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OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
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A Troubled Triangle:
Afghanistan: Crossroads of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan
a Troubled Region 4
in Strategic Perspective
Pakistan-Iran-Afghanistan Introduction in Mazar-i Sharif, Iran amassed its troops at
Relations: Looking Beyond Haleh Esfandiari, Director, Middle East Program the border with Afghanistan. It took a great
the Troubled Triangle 8 Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan can be char- deal of effort and diplomacy to diffuse the ten-
acterized as three neighbors each following sion between the two countries. While
Irans Strategic their own agendas. In the quarter-century Pakistan had relations with and condoned the
Perspective on Afghanistan since the Islamic Republic came to power in actions of the Taliban, Iran condemned the
and Pakistan 12 Iran, the countries have been going through Talibans treatment of women and the excesses
relationship phases that can be referred to at that were perpetrated under the name of
best as not so smooth if not hostile at Islam. Iran supported the anti-Taliban
times. Iran shares more than 500 miles of its Northern Alliance and later established close
border with each Afghanistan and Pakistan. contacts with Ismail Khan, the post-Taliban
The populations in both Afghanistan and governor of Herat. Irans relations with
Pakistan are comprised of a Sunni majority Pakistan have been both bumpy and intimate.
and Shiite minority. As the only Shiite coun- Irans ability to buy nuclear facilities from
try in this Troubled Triangle, Iran is com- Pakistan attests to a closeness of relations
pelled to react to events affecting Shiites in between influential elements in both govern-
Afghanistan and Pakistan. ments. Meanwhile, Pakistans close relation-
In 1997, when the Hazaras were massacred ship with the U.S. has created much concern
and a number of Iranian diplomats were killed among the Iranian leadership.
This publication was made possible through a grant from the Ford Foundation and the support
of the Open Society Institute.
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SPRING 2005
3
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SPRING 2005
Afghanistans status as a regional actor has the burgeoning heroin traffic some 25 years
always been a mixture of hinterland, buffer later. As a crossroads, Afghanistan is also the
state, and crossroads, often all at the same time. linchpin of Asia, tying together Central Asia,
Indeed, Afghanistan was always considered the Southwest Asia, and South Asia, and linking
land beyond the back of beyond. As a hinter- Persian, Pakistani, Indian, Chinese, Russian,
land, its rugged terrain and geographical posi- and Turkic cultures.
tion in the heart of inner Asia made it remote.
This was especially so following the decline of Modern History
the Mongol Empire and the opening of sea The events of the last quarter-century opened
lanes of economic transport in the 16th centu- Afghanistan up to substantial outside influ-
ry, which reduced the importance of arduous ences yet again. This time, the country has
overland trade via the historic Silk Road. been transformed by full-scale invasion and
Afghanistans increasing remoteness in the 19th occupation by Russian and Central Asian mil-
and 20th centuries contributed to its lack of itary forces with alien socio-economic-political
Larry P. Goodson
economic development upon independence in systems; a concomitant refugee flow that
1919 and in the decades that followed. regionalized the Afghanistan problem; cross-
As a buffer state, Afghanistan stood between border insurgency out of Pakistan, and less so
expansionist Russian and British empires dur- Iran; and a subsequent sense by Afghanistans
ing the 19th century Great Game, and then neighbors that their continued meddling in
between their successors in the 20th century, Afghanistans affairs was warranted and neces-
the Soviet Union and the United States, who sary after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.
competed for Afghanistans affections and Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union
influence through aid and diplomacy. just three years after its withdrawal from
Afghanistan has also become a place where Afghanistan opened up the prospects of trade
Pakistan and Irans own geopolitical ambitions with Central Asia, a region long closed to its
and rivalries could play out. Each country has southern neighbors which fully re-energized
long sought to thwart the other, and their rival- Afghanistans crossroads status again. Yet,
ry grew increasingly problematic with the Afghanistans renewed regional centrality also
demise of the Soviet Union and the desires of emboldened its neighbors, freed from the long
both countries to expand their influence in the Soviet shadow at last, to begin using
region through Afghanistan. Afghanistan as a convenient backyard for their
It is as a crossroads that Afghanistan has its regional geopolitical aspirations.
