The case arose in 1958, when Edward Lewis Schempp, his wife, and two of their

children, who attended public schools in Pennsylvania, filed suit in U.S. district
court in Philadelphia, alleging that their religious rights under the First Amendment
had been violated by a state law that required public schools to begin each school day
with a reading of at least 10 passages from the Bible. The Schempps, who
were Unitarians, claimed that the law was an unconstitutional establishment of
religion and that it interfered with the free exercise of their religious faith, in violation
of the First Amendments free-exercise clause (Congress shall make no law
prohibiting the free exercise of [religion]). They asked the court for declaratory and
injunctive relief (i.e., to declare the law unconstitutional and to issue
an injunction against its enforcement) and to strike down the school districts
additional requirement that students recite the Lords Prayer at the beginning of each
school day.

After the district court found in favour of the Schempps, the school district and the
states superintendent of schools appealed to the Supreme Court. Before the case was
heard, however, the Pennsylvania General Assembly amended the law to permit
students to be excused from Bible readings upon the written request of a parent. The
Supreme Court then vacated and remanded the district courts judgment for further
consideration in light of the amended law. After the district court held that the law
remained in violation of the establishment clause, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a
new appeal, consolidating it with a similar case that had arisen in
Baltimore, Maryland, Murray v. Curlett, in which the lower court had found that
Bible reading in public schools is constitutional. Oral arguments were heard on
February 2728, 1963.

HELD

In an opinion for an 81 majority written by Justice Tom C. Clark, the court

noted and reaffirmed the Supreme Courts incorporation of the establishment
clause in Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940). It also endorsed the view, supported
in numerous precedents, that the establishment clause was not intended
merely to prohibit Congress from aiding or preferring one religion at the
expense of others but also to ensure that it does not promote all religions, or
religion generally. The court noted with approval the dissenting opinion of
Justice Robert H. Jackson in the Supreme Courts decision
in Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing (1947), in which he
wrote that the effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution
was to take every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things
which could directly or indirectly be made public business, and thereby be
supported in whole or in part at taxpayers expense. The court likewise cited
Justice Wiley B. Rutledges dissent in Everson, according to which the [First]
Amendments purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment of
a single sect, creed or religion[but] to create a complete and permanent
separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by
comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.
Those principles, the court noted in Schempp, have been long established,
recognized and consistently reaffirmed.

However, just as the government may not promote any or all religions, it is
also prohibited from inhibiting or interfering with religion, as the free-exercise
clause of the First Amendment establishes. The court again cited Rutledges
dissent in Everson, among other precedents, to support that point: Our
constitutional policydoes not deny the value or the necessity for religious
training, teaching or observance. Taken together, therefore, the two religion
clauses of the First Amendment require the state to be neutral not only as
between different groups of religious believers but also as between religious
believers and nonbelievers.

On the basis of that conclusion, the court in Schempp devised a test to

determine whether a given statute is in violation of the establishment clause:

The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion, then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that, to withstand the strictures
of the Establishment Clause, there must be a secularlegislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion.

That test foreshadowed the Supreme Courts Lemon test for consistency
with the establishment clause, which it fashioned in 1971
in Lemon v. Kurtzman.
Examining the circumstances of the Bible readings and prayers in the schools
in Pennsylvania and Maryland, the court found that they constituted religious
exercises and were therefore unconstitutional under the establishment clause.
The court dismissed as unconvincing the argument that the exercises and the
laws requiring them served the secular purpose of
nonreligious moralinspiration. Nor was it pertinent that students could be
excused from the exercises upon the request of a parent, for that fact
furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment
Clause, as the Supreme Court had held in Engel v. Vitale (1962). Finally, the
court denied that its finding amounted to an establishment of a religion of
secularism or that by failing to uphold the exercises it was interfering in the
free-exercise rights of religious students and their parents. While the Free
Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of
free exercise to anyone, the court declared, it has never meant that a
majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.
CONNECT WITH BRITANNICA

Concurring opinions were filed by Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, joined by

Justice John Marshall Harlan, and by Justices William J. Brennan, Jr.,
and William O. Douglas. Justice Potter Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in
which he argued that the record before the court was insufficiently developed
to allow it to conclude that the students were coerced into participating in the
exercises in violation of the establishment clause.

Facts of the case

The Abington case concerns Bible-reading in Pennsylvania public schools. At
the beginning of the school day, students who attended public schools in the
state of Pennsylvania were required to read at least ten verses from the
Bible. After completing these readings, school authorities required all
Abington Township students to recite the Lord's Prayer. Students could be
excluded from these exercises by a written note from their parents to the
school. In a related case -- Murray v. Curlett -- a Baltimore statute required
Bible-reading or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at open exercises in public
schools. Murray and his mother, professed atheists -- challenged the prayer
requirement.

Question
Did the Pennsylvania law and Abington's policy, requiring public school
students to participate in classroom religious exercises, violate the religious
freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Conclusion
The Court found such a violation. The required activities encroached on both the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment since the readings and recitations
were essentially religious ceremonies and were "intended by the State to be so." Furthermore,
argued Justice Clark, the ability of a parent to excuse a child from these ceremonies by a written
note was irrelevant since it did not prevent the school's actions from violating the Establishment
Clause.

___

Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)

Facts:
Pennsylvania state law required that "at least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the
opening of each public school on each school day." Two families sued, claiming this violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.

Issue:
Whether an official reading at the beginning of each school day of Bible passages, without further comment, violates
the Establishment Clause.

Holding:
By a vote of 8-1, the Court held that state-sponsored devotional Bible readings in public schools constitute an
impermissible religious exercise by government.

Reasoning:
The Court found that state-sponsored devotional exercises violate the Establishment Clause. The Constitutional
defects are not corrected by allowing an opt-out provision. The Establishment Clause constrains government from
involving itself in religious matters. Therefore, government action that promotes or inhibits religion violates the
Constitution. The state may not draft or conduct religious prayers in schools filled with captive audiences of children.

Majority:
"In addition, it might well be said that ones education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the
history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is
worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible
or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected [sic]
consistently with the First Amendment. But the exercises here do not fall into those categories. They are religious
exercises, required by the States in violation of the command of the First Amendment that the Government maintain
strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion." (Justice Tom Clark)

__
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Both Abington School District v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett dealt with state-
approved reading of Bible passages before classes in public schools. Schempp was
brought to trial by a religious family who had contacted the ACLU. The Schempps
challenged a Pennsylvania law which stated that:

...at least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of
each public school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such
Bible reading, upon written request of his parent or guardian.

This was disallowed by a federal district court.

Murray was brought to trial by an atheist: Madalyn Murray (later O'Hair), who was
working on behalf of her sons, William and Garth. Murray challenged a Baltimore
statute that provided for the "reading, without comment, of a chapter of the Holy Bible
and/or of the Lord's Prayer" before the start of classes.

This statute was upheld by both a state court and the Maryland Court of Appeals.

