Bok:978 1 137 48332 4

PSYCHOLOGY AND
PHILOSOPHY OF
ABSTRACT ART
Neuro-aesthetics,
Perception and
Comprehension
Paul M.W. Hackett

Psychology and Philosophy of Abstract Art
PaulM.W.Hackett
Psychology and
Philosophy of
Abstract Art
Neuro-aesthetics, Perception and Comprehension
PaulM.W.Hackett
Emerson College
Boston, Massachusetts, USA
ISBN 978-1-137-48331-7 ISBN 978-1-137-48332-4 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-48332-4
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I dedicate this book about perceiving abstraction to Spike Milligan and
posthumously thank him not only for his humour, but also the rational
insight he provided. He was often thought mad, including by himself
perhaps. Milligan possessed a perception of the world that was complex
with intricate and convoluted turns. Our injudiciousness blinds us from
appreciating the rationality of his responses of despair: all else is illusion.
PREFACE
In Fine Art and Perceptual Neuroscience (Hackett, 2013), I first proposed

that the facet theory and mapping sentence approach could be used to
investigate artistic understanding, and the appreciation and creation of art.
In later writing, I more generally suggested that a philosophical apprecia-
tion of the mereological and ontological structure of fine art is created
when using mapping sentences embodied in a facet theoretical rubric.
Whilst penning my earlier books two major strands of writing came to the
fore. This present book deals with these strands that may be summarized
as: the conception of a complex space within which abstract two-dimensional
visual art exists and the necessarily simultaneously fragmented and unified
notions of the perception of these artworks. Moreover, this present text will
question what it is to perceive an abstract artwork as a total piece of art
and also what, if any, are the components that comprise this?1 The schol-
arship I present in this book further develops the use of qualitative and
philosophical mapping sentence enquiries to explore more deeply the per-
ceptual neuroscience/psychology as this relates to fine art.
PERCEIVING ANDUNDERSTANDING
Perception is the process through which we gather experiential informa-
tion about both the internal condition of our bodies and the world exter-
nal to us. Perception is also an action, a process in which we engage.
Perception allows us to understand our existence through gathering data
from our senses and using this information in a format, which makes
sense to us. Perception has a cardinal position in our daily lives and in an
vii
viii PREFACE
attempt to clarify the process of human perception, I introduce readers of

this book to selected philosophical theories that have been employed and
reported in the literature. I then go on to use and focus these theories to
address the act of perceiving and understandings abstract fine art.
As well as philosophical explanations, there have been many attempts to
better understand the general process of visual perception that has origi-
nated from scholars working within psychology, neuroscience and other
disciplines. In order to set the scene for the research, I present in this essay
a review of a selection of research from appropriate disciplines. I hope the
examples of scholarship that I chose as illustrative are able to offer the
reader a broad and sufficient understanding of visual perception and its
contemporary theories. However, within a book that is as brief as this, the
literature I have chosen is by necessity partial and will inevitably reflect
my own specific requirements and will support my point of view. With
the above caveats stated I commence with a presentation of the origins
of perceptual understanding in a review of Aristotles writing on this sub-
ject. In addition to his writing on perception being seminal and erudite,
Aristotles theories continue to attract scholarly work that argues for the
utility and perhaps veracity of his claims within a contemporary context.
To illuminate such present-day scholarship I will offer the thoughts of
Anna Marmodoro (2014) and her exposition of the Aristotelian approach
to the perception of objects.
ABSTRACT ART
Rather than simply being concerned with the general process of visual
perception, I will specifically address the perception of abstract fine art.
I commence this book by making the assertion that to varying extents
the perception and understanding of all works of art require some degree
of conscious awareness on the part of the person experiencing the work.
I believe awareness of fine art is necessarily a relatively time-protracted
process as brief exposure to a visual stimulus, no matter how aesthetically
attractive, I claim, seems difficult to conceive of under usual understand-
ings of art experiences. It would also seem to me that different works
of art are experienced in different ways and that problems may exist in
attempting to find a common art experience: an art experience that
transcends art genres, media, sensory modality and so on.
As a consequence of the potential difficulties that appear to exist in try-
ing to identify possible experiential commonalities across different forms
PREFACE ix
of art, in this essay I will place boundaries around my consideration of

perception to include just art-related visual sensations. Therefore, I define
the object of perceptual interest in my writing as being two-dimensional
drawings, paintings and so on, and I further limit the art genre to abstract
art. By restricting my outlook to this single form of fine art, I am breaking
off a tiny fragment from the enormous corpus of possible artworks and
limiting the scope of this writing to a tiny art particular. Even with this
restriction of purview, it is difficult to imagine that when we perceive and
experience abstract two-dimensional fine artworks, such as paintings and
drawings, this process is straightforward, trouble-free or undemanding.
Therefore, in order to remove any unnecessary ambiguity, in the initial
chapter of this book I clarify the subject matter of my writing by defining
the abstract two-dimensional artworks that constitute the focus of interest
as being from approximately the last 115 years. It is my hope that by the
time readers have completed this initial chapter they will have developed a
rudimentary awareness of abstract two-dimensional art.
PERCEIVING ANDUNDERSTANDING TWO-DIMENSIONAL

ABSTRACT ART
However, my concern is not solely with reviewing the nature of abstract
fine art as a static veridical object or event, rather my interest is in these
forms of artwork as they are actively perceived and experienced. Therefore,
as I have already alluded, as this book progresses, theories of perception
from psychology, philosophy and so on will be applied to the perception
of abstract fine art. In addition to these theoretical perspectives, I will also
forward the idea that categories may be used to form a basis for under-
standing perception and I therefore briefly review categorial systems,
ontologies and mereologies. I also introduce psychological constructs, as
these may help in our understanding of the process of meaningful percep-
tion as opposed to the simple registration of sensation. In reviewing qua-
lia I consider the theoretical understanding and underpinnings of qualia
drawing upon contemporary scholarly writing. I will also look briefly at
criticisms of qualia by, for instance, John Searle who has deprecated the
need for and use of any intermediary construct,2 such as a quale, to illumi-
nate perceptual understanding.
The contemporary scholarship of Paul Crowther (especially that to be
found on the categories of art experience from his 2007 book) embodies
x PREFACE
a categorical ontology for understanding differences within abstract fine

art of all kinds. His work is closely related to my present research, and
his theoretical ontology constitutes a major part of my essay. Indeed the
culmination of this research is my use and extension of Crowthers onto-
logical structure within a mapping sentence framework (but more about
this later). Consequent to the importance of his work to my own, I con-
sider both the validity of Crowthers eight dimensions of abstract art dif-
ferentiation, and how his eight categories may be combined to facilitate
understanding in a combinatorial sense when viewing specific works of this
genre of art.
Having thought about these and other researchers offerings, I claim
that a need exists for structuring understanding of the perception of
abstract two-dimensional fine art and I suggest a model for depicting
the concurrent processes of sensing and perceiving these visual stimuli.
Consequently, I propose a structured ontological framework to account
for the perception of abstract fine art which employs the mapping sentence
as qualitative structured ontology that can be usefully applied to enable the
understanding of the perceptual experience of art abstraction. My empha-
sis throughout this writing prepares the reader for claims I make later
in this book regarding further analyses I undertake into the categorical
structure of art abstraction. These analyses come after the establishment
of a trustworthy mapping sentence framework and demonstrate the highly
complex nature of perception in instances where epistemological develop-
ments within perception necessitate input from many research approaches.
In trying to achieve the above aspirations, I will first formulate, then
explore and finally attempt to answer a series of questions. These questions
may be summarized (perhaps over-ambitiously) as follows:
In what way or ways do we perceive and comprehend two-
dimensional abstract art (paintings, drawings etc.) from the
Modernist genre through Post-Modernism to the art of the pres-
ent day (that is Western abstract art taken from approximately the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries);
In what way may an understanding of the genre of abstract art be
best developed?
Within these pages I offer a possible answer to these questions.
This book is an extension of my earlier book Perceptual Neuroscience
and Fine Art (Hackett, 2013) and in this new text I conduct further enqui-
ries into the ever-growing field of neuroscience and psychological research
PREFACE xi
that addresses perception. Consequently, I will also draw upon my writ-

ing on mapping sentence mereologies and extend the use of mapping
sentences from the research I presented in Facet Theory and the Mapping
Sentence (Hackett, 2014).3
MAPPING SENTENCES ANDFACET THEORY

In this book I will:
Present the mapping sentence as a structured ontology/mereol-
ogy that, I claim, possesses a unique ability to embody a specific
theory for perceiving abstract art.
Present the mapping sentence as a theoretical structure that
enables the comparison of other theories of perception when they
too are embodied within mapping sentences.
Extend psychological, philosophical and neuroscientific knowl-
edge and understanding into how we perceive more abstract
forms of modern and contemporary abstract fine art.
Develop a new way of understanding abstract fine art from a phil-
osophical/psychological viewpoint.
Extend facet theory literature into the area of art and perception.
Extend my previous research on a philosophical and qualitative
understanding of the mapping sentence and facet theoretical
ontological and mereological systems.
Provide some initial answers to questions about understanding
and perceiving abstract art that have arisen from within the critical
literature of art.
By using mapping sentences and analyses from the facet theory
approach, I take up a position that has not previously been assumed from
which to contribute to the emerging disciplines of neuro-aesthetics and
neuro-art history. From my unique outlook, one that envisions mapping
sentences as mereological ontologies, I am able to appreciate a distinctive
and perhaps deeper level of understanding than is usually achieved within
this academic art literature.4 Moreover, I argue that an understanding of
fine art perception (specifically of abstract fine art perception) may only be
meaningfully achieved through the adoption of a viewpoint incorporating
psychology, philosophy, neuroscience, fine art and facet theory in a neo-
teric synthesis. Consequently, by focusing upon the integration of multi-
ple disciplines, I am provided with a unique perspective on art abstraction.
xii PREFACE
Due to the multiplicity of perspectives I employ, I offer a challenge

to the reader. I ask readers when they think on the questions I ask about
the fundamental structure of perception of abstract fine art and how this
structure can best be appreciated, to consider in some depth information,
terms and concepts from disciplinary areas in which they may have little
expertise. I enquire as to whether there are basic units or fundamental
building blocks to our appreciation and understanding of abstract fine art
and how, if these units do exist, these components come together in the
phenomenological appreciate of any given artwork?5
SYNOPSIS OFCHAPTERS
Attempting to shed even a little light upon the answers to the questions
I posed above is a formidable task. In the first chapter entitled Defining
Abstract Art, I first review and then provide a definition for the main
subject matter of this research: abstract two-dimensional art from approxi-
mately 1900 to 2015.
Earlier, I stated that there are many theories of perception in general
that take a philosophical, psychological or other perspective. In Chap.
2, Theorising Perception, I offer a brief selection of theories of visual
perception from scholars such as Bertrand Russell, John Locke and John
Searle. In this chapter I acknowledge different forms of perceptual expe-
rience as being illusions, hallucinations or veridical perceptions. Also, in
Chap. 2, I present the writing of chosen scholars, and I offer perceptual
theories from such schools as direct and indirect realism, phenomenal-
ism, intentional or representational theories of perception, and disjunctive
and adverbalist accounts of perception. Research that has originated from
scholars who have used the concept of qualia to structure their views of
perception is considered. Finally, I provide insight into perception from
psychological and neuroscientific research and I claim the need for phe-
nomenological research positions that incorporate the person viewing the
artwork, along with the artwork itself and contextual features of the view-
ing experience.
Chapter 3, Expanding Theoretical Complexity, consists of a review
of research into abstract fine art which mainly originated from psychologi-
cal and neuroscientific disciplines. I blend Gestalt psychology with cogni-
tive/visual neuroscience and I take to heart the claim of neuroscientists
Kanai and Tsuchiya (2012) when they said, Perhaps the most difficult
biological question of all might be how and why electrochemical neuronal
PREFACE xiii
activity in the brain generates subjective conscious experience such as the

redness of red (p392). In reviewing some of the ways in which psy-
chological research has addressed how abstract fine art is experienced, I
consider the works of Arnheim (1943, 1966, 1969, 1974, 1986), Fechner
(see, Solomon, 2011) and Gestalt psychology. I also reflect upon Gestalt
psychologys series of basic principles, which Gestalt psychologists claim
account for the process and experience of perception. Hallucinations and
illusions are again pertinent to my writing as these phenomena have been
the subjects of enquiry from a Gestalt-neuroscientific perspective.
In Chap. 4, Perceptual Content, Process and Categorial Ontologies,
I delve more deeply into perception, this time looking at this in terms of
its content, process and categorial ontologies: these are natural extensions
of the theory and methodology presented earlier in this book. From this
review I develop notions of an ontology of fine art which is presented
through the structure of facet theory employing the mapping sentence as
a perceptual mereology. I present in some detail this theoretical position
to provide an account for the perception of art abstraction, and I describe
qualitative and philosophical facet theory and introduce the reader to
applied arenas in which the approach has found utility. I propose map-
ping sentence ontologies to account for the perception of abstract fine art.
These mapping sentences are extensions of the mapping sentences previ-
ously employed to account for the understanding of grid-based abstract
fine art (Hackett, 2013) and for artists understanding of the PhD in fine
art (Schwarzenbach & Hackett, 2015).
In Chap. 5, A Mapping Sentence Mereology for Perception of Abstract
Art, I suggest some possible benefits associated with using categorial sys-
tems to investigate perception. I propose adaptations of my grid variation
mapping sentence (Hackett, 2013) and suggest new mapping sentences
to explore abstract fine art. An important way in which facet theory has
been used in the past has been to look at the combined effects upon the
perception of abstract art of the elements specified in a mapping sentence.
This form of enquiry has been undertaken by identifying what is known as
the partial ordering in elements. Partial ordering reflects the common psy-
chological process we employ in many settings where some aspects of an
event or phenomena are perceived to have more or less of a given quality.
To explain this a little more, we can propose that paintings may be
identified as being a certain size and they may also be determined as hav-
ing figurative compositional elements. These two characteristics will serve
to illustrate partial ordering; however, in practice there are likely to be
xiv PREFACE
many more elements. Having identified the pertinent elements that char-
acterize paintings, any individual painting may be understood to possess
a certain amount of each of these characteristics and may be identified in
terms of the extent to which it possesses a of characteristics. For example,
painting A may be large and highly figurative. Painting B may be simi-
larly large but have no figurative elements. Painting C is however small
with only moderate levels of figuration: Each painting can be described
in terms of the extent of its possession of these three characteristics. In
reality, it is likely that more than three paintings would form our sample
of artworks and that there would be more than two typifying characteris-
tics. In this chapter a mapping sentence is developed out of the writing of
Paul Crowthers ontological characteristics of abstract art, which provides
the elements out of which I propose a partially ordered understanding of
abstract two-dimensional fine art.
I conclude this chapter by looking at possible ways in which the map-
ping sentence can be used as an integrative tool in the research process
and the implications of the mapping sentence to art theory and practice.
Finally, I suggest possible future research using the mapping sentence for
fine art and ways of extending the mereological understanding of abstract
two-dimensional fine art using the mapping sentence and partially ordered
understandings.
NOTES
1. This current authorial project is a succinct exposition of my continuing
research into the understanding of fine art creation and appreciation using
facet theory, the mapping sentence and partial ordered analyses. This book
presents the findings of several research studies/projects and synthesizes the
conceptual perceptive. In some senses this book amalgamates multiple proj-
ects that have been ongoing since the previous decade. However, this book
also represents an intermediary stage of my research. Additionally, the con-
tents of this book are drawn from a broader body of research that is con-
cerned with qualitative facet theory and the mapping sentence considered as
a philosophical orientation to a wide variety of life areas. More recently, my
research has started to embrace avian problem-solving and other forms of
behaviour (see, Clayton, 2014, Clayton and Emory, 2015 for examples of
the types of behaviour I am attempting to depict within a qualitative/philo-
sophical mapping sentence model).
2. Intermediary constructs are important in the writing of this book. In later
chapters, some philosophical theories of perception (e.g., sense-data theory)
PREFACE xv
will be explained and it will become obvious that these theories are depen-
dent upon some form of intermediary construct for their existence. It is
therefore important that I define what is meant by an intermediary con-
struct. The first term intermediary is relatively straightforward and I will use
this word in its usually accepted sense as a go-between, as something (usu-
ally a person but not within this book) that links other things. I will use the
second term construct as an amalgam of the words two slightly different
meanings when approached from philosophy and psychology. In psychology
a construct is employed as an explanatory variable that is not available to
direct observation. In philosophy a construct is something that is dependent
for its existence upon a persons mind. Thus, an intermediary construct is an
unobservable entity within the individual that acts as a go-between other
observable phenomena.
3. In this book I propose an extension of the qualitative application of the
mapping sentence used within a facet theoretical rubric to the perception of
abstract fine art.
4. For example, writing by authors such as Zeki (1999) and Onians (2007).
These and other authors, whilst being seminal experts in their own disci-
plines, do not have the catholicity of vision that I bring to the subject in this
book.
5. Later in this book, I suggest that it may be useful to consider whether these
possible basic units of understanding can be identified, perhaps in adapted
form, and be employed to assist understanding of other forms of fine art and
other art-related activities? In particular, I am concerned with areas from
within the discipline of art such as art education (specifically at the tertiary
level of education) and perhaps even marketing of art-related products and
services. In order to provide possible answers to these questions I present
mapping sentences that I have used in investigations into these forms of art-
related events and behaviours.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research conducted and reported in this text has been significantly
supported through my collaboration with Dr. Anna Marmodoro, proj-
ect director of the Power Structuralism and Ancient Ontologies research
group within the Department of Philosophy at the University of Oxford
where I am an academic visitor. I would like to thank all those at Oxford
University who have supported my research and for the access to resources
my appointment has provided. I also thank Professor Gordon Foxall from
Cardiff University for his comments and suggestions.
xvii
CONTENTS
1 Defining Two-Dimensional Abstract Art 1
2 Theorizing Perception 11
3 Expanding Theoretical Complexity 35
4 Perceptual Content, Process andCategorial Ontologies 51
5 Mapping Sentence and Partial Order Mereology for

Perceiving Abstract Art 89
Glossary of Terms 127
Bibliography 133
Index 137
xix
LIST OF FIGURES
Fig. 4.1 Mapping sentence for the validity of hermeneutic consistency

of a mapping sentence 66
Fig. 4.2 A mapping sentence for Aristotles categories 67
Fig. 4.3 Initial mapping sentence for Marmodoros combination of
Aristotles substance model and the common power model
of perception 75
Fig. 4.4 Mapping sentence for Lowes four-category ontology 81
Fig. 5.1 Mapping sentence for defining grid image variation 92
Fig. 5.2 Mapping sentence of artists understanding of the PhD in
fine art 93
Fig. 5.3 Details of Crowthers characteristics for structuring
contextual visual space 96
Fig. 5.4 Mapping sentence for Crowthers eight category ontology 99
Fig. 5.5 Relationship of correspondence for Crowthers ontology 108
Fig. 5.6 Theoretical scalogram matrix 113
Fig. 5.7 Dimension diagram 115
Fig. 5.8 Hasse Diagram of the nine paintings 116
xxi
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1 Gestalt principles of perception 42

Table 5.1 Crowthers summarized characteristics for structuring
abstract art 97
Table 5.2 Eight correspondence questions 97
Table 5.3 Three abstract paintings assessed in terms of Crowthers
characteristics 110
Table 5.4 Nine paintings used in evaluation 114
Table 5.5 Abstractness rating profiles for nine paintings 117
xxiii
CHAPTER 1
Defining Two-Dimensional Abstract Art
Abstract This chapter is concerned with defining and describing the sub-
stantive content of this book, namely two-dimensional abstract art from
the last 115 years. This chapter also sets the scene for the philosophical
and psychological research I present later in this book. In defining abstract
painting and drawing, I draw upon my own experiences of viewing this
art form and then review the writing of several scholars and critics. I also
consider abstraction as the contrast of representationalist painting and I
introduce the writing of philosopher Paul Crowther and his eight char-
acteristics of an artwork that typify a piece of art as being an abstract
artwork. As well as abstraction, other forms of art and art in general are
considered in my attempt to clearly delineate the focus of this research.
Keywords Abstract art Abstraction Fine art Perception

Phenomenology
INTRODUCTION
A few years ago I was fortunate to attend an exhibition at the Picasso
Museum in Paris of the paintings of Pablo Picasso hung alongside those of
Francis Bacon (see, Baldassari 2005). Previously, I had found great plea-
sure and interest in looking at the works of these two artists, but I had
never before encountered a selection of these artists works hung together.
The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 1

P.M.W. Hackett, Psychology and Philosophy of Abstract Art,
DOI10.1057/978-1-137-48332-4_1
2 P.M.W. HACKETT
The curator had taken great care to position the paintings in such a manner
as to create an intimate dialogue between the paintings, and the exhibition
as a whole enthused me; an experience that has remained active in my
thoughts ever since. Two rather obvious impressions that I formed at this
show were as follows. First, I found it apparent that both artists could in
some way be thought of as creating abstract artworks, as their paintings
of people and places were not directly representational or veridical cases
of subject matter-to-image correspondence: nobody would expect to see a
cubist woman or a disfigured Pope in the manner that Picasso and Bacon
had respectively painted. Second, whilst both artists works were abstract
to varying degrees, it seemed apparent that their understanding of what
constituted abstraction and the role and reason for painting in the abstract
probably differed greatly.
However, both artists can also be thought to be representationalist
in that they clearly depict or represent people and places in their paint-
ings. Indeed, if the works of these two artists are considered against other
abstract artists, such as Ellsworth Kelly or Paul Rothko, Francis Bacons
and Pablo Picassos works may seem highly representational and barely
abstract or semi-abstract. A consequence of the breadth of the church of
art abstraction is that a simple definition of what constitutes an abstract
artwork is problematic. Later in this chapter and towards the end of this
book I will illustrate, in some detail, the importance of thinking expan-
sively about what, vis--vis the characteristics of an artwork, makes a
given piece of art abstract. To these ends I present the scholarship of Paul
Crowther (2007) and expand upon the eight categories he uses to delin-
eate abstract art.
However, as well as embodying an apparent visual content, artists along
with their work are understood to exist within a context, and increas-
ingly this context has become an important component in understanding
an art exhibit. Furthermore, context has come to the fore of curatorial
practice and critical exposition (Bryant 2009). Examples of the verac-
ity of artistic context in appreciating and even in presenting an artists
work are many. I could have chosen from a multitude of examples from
amongst the vast collection of exhibitions that have incorporated the con-
textual phenomenology associated with the artistic creation.1 However,
the Francis Bacons studio at the Hugh Lane Gallery in Dublin (McGrath
2000) and the Atelier Brancusis studio at the Centrum Pompidou in Paris
(Barthel 2006) serve as examples of such practice. These two exhibitions
are housed permanently in buildings within which the respective artists
DEFINING TWO-DIMENSIONAL ABSTRACT ART 3
studios (Bacon and Brancusi) have been recreated in order to ground and
locate the artist and the artwork in a place that is recognizable to viewers
and to which a narrative of the artists life is attached.
As well as these permanent sites, there are of course also innumerable
travelling or temporary examples of locating an artists work by present-
ing the context of where the artist worked: In these exhibitions, the art-
ists process and location of production are intimately associated with the
artworks. The works by artist Dieter Roth provide an example of this.
Roth spent much time in Iceland, and shortly after his death the Listasafn
Iceland held a major retrospective of his work (Roth 2005; Dobke, etal
2004). In this particular exhibition, a phenomenological account of
Roths work was presented (see, Crowther 2009; Parry 2011) in which
more than 400 of his pieces were exhibited in a show curated by Roths
son, Bjrn Roth. This exhibition was described thus, On view at the
Train exhibition are some of the artists best-known installations, books,
graphic works and paintings. In selecting the works, the curator was par-
ticularly concerned with their links to Iceland (Dobke, etal 2004). In all
exhibitions that reference artwork and the artist to a physical situation,2 an
artists work is considered phenomenologically through placing paintings,
drawings, sculptures, and so on, within the context of their production
and in which the pieces of art tell a broad story about the artist along with
his or her work. Here, I am suggesting that by juxtaposing any form of
art, including abstract art, within the context of its inception, inspiration
and/or creation that is recognizable to the viewer, the context is able to
bring representational qualities (contextually representational qualities) to
the most abstract of artwork.
The preceding sentences demonstrate how attempting to understand
art and more specifically abstract art is a multifarious occupation and that
many factors, including context, may be influential. However, context is
but one very specific quality of art in general and particularly art abstrac-
tion, and in the following section I forward a notion of how we may ini-
tially think about the qualities of art abstraction.
DEFINITIONS OFART ANDABSTRACT FINE ART

This book is about how we perceive and understand abstract fine art rather
than being a review of abstract art itself. However, it is necessary to pro-
vide some initial definitions of both art (fine art) and abstract art in order
to place boundaries around the scope of this book. Therefore, in this writ-
4 P.M.W. HACKETT
ing art will be defined broadly as both a process and a product of

human skill, imagination and invention (Art 2015). Usually art invokes
the idea of visual art, but often art is taken to include theoretical and per-
haps critical art disciplines and may embrace literature, music and drama
as well as drawing, sculpture, painting and printmaking, and so on. Over
the last half-century or so, art has come to take in installations, events,
digital works and many other conceptual and physical forms. The breadth
of what now constitutes art can perhaps be understood by considering the
breadth of the contents and themes that exist within art and which have
been cited as giving an artwork significance and meaning. What is meant
by the content of a piece of art is the artworks subject matter, whilst its
theme is its object. On this understanding themes may be universal (e.g.,
love, death, nature) or repeated and common (e.g., genre, landscape, the
human form, figurative art, abstraction) (Art 2015).
The late British aesthetic philosopher Ronald Hepburn has reviewed
how the understanding of fine art comes about. Aesthetic theories, he says,
may be subdivided into those that attempt analytic neutrality and those
that aim to establish judgements that are of practical worth. Hepburn
claims that one group of philosophers who are concerned with aesthet-
ics take a linguistic focus and relate aesthetics to attempts to understand
how language is used when we talk about artworks. Other aestheticians,
claims Hepburn, closely relate their writing to art criticism to enable them
to reach aesthetic value judgements. These two examples constitute the
extreme poles on a continuum of philosophical practice. This linearity
forms what Hepburn calls a conceptual scaffolding within which art
may be positioned and which also distinguishes linguistic philosophy from
art criticism. Furthermore, this dimension, running from linguistic philos-
ophy to art criticism, has a broad reach and differentiates concepts about
central and peripheral elements of aesthetic experience as well as accounts
of artistic creativity, which can be seen to influence our real-world reac-
tions to aesthetic objects.
In order to further establish the boundaries to the subject of my writ-
ing, I present a brief review of abstract forms of art. Many definitions
of abstract art exist, for example, Art which is either completely non-
representational, or which converts forms observed in reality into patterns
which are read by the spectator primarily as independent relationships,
rather than with reference to the original source (Abstract Art 2003).
This definition stresses the lack of direct representation in abstract art or as
involving the process of inspired interpretation. Representation has been
identified as a form of art known at least since the time of Aristotle who
termed this mimesis or imitation. In this form of art the artist is attempt-
ing to represent or even replicate the appearance of reality and where skill
and accuracy are usually associated with a piece being a successful artwork
that produces pleasure in the viewer. On the other hand, another Greek
philosopher also from the classical era, Plato, understood the artist to con-
vey his inspired vision rather than simply depict reality. On this under-
standing, such inspiration originated from the artists muses, the gods,
inner impulses or the collective unconscious (Abstract Art 2003) and the
artist expresses emotions, essences and veracities that are not visible.
Read and Stangos (1994) offer a similar definition of abstraction when
they claim that this is a form of art, which does not imitate or directly
represent external reality: some writers restrict the term to non-figurative
art, while others use it of art which is not representational though ulti-
mately derived from reality. It is evident that abstract art is not a simple
art genre to define. In the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Art Terms (Clarke
2010), abstract art is identified as being non-representational and contain-
ing the implicit notion that the abstract artwork is not a mirror of reality
but exists in its own right. Van Vliet (2013) described abstract painting
tersely as being: non-figurative, non-representative, non-objective art, free-
painting, free-abstract, intuitive-style. Fer (2000) offers a more elaborate
and more thorough account of abstraction when she defines abstraction as
being, art that does not picture things in the world, but nevertheless
claims its objecthood as a painting or a sculpture (p.4).
In the chapter, The Rise and (Partial) Fall of Abstract Painting in the
Twentieth Century, David Galenson (2009) views abstract painting. He
identifies this form of painting to have been independently created by the
artists Malevic, Kandinski and Mondrian, and to be one of the twentieth
centurys most radical of art movements. Abstraction, as it developed into
Abstract Expressionism, moved to a point of dominance within the art
world, through the works of Pollock, de Kooning, Rothko and others at
the end of the Second World War. These artists (and others) saw abstrac-
tion as a means to artistic discovery. They further believed that abstrac-
tion would be the foremost artistic form in the future. However, a few
years later, abstract painting had lost its dominance to conceptual art as
practised by artists such as Johns, Rauschenberg, Warhol and others and
abstraction was relegated to a more minor role after the 1960s.
Another scholar who has written on the perceptual constitution of
abstract art is Rosalind Krauss (Krauss 1986, 1994; see also Walker 2011).
6 P.M.W. HACKETT
Krauss (1994) has suggested a framework for understanding abstract art in