most enduring status, captured romantically Thus, during the 1990s through late 2001,
in modern imagination as a southern hub of as the country convulsed in a long civil war
the ancient Silk Road. Indeed, while fought by internal militias who were proxy
Afghanistan has always been a place through armies for regional rivals, legal trade through
which commerce passed, it has also been a Afghanistan languished while illegal smuggling
highway for some of historys most celebrated and the drug traffic grew. Gulbuddin
military leaders and their armies, from Hekmatyars Hezb-i Islami and later the
Alexander to Genghis Khan to Tamerlane to Taliban were supported by Pakistan. The
the founders of the Moghul Dynasty in India. Hazara party Hezb-i Wahdat was supported by
In the modern era, Afghanistan has continued Iran. Rashid Dostums Uzbek militia Jumbish-
to be shaped, despite its forbidding terrain, by i-Milli was supported by Russia and
the armies and traded goods that pass across its Uzbekistan. The Tajik-dominated Shura-i-
4 borders, whether the Soviet Army in 1979 or Nazar of Ahmad Shah Massoud was supported
AFGHANISTAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS RESULTS - 2004
Leading Candidate by Province
BADAKHSHAN
Not Available
by Iran, Russia, India, and other regional mind Osama bin Laden. While the U.S. did
actors. Much of this regional geopolitical med- have diplomatic relations with Pakistan on
dling was made possible by American disen- 9/11, official disapproval of the military coup
gagement following the Soviet withdrawal, that brought General Pervez Musharraf to
proving that whatever Afghanistan was to its power was issued in October 1999 and further
regional neighbors, to much of the world it strained what were already very cool relations,
remained a backwater, or hinterland, still. due to Pakistans nuclear tests in 1998.
September 11, 2001 changed the strategic Sanctions on Pakistan had been imposed by
calculus concerning Afghanistan and its neigh- the U.S. in 1998 and were strengthened fol-
bors, and importantly, the change in the calcu- lowing the military takeover in 1999.
lus began in Washington. Prior to 9/11, September 11, 2001 caused the United
Washington had limited influence in the States to see the world in terms of the Global
Troubled Triangle of Afghanistan, Iran, and War on Terrorism threat, prompting a funda-
Pakistan, as it had undergone diplomatic dis- mental change to its policy of trying to contain
engagement with all three countries. The and isolate that threat in the Troubled Triangle.
United States has had a troubled relationship A full re-engagement with Afghanistan was
with Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, facilitated initially through a military effort to
which led to a suspension of diplomatic rela- topple the Taliban, as well as with some quiet
tions by the U.S. in 1980 and extensive eco- back-channel cooperation with Iran to produce
nomic sanctions. Irans pursuit of weapons of the Bonn Accords, which would provide the
mass destruction and known links to Islamist foundation for the subsequent successful polit-
terrorist groups led to a further deterioration ical transformation of Afghanistan. American
following 9/11, and Iran was listed as a mem- engagement with Iran was short-lived, as neo-
ber of the Axis of Evil by President George conservative voices grew dominant within the
W. Bush in January 2002. The U.S. also had U.S. foreign policy community. Irans geo-
no diplomatic relations with the Taliban gov- graphic position and Pakistans role as a patron
ernment in Afghanistan and had imposed of the Taliban made rehabilitating the floun-
sanctions there in 1999 over the Talibans dering relationship with Pakistan an urgent
refusal to hand over Al-Qaida terrorist master- American priority; and the Youre either with 5
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SPRING 2005
strategic umbrella, Karzai now benefiting from the development of the most
rehabilitated road network in Afghanistan by
re-develop the Afghan state with- electricity supply in western Afghanistan now
exist with both Iran and Turkmenistan.
Pakistan-Iran-Afghanistan Relations:
Looking Beyond the Troubled Triangle
By Ayesha Siddiqa, Pakistan Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars;
Visiting Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad;
Correspondent, Janes Defence Weekly
Since the 1990s, there has been much discus- tion of its foreign and security policies from
sion about the uneasy relations between dependence to independence, is a helpful
Pakistan and Iran, and the equally difficult to context in which to analyze these bilateral
define relations between Pakistan and relations. Finally, the two sets of relations
Afghanistan. In fact, the phrase Troubled ought to be analyzed in a three-dimensional
Triangle suggests the presence of a geo-politi- context including: (a) the progression of
cally unstable critical core, the security of Pakistans security and foreign policies; (b) a
which might have regional and extra-regional hexagonal framework; and (c) the issue of reli-
geo-strategic implications. The independent gious identity.
