IV.
Property Relations Between Husband RTCs Ruling
and Wife (Arts. 74-148)
Donations Between Husband and Wife
During Marriage and Common Law Spouses,
Void :
1. Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael,
GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001; 370
SCRA 414
Background: Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed with modification the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10,
Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case
No. 4593, declaring as void a deed of donation
inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T.
Comille in her favor and its subsequent resolution
denying reconsideration.
Facts:
After the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980,
Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino
Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter
waived her share consisting of one-fourth ( 1/4) of
the property to Francisco.
On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in
his name with the Registry of Deeds. Having no
children to take care of him after his retirement,
Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the
latters cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian, and
petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take
care of his house, as well as the store inside.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the
nature of the relationship between Cirila and
Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said Francisco and
Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same
room, while Erlinda Tabancura, another niece
of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her
that Cirila was his mistress. Cirila contested that
she just a helper having authority to enter into
Franciscos room if the latter order he. She denied
they ever had sexual intercourse. On January
24, 1991, a few months before his death,
Francisco executed an instrument denominated
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos, in which he ceded
a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square
meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who
accepted the donation in the same instrument.
Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square
meters in his name. The deed stated that the
donation was being made in consideration of the
faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over
the past ten (10) years. The deed was notarized
by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. and later registered by
Cirila as its absolute owner. On October 4, 1991,
Francisco died without any children.
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a
complaint against petitioner for declaration of
nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery
of possession, and damages. Respondents, who
are the decedents nephews and nieces and his
heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila
was the common-law wife of Francisco and the
donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her
favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Article 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous
advantage, direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each
other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
executed by the late Francisco Comille recorded
as Doc. No. 7; Page No. 3; Book No. V; Series of
1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic
T. Lacaya (Annex A to the Complaint) null and
void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of
the house and lot subject of the deed unto
the plaintiffs within thirty (30) days after finality
of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fees
in the sum of P10,000.00.
CAs Ruling:
The respondent Cirila appealed to the CA but the
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence
this petition.
Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art.
87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this
case.
SC Ruling
After a review of the records, we rule in the
affirmative. The general rule is that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is grave
abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence but is contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (j) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
The Court of Appeals based its findings on
evidence presented by both parties, the general
rule should apply. In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held
that the term cohabitation or living together as
husband and wife means not only residing under
one roof, but also having repeated sexual
intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means
more than sexual intercourse, especially
when one of the parties is already old and may no
longer be interested in sex. At the very least,
cohabitation is the public assumption by a man
and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling
together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such.
It is difficult to believe that she stayed with
Francisco and served him out of pure
beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to
the conclusion that she was Franciscos common-
law spouse. Respondents having proven by a
preponderance of evidence that Cirila and
Francisco lived together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage, the inescapable
conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco
1|JRCMENDOZA L AW ARCHIVES
in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
payment of the full amount. Evidently, there was
a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner
of the Paranaque property which became the
conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife
executed an instrument acknowledging the loan
but Abelardo did not sign.

RULING OF THE RTC:

Liabilities of the Absolute Community
On June 26, 1996, the RTC Valenzuela (Branch 71)
rendered its judgement in favor of the petitioner.
2. Carlos vs. Abelardo, GR No. 146504, April
The dispositive portion reads:
9, 2002
1. Ordering the respondent and his wife,
Background:
Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo, to pay petitioner
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari
the amount of US$25,000.00 or its equivalent in
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision
Philippine Currency at the time of its payment,
of the Court of Appeals dated November 10, 2000
plus legal interest from August 24, 1994 until fully
in CA-G.R. CV No. 54464 which reversed and set
paid;
aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
2. Ordering Manuel T. Abelardo to pay
Valenzuela, Branch 172, and dismissed for
Honorio L. Carlos the amount of P500,000.00
insufficiency of evidence the complaint for a sum
representing moral damages and the further
of money and damages filed by herein petitioner
amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
Honorio Carlos against respondent Manuel
3. Ordering the respondent and his wife,
Abelardo, his son-in-law, and the latters wife,
Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo, to pay petitioner
Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo.
the amount of P100, 000.00 as attorneys fees,
plus the costs of suit.
FACTS:
On October 13, 1994, Honorio Carlos (Carlos)
RULING OF THE CA:
filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo
Respondent Abelardo appealed the decision of
(Abelardo), his son-in-law, for the recovery of
the trial court to the Court of Appeals. On
US$25,000.00 loan used to purchase a house and
November 10, 2000, the Court of Appeals
lot located in Paraaque. Carlos averred in his
reversed and set aside the trial courts decision
complaint that in October 1989, respondent and
and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo
evidence to show that the subject amount was
approached him and requested him to advance
indeed loaned by petitioner to respondent and his
the amount of US$25,000.00 Petitioner then
wife. The Court of Appeals found that the amount
issued a check in the name of a certain Pura
of US$25,000.00 was respondents share in the
Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged
profits of H.L. Carlos Construction. Hence, this
receipt thereof.
petition.
When petitioner inquired from the spouses in as
ISSUE:
to the status of the amount he loaned to them
Whether or not a loan obtained to purchase the
sometime July 1991, the latter acknowledged
conjugal dwelling can be charged against the
their obligation but pleaded that they were not
conjugal partnership.
yet in a position to make a definite settlement of
the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed
RULING OF THE SC:
violent resistance to petitioners inquiries on the
The court found merit in the petition.
amount to the extent of making various death
Early in time, it must be noted that payment of
threats against petitioner.
personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be
On August 24, 1994, petitioner made a formal
charged to the conjugal partnership except
demand for the payment of the amount of
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply
family. The defendants never denied that the
with their obligation. Consequently, petitioner
check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the
filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money
subject house and lot. They do not deny that the
and damages against respondent and his wife
same served as their conjugal home, thus
before the RTC of Valenzuela (Branch 172).
benefiting the family. Hence, defendant-husband
and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable
As the respondent and his wife were separated
in the payment of the loan.
for more than a year prior to the filing of the
complaint, they filed separate answers. Abelardo
The evidence adduced by petitioner sufficiently
contended that the amount was never intended
established his claim that the US$25,000.00 he
as a loan but his share of income on contracts
advanced to respondent and his wife was a loan.
obtained by him in the construction firm (using
The loan is the liability of the conjugal
the name H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION) and that
partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family
the petitioner could have easily deducted the
Code:
debt from his share in the profits. He also denied
having made death threats to Carlos. By way of
Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be
compulsory counterclaim, respondent asked for
liable for:
moral damages from petitioner for causing
xxx
alienation of his wifes love and affection,
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during
attorneys fee and cost of suit. Maria Theresa
the marriage by the designated administrator-
Carlos-Abelardo, on the other hand, admitted
spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
securing a loan together with her husband, from
of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them
petitioner. She claimed, however, that said loan
with the consent of the other;
was payable on a staggered basis so she was
surprised when petitioner demanded immediate

2|JRCMENDOZA L AW ARCHIVES
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited;
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover
the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties.
xxx
While respondent did not and refused to sign the
acknowledgment executed and signed by his
wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the
benefit of the family because it was used to
purchase the house and lot which became the
conjugal home of respondent and his family.
Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of
consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the
Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such
loan together with his wife.
The petition was granted. The decision of the
Court of Appeals was modified and respondent
Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner ithe
amount of US$25,000 or its equivalent in
Philippine currency at the time of payment plus
legal interest including moral and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees.
Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and
Disposition of the Community Property
3. Vda. De Ramones vs. Agbayani, GR No.
137808, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 306
FACTS:
On May 23, 1979, Santos Ramones,
without the knowledge of his wife,
Aldegonda, sold to Aurora P. Agbayani a
100-square meter portion of the conjugal
lot for P5,000.00. The Deed of Sale was
annotated by the Register of Deeds as
Entry No. 90 at the back of TCT No. T-
43468.
On March 7, 1980, Santos Ramones died.
Subsequently, Aldegonda and her
daughters Beatriz and Margarita, herein
petitioners, had a restroom and a concrete
septic tank built on the area sold by
Santos Ramones to Agbayani without
Agbayanis knowledge.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CASE (Agbayani vs
Ramones)
Agbayani filed a complaint for quieting of title
and recovery of possession against
petitioners on the basis of the Deed of Sale
executed by Santos Ramones.
The Ramoneses contended that the sale
between Santos Ramones and Agbayani is
void since it was executed without the
consent of his wife, Aldegonda Ramones.
RTC DECISION: IN FAVOR of the Ramoneses
HELD:
The Deed of Sale is void because it was executed
without the consent of the wife Aldegonda
Ramones.
COURT OF APPEALS CASE
CA DECISION: REVERSED the decision of the RTC.
Confirmed the Deed of Sale and declared
Agbayanis the absolute owners of the lot in
question.
HELD: Article 166 of the Civil Code prohibits
alienation or encumbrance of real property by the
husband without the consent of the wife. This
provision should be read with Article 173 of the
same Code providing that the wife may, during
the marriage and within ten (10) years from the
questioned transaction, ask the courts for
annulment of any contract of the husband
entered into without her consent. In other words,
the lack of consent by the wife will not make the
alienation of the conjugal property by the
husband void. It is merely voidable. SINCE THE
RAMONES WIFE DID NOT ASK FOR THE
ANNULMENT OF THE DEED OF SALE WITHIN 10
YEARS FROM THE DATE OF SALE, THE SALE IS
VALID.