the form of a Klein Group diagram or model (see, e.g., Armstrong 1997,
and a more recent book based upon a symposium edited by Papapetros
and Rose (2014) in which Krausss approach is heralded). This model is
a quadrilateral composition in which a term is written in each of its four
corners. The top left corner is labelled Ground. Progressing in a clockwise
direction from this point one will find the terms Figure, Not Figure and
Not Ground written at each successive corner. The sides of the square
are drawn with straight lines possessing arrows at both ends to suggest
the reciprocal connection between pairs of terms. The top left corner
(Ground) is then joined to the bottom right corner (Not Figure) with
a straight line and a straight line is drawn to link the top right corner
(Figure) to bottom left corner (Not Ground) and again both lines have
arrows at their tips to indicate two-way relationship. This model, Krauss
says, indicates the non-absolute nature involved in the perception of
abstract art;3 it also demonstrates the intricate lengths scholars have gone
to in their efforts to understand abstraction and to communicate their
insight.
Abstraction in fine art is of many different types in two and three
dimensions, all of which, to varying extents, are characterized by the
work departing from traditions of direct resemblance to and depiction
of something in the everyday world. This is not to say that abstraction
does not seek to depict and represent but that such aims are shrouded in
reconfiguration and the breaking-down of the habitual practices of paint-
ers and sculptors. Within these attempts to disassemble conventions of
art production, Crowther and Wnsche (2012) claim that key features
exist in abstract works that take the form of two structural aspects in the
works relation to recognizable objects, creatures, states of affairs, and so
forth. First, the work abstracts from the external world within which it is
physically and temporally located by assigning selected components of the
work novel or unfamiliar appearances. Second, abstraction involves the
establishment, using natural creativity, of novel self-directed forms. These
forms are non-traditional and non-habitual, and may be identified as origi-
nating in the unconscious.
During the twentieth century many artists developed their practice in
a manner that departed from the traditional depiction of veridical images.
The resulting artistic output has been of many kinds, including semi-
abstract, abstract and minimalist two-dimensional works. Accompanying
such practice, these artists have offered theoretical testaments of elucida-

tion for their work. For example, Gerhardt Richter (Obrist, etal 2009),
Agnes Martin (Martin and Schwarz 2005), David Smith (Gray 1989),
Patrick Heron (Heron & Gooding, 1997) Kurt Schwitters, etal (1993)
and so on. Few texts have been written that attempt to develop a general
theory for art abstraction (a notable exception being Crowther (2007)
who attempts to produce a general theory that I introduce below and
discuss in some depth later in this book4). Rather, these writings have
typically set about explaining how the cultural and historical context of
how the work of an abstract artist has been produced and received within
a cultural and historical setting (see, e.g., Cheetham 1991). Artists such
as Patrick Heron (Heron and Gooding 1997) have offered a manifesto
of their own work in terms of their expressed theories, although these
often concentrate upon the spiritual significance of their abstract work.
Crowther (1997) has considered these writings in depth, including the
artwork and commentaries by Kandinsky and Mondrian, determining
these to offer a number of interpretations of the meaning of abstract
forms that turn out, ultimately, to be dependent on cultural factors in
order for this supposedly universal meaning to emerge (Crowther 2009).
In his 2007 book, Crowther offers another complex model in what he
claims to be a set of comprehensive eight characteristics that are able to
account for variation in the constituent parts of an abstract painting and
thus to define this form of art. Crowthers model will constitute a substan-
tial part of my later writing and below I offer Crowthers eight character-
istics as an initial framework for defining abstract art.5
Crowthers characteristics (which I embolden in the following sen-
tences) appear thorough and reflect that there are many possible qualities
that can be suggested as forming the boundaries around the genre of art
abstraction. An abstract artwork may feature resemblances through pro-
cesses such as the combination of elements in the work is Crowthers first
characteristic. Gestural associations using visual forms may also be used
in abstract art to evoke responses. Visual features that are usually invis-
ible may be revealed (revelations) in an abstract work and the placement
of phenomena within a novel environment is a further characteristic.
Abstraction may also achieve its effect through the practice of reconfigur-
ing the familiar to produce neoteric configurations and it may use visual
suggestions. The seventh of the characteristics is the use of spatiality/
structure, and the final characteristic involves the employment of fantasy
8 P.M.W. HACKETT
or dreamlike phenomena. Crowther claims that his list comprehensively

defines abstract art in such a manner so as to make it a relatively straight-
forward task to analyse the works of abstract artists, for example, Picasso
and Bacon, in terms of the extent to which their works are characterized
by his dimensions.
CONCLUSIONS
In this introductory chapter, I have historically located two-dimensional
abstract art as a form of art that has existed from approximately 1900 to
date. Furthermore, I clearly define this form of fine art as the focus of my
research as I attempt to shed light upon the process of gazing at, perceiv-
ing and understanding an abstract artwork. I feel that it will be beneficial
to the reader if at this juncture I clearly state what this book is not about.
During the course of this brief text I will not be providing an art textbook
or a comprehensive review of contemporary or abstract art. Neither is
this book one that will inform the reader how to look at art: it is not a
book on art appreciation. Yet again, I will not be providing information
in regard as to how abstraction can or should be created and any insight
that the reader gathers in these regards is not my explicit intention. I will
also not be considering the reasons for the more recent re-emergence of
abstract art, or questions as to whether this genre of art actually ever went
away. What I will do in this book is attempt to develop an understand-
ing of the process of perceiving and understanding abstraction through
blending approaches from several disciplines including psychology and
philosophy and the inherent knowledge contained in each. However, the
major theoretical thrust in both my research and writing will come from
my earlier work within the facet theory rubric. By adopting a facet theory
approach the questions I attempt to answer can be summarized as: how
am I looking at abstraction, and how and what am I aware of when I look
at these pieces? In short, how, or in what ways, am I perceiving abstract
two-dimensional fine art?
It is obvious that the perception of art and abstract art is rooted in
the processes of perception itself both at a physiological, psychological
and cultural level and at an ontological and epistemological level. In the
next chapter, I therefore offer a review and understanding of the pertinent
aspects and theoretical stances typically from within philosophy and psy-
chology that have addressed the process of human perception.
NOTES
1. A convincing argument may be offered that all art exhibitions incorporate
context and in this book I do not dispute that claim. Rather, I focus upon
situations in which context is a more intentional aspect of the artwork or
exhibition.
2. This is especially the case of the location of the artwork creation or the loca-
tion that inspired the artist to create the work.
3. I provide an in-depth exposition of Rosalind Krauss Klein group model in
Hackett (2016).
4. Crowther is not, however, an abstract artist and he does not write about his
own work.
5. The ontological model of Crowthers clearly defines the genre of fine art
that is of interest in this book.
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art terms. London: Thames & Hudson. Retrieved from https://ezproxy-prd.
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content/entry/that/abstract_art/0
Armstrong, M.A. (1997). Groups and symmetry. NewYork: Springer.
Art. (2015). The Hutchinson unabridged encyclopedia with atlas and weather guide.
Abington: Helicon. Retrieved from https://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/
login?url=http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:5058/content/entry/heli-
conhe/art/0
Baldassari, A. (2005). BaconPicasso: The life of images. Paris: Flammarion.
Barthel, A. (2006). The Paris studio of Constantin Brancusi: A critique of the
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Bryant, J. (2009). Museum period rooms for the twenty-first century: Salvaging
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Cheetham, M. A. (1991). The rhetoric of purity: Essentialist theory and the advent
of abstract painting (Cambridge studies in new art history and criticism).
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Clarke, M. (Ed.). (2010). The concise oxford dictionary of art terms. Oxford:
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do?ResultsID=14EB2AACDFC1&SortType=relevance&searchType=quick&I
temNumber=1.
Crowther, P. (1997). The language of twentieth-century art: A conceptual history.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Crowther, P. (2007). Defining art, creating the canon: Artistic value in an era of
doubt. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
10 P.M.W. HACKETT
Crowther, P. (2009). Phenomenology of the visual arts (even the frame). Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Crowther, P., & Wnsche, I. (2012). Meanings of abstract art: Between nature and
theory (Routledge advances in art and visual studies). London/New York:
Routledge.
Dobke, D., Roth, D., Vischer, T., & Walter, B. (2004). Roth time: A Dieter Roth
retrospective. Zurich: Lars Muller Publishers.
Fer, B. (2000). On abstract art. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Galenson, D. (2009). Conceptual revolutions in twentieth-century art. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Gray, C. (1989). David Smith by David Smith: Sculpture and writings. London:
Thames and Hudson.
Hackett, P. M. W. (2016). Perceiving art space: A mapping sentence mereology.
Cham: Springer.
Heron, P., & Gooding, M. (1997). Painter as criticPatrick Heron: Selected writ-
ings. London: Tate Publishing.
Krauss, R. (1986). The originality of the avant-garde and other modernist myths.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Krauss, R. (1994). The optical unconscious. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Martin, A., & Schwarz, D. (2005). Agnes Martin: Writings. Ostfildern/Berlin:
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Papapetros, S., & Rose, J. (Eds.). (2014). Retracing the expanded field: Encounters
between art and architecture. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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and artists. London: Thames & Hudson.
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Schwitters, K., Rothenberg, J., & Joris, P. (1993). PPPPPP poems, performance
pieces, proses (sic), plays, poetics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Van Vliet, R. (2013). Abstracts: Techniques and textures. Petaluma: Search Press.
CHAPTER 2
Theorizing Perception
Abstract An abstract painting may be considered a configuration of marks

representational of something but not essentially so. If the artwork pos-
sesses representational qualities, these may arise through associations with
the sociocultural and physical contexts surrounding the work. Exception
has been taken to representationalism and its reliance of locating events
within specific environments to provide them with an identity. I briefly
deliberate direct/indirect realism, phenomenalism, intentional/repre-
sentational theories of perception and disjunctive accounts/adverbalists.
Qualia are individual conscious experiences and are considered as philo-
sophical accounts of perception by Bertrand Russell, John Locke and John
Searle. Additionally, psychological and neuroscientific research is viewed
and I claim the need for phenomenological research perspectives when
attempting to understand the perception of abstract artwork.
Keywords Perception Fine art Art Abstract art Perception of art

Visual perception Philosophy
INTRODUCTION
In Chap. 1, I introduced abstract art as this books subject matter and sug-
gested that the definition of this form of art is complex. The objective of
this second chapter is to offer a broad overview of theories of perception.1
The multiplicity and diversity of these theories indicate the many ways

DOI10.1057/978-1-137-48332-4_2
12 P.M.W. HACKETT
perception has been investigated and theorized about by scholars, each

of whom has attempted to shed light upon how we undertake the activity
of gathering information about our external and internal worlds. Some of
the orientations towards understanding perception are in direct opposi-
tion to each other whilst others are complimentary. The initial question
that must be asked is however: What is perception and what does it mean
to perceive something?
In Daniel Dahlstroms recent translation of Edmund Husserls Ideas
1, Husserl is quoted as saying that the experience that affords [the
objects] in an originary (sic) way is perception, understood in the usual
sense of the term (2014, p8, original emphases). Husserl elaborates that
when something is real in a primary and original sense, it constitutes a
cause or source of our experience where our intuitive awareness, knowl-
edge or understanding of this is because of what we feel or sense. Thus, it
may be claimed that the act of perceiving can be thought of as a disinter-
ested, experiential process.
When I wrote disinterested I meant that we can theoretically conceive
of perception simply as sensing; for instance, seeing an object, hearing a
noise, smelling an odour, touching a solid object and tasting liquid. We are
also able to perceive in a less solely veridical sense. For example, seeing a
psychedelic painting may make me feel dizzy; hearing discordant contem-
porary classical music makes me feel unsettled; and a particular abstract
expressionist painting looks too busy to me and I feel confused. Maund
(2003) sees all of these instances as forms of perception and claims that
few people would contest these to be perceptions. However, he questions
exactly how these experiences should be conceived, how we should
analyse them, what their structure is and so on (Maund 2003, p52). In
this chapter I take Maunds question regarding the structural qualities of
perception as guidance and I review some of the ways in which the task of
understanding perception has received scholarly attention.
THEORIES OFPERCEPTION
From within the discipline of philosophy there have emerged several theo-
ries, which provide accounts for human perceptual experiences. Each of
these theories has set itself the task of attempting to explain and provide an
understanding of how perceptual data is gathered and how this data may
be associated with our beliefs and knowledge regarding the world in which
we live. Each of the theoretical views that have been put forward embod-
THEORIZING PERCEPTION 13
ies specific notions regarding metaphysical and ontological perspectives.

Within the context of this book, under each definition of perception, the
question may be asked as to what are the properties of the experiences I
have when I look at an abstract piece of art? Following on from this ques-
tion I may also ask: In what ways is it important to distinguish between
conscious and unconscious experiences of abstract art? How do these dif-
fer? In what ways do they interact in our experiences? There are multiple
answers to these questions that I will consider in the following pages.
INTERNALIST ANDEXTERNALIST
When reviewing theories of perception, internalist accounts may be ini-
tially contrasted with externalist perspectives. The former of these rest on
the assumption that perception resides within the mind: that our percep-
tions of the events and things we encounter, along with our knowledge
and beliefs about these, are components of the mind of the person who
is having the perceptual experience. This perspective may be contrasted
with externalist accounts that hold the underlying assumption that the
aforementioned components are real aspects of the world external to the
person who is undertaking the act of perceiving. Internalist and externalist
accounts form the most basic dichotomous framework within which theo-
ries of perception may be positioned. Below I provide a cursory consid-
eration of major categories of philosophical commitments as these relate
to theories of perception by including the following: Direct and Indirect
Realism, Phenomenalism, Disjunctive Accounts of Perception and The
Intentional or Representational Theory of Perception. I will commence
by looking at realism.
DIRECT ANDINDIRECT REALISM

I consider the direct realism approach first because of the theorys intui-
tive appeal and apparent straightforwardness, and also because the con-
trasting theories of phenomenalism, intentionalism and disjunctivism may
be understood as being responses to direct realism. Brewer states that
it is commonsense that the natures of such things as stones, tables,
trees and animals themselves are independent of the ways in which such
physical objects do or may appear in anyones experience of or thought
about the world. I call the thesis that the objects of a given domain are
mind independent in this sense, realism about that domain (2011, p2,
14 P.M.W. HACKETT
original emphasis). Those who maintain a realist outlook take the view
that we perceive objects and events as they actually exist and that the
objects we perceive have qualities such as shape, size, colour, odours and
tastes. Realists believe that our senses form veridical perceptions of events
and objects. Given such a belief in accurate perception it also follows that
objects are envisaged as possessing an existence beyond the act of percep-
tion and also that objects and events obey scientific laws and principles.
Scholars who maintain a direct realist theoretical stance understand the
conscious experiences of abstract art to be constituted through our per-
ceptual relations to the artwork as this exists as an object with ordinary
properties such as its colour and form. Direct realism, which is also called
common sense realism, takes a perspective on perception that asserts our
daily experiences, and notions of the events and objects we encounter are
tantamount to what we perceive. On this conception, our senses are able
to offer us direct awareness of the world external to us including abstract
artistic forms.
There are two variations of direct realism: nave and scientific direct
realism. Under the first of these there is a belief that when an object is not
being perceived the objects maintain possession of all of its properties:
properties are continually present but not perceived. On the other hand,
scientific direct realism claims that only some of the perceived properties of
an object are maintained when the object or event is not observed as some
properties depend upon the person perceiving them for their existence. To
more fully understand the distinction between the two types, it is useful to
consider John Lockes writing on this subject. In his thoughts about the
ways in which we know the external world, Locke proposed a distinction
to exist between primary and secondary qualities (Yolton 1970, and see
Lennon 2004a, b; 2007). For Locke, an object possesses primary qualities
that exist independently of someone perceiving them. Locke stated these
properties to include an objects shape, size, position, number, mass and
so on. Priselac (undated) identifies science to be completing the list of
primary qualities by adding small particle characteristics and so on. Locke
understands objects to possess secondary qualities that are dependent for
their existence upon being perceived: Such dispositional qualities are not
actually owned by the object and are only extant when understood in their
relation with someone perceiving them.
On first reading this may sound complicated but in reality Locke is
making the elementary point that an object, in our instance an abstract
painting or drawing, has a surface with physical characteristics that cause it
to reflect light in such a way that our eyes perceive it as being a particular
colour. Under this understanding, the object does not possess a primary
quality of being of a certain colour; rather the primary characteristic pos-
sessed by the object is a surface of a given composition. Thus, the object
is disposed to reflect light that a person looking at the object will see as
a given colour and the perception of this colour is dependent upon a
perceivers presence and is a secondary characteristic of the object. Locke
himself states the primarysecondary characteristic distinction thus:
The ideas of the primary alone really exist. The particular bulk, number,
figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in them,whether
any ones senses perceive them or no: and therefore they may be called real
qualities, because they really exist in those bodies. (Locke 2009, p96)
Locke goes on to say that in contradistinction secondary qualities of an

object exist in objects only as modes of primary qualities. Thus:
light, heat, whiteness or coldness, are no more really in them than sickness
or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them; let not the light see
light or colours, nor ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose
smell, and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such particular
ideas, vanish and cease. (Locke 2009, p96)
Within the realist camp, the opposite position to direct realism is occu-
pied by indirect realism or representative realism.2 On the understanding
of indirect realism what we consciously experience is not the real world
but rather an internal representation of our external world. Indirect real-
ists have no difficulty agreeing on the existence of objects in the world
independent of the observer. What is different in this approach is an
understanding that during the process of perception real-world objects
are not directly engaged with by the person understanding the sensing,
rather the person interacts with a perceptual go-between that links the
object and person. This intermediary or mediating process has been called
sense datum or sense data.
For a philosopher occupying a position as an indirect realist, notions
embodied in sense-data theory imply that we do not perceive an object
but instead we perceive a mental representation of that object, which has
the properties of the object but are often thought of as being two rather
than three dimensional. Under such an account, when I look at Rodins
16 P.M.W. HACKETT
The Thinker, the sculpture causes an internal mental two-dimensional set

of sense data, which is what I perceive rather than perceiving The Thinker
itself. Resulting from this state of affairs, sense data are perceived by an
inner equivalent of the visual process that employs a more understand-
able or analyzable model for, whilst being comparable to, the perception
itself. Supporters of indirect realism have put forth many arguments in
support of this position. For example, the fact that all perception occurs
in the past due to the time it takes for light to reach our eyes and for us to
become aware of this. Hence, the argument goes, we do not perceive the
thing itself but some representation of this. However, all perception is an
activity that takes time for us to process the information associated with
a perception, and this is therefore not a convincing argument for indirect
realism. Other scholars see the complexity of the process of perception
to offer support for indirect perception. They cite the physiological and
neurological aspects of the perceptual systems (such as vision) as evidence
that we do not perceive directly but through retinal and cortex neurons
and that these physical structures are perceptual intermediaries. However,
such structures are not suitable to be labelled intermediaries under the
understanding that indirect realism has of intermediaries: Supporters of
this approach assert that we actually perceive the intermediaries, and it
seems difficult to conceive that what we perceive are neurons.
Hallucinations occur when we perceive something that does not actu-
ally exist and illusions are distortions of actual perceptual data. Illusions
happen when things appear through our senses as being different to how
they are constituted in the real world. Philosophers have spent much time
asking the question whether real or veridical perception can be equated
with illusion and/or hallucination? There are many illusions that we expe-
rience in the course of our everyday lives, due to visual perspective and
other causes, that we normally are able to take in our stride and are not
confused by. For example, when we look at a straight road leading into
the distance, this appears to become narrower, where in fact the road itself
remains a constant width. This inconsistency between actuality and our
perception of this does not usually trouble us in interpreting and interact-
ing with a world based upon such illusory information. Some philosophers
claim that the visually narrowing road we see cannot be the road itself
remains a constant width. The same holds true if I were hallucinating a
road in a desert mirage except in this case the road would not be there at
all. Thus, for an illusion or hallucination to be convincing it must possess
similar experiential content to a veridical perception. Consequently, schol-
ars have resorted to notions of psychological constructs to account for this

intermediary of perception and have called these sense data, suggesting
that it is these theoretical constructs that we see when we hallucinate or
experience an illusion.
As previously mentioned, illusions, hallucinations and veridical percep-
tions are experientially one and the same thing, and philosophers have
asserted that this commonality is due to sense data. On this understand-
ing, sense data is a ubiquitous explanation for all forms of perception and is
an argument that has found many supporters. For example, Stroll (2000)
states how Bertrand Russell was an advocate of sense-data theory. Sense
data are more contemporary workings of similar theories by Descartes,
Locke, Hume and others, who posited that we are only able to have a
direct awareness of the ideas that we personally hold. The sources of our
internally held awareness may be located in the world external to our self
but we are only able to have an indirect awareness of these.
Stroll continues that the above four philosophers (and to this list Lean
(2013) adds Berkeley, Moore and Broad) hold a form of scepticism, under
which Russells is the weakest and where Russells empiricism asserts that
any access we have to a world external to ourselves is necessarily mediated
by the self and we are thus never able to possess certain knowledge of exis-
tence external to our minds. Indeed, Lean (2013) reiterates this formula-
tion, which is known as sense-datum analysis, to mean that we are not able
to have certain knowledge of the existence of the objects we perceive and
further that if it were possible to be aware of these objects as they actually
exist then these would be different from our usual conceptions of them.
He continues by noting that Broad, in his epistemological writings on the
subject, employs sense-datum analysis to demonstrate the indefensibility
of our everyday understandings of what physical objects are and how we
perceive these (Broad 1914, 1923, 1925).
There are however many difficulties that arise from using sense data as
an explanation for perception.3 An example is the fact that sense data are
events that are formed and held inside the mind, which possess physical
characteristics such as size, shape and colour. However, materialist philoso-
phers have been unable to discover intra-neural structures for these object
qualities and this seems to refute the existence of sense data, suggesting
that they reside immaterially within the mind. This position leads indirect
materialism to propose a dualist account for perception that posits physical
objects to exist in tandem with an ontology of non-physical objects.
18 P.M.W. HACKETT
Questions arise when considering the dualist position as providing

explanations for sense data in non-physical terms is counter to an intel-
ligible understanding of the descriptions that are provided about percep-
tion by indirect realists. For example, what are the mechanisms of the
interaction between mind and body, how do these interactions produce
veridical perceptions of the external world and what causes sense data to
be mentally apparent to us? Moreover, it seems that non-physical items
can be the product of our interactions with the physical world and in what
ways can non-physical items cause the person experiencing the percep-
tion to commit a physical action? A possible resolution to these questions
is the idea of over-determination. On this account physical actions have
two causes, which when taken alone are insufficient to bring about behav-
iour; these implicate, on the one hand, sense data and, on the other hand,
physical phenomena. The result however of assuming this position is that
the perception of an event is incidental to the action associated with this
event. This indicates some of the difficulties associated with non-physical
positions on sense data and notions of causation. It also shows the prob-
lem the dualist account has of conceiving the mind as being distinct from,
whilst being causally effective within, the world external to the individual.
Furthermore, if sense data are non-physical the question may be asked
as to where are they spatially located? Physical objects are perceived in
physical relation to each other, and it is problematic conceiving how non-
physical items possess physical dimensions and thus how a non-physical
item can be perceived as being in front of another incorporeal body. It
is difficult to resolve this ambiguity as this problem extends into difficul-
ties conceiving how the spatial explanations we employ when we describe
physical items (such as size, shape and colour) can be used when consider-
ing non-physical sense data.
Another objection to indirect realism comes from adverbalists whose
account of perception is constituted upon how we employ adverbs to
modify the verbs we use to describe characteristics of what we perceive.
Under this account, when we visually sense the road as narrow in the
distance we are sensing the road narrowly. They claim that these adverbial
modifications are the way in which we should describe characteristics of
what we perceive instead of the customary way, which is to describe the
objects we are perceiving. Philosophers who adopt an adverbalist posi-
tion propose that we tend to describe perception in terms of how we are
experiencing the world rather than providing an account of the sensory
properties of mentally held (epistemological) events. Thus, there is a qual-
ity of perception that involves being appeared to. This being the case,
rather than resorting to sense-datum constructs, adverbs can be employed
as description or explanations of perception.
On the adverbalist account, perceiving an abstract painting is explained
by stating that we are perceiving the artwork abstractly and paint-
ingly, or that when experiencing the sensation of an abstract painting, I
am sensing a painting abstractly. By adopting a strategy of describing what
it is to experience a perceived event, such as the narrowing of the road,
perceptual explanations are adequate without resorting to the addition
of the concept of sense data. Another problem with indirect realism is its
inability to provide explanation of why we should believe in a world that
is extant underneath the shroud of sense data and beyond our perception
and which creates the possibility that all our understandings about the
world may be erroneous.
PHENOMENALISM
The next approach to perception that I will consider is that of phenom-
enalism, which is an orientation to perception rooted in the notion that
the world does not exist in isolation from the perceiver and consequently
that sense data have the same status as our description of physical events.
However, on this understanding, the troubling situation arises when we
do not engage in perceiving an object that has no existence. To avoid
this fragmentation of reality, phenomenalism posits that physical items
have a continued existence because a possibility exists that they could be
perceived in the future. However, such an account implies perception to
be complex as it would seem that as we perceived sense data, we instan-
taneously perceive the specification of when, where, how and so on we
would come across the object of perception in the future. It is important
to note that from a phenomenalist position a world that is independent of
our possible or actual experiences does not exist. Therefore, to state that
the road narrows towards the horizon is the same as saying that the admix
of sense data that we typically experience when looking at, or travelling
down, a visually receding road is inevitably followed by our experience of
narrowing road sense data: These experiences constitute the perception of
a road visually progressing into the distance. Phenomenalism then appears
to accept that sense data do in fact exist. However, phenomenalism does
not conceive that sense datum acts as intermediaries in the process of our
20 P.M.W. HACKETT
perceiving the world around us, and under this view we are forced to con-
clude that the physical world is made out of our sense data.
Some scholars have objected to the apparent consequence of hold-
ing such an extreme position as that held by phenomenalist as imply-
ing the material world would cease to exist if our minds ceased to exist.
Furthermore, phenomenalism appears to take the view that it is only the
self that can be known. Critics, however, point to the fact that we are
apparently able to put ourselves in the position of others and are able to
translate what we observe of other peoples behaviours and what we hear
them say into our own notions of what they are thinking. Notwithstanding
this, observable behaviour is also made up of sense data and their counter-
factual relations resulting in phenomenalism being both solipsist and ide-
alistic. However, Chisholm (1948) noted that the sensations experienced
by an individual are dependent upon factual information about the person
perceiving and their situation. Conditional statements therefore cannot
universally describe the relationships between sensations without taking
into account information about the person undertaking the act of perceiv-
ing and the context of this activity.
DISJUNCTIVE ACCOUNTS OFPERCEPTION

Scholars who assume a disjunctivist position towards perception (see, e.g.,
Haddock and Macpherson 2008; Byrne, and Logue 2009) offer an answer
to the question of how we perceive whilst at the same time maintaining
the direct realist tradition. Those who call themselves disjunctivists have
achieved this status through their belief that the conscious state that an
individual is in when perceiving veridically is different to the mental state
he or she would be in when experiencing a hallucination or an illusion.
However, the question may be asked as to what are the conscious mental
states that we experience in all of the conditions under which we perceive
the world around us? Theorists who fall into the category of being sense-
data theorists understand that the individual experiencing the object or
state of affairs, whether this event is a veridical perception or is hallucina-
tory or illusory, will be having the same conscious properties occurring in
all of these three cases. Differences between these experiences are due to
variations in an individuals relations to sense data and their properties.
It is interesting to note at this point that As a theory of visual experi-
ences, disjunctivism is in its infancy, and much interesting research remains
to be done (Fish, undated). Disjunctivism provides a convincing argu-
ment, which through denying the similarity of veridical and non-veridical

perceptual processes and experiences counters the need for theoretical
accounts of perception to explain such differences. Thus, veridical percep-
tion, illusions and hallucinations are different forms of experiences rather
distortions or variation of a common experience.
THE INTENTIONAL OR REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY

OFPERCEPTION
The intentional theory of perception is sometimes called representational-

ism or intentionalism. On this account, it is understood that a person is
in direct perceptual contact with their world. This theory also emphasizes
the importance of the relationship between belief and perception. On
this theory, beliefs are seen to be intentional as they are about something
and this something forms (represents) an aspect of the world. The theory
holds the notion that the sensory states we find ourselves in when looking
at events in the world are representative of the environment in which we
are immersed. Furthermore, this relationship is seen to hold true when an
event or state of affairs is experienced either veridically or non-veridically.
This proposition regarding the nature of the perceptual process is called
representationalism under which there is no requirement for the tangible
physical presence of an item or its sense datum in order for the person
undertaking the act of perceiving to experience the event.
Scholars who are representationalists fall into two camps, which
between them enable representationalism to provide a plausible account
of sense experience in general. The two camps are of strong and weak
representationalists with two branches to the representationalist position:
naturalists and phenomenologists. However, representationalism has been
seen to omit consciousness as being part of sensory experience.4 Strong
representationalists assume the position whereby the conscious properties
of an event that we sense are equivalent to representational properties of
that event. The weak representationalist position is that the events we
sense are mental representations that correspond to the events. Thus, an
object or state of affairs can be considered as a configuration of marks that
may be representational of something but are not essentially so. If an event
or state of affairs does possess representational qualities, then these quali-
ties will likely arise only through the event being set within a surrounding
sociocultural and physical environment.
22 P.M.W. HACKETT
Intentionalists understand that both veridical and non-veridical percep-

tions have an intentional content. They make a central claim that repre-
sentational states may contain error as we can hold false beliefs and for the
intentionalist, non-veridical perceptions such as illusions and hallucina-
tions are due to false beliefs. In these circumstances our representations of
the world, both in our perceptions and beliefs, are incorrect. Sense-data
theorists offer an understanding of perception to intentionalists as both
embody a form of representation that provides information about the
external world. The common feature between veridical and non-veridical
perception is a persons intention rather than an object. Those who adhere
to intentional accounts of perception believe that there is no need for non-
physical sense data as a naturalistic account of intentional content encom-
passes perceptions salient features. The question may however be asked
as to whether representational content is always the basis for beliefs and
judgements as our experiences, in some situations, appear to have more
subtlety and refinement than the concepts we hold. For example, I may
hold the concept of abstract art and this conceptualization may be subdi-
vided (perhaps into various types of abstraction) and I can therefore have
experiences of individual abstract artworks that are vastly different to other
such experiences. However, intentionalists explain the rich complexity of
experience through non-conceptual representational content.
PHENOMENOLOGY
The way in which I become aware of the world within which I am located
has an important impact upon my perceptions. When I look at the road
stretching and narrowing as it progresses into the distance, I also squint
in slight discomfort due to the fact that the road is heading directly into
the sun. I feel tired as I look at the bright though setting sun and think
about how long my drive home will take me. As my perception of the road
is experientially located in my life, I have perceptions that are something
more than uncomplicated representations of the world. I am more or less
influenced by the context within which I form the experience of my per-
ception, and intentionalists understand perceptual content to constitute
my perceptual experiences.
It seems reasonable to assume that perception is at least in part formed
by our conscious and direct experiences of our world, its objects and its
events. For example, when I look at the road narrowing as it stretches into
the distance my perception possesses a component that may be thought
of as what it is like to be experiencing the perception of the receding road

at that moment and under those given circumstances. Intentionalists have
attempted to account for the phenomenological components of percep-
tion by associating representation with the phenomenological aspects of
our experiences. However, some scholars claim that physical and phenom-
enological phenomena cannot be reconciled as they are so fundamentally
different (e.g., Levine 1983). Attempts to reconcile the physical and phe-
nomenological have employed assertions that the processes of causation
possess a common phenomenological component.
Phenomenological accounts of perception have been criticized because
the phenomenological components of perception may be associated
with the causal processes that make up perceptions representational con-
tent. Conversely, phenomenological aspects of perception can be seen to
require perceptual properties that are not representational to be included
in understanding perception. For example, Peacocke (1988) claims that
when viewed on its own, representational content, in some situation, is
unable to provide an adequate account for phenomenology as aspects of
a persons experience differ in phenomenological terms but have similar
representational content. An example of this is motion parallax and other
cues to depth perception such as differences in size, the differential move-
ment of objects due to their relative distance from the perceiver and the
relative occlusion that occurs between objects that are at a variety of dis-
tances from the observer. This has led some scholars to put forward the
idea that intentionality understandings of perception should be rejected
as sensation is required along with representational facets of perception
to provide adequate accounts of perception: This has led to qualia being
proposed as the non-representational aspects of experience. Some scholars
understand qualia to be the phenomenological aspects of our conscious
experience. However, on some accounts, qualia are seen as inflexible and
are rejected5 (Dennett 1991).
INDIRECT PERCEPTION: QUALIA ANDSTRUCTURE

Qualia is a term that is used to mean the subjective constituents of the
sense of perception, the phenomenal character of perception (Nida-
Rmelin 2008): those parts of the perceptual process that are within the
person who is undertaking the act of perceiving. As Lewis (1929, p121)6
puts this, qualia are the recognizable qualitative characters of the given.
Philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett (1988) has said that
24 P.M.W. HACKETT
qualia is a term about the way things seem to us as individuals with which
most of us are unfamiliar. However, he continues to say that qualia are
something that each of us is extremely aware of. Neuroscientists Kanai
and Tsuchiya (2012, p396) have investigated qualia stating that: While
the concept of qualia is elusive, its neurobiological basis can be investi-
gated with the empirical neuroscientific approach. These two scientists
interests in qualia are rooted in attempts to address what they claim to be
biologys most difficult question, which they summarize as, how and why
electrochemical neuronal activity in the brain generates subjective con-
scious experience such as the redness of red (Kanai and Tsuchiya 2012,
p392393). Within neuroscience attempts are made to follow the pathway
taken by light (continuing Kanai and Tsuchiyas example, we will call this
red light) from the point at which it stimulates the retina, which changes
the form of light to electrical impulses that pass to the visual cortex via the
visual thalamus. After undertaking and completing this journey we experi-
ence the red light as a conscious red light phenomenon. This then leads
us to ask the question, how the red light that we experience comes out
of processing the sensory stimulations from which the experience arises?7
The phenomenological experience in perception, or the feeling of what
something is like, is what Kanai and Tsuchiya (2012) identify as qualia and
I will adapt their understanding in this text. The two authors continued to
review ways in which approaches from within neurobiology may be able to
shed light upon subjective phenomenological experiences. Ramachandran
and Hirstein (1997) noted four functional aspects of qualia; these being:
1. Irrevocable (qualia are undeniable);

2. Flexibly/consciously used when we make plans;
3. Located in short-term memory;
4. Intimately bound to attention.
Kanai and Tsuchiya (2012) further note that mandatory fusion is

involved in conscious perception such that a number of inputs from the
senses are automatically bound together. Thus, on this understanding, our
experienced perceptions (qualia) are neural creations.
Earlier, I noted how there is some confusion about the veridical nature
of perception, and this uncertainty grows when notions of qualia are
introduced. This ambiguity continues when one asks what nature qua-
lia possess? Typically, a quale (the singular form of qualia) is used in the
denotation of the experiential aspects of perception and qualitative per-
ceptions smallest possible unit. Alternately, the quale is seen in all encom-
passing terms as the totality of phenomenal perception (Ramachandran
and Hirstein 1997).
Qualia arise when an event or a phenomenon stimulates a persons
senses and is the perceived experience or quality that arises. The word
itself comes from Latin and means what sort or what kind (Kanai and
Tsuchiya 2012) and this root is useful in understanding how the term is
used in perceptual studies. Incidents of qualia are unique to the individ-
ual having the perceptual experience (Nida-Rmelin 2008; Smith 2011).
Glendon 2015, personal communication, Jackson (1982) and Manzotti
(2008) identify qualia to be bodily sensations (the experiences that hap-
pen during perception) or as emotions arising from the experiences of the
senses, whilst Chumley and Harkness (2013) claim qualia to be a mixture
of sensory qualities along with feelings. The differences between under-
standings of what constitutes a quale are obvious from the above and
several writers have commented upon this lack of definitional agreement
(see, e.g., Graham and Horgan 2008; Wright 2008a).
In the current context, qualia are the phenomenal aspects of art per-
ception. Furthermore, the phenomenal experience of art is cardinal in the
perception of a work of art and perhaps especially so when perceiving the
relatively non-deterministic art form of abstract fine art. Consequently,
qualia form extremely important components of how a person perceives,
understands and appreciates a piece of abstract art. However, it is not pos-
sible to objectively identify or measure or to compare qualia.8
I will now consider qualia in greater detail. However, before undertak-
ing this, it is worth noting that the notion of qualia has also been criticized
from a variety of theoretical positions. For example, supporters of the
physicalist position note that qualia cannot be explained by neuroscience
and thus cannot exist (Kind 2008). However, claims have been made that
physicalist opponents to qualia have to provide an adequate explanation
of our phenomenological experiences (Kind 2008). Denying phenomeno-
logical data (Kind 2008), representationalists turn against phenomenolog-
ical data and propose that all of the experiences that we are able to sense
may be accounted for within our conscious perceptions (Wright 2008a).
Returning to a more positive position on qualia, the qualia real-
ist understands a quale to be inherent, essential and existent, and that
the nature of the existence of manifest experience cannot be explained
through the understanding of physical principles, matter and forces (see,
Glendon 2015, personal communication). For example, as Gary Hatfield
26 P.M.W. HACKETT
(2007, p133) says, I am a qualia realist. I believe that specifically phe-

nomenal qualia are present in perception. Thus, when we see a yellow
lemon in good light, we typically see that it is yellow by experiencing
a yellow quale. Graham and Horgan (2008) further illustrate what it
means to be a qualia realist when they write, Qualia realism, roughly, is
the thesis that qualia are real. They are a ubiquitous part of the conscious
face of existence (p89).9 They contrast this position with qualia antireal-
ism, which they say is the thesis that qualia are absent from the conscious
face of existence (p89). These authors extend the importance of qualia
to the point of saying that without qualia our mental states would be non-
phenomenological and this would have consequences upon how devel-
oped our conscious mental states could become.
Chalmers (2003) presents qualia as being extant phenomenal experi-
ences, entities that cannot be either reduced to their physical constituents
or disassembled by their functional subcomponents. Some writers such
as Bradley (2011) assume that despite qualia not possessing a physical
presence, they are nonetheless rudimentary and ubiquitous characteristics
of the world. Nave or direct realism propounds the view that qualia are
products of the process of representational perception which places them
in the physical world and consequently phenomenal experiences are exactly
the same as physical conditions that give rise to perceptions (Brown 2008;
Kind 2008). As I commented upon earlier, representationalism is the the-
ory that an object in the external world, the immediate object of knowl-
edge, is constituted as an idea or notion within the mind of the perceiver
and is distinct from the stimulus source or event external to the individual,
which brought about the perceptual experience. From another perspec-
tive upon qualia, indirect realism assumes a representationalist perspec-
tive. On this understanding qualia are understood as being demonstrative
of the manner in which we make concrete the experienced environment
external to ourselves (Wright 2008a) and which has led to some writers
considering indirect realism to see this as a position that is recognized as
scientific by empirical researchers such as psychologists and neuroscientists
(Glendon 2015, personal communication).
Psychological and neuroscientific research into the phenomena of visual
illusions have been cited in support for the role of qualia in perception
through indirect realism. For example, Brown (2008) puts forward evi-
dence from a study that demonstrated a visual display of subjective con-
tours possessed qualitative differences from the external stimulus; Kleiser,
Seitz, and Krekelberg (2004) implicated saccades as instrumental in cases
of the neural filling-in phenomena; Purves and Lotto (2003) demon-

strated how contrast between background and foreground caused the dif-
ferential perception of colour; Brown (2008) states that when we perceive
colour, this process involves the activity of the whole of the neural visual
pathway including the retina, optic nerve, lateral geniculate nucleus and
cortical regions; Lowe (2008) cited the occurrence of double vision when
viewing an object at very close range as evidence that our perceptions of
external events in the external world may be extremely different from the
characteristics possessed by the events themselves and that these differ-
ences provide support for the existence of visual qualia.
In sense-data theory, events that are external to the perceiver are seen as
being duplicated within the perceivers brain (Broad 1914). Sense-datum
theory is closely related to representation theory of perception as it holds
that introspection is not a part of the external world whilst it does repre-
sent this. Wright (2008a) states that a strong account of qualia is unneces-
sary as the nature of qualia is explicable through the intentional content
of qualia. However, Maund (2008) puts forward the opposite position in
claiming that qualia and sensations are experientially non-intentional.
In closing this section on qualia I offer the writing of Visan (2014).
When we perceive a colour (again, I will use red for an example) Visan
claims that we instantly see red when we are exposed to a red stimulus.
However, Visan says that the red colour is also a quale, in that all instances
of red are subjective and have the quality of redness. Moreover, Visan
claims that this redness is a single unified entity and that the phenomenal
characteristics of sensibility and understanding are fundamentally the same
thing. Visan argues that a process of neurophysiologically based structural
learning establishes equivalence between sensing and understanding. To
explain this a little further, he notes that we have physiological apparatus
(neural regions) that enables us to see red when we first see the colour red.
When we come to understanding a sensed phenomena we do not possess,
a priori, the necessary brain structures for understanding. Instead, these
develop through a learning process that comes about through contact
with the stimuli situation are created in the brain. Importantly however,
after they are created, understanding will come up with the same ease
as sensibility comes (Visan 2014. p731).
I would add to the argument for the similarity between phenomenal
characteristics of sensibility and understanding and claim that even the
stimuli for which we inherently possess neural structures to allow their
sensation will be modified through how we understand (or perceive)
28 P.M.W. HACKETT
these: All stimuli will to a lesser or greater extent take the form of a quale.
However, I also question the need for qualia to be present as anything
other than descriptions of processes.
The above statement then begs the question as to what form qualia
take in the process of perception. A quale, as I am proposing it is a learnt
understanding: a hypothetical intermediary construct that exists between
sensation and meaning. The question then arises if such an intermediary
required to allow perception? My answer to this is in accordance with
Searle that a go-between does not appear necessary for the depiction of
the process of visual perception as the neural structures that account for
perception incorporate both sensors and semantic interpreters that act in
tandem. Thus, perception becomes a parallel process with feedback.
SEARLES THEORY OFDIRECT PERCEPTION

John Searles work on perception stands in stark contrast to the theoretical
stances present in indirect perception as he rejects notions of both sense
data and qualia. Speaking of sense datas existence, Searle notes how the
concept was developed to offer perceptual awareness of an object. His
thesis (which I consider in greater detail below) is that many perceptual
theories, have the consequence that one never sees objects and states of
affairs in the world, but only ones own subjective experiences (p76), and
consequent upon this the term sense data was developed as a description
of this process. By dismissing sense data, Searle notes that he is negating
the concept of sense data as objects of perception that constitute conscious
perceptual experiences but not the idea of conscious perceptual experi-
ences, per se. As conscious perceptions are themselves the perception
itself and not themselves objects of perception, it seems misleading to call
these sense data. Searle also claims that perceptions do not provide extra
information about the object of perception over and above the perception
itself and therefore do not take the form of data.
In Seeing Things as They Are, John Searle (2014) states that his inten-
tion in writing the book was to provide a more accurate theory of per-
ception. He notes how philosophy has been overwhelmed by a mistake
it made in the seventeenth century and has subsequently repeated. The
mistake has been in supposing that we never directly perceive objects
and states of affairs in the world, but directly perceive only our subjective
experiences (p11). With this Searle immediately places himself in a differ-
ent intellectual and hypothetical sphere to the qualia and representational-
ist theoreticians that I have mentioned. Searle continues by naming some

of the luminaries that he sees as making this mistake to include Descartes,
Locke, Berkeley, Leibniz, Spinoza, Hume and Kant Mill and Hegel
(p11). Searle then sets forth to correct this mistake.
Searle (2014) describes scenes within which a person is reading a book
in two situations, indoors and outdoors, and then proposes a theory of
direct perception. He claims that this person will be directly seeing objects
and states of affairs, which exist within the setting where the book is being
read. These objects and states of affairs complete independence of the
persons perception of them, as the objects and states do not require the
person to perceive them for the objects to exist. To explain this further,
he reflects that if the person doing the perceiving closes his or her eyes the
perceptions of the objects or states of affairs cease. However, the objects
and states of affairs do not cease and have a continued existence inde-
pendently of perceptions of the objects. Second, Searle asserts that the
person will perceive these events directly without the need for any inter-
mediary entity or process. Within the perceiving persons brain, conscious
visual experiences proceed that do not require the continuation of visual
experience for their persistence. Consequently, Searle posits two distinct
components in conscious perceptual situations: the ontologically objective
states of affairs that you directly perceive, and the ontologically subjective
experiences of them (p12, original emphases). Continuing, Searle then
asserts the need for a third element, that of a causal relationships between
the objective reality and subjective experience whereby the former brings
about the latter.
On his understanding of perception Searle claims that his is a theory
that is based upon intentionality, which counters arguments for the sub-
jective experience of perception as being the object of perception and that
there is no subjective perceptual experience common to both veridical
perception and hallucinations. Searle identifies perception as intentional
similar to other biologically primitive intentional forms of behaviour,
such as beliefs (which) are in large part derived from the intentionality
of perceptual experiences (p54). I agree with Searles somewhat obvious
claim for the intentional basis for perception. Searle justifies his identifi-
cation of intentionality in perception by citing a common definition of
intentional states as being states, which are of, or about, or directed at
phenomena or events in the world.10
In this way Searle provides an account of perception as being an active
and goal-directed process. Searle is not alone in claiming the perceptual
30 P.M.W. HACKETT
process to be active, to involve action or to be goal directed. However, a

further and more thorough review of Searles writing, or of other scholars
of perceptual philosophy and psychology, is beyond the scope of this text.
Instead, in this chapter I have provided a brief review of major outlooks
and perspectives of research on perception.11
CONCLUSION
I have offered a very brief tour through a variety of chosen philosophical
perspectives on the process and experience of perception. I have focused
upon the sense that has received most scholarly attention and vision, and
this is the sense modality most concerned with perceiving abstract fine art.
I have not defined any one theoretical approach to perception as being
cardinal as I will explore the general process, as related to abstract art, in
greater detail as this book progresses. However, I have established two
points: that visual perception is not a simple process and that a wide variety
of scholars from a number of theoretical positions have offered different
explanations of this process. I also pursued in greater detail qualia theories
of perception and chosen aspects of this theory along with John Searles
notions of direct perception.
It is not a central concern of mine to establish the relative worth of
the competing philosophical theories of perception. Rather, I am most
interested in the establishment of a clear understanding of the process of
phenomenologically located perception of abstract art objects. In the next
chapter I introduce research that has addressed visual perception, other
than those that are derived from philosophical sources, such as psychol-
ogy and neuroscience. The selection of writing about the process of visual
perception that I chose to present is offered to demonstrate the varied and
complex nature of this form of human perceptual activity.
NOTES
1. In his book, Philosophy of Perception, William Fish (2010) provides a com-
prehensive review of the different philosophical theories of perception.
Fishs work will not form a major part of this text but his review is thor-
ough and the interested reader is guided to this text. Another point that is
worthy of making is of direct relevance to the last chapters in this book.
Fish breaks down the perceptual theories in an ontological-like presenta-
tion. First, he puts forward the notion of perceptual theories wearing one
of two hats which he calls phenomenological and epistemological percep-

tual hats. The former of these is identified as incorporating perception as
conscious experience and the latter is perception as the primary source of
our knowledge. Fish then reviews each theory in these terms and each is
typified by three principles: Common Factor Principle, Phenomenal
Principle and Representational Principle. This forms a two-by-three cate-
gorical ontology.
2. The polar positioning of the two approaches, indirect and direct realism, is
known as epistemological dualism.
3. These difficulties include those that arise from metaphysics.
4. On the other hand, it may be claimed that phenomenology ignores
representation.
5. See endnote 3in which I define intermediary constructs.
6. In 1929, C.I.Lewis developed the concept of qualia.
7. As well as our finding difficulty in identifying how phenomenological expe-
riential aspects of perception occur, there is also difficulty in explicating
why these events have experiential phenomenal characteristics that are only
available through introspection.
8. Qualia have also been equated with meaning (Vian, 2014), and memory
has also been identified as a necessary prerequisite for qualia (Robbins,
2013).
9. Interestingly, Glendon (2015) cites Graham and Horgan (2008), who
note how qualia realists widely accept the idea of the qualia as something
that we are consciously aware of and which grows out of external events.
However, they have little to say about the relationship between qualia and
sensations internal to the body (e.g., borborygmi). Glendon further notes
how Smythies (2008) suggests bodily sensations are indeed a feature of
qualia.
10. Searle defines four features of visual experiences that are sufficient to allow
for intentionality: intentional content, direction of fit, conditions of satis-
faction, and causal self-reflexivity.
11. I guide the interested reader to texts such as those by Gendler and
Hawthorne (2006), Noe (2006), Noe and Thompson (2002), and
Schwartz (2004).
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 3
Expanding Theoretical Complexity
Abstract I introduce psychological and neuroscientific approaches to

visual perception, delving further into these perspectives in an attempt to
broaden my outlook on visual perception. From within visual neurosci-
ence research, I look at research that has investigated the activities and
functions of single neural cells as well as that into larger neural regions.
Gestalt psychology is next considered and integrated with understandings
from visual neuroscience. I also seek to broaden the consideration of visual
perception prior to Chaps. 4 and 5 in which I focus upon more specific
notions of perceiving abstract fine art. I conclude this chapter by stating
my position thus far and by posing a series of questions that I will answer
in the remaining chapters of this book.
Keywords Visual neuroscience Psychology Gestalt psychology

Visual perception
INTRODUCTION
Glendon (2015, personal communication) distinguished between how
different philosophers have viewed qualia and I have summarized his writ-
ing in the last chapter. Glendon also demonstrates how various camps
within the qualia debate are interrelated and how the assumption of a
given stance may often be unclear or indistinct. In summarizing his posi-
tion, Glendon cites Chalmers (1995) who questions the ability to estab-

DOI10.1057/978-1-137-48332-4_3
36 P.M.W. HACKETT
lish the conceptual worth of qualia as providing useful means to aid in

understanding perceived phenomenally representative images. Wright
(2008b) notes how the concept of qualia still has to be developed suffi-
ciently to enable the formation of operationalized tests of claims regarding
the nature of qualia. This point is refined by Kanai and Tsuchiya (2012)
in their statements that for animals that are conscious of their world, such
as human beings, qualia undoubtedly exist subjectively in the form of pain
and hunger, and that the activity of perception plays a central role in our
very existence.1 However, these authors issue the caveat that given that
we are able to conceive nonsensical possibilities, such as philosophical
zombies, suggests that our conceptualization of qualia may still be prema-
ture (Kanai and Tsuchiya, p393).
Manzotti (2008) put forward a realist process-based argument in sup-
port of the use of qualia. He proposed that how we experience phenom-
ena and the realities within our external world constitute two descriptions
of the same thing. It seems reasonable to assert that perception contains
phenomenal components. However, in this book I claim that we already
possess many psychological constructs, which have been empirically sup-
ported (e.g., sensation, perception, arousal, awareness, emotion) and
research is needed that presents a convincing argument that we need the
quale.2 Thus, the value of qualia as a term that is able to convey meaning
when attempting to understand phenomenal experiences associated with
perception remains to be proven.
I have chosen to commence this chapter by stressing the importance
of the qualitative aspects of visual perception as these should be kept in
mind during my presentation of psychological and neuroscientific per-
spectives on visual perception. In confirmation of the complexity of pos-
sible explanations of the perception of abstract art, in the pages that follow
I state how intra-individual processes can inform our appreciation of art
perception.
NEUROSCIENCE ANDVISUAL PERCEPTION

Neuroscience is the scientific investigation of the nervous system both
as a whole and in terms of its component parts (in terms of both activi-
ties in neural regions and in single neurons).3,4 Cognitive neuroscience
attempts to provide an understanding regarding the ways in which neural
activity constitutes the foundations of human behaviour, including vision,
through reference to the activity of neural mechanisms (Orban 2012).
EXPANDING THEORETICAL COMPLEXITY 37
Thus, in visual neuroscience attention has been focused upon the scientific
exploration of sight through the examination of cortical and other regions
such as neural pathways and the retina. Visual neuroscience attempts to
provide an understanding of how our ability to perceive arises from neural
activity along with attempting to develop knowledge about behaviours
that rely on vision.
An initial understanding that arises from visual neuroscience is that the
primary visual cortex (and most other cortical areas of the visual system)
displays the presence of retinotopic5 arrangements across each cortical
area. This finding may suggest qualified encouragement for notions that
images from the world external to a person perceiving the world are pre-
served as a whole image and this has been discovered to be the case even at
advanced stages of processing along the ventral and dorsal visual streams.6
The outlook assumed by visual neuroscience is a more restrictive view
than the one adopted by general neuroscience only in that it concentrates
exclusively upon the neurology of sight (Pettigrew and Sanderson 1986).
Visual cognitive neuroscience has identified the receptive field (RF) as
being the area in a persons visual field to which an optical nerve cell opti-
mally responds. Furthermore, There is a progressive arrangement in the
complexity and size of the section of visual field to which a cell reacts, and
a complexity in the stimulus that evokes a response in cells of the visual
cortex (Hackett 2013, p12). This progressive arrangement of complexity
runs from response fields that fire optimally to simple stimulus types and
smaller visual areas through to response fields that preferentially respond
to stimuli of greater complexity and larger areas. This configuration of
response field sensitivity maintains the notion that a hierarchical organi-
zation of neural cells exists for extracting visual features. In this situation
lower-level cells impel higher-level cells as both selectivity and complexity
increase throughout the neural system (Hubel 1988).7
This progression in response field sensitivity is present from V1 areas of
the primary visual cortex successively to areas of the inferotemporal cortex
in the ventral visual stream (Felleman and van Essen 1991; Keiji Tanaka
2003). Furthermore, in single-neuron studies into visual processes, highly
significant increases in neural activity have been produced when inputs
from multiple senses are combined, producing what has been called sup-
peradditative growth as the observed responses were found to exceed
the sum of evoked responses from individually considered modality-spe-
cific stimulus components (Rowland et al. 2007, see also Stanford and
Stein 2007). This finding may suggest that RFs in cells are organized in
38 P.M.W. HACKETT
a manner that integrates visual sensory inputs in a way analogous to the

idea that the whole of a perception is greater than the sum of perceptions
components when considered alone.8
It is however understood that there may be problems in adopting a rudi-
mentary hierarchical understanding of perception as research has shown
cortical connections to feed-forward and also to be involved in recurrent,
and feed-back inputs. Under this understanding, the perceptual processes
often require processing from both the bottom-up (sensory input based)
and the top-down (attention and motivation based). Furthermore, the
visual cortex is functionally specialized in its composition. For example,
layer V4 has been found to respond optimally to colour, whilst layer V5
responds to motion. Cells that possess a multi-purpose nature and are able
to impart flexibility into the visual neural system have also been found.
The research by Spillman and Ehrenstein (2004) also places emphasis
upon the visual systems complexity where these authors demonstrated
vision-related neural regions to be highly interactive and to employ feed-
forward, feed-back and lateral loops.9
It is well known that information from visual sense sources passes along
two physically and functionally separate neural pathways, which pass infor-
mation to separate visual cortical areas. These are termed the ventral visual
stream and the dorsal visual stream. Sensory information regarding shape,
brightness, colour, orientation and depth is passed along the ventral visual
stream to specific areas of the cortex. Sensations that are related to the
direction of movement and spatial location of events in our visual world
pass along the dorsal visual stream to different areas of the visual cor-
tex. This functional division of the two visual streams allows differential
processing along the two visual pathways where the dorsal stream feeds
the temporal lobe and answers what questions, and the ventral stream
feeds the parietal love and answers where questions, in regard to visual
stimuli.
The intricacy of neural processes associated with visual perception has
been found to involve several different regions of the brain that act in an
integrated manner. Whilst the ways in which general activity of visual per-
ception may, or may not, be exactly the same as the visual perception of
specific piece of two-dimensional abstract art, such integrative activities are
most surely similar. An example of perceptual complexity and integration
is provided in a recent study that looked specifically at the handling by spe-
cialized neural regions in the processing of various orthographic aspects
and semantic components of Chinese characters (Xu et al. 2015). The
authors cite how earlier neuroimaging studies into word recognition iden-
tified functions within specific neural systems but that more recently stud-
ies have considered the integration and interaction of important aspects
of distributed neural systems when considering visual word recognition
(Xu etal. 2015). The authors suggest that this indicates the processing of
languages that have an alphabet employ both the dorsal and ventral neural
pathways that originate from the visual cortex. Through functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI), Xu etal. used dynamic causal modelling
taking Chinese characters as stimuli to investigate the interaction of neural
systems. They demonstrated how the pathway to the left ventral occipi-
totemporal cortex was employed in recognizing Chinese characters where
this pathway is linked with the superior parietal lobule and the left middle
frontal gyrus (MFG). This they claim forms a dynamic neural network in
which information flows from the visual to the left occipitotemporal cor-
tices and the left MFG via the parietal lobule. I have cited this research to
illustrate the probability that the perception of two-dimensional abstract
art is a similarly intricate process that potentially implicates several neural
regions and streams.
In a study that is more directly related to art but which involved learn-
ing and art activities, Schlegel etal. (2015) investigated both behavioural
and neural changes in drawing and painting students compared to other
non-art students. They discovered reorganization to occur in art students
prefrontal (neural) white matter and these students became more creative
even though their perceptual ability remained constant. Art students also
exhibited, multivariate patterns of cortical and cerebella activity evoked
by this drawing task became increasingly separable between art and non-
art (sic) students (p440). The investigators claimed that the creative task
enabled creative cognition and mediated perceptuomotor integration, and
that developing artistic skills was supported by neural pathway plasticity.
These findings are typical of those of much similar research, and this sug-
gests that any simplistic understanding of the ways in which we perceive
abstract art is potentially erroneous, as it appears that art-related experi-
ences may effect our subsequent perception of art.
Aristotles writing demonstrates a great deal of complexity to exist in
the perceptual process and this intricacy has been made apparent in the
research undertaken by neuroscientists. For example, Kanai and Tsuchiya
(2012) stress how understanding the process of visual perception is enor-
mously complex when they say, Perhaps the most difficult biological
question of all might be how and why electrochemical neuronal activity
40 P.M.W. HACKETT
in the brain generates subjective conscious experience such as the redness

of red (p392). They continue to stress our lack of knowledge in this
regard by saying how the redness of red emerges from processing of
sensory information is utterly mysterious (p392). Our ability to perceive
in a meaningful manner, such as illustrated by our seeing redness, seems to
be even more inscrutable when redness is a quality of an abstract artwork.
This mystery, according to Kania and Naotsugi, is still maintained even
though neuroscience is able to map the progress along the neural path-
ways of electro-chemical activity associated with visual perception.
Human beings gather sensory data and interpret these to form a basis for
our reactions to the world around us: This is a process of active awareness.
On this understanding, we sense a piece of art and actively perceive this,
which forms the basis for our overt behaviours (we approach it, purchase
it etc.) and covert behaviours (are interested in it, feel warmly towards it
etc.) towards this object or event. Selective visual neurons from within
templates that are formed by individuals neurally encoded pertinent pre-
vious experiences respond to components of their visual surroundings.
Perceptual processes of both conscious and subconscious types seem, as
Hackett (2013) notes, to be essential in our experiences of art and abstract
art. An absolute distinction between these two forms of perception presents
problems. Visual perception appears to be an active process at a precon-
scious level as specific visual sensations are responded to optimally by spe-
cific neurons. Furthermore, when we interpret abstract artworks through
reference to other pieces of art or other experiences in our lives, this would
appear to be a conscious process. Moreover, our being aware of likenesses
that exists between specific paintings and other paintings and non-painting-
related visual events, and our emotional reactions to artwork would seem to
come about at both a subconscious level and a conscious level of experience.
For example, the inspection and recognition of shapes and the overall struc-
ture of an abstract drawing is conscious. Feelings that paintings evoke in us,
for example, a sense of extreme anxiety, are probably subconscious although
encounters with abstraction may typically involve conscious awareness as the
viewer may be solving a perceptual challenge set by the artist.
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH INTO ABSTRACT FINE ART