COURT DECISION
Arguments for both cases were heard on the 27th and 28th of February, 1963. On the
17th of June, 1963, the Court ruled 8-1 against of allowing the reciting of the Bible verses
and the Lord's Prayer.

Justice Clark wrote at length in his majority opinion about the history and importance
of religion in America, but his conclusion was that the Constitution forbids any
establishment of religion, that prayer is a form of religion, and that hence state-
sponsored or mandated Bible reading in public schools cannot be allowed.

For the first time, a test was created to evaluate Establishment questions before courts:

...what are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment. If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as
circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the structures of the
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. [emphasis added]

Justice Brennan wrote in a concurring opinion that, while legislators argued that they
had a secular purpose with their law, their goals could have been achieved with readings
from secular document. The law, however, only specified the use of religious literature
and prayer. That the Bible readings were to be made "without comment" demonstrated
even further that the legislators knew that they were dealing with specifically religious
literature and wanted to avoid sectarian interpretations.
 A violation of the Free Exercise Clause was also created by the coercive effect of the
readings. That this might entail only "minor encroachments on the First Amendment,"
as argued by others, was irrelevant.

The comparative study of religion in public schools is not prohibited, for example, but
those religious observances were not created with such studies in mind.

SIGNIFICANCE
This case was essentially a repeat of the Court's earlier Court Decision in Engel v. Vitale,
in which the Court identified constitutional violations and struck the legislation. As
with Engel, the Court held that the voluntary nature of religious exercises (even allowing
parents to exempt their children) did not prevent the statutes from violating the
Establishment Clause. There was, of course, an intensely negative public reaction. In
May 1964, there were more than 145 proposed constitutional amendments in the House
of Representatives which would permit school prayer and effectively reverse both
decisions. Representative L.

Mendell Rivers accused the Court of "legislating - they never adjudicate - with one eye
on the Kremlin and the other on the NAACP." Cardinal Spellman claimed that the
decision struck

...at the very heart of the Godly tradition in which America's children have for so long been
raised.

Although people commonly claim that Murray, who later founded the American
Atheists, was the women who got prayer kicked out of public schools (and she was
willing to take the credit), it should be clear that even had she never existed, the
Schempp case still would have come to the Court and neither case dealt directly with
school prayer at all they were, instead, about Bible readings in public schools.

Article

_________

Lee v. Weisman

Facts of the case

In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school
principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school
principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel
Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the
rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a
temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the
ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent
injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from
inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools'
ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling
against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted
certiorari.

Question
Does the inclusion of clergy who offer prayers at official public school
ceremonies violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

Held

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates "a
state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such conduct conflicts
with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect
coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which
establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that
government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on
by government.

___

In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court declared

unconstitutional the practice of inviting clergy to deliver
invocations and benedictions at public school
graduations. Weisman, the parent of a public school
student in Rhode Island, sued the Providence school
system to stop them from allowing clergy to participate in
graduation ceremonies. Weisman challenged a school
board policy that gave each school principal complete
discretion to choose a clergy member of any faith to give
an invocation at school graduations. In addition, the
principal controlled the content of the invocation to insure
that it remained secular in nature. The Court held that
this type of state control over which clergy gave the
invocation and the content of the invocation constituted
state establishment of religion. The Court also found that
students might feel compelled to attend the ceremony
despite their opposition to any religious invocation, which
would result in government coerced support of religion.
For example, a non-observing student might feel peer
pressure to attend the ceremony, or, because high school
graduation is such a significant occasion in a persons life,
even non-observing students might feel compelled to
attend. Thus, the Court held that the practice of inviting
clergy to give invocations at public school ceremonies
violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.

___ LEE V. WEISMAN (1992)

Summary

This lesson spotlights Deborah Weisman and the Supreme Court case Lee v.
Weisman (1992). In this case, Deborah objected to her public school districts
practice of inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at graduation
ceremonies. The Supreme Court agreed that the Rabbi-led non-sectarian prayer
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Resources

Lee v. Weisman , The Oyez Project

 Lee v. Weisman , Cornell Law

Activity

The Nathan Bishop Middle School graduates looked up at the stage as the Rabbi
stepped up to the podium. The Rabbi began the public school commencement
ceremony by giving thanks to God for the legacy of America where diversity is
celebrated He continued, O God, we are grateful for the learning which we
have celebrated on this joyous commencementwe give thanks to you, Lord, for
keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing us to reach this special, happy
occasion.

Before the graduation, Principal Robert E. Lee had invited the clergyman and
provided him a two-page instructional flyer, prepared by the National Conference
of Christians and Jews. He was advised that his prayer at graduation must be
nonsectarian.

Student Deborah Weisman objected to the graduation prayer. Her father, Daniel
Weisman, agreed. Though the Weisman family was Jewish, they believed the
Rabbis prayer on behalf of the government-funded school was a violation of the
First Amendments Establishment Clause, which holds, Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion The school district asserted that
the nonsectarian prayer did not endorse any religious viewpoint, and that the
Establishment Clause should not prohibit such an activity.

The Supreme Court ruled in Lee. v. Weisman (1992) that the practice of inviting
clergy to offer prayers at graduation did violate the Establishment Clause. Since
attendance at graduation is a milestone very few students would be willing or
able to skip, the state in effect required participation in a religious exercise. The
Court asserted that the Establishment Clause guarantees that government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.

The decision continued, The lessons of the First Amendment are as urgent in
the modern world as in the 18th Century when it was written. One timeless
lesson is that if citizens are subjected to state sponsored religious exercises, the
State disavows its own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable
conscience and belief which is the mark of a free people.

___
Lee

Facts

Robert E. Lee (defendant), a public middle school principal, invited a Jewish rabbi to
say prayers at his schools graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman (plaintiff), whose
daughter was among the expected graduates, sought a temporary restraining order in
federal district court to prevent the rabbi from speaking at the graduation. His request
was denied, and the rabbi delivered several prayers at the graduation. Weisman later
sought a permanent injunction in federal district court barring Lee and other school
officials from inviting clergy to deliver prayers at public school graduations. The district
court granted the injunction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.

---
STONE v GRAHAM

Facts of the case

Sydell Stone and a number of other parents challenged a Kentucky state law
that required the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in each public
school classroom. They filed a claim against James Graham, the
superintendent of public schools in Kentucky.

Question
Did the Kentucky statute violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment?

In a 5-to-4 per curiam decision, the Court ruled that the Kentucky law violated the first part of the
test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and thus violated the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution. The Court found that the requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted "had
no secular legislative purpose" and was "plainly religious in nature." The Court noted that the
Commandments did not confine themselves to arguably secular matters (such as murder,
stealing, etc.), but rather concerned matters such as the worship of God and the observance of
the Sabbath Day.