SUPREME COURT CASE (Petition for Review
on Certiorari)
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of real property
belonging to the conjugal partnership by Santos
Ramones without his wifes consent is void.
SC DECISION: AFFIRMED the decision of the CA.
HELD: Since the sale was executed on May 23,
1979 before the effectivity of the Family Code,
the provisions of the Civil Code of 1950 will apply.
Clearly, Article 166 is categorical that the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the
wifes consent. This provision, however, must be
interpreted in conjunction with Article 173 of the
same Code which provides that the wife may ask
the courts for the annulment of the contract
within 10 years from its execution.
Here, there is no proof that petitioner Aldegonda
Ramones filed any complaint to annul the Deed of
Sale entered into by her husband. As held by this
Court in Villaranda,[8] her right to bring an action
to invalidate the contract has thus prescribed.
Hence, the assailed Deed is still valid and
enforceable.
Liquidation of the Absolute Community
Assets and Liabilities
4. Dael vs IAC, GR No. 68873, March 31,
1989, 171 SCRA 524
FACTS:
Cesario Cabutihan was married to Beinvenida
Durana, whom he had five children, Carmencita,
Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido all surnamed
Cabutihan. Upon the death of the wife; Cesario
contracted a second marriage with his former
wifes sister Victorina. The latter's heirs are the
children of her two sisters and a brother namely:
Bienvenida Durana, Soledad Durana and Federico
Durana Sr.; the latter is the father of the
oppositors, Federico, Jr., Flordelizada ,
Fredizvinda, Fabian and Fe Patricio, all surnamed
Durana; while Soledad Durana is the mother of
the other oppsitors, Evaristo, Domingo Jr., Lucilda
and Conrado, all surnamed Dael; the other heirs
of Vitorina Durana are the petitioner herself and
the intervenors who are all the children of
Bienvenida Durana.
3|JRCMENDOZA L AW ARCHIVES
It is claimed by all the oppositors that they are
entitled to 2/3 portion of the estate of Victorina
Durana considering that their predecessors-in-
interest are the brother and sister of Victorina
Durana; while the remaining 1/3 portion should
devolve to the petitioner and the intervenors who
represent their mother Bienvenida Durana and
the other sister of Victorina Durana.
Ruling of RTC:
Private respondents filed settlement over the
property of their deceased parents to the Court of
First Instance of Quezon by Carmencita
Cabutihan, one of the private respondents herein.
Trial Court rendered a decision holding that
Victorina Durana had no paraphernal properties
brought to her marriage with Cesario. That the
copra business was formed during the first
marriage and Victorina used the same facilities,
credit and capital in managing the business, and
the main source of the income not only of Cesario
and also of Victorina during their respective
lifetimes was the copra business.
To determine, therefore, the extent of the estate
of Victorina Durana from the list of properties,
which erroneously include even the Estate of the
First Marriage, the conjugal estate of Cesario's
first marriage must be settled or liquidated first;
one-half of the conjugal estate shall be inherited
by Cesario Cabutihan and his five (5) children, all
surnamed CABUTIHAN, the inheritance of Cesario
Cabutihan in the Estate of Bienvenida Durana in
addition to the other one (1/2) half which is his
share in the conjugal partnership with his wife
Bienvenida shall constitute Cesario's estate which
shall be inherited by his heirs, namely: Victorina
Durana, his second wife, and his legitimate
children by his first wife, all surnamed
CABUTIHAN.
Hence, the extent of the Estate of Victorina
Durana shall consist only of her share in the
inheritance of the Estate of Cesario Cabutihan.
Ruling of CA:
As a consequence, petitioners appealed to the
former Intermediate Appellate Court. Respondent
court promulgated its decision which affirmed the
decision of the lower court, hence this petition for
certiorari.
Petitioners submit that both the respondent and
lower courts erred in concluding that the copra
business, as well as the properties listed in the
inventories as acquired during the second
marriage, are assets of the conjugal partnership
of the first marriage between Cesario and
Bienvenida. They argued that to so hold would, in
effect, maintain the theory that the marital
community of proprietary interest continued to
exist even after the Cesario-Bienvenida conjugal
partnership had been dissolved by the death of
Bienvenida.
The first marriage existed for approximately
fifteen (15) years (1942 to 1957), while the
second marriage lasted for about fourteen (14)
years (1958 to 1972). Applying the aforestated
rule, the first conjugal partnership will be
prorated a share of fifteen twenty-ninths (15/29)
of the properties, while the second conjugal
partnership will get fourteen twenty-ninths
(14/29) thereof.
One-half (1/2) of the properties that pertain to the
first conjugal partnership belong to Cesario as his
conjugal share therein, while the other half shall
be considered as inherited by him and his five
children as the heirs of Bienvenida.
The properties pertaining to the second
partnership shall also be equally divided, one-half
(1/2) to belong to Cesario and the other to
Victorina as their respective shares in their
conjugal partnership properties. The share of
Cesario should then be divided among his heirs,
namely, Victorina and his five (5) children.
To recapitulate, the estate of Victorina for
distribution to her heirs shall consist of her one-
half (1/2) share in the conjugal properties of the
aforesaid second marriage and her one-sixth (1/6)
share in the estate of Cesario as an heir.
ISSUE:
Is the marital community of proprietary interest
continued to exist in the second marriage, even
after the Cesario-Beinvenida conjugal partnership
has been dissolved by the death of Bienvenida?
HOLDING:
When Bienvenida Durana died, the first conjugal
partnership was automatically dissolved. That
conjugal partnership was then converted into an
implied ordinary co-ownership. It was also at this
point in time that the inheritance was transmitted
to the heirs of Bienvenida. Thus, her heirs,
Cesario, Nonilon Carmencita Romulo, Lermo and
Bienvenido, acquired respective and definite
rights over one-half (1/2) of the conjugal
partnership property which pertained to
Bienvinida. Consequently, whatever fruits or
income may thereafter be derived from the
properties, including the copra business, would
no longer be conjugal but would belong in part to
the heirs in proportion to their respective shares.
The fruits and income of the other half of the
property of the conjugal partnership would
exclusively belong to Cesario.
The decision of the lower courts was set aside.
The properties shall be divided in the following
manner: (a) Seven-twelfths (7/12) of fifteen
twenty-ninths (15/29), and one-half (1/2) of
fourteen twenty-ninths (14/29), of the properties
listed in the inventory, shall constitute the estate
of Cesario Cabutihan. This estate shall be divided
equally among his six (6) heirs, namely, his
second wife, Victorina, and his five (5) children,
Nonilon Carmencita, Romulo, Lermo and
Bienvenido, all surnamed Cabutihan; and (b) The
remaining five-twelfths (5/12) of fifteen twenty-
ninths (15/29) of the properties shall belong to
the said five (5) children, as their respective
participations in their mother's inheritance;
The estate of Victorina Durana, shall consist of
one-half (1/2) of the other portion constituting
fourteen twenty-ninths (14/29) of the properties
which represents her share in the conjugal
properties of the second marriage, and one-sixth
(1/6) of the estate of Cesario Cabutihan as fixed
herein, and said properties shall be divided
among her heirs.
Conjugal Properties
5. Ching vs. Court of Appeals, GR No.
126642, Feb. 23, 2004
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI)
obtained two loans from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-
4|JRCMENDOZA L AW ARCHIVES
President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing
guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the
said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of
all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of
money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ
of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching
requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties
of said Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment
of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo
Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on
attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000
shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were
acquired by her and her husband during their
marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner
spouses aver that the source of funds in the
acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not
the controlling factor when invoking the
presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks
under Art. !21 and that such presumption
subsists even if the property is registered only in
the name of one of the spouses, in this case,
petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the
petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not
contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-
husbands profession or business.44
ISSUE:
WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on
by the sheriff to answer for the loans guaranteed
by petitioner Alfredo Ching
HELD:
No. The CA erred in holding that by executing a
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
with the private respondent for the payment of
the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in
the exercise of his profession, pursuing a
legitimate business.
The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be
the conjugal partnership property of the
petitioners. The private respondent failed to
adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband
acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.
The appellate court erred in concluding that the
conjugal partnership is liable for the said account
of PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership
shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases
where she may legally bind the partnership.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a
liability that should appertain to the husband
alone, there must be a showing that some
advantages accrued to the spouses.
In this case, the private respondent failed to
prove that the conjugal partnership of the
petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-
husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty
and suretyship agreement with the private
respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The
contract of loan was between the private
respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit
of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from
the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered
into an accommodation agreement or a contract
of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby
be benefited. The private respondent was
burdened to establish that such benefit
redounded to the conjugal partnership.
6. Ferrer vs. Ferrer, GR No. 166496, Nov. 9,
2006 (Art. 120)
Facts:
Petitioner Josefa alleged that she is the widow
of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), a half-brother of
respondents Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and
Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael).
Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter
acquired a piece of lot.
He applied for a loan with the SSS to build
improvements thereon, including a residential
house and a two-door apartment building.
However, he stopped paying rentals thereon,
alleging that he had acquired ownership over the
property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by
Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and
Ismael and their spouses.