sets of bilateral relations between the three
countries have not expanded into a trilateral Pakistans Security and Foreign Policies
framework in which any of the three countries One of the key arguments of this paper is that
could smoothly manage relations amongst the Pakistans relations with Iran and Afghanistan
others. The inability to undertake a paradigm go beyond the linear Pakistan-India frame-
Ayesha Siddiqa shift relates to the geo-strategic development work. Surely, this is a significant parameter.
in the region after the 1980s. Contrary to the Traditionally, India enjoyed good ties with
view that the bilateral relations are troubled, Iran and Afghanistan. The relations between
my perception is that bilateral relations are Kabul and New Delhi date back to 1947 and
tense due to divergent policies. However, the before. Kabul was always considered hostile to
shared and divergent interests would not allow Pakistan, and this is what Islamabad sought to
relations between the three neighbors to dete- change through its two decades of involve-
riorate to a point of hostility. There are shared ment in Afghanistan. Driven by its military
values and common interests that would allow objectives, Pakistans main concern after the
these countries to contribute positively departure of Soviet forces and American assis-
towards each others security. tance was to structure Afghanistans politics in
The existing analysis tends to see Pakistan- such a manner that it would cease to be a
Iran relations largely in the context of the threat to or have the ability to collaborate
developments in Afghanistan. The Pakistan- against Pakistan. The support provided to the
Iran confrontation over the political future of various warlords, and later the Taliban, estab-
Afghanistan, especially during the 1990s after lished Pakistans stakes in Kabul. While 9/11
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Kabul changed the strategic environment, it did not
and the end of the Cold War, has been the cen- diminish Islamabads interests or capacity to
terpiece of analysis. However, Pakistans rela- affect Afghanistans internal politics.
tions with Iran and Afghanistan need to be Pakistans influence would certainly be diffi-
analyzed in a historic framework rather than cult to counter, even with Indias growing
in a post-December 1979 context. relations with Kabul. Although Islamabad is
Furthermore, while India plays an important deeply upset about Indias bid to re-establish
role, the changes in Pakistans Iran and itself in Pakistans west the apprehension is
Afghanistan policies were driven by other that this would be used to destabilize
objectives as well. Islamabads desire for a Pakistan there are limits to New Delhis
leadership role in the region, especially in the influence in Kabul. This factor needs to be
8 context of the Muslim world and the evolu- taken into consideration.
Similarly, there is concern regarding Iran- The Hexagonal Framework
India relations. The development of the sea- The Troubled Triangle can also be analyzed at
port in Chahbahar, Iran with New Delhis another level: in the context of a hexagonal rela-
assistance is seen as challenging Pakistans geo- tionship including Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
strategic interests and Islamabads own devel- U.S., India, and Russia. Pakistan-Iran or
opment of the port at Gwadar. The relations Pakistan-Afghanistan relations were never inde-
between the three countries at a bilateral level pendent of the impact of the policies of these
must be seen in the broader perspective of the other players. These states have stakes in the
evolution of Pakistans security and foreign region and their physical presence or expression
policies moving from dependence to inde- of interest in the region tends to impact rela-
pendence or from infancy to adolescence. tions within the Troubled Triangle.
Pakistan-Iran relations can be divided into
two phases: 1954 78 and 1978 2001 and
beyond. The joint membership of the U.S.- The Troubled Triangle can also
sponsored CENTO (Central Treaty
Organization), creation of the regional net- be analyzed at another level:
work (RCD), and military cooperation
between the two countries was the hallmark in the context of a hexagonal
of the first period. Iran came to Pakistans help
during the 1965 war and provided gunship relationship including Iran,
helicopters that were used against Baluch
insurgents in the mid-1970s. This was the Pakistan, Afghanistan, U.S.,
heyday of the friendly bilateral links between
the two neighbors. India, and Russia.
The heyday of Pakistan-Iran relations also
marked a turning point. Former Prime This is truly a multi-layered relationship
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhuttos ambition of between the three neighbors, each affected by
turning Pakistan into the leader of the Muslim the other states bilateral links with other coun-
world, and his ability to communicate with tries. The U.S. is an active player in the region.