--

In Stone v. Graham the Supreme Court considered the

constitutionality of a Kentucky statute that required the
Ten Commandments to be posted on the walls of every
classroom in the state. The copies of the Ten
Commandments had been purchased with private
contributions, and the following language appeared at the
bottom of each copy in small print: The secular
application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in
its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western
Civilization and the Common Law of the United States.
Applying the test articulated by the Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, the Court concluded that the Kentucky statute
was unconstitutional because it had no secular legislative
purpose. The Court noted that while several of the
Commandments are secular in nature, the first part of the
Commandments concerns the religious duties of
believers. Merely posting the Commandments on the
wall, the Court concluded, served no educational
function, as the Commandments were not integrated into
the secular curriculum; the display could give students
the impression that the state was promoting the religious
beliefs the Commandments represent. Regardless of the
private funding and the explanatory language at the
bottom of the display, the Court determined that by
posting the Commandments under the auspices of the
legislature, the state provided official support of religion
in violation of the Establishment Clause.
___

e v. Graham, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on November 17, 1980,
ruled (54) that a Kentucky statute requiring school officials to post a copy of
the Ten Commandments (purchased with private contributions) on a wall in
every public classroom violated the First Amendments establishment clause,
which is commonly interpreted as a separation of church and state.

In addition to the posting of the Commandments, the Kentucky statute (1978)

required that this notation was to be placed, in small print, at the bottom of
each display: The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly
seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and
the Common Law of the United States. Opponents of the statute claimed that
it violated the establishment and free exercise clauses of the
First Amendment. Sydell Stone, among others, sued, and James B. Graham,
the states superintendent of education, was named as the respondent. A trial
court upheld the statute, ruling that its purpose was secular. The case then
went to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which was divided, thereby leaving the
lower courts ruling in place.

In 1980 the case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court. In a per curiam
(unsigned) opinion, it used the so-called Lemon test to evaluate whether the
statute was permissible under the establishment clause.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Supreme Court held that (a) a statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; (b) its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibitsreligion; and (c) the statute cannot
promote an excessive government entanglement with religion. If any of the
points are violated, the statute must be ruled unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court held that the Kentucky statute violated the first part of the
so-called Lemon test. The court rejected arguments that the notation on the
bottom of the Ten Commandments was sufficient to indicate the secular
purpose of the posting. Moreover, the court was of the opinion that the posting
of the Ten Commandments was clearly religious and not educational. The
Commandments were not part of the curriculum, and the court maintained that
the state was instead encouraging students to read, meditate upon, and
perhaps venerate and obey the Commandments, which is a violation of the
establishment clause. The court considered it to be irrelevant that the copies
were bought with private funds, because displaying the Commandments
demonstrated official state support of their message.

___

Facts of the case

The Arkansas legislature passed a law prohibiting teachers in public or state-
supported schools from teaching, or using textbooks that teach, human
evolution. Epperson, a public school teacher, sued, claiming the law violated
her First Amendment right to free speech as well as the Establishment
Clause. The State Chancery Court ruled that it violated her free speech
rights; the State Supreme Court reversed.

Question
Does a law forbidding the teaching of evolution violate either the free speech
rights of teachers or the Establishment clause of the First Amendment?

Ruling
\ Yes. Seven members of the Court held that the statute violated the Establishment clause.
Writing for the Court, Justice Abe Fortas stated that the law had been based solely on the
beliefs of fundamentalist Christians, who felt that evolutionary theories directly contradicted the
biblical account of Creation. This use of state power to prohibit the teaching of material
objectionable to a particular sect ammounted to an unconstitutional Establishment of religion.
Justice Fortas wrote, "The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public
schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a
scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First
Amendment." The two other members of the Court concurred in the result, writing that it violated
either the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (because it was unconstitutionally vague)
or the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment.

___
Epperson v. Arkansas - Significance
The decision demanded that governments refuse to favor any particular
religion or religious theory over another.

A young schoolteacher named Susan Epperson found herself caught in a

dilemma at the beginning of the 1965 school year. Little did she know at that
time that her dilemma would end up being solved by the justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the landmark case Epperson v. Arkansas. Reminiscent of
the famous Scopes monkey trial, Tennessee v. Scopes, of 1925, the significance
of Epperson v. Arkansas is that our government cannot and should not favor
any one religion over another.

At the beginning of the 1965 school year, Epperson, a woman with a master's
degree in zoology from the University of Illinois, began to review the textbook
she was told to use to teach her tenth grade biology class. A biology teacher at
Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, Epperson realized, after
reviewing the chapters in the textbook, that one of the chapters contained
information about evolution. The theory of evolution is that humans
developed over time from lower animal forms.

Epperson's dilemma was this: she was supposed to teach the class using the
textbook. However, she knew if she taught the chapter on evolution contained
in the textbook that she would be fired. She knew the school system would
seek her dismissal because on the law books in the state of Arkansas at that
time was a statute that made it against the law to teach evolution in any state
supported school.

Filing suit in the local chancery court, Epperson sought to have the law
deemed null and void and she wanted to prevent the school system from firing
her. The chancery court said that the law violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The First Amendment grants all
Americans freedom of speech and prevents the government from favoring one
religion over another. The Fourteenth Amendment extends the First
Amendment to the states. Epperson's dilemma continued as the case was
appealed. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the decision of the chancery
court. In a short statement, the Arkansas Supreme Court said the law was legal
because the state has the power to decide what the curriculum is in its public
schools. However, the Arkansas Supreme Court did not express any opinion as
to whether or not the law allows a teacher to explain the theory of evolution.
Read more: Epperson v. Arkansas - Significance - Court, Supreme, School, and
Law - JRank Articles http://law.jrank.org/pages/22966/Epperson-v-
Arkansas-Significance.html#ixzz4cboXAdsZ

Next came Epperson's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The High Court
reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision and said that the Arkansas
law could not stand. Justice Fortas explained the U.S. Supreme Court's view.
He said that our democratic government must remain neutral when it comes
to religious theory. In expressing the views of the Court, Justice Fortas quoted
other precedent-setting cases including Watson v. Jones. In 1872, in Watson
v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court said "the law knows no heresy, and is
committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect."

In comparing Epperson v. Arkansas to other similar cases, the U.S. Supreme

Court, it should be noted, took similar positions in two other cases. The High
Court held closely to the separation between church and state in 1962 in Engel
v. Vitale and in 1963 in Abington School District v. Schempp.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Epperson v. Arkansas told the American public,
and especially its school systems that the protection of constitutional freedoms
is vital in our schools. In addition to quoting from Watson v. Jones, Justice
Fortas talked about other cases including Everson v. Board of
Education. In Everson v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
a state law that provided free bus service to school children, both public and
private school children. During the Eversoncase the High Court said, "Neither
a state nor the federal government can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another."

In Epperson v. Arkansas the U.S. Supreme Court went as far back as to quote
Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson said the First Amendment to the Constitution
was intended to erect a "wall of separation" between church and state. In
making its decision in Epperson, the U.S. Supreme Court was aided by the
precedents set in previous freedom of religion cases.