When her husband was already bedridden,
respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him
sign a document, purported to be his last will and
testament. The document, however, was a Deed
of Sale covering Alfredos lot and the
improvements thereon.
Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with
the RTC of Pasig, a Complaint for Annulment of
the said sale against respondents.
RTC:
RTC dismissed the same. RTC found that the
terms and conditions of the deed of sale are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, and public
policy, and should be complied with by the
parties in good faith, there being no compelling
reason under the law to do otherwise.
CA:
The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
SC: Subsequently, on 7 November 1994, this
Court, in G.R. No. L-117067, finding no reversible
error committed by the appellate court in
affirming the dismissal of the RTC, affirmed the
Decision of the Court of Appeals.
According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC
shows that, when Alfredo died on 29 September
1999, or at the time of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, she had the right to be
reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on
Alfredos lot.
She alleged that the cost of the improvements
amounted to P500,000.00; hence, one-half
thereof should be reimbursed and paid by
respondents as they are now the registered
owners of Alfredos lot.
She averred that respondents cannot claim lack
of knowledge about the fact that the
improvements were constructed using conjugal
funds as they had occupied one of the apartment
buildings on Alfredos lot, and even paid rentals
to petitioner.
Petitioner prayed that respondents be ordered to
render an accounting from September, 1991, on
the income of the boarding house constructed
thereon which they had appropriated for
themselves, and to remit one-half thereof as her
share. Finally, petitioner sought from respondents
moral and exemplary damages, litigation and
incidental expenses.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss,
contending that petitioner had no cause of action
5|JRCMENDOZA L AW ARCHIVES
against them, and that the cause of action was
barred by prior judgment.
Note: In Case of Emergency, please refer to this
portion.
RTC:
RTC rendered an Order, denying the Motion to
Dismiss.
According to the RTC, no pronouncement as to
the improvements constructed on Alfredos lot has
been made in Civil Case No. 61327, and the
payment of petitioners share in the conjugal
partnership constitutes a separate cause of
action.A subsequent Order[11] dated 17 January
2003 was issued by the RTC, denying
respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
CA:
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for
Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
RTC in denying the dismissal.
On 16 August 2004, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision granting the Petition. It held
that petitioners Complaint is not the proper
action for the respondent to enforce her right of
reimbursement of the cost of the improvements
on the subject property.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereon.
However, on 17 December 2004, the Court of
Appeals rendered a Resolution denying the
motion.
Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
WON respondents have an obligation to respect
her right to be reimbursed
HELD:
NO. While it made a reference to the right of the
spouse as contemplated in Art. 120 22 of the
family code to be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests
on the spouse upon whom ownership of the
entire property is vested. There is no obligation
on the part of the purchaser of the property, in
case the property is sold by the owner-spouse.
Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in
determining the ownership of the improvements
that are made on the separate property of the
spouses at the expense of the partnership or
through the acts or efforts of either or both
spouses.
Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any
resulting increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the
spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership,
subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of
the improvement.The subject property was
precisely declared as the exclusive property of
Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family
Code.
What is incontrovertible is that the respondents,
despite the allegations contained in the
Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject
premises, are not petitioners spouse nor can they
ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom
the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her
costs rested.
It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to
reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse
who expended the acts or efforts, as the case
may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not
have the obligation to respect petitioners right to
be reimbursed.
The right of the respondents to acquire as buyers
the subject premises from alfredo under the
assailed Deed of Sale in Civil Case No. 61327 had
been laid to rest. This is because the validity of
the Deed of Sale had already been determined
and upheld with finality.
The petition is denied.
7. MBTC vs. Tan, GR No. 163712, Nov. 30,
2006
Facts:
On the application for extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage filed by herein petitioners Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) and its Vice
President Rogelio T. Uy (Uy), the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental issued a
"Sheriffs Notice of Sale" setting on April 17, 1998
the sale at public auction of four mortgaged
parcels of land registered in the name of herein
respondent Jose B. Tan who was referred to in the
title.
A day before the scheduled public auction of the
mortgaged properties or on April 16, 1998,
respondent spouses Jose B. Tan and Eliza Go Tan
filed a complaint3 against petitioners, along with
Albano L. Cuarto, Sheriff IV of the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff of Misamis Oriental, for removal
of cloud on the title in question and injunction
before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental.
As scheduled, the public auction of the foreclosed
properties took place on April 17, 1998 following
which the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of
Misamis Oriental issued a Sheriffs Certificate of
Sale in the name of petitioner Metrobank, the
highest bidder.
Petitioners further alleged that the deeds of real
estate mortgage, promissory notes, and credit
line agreements bore the signature of respondent
Jose B. Tan either for himself or as attorney-in-fact
of his son Ariel Tan and, in one of them, his wife-
co-respondent Eliza Go Tans signature appeared.
By way of Counterclaim, petitioners prayed for
the award of attorneys fees, compensatory
and/or moral damages, exemplary damages, and
other reliefs.
Crediting the testimony of respondent Jose B. Tan
denying having 1) executed and signed the two
amendments of the mortgage, 2) received the
amount of P40,000,000, and 3) appeared before
Notary Public Joel Pearanda who notarized11 the
mortgage for P40,000.00, and likewise crediting
the testimony of respondent Eliza Go Tan denying
that the signature appearing on the real estate
mortgage dated November 5, 1992 was hers,12
and finding that the existing loans covered by
real estate mortgages had been fully paid as of
July 1, 1997, defendant Metrobank had no basis
6|JRCMENDOZA L AW ARCHIVES
to be paid again through the extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings.
Ruling of Misamis Oriental RTC Branch 38:
Judgment in favor of respondents, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court
hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
spouses Jose B. Tan and Eliza G. Tan and against
the defendants, as follows:
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
By Decision of November 21, 2003, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision and
accordingly dismissed petitioners appeal. And it
denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Jose B. Tan is a party
to the questioned extra-judicial foreclosure and
public auction sale.
Ruling:
Respondent Jose B. Tan insisted that he was not a
party to the documents bearing on the grant of
the credit line, he pointing to the absence of his
signature above his typewritten name on the
Credit Line Agreements, promissory notes,
disclosure statements, and an Amendment of
Real Estate Mortgage. Respondents presented in
evidence Promissory Notes Exhibits "B-2" and
"B-4" dated July 1, 1997 and June 24, 1997,
respectively.
All document-exhibits of petitioners which are
original copies bear the signature of respondent
Jose B. Tan, however, as solidary co-debtor of his
sons Rey John Tan and Ariel Tan. And these
documents were annotated at the back of the
title in question.
In the absence of proof, any allegation, that the
signatures of respondent Jose B. Tan on the
abovementioned documents were forged, this
Court is constrained to uphold their genuineness.
As for the claim that respondent Eliza Go Tan did
not give her consent to the mortgage of the title
in question, the same is belied by her signature
on Exhibit "18"-Real Estate Mortgage which is
annotated as Entry No. 174644 at the back of the
title. Her bare denial that the signature was
forged, without more, does not lie.
The property subject of the mortgage is
registered in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of
legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos."
Thus, title is registered in the name of Corazon
alone because the phrase "married to Rogelio
Ruiz" is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Corazon and should not be construed to mean
that her husband is also a registered owner.
Furthermore, registration of the property in the
name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to
Rogelio Ruiz" is not proof that such property was
acquired during the marriage, and thus, is
presumed to be conjugal. The property could
have been acquired by Corazon while she was
still single, and registered only after her marriage
to Rogelio Ruiz. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. The
presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code
that properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the
instant case. Before such presumption can apply,
it must first be established that the property was
in fact acquired during the marriage. In other
words, proof of acquisition during the marriage is
a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. No
such proof was offered nor presented in the case
at bar.
In fine, the extra-judicial foreclosure and
subsequent sale of the mortgaged property
covered by the title in question was valid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the appellate court is SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. 98-225, "Jose B. Tan and
Eliza Go Tan v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, et al.," filed before and raffled to
Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, is DISMISSED.
8. Matthews vs. Taylor, Gr. No. 164584, June
22, 2009
Facts:
1. On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin, a
British subject, married Joselyn, a 17-year old
Filipina.
2. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was
subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a
lot (Boracay property).
3. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
4. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters
funds, constructed improvements thereon and
eventually converted the property to a vacation
and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow
Inn.
5. All required permits and licenses for the
operation of the resort were obtained in the name
of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister.
6. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling
out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen.
7. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a SPA in
favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to
maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise
enter into contract with third parties with respect
to their Boracay property.
8. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and
petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into
an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay
property for a period of 25 years, with an annual
rental of P12,000.00.
9. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the
property and renamed the resort as Music Garden
Resort.
10. Claiming that the Agreement was null and
void since it was entered into by Joselyn without
Benjamins consent, Benjamin instituted an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of
Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the
petitioner.
11. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in
the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay
property, and coupled with the fact that he was
Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said
property required his consent.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Agreement of Lease of a
parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife
without the consent of her British husband is
valid
2. Whether or not Benjamin is the actual owner of
the property since he provided the funds used in
purchasing the same
Ruling:
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
states:
7|JRCMENDOZA L AW ARCHIVES
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession,
no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have
been disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited
constitutional provision, they are also disqualified
from acquiring private lands. The primary
purpose of this constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony. Our
fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right
to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved
only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least
sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by
Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are
absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private
lands in the Philippines, save only in
constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is
no rule more settled than this constitutional
prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to
circumvent the provision by trying to own lands
through another.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of
Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin,
being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from
acquiring private and public lands in the
Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to
be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale
of said property, she acquired sole ownership
thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins
claim that he provided the funds for such
acquisition. By entering into such contract
knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was
created in his favor; no reimbursement for his
expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can
be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In
any event, he had and has no capacity or
personality to question the subsequent lease of
the Boracay property by his wife on the theory
that in so doing, he was merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would
countenance indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to
be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien
husband a substantial interest and right over the
land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to
its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
Liabilities of the Conjugal Partnership
9. Carandang vs. Heirs of Quirino de
Guzman, GR No. 160347, Nov. 29, 2006
NATURE OF THE CASE: This case reached the
Supreme Court as an appeal to the decision of
the CA ruling against the spouses Carandang and
denying their motion for reconsideration. The CA
affirmed the RTCs decision that Milagros de
Guzman, the decedents wife, is not an
indispensable party in the complaint, hence, her
non-inclusion in the case does not warrant a
dismissal of the complaint.
FACTS: Spouses Carandang and the decedent
Quirino de Guzman were stockholders and
corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting
System (MBS). The Carandangs have equities at
54 % while Quirino has 46%.
When the capital stock of MBS was increased on
November 26, 1983, the Carandangs subscribed
P345,000 from it, P293,250 from the said amount
was loaned by Quirino to the Carandangs. In the
subsequent increase in MBS capital stock on
March 3, 1989, the Carandangs subscribed again
to the increase in the amount of P93,750. But,
P43,125 out of the mentioned amount was again
loaned by Quirino.
When Quirino sent a demand letter to the
Carandangs for the payment of the loan, the
Carandangs refused to pay. They contend that a
pre-incorporation agreement was executed
between Arcadio Carandang and Quirino,
whereby Quirino promised to pay for the stock
subscriptions of the Arcadio without cost, in
consideration for Arcadios technical expertise,
his newly purchased equipment, and his skill in
repairing and upgrading radio/communication
equipment therefore, there is no indebtedness on
the part of the Carandangs.
Thereafter, Quirino filed a complaint seeking to
recover the P336,375 total amount of the loan
together with damages. The RTC ruled in favor of
Quirino and ordered the Carandangs to pay the
loan plus interest, attorneys fees, and costs of
suit. The Carandangs appealed the trial courts
decision to the CA, but the CA affirmed the same.
The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the Carandangs were also denied. Hence, this
appeal to the SC.
SPOUSES CARANDANG: Three of the four
checks used to pay their stock subscriptions were
issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the
decedents wife. Thus, Milagros should be
considered as an indispensable party in the
complaint. Being such, the failure to join Milagros
as a party in the case should cause the dismissal
of the action by reason of a jurisprudence stating
that: (i)f a suit is not brought in the name of or
against the real party in interest, a motion to
dismiss may be filed on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action."
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC should have
dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of
action, considering that Milagros de Guzman,
allegedly an indispensable party, was not
included as a party-plaintiff.
HELD: No. Although the spouses Carandang were
correct in invoking the aforementioned doctrine,
the ground set forth entails an examination of
whether the parties presently pleaded are
interested in the outcome of the litigation, and
not whether all persons interested in such
outcome are actually pleaded. The first query
seeks to answer the question of whether Milagros
is a real party in interest, while the latter query is
asking if she is an indispensable party. Since the
issue of this case calls for the definition of an
indispensable party, invoking the
abovementioned doctrine is irrelevant to the case
because the doctrine talks about a real party in
interest and not an indispensable party.
Although it is important to take note that an
indispensable party is also a real party in interest.
*Definitions:
> Real party in interest the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment of the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
> Indispensable party a party in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an
action
8|JRCMENDOZA L AW ARCHIVES
> Necessary party one who is not indispensable
but who ought to be joined as a party if complete
relief is to be accorded as to those already
parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action
> Pro-forma parties those who are required to
be joined as co-parties in suits by or against
another party as may be provided by the
applicable substantive law or procedural rule.
An example is provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. Husband and wife
shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by
law.
Pro-forma parties can either be indispensable,
necessary or neither indispensable nor necessary.
The third case occurs if, for example, a husband
files an action to recover a property which he
claims to be part of his exclusive property. The
wife may have no legal interest in such property,
but the rules nevertheless require that she be
joined as a party.
Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married
before the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988. As they did not execute any
marriage settlement, the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains govern their property
relations.
All property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved. Credits are
personal properties, acquired during the time the
loan or other credit transaction was executed.
Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the
marriage are presumed to be conjugal property.
Assuming that the four checks are credits, they
are assumed to be conjugal properties of Quirino
and Milagros. There being no evidence to the
contrary, such presumption subsists. As such,
Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of specific
partnership property, is certainly a real party in
interest.
Now, with regard to the discussion on the effect
of non-inclusion of parties in the complaint filed:
in indispensable parties, when an indispensable
party is not before the court, the action should be
dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actuations of the court
void, for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present.
For necessary parties, the non-inclusion of a
necessary party does not prevent the court from
proceeding in the action, and the judgment
rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the
rights of such necessary party. Non-compliance
with the order for the inclusion of a necessary
party would not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint. Lastly, for pro-forma parties, the
general rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must be
followed: such non-joinder is not a ground for
dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action
to recover a sum of money, we held that the
failure to join the spouse in that case was not a
jurisdictional defect. The non-joinder of a spouse
does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a
formal requirement which may be cured by
amendment.
Conversely, in the instances that the pro-forma
parties are also indispensable or necessary
parties, the rules concerning indispensable or
necessary parties, as the case may be, should be
applied. Thus, dismissal is warranted only if the
pro-forma party not joined in the complaint is an
indispensable party.
Under Art. 147 of the Civil Code which was
superceded by Art. 108 of the Family Code, the
conjugal partnership shall be governed by the
rules on the contract of partnership. Thus,
Milagros is a co-owner of the subject personal
property in this case the credit incurred by
spouses Carandang. Being co-owners of the
alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman
may separately bring an action for the recovery
thereof.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-
owners are real parties in interest. However,
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may
bring an action, any kind of action, for the
recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only
one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who
filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned
property, is an indispensable party thereto. The
other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be accorded in the suit even
without their participation, since the suit is
presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all
co-owners.
Thus, Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable
party in the action for the recovery of the
allegedly loaned money to the spouses
Carandang. As such, she need not have been
impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of the suit is
not warranted by her not being a party thereto.
(The Civ Pro issue was not the main issue in the
case.)
10. SBTC vs. Mar Tierra Corp., GR No.
143382, Nov. 29, 2006
Facts:
Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its
president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a
P12,000,000 credit accommodation with
petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company.
Petitioner approved the application and entered
into a credit line agreement with respondent
corporation. It was secured by an indemnity
agreement executed by individual respondents
Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo
A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and
severally with respondent corporation for the
payment of the loan.
Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its
debt balance as it suffered business reversals,
eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent corp and individual
respondents.
RTC:
Unable to collect the balance of the loan,
petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money
with a prayer for preliminary attachment against
respondent corporation and individual
respondents in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 66. It was docketed as Civil Case
No. 3947.
Subsequently, however, petitioner had the case
dismissed with respect to individual respondents
Lacson and Lopa,2leaving Martinez as the
remaining individual respondent.
9|JRCMENDOZA L AW ARCHIVES
RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and
personal properties of respondent corporation
and individual respondent Martinez including the
conjugal house and lot of the spouses. It held
respondent corporation and individual respondent
Martinez jointly and severally liable to petitioner
for P5,304,000 plus 12% interest per annum and
5% penalty commencing on June 21, 1982 until
fully paid, plus P10,000 as attorneys fees. But it
found that it did not redound to the benefit of his
family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the
attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the
spouses Martinez.
CA:
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, petitioner
appealed to the CA but the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts decision in toto.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable
for an indemnity agreement entered into by the
husband to accommodate a third party.
HELD:
No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the
Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for
all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de
Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for
another, the husband does not act for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is
clearly intended for a third party.
In Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if
the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money
and services to be used in or for his own business
or profession, the transaction falls within the term
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. In other words, where the husband
contracts an obligation on behalf of the family
business, there is a legal presumption that such
obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
On the other hand, if the money or services are
given to another person or entity and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the
transaction cannot by itself be deemed an
obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family.
In the case at bar, the principal contract, the
credit line agreement between petitioner and
respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit
of the latter. The accessory contract (the
indemnity agreement) under which individual
respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a
surety for respondent corporation was similarly
for the latters benefit. Petitioner had the burden
of proving that the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction.
It failed to discharge that burden.
Administration of the Conjugal
Partnership Property
11. Abalos vs. Macatangay, Jr., GR No.
155043, September 30, 2004; 439 SCRA 649
FACTS:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the
registered owners of a parcel of land with
improvements. Arturo made a Receipt and
Memorandum of Agreement in favor of
Macatangay, binding himself to sell to latter the
subject property and not to offer the same to any
other party within 30 days from date. Full
payment would also be effected as soon as
possession of the property shall have been turned
over to Macatangay. Macatangay gave an earnest
money amounting to P5,000.00 to be deducted
from the purchase price of P1,300,000.00 in favor
of the spouses.