I could continue to provide examples of the intricacy of neural aspects
of visual perception and demonstrate further the fact that many neural
regions and components are implicated in the production of the experi-
ence of visual perception. I trust that in such a short book, the examples
I have provided allow an appreciation of this phenomenon, and having
demonstrated the complexity of neural activity in visual perception, I will
now turn to consider some psychological views of perception.
Psychologists have undertaken research into art from a variety of theo-
retical stances with well-known examples being the writing of Arnheim
(1943, 1966, 1969, 1974, 1986) and Fechner (see, Solomon 2011).
Other research from within psychology has originated from several psy-
chological subdisciplines and has employed a variety of theoretical orien-
tations. I do not attempt in this chapter to provide a thorough overview
of these approaches, rather I will selectively present research that has
emerged from within Gestalt psychology as this, I believe, appears to offer
an exemplary level of understanding of how abstract art is perceived.10
GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY
Gestalt psychologys research into vision attempts to understand why
things look as they do (Kofka 1920). Gestalt psychology is an early exam-
ple of psychology addressing the process of perception and may be seen to
be a theory of perceptual integration that is concerned with how we orga-
nize what we perceive. Gestalt principles constitute a theoretical structure
that allows the ordering and simplification of visual perception whilst not
losing important aspects of the perceptual process. Thus, under Gestalt
understanding an image is usually, perceived according to the orga-
nization of the elements within it, rather than according to the nature
of the individual elements themselves (Braisby and Gellatly 2012, p71).
The central tenets of the approach are that gestalts11 are units of percep-
tion; the sum of the individual parts of a gestalt unit is usually less than
the whole of the given gestalt12 and significant changes in the parts of
a gestalt unit usually do not destroy the perceptual completeness of the
gestalt (see, e.g., Wertheimer 1912, 1923, Brett King and Wertheimer
2007). Gestalts refer to the visual concepts of figure, form and shape and
Gestalt psychology provide a theoretical and empirical rule-governed basis
as to how visual sensory information is organized and hence perceived.
Gestalt psychologys basic principles13 for perception are listed in
Table3.1:
As well as visual integration, Gestalt psychologists have been concerned
with how we separate visual items. For example, research has considered
how vision is structured through the principle of figure and ground per-
42 P.M.W. HACKETT
Table 3.1 Gestalt principles of perception

Gestalt principle Implication of principle
Good figure (Pragnanz or Tendency to perceive patterns to have as simple a structure as

simplicity) possible
Similarity Tendency to group together similar colours, shapes,
orientations
Good continuation Tendency to connect points as smoothly as possible in straight
or curved lines, where elements of the line are seen to belong
together
Proximity Tendency to group together items that are near to each other
Common region Tendency to group together items in a region
Uniform connectedness Tendency for a connected region of uniform properties
(texture, motion, colour etc.) to be perceived as a single unit
Familiarity Tendency to group items if the group formed has meaning or
familiarity
Common fate Tendency to group together items that move in a similar
direction
Synchrony Tendency to group together events that happen simultaneously
ception, a process that is influenced by knowledge of the visual elements

that are being perceived as the figure (see, e.g., Dickinson and Pizlo
2013). Other writers have commented upon and extended Gestalt princi-
ples of integration and segregation in reference to fine art. Ramachandran
(2004) stated Ten Universal Laws of Art in which he brings together
Gestalt and other forms of psychology with cognitive neuroscience.
Ramachandrans ten laws are: Peak Shift; Grouping; Contrast; Isolation;
Perception Problem Solving; Symmetry; Abhorrence of Coincidence/
Generic Viewpoint; Repetition, Rhythm and Orderliness; Balance and
Metaphor. Later in this book, I provide a structure14 for understanding
abstract art but at this stage Ramachandrans model for the components of
fine art demonstrates how neuroscientific knowledge can support Gestalt
principles in offering explanations of how fine art is perceptually organized.
GESTALT THEORY ANDCOGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE

Over the preceding decades neuroscientific research into the processing
of visual stimuli has moved forward a great deal as has the need for ways
of understanding and organizing the knowledge that has been developed.
As a result of this need, concepts from Gestalt psychology (such as figure
ground segregation) have been used along with neuroscientific procedures
to enable the illustration of neural mechanisms associated with psycholog-

ical processes. In 1940, Wolfgang Kohler wrote that it had been acknowl-
edged that psychophysical processes of the central nervous system were
correlated with psychological phenomena, and later that conscious expe-
rience existed at the level of neural activity (Kohler 1920, 1923, 1947).
Several researchers including Farah (2006), Sekuler (1996) Spillmann and
Ehrenstein (2004) and Westheimer (1999) commented upon how neu-
roscience is now able to lend support and to enhance understanding of
Gestalt principles. However, Gestalt principles may need developing and
adapting to enable the accommodation of the knowledge that is emerging
from neuroscience (Sundqvist 2003).
Gestalt psychology has described relationships between figure and
ground in a visual scene. Figureground relationships have also been
addressed by neuroscience. For example, Iwabuchi (1998) noted the
veracity of focusing upon the perceptual unit of the figure as segregated
from ground. Iwabuchi notes how contemporary research sees the form-
ing of figure as coming about through the binding of visual features.
Iwabuchi notes how within the neuroscience literature, this process has
been specifically related to feature encoding neurons, where these cells
respond optimally to specific visual features. However, the author states
that it is unknown how different aspects of an object are brought together
as a coherent representation of an object.
Hallucinations and illusions have been the subject of enquiry from a
Gestalt-neuroscientific perspective. De Jong (2014) investigated neural
compensation during the small time between ocular and cortical process-
ing. De Jong claimed illusions to result from the brain incorrectly fill-
ing-in information during this period due to misconceptions of external
stimuli. Hallucinations, on the other hand, are false perceptions, which
arise independently of external stimuli. De Jong found that Gestalt psy-
chology was able to provide activity-based descriptions of illusory prin-
ciples whereas neuroscience explains these principles through using neural
imagining. Gestalt psychology has enabled the development of the notion
that perception necessitates the interaction between a visual image and
an individuals apparatus for visual perception, organized through neural
processes as developed through Gestalt psychology. The strictures within
which perception is possible were seen by Gestalt psychologist Kofka
(1935) as constituting the laws of vision and to be indicative of the usual
responses people have to visual images.
44 P.M.W. HACKETT
Neuroscientists have employed Gestalt principles along with the recep-

tive field of a visually related neuron, whilst using neural measures, includ-
ing fMRI, to develop complex understandings of visual processes (see,
e.g., Kawisher and Duncan 2004). Gestalt principles apply to many of
the components and techniques of abstract art. For example, abstraction
is often seen to be employing the use of camouflaged and hidden forms,
ambiguous figures, the creation of a sense of depth and three-dimensional
perspective, the delineation of figure through contour and so on, all of
which are directly related to Gestalt principles (see, e.g., Metzger 1936).
These have also been subject to research from the neurosciences.
For instance, contemporary research in monkeys has shown that there
is a neurological basis for the identification of figures using contours.15
Here, Zhou etal. (2000) found V1 and V2 cells from the visual cortex
that were selectively sensitive in the establishment of figure perception
in cases where there was an overlap between quadrilaterals of different
luminescence: the juxtaposition of such visual boundaries being a fea-
ture of much abstract painting. Furthermore, when surfaces that differ
a great deal in terms of orientation, contrast and so on form boundar-
ies more readily. Horizontal placement of regions has been found to not
effect figure perception whereas in vertical placements upper regions are
more likely to be seen as figure than lower regions (Vecera etal. 2002).
Goldstein (2013) found that many other features of abstraction such as
size, symmetry, orientation and meaning influence figure perception.
Research findings suggest that our perceptual processes have evolved
to allow RFs of specific neurons to gather information about lines, lin-
ear edges and their orientations, the meeting points of differing textures,
different shapes, the human face and houses, all of which have obvious
implications for how we experience abstract art. V1 neurons that provide
support for similarity and good continuation principles have been iden-
tified, as they respond optimally to specific linear orientations within a
field of similarly oriented linear elements (Zapadia etal. 1995). Lamme
(1995) discovered neural processes for figureground effects after the dis-
covery of V1 neurons that were optimally responsive to lines in specific
orientation when, and only when, the background constituted lines run-
ning in a contra-lateral direction.16 In their investigations, Lamme (1995)
and Zipser etal. (1996) described how figure and ground effects varied
relative to the orientation of the figureground elements. They found that
a grid figure presented against a ground of gridded images that were in a
dissimilar orientation produced stronger neural responses than when the

figure and ground grids were similarly oriented.
The understanding of abstract art also appears to be informed by other
research that has brought together Gestalt psychology and neuroscience
approaches. Examples of this research include how different aspects of
paintings are perceived. For example, as I mentioned earlier, it has been
discovered that neurons of the primary visual cortex have a progressive
arrangement of cells of the visual cortex V1 region that ranges from cells
with an onoff state and centresurround antagonism responding to very
small visual fields to cells higher in the visual cortex that respond to more
intricate visual information from larger visual fields. Gray et al. (1989)
found that neurons tend to fire at similar times if they receive comparable
stimulation. This may be related to Gestalt notions of figureground sepa-
ration and where figures appear to be more like objects than grounds and
where they appear to be in front of the ground. Furthermore, grounds
appear as being less formed and are less memorable than figures. In terms
of an abstract painting, this may help to explain how images are conjured
from non-figural colour, tonal and specific arrangements of marks.
Another finding from neuroscience research that appears to help facili-
tate the perception of abstract art is that linear elements will fulfil the
principle of continuation even if these lines are small and separated in the
visual field but that even small disruptions in elements that constitute a
circle interrupt its perception (Kovacs and Julesz 1993). Furthermore, in
order to perceive art abstraction in a meaningful way, stimuli of a variety
of types must be brought together: colours, sizes, linear elements and so
on. As these different forms of visual features are processed in different
regions of the brain, this raises the question of how these disparate ele-
ments can be brought together as a meaningful perception. The previ-
ously mentioned synchronized neural firing of adjacent visual elements
may bind together these visual elements and allows groups of neurons
to form due to changes in the visually presented stimuli and provide an
explanation for figureground effects.
QUESTIONS ANSWERED INTHIS BOOK

In the preceding chapters, I have asked the question of how do we perceive
two-dimensional abstract fine art. Following this I reviewed a selection
of philosophical, neuroscientific and psychological approaches that have
46 P.M.W. HACKETT
been used in attempts to understand the process of perception in general

and have alluded to how this relates to perceiving abstract art. All of my
writing to this point has concentrated on documenting the complexity of
this art form and the necessity for intricate understandings of its percep-
tion. In the following chapters, I refine my perspective by considering
notions of perceptual ontologies.
However, before I introduce ontological perspectives, in the final
paragraphs of this chapter I make a series of forthright statements that
define the limits to the scope of my subsequent writing. In addition,
the statements allow the reader to develop the requisite frame of mind
for its appreciation when they are reading the final two chapters of this
book.
The statements are as follows:
1/Perception is a highly complex philosophical, psychological and phenom-

enological process.
2/Perception incorporates both empirical and theoretical components.
3/Understanding the perception of two-dimensional abstract art images
may best be achieved through attempting to fathom the interplay of the
processes we use when perceiving aesthetic visual events.
There are a series of concomitant implications that arise out of the

above statements:
Statement 1 implies that over-simplistic depictions of perception will be

empirically and/or theoretically inadequate.
Statement 2 implies that any depiction of perception must satisfy theoretical
understandings (as drawn from philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, etc.)
and must be directly applicable to real-world situations.
The above statements will have wide-ranging effects upon my thoughts,

subsequent writing and the model that I propose to assist in understand-
ing how we perceive abstract fine art.17 In Chap. 4 I introduce the work
of researchers from the areas of facet theory and philosophers who have
concerned themselves with metaphysical ontologies. As these new per-
spectives are presented, I develop further statements regarding how the
perception of abstract fine art may be best understood and I state the
implications of these propositional themes.
NOTES
1. Qualia are usually defined within philosophy as being individual instances
of subjective, conscious experience. On such an understanding, it is appar-
ent that many species of non-human animals experience and employ qualia
regularly in their daily lives. Birds are an example of this, especially from
the corvid family (crows, raven, magpies and their allies) and parrots.
2. Separately, in his writing Glendon (2015) makes similar claims.
3. This section of the chapter draws heavily upon the contents of my earlier
book (Hackett 2013).
4. Neuroscience and the fMRI have made significant contributions to our
understanding of the process of human perception. As Tong and Pratt
(2012) stated, Considerable information about mental states can be
decoded from noninvasive measures of human brain activity. Analyses of
brain activity patterns can reveal what a person is seeing, perceiving, attend-
ing to, or remembering (p483).
5. Retinotopic refers to the spatial correspondence of retinal cell arrangement
through other neural structures such as the fibres in the optic nerve. The
process of retinotopic mapping refers to how in regions of the visual cortex
(e.g., V1 through V5) neurons are organized in a manner so that they
constitute a two-dimensional representation or mapping of a visual con-
figuration of an image as extant upon the retina so that adjacent regions in
an image are represented by adjacent regions of the cortex but with empha-
sis being placed upon input from foveal regions. Simply stated, retinotopic
representations involve vision being sectioned into quadrants and then
inverted and reversed. Retinotopic relationships are, however, more com-
plicated than I may have made them appear and the reader is guided to
texts such as text by Purves and Lotto (2003).
6. I speak more about these streams and their functioning later in this
chapter.
7. See also the work of Serre et al. (2007) on hierarchical neural
organization.
8. I talk about this later in my adaptation of Crowthers model using a map-
ping sentence ontology.
9. This intricacy enabled claims for a functional continuum within discrete
pathways and which led the researchers to question whether the numerous
pathways were a component of functionality.
10. For details of the Gestalt approach to perception, see the publications by
Arnheim (1943), and, Hamlyn (1961), Geremek etal. (2013), Kohler (1970),
Lehar (2002), Metzger (2009), Ehrenzweig (1971) and Verstegen (2005).
11. Gestalts are totalities that comprise subunits that are organized in such a
way that the totality or whole is perceived as being more than the simple
sum of its constituent elements.
48 P.M.W. HACKETT
12. As Max Wertheimer put this, the properties of any of the parts are gov-
erned by the structural laws of the whole.
13. Gestalt principles have been widely called laws. However, scholars such as
Goldstein (2013) have noted that these laws do not constitute strong
enough predictors of behaviours to be called laws and should instead be
thought of a Gestalt heuristics or rules of thumb.
14. An adaptation of the eight-category ontology by Crowther (2007).
15. This is obviously implicated in the perception of abstract art.
16. However, V1 cells optimally respond to relatively simple visual elements
whereas the response to contra-lateral lines appears to be sophisticated,
suggesting that these cells may have received information from cells later in
the visual pathway.
17. It is important to reiterate that in this book when I speak of perception I
am, except on occasions when I state otherwise, referring exclusively to
human perception and perception along visual channels, and I make no
claims as to non-human, non-visual perception.
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CHAPTER 4
Perceptual Content, Process andCategorial

Ontologies
Abstract In this chapter, I consider how the exploration of perceptual

processes associated with abstract art requires a representational frame-
work for perceptual content. I propose the need for a meaningful struc-
tured ontology/mereology to depict the general process of perception and
specifically perception of abstract fine art. Facet theory and the mapping
sentence (Canter, 1985, Hackett, 2014a, Shye, 1978) have been used to
form structural ontologies for a variety of human behaviour activities and I
provide an overview of traditional quantitative facet theory whilst focusing
on innovative qualitative facet theory. I forward an appreciation of facet
research and how this is embodied within the mapping sentence and how
this makes it applicable to investigating a perception, including perception
of art.
Keywords Facet theory Qualitative facet theory Facets Mapping

sentence Structured ontology Mereology
INTRODUCING CATEGORIES, ONTOLOGIES, PERCEPTION

ANDART
I have recently written that the process of categorizing reality appears to

be both an ancient and fundamental ability that many living organisms
possess (Hackett 2015). As I noted in the aforementioned publication,
the ability to categorize seems to be a facility possessed and employed by

DOI10.1057/978-1-137-48332-4_4
52 P.M.W. HACKETT
even the most basic living creatures. This ability to categorially classify
the world external to the organism also appears to be a characteristic of
social collectives of living things. Socially agreed upon categorization is
illustrated in much human behaviour and also in the behaviours of many
other animals from many phylogenetic backgrounds.1
In Hackett (2015), I offered an example of the categorizing behaviour
of slime moulds to illustrate the fundamental nature of categorial clas-
sification. These organisms alter their constitution and their behaviours
dependent upon conditions of the environment external to them. When
food is plentiful slime moulds take the form of individuated organisms.
However, if environmental circumstances change and food becomes less
readily available, the organisms come together as a collective slime that
moves as a single body. This adaptive behaviour has been shown by
scientists who have placed slime moulds in mazes and have observed the
moulds to have grown along the paths leading to a food source, whilst the
moulds that originally grew down the paths that did not lead to a food
source died. Thus, an agglomerate slime mould can locate a food source
and act as a collective to gather the food (a categorially related form of
behaviour involving classifying a path, based on data about the turns in the
maze that the collective in some way shares, as being correct or incorrect,
advantageous or non-advantageous): This demonstrates categorization to
be a fundamental behavioural and biological process.
At this point I state the somewhat obvious point that the information
carried by categorial types of data must be necessarily meaningful to the
organism using that category as a basis for discrimination or understand-
ing. That is, to usefully employ categorical information we must under-
stand the categories and criteria of category membership. In this chapter,
I review the psychological, philosophical, and other social science and
humanities understanding of categories and also define categories, when
considered in a behavioural context, as groupings or collectives with con-
tents that have meaning or purpose in some context. Moreover, categories
are identifiable and their identity is significant in regard to either or both
the categories content and/or its context. I now present an overview
of categories and how categories are used drawing upon literature from
the humanities, social sciences and other disciplines. In reviewing this lit-
erature I provide an evaluation of the status of categories as structural
units that human beings employ to facilitate an understanding of their
existence.2
PERCEPTUAL CONTENT, PROCESS ANDCATEGORIAL ONTOLOGIES 53
The concepts that I introduce in this chapter assume that human beings
have an affinity for, or at least have a tendency towards, categorizing things
or aspects of the world both from inside and outside of their bodies. I
make a second uncontroversial assumption that perception is an important
process through which we gather information about our world. On these
assumptions it is reasonable to propose that the inclination to understand
through categorial systems may be usefully applied to perception. Let me
explain a little more about this categorizing proclivity as it may be applied
to perception. On the most rudimentary levels of understandings of the
perceptual process, we categorize a perception as being either internal or
external of our own body. We also categorically understand a perception
as coming from one or more categories of sense modality. Furthermore,
it is possible to categorize perception as having both a process and a
content with each of these categories, and being themselves best under-
stood through the breaking of categories into subcategories. Thus, on the
assumption of the pertinence of the act of forming categories, I briefly
review scholars writing on how we form and use categories.
From within the social science and humanity academic disciplines (e.g.,
psychology, philosophy), scholars have asked questions about the ways we
use categories for understanding both the world within which we live and
to plot a course through our lives. These investigations have led to the
development of notions on personal or psychological categories and also
shared, perhaps higher order social categories, that exist as ontological,
metaphysical and mereological terms.3 In this chapter I review, and some-
times question, how writers have commented on the internal structures
of categories. For instance, categories are characteristically thought of as
being bi-polar, and I question whether some categories take other formats
and when and why this may be the case? Other questions such as when are
categories mutually exclusive, correlated or independent are also consid-
ered. I also pay attention to how categories may exist in relation to other
categories as interconnected categorial networks or complexes and how
does the nature of such arrangements inform our understanding of the cat-
egory network. These considerations lead on to the process of categorial
mereology, which in this book I specifically define as the category-based
study and understanding of part-to-whole and part-to-part relationships
within an ontological context. I evaluate whether categories may most
usefully be understood in isolation or combination and if in combination,
what are the characteristics of categories in combinatorial arrangement.
54 P.M.W. HACKETT
ONTOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OFFINE ART

Forming a definition of what art is or what constitutes a piece of artwork
can be seen to be subtlety different from establishing an ontology of art
(Roholt 2013). In this context, ontologies describe the potentially mul-
tifarious fundamental nature of artworks and do so in ways that allow
art to be understood and interpreted. Ontological studies are concerned
with developing an epistemology of being in its most basic of concep-
tions. Several scholars have adopted this outlook and developed ontologi-
cal accounts of art (see, e.g., Currie, 1989; Ingarden 1989; Thomasson
2004, 2005). Within these (and other) writings on the ontology of works
of art, authors have asked questions such as what kind of thing or entity
is a work of art? For example, Currie (1989) argues that artworks are not
objects or things created by an artist; instead, he claims that artworks are
the performances the artist enacts.
In the following section I provide a very brief view of some other exam-
ples of ontological accounts of fine art (concentrating, as I do throughout
this book, on two-dimensional abstract art). The examples are chosen not
to be exhaustively illustrative of ontological accounts of art in general, but
instead they are chosen to illustrate ontological accounts of art to have
sought both to identify art from other events and to differentiate subcom-
ponents or aspects within the category of art.
At its most basic ontological level, a two-dimensional fine artwork can
be understood to possess a physical existence whilst also being a mental
idea. When art is defined to be an end product rather than as concep-
tual or in terms of artistic processes, most artworks are objects. Thus,
the existence of these two conceptions seems to demonstrate that there
is no unitary definitional ontology for fine art (Roholt 2013), a claim
that is strongly supported both by many other ontologies of art from the
literature and from common sense. Currie (1989) stresses the necessary
complexity of any ontology of art when he notes that usually we associate
with the finished piece of art as a product, but how the artist arrived at
this end point is equally fundamental to the artwork, and in his writing
Collingwood (2013) identifies a painting as a mental object rather than
just a physical one.
The production of a piece of art is a process in which the artist encoun-
ters technical and conceptual problems set within a phenomenological,
cultural and historical context (both in terms of the cultural context of art
and in a broader sense that includes the artist, the art establishment, art
education etc.).
However, having established the physical object like qualities of a piece

of art, the simple object must be imaginatively engaged with in order for
this object to be perceived as a work of art. Such imagination exists per-
haps upon a continuum of psychological effort. For instance, when view-
ing a painting of a horse by the eighteenth century artist George Stubbs,
the onlooker must work to interpret the paint on the canvas in order that
the two-dimensional marks the artist has produced on a flat surface may
be perceived as a three-dimensional horse. However, in this case the effort
may be minimal when compared with viewing the stylized marks and
colours of Francis Bacon. Even more psychological work may be required
when viewing an installation by Tracey Emin (in these examples, as well
as proposing an increase in cognitive effort, I am also crossing media used
and artistic types of expression). The important point I am making is that
we never directly perceive an art image but do so within an ontological
perceptual structure that includes elements such as context and narrative.
Furthermore, philosophical idealists believe that perceiving art involves
an activity that is engaged in by the viewer, during the course of which he
or she mentally constructs the experience of the artwork, which is in part
at least, a reconstruction of the ideas in the artist mind when he or she cre-
ated the artwork. Nelson Goodman put forward another basic ontology
when he proposed the concepts of autographic and allographic forms of
art. The key distinction between these two forms is notation where allo-
graphic art forms may be notated and autographic may not. He draws the
distinction between these; thus fine arts such as painting, drawing, sculp-
ture and so on are autographic; theatre, literature, music, dance and so on
are allographic. The idea of forgery is pertinent to autographic forms but
not allographic where any performance of the ballet Swan Lake is Swan
Lake and not a forgery of the ballet. However, questions have been asked
about whether any error or slight variation in a work of art, such as Swan
Lake, entails it becoming a different work?
Others, Currie (1989) for example, reject Goodmans distinction
between autographic and allographic arts, and offer a unified theory.4
Contextualists are another group of scholars who take the historical con-
text of art into account. On this understanding, tokens of a given artwork
may be extrinsic as well as intrinsic properties of an artwork, whereby two
paintings may appear to be the same but have different content and aes-
thetics due to contextual factors. The above examples emphasize that the
phenomenological and ontological aspects of art are extremely pertinent
in the perception of art.
56 P.M.W. HACKETT
Thomasson (2006) comments on philosophers classifying artwork

within ontological categories, which include physical objects, abstract
structures, imaginary entities, action types and tokens. Thomasson then
suggests that ontological classifications may possess differences in that
sortal terms (painting, sculpture) need rules of what is being referred to
(what ontological sorts of things) and that arbitrating these questions
needs some type of conceptual analysis. Thomasson (2006) believes that
employing such ontologies would allow greater breadth to our ontolo-
gies and understanding. However, when we ask some questions about
given artworks these may be inappropriately conceived and impossible to
answer. Such questions may include attempting to allocate an ontological
standing to a given piece of work.
Levinson and Davies (2005) take a broad view of the ontology of art,
as they are cognizant of the fact that artworks are not natural entities
but human social constructions. Under his conception, categories such
as an artworks media (stone, words, paint), their type (sculpture, draw-
ing, installation) or their referent (realism, surrealism, impressionism) may
allow some understanding of a piece of art. However, such an ontology
of works of art often does not fit parsimoniously into classifications of an
artwork, as phenomenological (sociological and ideological) categories are
also influential in understanding art.
However, the ontological process is not just of interest or consequence
to the academic scholar. This claim is made apparent in the work of
Michael Weh (2010) who investigated the use of the categories, singular
artworks or multiple artworks. Because of notions of the uniqueness
of singular pieces of art, this form of ontological allocation is of import,
he says, as membership within these categories impacts how the work is
appreciated and understood, exhibited and sold. Weh concludes that the
use of these categories needs consideration and a new way is needed to
decide category membership. Others such as Cray (2014) have claimed
that novel ontological categories are necessary to classify artworks, stating,
for example, that a new category of artefacts imbued with ideas would be
useful in order to help us understand conceptual art in a way that existing
categories are unable to do.
From the preceding paragraphs it is apparent that due to the complex-
ity of what may be identified as being art and also the symbiosis between
art and the context within which this exists, no single ontology of art has
emerged in the literature. In the section that follows, I briefly detailed
facet theory as a theoretical framework approach within which it may be
possible to develop an ontology for fine art.5 Later, I divide this chapter
into two main sections: the Process of Perception and the Contents of
Perception, which constitute a bifurcated categorical (ontological) system
in its own right. In dividing perception into these two categories, I do
not mean to imply that perception, as it is carried on and experienced in a
persons daily life, is necessarily divided in this manner. Rather, I employ
these categories to more easily enable me to present a discussion and a
description of perception. However, I now consider facet theory and the
mapping sentence, which are the tools I will be using in my attempts
to describe and understand the process of abstract art perception that I
present.
FACET THEORY, ONTOLOGY ANDMEREOLOGY

