Você está na página 1de 14

GROUP III.

REPORTERS:

APRIL ROSE S. LERIT


PRINCESS JOY B. FRANCISCO

TOPICS:

A Rights and conditions of membership(Art. 241)

i Union Membership

ii Union Officer

iii Rights of members

B Legitimate Labor Organization (Art. 242)

i Rights

ii Authority of Union

C Unfair Labor Practices

i Employers (Art. 248)

ii Labor Organizations (Art. 249)

ART. 250 [241]. RIGHTS AND CONDITIONS OF


MEMBERSHIP IN A LABOR ORGANIZATION

NATURE OF RELATIONSHIP

Labor Union had been evolved as an organization of collective strength for the protection of labor against the unjust exactions
of capital, but equally important is the requirement of fair dealing between the union and its members, which is fiduciary in nature. The
Labor Union may also be considered as agent of its members for the purpose of securing for them fair and just wages and good
working conditions.

1. Rights and Conditions of membership in a labor organization

The rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization are classified as follows:

a. As to fees, dues, assessments and other contributions of union members


b. As to union funds and financial transactions
c. As to union officers/members
d. As to question of major union policy
e. As to workers education

A. As to fees, dues, assessments and other contributions of union members

(a) No arbitrary or excessive initiation fees shall be required to the members


(b) No arbitrary, excessive or oppressive fine and forfeiture shall be imposed
(c) No officer, agent, or member of a labor organization shall collect any fees, dues, or other contributions in its behalf or
make any disbursements of its money or funds unless he is duly authorized by its constitution and by-laws
(d) Every payment of fees, dues and other contributions shall be evidenced by a receipt signed by the officer/agent making
the collection, and entered into the record of the organization to be kept and maintained for the purpose

1
(e) No special assessment or other extraordinary fees may be levied upon

B. As to union funds and financial transactions

(a) To full and detailed reports of all financial transactions


(b) The funds of the Union shall not be applied for any purpose or object other than those expressly provided by its by-laws or
those expressly authorized by a written resolution
(c) Every income or revenue shall be evidenced by a record
(d) Every expenditure shall be evidence by a receipt, which shall state the place, date and purpose of such payment
(e) Any action involving the funds of the Union shall prescribe after three (3) years from the date of submission of the Annual
Financial Report to the DOLE
(f) The officers of any Organization shall not be paid any compensation other than the salaries due to their positions
(g) The Books of Accounts and other records of financial activities shall be open to inspection by any member thereof during
office hours.

C. As to union officers/members

(a) To directly elect their officers, including those of the national union or federation to which they are affiliated. The election
takes place at intervals of five years.
(b) No qualification requirements for candidacy to any position shall be imposed other than membership in good standing
(c) No Labor Organization shall knowingly admit as members any individual who belongs to a subversive organization or who
is engaged in any subversive activity
(d) No person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall be eligible for election as a union officer or
for appointment to any position in the union

Union Officer
The Implementing Rules used to contain the following provision:

No person who is not an employee/worker of the company where an independently registered union. . . shall henceforth be
elected or appointed as an officer of such union .

D. As to question of major union policy

(a) To determine by secret ballot any question of major policy affecting the entire membership of the organization
(b) Unless such secret ballot cannot be done, the Board of Directors of the organization may make decision in behalf of the
general membership

E. As to workers education

(a) It shall be the duty of any Labor Organization to inform its members on the provision of its (1) Constitution/By-laws; (2)
Collective Bargaining Agreement; (3) Prevailing Labor Relations System; and (4) Right & Obligations under existing labor
laws.
(b) For this purpose, registered labor organizations may assess reasonable dues to finance labor relations seminars and
other labor education activities.
(c) Effect any violation of the Right and Conditions of membership, as provided by law.

CASES:
DEL PILAR ACADEMY VS DEL PILAR ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION, G.R. NO. 170112 APRIL 30, 2008

FACTS: Respondent Del Pilar Academy Employees Union is the certied collective bargaining representative of teaching and non-
teaching personnel of petitioner Del Pilar Academy. The Union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement granting salary increase
and other benets like compensation for overloads, limitations of teaching assignments, increase in the number of incentive leaves,
vacation leave and longevity pay. The Union assessed the agency fees and requested the school to deduct the said fees from the
employees salary. However, Del Pilar refused to eect the deductions claiming that the non-union members were not amenable to it
and they did not sign any written authorization.

The Union led a case of unfair labor practice against the employer stating that the act of Del Pilar Academy was done to undermine
the union or stie the right to self-organization. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case of unfair labor practice against the employer, but
compelled the academy to deduct the assessed union fees from the salary of the non-union members. Del Pilar Academy appealed the
case before the NLRC and the CA, but both tribunals armed the decision of the arbiter. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the union is entitled to collect agency fees from non-union members.

RULING:

2
1. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees, from employees
who are not union members, is recognized by Article 248(e) of the Labor Code, thus: Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining
unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed reasonable fees equivalent to the dues and
other fees paid by the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective
bargaining agreement. Provided, That the individual authorization required under Article 241, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply
to the non-members of recognized collective bargaining agent.

MARINO V. GAMILIA, G.R NO. 149763, JULY 7, 2009

FACTS: Petitioners Marinoet. Al were among the executive officers and directors (Mario Group) of the University of Sto. Tomas Faculty
Union (USTFU), the bargaining representative of faculty members of UST and Respondents Gamillaet. Al were UST professors and
USTFU members. Pursuant to a MOA between UST and USTFU, faculty members belonging to the collective bargaining unit were
granted additional economic benefits in a lump sum of 42 million. As stated in the MOA, a check-off of ten percent will be deducted from
the lump sum for Labor Education Fund and Attorneys fees from USTFumemmbers and agency fee from non-members. Hence,
through its President Mario, the Union has collected 10% of the 42M from the UST.