Subsequently, Arturo and Esther had a marital
squabble brewing at that time and Macatangay,
to protect his interest, made an annotation in the
title of the property. He then sent a letter
informing them of his readiness to pay the full
amount of the purchase price. Esther, through her
SPA, executed in favor of Macatangay, a Contract
to sell the property to the extent of her conjugal
interest for the sum of P650,000 less the sum
already received by her and Arturo. She agreed to
surrender the property to Macatangay within 20
days along with the deed of absolute sale upon
full payment, while he promised to pay the
balance of the purchase price for P1, 290,000.00
after being placed in possession of the property.
Macatangay informed them that he was ready to
pay the amount in full. The couple failed to
deliver the property so he sued the spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a contract of sale
between Arturo and Galicano?
RULING OF THE RTC:
Macatangay filed a complaint against the
petitioner Abalos for specific performance to
execute in favor of herein respondent a deed of
sale over the subject property. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of
Macatangay for specific performance. It ruled that
the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) ostensibly
issued by Esther in favor of Arturo was void as it
was falsified. Hence, the court concluded that the
SPA could not have authorized Arturo to sell the
property to respondent. The trial court also noted
that the check issued by respondent to cover the
earnest money was dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds and while it was replaced
with another check by respondent, there is no
showing that the second check was issued as
payment for the earnest money on the property.
RULING OF THE CA:
On appeal taken by respondent Macatangay, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court. It ruled that the SPA in favor of Arturo,
assuming that it was void, cannot affect the
transaction between Esther and respondent. The
appellate court ratiocinated that it was by virtue
of the SPA executed by Esther, in favor of her
sister, that the sale of the property to respondent
was effected. On the other hand, the appellate
court considered the RMOA executed by Arturo in
favor of respondent valid to effect the sale of
Arturos conjugal share in the property
RULING OF THE COURT:
Dissatisfied with the appellate courts disposition
of the case, petitioner Abalos seeks a reversal of
its decision. The Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the CA. It ruled that Arturos action for
specific performance must fail. Even on the
10 | J R C M E N D O Z A L A W A R C H I V E S
supposition that the parties only disposed of their
respective shares in the property, the sale,
assuming that it exists, is still void, the right of
the husband or the wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non
habet. No one can give what he has not.
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated
as administrator of the conjugal partnership,
cannot validly alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the
wifes consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose
of any property belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the conformity of the
husband. The law is explicit that the wife cannot
bind the conjugal partnership without the
husbands consent, except in cases provided by
law.
In all instances, the present law specifically
requires the written consent of the other spouse,
or authority of the court for the disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal partnership property
without which, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void.
Sale/Mortgage of properties of the
conjugal partnership needs the consent
of the spouses; Otherwise, void
12. Jose Uy, et. al., vs. CA, et. al., GR No.
109557, November 29, 2000
Facts:
Background: The case is an appeal via certiorari
from the decision of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution denying reconsideration, reversing that
of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo, Branch 32 and
declaring void the special proceedings instituted
therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner
Gilda L. Jardeleza, in view of the comatose
condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.,
with the approval of the court, to dispose of their
conjugal property in favor of co-petitioners, their
daughter and son in law, for the ostensible
purpose of financial need in the personal,
business and medical expenses of her
incapacitated husband.
Relevant Dates:
-March 25, 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is
suffering of a stroke which left him comatose and
bereft of any motor or mental faculties.
-June 6, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza(son), upon
learning that one piece of real property belonging
to the senior Jardeleza spouses was about to be
sold , filed a petition before the R.T.C. of Iloilo
City, Branch 25
The petitioner averred therein that the present
physical and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from competently
administering his properties, and in order to
prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas
real and personal assets, there was a need for a
court-appointed guardian to administer said
properties and guardianship be in favour of Gilda
Ledesma Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. It was further prayed that in the meantime, no
property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be
negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to
third persons.
-June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza
herself filed a petition docketed as Special
Proceeding NO. 4691, before Branch 32 of the
R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of
incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of
sole powers of administration of conjugal
properties, and authorization to sell the same.
Therein, the petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred
the physical and mental incapacity of her
husband, who was then confined for intensive
medical care and treatment at the Iloilo Doctors
Hospital. She signified to the court her desire to
assume sole powers of administration of their
conjugal properties. She also alleged that her
husbands medical treatment and hospitalization
expenses were piling up, accumulating to several
hundred thousands of pesos already.
- June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo
City issued an Order (Annex C) finding the
petition in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to be sufficient in
form and substance, and setting the hearing
thereof for June 20, 1991.
Ruling of RTC
- June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City
rendered its decision.
1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioners
husband, to be incapacitated and unable to
participate in the administration of conjugal
properties;
2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to
assume sole powers of administration of their
conjugal properties; and
3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No.
4291 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, situated in
Iloilo City and covered by TCT No. 47337 issued in
the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L.
Jardeleza and the buildings standing thereof.
Petitioners Action:
-On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro
Jardeleza, being unaware and not knowing that a
decision has already been rendered filed his
Opposition to the proceedings before Branch 32
-On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro
Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration of the
judgment. He propounded the argument that the
petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption
of sole powers of administration, and authority to
sell the conjugal properties was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and
properties of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such, it
cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the
provisions on summary proceedings set out in
Article 253 of the Family Code. RTC denied the
petition, hence appealed to CA
Ruling of Court of Appeal
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the
property to her daughter and son in law. Upon
the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision
of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property under
Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a
parcel of land with its improvements.
Ruling of Supreme Court
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on
summary proceedings does not apply to cases
where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated
or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial
court found that subject spouse was incompetent
who was in a comatose condition and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the
proper remedy is a judicial guardianship
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The
law provides that wife who assumes sole powers
11 | J R C M E N D O Z A L A W A R C H I V E S
of administration has the same powers and duties
as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who
desires to sell real property as administrator of
the conjugal property, must observe the
procedure for the sale of the wards estate
required of judicial guardians, and not the
summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC
further held that such incapacity of the trial court
to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null
and void on the ground of lack of due process.
13. Bautista vs. Silva, 502 SCRA 334, Sept.
19, 2006
Background:
To establish his status as a buyer for value in
good faith, a person dealing with land registered
in the name of and occupied by the seller need
only show that he relied on the face of the seller's
certificate of title. But for a person dealing with
land registered in the name of and occupied by
the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted,
such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code
or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show
that he inquired into the latter's capacity to sell in
order to establish himself as a buyer for value in
good faith. The extent of his inquiry depends on
the proof of capacity of the seller. If the proof of
capacity consists of a special power of attorney
duly notarized, mere inspection of the face of
such public document already constitutes
sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of
attorney is provided or there is one but there
appear flaws in its notarial acknowledgment mere
inspection of the document will not do; the buyer
must show that his investigation went beyond the
document and into the circumstances of its
execution.
Appealed by Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
November 21, 2001 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which affirmed in toto the January
10, 1995 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) and the February 27, 2003 CA Resolution
which denied the motion for reconsideration filed
by Spouses Bautista.
FACTS:
Spouses Berlina Silva and Pedro Silva (Pedro)
were the owners of a parcel of land with a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No B-37189,
which was registered on August 14, 1980 in their
names. On March 3, 1988, Pedro, thru a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by
Berlina in his favor, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the said parcel of land in favor of
Spouses Bautista. Berlina, at the time of sale was
in Germany working as a Nurse. After the
execution of sale, TCT No B-37189 was cancelled
and in lieu thereof, TCT No. V-27655 was issued
under the names of Spouses Bautista on March 4,
1988.
A civil case in RTC Valenzuela (Branch 71) for
annulment of Dead of Absolute Sale and TCT No.
V-27655 and Reconveyance and Damages was
filed by Berlina against Spouses Bautista.
Based on the evidence presented, the RTC also
found that the signature appearing on the Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) as that of Berlina is a
forgery, and that consequently the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in favor of
Spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlina.
RULING OF THE RTC:
On January 10, 1995, the RTC Valenzuela (Branch
71) rendered its judgement on the case filed by
Berlina against Spouses Bautista stating:
1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 3, 1988 executed by Pedro M. Silva null
and void and the resulting Transfer Certificate of
Title No. V-2765 of Valenzuela Registry in the
name of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista
cancelled and that Transfer Certificate of Title No.
B-37189 reinstated.
2. Ordering respondents to reconvey the
property covered by the said Transfer Certificate
of Title No. V-2765 together with the
improvements thereon to the petitioner.
3. Condemning the respondents to pay the
petitioner the sum of P5,000.00 in the concept of
reasonable attorney's fees and the costs of suit.
RULING OF THE CA:
Spouses Bautista filed an appeal with the CA
which, in its November 21, 2001 Decision,
affirmed in toto the RTC decision; and, in a
Resolution dated February 27, 2003, denied the
Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioners are considered as
purchasers in good faith and for value having
relied upon a SPA which appears legal, valid and
genuine on its face
2. Whether the nullity of the deed of sale
includes the one half share of the husband gratia
argument (for the sake of argument) that the SPA
is a forgery and the deed of sale executed by the
husband is null and void
RULING OF THE SC:
There is no merit to petitioners claim that they
are purchasers in good faith. There was positive
and convincing evidence that respondent did not
sign the SPA. The SPA, being a forgery, did not
vest in Pedro any authority to alienate the subject
property without the consent of respondent.
