Ofer Zalzberg

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Renewed Tensions at Jerusalems Holy Esplanade
MARCH 14, 2017, 1:21 PM
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Ofer Zalzberg Ofer Zalzberg is Senior Analyst of the International Crisis

Groups Arab-Israeli project.
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This weeks stabbing attack at the Lions Gate of Jerusalems Old City, in which
two Israeli border police officers were injured and their assailant was killed, is
an ominous signal of growing strains around the citys Holy Esplanade (Temple
Mount / Haram al-Sharif). Tensions and clashes in and around the Esplanade are
common during Muslim and Jewish holidays, at times leading to violence far from
the site itself. It is worrying that two months before Passover and the holy
month of Ramadan, there are already signs of escalation at the site, after a
considerable period of relative calm.
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The weeklong Jewish Passover holiday, during which many Temple activists will
seek to enter the Esplanade, begins on 10 April; Ramadan commences slightly
more than a month afterward, on 26 May. If past is precedent, some Temple
activists will attempt to demonstrably defy the ban on non-Muslim prayer, part
of the historic status quo that has kept calm at the site, more or less, for over a
century.
Moreover, the current six-month waiver of US legislation requiring the
relocation of its embassy to Jerusalem will expire on June 1, within days of
Ramadans start. Even if US President Donald Trump ultimately decides to renew
the waiver, as previous presidents have done regularly citing US national
security interests, his previous stated support for moving the US embassy from
Tel Aviv may well catalyze protests. Moving the US embassy to Jerusalem would
be understood by Palestinians, and in Jordan, as support for full Israeli
sovereignty over the entire city, including its Arab parts and the al-Aqsa
Mosque.
An additional source of tension is the so-called muezzin law, banning the night-
time use of loudspeakers from houses of prayer, which has already passed a
preliminary Knesset vote. Like the possible US embassy move, it could provoke
demonstrations even if it never comes into effect. Jordan has already
condemned Israel over this for limiting mosque and church worship in East
Jerusalem, and even more strenuously denounced restrictions at the al-Aqsa
Mosque and other Waqf-run sites.
The Jerusalem Intifada of 2014 and 2015 shows that in such an incendiary
atmosphere, in which Muslims sense al-Aqsas integrity is threatened, an
increase in Palestinian protest, including violent attacks, is likely. But the mood
in 2017 will be much more combustible because the first week of June also
marks the 50th anniversary of the start of the Israeli occupation.
The past two years of fragile calm at the Esplanade were largely the product
of quiet understandings in 2014 and 2015 between Jordans King Abdullah and
Israels Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The understandings comprise four
commitments, three by Netanyahu, one by Abdullah. Netanyahu committed to
prevent entry to the Esplanade by all Knesset members, including those who
have made inflammatory statements about extending Israeli sovereignty over
the site and the replacing of the Dome of the Rock with a Jewish Temple; to
refrain from imposing, as a security measure, categorical age or gender
limitations on Muslim access, which in the past often had backfired; and to keep
provocative activists from the site and to limit the size of religious Jewish
groups permitted to enter, reinforcing the notion that the status quo provides
for non-Muslim access only for touristic purposes not religious ones. Abdullahs
single, crucial commitment was to prevent young Palestinians, who might become
the next days stone-throwers, from entering the compound at night, ostensibly
for night-time prayer (itikafh).
There are initial indications that the valuable pact may unravel. Palestinian and
Jordanian leaders have renewed their claims that Israel is harming the al-Aqsa
Mosque. This stems primarily from one key shortcoming of the understandings
themselves: they did not bridge the divergence between Israel and Jordan over
whether the Esplanades immediate environs are part of the site, as Jordan
argues, and whether Israeli archeological excavations held there without
coordination with Jordan violate the status quo.