Kabul, reduced Tehrans political significance Washingtons tensions with Tehran and its phys-
for Islamabad. Moreover, Bhutto was interest- ical presence in Afghanistan have bearings on
ed in the leadership role himself. Islamabad was Pakistans relations with its neighbors, especially
gradually growing to have a sense of its own when Islamabad is viewed as a proponent of
geo-political significance. The first Afghan war American policies encouraging Washington to
of the 1980s bolstered Pakistans confidence. A prolong its stay in the region. American forces,
lot of people in responsible positions consid- indeed, are external to the region, and their pres-
ered Pakistans role as significant in causing the ence causes geo-political instability at a certain
death of the Eastern superpower. This per- level. However, Islamabad is keen to have the
ception was certainly popular in the armed U.S. prolong its stay in Afghanistan. Pakistans
forces and other strategic organizations. relations with the U.S. are central to the present
The 1980s and the 1990s were two decades debate. There is inherent tension in Iran-
in which Islamabad established its interests in Pakistan ties due to Islamabads relations with
Afghanistan and its political system. the U.S. While Islamabad sees some strategic
Afghanistan was far more relevant in terms of dividends in its relations with the U.S., it also
pursuing Islamabads goals with West and depends on conflict in the wider Asian region to
Central Asia. The idea of Pakistan leading a keep Washington engaged. Having been let
Muslim block, which is attributed to General down by the U.S., at least five times, as some
Zia-ul-Haq, did not become dormant in the Pakistani analysts suggest, Islamabad is not keen
ensuing years after his sudden death in 1988. for a repetition of this experience. 9
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SPRING 2005
11
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SPRING 2005
Over the course of the past four years, Irans the Saudi-Iranian rivalry for control of the
strategic perspective on its eastern frontier has Persian Gulf. The Pakistani government, wary
undergone significant change. As the Global of Iranian interference and Shia restlessness,
War on Terrorism has altered the political land- and the countrys strong Sunni Islamic forces
scape of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran took the side of Saudi Arabia and endorsed its
faces new strategic realities that present both containment strategy. What emerged was a
opportunities and challenges. strong strategic tie between Riyadh and
Islamabad, which would then extend to Kabul
The Legacy of the 1990s after the rise of the Taliban. This alliance was
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in strongly anti-Shia and anti-Iranian. Saudi
1980, Iran became host to some two million Arabias aim here was to create a Sunni wall
Afghan refugeesone of the largest refugee from Pakistan north through Afghanistan and
populations at the time. Many of the refugees into Central Asia.
became integrated into the Iranian labor mar- As a result, for much of the decade preced-
Robert Hathaway, Director of ket, and others were cared for by Iran without ing September 11, 2001, Irans strategic per-
the Asia Program at the Wilson
Center; Vali Nasr
support from the international community. spective regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan
The refugee issueand especially the fact that was determined by its reaction to the Saudi-
the refugees included Persian speaking and Pakistani-Taliban condominium. The success
Shia Afghanscreated vested interest in the of Saudi Arabia in creating and managing the
resolution of the Afghan war in Tehran. That Sunni wall accounts for Irans tilt toward
interest became more pronounced with the rise India in the 1990s and its strong backing of the
of the anti-Shia and anti-Iranian Taliban, Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.
whose massacre of Shias in Mazar-i Sharif and
Bamiyan in 199798 and the execution of Irans Strategic Perspective After
Iranian journalists and diplomats in 1997 led September 11
to the mobilization of some 200,000 Iranian Events of September 11, 2001 brought the
troops on the Afghan border. Throughout the anti-Iran Sunni alliance into Americas
Afghan war, Iran had supported various crosshairs. The alliance that had received
Afghan factions, including the Shia Hazara Washingtons tacit support to contain Iran was
party Hezb-i Wahdat and Ismail Khan of now viewed as the source of the greatest terror-
Herats militia. After the rise of the Taliban, ist challenge to the U.S. With the fall of the
Iran more forcefully threw its weight behind Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistans shift to sup-
the Northern Alliance. port the Global War on Terrorism, and ten-
In the 1980s, Irans revolutionary leaders sions in relations between the U.S. and Saudi
looked to Pakistans Shia population which Arabia, Iran found new opportunities on its
constitutes 1525% of the population as a eastern frontier. With the Sunni wall gone,
target for exporting their ideology and revolu- Iran found new room to maneuver.