In summary, Epperson v. Arkansas is significant because it demanded

governments refuse to favor any particular religion or religious theory over
another. Governments must maintain a religious neutrality, the Supreme
Court said in Epperson. If they do not, they are infringing on a person's
constitutional rights set forth in the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Read more: Epperson v. Arkansas - Significance - Court, Supreme, School, and
Law - JRank Articles http://law.jrank.org/pages/22966/Epperson-v-
Arkansas-Significance.html#ixzz4cboemST2

___

Epperson v. State of Arkansas, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on

November 12, 1968, ruled (90) that an Arkansas law barring the teaching
of evolution in public schools violated the First Amendments establishment
clause, which generally prohibits the government from establishing,
advancing, or giving favour to any one religion.

Three years after the Scopes Trial of 1925in which a teacher was found
guilty of violating a Tennessee law that barred the instruction of evolution in
that states public schoolsArkansas enacted a statute that made it illegal for
teachers in state-supported schools or universities to teach the theory or
doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals
or to adopt or usea textbook that teaches such a theory. Those who
violated the statute could be charged with a misdemeanour and dismissed.
Until 1965 the science textbooks used in the school system of Little Rock,
Arkansas, did not contain a section on evolution. For the 196566 academic
year, however, school administrators adopted a textbook that included
information on the theory. Susan Epperson, a biology teacher, was confronted
with the task of teaching from the new textbook. Fearing that she might be
dismissed, Epperson sought a declaration that the Arkansas statute was void.
She also sought to enjoin the state and school officials from dismissing her for
violating the statute.

A chancery court in Arkansas ruled that the statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, which safeguards the First Amendments freedom of speech and
thought from state interference. The Supreme Court of Arkansas, however,
reversed the decision, holding that it was within the states authority to specify
public schools curriculum. That court failed to address the
other constitutionalissues.
The case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court on October 16, 1968. In
its analysis the court concluded that the statute sought to prevent public
school teachers from presenting evolution because it was contrary to the
belief of a particular religious groupone that thought the Bibles book
of Genesis should be the only source of information as to the origins of
humankind. Based on that finding, the court held that the law was
unconstitutional because the government must be neutral in matters of
religious theory, doctrine, and practice and must be neutral between religions
and between religion and nonreligion. In addition, the government should not
aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another. Thus,
the court ruled that the Arkansas statute violated the First Amendments
establishment clause, which was protected on the state level by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court was
overturned.

__

Epperson v. Arkansas
In 1968, in Epperson v. Arkansas, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a 1928 Arkansas statute that prohibited the teaching of evolution.
The Court held the statute to be an unconstitutional attempt to advance a
particular religious viewpoint:

The law's effort was confined to an attempt to blot out a particular

theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical account,
literally read. Plainly, the law is contrary to the mandate of the
First, and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution."
This case established the precedent that a state curriculum could not "be
tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma." This
case brought to an end the enforcement of "Scopes era" laws or the passage
of new ones prohibiting the teaching of evolution.

Epperson

Relevant Facts: In 1928, Arkansas passed a statute as a result of a successful ballot initiative that
outlawed the teaching of evolution in public schools and universities. Some forty years later, Susan
Epperson was employed as a biology teacher in Little Rock, Arkansas. When the administration at
her school adopted a new textbook for the upcoming school year, one that included a chapter on
evolution, Ms. Epperson was faced with a difficult choice. She could either teach the course as
directed by the administration, subjecting her to punishment for violation of the statute in question, or
comply with the law and place her job in jeopardy. She chose a third option, and brought suit
challenging the constitutionality of the law and seeking to enjoin its enforcement. At trial, the court
determined that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment by restricting free speech as
guaranteed by the First Amendment, finding it particularly objectionable that the statute impeded the
quest for knowledge. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the State controlled
curriculum in public schools.

Issue: Do state laws prohibiting the teaching of scientific theories, on the basis of religious
objections, violate the First Amendment?

Holding: Yes, states may not prohibit teaching scientific theories unless they have a valid, secular
purpose for doing so. While states do have control over school curriculum, they are not free to
exercise such control in a way that runs afoul of First Amendment guarantees.

Reasoning: Justice Fortas, writing for the Court, first addressed the raised issue of vagueness.
The parties disagreed concerning whether the statute prohibited mentioning the theory of evolution,
or whether it merely prevented teaching that the theory was true. The Court determined that the
inquiry was unnecessary, as the statute was unconstitutional under either interpretation. After a brief
recitation of the history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Justice Fortas explained that the
instant case was a simple one. State action must but in furtherance of a secular purpose in order to
pass Constitutional muster. When, as here, the statute seeks to advance the beliefs of a particular
sect by prohibiting teachings they find objectionable, it violates that command. While states may
properly oversee the curriculum of their public schools, they must do so in a way that does not
violate the rights of students and teachers. In this case, there was no possible secular justification
for the statute, passed and codified solely to protect the religious view that students ought not to be
exposed to theories contrary to the book of Genesis in the Bible. Accordingly, the statute violated
the Establishment Clause.

Dissent: While there were no dissenting opinions, Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart each wrote
concurring opinions. Justice Black, while concurring in the result, preferred to more carefully
scrutinize the issue of standing, and on the merits would have struck down the law for vagueness.
He also argued that valid secular purposes could have existed, that the theory could have been
considered anti-religious, and that teachers in public schools do not have the same academic
 freedom they would in private institutions. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, agreed that the
statute violated the Establishment Clause, but thought that the Court should have passed without
comment on both free speech and vagueness. Justice Stewart would have also overturned the
statute on vagueness grounds, arguing that while states may properly determine curriculum, they
may not prohibit even the bare mention of competing ideas not contained within the proscribed
course of study.

Conclusion: States must adopt school curricula with valid, secular purposes in mind. A State may
not prohibit the teaching of a theory merely because it conflicts with the established tenets of a
particular faith.

__

Epperson v. Arkansas case brief

Epperson v. Arkansas case brief summary
393 U.S. 97 (1968)

CASE SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff teacher brought an action that sought a declaration that an Arkansas statute, Ark. Stat. Ann.
80-1627 and 1628, that made it unlawful for a teacher in a state-supported school to teach
evolution, was unconstitutional. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the chancery court's decision
and held that the statute was a valid exercise of the state's power to specify the curriculum in its
public schools. The teacher appealed.

CASE FACTS
The teacher had challenged the constitutionality of the Arkansas law that made it a misdemeanor to
teach the evolution theory and subjected her to dismissal from her position.

DISCUSSION

The Court did not rest its decision on the vagueness of the Arkansas statute, but held that the
statute could not stand because the State of Arkansas' right to prescribe the curriculum for its public
schools did not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a
scientific theory or doctrine where the prohibition was based upon reasons that violated the First
Amendment.
There was no doubt that Arkansas had sought to prevent its teachers from discussing the theory
of evolution.
Thus, the Arkansas law could not be defended as an act of religious neutrality because the
State did not seek to excise form the curricula of its schools and universities all discussion of the origin
of man.
The law attempted to blot out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the
Biblical account.