Categorial systems have long found their presence in philosophical and
psychological scholarship. For example, in psychology the most familiar
writings about categories are probably those by Kelly and his personal
construct theory(Kelly 2013), Guttmans facet theory(Guttman
1947), Piaget on child development(Piaget and Inhedler 1969), and in
philosophy(Chisholm 1996).
Within the social sciences over the past 70 years, the approach of facet
theory has developed and found a level of popularity. Facet theory origi-
nated from the research carried out by Louis Guttman (Guttman 1947, see
Levy 1994 for a theoretical summary). Guttman was working in psycho-
logical testing and psychometric measurement where he was concerned
with, amongst other things, psychometric scale development. Out of his
research in this area grew the Guttman Scale (1944, 1950) from which
facet theory emerged along with theoretical notions that surrounded the
Guttman Scale and this formed the basis for the facet theoretical concep-
tion of social science research. Present day research and thinking has also
employed Guttmans psychological principles (especially Guttman Scale)
within many areas, including scaling, concept/attitudinal measurement
and the formulation of behavioural laws: All of this research is firmly
rooted in the theory and application of categorical accounts.
From within psychology structured categorial ontological systems
known as mapping sentences have been developed within facet theory
research to depict a research domains content (see Canter 1985b, Hackett
2014a, b for details). Central to adopting a categorial position in research
is an assumption that by disassembling human behaviour and existence
58 P.M.W. HACKETT
into valid subcategories or subcomponents will produce matchless insight

into the lived meaning an individual possesses and offers insight into the
social construction of shared behaviours.6
In its application within research and the subsequent analysis of the
research data that the approach yields, facet theory has been quantitative
in nature (e.g., Borg and Shye 1995; Canter 1985a; Shye 1978; Shye and
Amar 1985, Shye and Elizur, 1974; and see the following for a summary
of the theoretical basis of facet theory: Guttman 1947; Levy 1994). The
facet theoretical approach is as widely and consistently used as a systematic
categorial approach in the social sciences that I have recently extended
into more philosophical and qualitative arenas of enquiry (Koval and
Hackett 2015).
Developing from this psychometric base, facet theory has been con-
cerned with complete research projects from hypothesis generation to
design, through to data analysis. The data that has been generated within
research projects that have incorporated facet theory as their theoreti-
cal underpinning has been numerical in kind (e.g., Canter 1985, Shye
1978). Since its origination this quantitative facet research approach has
been used to design research that has addressed the diverse disciplines and
content which includes applied settings such as education where it has
been used to investigate the teachers professional ethics (Fisher 2013);
educational experience of international students (Hackett 2014a, b, Koval
et al. 2016); teachers perceptions of student characteristics (Maslovaty,
etal, 2001). The approach has also been used in forensic psychology and
from within the research of David Canter and his colleagues, investiga-
tive psychology has emerged as an applied discipline used to aid criminal
investigators to identify patterns in criminal behaviour and offender pro-
filing (Canter 2008; Canter and Youngs 2009, Jones etal. 2014; Youngs
2013); to address specific forensic concerns such as differentiating the
veracity of suicide notes (Ioannou and Debowska, 2014) or the use of
risk factor characteristics to differentiate those making school gun attacks
(Ioannou etal. 2015). Facet theory has also provided considerable insight
within commercial and consumer research (Wu etal. 2015) and personal-
ity research (Cohen and Deuling 2014).
Furthermore, since the origination of facet theory, there has been con-
tinual and ongoing research into the theorys methodological and ana-
lytical basis (e.g., Takayuki 2015). As well as being used to develop new
research programs, facet theorys analytical approaches, such as smallest
space analysis, have been used to analyse data that has originated from
non-facet theory research projects and has provided insight into both the
psychological and psychometric structure of these content domains.7
My research has moved facet theory research even further from its psy-
chometric origins and over the past few years I have developed a qualita-
tive facet theory and undertaken qualitative data analyses within a facet
theory research rubric.
At this point I believe that I need to clearly identify precisely what I
mean by terms that are sometimes ambiguously used. The first of these
words is qualitative. An example of this potentially confusing usage of
the word qualitative appears in the phrase qualitative facets. Such usage
of this phrase has appeared in the facet theory literature where it has indi-
cated a facet that has a qualitatively arranged element structure. What is
meant by qualitative in this context is that the elements of a specific facet
are arranged in such a way that they appear as a circle. When arranged
in this manner no facet element can be seen as before or after, greater or
lesser, than any other facet element. In contrast to this facet structure,
quantitatively ordered facet elements appear as being ordered along a line
or as slices in two-dimensional space. When speaking about qualitative
facet theory, I do not employ the above notion of qualitatively arranged
facet elements. Instead, I use qualitative in the more usual social science
sense as to imply the gathering and analysis of rich observational data.
On this definition of qualitative, the onus is placed upon the researcher
to gather non-numerical forms of data, such as narratives, observations,
visual records, and then to analyse these sets of data to establish reliable
and valid interpretative hermeneutical account.
Furthermore, I have also been couching the mapping sentence within
what may be thought of as a way of conceiving human behaviour and
experience as embodied in a facet theoretical outlook. Under such con-
ception, I propose facet theory as a philosophical path to understanding
human behaviour and human understanding of their experiences (Hackett
2014a, b). I also employed the mapping sentence approach within the
context of fine art, but in a very different manner in this book, where I
used mapping sentences to form the basis for my own art practice as an
abstract geometric artist (Hackett 2006, 2009) and for writing about this
practice (Hackett 2013).
What I am here calling facet theorys philosophical approach conceives of
human experience as comprising multiple parts each of which is relatively
discrete and identifiable whilst these parts are simultaneously and empiri-
cally inextricably interlinked with the other components. The philosophy
60 P.M.W. HACKETT
of facet theory is thus ontological in nature as it talks about fundamental

aspects of being within a variety of specific life domains. This theoretical
ontology is present in the mapping sentence, which is the main tool of
facet theoretical research. The mapping sentence identifies both the onto-
logical basics of a domain and subcomponents or elements of these funda-
mental units. As a structured mereology, the mapping sentence facilitates
facet theory research design and analysis as a set of structural hypotheses
about the domain being investigated. As a mapping sentence identifies
the ontological units of a content area, subdivides these into elements and
then employs the mapping sentence to specify the part-to-whole and part-
to-part relationships within the ontology. The mapping sentence, when
used as I have in my research, forms a linguistic mereology.8
Elsewhere, Erin Koval and I have stated that the mapping sentence has
the ability to enable the hermeneutically consistent depiction of a con-
tent area whilst providing a veracious structured ontology and mereology
(Koval and Hackett 2015). In this book we note how three concepts epit-
omize qualitative facet theory: hermeneutic consistency, structured ontology
and mereology. Hermeneutics is a process that involves the interpretation
of texts and other narrative data forms (see, Heidegger 2008; Gadamer
2004). Moreover, a hermeneutic interpretation attempts to reveal and
preserve the meaning and veracity of the event as understood by those
experiencing the event. The internal consistency of a set of items is often
referred to as reliability or internal consistency reliability within psycho-
metric literature and is usually understood as data measurements that are
consistent across different times at which the data is gathered and different
locations where the data is gathered.9 When performing a hermeneutic
procedure, interpretation of existential components of life, both time and
place reliability, is important if any confidence is to be developed in regard
to such an interpretation. Let me explain, if an interpretation is made of
a given narrative source or observation and the interpretation is repeated
upon the same or essentially similar narrative material or observation in a
different location, then one would expect the interpretation to be similar
if there are no important differences between locations that relate to the
narrative or observational content. The same is also true in terms of differ-
ences in when the interpretation is made rather than where: If nothing sig-
nificant to the interpretation of the narrative has changed between when
two interpretations are made, then one would expect consistent interpre-
tations. These characteristics are extremely valuable as if a consistent her-
meneutic is present, then differences in interpretations may be attributed
to time and locational circumstances or to variations in the content under

investigation; that is, the meaningful content of the narrative itself (Koval
and Hackett 2015).
I then proceed to qualify the form of understanding that I envisage the
mapping sentence to constitute to be that of a structured or structural
ontology. Whilst the word ontology has been used with different mean-
ing within a varied set of disciplines, of most direct relevance to my use
of the word ontology is that used in philosophy where ontology means
the investigation and understanding of existence, reality and being. This
understanding also includes notions of categories of existence and how
these subunits are related to each other, where ontology asks the question:
What kinds of things exist? I am therefore taking ontology to mean the
basic units or parts of existence and proposing that an understanding of
ontology is useful if one believes that by understanding the components,
parts or subcharacteristics of an event or entity, then one is likely to better
appreciate the total entity that comprises these parts.
Moreover, the processes of existence may better be appreciated when
the composition and arrangement of entities are understood in terms of
the functional grouping and the structural nature of subdivisions within
an ontology.
Structure can be defined both as a noun and as a verb. As a noun in
grammatical term, the word structure implies an arrangement of the ele-
ments or the parts of something and is also the interrelationships between
these parts. The word structure also identifies the quality of being orga-
nized. As a verb, structure has the active connotation of constructing or
arranging in reference to rules or some detailed proposal. In its adjectival
form, structural refers to the parts of a complex whole and how such
components are arranged and the relationships between elements of the
whole. The phrase, structured ontology, therefore unites the concept of
ontology, or the underlying complex nature of experience, within a rule-
based arrangement where the given structure of an ontology explicates
greater understanding of a specific existential domain.
Finally, in defining the scope of the notion of ontology we come to the
term mereology, which has been used under slightly different definitions
and is also perhaps confusing due to the scarcity of its usage. Under its
most strict and formal definition, mereology is the study of part-to-whole
relationships. Within the area of metaphysics, mereology is defined as,
any theory of part-hood or composition (Harte 2002, p7). Definitions
from other disciplines have been slightly at variance with each other: for
62 P.M.W. HACKETT
example, in philosophy(Henry 1991); in science(Calosi and Graziani

2014); in logic and mathematics(Urbanaik 2013); in semantics
(Moltmann 2003). Therefore, in order to avoid any potential confusion
about what I mean when I refer to mereology I offer my own definition
of mereology as follows:
Mereology is the systematic and explicit investigation, analysis and under-

standing of the relationships present within a structured ontology, in terms
of the part-to-part, part-to-whole, part to context and background and
part to observation range, relationships: where context and background are
essential and inherent components of the existence and realisation of the
structured ontological system and when changes in the background and
context may result in a structured ontological system being significantly dif-
ferent to one observed in terms of things known or those unknown, and
where the specification of a different range of observations may significantly
alter either the content of the structured ontology or the nature of knowl-
edge embodied within the structure.
This definition provides a comprehensive understanding of mereology

that also includes part-to-part relationships within a whole entity, event
or state of affairs that is contextually located. This breadth of definition, I
argue, is essential in attempting to understand the perception of abstract
fine art.10 Thus, I claim that when taken in this broad sense it is evident
that facet theory and specifically the mapping sentence are mereological
conceptions and structuring devices. In the rest of this book I present and
assess the meaningful implications of the concepts of hermeneutic con-
sistency, structured ontology and mereology as I use these to provide an
account of perceiving two-dimensional abstract fine art.
Thus far, I have provided an overview of selected psychological and
philosophical theory as applied to the understanding and perceiving of
abstract fine art from 1900 to the present day. In doing this, I have paid
brief consideration to how the psychological research approach of facet
theory and the mapping sentence has produced understanding of psy-
chological processes and I have emphasized qualitative and philosophical
applications of facet theory and the mapping sentence. As the mapping
sentence is centrally located in the facet theory approach and is the car-
dinal research approach and theme of this book, I consider this structure
in some detail in the following paragraphs. I provide details about the
mapping sentence not only as the basis for facet theoretical investigations,
structural hypothesis testing and theory generation but also mainly as a

stand-alone approach to philosophical and qualitative investigations in the
social sciences and the humanities.
Over the past few years I have proposed and then started to develop the
notion of a qualitative facet theory and subsequently I have begun con-
ducting research within this rubric. This qualitative research has focused
upon several domains of research content in which I have used the map-
ping to enable qualitative analyses of these domains content, where the
mapping sentence has provided the framework for research design, data
gathering, data analysis and theory development: The common feature of
qualitative facet theory research is that it employs a facet theory mind-set
embodied within a mapping sentence.11
Of seminal importance to any facet theory research are the philosophi-
cal and theoretical underpinnings of facet theory approach to research
design as embodied in the mapping sentence and its series of inherent
structural hypotheses. As Canter (1985b) says, a piece of facet research
is a process of refinement, elaboration and validation of a mapping sen-
tence (p266). I closely follow Canters notion of the mapping sentence
and facet theory research in my investigations of how we perceive abstract
fine art that I present in this book. On this understanding, through using
the mereological device of the mapping sentence, facet theory is a philo-
sophical orientation towards research, as well as a research process, which
attempts to culminate in the statement of a valid compositional mereol-
ogy (mapping sentence) of its research domain. Moreover, this definition
implies that the mereological composition of a domain of interest is the
relation between a whole and its specific parts, in which parts form the
whole and where the whole is nothing more than its parts: the whole is its
parts (see Cotnoir and Baxter 2014).
Another word that is used by different disciplines with distinctive or
nuanced meaning is ontology where these disciplines have incorporated
ontology into their lexicon and ways of thinking. Examples of these
approaches include: philosophy where ontology is a branch of metaphysics
concerned with the nature of being (see, e.g., Poli and Seibt 2014); within
the area of data management, applied ontology composes a set of strate-
gies for organizing scientific knowledge (Arp etal. 2015); within software
technology and engineering, ontologies allow the sharing of terminology
and knowledge and in defining models and meta-models (Carelo et al.
(eds.) 2006); and within artificial language, ontologies may involve inter-
64 P.M.W. HACKETT
preting natural language in association with domain-specific knowledge

present in ontologies (Cimiano etal. 2014).
It is apparent therefore that ontology is defined differently between dis-
ciplines but that regularities appear in these definitions, whereby ontology
may refer to the components of being that exist perhaps a priori. However,
within this book I use the terms ontology with the precise and specific
definition I here provide:
Ontology involves the study and formal structural statement of a domain

of content in terms of its more rudimentary or basic categorial components
as these may be understood at this fundamental level and as their meaning
may be further revealed through consideration of more sub-ordinate, par-
ticular or evident categorial entities. (my emphases, adapted from Koval and
Hackett 2015)
Within this definition, structure is specified as a necessary component

of an ontology. Structure is important as it is vital in bringing together
the initially theoretical elements of the ontology and in explicating the
inherent empirical or veridical experiential aspects that are determinately
present within the ontology. On this definition of ontology, the mapping
sentences clearly form structured ontologies and two central assertions
arise when these definitions are applied to either a qualitative facet theory
or a facet theoretical philosophical orientation:
A mapping sentence is constituted of the unison of a structured ontology

and a mereological account of a specified content domain.
A mapping sentence is a hermeneutically consistent account of a specified
domain of interest.
I will also use the phrase hermeneutic consistency with a specific

meaning:
Consistency means within our context, the quality of being relatively

unchanging meaning or interpretation across space and time whilst provid-
ing a cogent explanation of an event, item or state of affairs.
Hermeneutical is defined as the particular interpretative research

methodology understood through the writing of Heidegger (2008) and
Gadamer (2004). On this account I am thinking of the hermeneutic
circle as a process of understanding. In conclusion, facet theory and the
mapping sentence are research approaches that use a structured ontology/

mereology to explicitly build a consistent framework within which to
advance hermeneutically formed research-based knowledge.
MAPPING ANONTOLOGICAL DOMAIN

The mapping sentence is the foundation of both traditional quantitative
facet theory research and philosophical/qualitative facet theory research,
and in each of these, the mapping sentence may be employed in both an
exploratory and confirmatory fashion: The mapping sentence is what allows
facet theoretical investigations to test hypotheses and for research using this
approach to generate and test theory. I have also used the mapping sentence
as a stand-alone approach to investigations in the social sciences. By using a
mapping sentence the researcher may define and delimit his or her area of
research interest in a manner that specifies the most pertinent aspects of this
domain coupled with the interaction of domain aspects. The mapping sen-
tence offers a linguistic representation or a linguistically represented ontology,
the utility of which has been stated by E.J.Lowes (2006, p18). In Fig.4.1 a
qualitative/philosophical mapping sentence from Koval and Hackett (2015)
is presented. This mapping sentence demonstrates how a hermeneutically
consistent understanding of a research domain may be developed using non-
numerical research organized through a mapping sentence.
Closer investigation of this mapping sentence demonstrates the mecha-
nisms embodied in a mapping sentence. Starting with the last facet, the
range facet, this clearly draws limits around the way that a research domain
will be investigated. In this example, the range over which the domain is
understood is that of the extent to which the ontological and mereologi-
cal totality of a mapping sentence ontology can represent a life area in a
hermeneutically consistent manner. In the mapping sentence person (x)
is any person who is reading and understanding the mapping sentence.
The two content facets of ontology and mereology, in their combinato-
rial arrangement, determine the values observed in the range facet. This is
true as the ontology facet states that the content of the mapping sentence
ontology comprises facets of content or range facets (with subdivisions
of facet elements); background (which lists background characteristics of
the instantiation of the ontology) and range which specifies the episte-
mological/characteristics of the observations that constitute the mapping
sentences logic. The mereology facet characterizes the nature of the rela-
tionships that are extant within the mapping sentence ontology as being
66 P.M.W. HACKETT
The content of this paper, when read by person (x) embodies a facet theory approach using a
ontology
(content facets )
mapping sentence with: ([facet elements] ) and where the structure between these
(background facets )
(range facet )
mereology
ontological components is in terms of: (part-to-part ) relationships, and judges this to have
(part-to-whole)
range
(more)
(to ) hermeneutic consistency in relation to the ontological domain.
(less )
Fig. 4.1 Mapping sentence for the validity of hermeneutic consistency of a map-
ping sentence (Adapted from: Koval and Hackett 2015)
either part-to-part (facet/facet element-to-facet/facet element) or part-

to-whole (facet/facet element-to-mapping sentence).
The example provided in the above mapping sentence tenders support
for my claim that the mapping sentence is a framework for qualitative
research. Moreover, I assert that this research may be undertaken within
a facet theory rubric, which yields hermeneutically consistent understand-
ing. I further state that using a mapping sentence approach as a purely phil-
osophical outlook to understand human experience constitutes a coherent
approach to understanding metaphysical ontologies. Thus, Facet theory
and mapping sentences form a precise though flexible framework that can
be used to design research and writing within philosophical research and
other qualitative endeavors (Koval and Hackett 2015).
Another example of the utility that I claim the mapping sentence pos-
sesses and which allows peerless insight to arise using non-numerical
research constituted within the conceptual rigour of the mapping sentence
and facet theory is demonstrated in Fig. 4.2. This example is derived
from research that I have undertaken, which is centrally germane to the
content of this book. In the previous research I investigated Aristotles
Categories (Aristotle and Ackrill 1975) that resulted in developing a map-
ping sentence for Aristotles categorial ontology (the mapping sentence
____________________________________________________________________________________
Substance Quantity
Person (x) perceives the given: { primary } substance, in terms of its: {continuous} quantity,
{secondary} { discrete }
Quality
{ habitual and dispositional }
and also its: { natural capabilities and in capabilities } quality, which may be experienced either in:
{ affections and affective }
{ shape }
Relation Place Time

{ isolated } relation, in a given: { near to } relative location, and in:{ past } time relative to
{interacting} {far from} {present}
{ future }
Having
{their clothes}
extrinsic events, whilst having: { ornaments } as chattels, and where the action of the power:
{ possessions}
Being in
Action a position
{upon something else} is associated with: { positive} change, and being the recipient of a given
{ within itself } {negative}
Range
Affection {greater}
affection: {upon the self} by which they understand their being from a: { to } extent.
{ lesser }
____________________________________________________________________________________
Fig. 4.2 A mapping sentence for Aristotles categories (Adapted from Hackett
2014a)
presented here is a slight adaptation from Hackett 2014a, b). Aristotles

ten ontological categories are: 1: Substance (); 2: Quantity ();
3: Quality (); 4: Relation (); 5: Place (); 6: Time (); 7:
Being-in-a-position (); 8: Having (); 9: Action (); 10:
Affection (). These categories are clearly depicted in the mapping
sentence in Fig. 4.2 along with a possible mereological arrangement for
these categories. This mapping sentence, in its structural account of The
Categories, clearly displays both Aristotles original ontology and then
uniquely offers a potential mereological arrangement of his categories in
terms of both their part-to-part and part-to-whole interrelationships. In
achieving this, I hope the mapping sentence opens further exploration of
Aristotles ontology.
68 P.M.W. HACKETT
In the preceding paragraphs I have been talking about mapping sen-

tences and the use of facet theory in a qualitative and philosophical context
in order to introduce the reader to the approach that is key to the research
presented in this book. In the rest of this chapter I concentrate upon the
use of the mapping sentence to understand abstract fine art, which may
be divided into two broad content domains of the process of perception
and the objects of perception as these relate to experiencing abstract art.
THE PROCESS OFPERCEPTION
Perceptual experiencesfor instance, conscious episodes of seeing and hear-

ingare variously structured. To understand the kind of cognitive contact
with the world which experience provides, we must understand these
structures. (Stazicker 2015, p1, my emphasis)
With these words, Stazicker introduces his collection of articles on the

structure of perceptual experience. My reason for quoting Stazicker at
this point of this chapter is that I concur with Stazicker on the primacy of
structure when attempting to understand the human behaviour of percep-
tion.12 Moreover, I also make claims similar to those made by Stazicker
that in order to understand visual perception we must comprehend the
structure of visual experiences and that this need to develop an aware-
ness of these perceptual structures apply when we attempt to understand
our encounters with and perception of two-dimensional abstract fine art.
When I speak of perceptual structure I take perception to have multiple
components that vary with different perceptual experiences and which
involve physical and the psychological aspects of perception.
On this understanding of perception, not only does perception require
the collection of sensory information, but this data must also be gath-
ered through and apprehended and understood within an interconnected
knowledge base in the form of an ontological framework. One of the earli-
est attempts at providing some form of knowledge of the process of human
understanding about perception came through the exploratory endeav-
ours of Aristotle. Marmodoro (2015) offers a clear reading of Aristotles
outlook on perception and I turn to this document to guide my exposition
of Aristotles writing on perception.13
Central to Aristotles understanding of perception are two forms of
what he calls sensibles: the special sensibles and common sensibles. The
former of these, the special sensibles, are perceptions that arise through
each of the senses. In the case of common sensibles, perception of objects
and events occurs alongside the special sensibles; an additional ontological
complexity not involving any new or specific sense organ but adds to the
understanding of perception involving the common sensibles. As Anna
Marmodoro (2015) notes, this results in a metaphysical intricacy due to
the physical and mental association of the special senses and common
sense, where complex perceptions are a product of the intimate connec-
tion between mental and physical activities. Marmodoro (2015) continues
to say that Aristotle was intrigued by perception, which he considered a
fundamental process. However, such an understanding demanded, on the
part of Aristotle, metaphysical innovation in order to allow him to proffer
an explanation of perception.
Everson (1999) makes the interesting claim that for Aristotle percep-
tion is a direct experience as all qualities of sensory events are accounted
for within his sensibles. Furthermore, Aristotle identifies all of these sen-
sibles as being primary qualities in sensory processes such as vision. Thus,
Aristotle understands that the eye itself undergoes material changes when
perceiving, by which he meant that we see a colour or other features of
vision and that the alterations that the sense organ undergoes may be
explained without reference to perception or awareness.14
In her writing, Marmodoro (2015) notes how during the act of per-
ception, Aristotles causal powers and potentialities are differentially
activated, transmitting a causal influence whilst maintaining their iden-
tity. Marmodoro (2013) claims that Aristotle believed a real connection
is present between cause and effect, which he determined as a form of
ontological dependence. Thus, she states that for Aristotle a causal effect
was the fulfilment of an agents causal powers in what is acted upon
(p221). Moreover, an agents powers are realized dependent upon its,
coming in contact with a passive power, on which the active power
operates (p221). Expanding upon the seminal nature of Aristotles
understanding of perception and the solutions he proffers, Marmodoro
(2015) claims him to be the first to comment about and offer a solution
to difficulties that exist in binding inputs cross the different sense modes.
Aristotle understood that the input of sensorial information regarding the
characteristics of events (sounds, images etc.) is not adequate to facilitate
the perception of whole objects or events. Marmodoro says that Aristotle
was aware that sensorial information did not possess anything that could
unite this information as a perceptual whole and that neither did it offer a
70 P.M.W. HACKETT
context within which sensed properties may be assembled or in some way

united as a perceptual whole.
For Aristotle each perceptual organ is the sole producer of perception
in that mode where each sense organ yields a single qualitative mode of
perception. Aristotle offers an account for the unity of perceptual experi-
ence and perceptual awareness and a solution to the issues of binding and
the fact that we perceive things and events rather than disparate percep-
tual elements is that humans perceive additional information from object
percepts. These extra informational aspects are perceived through what he
calls the special senses in combination, which constitute, the epistemo-
logical foundations for our perception of objects. Their perception is far
more complex than that of the properties of objects, requiring additional
ontology and great metaphysical complexity at all levels of physical and
mental explanation (Marmodoro, 2015 p265). These extra components
are Aristotles common sensibles of movement, rest, number, shape and
size. These common sensibles are not sensed using any modally dedicated
sense organ but form an extra ontology reliant upon information being
transmitted from the special senses.
The common and special senses along with the amalgamation of the
physical and mental aspects of perception constitute a necessary meta-
physical complexity that enables perceptions to arise that are formed from
sensibles of various modalities. For Aristotle there are qualities in objects
that we perceive using our sense organs through a causal interaction by
means of the senses and objects causal powers. However, Marmodoro
(2015) notes that Aristotles explanation is threatened by the fact that
we perceive by using organs that yield information (sensibles) of a single
modality. On the other hand, our perceptual awareness is complexly mul-
timodal and the question may be asked of how such an intricate combined
modal perception comes about?
A possible solution to unified complex multimodal perceptual aware-
ness according to Marmodoro (2015) is achieved through assigning
perceptual awareness not to sense organs but to a process that extracts
information from the senses in some way, and from this produces multi-
modal perceptual experiences. However, Marmodoro says that each sense
organ gathers and yields information (sensibles) specific to the design of
the organ, and accounting for multimodal perception through some fur-
ther organ would disconnect the specific organ from awareness of its own
sensibles. At this point I have to interject that there is a problem that arises
here, as each sense organ itself does not have an awareness of its own sen-
sibles but rather transmits, sometimes selectively, its sensibles for further
neural processing (Hackett 2015).
Another solution to the problem of multimodal perception proposed
by Marmodoro is a central universal detector for any modality of sensibles.
She then refutes such a solution on the grounds that this structure runs
counter to the significance of each sense organ being designed for one
of the special sensibles: If there could be universal detectors that could
give rise to the awareness of sensibles of any modality, then universal sense
organs would not be needed in the first place (Marmodoro 2015, p267).
I cannot agree with this argument, rather it seems to me that the gather-
ing of mode-specific information through a single specified sense organ
designed to exclusively gather this single form of information makes per-
fect sense, given the very different physical forms of each of the modalities
of sensibles. For example, light waves of wavelengths between 400 and
700nm with maximal sensitivity during the daytime of 555nm (Skedung
et al. 2013) (opthalmoperception); sound waves within the range of
approximately 2020,000hertz (Cutnell and Johnson 1998) (audioper-
ception); texture (tactioception) as finely grained as approximately
10nm (Skedung etal. 2013); chemoreception with reliable detection of
~50molecules (Bialek 1987) (olfacoception/olfacception and gustaocep-
tion). Indeed, the possibility that these disparate forms of physical activity
could be registered through a single organ seems highly unlikely.
We usually think of perception being through our five traditional senses
and understand this to inform us about the world outside our bodies
(exteroception). Other senses exist that sense events within the body (pro-
prioception), which at times, may mix with exteroceptive senses. Examples
of these senses, which are additional to the five traditional senses, include
proprioception; information that is gathered to inform us about the inter-
nal state or within body activities such as where our limbs are, our posture,
hunger, tiredness and so forth. Phenomena such as emotions are mixtures
of internal and external factors and provide us with information about our
internal states and the perceived cause of these perceptions. It may be seen
as a shortcoming that philosophers largely address exteroception.
As I already noted, it seems difficult to imagine a single sense organ
that would have the ability to detect multiple features in the world. It
seems even more problematic to envisage the advantage of evolving an
organ that could do this over specialized single sense organs. For example,
if this single sense organ was damaged, the organism would be left with
no sensory input whatsoever as opposed to losing one of the senses. It
72 P.M.W. HACKETT
seems however to make good sense to use a single sense organ to gather
unequivocal information within a single mode and then to holistically
understand the meaning of this information centrally, in conjunction with
other sensibles from the other sense organs, at the point of extracting or
constructing meaning from the sensibles. This is so as the combination of
special sensibles produces a fuller picture and yields more understanding
than any single modality of sensible taken alone.
Aristotle understood that human awareness arises out of input from the
special senses also becomes available to a central perceptual faculty as an
ingredient inherent in the content of complex perceptions. The complex-
ity of the world itself or the complexity of our perceptions of the world
gives rise to complex content in perceptions. Perceptions with multimodal
complex content arise from the process of perceiving size, shape, move-
ment and so on (the common sensibles) along with the process of perceiv-
ing differences and similarities amongst sensibles of different modalities.
Marmodoro (2015) states that perceptual ability to distinguish between
sensibles is a most fundamental perceptual ability (p267). She further
allots our perception of common sensibles to the foundation for our
awareness of the objects in the world (p267).
Having identified the need for the integration of the common and spe-
cial senses, Aristotle sets about producing a series of models to account for
how this combination may come about. Aristotle offers what Marmodoro
(2015) calls a highly sophisticated metaphysical account of how the
special sense combine with the common sense to make up a perceptual
faculty that delivers multimodal complex perceptual content (p268).
Initially, Marmodoro notes how Aristotle develops an account for percep-
tion through the application of his metaphysical understanding regarding
mixing in the Mixed Content Model. This model is based upon the sug-
gestion that complex perceptual content must be composed of a mixed
content, where this mixture of items necessarily implies complexity whilst
resulting in an item mixture that is uniform in its nature. Moreover, items
within this complex admix maintain their identity. Items impinge on each
other and cause other items to temporarily veer from their original nature.
A change in the state of the mixture of items may result in the constitu-
tional parts of the mixture regaining their original nature. It is evident in
these cases that being in the mixture does not destroy the inherent nature
of the items making up the mixture. Aristotle, Marmodoro says, incorpo-
rates this feature of his metaphysics, into his understanding of complex
perception. Thus, sensibles are maintained in a complex perceptual mix-
ture but through simultaneously being sensed by a sense organ the result
is a unified perceptual content.
However, the Mixed Content Model has shortcomings such that it has
no answer for multimodal complex perception as each mode of perceptual
input (as I noted earlier) is of a distinctive type that cannot be combined
with input from another modality. Neither can this model avail under-
standing of perception when percepts are complex and discernable as the
resulting contents would seem necessarily to be variable.
Aristotle also explored the possibility of achieving perceptual unity by
means of the physiological structure of sense organs. Under this proposi-
tion, Aristotle envisages each sense organ as having a physiological division
into a series of parts each of which is sensitive to information of a specific
form in that perceptual mode. This model allows for specific sensibles
that arise exclusively from their sense organs whilst facilitating complexity
of content within a modality. Marmodoro (2015) calls this the Multiple
Sensors Model and notes how the model avails little understanding of how
perceptual content is balanced between parts of a sense organ in order to
produce unified perceptual content.
In another model, the Ratio Model, Aristotle approaches the unifica-
tion of common senses with complex contents that originates from mul-
tiple sensory modes but fails by not providing us with an understanding
of how unity comes about in senses or complex perceptual content. To
understand its failures the Ratio Model can be seen as an attempt to depict
multivariate aspects of perception as being similar to a pattern where this
pattern can be present in many different formats, instances and at a variety
of scales. Marmodoro (2015) believes that Aristotle considers a pattern to
exist between the modes of the senses and the modes of their perceived
sensibles as a relation between some modalities, types of perceived sen-
sibles and that the relationship demonstrates a unity.
Aristotles Relative Identity Model is based on the belief that a percep-
tual faculty is functionally divided but physically unified. The model is also
rooted in the notion that a physically unified event may in some situations
be bifurcated due to functional roles. This may be understood through
analogy with a point in a line where this is concurrently a single point as
well as constituting a linear component of that line. The Relative Identity
Model does not, however, account for the physical changes needed for a
sense to be able to perceive complex perceptual content. Moreover, the
model requires a sense organ to be functionally associated with different
modal sensibles and therefore cannot explain the unity of complex percep-
74 P.M.W. HACKETT
tual contents unity. However, Marmodoro believes the Relative Identity