Respondents filed with the Med-Arbiter, DOLE- National Capital Region a complaint for the expulsion of Mario Group as USTFU
officers and directors contending that they violated the rights and conditions of membership in USTFU in investing the unspent balance
of 42 M without prior approval of the general membership, holding elections viva voce, ratifying the CBA involving P42M economic
benefits and finally approving the 4.2 million in the form of check-off.

The case, along with the three others involving the parties were consolidated and indorsed to the Office of the Regional Director, DOLE-
NCR which ruled that the 4.2 M check-off collected by petitiones as negotiation fees was invalid pursuant to R.A 6728 stating that 70%
of the tuition fee increases should be allotted to academic and non-academic personnel. Thus, petitioners were relieved from their post
and ordered to pay the 4.2 M check-off as attorneys fee.

On appeal, the Bureau of Labor Relations affirmed with modification the assailed ruling and reasoned that the 4.2 M was in the nature
of attorneys fees and, thus, fell under the general prohibition against such fees under Art 222 (b) now Art. 228(b) of the Labor Code.
Likewise the charging against the union funds is not applicable, as the same was intended not for the union officers, but for the member
for the entire bargaining unit.

On appeal with the CA under Rule 65, affirmed the assailed ruling and reasoned that under Art. 241 (n) now 250 (n) of the Labor Code
provides that no special assessment shall be levied upon members of the union unless authorized by a written resolution of a majority
of all the members at a general membership meeting duly called for the purpose. Contrary to Articles 222(b) and 241(n) of the Code
and Sec. 5, Rule X of the CBL of the Union, no resolution ratified by the general membership of the USTFU through secret balloting
which embodied the award of attorneys fees was submitted. MR was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 4.2 M check-off taken on the 42 M lump sum economic benefits granted to faculty members is validly
deducted thereon.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that a check-off is a process or device whereby the employer, on agreement with the Union,
recognized as the proper bargaining representative, or on prior authorization from the employees, deducts union dues or agency fees
from the latter's wages and remits them directly to the Union. Its desirability in a labor organization is quite evident. The Union is
assured thereby of continuous funding. As this Court has acknowledged, the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of
the Union and, only indirectly, for the individual employees.

In the instant case, The P42 million economic benefits package granted by UST did not constitute union funds from whence the P4.2
million could have been validly deducted as attorneys fees. The P42 million economic benefits package was not intended for the
USTFU coffers, but for all the members of the bargaining unit USTFU represented, whether members or non-members of the union. A
close reading of the terms of the MOA reveals that after the satisfaction of the outstanding obligations of UST under the 1986 CBA, the
balance of the P42 million was to be distributed to the covered faculty members of the collective bargaining unit in the form of salary
increases, returns on paycheck deductions; and increases in hospitalization, educational, and retirement benefits, and other economic
benefits. The deduction of the P4.2 million, as alleged attorneys/agency fees, from the P42 million economic benefits package
effectively decreased the share from said package accruing to each member of the collective bargaining unit.

The Court further determines that the requisites for a valid levy and check-off of special assessments, laid down by Article 241(n) and
(o), respectively, of the Labor Code, as amended, have not been complied with in the case at bar. To recall, these requisites are: (1) an
authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the union members at the general membership meeting duly called for the
purpose; (2) secretary's record of the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check-off duly signed by the
employee concerned.

The failure of the Mario Group to strictly comply with the requirements set forth by the Labor Code, as amended, and the USTFU
Constitution and By-Laws, invalidates the questioned special assessment. Substantial compliance is not enough in view of the fact that

3
the special assessment will diminish the compensation of the union members. Their express consent is required, and this consent must
be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be followed to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed.

ART. 251 [242]. RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE


LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

NOT ANY LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION

The first three rights mentioned in the Article do not pertain to just about any union but only to the union that has been selected
as the bargaining representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. This article must be read in relation to Article 266.
The union whose demand for collective bargaining was rebuffed by the employer, because the union was not the certified
bargaining agent, has no right to stage a strike. The strike is illegal. Such illegality is reason enough for the NLRC to declare that
the union officers have lost their employments status.

RIGHT OF THE UNINON TO REPRESENT ITS MEMBERS

It is the function of a labor union to represent its members against the employers unfair labor practices (ULP). It can file an
action in their behalf without the cumbersome procedure of joining each and every member as a separate party.
A labor union has the requisite personality to sue on behalf of its members for their individual money claims. It would be an
unwarranted impairment of the right to self-organization if such collective entities would be barred from instituting action in their
representative capacity.
Even if it is not clear from the record that the union is a registered organization, but considering that it filed a petition for
certification election and such petition was granted on appeal by the Labor Undersecretary, such a union has the requisite
personality to sue in its own name to challenge the ULP acts committed by the employer. Such union may institute the action in its
representative capacity.

Members suspecting their Union


When a union files a case for and in behalf of its members, a member or several members of that union will not be
permitted to file in the same case a complaint-in-intervention even if it alleges that the union was not pursuing the case
diligently. Such complaint, together with the motion for intervention, will have to be denied upon a finding that those members
are already well represented by their union.
The intervention may be allowed, however, when there is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or that the representative
will not act in good faith for the protection of all interests represented by the union. The members who desire to intervene must
fraud, collusion, or lack of good faith on the part of their union.

COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS:

General Rule: A compromise agreement between a labor union and an employer is binding upon the minority members of the
union.
Exception: If there are members who did not consent to such settlement, the union has no authority to compromise the individual
claims of such members. Not having authorized their union to enter into such compromise, those members are not bound by the
terms of the settlement.

COMPROMISE OF MONEY CLAIMS

4
Money claims due to laborers cannot be the object of settlement or compromise effected by a union or counsel without the
specific individual consent of each laborer concerned. The union to which they belong can only assist them but cannot decide for
them. Neither the officers nor the majority of the union had any authority to waive the accrued rights pertaining to the dissenting
minority members.
Authority of the union to waive or quitclaim all or part of the judgment award in favor of the individual workers cannot be lightly
presumed but must be expressly granted and the employer, as judgment debtor, must deal in all good faith with the union as the
agent of the individual workers.
Where collective bargaining process is not involved and what is at stake are backwages already earned by the individual
workers by way of overtime, premium and differential pay, and final judgment has been rendered in their favor, the real parties in
interest with direct material interest, as against the union, which has only served as a vehicle for the collective action to enforce
their just claims, are the individual members themselves.

RIGHTS TO BE FURNISHED WITH FINANCIAL STATEMENT

To better equip the union in preparing for or in negotiating with the employer, the law (Article 212[c]) gives it the right to be
furnished with the employers audited financial statements. There are four points in time when the union may ask in writing for
these statements:
(1) After the union has been recognized by the employer as the sole bargaining representatives of the employees in the
bargaining unit; or

(2) After the union is certified by DOLE as such sole bargaining representative; or

(3) During the collective bargaining negotiation; or

(4) Within the last 60 days of the life of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

*Under Article 263, the last 60 days of the CBA is the time to give notice to terminate or modify the CBA. Therefore, this is
the time also for the union to gather fresh information on the financial condition of the company to enable it to prepare
intelligently for the forthcoming CBA renegotiation.

The audited financial statements, including the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement, should be provided by the
employer within 30 calendar days after receipt of the unions written request.

Art. 252 [242-A] Reportorial Requirements. The following are documents required to be submitted to the Bureau by the legitimate
labor organization concerned:

(a) Its constitution and by-laws, or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took
part in the ratification of the constitution and by-laws within thirty (30) days from adoption or ratification of the
constitution and by-lam or amendments thereto;

(b) Its list of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and list of voters within thirty (30) days from election;

(c) Its annual financial report within thirty (30) days after the close of every fiscal year; and

(d) Its list of members at least once a year or whenever required by the Bureau.

Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a ground for cancellation of union registration but shall
subject the erring officers or members to suspension, expulsion from membership, or any appropriate penalty.

HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA v. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES-
HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA SUPERVISORS CHAPTER (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC)
[G.R. No. 178296, 12 January 2011]

It is undisputed that appellee failed to submit its annual financial reports and list of individual members in accordance with
Article 239 of the Labor Code. However, the existence of this ground should not necessarily lead to the cancellation of union
registration. Article 239 recognizes the regulatory authority of the State to exact compliance with reporting requirements. Yet there is
more at stake in this case than merely monitoring union activities and requiring periodic documentation thereof.

The more substantive considerations involve the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association and right of workers to
self-organization. Also involved is the public policy to promote free trade unionism and collective bargaining as instruments of industrial
peace and democracy. An overly stringent interpretation of the statute governing cancellation of union registration without regard to
surrounding circumstances cannot be allowed. Otherwise, it would lead to an unconstitutional application of the statute and

5
emasculation of public policy objectives. Worse, it can render nugatory the protection to labor and social justice clauses that pervades
the Constitution and the Labor Code.

ABARIA v. NLRC
[G.R. No. 187778, 7 December 2011]

Not being a legitimate labor organization, NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not entitled to those rights granted to a legitimate labor
organization under Art. 242, specifically:
(a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining;

(b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining

xxxx

Aside from the registration requirement, it is only the labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit which is the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining, as provided in Art. 255. NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not the labor organization certified or designated by the
majority of the rank-and- file hospital employees to represent them in the CBA negotiations but the NFL, as evidenced by CBAs
concluded in 1987, 1991 and 1994.

In relation to Arts. 253 and 264:

Consequently, the mandatory notice of strike and the conduct of the strike vote report were ineffective for having been filed
and conducted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no legal personality as a legitimate labor organization, in violation of Art. 263 (c), (d)
and (f) of the Labor Code and Rule XXII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides for the consequences of an illegal strike to the participating workers:

x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status:
Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of
his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.

S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL v. SS Venture Labor Union


[G.R. No. 161690, 23 July 2008]

Whatever misgivings the petitioner may have with regard to the 82 dismissed employees is better addressed in the inclusion-
exclusion proceedings during a pre-election conference x x x. The issue surrounding the involvement of the 82 employees is a matter of
membership or voter eligibility. It is not a ground to cancel union registration.
xxxxxx

Once registered with the DOLE, a union is considered a legitimate labor organization endowed with the right and privileges
granted by law to such organization. While a certificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy with the concomitant right to
participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining unit, the registration may be canceled or the union may be decertified as the
bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested of the status of a legitimate labor organization. Among the grounds for cancellation
is the commission of any of the acts enumerated in Art. 239(a) of the Labor Code, such as fraud and misrepresentation in connection
with the adoption or ratification of the unions constitution and like documents.

The Court, has in previous cases, said that to decertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible
employees in its membership. It must also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with the
application for registration and the supporting documents, such as the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or
amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the constitution or by-laws, among other documents.