CONCLUSION
The Court reversed the decision of the state supreme court
___
EDWARDS
Facts of the case
A Louisiana law entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act" prohibited the teaching of
the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was
accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that
advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced
to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed,
evolution or creation, teachers were obligated to discuss the other as well.

Question
Did the Louisiana law, which mandated the teaching of "creation science"
along with the theory of evolution, violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment?

Yes. The Court held that the law violated the Constitution. Using the three-pronged test that the
Court had developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) to evaluate potential violations of the
Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan argued that Louisiana's law failed on all three prongs of
the test. First, it was not enacted to further a clear secular purpose. Second, the primary effect
of the law was to advance the viewpoint that a "supernatural being created humankind," a
doctrine central to the dogmas of certain religious denominations. Third, the law significantly
entangled the interests of church and state by seeking "the symbolic and financial support of
government to achieve a religious purpose."

___

Edwards

Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that
Louisianas Creationism Act (the Act) that required evolution be taught if creation science was
taught and vice versa violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution
(Constitution).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. While the Court is normally deferential to the states articulation of a
secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not without a
sham. It is clear that requiring schools to teach creation science with evolution does not
advance academic freedom.
Facts. The Act forbids the teaching of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by
instruction in creation science. No school is required to teach evolution or creation science. If
either is taught however, the other must be taught. The Appellees, Aguillard and other parents of
children attending Louisiana public schools, Louisiana teachers, and religious leaders
(Appellees) challenged the constitutionality of the Act. The District Court held that the Act
violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution either because it prohibited the teaching of
evolution or because it required the teaching of creation science with the purpose of advancing
a particular religious doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue. Whether the Act violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution?

Held. Yes. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Lemons first prong focuses on the
purpose of that animated adoption of the Act. In this case, the Appellants, Edwards and others
(Appellants), have identified no clear secular purpose for the Act. The goal of providing a more
comprehensive science curriculum is not furthered by either outlawing the teaching of evolution
or by requiring the teaching of creationism. While the Supreme Court is normally deferential to
the states articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be
sincere and not without a sham. It is clear that requiring schools to teach creation science with
evolution does not advance academic freedom. The Act does not grant teachers the flexibility
that they did not already possess to supplant the present science curriculum with a presentation
of theories besides evolution, about the origin of life. Here, the purpose of the Act was to
restructure the science curriculum to confor
m with a particular religious viewpoint. Therefore, the Act violates the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution.

Dissent. There is ample evidence that the majority is wrong in holding that the Act is without
secular purpose.
Concurrence. Nothing in this Supreme Courts decision diminishes the traditionally broad
discretion accorded state and local school officials in the selection of the public school
curriculum.

___

Edwards v. Aguillard
In a landmark ruling in 1987 in Edwards v. Aguillard, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the state of Louisiana's "Creationism Act" was unconstitutional.
This statute prohibited the teaching of evolution in public schools, except
when it was accompanied by instruction in "creation science". The Court found
that, by advancing the religious belief that a supernatural being created
humankind, which is embraced by the term "creation science," the act
impermissibly endorsed a particular religious viewpoint. In addition, the Court
found that the provision of a comprehensive science education is undermined
when it is forbidden to teach evolution except when creation science is also
taught. Some creationists responded to this decision by refashioning "creation
science" to avoid any explicit references to the Bible, to God, or to the beliefs
of a particular religious sect. This version of creationism re-emerged as part of
the "intelligent design" movement in the 1990s.

__

Edwards

Facts

The state of Louisiana passed the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act (Creationism Act) which forbade
the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by the
teaching of creation science. While the Creationism Act did not require schools to
teach either subject, if one was taught, the other was also required to be taught.
Aguillard (plaintiff), a representative of parents of children attending public schools,
Louisiana teachers, and religious institutions brought suit against Edwards (defendant),
representing Louisiana state officials responsible for enforcement of the act, in federal
district court. Aguillard challenged the Creationism Act as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Establishment Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to
Aguillard, and the court of appeals affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.

Rule of Law
____

Edwards

The case is significant because it reaffirmed that the advancing of any religious
doctrine violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
In June of 1987, the Supreme Court voted to reject a law passed by the state of
Louisiana. The rejection of this Louisiana law was to set a precedent in
religion and freedom of religion-related cases. The Louisiana law required
teachers in the state to teach "creationism." Although some people believe
creationism, also known as creation science, to be a fact, others believe it to be
a theory--a proposed but unverified explanation. In dealing with the case
of Edwards v. Aguillard, the High Court had to deal with many issues
including creation science, evolution, religion, and education. In the end, the
Supreme Court ruled that the Louisiana law violated the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Because of this violation, the
law was found to be unconstitutional.

To understand this case one must first understand the Louisiana law. Then
one must come to understand how the Supreme Court justices arrived at their
decision. The state of Louisiana passed a law it called "The Creationism Act."
Under the Creationism Act teachers were required to teach both the theory of
evolution and the theory of creation science.

The theory of evolution states that human beings evolved, or came into being
gradually, over time. The theory of creation science disagrees with the theory
of evolution. Creation scientists believe the origin of life did not happen over
time, and that humans did not evolve from lower life forms. Louisiana's
Creationism Act said if one theory is taught to students, then both theories
must be presented. Challenging the Creationism Act were Louisiana parents,
religious leaders, and teachers. A Federal District Court declared that
Louisiana's Creationism Act was unconstitutional and both the court of
appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Federal District Court's
decision.

Read more: Edwards v. Aguillard - Significance - Court, Act, Supreme, and

Louisiana - JRank Articles http://law.jrank.org/pages/22938/Edwards-v-
Aguillard-Significance.html#ixzz4cbuTUkzR

The U.S. Constitution's Establishment Clause prohibits the passage of any law
that takes away an individual's freedom of religion, whether that person
selects a religion or decides on no religion at all. The question the Supreme
Court asked itself was did the passage by the state of Louisiana of its
Creationism Act violate the Establishment Clause. Based on its long history
dealing with the religion clauses of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court
had developed what became known as the Lemon test. The Lemon test
allowed the Supreme Court to decide whether or not a certain piece of
legislation violated the Establishment Clause.

The Lemon test itself evolved over time. Many cases, including Everson v.
Board of Education, Engel v. Vitale, McGowan v. Maryland, Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, and the case lending the
test its name--Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971--among others, provided
precedents on which to build the Lemon test. The Lemon test the Supreme
Court used to decide whether or not the act violated the clause included the
justices' answers to three separate questions. The justices found that the
answers to their questions were: 1) Yes, the legislature passed the law with a
non-religious purpose. 2) Yes, the primary effect of the law was to advance or
inhibit religion. And, 3) Yes, the law created an excessive meshing of religion
with government. So, by answering yes to its three part question concerning
the violation of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court ruled against the
passage of the act.