Model provides a manner in which we can conceive, of the unity of
the perceptual faculty and the multiplicity of sense organs and respective
sensibilities (p272). She continues that here the common sense may be
thought of as a single sense organ with specific functions when encounter-
ing different types of sensibles, which interact with these within a different
context. However, the Relative Identity Model is unable to account for
the unity of perceptual content or the perceptual facultys perceptual pow-
ers in comparison with single senses.
In his Substantive Model, Aristotle offers a representation to account
for physical separateness and multiplicity with extant unity. This model
has foundations in the special senses making up the common sense where
special senses are found in specific sense organs, and common sense is
conscious of multimodal content through the special senses. It is common
senses metaphysical constitution and additional powers that facilitate this
ability. This implies that the common sense is a perceptual faculty with
collected different subfaculties that work together as the common sense to
allow different sensibles to be part of perceptual content. The Substantive
Models contribution to Aristotles engagement with understanding per-
ception is that it provides a possible account for smooth and continu-
ous rather than fractured or fragmented perception. The Common Power
Model is Aristotles last model in which the special senses are ascribed with
a common power dispersed across and jointly possessed by all of the spe-
cial senses. A single, unified functionality is the outcome of common pow-
ers being associated with the special senses as one perceptual system. This
unified sense possesses different types of perceptual capabilities formed of
the special senses with their special powers. Marmodoro notes, however,
that this model focuses on the structure of the common sense but does
not comprehensively account for the common sense and its content.
Marmodoro makes the interesting and important point that the
Common Substance and Common Powers Models are complimentary
with each other. By this she means that the common sense needs for its
functional organization, a common power controlling all the powers
of the special senses (p274).15 She proposes that the Substance Model
and the Common Power Model can be combined and thus offer a more
comprehensive account of the perceptual faculty than either model is able
to do on its own: The Substance Model is able to provide an account for
the unity of the common sense; The Common Power Model avails us an
understanding of the common sense as a perceptual power in and of itself,

extant over and above its unifying role in relation to the five traditional
exteroceptive senses. Unity and structure are not the only things the com-
mon sense can provide; according to Marmodoro, it can empower and
enrich senses and provide them functionalities in excess of the sensorial
product derived from simple sensory union. In an almost Gestalt combi-
nation, new awareness is generated in excess of that from the special senses
as a result of the operation of the common sense. In Fig.4.3 I propose a
mapping sentence depiction of the unification of the Substance Model and
the Common Power Model with the resultant benefits to the perceptual
process as proposed by Marmodoro.
This mapping sentence clearly states Marmodoros extension of
Aristotles thinking about perception through the combination of his
Substance Model with his Common Power Model. In the mapping sen-
tence it can be seen that I have accounted for the possibility that the
type of perception that the Combined Model is able to elucidate may be
veridical, hallucinatory or illusory, and I have specified the evaluation of
the model to be in terms of its ability to provide greater or lesser under-
____________________________________________________________________________________
Perceptual type
(veridical )
Person (x) when perceiving a: perceiving (hallucinatory) object or event, can be depicted through
(illusory )
Common Sense Unity

Aristotles model (greater unity)
Aristotles: (Substance Model ) that provides an account regarding: ( to )
(Common Power Model) (lesser unity )
Perceptual Power
(greater power)
of the common sense, and that also accounts for the: ( to ) of the common sense as a
(lesser power )
perceptual power of its own, which as a combined model provides an account of perception that is:
Range
(more)
( to ) complete in terms of its contents than that of either the Substance Model or Common Power Model alone.
(less )
___________________________________________________________________________________________
Fig. 4.3 Initial mapping sentence for Marmodoros combination of Aristotles

substance model and the common power model of perception
76 P.M.W. HACKETT
standing than either the Substance or Common Power Models are able
to do on their own. Finally, the mapping sentence demonstrates how the
Combined Model offers greater or lesser degrees of common sense unity
of the five senses and the greater to lesser degree of perceptual power the
common sense has.
Another contemporary author, Stephen Everson (1999), evaluates
Aristotles theory regarding the perception of objects and the qualities of
objects. Evanson claims that Aristotles understanding in regard to per-
ception is an application of the method he uses to explain the physics and
in a broader sense Evanson locates Aristotles theory of mind within the
context of his natural science. Evanson proposes that the method used
by Aristotle in explaining mental activity suggests important advantages
when compared to contemporary theories of mind, which he proposes to
be, for example, supervenience and functionalism. Evanson also argues
against an understanding of Aristotles account of perception as being
accounted for by material changes in the sense organs. Everson offers a
literalist interpretation of Aristotle under which a sense organ takes on a
property of the sensible event and is physically changed during the act of
perception. He goes on to consider each special sense, as well as the com-
mon sense, and to offer an explanation of how matter and material change
plays a role in perception.
Everson (1999) further emphasizes his belief that Aristotle believed
content to be of great importance in our understanding of the percep-
tual process.16 Everson states that Aristotles use of the term empeiria
should be translated as acquired perceptual concept rather than the nor-
mal interpretation as experience that in part determines perception. Thus,
for Everson to be perceptually aware takes a combination of phantasia
(in the sense that Aristotle understands this as our desire for our minds
to arbitrate anything outside of that), which has a sensorial presence and
a mental image with or without given empeiria. This, for instance, is able
to acquire the perceptual concept that is appropriate for the production of
the specific perceptual awareness in question.
Following on from Aristotles seminal contribution to understand per-
ception, many other scholars over the years have offered models of the
perceptual process. Often such models have been adaptations of Aristotles
ideas rather than totally novel workings. Earlier in this book I offered a
highly selective review of some theories of perception. My presentation
commenced with Aristotles writing on perception.
THE OBJECTS OFPERCEPTION

Much has been written about the ontologies that comprise the basic lev-
els of our experiences of reality, many of which have taken the format of
structured category-based systems. In this section I turn my attention to
the notion of categorial systems that have been used to enable the devel-
opment of ontological understanding.
The above writing on perception rests on the apparent fact that the
assignment of an individual event, object, state of being and so on to an
experiential category is a fundamental activity carried out both by human
beings and by other animals. So rudimentary are the processes involved in
categorizing that it is perhaps impossible to conceive of the existence of
conscious awareness without the presence of categories. It is conceivably
as a result of the fundamental and universal status of categories as means
to facilitate our interactions with the world around us that a considerable
body of writing has been produced on the subject of categories, with this
literature dating from the times of Classical philosophy.
An example of early writing on categories can be found in the work of
Plato (see, e.g., Harte (2002) for details of Platos writing in this area)
who developed a categorical ontology (an understanding of the funda-
mental levels of being expressed as the categories that constitute the most
basic levels of the worlds existence). Platos ontology conceives of two
separate worlds. The first of these worlds is the world of Forms, which is
comprised of physical objects, and the second is the world of what we are
able to sense and cognitively understand. According to Plato, the physical
earthly world is irregular, flawed and physical objects are transitory and
constantly fluctuating.
In describing this world, Plato employs the analogy of being impris-
oned within a cave where what we sense are imitations of reality with many
imperfections. Thus, we sense an illusion of reality or a reflection of extant
forms, and therefore there are two worlds: the visible world of ordinary
physical objects and the intelligible world of the Forms. Moreover, Forms
may be unchanging and eternal whereas physical objects are in flux and
where the former are more real than the latter. Forms are what Plato sees
as being what are truly extant whereas the physical objects of our senses
gain their reality through their involvement with the forms.
I have already presented the thoughts of Aristotle on the subject of per-
ception and I have briefly reviewed his Categories. Aristotle is another
philosopher from ancient times who produced an early example of a com-
78 P.M.W. HACKETT
plex appreciation and depiction of basic ontological categories. In the

Categories Aristotle proposed 10 ontological units to account for human
experience (see earlier in this chapter for details of Aristotles categorical
ontology). Sambursky (2014) stated that Aristotles 10 categories are an
attempt by him through principles unknown to us to compile a list
of concepts such that every word of non-compounded meaning can be
shown to belong to one of (the categories) (p17). Sambursky contin-
ues that Aristotles categories constitute a horizontal classification such
that the vantage points from which objects may be observed form a
a group of coordinated notions not bound together by a higher notion
embracing all of them (p17).
The Stoics philosophers of the third-century BCE are another example,
this time from the Hellenistic school of philosophy, who were active until
around 200 CE and have also written on categories. Knowledge about
the Stoic Categories comes from scholars such as Simplicius and Plotinus.
According to these authors the Stoics developed their own categorial sys-
tem in reference to categories of being. The Stoic Categories, Sambursky
(2014) says, have little in common with Aristotles Categories except for
their being named categories. In contrast to Aristotles Categories, the
Stoics ontology forms a vertical system in which each successive step is
increasingly specific and contains the categorial classification present in the
previous step. The categories identified by the Stoics numbered four with
these being:
Substance Substance is the formless material out of which things are made.
Quality Quality is how formless material is structured into the form of an
individual thing. The Stoics believed that air was the physical material
that constituted the physical component.
Disposition Dispositions are features of objects such as movement, form, size,
shape, and so on. Dispositions are the states that something is in.
Relative disposition Relative dispositions are dispositions in relation to some referent. For
example, the location of a person related to other things within a time
and space context.
To better understand this categorial system, I offer the following

example:
This is a piece of matter (substance), which exists simply as that substance,

the matter also constitutes an automobile (quality) (in the general sense of
belonging to that collective of matter that is known as automobiles) which
is also a specific automobile (it is this specific automobile) which is at pres-

ent being driven (disposition) and the automobile is the member of a fleet
of company automobiles used in a certain way when compared to other
vehicles, automobiles, trucks, etcetera, in the fleet (relative disposition).
This example not only illustrates the nature of the four categories but
also shows how lower levels of the categorial ontology must possess (i.e.,
be characterized by) higher levels. For Stoics the primary underlying mat-
ter of which the universe is composed is without form and is passive. At
this level of existence this matter is without any quality, which is imbued
through the ever-present pneuma (Sambursky 2014). Refinement is fur-
ther achieved at the next two successive levels.
Over the centuries since the Stoics and perhaps with increasing fre-
quency and complexity, a number of other categorically structured ontol-
ogies have been proposed that have assumed a variety of philosophical
stances.
There is a considerable body of writing that arose in mediaeval times,
from philosophers such as Simon of Faversham, Thomas Aquinas, Duns
Scotus, Henry of Ghent, Peter of Auvergne, Radulphus Brito, to name but
a few. Each of these reviews interprets and extends Aristotles Categories
(Pini 2002). Pini draws particular attention to the understanding of logic
as being concerned with what he terms second intentions. Pini asks what
is it that makes a concept a second intention and draws our notice to
the perspective held by Thomas Aquinas that second intensions represent
our intellectual understanding of things outside of our extramental experi-
ences. Therefore, a non-controversial listing of second intentions would
include species, syllogisms, definitions and so forth.
However, others from the above list of scholars (e.g., Faversham,
Ghent, Brito) developed the view that second intensions did indeed repre-
sent things, or properties and characteristics of things that exist outside of
our mental representations. An example of this understanding that is pres-
ent in the literature is fly agaric (Amanita Muscaria), which is a species of
fungi. I am able to identify these red fungi with white spots and, according
to Aquinas, I initially form an understanding of the quintessential concept
of fly agaric, which embodies the fundamental nature of what to me is a
fly agaric. Intellectually I evaluate the idea of fly agaric. I notice that when
I hold my idea against other instances of fly agaric then through this pro-
cess I am able to establish a concept of fly agaric that denotes all instances
equally well. Pini (2002) further comments that Simon of Faversham held
80 P.M.W. HACKETT
the understanding that the formation of my concept of fly agaric comes

from my repeatedly recognizing features in different instances of fly agaric.
For example, that they all seem to have red bodies with white spots and
white stalks, and thus these features predicate the species of fungi that
exemplify fly agaric.
In Pini (2002) the author looks at some of the central thinking in medi-
aeval logic and especially considers interpretations of Aristotles Categories
that arose in the thirteenth century in the work of Scotus. Pinis main
thrust is a consideration of the question of whether Aristotles Categories
concerns itself with logic or metaphysics and if Aristotles Categories can
best be thought of as concepts, words or things.
Pini (2002) expatiates upon the main points of Scotus writing about
the Categories. He notes that Scotus handling of Aristotles Categories
sees the Categories to be works of logic that conceive of categories as
human beings representations of events that exist outside of human minds.
Pini comes to this decision after he has identified two possible stances that
may be held regarding the status of the categories. First, categories may
be logical understandings or concepts that we possess and to which we
intellectually associate properties where such basic unambiguous concepts
with singular meaning represent our external world. Secondly, categories
are metaphysical forms of being as we understand these categories. Thus,
under Duns Scotus, when we consider categories from a philosophical
perspective, there is no simple unitary definition of a category.17
It is my contention that in this book knowledge development in regard
to ontological structure is possible by using the mereological framework
of the mapping sentence, which offers a flexible template for developing
insight regarding the combined effects of interrelated or non-independent
categories or classifications of a content area in a meaningful manner
(Hackett 2014a, b). To illustrate this claim I provide a mapping sentence
account for a contemporary categorical ontology, by Lowe (2006) with
his four-category ontology. Lowe developed his ontology through closely
reasoned reiterations of growing veracity until he arrived at the ontologys
final form, which he portrayed as an ontological square.
In the mapping sentence for Lowes ontology (Fig. 4.4) what I offer
is a transparent representation of his categorial notions of the basic ele-
ments of existence. The mapping sentence not only clearly reveals Lowes
four-category ontological structure, but also suggests the manner of the
mereological relationships between the ontological elements of Lowes
model. In writing about categorical predication, Lowe (2013) offers both
____________________________________________________________________________________
The world is understood to exist for any person (x) understands the world exist within four categories,
Kinds objects
where kinds are: (characterized by attributes) and objects are: (characterized by mode )
(instantiated by objects ) (instantiated by kinds )
(exemplified by attributes)
modes attributes
and modes are: (characterized by attributes) and attributes are: (characterized by kinds )
(instantiated by objects ) (instantiated by modes )
(exemplified by objects )
range
where this ontology accounts for basic existence to a:
(lesser ) extent.
( to )
(greater)
____________________________________________________________________________________
Fig. 4.4 Mapping sentence for Lowes four-category ontology (Adapted from:
Hackett, 2014a)
a synopsis and extension of his thinking about his four-category ontology

(Lowe, 2006). In his later work, Lowe questions the number of compo-
nents that are necessary to effectively structure an ontological (category-
based) depiction of our world? In reply to his own questions he posits four
mutually exclusive definitional elements with content that cannot be clas-
sified by using combinations of other elements from within the ontology.
The preceding section of my book has been concerned with structural
ontologies in their usual sense of being a classification system for the most
basic elements of our understanding of existence. In the next section I am
still concerned with categorial ontologies but I move my attention and
focus more specifically upon fine art.18 As well moving from the most basic
conceptions of reality to understanding of a specific aspect of life, there is
a necessary shift away from concern with stating fundamentals per se, to
an attempted establishment of the mereological, part-to-part illustration
of art appreciation.
CATEGORIES ANDART
As I have demonstrated in my consideration of both perception as a pro-
cess and in ontological understandings of our existence, that categories
appear important in both determining and explaining the content of the
82 P.M.W. HACKETT
perceptions. I have also considered what categories are and how we form
categories in a general sense. In the next section, I turn to categories of
art.
At one level the categories that are typically used in art can be under-
stood as categories imposed upon art by the art industry and the art acad-
emy (art historians, art critics etc.). These may be termed institutional
categories and examples of these are the art establishment (galleries, muse-
ums, art schools, as well as artists and art critics). However, running in
parallel with this institutional category system, or perhaps overlapping
and interacting with these art industry/academy categories, are catego-
ries derived from human psychological processes. These categories include
perceptual categories, emotional categories, categories of cognition and
memory categories. Another categorical form that may be employed
to differentiate works of art is a materials category that clearly identifies
the kinds of materials used in the making of an art event or object, for
example, an oil painting, on canvas, graphite on paper. A category that is
commonly used when considering art is the resultant product, such as a
painting, drawing, sculpture, installation and so on. Another category of
art is that of cost category, which incorporates features of the artwork along
with variables and factors external to the art object or event that together
determine value. To summarize, I propose in this book that the most typi-
cally employed categories that are used when we think of, experience and
understand art are institutional category, psychological processes category,
materials category, product category and cost category.
Having identified these categories, it is immediately apparent that the
relative importance of these may not be equal to each other in terms of the
effect each has upon perception of any specific piece of art. Furthermore,
a categorical ontological system, one that embodies the fundamental units
of what constitutes the experience of art, must allow for a mereological
account that attempts to understand the relationship of the categories of
art to art as a body and the interrelationships between the categories of
art. This mereology must also embody an uneven, unequal and changing
interplay between elements of the ontology. Having stated these require-
ments, I am faced with formally asking the question, how are the catego-
ries structured?
A study into the ontological structure of art attempts to determine the
most fundamental or most basic aspects of art, and then to structure these
diagrammatically, hierarchically or in some other arrangement in order to
develop a theoretical structure that can adequately portray art as a content
area whilst possessing empirical validity. It seems likely that this enterprise
will involve the identification and allocation of ontological categories to

positions of super-ordinate or sub-ordinate and/or to other more com-
plex arrangements. In the final chapter, I develop such ontologies in an
attempt to form an inventory of artwork that aligns with the perception
of abstract art. To this end, I present the mapping sentence and partial
ordered scalogram analysis19 as a possible way of achieving the representa-
tion of such a structured ontology and mereology.20
NOTES
1. For example, through a process of phenomenologically related learning
from their experiences with humans, corvid species have been discovered
to classify people as good or bad and to adapt their behaviours accordingly
(for a review on this, other corvid behaviour and accounts of corvids cog-
nitive abilities, see Marzluff and Angell, 2012).
2. In doing this, I will review selected major writings on categories that have
originated from the classical philosophers through to contemporary social
scientists and philosophers.
3. Mereology is the study of part-to-whole and part-to-part relationships
within an entity.
4. However, when thinking about the allographic/autographic classification,
it is important to note that this is not the same ontology as implied in a
singular/multiple categorial system of art objects.
5. I will later produce an ontological account for abstract two-dimensional art
using facet theory.
6. This statement implicates a mereological account of nature of human
behaviour and experience in providing a useful understanding of what it
means to be human.
7. For example, Kumar etal (2012) used smallest space analysis to re-examine
the work of Butler et al (2007), Structure of the Personality Beliefs
Questionnaire-Short-Form and were able to suggest a structure to the
responses to this questionnaire and to offer clinical recommendations
based upon this.
8. As the central thesis of this book is bound in the mapping sentence, which
in turn resides in a particular notion of part-hood, I need to briefly con-
sider opinions on the nature of how an entity is constituted. Debate exists
between those individuals who consider an entity to be made up of just its
parts and those who prefer the notion that in addition to an entitys parts,
the totality of the thing that is composed by its parts constitutes an entity
or a part of its own. I suggest that the facet theoretical approach embodies
a parts perspective where facets and their elements are seen to constitute
the total entity under investigation. However, the content domain that the
84 P.M.W. HACKETT
facets and facet elements form (as specified in a mapping sentence) is itself
another entity.
9. Reliability may also be assessed using Split-Halves procedures; Inter-rater
procedures; Parallel forms; Kuder-Richardson Test; Cronbachs Alpha test.
10. I support this claim with the multiple, inadequate ontologies of art that I
provided examples of earlier in this chapter.
11. I have, in this research, located facet theory as a philosophical orientation
that I have adopted towards a specific domain of interest within the more
general notion of the behaviour of and understanding of human beings
(Hackett, 2013, 2014a).
12. However, as I have already noted in the writing I present in this book, I
will adhere strictly to an exposition on visual sensory experience.
13. I am incorporating Aristotles thoughts and my scholarship upon Aristotle
as his writing is seminal as he offers a starting point from which to consider
human visual perception within an ontological framework.
14. Non-perceptual alteration in that it involves awareness.
15. However, Marmodoro limits the functionality of this amalgam to the five
traditional senses, as does Aristotle.
16. Everson cites Aristotles use of the term empeiria, as this appears in
Metaphysics I.1 and Posterior Analytics II.19.
17. Pini further considers second intentions but this time from the perspective
of Duns Scotus. Pini views Scotus early logical writing to be an extension
of Aquinas when Scotus considers the fundamental nature of a universal to
cause a second intention (Pini, 2002).
18. Such a shift of emphasis implies a change of substantive focus from exis-
tence to art.
19. See footnote 75 for further details on Partial Order Scalogram Analysis.
20. The manner in which I use ontology in this part of the book has similarities
to the ontological understanding of Jean Paul Sartre. In his book Being
and Nothingness, Sartre proposed a phenomenological ontology in which
his ontology can be seen to be a descriptive classification system. Ontology
is the study of what is, whilst phenomenology is the study of how we expe-
rience our lives. My mapping sentence for abstract art is perhaps best
thought of as a blend of these two conceptions.
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Chapter 5
Mapping Sentence andPartial Order

Mereology forPerceiving Abstract Art
Abstract In this chapter I concentrate on mapping sentence descriptions

of abstract art. In offering potentially valid and useful explanations for
understanding the experiential process of viewing abstract art, I do not
propose a single model of the entire abstract art experience; rather I offer
multiple context-specific mapping sentences. Finally, I suggest a mapping
sentence of Crowthers componential ontology for art abstraction. From
this mapping sentence I extend my enquiries to consider the partial order-
ing of elements of my modelling of Crowthers ontology. The chapter
closes by claiming that mapping sentences and partial ordered diagrams of
art experience provide an approach capable of producing greater under-
standing of abstract fine art as experienced phenomena.
Keywords Mapping sentence Abstract art Perception of art Partial

ordering Partial Order Scalogram Analysis (POSA)
Introduction
In earlier chapters I introduced psychological and philosophical theory as
this has been used to develop understanding of how abstract vision and
more specifically two-dimensional artworks are perceived and understood
by those viewing this form of art. Based on my review of the pertinent lit-
erature, I suggest that psychological and philosophical research often pres-
ents too simplistic an understanding of the perception of art, and especially

DOI10.1057/978-1-137-48332-4_5
90 P.M.W. Hackett
of this form of art. Moreover, this research is often an almost historical

account that has ignored much contemporary research from psychology
and neuroscience. In later chapters I further explored perception, ontol-
ogy and mereology as metaphysical frameworks and proffered facet theory
and the mapping sentence as a qualitative psychological and philosophical
approach to researching empirical content in the behavioural sciences.
I offered an example of a mapping sentence that I have developed in my
research into metaphysical descriptive ontologies, where for example, by using
the mapping sentence I interpreted a categorical ontology by Lowe (Fig. 4.4)
and suggested the mapping sentence to be an appropriate way to understand
and communicate the meaning of these ontologies. In order to explain the
process of constructing and interpreting a mapping sentence, I also con-
structed a mapping sentence for the mapping sentence itself as a structured
ontology and mereology (Fig. 4.1). In this final chapter I bring together the
contents of the earlier chapters: abstract fine art, perception, ontology, facet
theory and the mapping sentence. My intention in uniting these areas is to
understand the creating and perceiving of abstract fine art within phenome-
nologically valid contexts. I conclude by considering a partially ordered model
of the important aspects of understanding of abstract fine art.1
If ontologies are phenomenologically bound then a possible implica-
tion is that there may be as many veracious ontologies for any event or
phenomenon as there are distinct phenomenological occurrences of that
event. This is obviously also the case with an ontology that attempts to
shed understanding on the experience of abstract art. Thus, any expe-
rience of fine art must possess phenomenological specificity. As I com-
mented on this in the previous chapter, phenomenological specificity is
a characteristic of the mapping sentence, as this is focused on a particu-
lar phenomenon through its range facet and by background and content
facets. Consequently, I will proffer multiple mapping sentences, each of
which clearly and specifically addresses abstract art within an experien-
tial/phenomenological context. Through these multiple phenomenologi-
cal understandings of art, I engage the depth of the aesthetic experience.
Later I examine in greater depth, one specific mapping sentence ontology.
Categorical Systems andPerception
There are, I believe, shortcomings within extant research into how we

perceive and understand abstract fine art and in this section I review the
reasons why I consider these explanations to be inadequate. More specifi-
Mapping Sentence andPartial Order Mereology 91
cally, I will show how some existing theories are, in some cases, simplistic
and fragmented in others. This will lead into later sections in which I offer
a more sophisticated and thorough way of developing the required philo-
sophical and psychological knowledge. However, it is my belief that a cat-
egorical approach to modelling visual perception offers unequalled insight
as a research tool and I commence by presenting the categorical ontology
of the mapping sentence as an appropriate instrument for my research.
Using Mapping Sentences toUnderstanding

FineArt
In earlier research I developed and used mapping sentences to guide my
research in an attempt to form an ontological and mereological template
for aspects of fine art experience and practice. I have used mapping sen-
tences for projects viewing painting, art criticism and art education. I now
present these mappings and suggest how the sentences themselves, and
the knowledge contained within these different mapping sentences, may
be usefully brought together. In each of these separate mapping sentences,
psychologically important aspects of art are depicted within facets and
facet elements in relation to applicable response ranges. I discuss how a
general psychological profile has been adapted to address specific aspects
of fine art from the point of view of the artist and viewer of art, and the
following two mapping sentences illustrate how I have used these devices
to develop knowledge. In the first of these, the Mapping Sentence for
Defining Grid Image Variation (Fig. 5.1), the mapping sentence looks
at one specific form of abstract art, geometric abstraction, and provides
a comprehensive and explicit definition of the components of this form
of painting that an artist can manipulate or alter. The second mapping
sentence, the Mapping Sentence of Artists Understanding of the PhD in
Fine Art (Fig.5.2), approaches the understanding of art in a very differ-
ent manner by focusing on research and education, as these two features
apply to fine art.
In the mapping sentence for defining variations in the grid image
(Fig.5.1), details are provided of how a single form of abstract painting
and drawing, the geometric grid, may be systematically understood. The
facets and their elements in this mapping sentence form a comprehensive
representational for the discernable aspects of an abstract grid painting.
More precisely, the changeable parts of a grid painting are specified as
92 P.M.W. Hackett
Fig. 5.1 Mapping sentence for defining grid image variation (Hackett 2013)
being: art medium; colour; the accuracy with which the grid was depicted
in the work; the geometry used in the work; the grid cells shape; the
orientation of the grid; the consistency of the image; figure/ground rela-
tionship of the grid to its ground; what constituted the background of the
work. Each of these facets (or characteristics of abstract grid paintings) is
subdivided into elements that delineated the conditions that each of these
characteristics (facets) can take. For example, the background facet has
the elements of: literal; abstract; neutral; cartographic, whilst the orienta-
tion facet can be either perpendicular or diagonal. By selecting a different
_____________________________________________________________________________________
When questioned about the PhD in studio art, the respondents comments demonstrated their understanding of this
qualification was affected by the artists identity,which was comprised of notions of:
Facet A:
family
environment
artists as distinct and special their outlook was influenced by relationships between the role of
the price of freedom
primacy of art practice over academic work
Facet B:
being a teacher
creator and educator such as: how they were taught and their opinions were effected by their
teaching in art schools today
understanding of notions of research for example:
Facet C:
research methodologies in general and their estimation of the value of qualifications art practice research in
particular awarded in fine art in terms of:
Facet D: the perceived divide between practice and theory, artists and academia
the status of the MFA degree
financial burden of degrees in art
understanding what constitutes the PhD in fine art
proposals for alternatives to the PhD
evaluation of circumstances in which the PhD might be applicable
along with their convictions about:

Facet E: the importance of the art market upon production and to what extent this was related to
the market as gatekeeper and signifier of an artists success
the centralization of the art world
the perceived differences between the US and European art worlds
and included within the above themes was the embedded:

Facet F: fear of change and instability as evidenced in the perceptions of
the challenges to achieving art world membership
further academization of the art world
changing times
and the influence of:

Facet G: the active interview style during this research, which sometimes encouraged
unexpected evaluations of the PhD
friction in the interview
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Fig. 5.2 Mapping sentence of artists understanding of the PhD in fine art
(Adapted from: Schwarzenbach and Hackett 2015)
element for each facet, an abstract grid painting could be described in an

explicit and unequivocal manner that allows for the categorical classifica-
tion of this genre of painting.
In the second mapping sentence, along with Jessica Schwarzenbach,
I developed a mapping sentence within which professional art educa-
94 P.M.W. Hackett
tors who work at the tertiary level of education may have their attitudes
towards the PhD qualification in fine art depicted. Whilst this mapping
sentence is concerned with fine art, it addresses a very different aspect
of fine art to the mapping sentence for grid variation. In this latter case
the focus of attention is on tertiary-level art education and research. As a
consequence of this difference in focus, the mapping sentence has com-
pletely different facets and elements to those in the mapping sentence for
abstract grid painting. For example, in this mapping sentence the facets
were: artists identity; relationship between the role of creator and educa-
tor; notions of research; the value of qualifications awarded in fine art; the
importance of the art market for production; fear of change and instability;
and the active interview style.2 All of these facets have multiple elements
that, in an empirically valid manner, delimit how tertiary-level American
art educators structure their opinions and understanding of the fine art
PhD qualification. For example, the artists identity facet had elements of:
family; environment; art as distinct and special; the price of freedom; pri-
macy of art practice over academic work. These elements were discovered
in an interview with educators, and qualitative analysis of interview data
suggested that these elements completely accounted for how respondents
reported about the identity of the artist and appeared to influence how the
educators thought about the practice-based art PhD qualification.
Another example of how the mapping sentence was able to thoroughly
account for attitudes expressed by the interviewees is shown in the facet:
the value of the qualifications awarded in fine art. The elements of this
facet reflected the qualitative analysis of interviewees estimations of the
value of art qualifications and specified the terms for their appraisals: thus
the perceived divide between practice and theory, artists and academia; the
status of the MFA degree; understanding what constitutes a PhD in fine
art; proposals for alternatives to the PhD; evaluation of circumstances in
which the PhD might be applicable.
The preceding mapping sentences illustrate two of the contextualized
ways in which I have investigated fine art and show ways in which I have
used the mapping sentence to conduct art-related phenomenological
research. The two mapping sentences provide a framework for designing
and analysing research into fine art and both mapping sentences provide
valuable information that demonstrates fine art to be best understood
under a specific foci of interest. However, in this book I concentrate on
identifying usual or universally perceived parts of abstract fine art. Another
way of thinking about the researchs focus is that I am attempting to iden-
tify the commonly held ways in which people viewing two-dimensional

art abstraction perceive and conceive of their experiences. Paul Crowther
has attempted to answer similar questions in his research (see, Crowther
2007) and I now consider his scholarship as a potential framework, which
I may use to guide my own mapping sentence format research.
Paul Crowther: Defining Art, Creating theCanon:

Artistic Value inanEra ofDoubt
Expressing a sentiment that is correlated to my mapping sentence research
into fine art, Paul Crowther (2007, p94) states the place where phenom-
enological experience exists to be exceptionally complex and argues for
the existence of what he calls a contextual visual space. This space, he
claims, subtends and makes the immediately visible world intelli-
gible to us qua visual. Thus, he is proposing contextual visual space as
being the place where what is immediately seen is perceived and under-
stood in visual terms. Further, he argues that we are able to reside within
visual space, rather than merely encountering a two-dimensional world,
because of contextual visual space. As abstract paintings, according to
Crowther, do not facilitate the viewers entry into a zone of represen-
tation, the optical properties of these artworks must to the contextual
space dimensions he cites. For Crowther, eight characteristics compre-
hensively structure contextual space (Fig. 5.3).3 The characteristics are
summarized in Table 5.2.
The contents of the above tabulation of eight dimensions of Crowther
(2007) for comprehensively structuring contextual visual space allow for a
complete understanding of abstract art. In Table5.1, I summarize further
Crowthers propositions to provide a framework for abstract art.
Table 5.1 lists Crowthers ontology in a somewhat abbreviated and
perhaps terse fashion. Having read this list through it would appear to be
a comprehensive statement of the elements that an artist is able to experi-
ment with to produce abstract two-dimensional abstract artwork. When
looking at the tabular arrangement of these components, the question
arises, however, as to how these components relate to each other and how
they may be thought to come together to form any specific abstract art-
work? With this in mind, in Fig.5.4 I have produced a mapping sentence
that attempts to answer the two questions just raised about inter-item
arrangement and the items functional completeness.
96 P.M.W. Hackett
Fig. 5.3 Details of Crowthers characteristics for structuring contextual visual

space
In one way the mapping sentence for Crowthers ontology has achieved
the initial aim of my research as it provides a comprehensive account of the
perceptual components of abstract two-dimensional art. If this is the case
another question arises about how the mapping sentence helps us under-
stand how any specific abstract two-dimensional artwork varies in relation
to other abstract artworks and what are the relative importance of the
Table 5.1Crowthers summarized characteristics for structuring abstract art

Characteristic name Summarized characteristics
1/Resemblances Creating resemblances through combination

2/Gestural Associations Evocation through gestural associations with visual forms
3/Revelations Usually invisible visual features
4/Novel Environments Existence as product of usual environments
5/Neoteric Configurations Reconfiguration of familiar producing neoteric visual
configurations
6/Visual Suggestions Visual traces or suggestions
7/Spatiality/Structure Structural features of spatial appearances
8/Fantasy Imaginary and dream phenomena
Table 5.2Eight corre-

Question
spondence questions
1. Which abstract painting employed resemblances?
2. Which abstract painting employed gestural associations?
3. Which abstract painting employed revelations?
4. Which abstract painting employed novel environments?
5. Which abstract painting employed neoteric
configurations?
6. Which abstract painting employed visual suggestions?
7. Which abstract painting employed spatiality/structure?
8. Which abstract painting employed fantasy?
eight facets? This question may be stated as how influential is each of the
eight facets/components of the mapping sentence ontology in accounting
for the experiences of someone viewing a particular abstract artwork? In
the next section I attempt to answer this question by analysing the facets
of Crowthers ontology using partial order analysis and I depict my results
with a Hasse4 diagram.
Partial Order andHasse Diagrams

Following on from what I have written thus far, I suggest that it is reason-
able to assume abstract two-dimensional art may be appreciated along a
variety of dimensions.5 Furthermore, I propose that these dimensions may
be usefully embodied as facets within a mapping sentence to facilitate a
better appreciation of the components combined effects. It also seems
to be reasonable to claim that these facets are composed of variables with
98 P.M.W. Hackett
differing qualities and together this forms an intricate statement of the

equally complicated viewing experience. Given this complexity and ambi-
guity, I also claim that any attempt to assess abstract fine art that does not
embody a complexity, similar to that indicated in the proposed mapping
sentences, will not adequately reveal how abstract art is understood and
will consequently do little to allow the meaningful comparison of different
abstract artworks and will result in no overall understanding of the appre-
ciation of abstract art being developed.
Another statement that I feel able to make based on the complexity and
variety of assessments that may be made of abstract artworks is that these
evaluation criteria are different in nature and are not directly comparable.
However, it seems realistic that people are able to order paintings in terms
of their preference between pairs of paintings and that such orders may
themselves directly be comparable. On this assumption, I now present a
procedure for understanding the combined effects of Crowthers ontol-
ogy for the appreciation of abstract artworks by employing the facets and
facet elements that I have offered in the mapping sentence in Fig. 5.4.
First however, I present a simplified theoretical example of abstract art
appreciation.
Let us suppose there are three abstract paintings that we have identified
as being a sample of this art genre. For the sake of illustrating the process
that I am proposing as providing a descriptive model for understanding
abstract art (that of partial ordering), let us suppose that each painting is
by a different artist, for instance: Albers; Baselitz; Calder and I represent
each of these artworks by the initials of the artists who created the artwork
as A, B, C.If we are interested in understanding the relative worth of each
of these paintings as exemplars of abstraction, we may attempt to put these
into rank order of abstractness. However, the first and main question that
we need to answer is by which precise terms do we want to arrange the
paintings?
There are several possible answers to this question that may offer
potential criteria for an arrangement. For example, the four artworks may
be arranged according to their size, or according to their contents, their
materials, colour, and so on. First, we need to clearly establish that these
features of the paintings are important for viewers.6 We may then be able
to simply rank by variables (such as size). However, this ranking process
may be more problematic by other criteria (such as contents) where objec-
tive measures of content may be non-existent or ambiguous. In the case
of these ambiguous features we will need to establish a way of defining
__________________________________________________________________________________
Viewing an abstract artwork, person (x) perceive the optical characteristics of the abstract artwork to:
Resemblance
( resemble )
( to ) items events - states of affairs - through the combination of visual qualities,
(not resemble)
Gestural Association
( evoke )
and / or through gestural associations, which: ( to ) visual forms, and / or that:
(do not evoke)
Revealing
( reveal )
( to ) items - relations - states of affairs - that are not usually visible, and / or that:
(do not reveal)
Novel Environments
( use )
( to items relations - states of affairs - in novel settings, and / or by
(do not use)
Neoteric
Configurations
( reconfiguring )
producing neoteric visual configurations through: ( to ) to evoke new arrangements
(not reconfiguring )
Suggestions
( suggestive )
of the familiar, and / or by using visual traces that are: ( to ) of past future -
(not suggestive)
Spatial / Structural
( spatial/structural )
- counterfactual items - states of affairs, and / or by using features the are: ( to )
(not spatial/structural)
Phenomena
Fig. 5.4 Mapping sentence for Crowthers eight category ontology

100 P.M.W. Hackett
( imaginary )
characteristics and appearances, and / or which contain: ( dreamlike ) phenomena,
(imaginary & dreamlike)
( none of these )
Range
(greater extent)
and assess the above characteristics to be present in a specific painting to a: ( to ).
( lesser extent )
__________________________________________________________________________________
Fig. 5.4 continued
this feature in terms of its impact on people viewing at the artwork. One
way of doing this may be semi-numerical where the complexity of content
is taken as the number of separately identifiable features within a paint-
ing. Another approach may involve asking people about their reactions to
the paintings content and through thematic analysis of content establish-
ing commonalities in these assessments that may then be used to rate the
paintings in terms of the identified features presence, absence or extent.
Even apparently simple features of an artwork may, however, be consti-
tuted of several sub-features that need to be considered and where the
determination of the importance of a sub-feature is eventually an empirical
question.
In this way we may arrive at properties or qualities (q) of the artworks,
which we can write as q1, q2, , qn (in our example we will let n=3)
where q1 qn define variation in paintings A C and where the paint-
ings are the rows and the properties are the columns of a matrix. Having
established this matrix we are faced with answering a crucial question:
Do all of the properties we have identified as important (q1, q2, , qn)
contribute in the same way and to the same extent to the ordered arrange-
ment of the experience of our paintings (A C)?
The subsequent questions must then be asked: Are the relationships
between the characteristics monotonic or polytonic? Is an increasing
value for each characteristic associated with an increasing overall liking
of the painting? For example, size (q1) is measured in square centimetres
and let us imagine, for a moment, that usually the larger the paintings
the more that painting is liked. However, for some of the paintings a
well-defined opposite relationship may be observed where a small paint-
ing is extremely liked. On the other hand, the content aspect (q2) is
understood in terms of the presence or absence of features in the paint-
ing that have been established through pilot work to be preferred in
abstract paintings. An optimal number of components has been deter-
mined and the presence of more than this number of features is more
likely to be disliked. Thus, even if we simplify q1 as embodying a greater
pleasure for larger paintings and q2 as a larger number of features being
less liked, these two properties of a painting are not oriented in similar
directions and their properties must be reversed so they have a common
direction or monotonicity.
If we are able to clarify the above issues in terms of our paintings rela-
tionship to the evaluation criteria, it is possible for us to commence com-
parison of each painting with each others painting. We are then able to
perform comparisons of the paintings by looking at the data matrix we
have created. To illustrate how comparisons may be made let us suppose
that painting A has a profile of average rank orderings of 1.9, 7.5, 1.0 and
painting Bs profile is 3.7, 7.8, 2.1, where low values always represent the
most liked painting.
Looking at the three properties on which the paintings A and B are
understood, we may decide that painting B is less liked than painting A
because painting As assessments are all more positive (less than) than
painting B.Painting C, however, has a profile with evaluations of: 4.0, 8.7,
1.8, which demonstrates that on the three criterion C is always rated less
favourably than A.However, paintings B and C cannot be compared as
the relationship of the variables is inconsistent between the paintingsB
is more liked than C on the first and second variables, but C is more liked
than B on the third.
The example above is for three abstract paintings, but I could have
included more paintings in the comparisons. By increasing the number
of paintings in the rating, we would expect there to be more anomalous
profiles. In this case, any decision regarding which is the favourite painting
is relatively simple in terms of an overall composite score. However, com-
paring paintings becomes ever more problematic when considering the
varied aspects of an abstract painting. However, we have in the example
established what is called a partial order, where it is only possible to order
some items pair comparisons. In order for the reader to better appreciate
what I mean in the above statements, I provide more details regarding
partial ordering analysis.
102 P.M.W. Hackett
Axioms ofPartial Order

Thus far I have cursorily presented the notion of a partial ordering of
abstract art. However, partial ordering incorporates a set of accepted rules
that must be appreciated in order to understand the process of partial
ordering. For example, let us suppose that an object set X consists of
our sample of abstract artworks and that X is also a finite set of these works.
In our example, X consists of paintings A, B, C, and thus X={A.B.C.}. In
order that we can compare pairs of paintings, the relationship must exist
as a binary relation among the objects. Therefore, axioms 1 to 3 establish
the role of this relationship7:
Axiom 1: Reflexivity: AX : AA
Axiom 2: Anti-symmetry: AB, BA implies B=A
Axiom 3: Transitivity: AB and BC implies AC
Reflexivity refers to the fact that a painting can be compared with itself.
Anti-symmetry applies when both comparisons of paintings are valid, that

is, painting B is understood as better than painting A and simultaneously,
painting A is understood as better than painting B, then painting A is
identical with painting B.
Transitivity exists if the paintings are characterized by properties that are

at least ordinally scaled. For example, measurements of size or the mon-
etary value of a painting are transitive. However, the colour of a painting
may have unclear meaning in which any reason for ordering is uncertain,
as colour (i.e., red) belongs to a nominal category that simply labels a
paintings colour which cannot be used to rank paintings. Colour may,
however, allow the ranking of a painting where this exists on an ordinal
scale such that red is liked as much as or less than yellow which is liked
as much as or less than black (redyellowblack): the determination of
the qualitative items as being nominally or ordinally structured must be
answered for any use of a qualitative variable in a partial order analysis.
The answer will in part be determined by the reason for the research inves-
tigation and why items are being ranked.
When an examination of a partial ordering of a set of items (called a

POSET) is undertaken, in our case a selection of abstract paintings, the
requirements of partial ordering may be relaxed. In our research, such a

relaxation is due to the paintings being discretely identifiable artworks
that are potentially similarly ranked. In this situation paintings are treated
as different paintings but equivalent with identical data matrix rows.
Moreover, when paintings are found to be equivalent the data matrix may
be simplified by removing any equivalent items to leave a single represen-
tative painting. However, the paintings that have been removed through
equivalence may be reintroduced at the stage of writing-up the results
of the partial ordering so as to demonstrate the full extent of the partial
ordering (Patil and Taillie 2004).
It is possible to numerically express the relationships that emerge when
considering the partial ordering of a set of items on a set of variables.
However, the same profiles may be represented using a Hasse diagram to
graphically display the extant partial ordering among items. The Hasse
diagram is able to visually represent a partial ordering of a small num-
ber of items (in our case abstract artworks). In order to understand the
Hasse diagram, it is useful to consider how the diagram is structured
and that the diagram is constructed so as to enable a representation of a
POSET (see Aeschlimann and Schmid (1992) for details of Hasse diagram
construction).
Where the condition is met of x and y being two ordered pair vari-
ables that possess the relation x : y, the Hasse diagram is the structure
that arises from following the procedure of positioning x in a vertical plane
under y and then connect these using a straight line. This pair-wise proce-
dure is then repeated for every one of the pairs that conform to the x : y
relation. The resulting diagram is a Hasse diagram, which is also called a
partial order set diagram, order diagram or line diagram.
When considering a partial ordering of items Bruggemann and Patil
(2011) have noted that isomorphic Hasse diagrams result where the same
partial order relationship is differently drawn and represented in different
Hasse diagrams. Thus, there is flexibility in the creation of Hasse diagrams.
However, Hasse diagrams must be drawn with extreme care if, in the case
of abstract paintings, the diagram is to accurately present order relations
between paintings. In such a Hasse diagram paintings are organized in
the vertical plane so as to allow the depiction of levels of understanding of
abstract art. When possible, a Hasse diagram should be constructed with
straight lines that are drawn so they do not cross each other and with as
104 P.M.W. Hackett
similar a slope as is possible. Finally, when transitivity exists between a pair

of items there is no need to draw a connecting line.
Partial Ordering ofCrowthers Ontology

I now turn to the facets and their respective elements in the mapping
sentence for Crowthers eight-dimensional ontology and attempt to
classify the relationship between these using partial ordering modelled
and a Hasse diagram. There are eight facets each of which has bipolar
elements that represent more or less of the quality contained in the facet.
Crowther (2007) defines the contextual space occupied by art abstrac-
tion as being, massively complex (p94). The dimensions he presents
comprehensively structure this contextual space he says, although he
notes how it is a possibility that each dimensional may usefully be subdi-
vided. Furthermore, he states how there are potential dimensional com-
binations that play so important a role in structuring this contextual
space that they should be thought of as separate dimensions in their own
right. These claims, especially the former in regard to the possible subdi-
vision of dimensions, are of importance to my writing about the model-
ling of Crowthers ontology using partial order procedures. I make this
claim because the partial ordered analysis of my mapping sentence for
Crowthers ontology will investigate the structure, veracity and utility of
his ontological categories. The first step I will take in partially ordering
Crowthers ontology is to further consider the potential inter-relation-
ships of the items (paintings) I will partially order in terms of qualities
related to their abstraction.8
When attempting to establish a potential partial ordering for a set of
items of interest, the first concept that needs to be understood is that of
correspondence. Correspondence is a type of relationship that can exist
between two variables and is one of the two basic kinds of mathematical
relationships9 (Guttman 1991). Correspondence is typified by statements
of the kind: the painting is abstract, which may be written paint-
ing=>abstract.10 Correspondence relationships are between different
kinds of things where such relationships are not inherent relationships.
Transitive relationships, on the other hand, are between the same kinds
of things.
In the above correspondence: painting=>abstract, the notation needs
the supplementation of a descriptor of the terms under which there is a
correspondence. Furthermore, in order to make the example more realistic
I substitute the term painting with the name of a specific painting: I will
choose Picassos Guernica. This is therefore written:
Guernica => abstract genre

In this case the word genre (that was implied in the first relationship) is
specified as the terms of correspondence. This could also be written:
P=>A (P=Guernica)
G (A=abstract)
(G=genre)
This more abstract depiction of correspondence clearly demonstrates

the roles played by the three elements: where the concept to the arrows
left is the core object (core can also be thought of as argument) of the
question; the concept to the arrows right is the questions answer (the
cores image); the concept below the arrow is the rule by which the answer
arises from the question. Therefore, the diagram brings together the ques-
tion: what genre does this painting have? with the answer abstract. The
correspondence (the questions core) is this painting and the answer
is abstract. A stricter rendition of what is being written is, abstract
corresponds to this painting in the sense of being the kind of genre to
which the painting belongs. The structure of correspondence may thus
be written:
Correspondence: core => image sense

The implied question: What is the image that corresponds to the given core in the
given sense?
The answer: The given image
From the above example it can be seen that correspondence is a

structural statement that involves the arrow and the three concepts that
surround it, where, in some instantiations, the surrounding concepts
may be highly complex. Furthermore, there is sometimes the need for
considerable effort to be employed in determining the concepts that
act in the roles of core, sense and image. In such instances, completing
the above table for the specific correspondence may provide clarity. For
example:
106 P.M.W. Hackett
Guernica => abstract (is Guernica abstract?)
Recipient of genre
(what genre is Guernica?)
abstract => Guernica
genre
(what abstract characteristics
Guernica => genre does Guernica have?)
Characteristic of abstract
(what about Guernica impacts
abstract => genre
on the genre?)
characteristic of Guernica
(within what interaction does
genre => Guernicato abstract the genre occur?)
action dyad
(what relationship exists between
Guernica abstract => genre Guernica and abstraction?)
inter item characteristic
In the above examples the three terms of Guernica (painting), abstract

and genre are to be found acting as the core in one or two examples and
each term acts as the image at least once. All of the six examples of com-
binations of the correspondence relationship have a different sense and
none of these are the original statement that the painting is abstract. The
reason this is of importance is that the examples demonstrate the prolifera-
tion of possible relationships for assertions about art abstraction in every-
day speech. Everyday language takes the format of statements that do
not clearly differentiate between core image and sense. Philosophers seek
answers to their questions under more strictly specified core conditions,
a type of permissible results and a clear specification of their phenomena
of interest. In the current case, the core to be studied is paintings and the
genre that the painting will be determined by is abstraction.
Awareness of the implications of correspondence are important as they
clearly establish the research to be conducted, the questions asked, obser-
vations made and the conclusions drawn. Thus, in the present research I
am explicitly identifying:
A painting => abstract genre

As the correspondence relationship is the heart of the research, making

this choice implies that the core of my research is painting and that the
genre characteristics of abstraction are being studied.
Other characteristics of a painting may be specified and these ques-
tions are linked to the core sense of enquiry. Mapping sentences embody
and display this and other forms of linked and complex research designs.
It is possible to expand a research area by including other senses into
the formulation. For example, genre may be replaced by context or era/
age of a given artwork. Other images may be incorporated, such that
abstract could be replaced with semi-abstract, figurative and so forth. In
these examples the research questions would be modified to reflect the
complexity of the research content area whilst maintaining a clear specifi-
cation of the questions being asked and providing a framework for under-
standing variation in both questions and their answers. This relationship,
which is a series of correspondences, may be written in a mapping sentence
with Crowthers ontology of abstract art as core and is thus:
The preceding exhibit demonstrates that a correspondence has now
become a mapping (a single-stemmed arrow is used rather than the
double stem we have been using to indicate correspondence). This tem-
plate results in a series of questions that are formed through the exhaus-
tive inclusion of single elements from the facet in each question and the
possible answers are indicated as a range of possibilities. Furthermore, a
mapping demonstrates the possible questions whilst implying that only a
single answer can arise for each question and that this must be a value of
the range facet. As Guttman says, Selecting an appropriate answer from
the range establishes a correspondence between the particular answer and
the particular question (p110). The resulting questions along with the
response range are given in Table5.2.
In this example the mapping in Fig. 5.5 provides the range of pos-
sible answers as being the paintings that are of interest: La Demoiselle
DAvignon; Guernica; Nu descendant un escalier no. 2. Selecting one of
the paintings for each of the questions and asking whether this artwork is
typified by each of Crowthers eight specific ontological characteristics of
abstraction establishes a correspondence between an answer and a ques-
tion: a painting and a characteristic. More precisely, in the above example
the questions could be expanded to include a range facet of extent where
a painting is selected as being more to less typified by the characteristic
rather than being or not being so depicted.
108 P.M.W. Hackett
Characteristics of abstract painting:

(Resemblances )
(Gestural Associations )
(Revelations )
(Novel Environments )
(Neoteric Configurations)
(Visual Suggestions )
(Spatiality / Structure )
(Fantasy )
characteric of
(La Demoiselle D Avignon )
(Guernica )
(Nu descendant un escalier n2)
Fig. 5.5 Relationship of correspondence for Crowthers ontology
The next question that must be asked of Crowthers structural dimen-

sions is whether these are transitive? Within the context of partial order-
ing, transitivity is used to evaluate both numerical and non-numerical
variables. An example of transitivity will clarify its meaning11:
Example of transitivity:
A portrait is a kind of painting
A painting is a kind of artwork
Thus, we may conclude: A portrait is a kind of artwork
If we leave this somewhat abstract and simplified example and look at

the first facet in the mapping sentence for Crowthers eight dimensions, an
example of transitivity in the context of the perception of abstract art can
be provided. Let us assume that Crowthers dimensions are being used to
yield understanding of three specific and well-known paintings by Pablo
Picasso: painting A: Guernica (1937); and painting B: La Demoiselle
dAvignon (1907); painting C: Nu descendant un escalier no. 2 (1912)
(although the actual artist and paintings are unimportant and my example
could be applied to any set of art objects). I expect little disagreement to

be found in my calling of all of these paintings as both abstract and repre-
sentational to varied extents: the first evoking images of war, the second
images of prostitutes and the third the movement of a nude descending a
staircase. Remember, in this example we are just considering Crowthers
first dimension, which embodies notions that the artist has created in his
or her work, a greater or lesser resemblance to events, states of affairs or
images in the outside world.
Therefore, in this example I make a personal evaluation and con-
sider La Demoiselle dAvignon to more plainly resemble prostitutes than
Guernica plainly resembles scenes of war and Guernica to more plainly
resemble scenes of war than Nu descendant un escalier no. 2 plainly
resembles a nude descending a staircase. In transitivity this relationship
between the three paintings in terms of resemblances may be written:
Resemblances
La Demoiselle > Guernica, and Guernica > Nu descendant
more abstractn
ness more abstractness
La Demoiselle > Nu Descendant

and that:
more abstractness
I have used the noun form of abstractness for the reason that by using a
noun this demonstrates clearly that the three paintings (nouns) are being
indirectly compared with the direct comparison being made in terms of
the abstractness counterpart to the nouns (Guttman 1991). This proce-
dure may then be performed so as to provide an evaluative understanding
of the three paintings on all of the psychological constructs contained in
the eight dimensions of Crowthers ontology. If Crowthers claim as to
the comprehensive nature of his eight dimensions is true then the result
will be a thorough understanding of the extent of abstractness that is pres-
ent in each of the three paintings along with knowledge about how the
paintings differ from each other in terms of Crowthers sub-components
of abstraction. In order to assess the utility of Crowthers dimension when
used as an example of a dimension set that is potentially a comprehensive
set of descriptors of a sample of observations (in this example, the dimen-
sion set is of abstractness and the sample is of paintings), I will now assess
these three paintings in terms of all eight dimensions, the results of which
are presented in Table5.3.
110 P.M.W. Hackett
Table 5.3Three abstract paintings assessed in terms of Crowthers

characteristics
Paintings Profile
La Demoiselle>Guernica, and Guernica>Nu descendant ACB

Nu descendant>Guernica and Guernica>La Demoiselle BCA
Nu descendant>Guernica, and Guernica>La Demoiselle BCA
Guernica>Nu descendant, and Nu descendant>La Demoiselle CBA
Nu descendant>La Demoiselle, and La Demoiselle>Guernica BAC
Nu descendant>La Demoiselle, and La Demoiselle>Guernica BAC
A numerical representation of the above-listed profiles results in:

A=12; B=19; C=17 (calculated through giving 3, 2, 1, points for 1st
to 3rd place, respectively, and summating). Simple frequency analysis
in terms of this profile demonstrates that: A; 1st=1; 2nd=2; 3rd=5: B;
1st=4; 2nd=3; 3rd=1: C; 1st=3; 2nd=3; 3rd=2. (B4,3,1; C3,3,2;
A1,2,5).
From these simple calculations it is obvious that I felt that Nu descen-
dant (B) was the most abstract of the three paintings that Guernica (C)
was the second most abstract and I rated La Demoiselle the least abstract
painting. This ordered relationship is clearly present in both of the ways
in which I have analysed the data and reflects some of the extremely
important features of assessment and of appreciation of abstract fine
art. First, the ratings say something about how the three paintings con-
tained elements of the eight criteria for abstraction. Second, the assess-
ments I made say a great deal about what the assessment criteria from
Crowthers ontology mean to me. Both components of assessment are
extremely important in understanding how I perceive and understand
abstract art. Third, partial ordering of Crowthers ontological crite-
ria would appear to yield intelligible results and to provide a valuable
account about the conditions needed for assigning a piece of art to the
genre of abstraction.
Having considered three paintings, I am now going to enlarge my sam-
ple by adding six more abstract two-dimensional pieces. By doing this, I
hope to enable a slightly more realistic assessment of how this genre of art-
work is perceived. However, prior to undertaking this analysis I endeavour
to further refine understanding of the partial ordering procedure.
Ilan Sharon (1995) provides an example of the use of partial order-

ing from a very different area of study, that of stratigraphic analysis in
archaeology.12 I am offering Sharon as an example of the use of analysis by
partial ordering13 that clearly explains the application of this technique in a
manner that can be readily related to the analysis of art abstraction. Sharon
starts by pointing out that with the exception of the simplest archaeo-
logical sites reliable stratigraphic analysis is a pre-requisite to any attempt
to understand the arrangement of strata at a site. In complexly stratified
sites the importance of this analysis becomes unsurpassed. However, Ilan
claims, there is a dearth of research on how stratigraphic schemes are
achieved in terms of their logic or procedures.14
When analysing stratum deposits the scientist observes the depositional
units on a site and develops a scheme that reflects the units position in a
postulated depositional sequence. The data for interpretation that arises
from this procedure forms a partially ordered set.15 Sharon noted how in
such a set, when comparing any two sample units it may be said that A
is earlier than B or A and B are contemporary (or) . There is no direct
relation between A and B (p751). This is a fully ordered set as all units
may unequivocally be labelled in terms of the criteria of periodicity. These
stratigraphic units form an example of what is known as a scalogram,
which is a profile of element values. Scalograms form a two-dimensional
representation of the data set such that each element is denoted by a point
and where all points are arranged under the following protocol: the point
representing element A will be positioned above the point representing B,
if and only if (iff) A>B.
In terms of our interest area, any painting (A) may, for example, be
labelled as more (earlier) or less (later) than another painting (B) in terms
of a quality of abstraction, that is A>B. The nomenclature for Partial
Order Scalogram Analysis16 (POSA17) is written as P being a data set of
N elements (paintings, aspects of artworks) (pipn) upon which a set of
k different variables (v1vk) are observed. On this understanding, each
element pi is typified by a profile of attributes or dependent variables
{vi1vik} and where an attribute is a fully ordered category in the above-
mentioned sense. Each of these elements may be fully ordered in terms
of their own variables content. However, rankings of elements are poten-
tially different and thus, as previously mentioned, a partial ordering may
exist between elements. To further explain Guttmans understanding in
terms of abstract paintings, any two paintings may be considered identical
(pi=pj) iff their respective profiles are identical (vimvjm for each and all
112 P.M.W. Hackett
m=1k); pi is greater than pj (pi>pj) iff vimvjm for every m=1k. What
this means is that for any painting pi is ranked before pj in terms of some
aspect of abstraction, and pj is ranked before pi in terms of some other
aspect of abstraction. On the latter understanding the paintings would be
considered incomparable.
When attempting to perform a partial ordered analysis of abstract fine
art, the paintings that are to be evaluated need to be identified along with
the criteria for evaluation. For example, the paintings by Picasso and Bacon
I mentioned earlier in this book and on which I developed a mapping sen-
tence (see, Fig.5.5: Mapping Sentence for Crowthers Eight-Dimensional
Ontology) may also be used as examples. This mapping sentence states
that any interpretation of the abstract qualities of a painting will involve
eight types of consideration:
Resemblances (Rb); Gestural Associations (GA); Revelations (Rv); Novel