Absent such marital consent, the deed of sale
was a nullity.
The petitioners are not buyers in good faith. To
prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled
land need only show that he relied on the face of
the title to the property. He need not prove that
he made further inquiry for he is not obliged to
explore beyond the four corners of the title. Such
degree of proof of good faith, however, is
sufficient only when the following conditions
concur; (1) the seller is the registered owner of
the land; (2) the latter is in possession thereof;
(3) at the time of the sale, the buyer was not
aware of any claim or interest of some other
person in the property or of any defect or
restriction in the title of the seller or in his
capacity to convey title to the property.
Any absence on one or two of the foregoing, then
the law itself puts the buyer on notice and obliges
the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence
by scrutinizing the certificate of title and
examining all factual circumstances in order to
determine the sellers title and capacity to
transfer any interest in the property. Failure to
exercise such degree of precaution makes him a
buyer in bad faith. To prove good faith then,
petitioners must show that they inquired not only
into the title of Pedro but also into his capacity to
sell.
In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina
was in Germany at the time they were buying the
property and the SPA relied upon by petitioners
12 | J R C M E N D O Z A L A W A R C H I V E S
has a defective notarial acknowledgement. The
SPA was only a photocopy and did not contain
notarial seal. There being no notarial seal, the
signature of the notary public on the certificate
was incomplete making it a mere private
document in which petitioners cannot foist as a
banner of good faith.
As to the second issue, the petitioners cannot
retain the portion of Pedro Silva in the subject
property. It is well-settled that the nullity of sale
of conjugal property contracted by the husband
without the consent of the wife affects the entire
property and not just the share of the wife.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated November 21, 2001 and
Resolution dated February 27, 2003 of the Court
of Appeal are AFFIRMED.
14. Spouses Aggabao vs. Dionisio Parulan,
Jr., et. al., Gr. No. 165803, September 1,
2010
FACTS:
On March 18, 1991, an absolute sale of land
was executed between Ma. Elena Parulan and the
spouses Rex and Concepcion Aggabao. The two
parcels of land subject of the sale were part of
the conjugal property of the estranged couple Ma.
Elena Parulan and Dionision Parulan. Among the
documents presented by Ma. Elena to the
Aggabaos was a copy of the special power of
attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by Dionisio
authorizing Ma. Elena to sell the property.
Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate
owners copy of TCT# 63376 of one of the lots to
the petitioners. The spouses later learned that
the said copy was in the custody of Atty. Jeremy
Parulan, brother of Dionisio, who also had an SPA
authorizing him to sell the lots. Despite this and
other past issues related to the property, the
spouses fully paid the lots to Ma. Elena.
On April 15, 1991, Dionisio through Atty.
Parulan, commenced a civil action praying for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute
sale and the cancellation of the title issued to the
petitioners by virtue thereof. The petitioners also
filed their own action for specific performance
against the petitioners on July 12, 1991.
MAIN ISSUE:
Whether the sale of conjugal property made by
respondent wife, Ma. Elena Parulan, by presenting
a special power of attorney to sell (SPA)
purportedly executed by respondent husband,
Dionisio Parulan, in her favor was validly made to
the vendees (the spouses Aggabaos), who
allegedly acted in good faith and paid the full
purchase price, despite the showing by the
husband that his signature on the SPA had been
forged and that the SPA had been executed
during his absence from the country.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CASE (Parulan vs
Aggabao)
RTC DECISION:
IN FAVOR of Dionisio Parulan without prejudice to
any action that may be filed by the Sps. Aggabao
against co-defendant Ma. Elena Parulan for the
amounts they paid her for the purchase of the
subject lots. ANNULLED the deed of sale for
want of the written consent of respondent
husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr.
HELD:
The RTC declared that the SPA in the hands of Ma.
Elena was a forgery, based on its finding, among
others, that Dionisio had been out of the country
at the time of the execution of the SPA.
Moreover, the RTC rejected the defense of the
petitioners that they were buyers in good faith
because of their failure to exercise ordinary
prudence, including demanding from Ma. Elena a
court order authorizing her to sell the properties
similar to the order that the Los Baos Rural Bank
had required before accepting the mortgage of
the property. It observed that they had appeared
to be in a hurry to consummate the transaction
despite the brokers advice that they first consult
a lawyer before buying the property; that with
ordinary prudence, they should first have
obtained the owners duplicate copies of the TCTs
before paying the full amount of the
consideration; and that the sale was void
pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code.
COURT OF APPEALS CASE
CA DECISION: AFFIRMED the decision of
the RTC.
HELD:
CA opined that Article 124 of the Family Code
applied because Dionisio had not consented to
the sale of the conjugal property by Ma. Elena;
and that the RTC correctly found the SPA to be a
forgery.
SUPREME COURT CASE (Petition for Review on
Certiorari)
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Article 173 of the Civil Code
and not Article 124 of the Family Code should
apply to the sale of the conjugal property
executed without the consent of Dionisio.
2) Whether or not the petitioners are in good faith
at the time of their purchase of the property.
SC DECISION:
SUSTAINED the decision of the CA.
DENIED the petition for review on certiorari.
HELD:
The vendees were not buyers in good faith,
because they did not exercise the necessary
prudence to inquire into the wifes authority to
sell. We hold that the sale of conjugal property
without the consent of the husband was not
merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be
ratified.
1) Article 173 of the Family Code was already
repealed by Article 254 of the Family Code. Since
the sale was executed on March 18, 1991 after
the effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions
of the Family Code shall apply. Thus the proper
law is Article 124 of the Family Code which
provides that:
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated
or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of
the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or
13 | J R C M E N D O Z A L A W A R C H I V E S
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void
2) It is true that a buyer of registered land needs
only to show that he has relied on the face of the
certificate of title to the property, for he is not
required to explore beyond what the certificate
indicates on its face.
Yet, it ought to be plain enough to the petitioners
that the issue was whether or not they had
diligently inquired into the authority of Ma. Elena
to convey the property, not whether or not the
TCT had been valid and authentic, as to which
there was no doubt. Thus the SC cannot side
with the petitioners.
What was required of them by the appellate
court, which the SC affirms, was merely to
investigate as any prudent vendee should the
authority of Lolita to sell the property and to bind
the partnership. They had knowledge of facts that
should have led them to inquire and to
investigate, in order to acquaint themselves with
possible defects in her title. The law requires
them to act with the diligence of a prudent
person; in this case, their only prudent course of
action was to investigate whether respondent had
indeed given his consent to the sale and
authorized his wife to sell the property.
Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership's
Assets and Liabilities
15. Quiao vs. Quiao, G.R. No. 176556, July 4,
2012
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The
petitioner seeks to set aside the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of
Resolution defining the net profits subject of the
forfeiture as a result of the decree of legal
separation in accordance with the provision of
Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or alternatively,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 176 of
the Civil Code.
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal
separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
(Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the
legal separation thereby awarding the custody of
their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all
remaining properties shall be divided equally
between the spouses subject to the respective
legitimes of the children and the payment of the
unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children because Brigido is
the offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration
and appeal within the period 270 days later or
after more than nine months from the
promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed
before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking
the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned.
Ruling of RTC:
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED
denotes the remainder of the properties of the
parties after deducting the separate properties of
each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further
held that after determining the remainder of the
properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children because the offending spouse
does not have any right to any share of the net
profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2)
and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is
wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family
Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly
argues that Article 102 applies because there is
no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as
a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute
community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is applicable in this case.
Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested
rights overof the properties in the conjugal
partnership NO.
3. Is the computation of net profits earned in
the conjugal partnership of gains the same with
the computation of net profits earned in the
absolute community? NO.
RATIO:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to
the promulgation of the current family code, the
default rule is that In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the
spouses marriage the operative law is already
the Family Code, the same applies in the instant
case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family
Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property
relations between the spouses is governed by the
regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the
Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights
over half of the properties of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of
the Civil Code, which provides: All property of
the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife.
While one may not be deprived of his vested
right, he may lose the same if there is due
process and such deprivation is founded in law
and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded
his right to due process. First, he was well-aware
that the respondent prayed in her complaint that
all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.
In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that
the trial court divide the community assets
between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the
accounting and inventory of all the community
properties of the parties. Second, when the
decision for legal separation was promulgated,
the petitioner never questioned the trial courts
ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as
net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the
Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
being deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute
community, the husband and the wife become
14 | J R C M E N D O Z A L A W A R C H I V E S
joint owners of all the properties of the marriage.
Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage
(except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the
couples properties. And when the couples
marriage or community is dissolved, that
common mass is divided between the spouses, or
their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion
the parties have established, irrespective of the
value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is
applicable, since it has been established that the
spouses have no separate properties, what will be
divided equally between them is simply the net
profits. And since the legal separationshare
decision of Brigido states that the in the net
profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido
will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a
regime of conjugal partnership of gains under
Article142 of the Civil Code, the husband and
the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution
of the marriage or of the partnership, the net
gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage. From the
foregoing provision, each of the couple has his
and her own property and debts. The law does
not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those
debts or properties between the spouses. Rather,
it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already
established by the trial court that the spouses
have no separate properties, there is nothing to
return to any of them. The listed properties above
are considered part of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed
properties should be divided equally between the
spouses and/or their respective heirs. However,
since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty
party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in
the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal
partnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the guilty
partys favor.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED.