The Supreme Court, in making its decision, brought to light several points
about the Creationism Act that were discriminatory. The act required that
teachers develop curriculum guides for creationism but not for evolution. The
Supreme Court said this was discrimination. The act forbdale local school
boards from discriminating against creation=scientists, but not teachers who
taught the theory of evolution. The Supreme Court said this was
discrimination. And, the High Court noted, the act endorses the creation-
science=held religious belief that a supernatural being created human beings.
This, the justices agreed, violates the First Amendment to the Constitution.

By challenging the constitutionality of the act in court, the Louisiana parents,

teachers and religious leaders participated in what became a landmark case
dealing with freedom of and from religion. After the Supreme Court ruled,
Louisiana Governor Edwards along with others involved in the educational
system in Louisiana agreed not to implement the Creationism Act. In
summary, the case is significant because it reaffirmed that the advancing of
any religious doctrine violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Read more: Edwards v. Aguillard - Significance - Court, Act, Supreme, and

 Louisiana - JRank Articles http://law.jrank.org/pages/22938/Edwards-v-
Aguillard-Significance.html#ixzz4cbuYhE2e___

___

United States
Edwards v. Aguillard, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on June 19,
1987, ruled (72) that a Louisiana statute barring the teaching of evolution in
public schools unless accompanied by the teaching of creationism was
unconstitutional under the First Amendments establishment clause, which
prohibits laws respecting an establishment of religion.
In 1981 Louisiana enacted the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act, commonly called
the Creationism Act. It did not require that either evolution or creationism be
taught in public schools. However, the act stated that if one theory is
presented, then the other must be as well. According to supporters, the bill
had a secular purpose, which was protecting academic freedom. However,
opponents of the law, including high-school teacher Don Aguillard, charged
that it was a violation of the establishment clause and filed suit; Edwin
Edwards, as the governor of Louisiana, was named as one of the
respondents.
A federal district court granted Aguillard a summary judgment, noting that
there was no secular reason for barring the instruction of evolution. Moreover,
the court held that the statute promoted a particular religious doctrine. The
decision was affirmed by the appellate court, which found that the laws
purpose was to discredit evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every
turn with the teaching of creationism, a religious belief.

The case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court on December 10, 1986.
In its review the court used the so-called Lemon test, which determines
whether a statute is permissible under the establishment clause.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) the court held that the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose, its primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and it cannot create an excessive government
entanglement with religion. If any of the conditions are violated, the statute is
unconstitutional. In examining the Creationism Acts purpose, the court
rejected the states claims that the law was designed to protect academic
freedom and that it advanced a basic concept of fairness. The court held that
the act did not grant teachers greater flexibility. The court further found that
the Creationism Act was discriminatory by requiring the development of
curricular guidelines and research for creation science to the exclusion of
 evolution. Moreover, according to the court, the act did not ensure a more-
complete science curriculum. If the Louisiana legislature was attempting to
maximize the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science instruction,
the court reasoned, it would have included the teaching of all scientific
theories about the origins of humankind.
SIMILAR TOPICS
Roe v. Wade
Griswold v. State of Connecticut
Marbury v. Madison
Plessy v. Ferguson
Scopes Trial
District of Columbia v. Heller
O.J. Simpson trial
Gideon v. Wainwright
Lawrence v. Texas
Korematsu v. United States
The Supreme Court held that the state legislature had a preeminent religious
purpose in enacting the statute. The court believed that the state legislature
was attempting to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being
created humankind. The court thus ruled that the state statute was
unconstitutional because it violated the establishment clause. The decision of
the appellate court was upheld.

___

Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District

Updated Oct 24, 2011

Federal Court:
U.S. District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania
AU's Role:
Co-Counsel
AU's Involvement Began:
December 2004
Status:
Closed
The Dover Area School District required its science teachers to read students a
statement in biology class telling them that biological evolution is a "theory" with "gaps"
"for which there is no evidence," and encouraging the students to learn a doctrine called
"intelligent design" as an alternative to the scientific theory of evolution. Intelligent
design is the non-scientific assertion that evolution is wrong and that life on Earth "owes
its origin to a master intellect" an intelligent, supernatural actor. In other words,
intelligent design is creationism that has been dressed up in pseudo-science. In
December 2004, on behalf of a group of parents in the Dover School District, AU and its
allies filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the Districts policy. In the early part of
2005, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on standing grounds and a group of
parents moved to intervene in the case on the side of the defendant. On March 10,
2005, the court rejected both motions. In July 2005, the defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment. We filed our opposition to that motion in August 2005, and the
motion was ultimately denied. Trial commenced on September 26, 2005, and lasted six
weeks, concluding in early November. The parties then submitted proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law. On December 20, 2005, the judge issued a 139-page
decision in the plaintiffs favor. The Court ruled that intelligent design is not science but
an inherently religious view, and that the Districts actions were unconstitutional. The
controversy resulted in a significant shift in the school boards membership following a
November 2005 election; as a result, the decision was not appealed. The district court
approved $2 million in attorneys fees and costs, but AU and cocounsel agreed to accept
only $1 million in fees because the new board members support our position, and we
wanted to ameliorate the financial burden on their ability to educate Dovers children. Of
this amount, roughly $267,000 went to cover costs, and the remaining amount was split
between AU and the ACLU of Pennsylvania.

___
Kitzmiller originated when the Dover Area School District Board of Education in Dover, Pennsylvania voted 6-3
to "challenge" evolution, under the leadership of creationist Bill Buckingham, by adding a one paragraph
disclaimer to the local high school biology curriculum[1] garbling the regular curriculum with teach the
controversy and promoting the "scientific alternative" of intelligent design (ID) and using Of Pandas and
People as a reference. The dissenting members of the school board resigned in protest [2] and the measure
carried.

Buckingham had previously wanted to use the textbook Of Pandas and People in the classroom to teach both
sides of the creation-evolution "debate", but was shot down because teaching creationism was previously ruled
unconstitutional. See Edwards v. Aguillard.

Angered about being forced to teach about ID, the entire science teaching faculty of Dover High School refused
to read the statement, citing a clause in the Pennsylvania code of education allowing them not to be forced to
teach something they thought false. As a result, the statement was, instead, read by the assistant
superintendent during what the school staff felt was a forced classroom interruption. Local parents, weary of
their children being taught a false controversy surrounding evolution, filed a class-action lawsuit.

[edit]Holding of the Court

Using the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, the court found that intelligent design was primarily religious and fostered
unnecessary entanglement of church and state. The court further found that intelligent design is not science.

The 'Lemon' test examines three points.

Does the action have a purely secular purpose?

Does the action promote or inhibit religion?

Does the action result in an entanglement of the state and religion?

A failure of any of the three conditions means it is unconstitutional under the establishment clause.

___

Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District case brief

Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District case brief summary
400 F. Supp. 2d 707

CASE SYNOPSIS:
Plaintiff parents sued defendants, a school district and its board (Board), challenging the constitutional
validity of a Board policy that required presentation of the concept of intelligent design (ID) in ninth
grade biology classes, claiming that it constituted an establishment of religion prohibited by the First
Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Pa. Const.
art. I, 3 (2005).

