio. Globe Telecom and Smart filed a joint Motion for
Leave to Intervene which was granted by the trial court. On October 27, 2000, the trial court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the NTC from implementing Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 and the Memorandum dated October 6, 2000.

In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on
the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Subsequently, the trial
court denied the defendants motion to dismiss. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 2001.

Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, which was granted and annulled the injunction issued by the lower court.

Petitioners' motions for reconsideration were denied in a Resolution dated January 10, 2002 for
lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review filed by Smart and Piltel.

ISSUES:
WON Respondent court erred in holding respondents failed to exhaust administrative
remedy.
WON NTC has Jurisdiction over the case.
WON the Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional.

RULE:
1ST ISSSUE Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers
and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making
power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation
that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers.

The rules and regulations should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted
by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.17 They must conform to and be
consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation
to be valid. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs
in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature,
where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an

administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned
was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act
pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this
case, the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement.
Petitioners were able to register their protests to the proposed billing guidelines. They
submitted their respective position papers setting forth their objections and submitting
proposed schemes for the billing circular. After the same was issued, petitioners wrote
successive letters dated July 3, 2000 and July 5, 2000, asking for the suspension and
reconsideration of the so-called Billing Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear
denial of the requests contained in their previous letters, thus prompting them to seek
judicial relief.

2ND ISSSUE In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. The objective
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined
 some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the
court.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation

issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function,
the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether
a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or
the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

3RD ISSSUE In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No.
13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-
legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the
judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the
said issuances. Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in
dismissing the case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Azcuna, J., took no part

PRINCIPLE INVOLVED: Doctrine of Administrative Exhaustion.

Oposa vs Factoran

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant,
his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that
the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come.
The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony of
nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.