LAGUNA AUTOPARTS MFG. CORP v. DOLE


G.R. No. 157146
(1) The Regional Office, through the Labor Relations Division Chief, has determined that the respondent union complied with the
requirements under the law. It, therefore, declared that the respondent union has acquired legal personality as a labor organization.
Absent any pronouncement to the contrary, such determination of the Labor Relations Division Chief will stand, on the presumption
that the duty of determining whether the respondent union submitted the complete documentary requirements has been regularly
performed.

6
We rule, however, that such legal personality may not be subject to a collateral attack but only through a separate action instituted
particularly for the purpose of assailing it.

(2) Does a local chapter of a labor union need to be independently registered in order to acquire legal personality?

No. A local or chapter need not be independently registered to acquire legal personality. Section 3, Rule VI of the Implementing
Rules of Book V, as amended by D.O. No. 9 clearly states

SEC. 3. Acquisition of legal personality by local/chapter. A local/chapter constituted in accordance with Section 1 of this
Rule shall acquire legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documents enumerated therein. Upon compliance
with all documentary requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the local/chapter a certificate
indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.

PALEA V. FERRER-CALLEJA

FACTS:Prior to the effectivity of the Labor Code, there were four collective bargaining agents in the Philippine Airlines, Inc. one of
which is herein petitioner (PALEA) representing ground rank-and-file personnel. A petition for Certification Election was filed in order to
elect a supervisory union that could organize as a labor unit. In the said election, PALEA was certified by the BLR as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employee of the Philippine Airlines, Inc. PALEA and PAL signed a 3-year collective bargaining
agreement to be effective until 1979. Its life was, by agreement of the parties, extended up to 1980.

Before the expiration of the agreement, the respondent Philippine Airlines Non-Managerial Employees' Association (PANOMEA-FUR)
filed a petition for Certification Election among several employees of PAL, alleging that there is no other union existing in the proposed
bargaining unit. Thereafter, the licensed mechanics whom PANOMEA-FUR sought to represent, also filed their own petition for
certification election under the name of PAL Licensed/Amalgamated Federation of Labor of the Philippines (PALMA-AFL).

In view of this, PALEA and PAL filed their separate motions for reconsideration and question the said petitions. BLR Director denied
PAL's and PALEA's motions for reconsideration. Hence, this petition by PALEA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent Certification Elections are proper.

RULING:YES. While petitioner claims that PALEA is the exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file PAL employees, and
that PANOMEA seeks to dismember or fragmentize the already existing unit so that another one may be created, the Bureau of Labor
Relations found that the present CBA between PALEA and PAL covers only the rank and file employees but not the licensed
mechanics, administrative, supervisory, technical and confidential employees of PAL.
Employees have a constitutional right to choose their own bargaining representative. The holding of a certification election is a statutory
policy that should not be circumvented. Whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular union represents the majority of the rank-
and-file employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of a certification election is the most democratic method of
determining the employees' choice of their bargaining representative. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes
on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves.

ART. 259. [248]. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES


OF EMPLOYERS.

(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization

Instances of Interference

i. Denying union organizers access to employees


ii. Blacklisting or threatening to blacklist employees
iii. Asking employees about their union membership or activities
iv. Accepting an offer by the majority of the employee to abandon their union in return for wage increases to them
v. Prohibiting Organization activites
vi. Violence or Intimidation

(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall
withdraw from one to which he belongs
7
YELLOW DOGCONTRACT
The Unfair Labor Practice under Article 259 (b) refers to a yellow dog contract. It is an agreement between an employer and
an employee in which the employee agrees, as a condition of employment, not to join a union during the course of his
employment.

(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization;

It is considered as an unfair labor practice for an employer to contract out services or functions being performed by union
members when such act will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.

(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization,
including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters

COMPANY-DOMINIATION OF UNION
Domination of a labor union usually manifests in the following forms:

i. Initiation of the company idea


ii. Financial support to the labor union
iii. Employer encouragement and assistance
iv. Supervisory assistance

(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization

What the law prohibits is discrimination to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization. Where the purpose is
to influence the union activity of employees, the discrimination is unlawful.

TEST OF DISCRIMNATION
It is necessary that the underlying reason for the discharge of the employee be established. If the discharge is actually
motivated by a lawful reason, the fact that the employee is engaged in union activities at the time will not lie against the
employer and prevent him from the exercise of his business judgment to discharge an employee for a cause.

VALID DISCRIMINATION: UNION SECURITY CLAUSE


The discrimination is valid when the management and the union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement containing a
union security clause. Despite variations and limitations, a union security clause essentially requires membership in the union
so that that an employee may retain his job and the unions existence is assured. It is a form of compulsory union membership
which is authorized by the law.

KINDS OF UNION SECURITY AGREEMENT

i. Closed-shop. Only union members can be hired by the company and they must remain as union member to retain
employment in the company
ii. Union shop. Non-members may be hired, but in order retain employment, the employee must become union
members after a certain period.
iii. Modified Union Shop. Employees who are not union members at the time of the signing of contract need not join the
union, but all workers hired thereafter must join.
iv. Maintenance of Membership Shop. No employee is compelled to join the union, but all present or future members
must, as a condition of employment, remain in good standing in the union.
v. Exclusive Bargaining Shop. The union is recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of all employees in the
bargaining unit, whether union members or not.
vi. Bargaining for Members Only. The union is recognized as the bargaining agent only for its own members.
vii. Agency Shop. An agreement whereby employees must either joint the union or pay to the union as exclusive
bargaining agent as sum equal to that paid by the members.