On 1 February, the Knesset Ethics Committee decided, on the basis of the police
recommendations and due to pressures from both Jewish right-wing and Arab
Knesset members, that Israeli ministers and Knesset members will again be
permitted to visit the site as long as they observe the criteria set by the Israeli
police (particularly advance coordination of visits and not bringing cameras).
Prime Minister Netanyahu quickly reaffirmed the ban publicly in an attempt to
smother potentially inflammatory Palestinian media reports that suggested
Knesset members were already on their way to the Esplanade. Still, it is likely
that before Passover, religious Jewish Knesset members will use the Ethics
Committee decision to justify a public push to end the ban.
Moreover, a series of unrelated events late last month led Palestinian and
Jordanian ministers to protest that Israel was attacking the holy site. On 26
February, the Palestinian Authority Minister of Waqf and Religious
Affairs warned of Israeli attempts to destroy Al-Aqsa Mosque. His statement
was a reaction to a claim by the Islamic-Christian Committee to Defend
Jerusalem and Holy Sites stating that sinkholes in the neighborhood of Silwan, a
few hundred meters south of the mosque, had resulted from officially
sanctioned excavations conducted by a pro-settler organization.
Coincidentally, this was the same day that the Israeli Magistrate Court in
Jerusalem reiterated its position that Israels [Jewish] Holy Places Law applies
to the Esplanade, as part of its conviction of a Palestinian woman who attacked a
Knesset member when she visited the upper plateau of the Esplanade, near the
Dome of Rock, in November 2014. Jordans spokesperson and the PA cabinet
characterised the case as providing for Jewish worship rights at the al-Aqsa
Mosque. In fact, there was nothing new in the judgment: the court has held
since the 1980s that Jews have the right to pray at the site, but that the police
can temporarily abrogate that right when necessary to preserve public order;
the resulting temporary ban on Jewish prayer has now been in effect for over
three decades. To claim in this tense environment there was anything novel in
the courts ruling was imprecise and dangerous, though Jordan of course would
like to see the original decision granting Jews the right to pray at the site
overturned.
A few days later, on March 1, Jordan protested the completion of an Israel
Antiquities Authority project immediately south of Al-Aqsa Mosque, where the
ancient Umayyad Palaces are buried below the plateau. The construction of
wooden and concrete walkways included the installation of a sign with the
following text: purity pools used by Jewish pilgrims in the Second Temple
period. The path ends at Huldas Gates, the entry to the compound that Jews
used in ancient times. Jordan sent a letter of protest to Israels ambassador in
Amman, arguing that the works ignore the Waqfs authority over the site,
change the historical status quo and denigrate its Muslim character.
Pressures are likely to build in the run-up to the month of Ramadan, which begins
on 26 May. Internal Security Minister Gilad Erdan already has declared that he
will likely continue with his policy of allowing regular visits to the site, including
by Temple activists, subject to the limitations imposed on them by the
understandings with Jordan. However, toward the end of Ramadan, especially
during the months last ten days, the tensions caused by the entry of
controversial figures will grow in part because Jordan and Israel themselves
do not agree as to whether the historic status quo allows for non-Muslim entry
during this particularly holy period. Moreover, the periods special sanctity
makes it virtually impossible for Jordan to prevent youth from staying for the
night prayer, all but guaranteeing their presence in the morning during the visits
of Jews.
With all the threats clearly foreseeable, urgent steps are needed to maintain
the fragile calm in and around the Esplanade. Jordan and Israel should start
working out the terms of non-Muslim access to the site for Ramadan, in
particular during the final ten days of the holy period. It is high time for Jordan
and Israel to seriously consider allowing a visit by independent archeologists to
the site and its immediate environs in order to ease Israeli fears about illicit
Waqf works at the site, and to allay Muslim fears about Israeli excavations
below and around it. The U.S. should not relocate its embassy to Jerusalem
absent a broader agreement and should not even discuss the possibility, except
to discount it, in the run-up to the religious holidays.
Otherwise, by the time Ramadan arrives, it may well be too late to reverse this
dangerous course.