OVERVIEW: Proper application of both the endorsement and Lemon tests made it very clear that the
Board's ID policy violated the Establishment Clause.
The religious nature of ID would be readily apparent to an objective observer, adult or child. ID was not
science because (1) it violated centuries-old science ground rules by invoking and permitting
supernatural causation; (2) the irreducible complexity argument central to ID employed the same
flawed and illogical contrived dualism that doomed creation science; and (3) ID's negative attacks on
evolution had been refuted by the scientific community. Additionally, ID had not gained the scientific
community's acceptance, generated peer-reviewed publications, or been the subject of testing and
research. Moreover, ID could not uncouple itself from its religious antecedents. While the theory of
evolution was imperfect, that it could not yet render an explanation on every point could not be used
as a pretext to thrust an untestable alternative religious hypothesis into science classrooms or
misrepresent well-established scientific propositions. It was unconstitutional to teach ID as an
alternative to evolution in a public school science classroom.

OUTCOME: The court issued a declaratory judgment in favor of the parents that the Board's ID Policy
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Pennsylvania. Constitution. The
Board was permanently enjoined from maintaining the ID Policy in any school within the school district.

___

Lynch

Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiff, Daniel Donnelly (Plaintiff), objects to a crche
included in a Christmas display as violating the Establishment Clause of the United
States Constitution (Constitution).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Displays which celebrate the Christmas season without
favoring one religion over another are generally upheld. The government cannot permit
the type of display, which would endorse one religion over another because
Establishment Clause of the Constitution would be violated.

Facts. A crche included in a Christmas display, located in a park, owned by a

nonprofit organization, is alleged to violate the Establishment Clause, due to a
government entitys involvement with religion. The display included such objects as a
Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading Seasons Greetings, and a
crche. The crche had been included in the display for over 40 years. The Plaintiff
objected to the display and took action against the Defendant, Dennis Lynch
(Defendant), the Mayor of the city. In ruling on the case, the Supreme Court of the
United States (Supreme Court) acknowledges that the line-drawing test set forth in
Lemon is useful when inquiring into whether the challenged law or conduct has a
secular purpose, whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion
and whether it creates an excessive entanglement of government with religion. The
Supreme Court also acknowledges while the Lemon test is useful, there analysis will not
be confined to a single test. The Supreme Court ruled that the inclusion of the crche
in the Christmas display and the benefit caused by the inclusion of the crche to one
religion over another is incidental, indirect and remote. Moreover, the display of the
crche is not an advancement or endorsement of religion. It is only a government
recognition of Christmas itself.

Issue. Whether the inclusion of a crche in a Christmas display, erected by the city, in
a park owned by a nonprofit violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution?

Held. Reversed. The inclusion of a crche in a Christmas display is not am

advancement or endorsement of religion any more than the Government recognition of
Christmas itself or the inclusion of religious paintings in governmentally sponsored
museums.
Dissent. The inclusion of a distinctively religious symbol like the crche demonstrates
a sectarian purpose other than to gender the good will associated with the Christmas
season. The primary effect of the inclusion of the crche is to place a governmental
approval on a religious belief exemplified by the crche. The city is not merely using
the crche as a tradition holiday symbol, thereby purging the crche of its religious
content and conferring only an incidental and direct benefit upon religion.

Concurrence. The central issue in this case is whether the city has endorsed
Christianity by its display of the crche. To answer that question the Supreme Court
needs to look at what the city intended to communicate by the inclusion of the crche
and what message was actually conveyed. The purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon
test represent these two aspects of the meanings of the Citys actions.

Discussion. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution

prohibits the government from endorsing one religion over another. The Supreme Court
often relies on the Lemon test to inquire into whether the challenged law or conduct has
a secular purpose, whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion
and whether it creates an excessive entanglement of government with religion.

__

Facts of the case

The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display
located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a
Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons Greetings,"
and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over 40
years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis
Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket.

Question
Did the inclusion of a nativity scene in the city's display violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the
creche, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display,
viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to
advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the
historical origins of the Holiday and had "legitimate secular purposes." The Court held that the
symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was "far too late in the day to
impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country."
___

\LYNCH

\ The case led many to believe that the Court was tempering its stand for the
separation of church and state.

The case of Lynch v. Donnelly, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 5 March
1984, became a landmark case regarding the separation of church and state.
The case began as a dispute between a group of people who wanted a "creche"
displayed in public and a group who did not. A "creche" is a nativity scene, a
scene depicting the birth of Jesus Christ. The Supreme Court justices decided
the "creche" displayed in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, did not violate the
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Establishment Clause
outlines the government's role in the separation between church and state.
Part of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Establishment
Clause clearly prohibits any official establishment of a religion.

The case began when the city of Pawtucket put up its annual Christmas
display. The display was put up in Pawtucket's downtown area as it had been
for 40 years. The display contained other items besides the "creche." Among
the other items were a Christmas tree, colored lights, Santa Claus's home, and
animal figures.

After the display containing all these items was erected, a group of people filed
a lawsuit claiming the display violated the Establishment Clause. The group
filing the suit included residents of Pawtucket, members of the Rhode Island
affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union, and the union itself.

The decision in the case in district court commanded the city of Pawtucket not
to include the "creche." The district court agreed that by including the "creche"
the city had violated the Establishment Clause. The next stop in the appeals
process was the First Circuit Court of Appeals. This court also commanded
Pawtucket to remove the "creche," therefore upholding the decision of the
district court.

However, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Lynch v. Donnelly, reversed the two
lower court decisions, deciding to allow Pawtucket to display the "creche." The
"creche" the High Court said, did not violate the Constitution's Establishment
Clause.

When the 5-4 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court was announced, the New
York Times described it as a considerable modification of the existing line
between church and state. Linda Greenburg of the New York Times wrote, "it
significantly shifted the boundary in favor of religion."

Read more: Lynch v. Donnelly - Significance - Court, Creche, Justices, and

Establishment - JRank Articles http://law.jrank.org/pages/22971/Lynch-v-
Donnelly-Significance.html#ixzz4cbwJ3btE

In previous precedent setting cases regarding challenges to the Constitution's

Establishment Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court had voted against religion. The
Court's apparent accommodation of religion contrasted with its previous
decisions. In 1971, in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, a practice was declared
unconstitutional because it did not have a legitimate non-religious purpose.

The "Lemon Test"--a three part test used by Supreme Court justices to aid
them in deciding if a practice had violated the Establishment Clause--came
out of Lemon v. Kurtzman. However, in Lynch v. Donnelly, Chief Justice
Burger stated that his court did not consider the "Lemon Test" as essential as
other justices had in the past.

Instead of using the Lemon Test as a barometer in their decision making

process, several justices in Burger's Court substituted a new test. Their test
was simply the answer to the question of whether the Pawtucket practice of
displaying the "creche" posed a real danger to the establishment of a state
church. In other words, as Justice O'Connor stated at the time, whether the
government in question intends to endorse or is perceived to be endorsing a
particular religion.