(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to
give testimony under this Code
The law protects not only the employees right to form, join or assist labor organizations but also their right to testify on matters
covered by the Code. If this right is not protected, the right to self-organization will be indirecty defeated because the
employees will fear their employers reprisal.

(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code

8
Collective Bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement, is one of the democratic frameworks
under the Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound and
stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the union and is characterized as a legal obligation.

(h) To pay negotiation or attorneys fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in
collective bargaining or any other dispute
The purpose of this provision is to do away with corruption of union officers who may betray their members by accepting
benefits in the CBA or any dispute.

(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement


This unfair labor practice is further qualified by Article 274 [261] of the Labor Code. The pertinent portion of said article
provides:

. . .Violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as
unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this
article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the
economic provisions of such agreement.

Art. 260. [249]. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF


LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

RESTRAINT OR COERCION BY LABOR ORGANIZATION; INTERFERENCE BY UNINON IS NOT UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.

Interference by a labor organization is not ULP because interfering in the exercise of the right to organize is itself a function of
self-organizing. For instance, a union campaigns for membership even among members of another union. A union, at the appropriate
time files a petition to dislodge an incumbent bargaining union. A bargaining union, through a union security clause, requires an
incoming employee to join the union, or, when the occasion arises, persuades non-striking employees to join a strike. These are acts of
interference but they are not considered as ULP. They are, instead, manifestations of union dynamics and democracy whose ultimate
beneficiaries presumably will be the workers themselves.

Coercing participation in strike:


Art. 260 is violated when a union threatens employees with bodily harm in order to force them to strike. A union violates the
law when, to restrain or coerce non-strikers from working during a strike, it assaults or threatens to assault, threatens them with loss of
their jobs, blocks their ingress to and egress from the plant, damages non-strikers automobiles or forces them off the highway,
physically prevents them from working, or sabotages the employers property in their presence, thereby creating a general atmosphere
of fear and violence and threatening the non-strikers jobs.

UNION-INDUCED DISCRIMINATION

The law forbids as ULP union attempts to cause an employer to grant advantages for union members over nonmembers, for union
members is in good standing over suspended or expelled members, for union members over permit holders, for members of the union
executive board over more senior employees, for members of one union over members of another union, or for members of one local
over members of another local.
The forbidden discrimination may refer to terms of hiring or firing, in layoff, in seniority, or in benefits.

SALUNGA v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS


21 SCRA 216 (1967)
Can the union arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants membership or deny readmission?

9
No. Labor unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership and a closed-shop provision would
not justify the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of an employee whom the union thus refuses to admit
to membership without any reasonable ground therefor.

MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION V. NLRC


154 SCRA 369 (1987)
A union member may not be expelled from her union, and consequently from her job, for personal or impetuous reasons or for
causes foreign to the closed-shop agreement in a manner characterized by arbitrariness and whimsicality.

Rance, et. al. v. NLRC


G.R. No. 68147, 30 June 1988
The mere act of seeking help from another union cannot constitute disloyalty as contemplated in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. At most, it was an act of self-preservation of workers who, driven to desperation, found shelter in the NAFLU who took the
cudgels for them.

REFUSAL TO BARGAIN

Unfair Labor Practice under Art. 249(c) is intended to insure that unions approach the bargaining table with the same attitude of
willingness to agree as the Act requires of management.
A union violates its duty to bargain collectively by entering negotiations with a fixed purpose of not reaching an agreement or
signing a contract.

FEATHERBEDDING AND MAKE-WORK AGREEMENTS

Art. 249(d) refers to featherbedding, a term given to an employee practices which create or spread employment by
unnecessarily maintaining or increasing the number of employees used, or the amount of time consumed, to work on a particular job.
Most courts at common law found these practices to be economically wasteful and without any legitimate employee justification.

CBA DEAL WITH EMPLOYER

Asking for or accepting some fee from the employers as part of the CBA or dispute settlement is considered ULP by the union
under paragraph (e) of this article. In fact, such act is more than ULP it is reprehensible betrayal of trust, an act that deserves
condemnation of the highest order. Thus, under unamended Art. 239(g) this act was listed as a ground for cancellation of union
registration. But, regrettably and strangely, R.A. 9481 of 2007 deleted this act from the list in Art. 239 (now, 246) as amended.

CASES ON UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE:

THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, LTD., respondents.
G.R. No. 125038 November 6, 1997

FACTS: In a letter dated January 20, 1993, the Union, through its President, Peter Paul Gamelo, reiterated its previous verbal
objections to the Bank's unilateral decision to devise and put into effect the said program because it allegedly was in violation of the
existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the parties and thus constituted unfair labor practice. The Union demanded the
suspension of the implementation of the JEP and proposed that the same be instead taken up or included in their upcoming CBA
negotiations.
This prompted the Union to undertake concerted activities to protest the implementation of the JEP, such as whistle blowing during
office hours starting on March 15, 1993 up to the 23rd day, and writing to clients of the Bank allegedly to inform them of the real
situation then obtaining and of an imminent disastrous showdown between the Bank and the Union.
The Union engaged in said activities despite the fact that as early as February 11, 1993, it had already initiated the renegotiation of the
non-representational provisions of the CBA by submitting their proposal to the Bank, to which the latter submitted a reply. As a matter of
fact, negotiations on the CBA commenced on March 5, 1993 and continued through March 24, 1993 when the Bank was forced to
declare a "recess" to last for as long as the Union kept up with its concerted activities. The Union refused to concede to the demand of
the Bank unless the latter agreed to suspend the implementation of the JEP.
Instead of acquiescing thereto, the Bank filed on April 5, 1993 5 with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a complaint for unfair labor
practice against the Union allegedly for engaging in the contrived activities against the ongoing CBA negotiations between the Bank
and the Union in an attempt to unduly coerce and pressure the Bank into agreeing to the Union's demand for the suspension of the
implementation of the JEP. It averred that such concerted activities, despite the ongoing CBA negotiations, constitute unfair labor
practice (ULP) and a violation of the Union's duty to bargain collectively under Articles 249 (c) and 252 of the Labor Code.
The Union filed a Motion to Dismiss insisting that the right to engage in these concerted activities is protected under Article 246 of the
Labor Code regarding non-abridgment of the right to self-organization and, hence, is not actionable in law.