Acting on the Motion for Clarification dated July 7,
2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated
January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby CLARIFIED in accordance with the above
discussions.
Exclusive Cohabitation of Capacitated
Persons Without Marriage; Cohabitation
under a Void Marriage
16. Alain M. Dio vs. Ma. Caridad L. Dio,
GR. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
Facts:
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio
(respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984
until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live
together again. On 14 January 1998, they were
married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias
City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged
that respondent failed in her marital obligation to
give love and support to him, and had abandoned
her responsibility to the family, choosing instead
to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with
her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not
faithful, and would at times become violent and
hurt him.
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a
petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage
with petitioner, which was granted by the
Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001.
Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001,
respondent married a certain Manuel V.
Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias
prosecutor found that there were no indicative
facts of collusion between the parties and the
case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical
psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
deeply ingrained in her system since her early
formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondents disorder was long-lasting and by
nature, incurable.
Ruling of the RTC:
The RTC granted the petition for the declaration
of the nullity of the marriage as well as the
dissolution of the property regime absolute
community of property with respect to Article
50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a motion for partial
reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the
absolute community of property and the ruling
that the decree of annulment shall only be issued
upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code.
The RTC partially granted the motion and
modified the previous ruling with respect to the
dissolution of the absolute community of
marriage stating that - A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
Hence, this petition for review by certiorari
Ruling of the CA:
No ruling of the CA in this case. The petitioner
here invoke Rule 45 of the Rule in Civil Procedure
which is about the Appeal by Certiorari to the
Supreme Court which provides that - A party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment
or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall
raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.
Issue:
15 | J R C M E N D O Z A L A W A R C H I V E S
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial
court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
The court affirmed the decision of the RTC with a
modification that that the decree of absolute
nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon
finality of the trial courts decision without waiting
for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the
following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated
to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage,
or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and
there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred
in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
17. Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. Vs. Eden Villena
Aguila, G.R. No. 202370, September 23,
2013
Facts:
Juan Salas and Eden Aguila were married in
September 1985. Five months after, Aguila gave
birth to their daughter, Josan Jiselle. Salas left
their conjugal dwelling and since then no longer
communicated with Aguila or their daughter. In
2003, Aguila filed a petition for nullity of
marriage, stating that they have no conjugal
properties whatsoever.
In 2007, the RTC rendered a decision declaring
the nullity of marriage. After this declaration,
Aguila filed a manifestation stating that she
discovered two properties belonging to Salas. The
registered owner of the Discovered properties is
Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.
Rubina is Salas common-law wife. The RTC
granted the petition of the said discovered
properties that are among the conjugal properties
to be partitioned and distributed between Salas
and Aguila. However, Rubina filed a Complaint-in-
Intervention, claiming that the Discovered
Properties are her paraphernal properties. She
claims that she authorized her brother to
purchase the same, but because he was not well-
versed with legal documentation, he registered
the properties in the name of Juan S. Salas,
married to Rubina C. Salas.
Ruling of the RTC (Second Ruling)
The RTC found that Salas failed to prove his
allegation that Aguila transferred the Waived
Properties to third persons. The RTC emphasized
that it cannot go beyond the TCTs, which state
that Salas is the registered owner of the
Discovered Properties. The RTC further held that
Salas and Rubina were at fault for failing to
correct the TCTs, if they were not married as they
claimed.
Ruling of the CA:
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA
ruled that Aguilas statement in her petition is not
a judicial admission. The CA pointed out that the
petition was filed on 7 October 2003, but Aguila
found the Discovered Properties only on 17 April
2007 or before the promulgation of the RTC
decision. Thus, the CA concluded that Aguila was
palpably mistaken in her petition and it would be
unfair to punish her over a matter that she had
no knowledge of at the time she made the
admission.
Issue:
Whether Rubina owns the Discovered Properties
Ruling of the Supreme Court:
No. On both Salas and Rubina's contention that
Rubina owns the Discovered Properties, we
likewise find the contention unmeritorious. The
TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina
C. Salas" is the registered owner of the
Discovered Properties. A Torrens title is generally
a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the
land referred to, because there is a strong
presumption that it is valid and regularly issued.
The phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of
the civil status of the registered owner.
Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute the
ownership of the Discovered Properties in his
opposition to the manifestation. It was only when
Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubina's
statement that she owns the Discovered
Properties.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title
or her legal interest in the Discovered Properties,
she has no right to intervene in this case. The
Rules of Court provide that only "a person who
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court
or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court,
be allowed to intervene in the action."
In Dio v. Dio, we held that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the union of parties who
are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them
in equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
16 | J R C M E N D O Z A L A W A R C H I V E S
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is
in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants.
In the absence of descendants, such share shall
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied)
Under this property regime, property acquired
during the marriage is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through the couple's joint
efforts and governed by the rules on co-
ownership. 29 In the present case, Salas did not
rebut this presumption. In a similar case where
the ground for nullity of marriage was also
psychological incapacity, we held that the
properties acquired during the union of the
parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA,
would be governed by co-ownership. 30
Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered
Properties as ordered by the RTC and the CA
should be sustained, but on the basis of co-
ownership and not on the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM
the Decision dated 16 March 2012 and the
Resolution dated 28 June 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322.
Other Kinds of Cohabitation
18. Villanueva et. al. vs. Court of Appeals,
et. al., G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Facts:
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife
of defendant Nicolas Retuya, having been
married to the latter on October 7, 1926. Out of
the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children,
namely, Natividad, Angela, Napoleon, Salome,
and Roberta. Spouses Retuya resided at Tipolo,
Mandaue City. During their marriage they
acquired real properties and all improvements
situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu.
Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a
parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he
inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and
Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of
hereditary shares of approximately eight (8)
parcels of land in Mandaue City.
Some of these properties above-mentioned earn
income from coconuts and the other lands/houses
are leased.
In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived
with his legitimate family and cohabited with
defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein defendant,
Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son.
Nicolas, then, was the only person who received
the income of the above-mentioned properties.
Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the time she
started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no
occupation, she had no properties of her own
from which she could derive income.
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk
anymore, cannot walk anymore and they have to
raise him up in order to walk. Natividad Retuya
knew of the physical condition of her father
because they visited him at the hospital. From the
time defendant Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke
on January 27, 1985 and until the present, it is
defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas
illegitimate children who has been receiving the
income of these properties. Witness Natividad
Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because at
this time their father Nicolas was already senile
and has a childlike mind. She told defendant,
Procopio that their father was already
incapacitated and they had to talk things over
and the latter replied that it was not yet the time
to talk about the matter.
Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay
Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no
settlement was reached, hence, the said official
issued a certification to file action. Written
demands were made by plaintiff, through her
counsel, to the defendants, including the
illegitimate family asking for settlement but no
settlement was reached by the parties.
Ruling of the RTC:
The trial court rendered its Decision on 16
February 1994 in favor of Eusebia. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:
1. Declaring the properties listed in paragraph 2
of the amended complaint as conjugal properties
of the spouses plaintiff Eusebia Retuya and the
defendant Nicolas Retuya;
2. Ordering the transfer of the sole administration
of conjugal properties of the spouses Eusebia
Retuya and Nicolas Retuya in accordance with
Art. 124 of the Family Code to the plaintiff
Eusebia Napisa Retuya;
3. Ordering defendant Procopio Villanueva to
account and turnover all proceeds or rentals or
income of the conjugal properties from January
27, 1985 when he took over as administrator
thereof and until he shall have ceased
administering the same in accordance with the
judgment of this Court;
4. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to
reconvey the parcel of land situated at Tipolo,
Mandaue City now in the name of defendant
Pacita Villanueva under tax dec. No. 01450 and
transfer the same into the names of the conjugal
partners Eusebia N. Retuya and Nicolas Retuya;
5. Ordering the City Assessors Office of Mandaue
City to cancel tax declaration No. 01450 in the
name of Pacita Villanueva and direct the issuance
of a new title and tax declaration in the names of
Eusebia Napisa Retuya and Nicolas Retuya;
6. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to
reconvey that certain building of strong materials
located at Tipolo, Mandaue City under tax dec.
No. 01450 into the names of Eusebia Retuya and
Nicolas Retuya;
7. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to
pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 by way of
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in the
sum of P5,000.00 plus the costs.
17 | J R C M E N D O Z A L A W A R C H I V E S
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
Petitioners appealed the trial courts decision to
the Court of Appeals. Eusebia died on 23
November 1996. Thereafter, Eusebias heirs
substituted her pursuant to the resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 7 April 1997. The Court of
Appeals eventually upheld the Decision of the
trial court but deleted the award of attorneys
fees, ruling in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 16,
1994 is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
award of attorneys fees of P50,000.00 is deleted.
Issues:
1. Whether or not properties acquired during the
existence of the marriage of Nicolas Retuya and
Eusebia Retuya are conjugal.