tion. The prospects of greater Shia activism in Irans initial reaction was to support the fall
Pakistan provoked a response from Iraq and of the Taliban. Tehrans objective here was first
Saudi Arabia. As a result, Shia-Sunni rivalry in to roll-back the Sunni militancy that had lim-
Pakistan the former supported by Iran and ited Irans influence in Afghanistan. Second,
the latter by Saudi Arabia and Iraqquickly Irans leaders hoped that the vacuum left in
12 became an extension of the Iran-Iraq War and Afghanistan after the fall of Taliban would
allow Iran to expand its sphere of influence in generally a centralized Afghan state as strategic
western Afghanistan. Third, Iran hoped that threats. These fears became only more intense
Afghanistan would serve as the context for a after Ismail Khan was removed from power in
rapprochement with Washington. 2004 and reports surfaced that the U.S. may
Iran was able to achieve its first two objec- use an airbase in western Afghanistan for oper-
tives. Operation Enduring Freedom complete- ations against Iran. Since 2001, Tehran has
ly destroyed the Taliban. It also created a vac- vested its interests in local power brokers and
uum in which Irans economic ties with Herat warlords, and has remained distant from the
were strengthened. Freed from the menace of government in Kabul.
the Taliban, Ismail Khan returned from exile However, Iran has also been wary of insta-
to form the government in Herat, which was bility in Afghanistan. The Iranian population is
closely aligned with Iran and quickly gained concerned with the flow of refugees from
power. More important, the citys economy Afghanistan and the impact of chaos on Irans
was more tightly integrated into that of Irans interests. Local merchants in eastern Iran have
Khorasan province. Herats bazaars were filled benefited from the trade that stability in Herat
with Iranian goods that came to the city on
Iranian trucks and on roads build by Iran
which were far better developed than those Iranians found the U.S. to be in
connecting the city to the rest of Afghanistan.
The road development was financed by no mood to mend fences with
Iranian foundations, notably the Foundation
of the Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashad, and its Iran; in fact, the U.S. was buoyed
pace and scope far exceeded international eco-
nomic reconstruction projects in Afghanistan by its victory in Afghanistan and
at the time. Those goods were bought by labor
remittances from Afghans working in Iran. became keen to challenge
Iran had lost Herat in the 19th century. In
October 2001, Herat was far more tightly con- Tehrans policies.
nected to Irans road network and economic
infrastructure than it was to the rest of and Kabul has brought about, and hence they
Afghanistan. The collapse of the Taliban for all are eager to maintain order. The heroin trade
practical purposes extended Irans cultural and has been a source of great concern for Iran.
economic, if not political, boundaries into Heroin is transported though Iran both from
western Afghanistan. Economic ties between the north, through Turkmenistan, and the
Herat and Khorasan, more than government south, through Pakistans Baluchistan province,
strategy, has driven Irans Afghan policy. before it finds its way onto ferries in the Persian
Moreover, the case of Herat introduced a new Gulf. The trade has produced a drug economy
approach to regional exercise of power to in Iran, increased drug addiction within Iran,
Iranian foreign policy: economic influence in and also impacted law and order along Irans
lieu of political expansionism. borders. Collapse of order in Afghanistan is
Irans third objective never materialized. likely to increase the scope of the traffic in nar-
Iranians found the U.S. to be in no mood to cotics. As a result, stability is at the heart of
mend fences with Iran; in fact, the U.S. was Irans strategic interests in Afghanistan. Iran
buoyed by its victory in Afghanistan and would like order in Afghanistan, but not an
became keen to challenge Tehrans policies. American order.
This realization changed Irans strategic objec- Pakistan presents Iran with a different set of
tives in Afghanistan. Iran began to view long- interests and challenges. Since the 1990s, Iran
term U.S. presence in Afghanistan, a pro- has ceased to look at Pakistan as a strategic
American government in Kabul, and more partner. Irans economic and regional interests 13
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SPRING 2005
now lie with India, and Iran for some time now to establish a U.S. military base in the country.
has denied support to Pakistan on the Kashmir Although the political climate in Pakistan is
issue. Iran has also welcomed the weakening of not likely to support such a move, construction
Sunni militancy and Saudi influence in work in Gwadar has still raised the ire of both
Pakistan. However, Iran is keen that Pakistan Baluch tribesmen and Iranian leaders, who
does not become too closely tied with the U.S. look unfavorably on a permanent U.S. pres-
As a result, Iran has viewed the regime of ence in the region particularly so close to the
President Pervez Musharraf as a strategic threat. naval base Iran is developing in its Baluchistan
Tehrans desire to dampen U.S. enthusiasm for province at Chahbahar.