Justices Burger, White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor opined that the U.S.
Constitution commands that there should not only be tolerance of all
religions, but accommodation of all religions. The Constitution, these five
justices declared, forbids hostility toward any religion. In voting to reverse the
two lower court decisions, these five Justices asserted that Pawtucket has not
advanced any religion. The display, they affirmed, merely celebrates a holiday
recognized by Congress as a national tradition.

Although five of the nine Supreme Court justices believed the "creche" did not
pose any real danger, four justices dissented. Among the four was Justice
Brennan. Brennan said that the "maintenance and display at public expense of
a symbol as distinctively sectarian as a creche simply cannot be squared with
our prior cases."

Brennan and the other dissenters, Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,
said the "creche" was a recreation of an event that is at the center of
Christianity. And, the dissenting justices concurred, Pawtucket's action in
displaying the "creche" was a step toward establishing a religious preference.
In summary, the dissenting justices agreed with the American Civil Liberties
Union and the National Council of Churches that the display violated the
Establishment Clause. Still, the Supreme Court's decision did not totally
clarify the High Court's position on the Establishment Clause. Uncertainty was
maintained because the justices reviewed Lynch v. Donnelly while taking into
consideration that there were other items in the holiday display. Brennan and
the other dissenters noted that it was not clear which way the Supreme Court
would have voted had the display only contained the "creche."

Five years later, in a similar case the Supreme Court would rule differently. In
1989, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU the Supreme Court ruled that a
"creche" displayed in a public building without anything else present in the
display violated the Establishment Clause. Still, Lynch v. Donnelly is
significant because it suggested an allowance for some religious adjustment in
the concept of the separation of church and state.

Read more: Lynch v. Donnelly - Significance - Court, Creche, Justices, and

Establishment - JRank Articles http://law.jrank.org/pages/22971/Lynch-v-
Donnelly-Significance.html#ixzz4cbwLjISr

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Relevant Facts: The City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island had for many years erected an annual holiday
display in a park owned by a nonprofit group located in the heart of the citys primary shopping
district. The sponsored display included a variety of festive holiday decorations, including a crche,
Santas house, a Christmas tree, and a banner that read Seasons Greetings. Daniel Donnelly and
others objected to the display and the towns sponsorship, claiming that the display was religious in
nature and unconstitutionally endorsed religion by a government entity. Donnelly and others brought
suit against the City and Mayor Dennis Lynch, seeking to have the display removed and enjoin the
City from future religious displays. The Trial Court agreed that the display promoted religion and
issued the injunction, affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Lynch and the City appealed.

Issue: Does a City violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment, by erecting a crche alongside other holiday decorations?
Holding: No, the display did not violate the Establishment Clause as it had a legitimate secular
purpose and is appropriate given the historic importance of religion in public life. Such displays, even
where they contain some religious representations, are acceptable under the Establishment Clause
so long as do not advance religion or foster excessive entanglement between government and
religion.

Reasoning: Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion for a narrow majority of the Court. He begin
by acknowledging that the Court had previously determined that the Establishment Clause erected a
wall of separation between church and state, but questioned whether the usefulness of the metaphor
extending to practical consequences. As the majority explained, separation did not require callous
indifference towards religion, but rather a two-fold approach whereby government accommodate all
religions but was hostile to none- including the absence of religion. This understanding, Chief Justice
Burger explained, was confirmed by the Framers themselves, many of whom sat in early
Congresses that paid for and employed chaplains without reservation. Government does not run
afoul of the Establishment Clause through merely acknowledging religion or recognizing the
importance of religion in public life, so long as government remains sufficiently tolerant and eschews
hostility, an understanding the majority thought confirmed by history. The majority acknowledged the
complicated history of the Courts Establishment Clause jurisprudence, explaining that the relevant
inquiry is whether government actions establish support, or tend to do so, for any particular religion.
Other tests for Establishment Clause cases, including looking for a secular purpose, the nature of
entanglement between government and religion, and evaluating whether a particular act advances
or inhibits religion are all useful while none- even taken together- are dispositive. The Court should
look at displays in context, evaluating the totality of the circumstances rather than focusing on only
the religious symbolism of any particular display, as such a focus would always lead to invalidating
the conduct in question. In this case, the City had a valid secular purpose in promoting a holiday
recognized by Congress and the Executive, had expended very little money, and there was little
likelihood of entanglement. In sum, any perceived violations were de minimis. Concluding, the
majority pointed out that it would be strange to exclude a symbol of a holiday long recognized and
celebrated in this country as in others, in particular with the variety of public celebrations of
Christmas and Christmas symbols elsewhere.

Concurrence: Justice OConnor concurred, writing separately to clarify her view of the
Establishment Clause and attempt to harmonize the majority opinion with the traditional tests for the
Courts Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In her view, while all factors may be relevant, the key
here is whether the City intended to advance the Christian religion or had in fact done so. She
concluded that they had not, evaluating this case by its own particular facts as required for careful
considerations of Establishment Clause cases.

Dissent: Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice
Brennan highlighted the narrow nature of the Courts reasoning, having left open the question of
religious displays on government property and whether religious displays are acceptable if not
surrounded by other, secular symbols, but nonetheless disagreed with the ultimate conclusion. In his
view, the constitutional problems of government support for a crche and with it endorsement of the
Biblical view of the birth of Christ were not cured by the inclusion of other displays. Rather, Justice
Brennan concluded that the display was of particular value to those of the Christian faith and
conveyed an improper message to non-believers- namely that they did not belong. Justice Brennan
accused the majority of cherry-picking historical antidotes to bolster their case, arguing that the
Framers would not have approved of federal celebration of Christmas. He concluded that while most
are familiar with Christmas and the display is relatively harmless, even a small, innocuous step
towards establishing religion is unacceptable under the First Amendment. Justice Blackmun
dissented, joined by Justice Stevens. While he agreed with the main dissented opinion, he wrote
separately to highlight that the majority had dismissed established precedent. He felt the use of a
crche in a public display was doubly-offensive, constraining believers to acknowledge symbolic
meanings only while alienating non-believers.

Conclusion: The Court determined that the particular display in question here had a valid secular
purpose and did not serve to advance religion or entangle government with religion. While the
majority recognized the value of several established tests for Establishment Clause cases, they
highlighted the specific facts and circumstances of a mixed seasonal display for a publicly
recognized holiday and concluded that the First Amendment was no bar to such a government-
sponsored display.

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Facts

Every year during the Christmas holiday season, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island
(City) builds a large, public Christmas display. The display includes traditional secular
Christmas images such as Santa Claus and reindeer figures, as well as a religious crche.
The City originally spent public funds to acquire the display, but currently spends
nominal costs erecting and maintaining it each year. Donnelly (plaintiff) brought suit
against Lynch (defendant), the mayor and the City in federal district court on the
ground that the display violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The
district court agreed and held the display unconstitutional, and the court of appeals
affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.