RULING: The case is remanded for further proceedings regarding the allegation of ULP by the labor union.

10
By the very nature of an unfair labor practice, it is not only a violation of the civil rights of both labor and management but is also a
criminal offense against the State which is subject to prosecution and punishment. Essentially, a complaint for unfair labor practice is no
ordinary labor dispute and therefore requires a more thorough analysis, evaluation and appreciation of the factual and legal issues
involved.

It is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not authorize interference with the employer's judgment in the conduct of his business. The
Labor Code and its implementing rules do not vest in the labor arbiters nor in the different divisions of the NLRC nor in the courts
managerial authority. The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion, and promotion of employees has been traditionally identified as a
management prerogative subject to limitations found in the law, a collective bargaining agreement, or in general principles of fair play
and justice. This is a function associated with the employer's inherent right to control and manage effectively its enterprise. Even as the
law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management
prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.

RUBBERWORLD PHILS. ET. AL V. NLRC


GR NO. 75704, JULY 19, 1989

FACTS: Nestor Malabanan was employed by Petitioner Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. on September 25,1978 as an ordinary clerk. Later, he
was promoted to the position of production scheduler and then transferred to the Inventory Control Section as stock clerk. The General
Manager of petitioner-company received a copy of the Financial Audit Report showing a significant material variance between the year-
end actual inventory and that of the Cards (SC)/EDP Control Records. As a result thereof, the Section Head of the Inventory Control
Section conducted an investigation and submitted its report recommending the dismissal of Malabanan. Consequently, Malabanan's
case was endorsed to the Human Resources Division of petitioner-company, which affirmed the recommendation after conducting a
reinvestigation. Thereafter, Malabanan was dismissed.
Malabanan filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against petitioner-company alleging that he was a member of
the monthly salaried employees' union affiliated with TUPAS; that petitioner-company forced him to disaffiliate from the union; and that
due to his refusal to resign from the union, he was ultimately dismissed from employment. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on
the ground that it lacks proof to support his allegation.

ISSUE:Whether or not the dismissal of Malabanan is tainted with unfair labor practice

RULING: NO. Nothing in the records provide that the company actually performed positive acts to restrain the union participation of
private respondent. For one, it is doubtful whether Malabanan was really engaged in the organization of a labor union affiliated with the
federation TUPAS. The only evidence presented by him to prove this contention is his affidavit and that of his father. It is therefore, not
in accordance with ordinary experience and common practice that the private respondent pursued his battle alone, without the aid and
support of his co-members in the union and his federation especially in a case of serious nature as this one involving company
intervention with union activity.
As a rule, it is the prerogative of the company to promote, transfer or even demote its employees to other positions when the interests
of the company reasonably demand it. Unless there are instances which directly point to interference by the company with the
employees' right to self-organization, the transfer of private respondent should be considered as within the bounds allowed by law.
Thus, the Court ruled that the company did not commit any unfair labor practice in transferring and thereafter dismissing private
respondent.

Enriquez v. Zamora
G.R. No. 51382, 29 December 1986

FACTS: Enriquez and Ecarma were employed by PAL on October 2, 1961 and March 3, 1966, respectively. Consequently, they
became members of ALPAP. On October 3, 1970, Philippine Air Lines Employees Association [PALEA] and ALPAP staged a strike
against PAL to demand pay increases, better working conditions on the Manila-Karachi and Rome-Amsterdam flights, and a better
retirement plan.
Pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875, the President of the Philippines certified the strike to the Court of Industrial Relations
[CIR]. Said court, through Associate Judge Ansberto Paredes, issued an order dated October 7, 1970 directing the officers and
members of PALEA and ALPAP to call off the strike, lift the picket lines in all places of operation of PAL, and return to work not later
than Friday, October 9, 1970. PAL management, on the other hand, was ordered to admit the striking employees "back to work under
the same terms and conditions of employment existing before the strikes" and "not to suspend, dismiss or lay-off any employee as a
result" of said strikes.
On October 30, 1970, the board of directors of ALPAP adopted a resolution condemning PAL's alleged "continued acts of harassment
and other unfair labor practices" against the ALPAP such as the attempted lockout of ten members, the actual lockout of three other
members, the forced retirement of Captain Regino Masias [Macias] and the dismissal of ALPAP leader Captain Gaston. The board
resolved to undertake the grounding of all PAL planes and the filing of applications for "protest retirement" of members who had
completed five years of continuous service, and "protest resignation" for those who had rendered less than five years of service in the
company.
Upon learning that many members of the ALPAP had signed their respective "protest retirement/resignation" papers, and that ALPAP
would submit them en masse to PAL at a time to coincide with the then forthcoming Papal visit, PAL filed with the CIR an ex-parte
urgent motion to enjoin ALPAP officers and members from retiring or resigning en masse from PAL.
Acting on said motion, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an ordering LPAP and ALPAP not to strike or in any way cause stoppage
in the operation and service of PAL under pain of dismissal and forfeiture of rights and privileges accruing to their respective

11
employments should they disregard this Order; and PAL is also ordered not to lockout any of such members and officers of ALPAP
under pain of contempt and cancellation of its franchise.
Notwithstanding this order, some of the officers and majority of the members of ALPAP submitted their respective retirement or
resignation letters to PAL on December 12, 1970. The pilots tendered their retirement or resignation individually.
PAL acknowledged receipt of said letters through its own letter but denied the concerned employees their retirement benefits.