Musharraf was reflected in Tehrans claim in Iran is also concerned with the escalation of
2002 03 that most of the Al-Qaida activists sectarian violence since 2003. Iranians believe
arrested in Iran were dumped on the border by that the Musharraf government has been far
Pakistani intelligence, and at times were more vigilant in clamping down on Al-Qaida
accompanied by their handlers. More recently, activists than on violent anti-Shia groups such
Pakistanis have accused Iran of being unneces- as Lashkar Jhangvi. In fact, Sipah Sahabah
sarily cooperative with the International Pakistan (SSP) is Musharraf s only Islamist
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the ties ally its leader, Azam Tariq, was openly allied
between its nuclear energy program and the with Musharraf until his assassination in 2003.
A.Q. Khan network. More recently, the opposition to Musharraf
has accused Pakistan intelligence of using the
using ethnic tensions to prevent clients among the Shia of Pakistan are worried
about sectarian violence, and the Iranian gov-
the Musharraf regime from consol- ernment views anti-Shia activism in Pakistan
with great concern.
idating power, and hence, from The most important issue between Iran
and Pakistan, however, involves Irans nuclear
align itself with Washington. that is closely tied to regime survival in both
countries. Iran today faces the threat of mili-
tary action and regime change if it does not
Privately, Pakistani leaders blame Iran for curb its nuclear program. Pakistan would face
inciting a Baluch insurgency that has con- strong international sanctions and domestic
founded the military and political establish- upheaval if it is not able to contain the fall-
ment in Islamabad. The reason for this is that out from the A.Q. Khan issue. Each country
Pakistan believes that Iran is using ethnic ten- depends on the discretion of the other to
sions to prevent the Musharraf regime from avoid an escalation of its nuclear crisis.
consolidating power, and hence, from being It is a mystery why Pakistan sold Iran
able to more completely align itself with nuclear technology at a time when the two
Washington. In addition, Tehran shares the countries did not have warm relations and
suspicion of Baluch tribesmen that Pakistan were in fact growing estranged over the
has made an agreement with the U.S. to devel- Taliban and Pakistans close ties to Saudi
op a deep water port in Gwadar in southern Arabia. It is not clear exactly what Pakistan
Baluchistan that could serve as the site for a sold to Iran and when. However, there is no
future U.S. naval base. Some strategic thinkers doubt that Irans nuclear technology program
in Pakistan have argued that the only way to was built on Pakistani technology. As such,
14 compel the U.S. to commit itself to Pakistan is Pakistan could fill the missing pieces in by
providing the IAEA with a more complete Afghanistan, and tensions born of the nuclear
accounting of what it sold to Iran, and in par- issue. In the past five years, Irans perspective
ticular, with proof that Irans program was not has been shaped by economic drivers, maxi-
meant for peaceful purposes. Iran in turn mization of Irans strategic interests, and the
could provide proof that sale of nuclear tech- management of the perceived threat of an
nology was not limited to A.Q. Khan and was American presence in the region.
sanctioned by the Pakistani military. Given The U.S. policy in the region has been
the stakes, the strategic relationship between directed at restoring stability to both
the two countries is pivoted on the critical Afghanistan and Pakistan to preclude
issue of managing Irans nuclear crisis, which growth of terrorism, eliminate narcotics trade,
could deeply impact both Iranian and and reduce threats to the U.S. Iran, too, is
Pakistani regimes. keen on stability in the region, but not one
The events of September 11th radically that will exclude Irans influence and deny its
changed the strategic perspective of Iran with economic and strategic interests. Iran would
regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The have no stake in such stability. Moreover, sus-
impregnable Sunni wall was replaced with taining a complete exclusion of Iran from the
opportunities for expansion of Irans influence regional order would require the continued
into Afghanistan, but also with concern for and long-term commitment of the U.S. to
the growing U.S. presence in Afghanistan and Afghanistan and Pakistan, and its physical
Pakistan, the specter of renewed instability in presence in the region.
15
MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SPRING 2005
Board of Trustees
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States; Bruce Cole, Chair, National Endowment for the Humanities; Margaret Spellings, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education; Condoleezza Rice, Secretary,
U.S. Department of State; Lawrence M. Small, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
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