Ruling:
Petitioners claim that the subject properties are
exclusive properties of Nicolas except for Lot No.
152, which they claim is Pacitas exclusive
property. This issue is easily resolved. The Family
Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern
the property relations between Nicolas and
Eusebia even if they were married before the
effectivity of Family Code. Article 105 of the
Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family
Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships
established before the Family Code without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired under
the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the
Family Code, if the properties are acquired during
the marriage, the presumption is that they are
conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party
claiming that they are not conjugal. This is
counter-balanced by the requirement that the
properties must first be proven to have been
acquired during the marriage before they are
presumed conjugal.
Both the trial and appellate courts agreed that
the subject properties were in fact acquired
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. The
tax declarations covering the subject properties,
along with the unrebutted testimony of Eusebias
witnesses, establish this fact.
Petitioners further argue that since Nicolas and
Pacita were already cohabiting when Lot No. 152
was acquired, the lot cannot be deemed conjugal
property of Nicolas and Eusebia. Petitioners keep
belaboring this point in their petition and
memorandum.
The cohabitation of a spouse with another
person, even for a long period, does not sever the
tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Otherwise,
the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an
act that is both illegal and immoral. What
petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and
Pacitas cohabitation cannot work to the
detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse. The
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to
exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was
already living with Pacita. Hence, all property
acquired from 7 October 1926, the date of Nicolas
and Eusebias marriage, until 23 November 1996,
the date of Eusebias death, are still presumed
conjugal.
19. Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. vs. Spouses
Paulino & Evangeline Abuda, G.R. No.
202932, October 23, 2013
The Facts
Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes were married
on 9 June 1980. Both of them had children from
prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter named
Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had
a son named Edilberto, who was the father of
Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr.,the petitioner in this case.
Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin
Roxas (Crispin) when she married Esteban.
Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This
marriage was not annulled, and Crispin was alive
at the time of Socorros marriage to Esteban.
Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand, was
dissolved by virtue of his wifes death in 1960.
In 1968, Esteban acquired one-half of a lot
situated in 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio Street,
Vitas, Tondo, Manila, while Evangeline bought the
other half for her father in 1970. When the title
to the property (TCT No. 141782) was released in
1980, it was registered in the name of Esteban
Abletes. Evangeline also alleged that she and
her father operated small business
establishments at 903 and 905 Delpan St,. Tondo,
Manila. When Esteban died, the Vitas and Delpan
properties was sold to Evangeline and her
husband. Esteban died in 1997, while Socorro
died in 1999. In 2000, Leonora, Edilbertos
mother discovered the sale of the properties to
Evangeline, which she then relayed to Edilberto.
The latter, represented by Leonora filed a petition
for annulment of deeds of sale before the RTC of
Manila, alleging that the sales were fraudulent as
Estebans signature in the deeds were forged.
Evangeline countered that because of the prior
marriage by Socorro to Crispin, her marriage to
Esteban was null and void, hence, Socorro and
her heirs may not claim any right or interest over
the properties she and her father acquired.
Issue:
Whether or not Esteban and Socorro were co-
woners of the Delpan and Vitas properties, thus
entitling Edilberto as heir of Socorro to a share of
the properties.
The Ruling of the RTC-Manila
The RTC ruled in favour of Evangeline and
Paulino. Since the marriage of Socorro and
Esteban were void, the applicable rule was Article
831 of the Civil Code, which was the governing
law at the time the two were married. It also
applied Ninal vs. Badayog2 ratiocinating that no
prior judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is
needed in order to establish the nullity of the
marriage. The Vitas and Delpan properties were
not conjugal, and governed by Articles 1443 and
4854 of the Civil Code. Applying the foregoing
provisions, the RTC determined that they were
properties of Esteban, and since Socorro did not
contribute any funds to the acquisition of the
properties, she was never a co-owner thereof,
and she or her heirs cannot claim any right over
the properties
According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and Delpan
properties are not conjugal, and are governed by
Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together
as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the
benefits as well as in the charges, shall be
18 | J R C M E N D O Z A L A W A R C H I V E S
proportional to their respective interests. Any
stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be
void.
Aggrieved, Edilberto filed an appeal before the
CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the RTC decision, but clarified
that the applicable law is Article 1485 of the
Family Code, and applied the ruling in Saguid vs
CA6. It held that the provisions apply even if
cohabitation or acquisition of the property
occurred prior to the enactment of the Family
Code. In this case, Edilberto failed to provide
evidence that Socorro contributed to the
acquisition of the properties.
Article 148 of the Family Code states that in
unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other:
x x x only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
Edilberto elevated the case to the Supreme Court
via a petition for review on certiorari.
The Ruling of this Court
The Supreme Court denied the petition, the
decision in the CA is affirmed.
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family
Code, which the CA applied in the assailed
decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the
parties are incapacitated to marry each other],
only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another,
his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith is not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise
apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and
Delpan properties can be considered common
property if: (1) these were acquired during the
cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2)
there is evidence that the properties were
acquired through the parties actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry.
Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the
Delpan property was acquired prior to the
marriage of Esteban and Socorro.[29]
Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase
price of the Delpan property was made by
Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of
her father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who
does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is
deemed to be a donation, which requires the
debtor's consent. But the payment is in any case
valid as to the creditor who has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of
her father, and the parties intended that the
Delpan property would be owned by and
registered under the name of Esteban.
During trial, the Abuda spouses presented
receipts evidencing payments of the
amortizations for the Delpan property. On the
other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence
showing Socorro's alleged monetary
contributions. As correctly pointed out by the CA:
[s]ettled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the
burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the
case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x x.
Here it is Appellant who is duty bound to prove
the allegations in the complaint which
undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do so.
20. Banguis-Tambuyat vs. Balcom-Tambuyat,
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015
Facts:
Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda
Balcom Tambuyat were married on September
16, 1965.
During their marriage, Adriano acquired several
real properties, including a 700 sq. m. parcel of
land located at Brgy. Muzon, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, which was bought on November 17,
1991. The Deed of Sale was signed by Adriano
alone as vendee.
One of the signing witnesses was petitioner
Rosario Banguis Tambuyat, who signed therein
as Rosario Tambuyat. All this time petitioner
Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco.
When TCT covering the subject property was
issued, it was made under the name of Adriano
M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.
When Adriano died intestate on June 7, 1998,
Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of the
subject TCT. She alleged that she was the
surviving spouse of Adriano. That the TCT was
erroneously registered and made in the name of
Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E.
Banguis. That per annexed marriage contract,
Banguis was still married to Nolasco. Wenifreda
prayed that the TCT be cancelled. That a new
certificate of title be made out in Adrianos name,
with her as the spouse indicated, and that
Banguis be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT.
On her defense, Banguis claimed that she and
Adriano were married on Sept. 2, 1988, and
thereafter lived together as married couple; that
their union produced a son; and that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the petition for
cancellation, which is merely a summary
proceeding considering that a thorough
determination will have to be made as to whether
the property is conjugal or exclusive property,
and since she and Adriano have a child whose
rights will be adversely affected by any judgment
in the case.
The RTC decided in favor of Wenifreda and
directed the RD of Meycauayan to cancel the TCT
of Banguis and in lieu thereof to issue a new
certificate of title in the name of Adriano M.
Tambuyat married to Wenifreda Winnie Balcom
Tambuyat. RTC justified its decision by using Sec.
108 of PD 1529 which states: court authorization
19 | J R C M E N D O Z A L A W A R C H I V E S
is required for any alteration or amendment of a
certificate of title when any error, omission or
mistake was made in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate
certificate, or when there is reasonable ground for
the amendment or alteration of the title.
The CA sustained the trial courts decision,
noting that Banguis name was included in the
TCT by error or mistake. It held that the evidence
adduced proved that Wenifreda and not Banguis
is the lawful wife of Adriano that there is a valid
and subsisting marriage between Nolasco and
Banguis, and the latter admitted to such fact
during the course of the proceedings in the trial
court and that Banguiss opposition to
Wenifredas petition for cancellation of TCT is not
real and genuine as to place the latters title to
the subject property in doubt.
Issue: Whether the cancellation of the TCT filed
by Wenifreda be granted by the court.
Held: YES
Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding
for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a
certificate of title may be resorted to in seven
instances, included are (1) when any error,
omission or mistake was made in entering a
certificate or any memorandum thereon or on
any duplicate certificate and (2) when there is
reasonable ground for the amendment or
alteration of title. The present case falls under the
two instances because the RD of Bulacan
committed and error in issuing the disputed TCT,
in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to
Rosario E. Banguis when, in truth and in fact,
respondent Wenifreda and not Banguis is
Adrianos lawful spouse. As correctly ruled by the
appellate court, the preponderance of evidence
points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate
spouse of Adriano. Thus, it cannot be said that
Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to
each other it cannot even be said that they have
a common law relationship at all.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law
marriages. A man and woman not legally married
who cohabit for many years as husband and wife,
who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they
live may be considered legally married in
common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. While it is true that our laws do not
just brush aside the fact that such relationships
are present in our society, and that they produce
a community of properties and interests which is
governed by law, authority exists in case law to
the effect that such form of co ownership requires
that the man and woman living together must not
in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in Article
144, when referring to a spouse contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse.
20 | J R C M E N D O Z A L A W A R C H I V E S