ISSUE: Whether or not PAL is guilty of unfair labor practice for having terminated petitioners employment.

RULING: No. Petitioners cannot validly claim that PAL committed an unfair labor practice because, having voluntarily terminated their
employment relationship with PAL, they were not dismissed. The pilots' mass action was not a strike because employees who go on
strike do not quit their employment. Ordinarily, the relationship of employer and employee continues until one or the other of the parties
acts to sever the relationship or they mutually act to accomplish that purpose. As they did not assume the status of strikers, their
"protest retirement/resignation" was not a concerted activity which was protected by law.
A strike means only a 'temporary stoppage of work'. What the mentioned pilots did, however, cannot be considered in the opinion of this
Court, as mere 'temporary stoppage of work' contemplated was evidently a permanent cut-off of employment relationship with their
erstwhile employer, the Philippine Air Lines.

WISE AND CO., INC. v. ZAMORA


G.R. No. 87672, 13 October 1989

FACTS: When the management introduced a profit-sharing scheme for its managers and supervisors, the Union wrote the
management to ask its members be allowed to participate in the said program. The management denied the request on the ground that
such participation was not provided in the CBA. Later, when negotiation of the CBA was approaching, the management wrote the union
that it was willing to consider including the union members in the profit-sharing scheme if the negotiations would be concluded before
December 1987.

On March 30, 1988, the company distributed the profit-sharing benefit not only to managers and supervisors but also to all rank-and-file
employees not covered by the CBA because they were excluded from their agreed definition of bargaining unit, such as the regular
rank-and-file employees int he office of the president, vice-president, security office, corporate affairs, accounting and treasury
department.

ISSUE: Whether or not the grant by management of profit-sharing benefits to its employees who are non-union members is
discriminatory against union members

RULING: NO. There can be no discrimination as the situation of the union employees is different from that of the non-union employees.
Discrimination per se is not unlawful. There can be n discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated.
The grant by petitioner of profit sharing benefits to the employees outside the "bargaining unit" falls under the ambit of its managerial
prerogative. It appears to have been done in good faith and without ulterior motive. More so when as in this case there is a clause in
the CBA where the employees are classified into those who are members of the union and those who are not. In the case of the union
members, they derive their benefits from the terms and conditions of the CBA contract which constitute the law between the contracting
parties. Both the employer and the union members are bound by such agreement.
However, the court serves notice that it will not hesitate to strike down any act of the employer that tends to be discriminatory against
union members. It is only because of the peculiar circumstances of this case showing there is no such intention that this court ruled
otherwise.

PHILIPPINE GRAPHIC ARTS, INC. v. NRLC


G.R. No. L-80737, 29 September 1988

FACTS: In October, 1984, the petitioner corporation was forced by economic circumstances to require its workers to go on mandatory
vacation leave in batches of seven or nine for periods ranging from 15, 30, to 45 days. The workers were paid while on leave but the
pay was charged against their respective earned leaves. As a result, the private respondents filed complaints for unfair labor practice
and discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the forced vacation leave without pay is unfair labor practice and if not an unfair labor practice.

RULING: No. The decision to resort to forced leaves was, under the circumstances, a management prerogative. The workers' claim of
non-resort to the grievance machinery is negated by their failure to initiate steps for its employment.
As found by the NLRC, the private respondents themselves never questioned the existence of an economic crisis but, in fact, admitted
its existence. There is basis for the petitioner's contentions that the reduction of work schedule was temporary, that it was taken only
after notice and consultations with the workers and supervisors, that a consensus was reached on how to deal with deteriorating
economic conditions and reduced sales and that the temporary reduction of working days was a more humane solution instead of a
retrenchment and reduction of personnel. The petitioner further points out that this is in consonance with the collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and its employees.
There is also no showing that the imposition of forced leave was exercised for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of
employees under special laws or under valid agreements. As the records show, petitioners instituted the forced leave due to economic
crisis, which private respondents do not even question.
12
Likewise the forced leave was enforced neither in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive nor wanton manner, nor out of malice or
spite.

NATIONAL LABOR UNION (NLU) V. INSULAR LA YEBANA,


GR NO. L-15363, JULY 31, 1961

FACTS: The petitioner National Labor Union, filed charges of unfair labor practice against Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corporation before
the of Court of Industrial Relations in accordance with Section 5 of Republic Act No. 875. The petitioner alleged that the Corporation
discriminatory dismissed its employees namely; Juana Torres, Dominador Gonzales and Honorato Gabriel. In the case of Juana
Torres, it was charged that she was dismissed from her work because she campaigned actively against the president of the Union as
alleged in the complaint. In the case of Dominador Gonzales, it is charged that he was dismissed because he is a rabid member of the
Union and was campaigning for membership to be able to change the president. In the case of Honorato Gabriel, no specification of
unfair labor practice is made because even in the complaint, Gabriel stated or admitted that the axle of the machine, which he
operated, broke and as the machine had not yet been repaired he was unable to do any work.

ISSUE: Whether or not unfair labor practices as violations of law, shall be prosecuted in the same manner as a criminal offense

RULING: YES. A consideration of Industrial Peace Act (Rep. Act No. 875), clearly discloses the intention of the lawmaker to consider
acts which are alleged to constitute unfair labor practices as violations of the law or offenses, to be prosecuted in the same manner as a
criminal offense. The reason for this provision is that the commission of an unfair labor practice is an offense against a public right or
interest and should be prosecuted in the same manner as a public offense.
Section 5 of the Industrial Peace Act provides for the following prohibition:
(b) The Court shall observe the following procedure without resort to mediation and conciliation as provided in
section four of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred and three as amended or to any pre-trial procedure. (Sec. 5, R.A.
875)
This prohibition confirms the principle above indicated governing the proceeding in unfair labor practice cases, i.e., that the proceeding
is in the nature of a public prosecution for an offense defined in the Industrial Peace Act. This prohibition against the court's exercising
its power of conciliation and mediation, is in complete consonance with the directive contained in the same section that if unfair labor
practice has not been proved or if the complainant withdraws his charges, the unfair labor practice case shall be dismissed. The reason
for the distinction between an unfair labor practice case and a mere violation of an employer of its contractual obligation towards an
employees is, as we have stated above, thus: That unfair labor practice cases involve violations of a public right or policy, to be
prosecuted like criminal offenses whereas a breach of an obligation of the employer to his employee is only a contractual breach to be
redressed like an ordinary contract or obligation.

LVN PICTURES EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION (NLU). petitioner, vs. LVN PICTURES, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. L-23495 September 30, 1970

FACTS: The LVN Pictures, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the LVN) was a corporation engaged in the business of producing Tagalog
movies. Among its employees were the members of the LVN Pictures Employees and Workers Association (NLU) (hereinafter referred
to as the EWA) with which it executed on April 23, 1959 a collective bargaining agreement to expire on December 31, 1960. During
their employment with LVN, the members of the EWA served in various capacities in the LVN, such as cameramen and their assistants,
soundmen and their assistants, sound technicians, carpenters, electricians, drivers, laboratory personnel and laborers doing odd jobs.

By letter dated March 20, 1961, the LVN informed the EWA that, because of huge losses incurred and the many obligations of the
former which could not be met, the stockholders had agreed not to invest additional capital and to stop producing new moving pictures,
and to finish only the pictures that were then under production. Moreover, in view of the refusal of the EWA to consider the LVN's
proposals and because of the mounting losses, the LVN's board of directors decided to close its movie production as of May 31, 1961.

As a necessary consequence of the stoppage of its movie production after May 31, 1961, the LVN was compelled to dismiss all its
personnel employed in the said movie production, among them the 84 employees and/or workers of the EWA The equipment and
properties of the LVN were kept in the studio premises under the care of a skeleton force selected for the purpose. Thereafter, in order
to secure rents to meet some of its obligations the LVN leased its equipment and properties for the production of moving pictures to the
Tagalog Ilang-Ilang Productions, Arriba Productions, Inc., Manuel M. Lagunsad Productions, Galaxy Productions, Inc., Dalisay Pictures,
Inc., Magna East Productions and other producers, at P13,000 per picture. In the production of moving pictures, the several lessees
employed their own personnel to handle the leased properties and equipment of the LVN. There were some instances when these
lessees employed former workers and employees of the LVN.

On July 18, 1961 the EWA filed a complaint charging the LVN with violations of section 4(a) (1) and (4) of Republic Act 875 (Industrial
Peace Act), consisting of alleged union interference by the LVN and/or discriminatory dismissal of 84 employees and workers because
of the membership in the EWA The LPCU likewise filed on October 20, 1961 a complaint against the LVN and the DPI for alleged
violations of sec. 4(a) (1), (4) and (6) in relation to sections 12 and 13 of the Industrial Peace Act, consisting of alleged acts of
discrimination, shortening of working hours and/or days, and forced dismissals. In both cases the CIR decided in favor of the
respondents, holding the latter not guilty of unfair labor practices in dismissing the employees-members of the EWA and the LPCU,
and, in the latter case filed by the LPCU, declaring that the DPI is a business establishment and entity separate and distinct from the
LVN. The motions for reconsideration filed by the respective complainants were denied by the CIR.
13
ISSUE: Is the LVN guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing its employees who are members of the EWA and the LPCU?

RULING: No.
This Court, in a number of cases, has recognized and affirmed the right of an employer to lay off or dismiss employees because of
losses in the operation of its business, lack of work, and considerable reduction in the volume of his business. We have held that such
acts of dismissal do not constitute unfair labor practice. Indeed, "an employer may close his business, provided the same is done in
good faith and is due to causes beyond his control. To rule otherwise would be oppressive and inhuman."

The respondent CIR found for a fact, and our own independent study of the evidence shows, that the LVN suffered tremendous losses,
completely depleting its capital which was needed to operate and continue its business of producing moving pictures. In order to avoid
immediate lay-off of employees and the closure of its business, the LVN proposed to the EWA a change in the payment of salaries and
wages of the employees and workers from salary or wage basis to the "pakiao" system; and when this was rejected by the union, it
offered to reduce the monthly compensation of all the employees (except those receiving less than P175 a month and the daily wage
earners) regardless of their union membership, and this too was rejected. In order to avoid further losses and in view of the refusal of
the union to cooperate in alleviating its mounting losses, the LVN was left with no alternative but to close its movie production as of May
31, 1961 and to dismiss its employees. This the LVN had the right to do, and it did so in good faith. We are not unmindful of the plight of
the employees in this case, but we consider it oppressive to compel the LVN to continue its business of producing movies when to do
so would only result in its incurring further losses.

14

Você também pode gostar