Environments (NE); Neoteric Configuration (NC); Visual Suggestion (VS);
Spatial/Structures (SS); Fantasy (F)Range (R) (extant of abstraction).
If the dimensions proposed in these facets are pertinent to those indi-

viduals who are looking at abstract paintings then we would expect that
these should partially order evaluations of paintings that are agreed to be
abstract. Individual paintings are more frequently assessed and understood
in terms of these dimensions used in isolation. However, if these are valid
dimensions for structuring our understanding of abstraction then it would
seem reasonable to believe that at least some of these dimensions act inter-
actively upon our understandings: POSA attempts to present an account
of such an amalgamated effect.18
The first problem or challenge associated with attempting to under-
stand abstract two-dimensional art is the complexity of the psychologi-
cal domain that such evaluations encompass (this complexity is illustrated
in the eight-dimensional account provided by Crowther). It should be
immediately obvious that to imagine the psychological nature of these
eight variables could be perfectly ordered is highly unlikely (it would seem
likely that a lack of perfect ordering would be the case for any eight vari-
ables in most real-world context). To elaborate on this notion, if we imag-
ine that the eight variables listed above: Rb; GA; Rv; NE; NC; VS; SS;
and F, (v1(Rb)v8(F)) that are believed to account for abstraction are used
to evaluate paintings by a set P of N observers, p1pN. Each of the vari-
ables (v(Rb)v(F)) has an ordered range Ak=(1,2,k) (k=1n) (k2).
1,2k are the kth variables categories.
Given the above, we can imagine that the order of the categories 1k
within each range is determined by an external content variable taken from
v(Rb) to v(P). At this instance the mapping M:PA where A=A1, A2An
through empirical observation assigns to each observer pi in P a profile
a1(i)a2(i)an(i) in A. Then M(P)=A is the set of profiles that are actually
observed for all observers of abstract art in set P where A is a scalogram
which forms the matrix in Fig.5.6.
On this understanding, a profile a1(i) is taken to be greater than another
profile a1(i) iff a1(i)a1(j) for all k=1n and at least a single variable (e.g.,
k0th) for which ak(i)0>ak(j)0.
A Partial Ordering ofAbstract Art

Abstract art is a very eclectic and broad field of artistic creativity. Having
considered the structuring of three abstract works of art, it is immediately
clear that evaluating just three works of this type of art is exceptionally
restrictive within the context of a book that is about how we perceive
abstract art in a somewhat general sense. Consequently, as an illustration
of a partial order understanding of art abstraction, I will now perform
a partial order type of analysis using nine selected abstract paintings. In
order to explore Crowthers eight-dimensional ontology for the differen-
tial understanding of abstract artworks, I chose the following nine pieces
of abstract modernist painting. The nine paintings are listed in Table5.4.
Fig. 5.6 Theoretical scalogram matrix

114 P.M.W. Hackett
Table 5.4 Nine paintings used in evaluation

# Painting Date Size
1 Jackson Pollock, One: Number 31 1950 269531cm

2 Ellsworth Kelly, Orange Blue I 19645 152137cm
3 Pablo Picasso, Les Demoiselles dAvignon 1907 244234cm
4 Ives Klein, Blue Monochrome 1961 195140cm
5 Wassily Kandinsky, Composition VIII 1923 140201cm
6 Pablo Picasso, Guernica 1937 349776cm
7 Yves Klein, Big Blue Anthropometry (Tribute to Tennessee 1960 275407cm
Williams)
8 Mark Rothko, Orange, Red, Yellow 1961 236206cm
9 Marcel Duchamp, Nu descendant un escalier no. 2 1912 14782cm
I selected these nine pieces in order to include works from different

types of modernist painting whilst not introducing pieces from differ-
ent genres as this would have been a variable that is beyond the remit of
Crowthers ontology. I decided to rate reproduced images of each of the
above nine pictures on a 1 to 4 rating scale, where in all cases a rating of
1 implied little or none of the ontological characteristic was present in the
artwork and 4 meant that that artwork was highly typified by this charac-
teristic. A rating of 2 or 3 constituted points between these two extreme
anchors. A 1 to 4 rating range (a range with an even number of alternate
choices) was employed in order to force a decision as to whether the onto-
logical descriptor characterized the painting or not.
The ratings of each of the paintings resulted in the above data matrix,
which also includes a summated profile rating score for each pain-
ing. As it happened I gave one painting the minimum possible rating
(1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1) and one painting the maximum rating (4,4,4,4,4,4,4,4).
Paintings in the above table are arranged by this quantitative rating score
from Marcel Duchamps nu descendant un escalier no. 2 that was highly
characterized by all of Crowthers 8-rating criteria of abstract paintings to
Ives Kleins Blue Monochrome, which I considered was minimally typi-
fied by each of these assessment criteria. As well as the above quantitative
(summated rating score) arrangement of paintings, the paintings dif-
fered in comparison to each other in terms of the arrangements of ratings
across (from left to right) each paintings rating profile. The summated
rating answers the question of to what extent is this painting typified by
Crowthers characteristics of an abstract painting? The arrangement of
scores across a paintings rating profile answered the question in what
ways is this painting more or less characterized by Crowthers character-
istics of an abstract painting? Both the summative and profile score may
be compared with other paintings totals and profiles to produce a depic-
tion of the relationships between a set of artworks as they are assessed on
Crowthers ontological criteria.
As discussed earlier, the Hasse diagram is able to display similarities and
differences that exist in a data matrix of profile scores. In the current case
what the Hasse diagram demonstrates is a combined quantitative and the
qualitative arrangement of paintings in terms of how these are character-
ized by Crowthers criteria. The arrangement is theoretically illustrated in
Figs.5.7 and 5.8 and the paintings are plotted in terms of qualitative and
quantitative differentiations.
Fig. 5.7 Dimension diagram

116 P.M.W. Hackett
Figure5.8 clearly demonstrates the quantitative dimension of evalua-

tions running from bottom left to top right of the square item plot. The
ordering of paintings is the same as that given in Table 5.5. However,
another dimension exists that runs between the other two corners of the
diagram (top left and bottom right). This second dimension embodies the
qualitative aspects of the similarities and differences between the patterns
in the profile scores. To clarify this, a plot is created for each of the items
in the score profile in which preserves the positioning of each individual
painting in the overall plot. However, the item score for each variable is
printed in the paintings position. From this series of plots it is possible
to discern the structure of each variable. The partitioning of these plots
employs the use of straight lines that compartmentalize all (or as many)
Fig. 5.8 Hasse Diagram of the nine paintings

Table 5.5Abstractness rating profiles for nine paintings

# Painting Rating profile Profile sum
9 Marcel Duchamp, Nu descendant un escalier no. 2 44444444 32

6 Pablo Picasso, Guernica 34344444 30
1 Jackson Pollock, One: Number 31 44434144 28
8 Mark Rothko, Orange, Red, Yellow 44332144 25
3 Pablo Picasso, Les Demoiselles dAvignon 23234334 24
7 Yves Klein, Big Blue Anthropometry 33322133 20
2 Ellsworth Kelly, Orange Blue I 33121143 18
5 Wassily Kandinsky, Composition VIII 32221232 17
4 Yves Klein, Blue Monochrome 11111111 8
of the items with similar scores on a variable into a region. The format of
regions must be vertical or horizontal slices, L- shaped or inverted L-
shaped partitions or top right to bottom left, or top left to bottom right
partitions. If an item can be partitioned in this manner the partitioning
may be drawn in an overall profile score plot along with all other item
plots. Together, these lines structure the meaningful space of interest.
In the current study into my perceptions of nine selected abstract art
paintings, using the eight characteristics of abstract painting identified by
Crowther (2007) to structure understanding of this art form, six of his
characteristics were found to partition the plots under the above parti-
tioning criteria. These were the characteristics of: 1/resemblances; 2/
gestural associations; 3/revelations; 4/novel environments; 6/visually
suggestions; 7/spatiality/structure. Two of Crowthers characteristics: 5/
neoteric configurations; 8/fantasy, did not partition areas that exclusively
captured single identities (single profile scores) under any of the six forms
of acceptable partitioning. Consequently, it may be stated that Crowthers
six variables or characteristics (numbers: 1,2,3,4,6,7) were pertinent in
my understanding of what constituted an abstract painting and that the
remaining two of his characteristics (numbers: 5 and 8) did not appear
to play a consistent role in my understanding of the selected abstract
paintings.
The joint axis runs from bottom left to top right of the plot and rep-
resents the extent of the overall quality that is being explored, in this
case the degree of abstractness of the selected artworks. Duchamps Nu
descendant un escalier no. 2 was located top right in the diagram and
was understood by me to be the most abstract of the assessed paintings.
Conversely, Kleins Blue Monochrome was positioned at the bottom
118 P.M.W. Hackett
left of the diagram and I understood this painting to be the least abstract
on Crowthers understanding of abstractness.
Furthermore, in Fig. 5.8, I have superimposed the six characteristics
of Crowthers ontology of abstractness that legitimately partitioned my
assessments of the paintings. By including these partitions in the diagram,
their combined effects within my understanding can be discerned. To
read the diagram in Fig.5.8, it must be understood that the digits within
the diagram (the numbers 1 to 9) represent the location of the pieces of
abstract artwork as I assessed these upon all of Crowthers characteristics.
The numbers around the outside edges of the diagram are positioned at
the point at which a partition for the category with this number reached
the edge of the diagram. Vertical solid lines are drawn to illustrate the par-
titioning of Crowthers characteristics numbers 4 and 6 (4/novel environ-
ments; 6/visually suggestions), with high scores being positioned to the
right of the diagram and low scores to the left. Horizontal solid lines in
the diagram illustrate where the partitioning lines for Crowthers charac-
teristics, numbers 1 and 7 (1/resemblances; 7/spatiality/structure), met
the edge of the diagram. In this case high scores on these categories were
at the top of the diagram and low scores towards the bottom. I have drawn
diagonal broken lines to show the partitioning of Crowthers category
number 3 (3/revelations) and in this case the high scores are to the top
right of the diagram and low scores on this characteristic are at the bottom
left. Finally, the broken L-shaped heavily drawn lines show the parti-
tioning of paintings in Crowthers category 2 (2/gestural associations)
and again higher scores are towards the top right and lower scores towards
the bottom left of the diagram.
At this point and before I go on to provide further interpretations of
the artworks, I need to re-emphasize the point that the appraisal I am
presenting here is my own. This is likely to be highly individualistic and
may very well differ significantly from any other persons understanding
of abstract art. I also need to stress that Crowthers eight characteristics
present an extremely complex account of an even more complicated con-
tent area, that of abstract art. Any attempts to understand the concur-
rent and combined effects that eight characteristics may have upon my
understanding of the paintings constitute an intricate and difficult task.
However, as already noted two of Crowthers characteristics did not seem
to play an important role in my reasoning. Furthermore, the partitioning
of characteristic number 3 (the degree to which an abstract artwork was
able to reveal a visual experience that under normal conditions was invis-
ible and which included visual features of items, relations, states of affairs
including very small surface features, internal configurations of visual
events in a painting, fleeting atmospheric effects and unusual perspectives)
appeared to be highly associated with my overall appraisals of the extent
to which the paintings were abstract.19 This being the case, it seems that
the revelatory characteristic of abstract paintings was closely related to my
understanding of the degree to which I thought a painting to be abstract.
Consequently, this characteristic (number 3), along with the two char-
acteristics that did not lawfully partition the diagram (numbers 5 and 8)
need not be considered in further explorations into the qualitative profiles
of my understanding of abstractness.
Closer inspection of the paintings and how they fall upon the two-
dimensional plot and how they are captured by straight partitioning lines
for each of the item plots shows some interesting relationships. The first
point to acknowledge is that the ability for the POSA to capture item
values for most of the dimensions suggested by Crowther (2007) using
straight lines advocates that these characteristics of abstract paintings were
indeed pertinent to my understanding of the art genre.
The POSA diagram also demonstrates how I interpret Crowthers char-
acteristics through my construal of the nine paintings. Duchamps Le Nu
Descendant no. 2 is located at the top right of the diagram as I rated
this painting as possessing all of Crowthers characteristics to a maximum
extent. It was not my specific intention to have a painting in this POSA that
was rated as completely possessing all of the characteristics of abstractness,
but this being the case ensures the extreme position of the painting in the
POSA.This position is therefore characterized by Crowthers qualitative
assessment dimensions as being high in the depicting novelty of environ-
ment, being visual suggestive, high in resemblance and structural and spa-
tial qualities. This painting was also assessed to be quantitatively abstract
and as shown in the quantitative dimension in the POSA.
By looking at the other paintings rated as being high or medium-high
in terms of their being visually suggestive and incorporating novel envi-
ronments, Picassos Guernica was high on both of these characteristics
whilst embodying resemblance and structural and spatial effects. Both of
the works by Duchamp and Picasso (found towards the top right of the
POSA) possessed images that to some extent were recognizable as depict-
ing human beings. Picassos Le Demoiselles DAvignon was medium-high
in terms of environmental novelty and visual suggestiveness but low in
terms of resemblance. This is perhaps indicating that I was not understand-
120 P.M.W. Hackett
ing resemblance as resembling human beings as this painting by Picasso is

arguably the clearest depiction of the human form amongst the nine works
of art. The last of the paintings that was seen to be to some extent highly
characterized by novelty of environment and as being visually suggestive
was Kandinskys Composition VIII. The positioning of this painting in
the POSA implies that this painting was much lower on gestural associa-
tions than the works by Picasso and Duchamp. Also, there may perhaps
be another characteristic that was at play in structuring my understanding
of abstraction, and this characteristic was a specific form of resemblance,
which was suggestive of human beings.
Three paintings were located towards the top-left of the POSA:
Pollocks One: Number 31; Rothkos Orange, Red, Yellow; and Kleins
Big Blue. The paintings by Pollock and Rothko were both high in terms
of resemblance and structural and spatial qualities whereas the Klein paint-
ing was medium in these. Kleins work was also seen as being fairly low in
visual suggestiveness.
It should be remembered that this POSA is based on a sample of nine
selected abstract paintings. In making these selections I attempted to be
eclectic in my choices. However, there are many types of abstract painting
that I have unintentionally not included. An example of this is geometric
abstraction as exemplified by the works of Sol Lewitt, Terry Winters and
many others. This being the case, other forms of abstraction many have
been understood by myself through reference to different dimensions to
those found in the POSA or I may have used the same dimensions in a
different manner.
Perhaps the biggest caveat that must be issued in regard to readers
attempting to make sense of these research findings is in terms of the pre-
viously mentioned fact that the evaluations were made by a single person,
which limits the potential for generalizing from these results. Another and
even greater source of bias is due to the fact that I was the sole individual.
Notwithstanding these caveats, I have succeeded in producing theoretically
grounded empirical support for Crowthers characteristics of abstraction and
I have suggested possible redundancy amongst his ontological elements.
Conclusions: Mapping Sentence andPartial

Ordering ofAbstract Art
My reasons for writing this book were to investigate the highly complex
domain of visual perception in specific reference to abstract art. I wished
to offer an understanding of this process that was able to instantiate the
multifarious nature of art perceptual experiences and which extended phil-

osophical and psychological knowledge within this area. In this final con-
cluding section I bring together the insight I have achieved using mapping
sentences and partial ordered analyses of perceptions of abstract fine art.
It is immediately apparent that there are both similarities and differences
between these two research approaches. Mapping sentences and partial
ordered analyses have in common their use of structuples (profiles of fac-
ets and their elements) as a means of defining the content area of abstract
art. Another similarity is that the two approaches attempt to yield a total
account of the phenomena of concern through structuple combinations.
Amongst the differences between the partial order and mapping sentence
output is that mapping sentences are linguistic and partial orderings are
usually graphic.
What I am claiming in this book is that in combination the mapping
sentence and the partial ordering of elements of the mapping sentence
investigated within a semi-qualitative and philosophical framework pro-
vide a template for understanding the complexities of the perception and
understanding of abstract art. In earlier parts of this book I demonstrated
how both abstract art and art in general are complex perceptual events. I
also demonstrated that many models of perception have arisen from within
the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. Furthermore, I have shown
that ontological systems have been developed that attempt to account for
the way that we conceive of the fundamental components of general being
and also of more specific instances. Due to the potential insight that a
perceptual ontology may yield to our understanding of the activity of see-
ing, and because of the complexity of the perceptual process, I have incor-
porated a theory of perception within an ontological rubric. Moreover, I
have turned to the complex system of data analysis that is provided by the
facet theoretical approaches of the mapping sentence and POSA and have
suggested that such a complex outlook and analysis is required for under-
standing the perception of abstract art and that when all these approaches
are used together they offer unsurpassed insight.
The mapping sentence was the initial tool that I used to investigate
for understanding abstract art. I presented multiple mapping sentences
from different aspects of fine art, including the abstract artwork itself and
art education. From these mapping sentences, I believe it is reasonable
to state that the mapping sentence has provided a framework for clearly
addressing this content area and for demonstrating that the content area
of understanding art can be approached from many different perspectives.
122 P.M.W. Hackett
Furthermore, I have shown how each of these perspectives will require a

different focus of research attention using a different mapping sentence
to guide research/allow interpretation of research findings. The mapping
sentences have also clearly demonstrated that it is possible to approach and
think of the perception of abstract art within an ontological and mereo-
logical structure. However, this research is in its infancy and is subject to
ongoing study and further consideration.
Partial order analyses have allowed me to depict the roles of Crowthers
eight ontological characteristics of abstract art. This has suggested the
empirical validity and utility for an ontological understanding of this type
of art. I have also suggested that there may be equivalency between some
of Crowthers characteristics and that his model may therefore be simpli-
fied. However, these theoretical statements await further empirical enquiry,
which I am at present conducting. Indeed, I am carrying out research that
enquires into whether Crowthers eight characteristics, or a reduced num-
ber of characteristics based on my POSA are the optimal and under which
circumstances. I am investigating to see if the structure that arose in my
completion of the assessment of the selected nine abstract paintings is: 1/a
highly individualistic assessment framework, one that will yield drastically
different structure for each person it is used with, or 2/whether there is
some degree of commonality in the POSA/characteristic structure that
is likely to emerge through administering the assessment with different
people. If the former is the case then my research will continue by asking if
the POSA structure is consistent enough to allow the rating framework to
be used with individual respondents and then for comparisons to be made
between the POSA plots of individual participants. In this situation the
assessment framework would produce interesting results that would allow
a person to be characterized through POSA of his or her assessments and
then these to be related to background characteristics of the individual
as these appear pertinent to understanding abstract two-dimensional fine
art. If the second situation is found to exist then this would suggest that
the assessment framework, based on the eight characteristics of Crowther,
is robust enough to allow the assembly of generalized enquiries (inter-
views, questionnaires) that could be given to both individuals and groups
of respondents.
Much work remains before either of the above situations can be claimed
to exist. However, the theoretical results I have presented in this book
offer empirical and theoretical support for the utility of Crowthers ontol-
ogy and for understanding the empirical formation of the characteristics
by using POSA.The final form of ongoing future research is that which

combined the use of the mapping sentence and POSA analyses, both in
the area of fine art appreciation and in the broader domain of more gen-
eral ontologies and mereologies.
At the commencement of this book, I posed a series of questions that I
hoped this research would shed some light upon, and I will now consider
the extent to which I have achieved answers to these questions. Through
developing a partially ordered account of the perception of abstract art,
I am able to support the notion that this is a highly complex philosophi-
cal, psychological and phenomenological process and that this has both
empirical and theoretical components. As I used a mapping sentence
mereology to achieve this insight, I have demonstrated the perception
of two-dimensional abstract art images may best be understood using
processes and procedures that employ to perceiving non-art images. The
complex ontology that my research has developed supports that any sim-
ple depiction of the perceptual may well be empirically and/or theoreti-
cally inadequate.
The question I initially asked was what is the way (or what are the
ways) in which we perceive and comprehend two-dimensional abstract
artworks of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries? I believe my research
has provided an answer to this question in the form of a partial ordering
of elements Crowthers ontology, which that these elements are a fruitful
framework for conducting future research. This research could produce
mapping sentences to explore perception of other art genres. After empiri-
cal evidence has been gathered to modify, support or reject these mapping
sentence, a partial ordering of mappings elements should offer valuable
insight into other areas of art practice and appreciation.
The research I have presented in this book has shown the mapping
sentence to be a structured ontology/mereology that is uniquely able to
employ its inherent theoretical foundations in Guttmans facet theory and
to offer an empirically supported account of perceiving two-dimensional
abstract art. In achieving this amalgamation of theory and empirical obser-
vation, I have both extended psychological, philosophical and neuroscien-
tific knowledge and understanding into how we perceive abstract forms of
modern and contemporary fine art, and I have developed a new qualita-
tive/philosophical facet theoretical understanding of abstract fine art. As a
consequence of achieving this, I have extended the facet theory literature
into the area of art and perception and my previous research into philo-
124 P.M.W. Hackett
sophical and qualitative aspects of mapping sentences as ontological and

mereological systems.
Notes
1. Partial ordering and Partial Order Scalogram Analysis (POSA) are data
analysis procedures, which will be used interchangeably in this book.
Partial order analyses attempt to discover those variables within a research
project that may be understood to possess order in their responses. More
details about this procedure will be provided later in this chapter.
2. This final facet addressed the data collection approach used by the
researcher rather than any aspect of art education. However, it was felt that
the employment of this style of interview technique significantly influenced
the data gathered and was therefore an important aspect of the research
outcomes and consequently was included in the mapping sentence.
3. Crowther states that his eight dimensions appear to him as a comprehen-
sive structure of conceptual space, whilst he allows for the possibility that
these dimensions may be subdivided and/or combined in a way that
enables these to be dimensions themselves.
4. The diagram is named after the German mathematician Helmut Hasse.
5. I use information on Hasse diagrams, etc., from Guttman (1991) at many
points during this section of this book.
6. This is what Crowther is attempting to achieve in the establishment of his
ontology.
7. It should be noted here that the use of the letters A,B,C is indicative of the
three abstract paintings by the three specified artists. These letters are used
in axioms 13 for simplicity. However, in an actual partial ordering the
paintings themselves are not rated; what are rated are characteristics of
each of the paintings.
8. Later in this book I will not be using the three artists that I have been using
as a simplified example of the partial order process, but instead I will con-
centrate on a series of nine specific abstract paintings on which I will per-
form a partial order analysis.
9. The other relationship being transitivity, which I will consider later in this
chapter.
10. Here, Guttman, (1991) uses the => symbol to mean corresponds, which is
slightly different to its more usual meaning as a logic symbol with the
meaning of implies.
11. The example is an example of a syllogism where the conclusions drawn are
justified.
12. Stratigraphy is the sub-discipline within geology that investigates strata in
rock and their ordering and relative positions. Stratigraphers are also con-
cerned with the relationships between depository strata and geological

time. Stratigraphy may also be employed in archaeological research to
investigate archaeological remains that are found in layers.
13. Sharon employs an adaptation of the classic form of partial order analysis.
However, it should be noted that the precise type of partial order scalo-
gram analysis that is used is not of central concern in this writing. This is
because it is the general principles of the approach that are of greatest
concern in my writing and the analyses I perform are upon qualitative
assessments by an individual person.
14. Sharon (1995) notes how Harris work (1979) is an exception to this and
that others have employed Harris methods (Bishop and Wilcock 1976;
Day 1987; Ryan 1988; Herzog 1993).
15. It will help to understand if I use this example to delve further into partially
ordered sets.
16. Louis Guttman introduced the idea of partial ordering in the analysis of
human behaviour (Guttman 1950). For further details, see Borg and
Lingoes 1987; Shye 1985; Shye and Amar 1985.
17. POSA is the technique that has been developed to perform analysis of partial
ordering. For the POSA analysis package for the social sciences and for details
on this, see Lingoes 1973, Lingoes, et al, 1979; Amar and Toledano 2005.
18. The following section draws heavily on Shye and Amar (1985).
19. It may be found that assessments made of artwork in catalogues, maga-
zines, on websites and so on will have this characteristic diminished, and
therefore that there is a clearly identifiable dimensional difference between
the experiences of looking at abstract art in the flesh and in
reproductions.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Abstraction (Abstract Art) Abstract art may strictly be defined as a

twentieth-century Western form of art. What identifies abstraction is
the rejection of representation. To a smaller or greater extent, this form
of art has little concern with the literal depiction of the world that is
normally visible. Abstraction is a Term used in an art context in several
ways: in general for processes of image making in which only some of
the visual elements usually ascribed to the natural world are extracted
(i.e., to abstract), and also for the description of certain works that fall
only partially, if at all, into what is commonly understood to be repre-
sentational. Differing ideas and manifestations of abstraction appeared
in artists works in the successive modern movements of the 20th cen-
tury (Goodman, 1996).
Cognitive Representations The conscious thought-based depiction,
description or account, often visual, of somebody or something. Such
representations are often of situations rather than isolated stimuli.
Construct An explanatory variable that cannot be observed directly is
called a construct. An example is intelligence, which cannot be directly
seen in operation but is inferred to explain intellectual types of behav-
iour. Constructs have two extreme points or poles, for example, hot
cold, fastslow. Events we encounter may be judged or measured
using constructs where we may assign an event to a point between the
polar opposites. George Kelly used constructs as the basis of his per-
sonal construct psychology.

DOI10.1057/978-1-137-48332-4
128 GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Data Data may be defined as a set of values or conditions that may be

taken by qualitative or quantitative variables. Data is collected in a vari-
ety of ways and is measured, assessed, gathered together, analysed and
reported to create coherent and useful information. However, indi-
vidual datum that has not been assessed may still provide information.
Direct Realism Direct realism is a form of realism (see later in the glossary
for a definition of realism) that is also called common sense realism or nave
realism. This philosophy of mind makes claims that our senses provide us
with direct awareness of what we perceive in the world outside our bod-
ies. This form of realism runs counter to indirect realism that holds that
we consciously experience internal representations of the world around us
rather than our conscious experiences being of the real world.
Disjunctivism There are many theories of visual experience amongst
which disjunctivism alone posits visual experience to be either a good
case or a bad case (see, Snowdon, 2008). On this theory veridical experi-
ences and hallucinations share no common components. Disjunctivism
states that there are different mental states present when a person expe-
riences a veridical perception (this is the good case) and when they
experience a hallucination or an illusion (this is what is called the bad
case). The differences between these two types of perceptual experience
may not be discernable by a perceiving person but nevertheless their
mental states associated with each perceptual type will not be the same.
The difference between the two types of experience is that in the case
of a veridical perception this is connected to the external world in the
correct manner but this is not so with hallucinations.
Element (see, facet element)
Facet(s) Facets are useful and empirically divisible, valid components of
a content area.
Facet Elements In facet theory, facet elements are mutually exclusive
subdivisions of a facet.
Facet Theory Facet theory is a social science approach to the research
and understanding of complex human behaviour and situations. This
approach identifies empirically valid components of a research area and
specifies the structure of their combinatorial relationships.
Hasse Diagram Hasse diagrams are taken from mathematics where they
are rudimentary graphical instruments used to instinctively convey
ordered relationships within partially ordered sets (or POSETs). In this
situation, a partially ordered set (see entry in this glossary) in each par-
tially ordered element of the set is represented as a point where a line is
drawn upwards from this point (x) to another point (y) (POSET) when-
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 129
ever x < y and when no z exists in the POSET where x < z < y (Werning,
Machery & Schurz, 2006). Upward lines may cross but not touch any
other points except at their ends. By labelling the points of the POSET,
this diagram is able to unequivocally establish the partial ordering of
the set of items. However, due to the sometimes multiple different
ways to draw a Hasse diagram for a data set, there may be difficulty in
constructing a single definitive diagram for a POSET.
Indirect Realism Indirect realism is a philosophical position that is also
called representationalism, representative realism, the representative
theory of perception and epistemological dualism. On this understand-
ing, it is believed that we perceive the world indirectly through an inter-
nal representation that we form of what it is we perceive. Furthermore,
we cannot directly experience the objects, and so on, that we encoun-
ter, but only our interpretations and ideas about these events. Indirect
realism sees our notions about the world to derive from sense data of
real events. However, it is the sense data that represents our experi-
ences that constitute the direct component of our perceptions. The
argument for representationalism is supported by their claims that all
we are able to experience is that information that is passed through our
senses. As a consequence of perception being necessarily indirect, such
philosophers continue by arguing that there is therefore no need to
think of hallucinations, dreams or visual illusions as being special cases
of perception. Rather, we do not perceive properties of the world itself,
but our perceptual representation of it.
Mapping; a, A mapping is a theoretical or empirical statement that is
provided by a mapping sentence for a research domain, the specifica-
tion of a content area in terms of its pertinent facet and facet elements.
Mapping Sentence A mapping sentence is a theoretical statement of
a research area that is a fundamental component of the facet theory
approach to research. It is a group of statements that express an affec-
tual, cognitive or conative concept through a specific, empirically
derived process. The statements are facets (see above) that are linked
by using everyday connective language to suggest the relationship
between the facets. The mapping sentence is a series of hypotheses
about the research domain. Later in facet research, inquiry explores the
validity of the sentences statements and allows for the alteration of its
structure through the research process.
Mereology The word mereology comes from the Greek word for part.
The study of mereology dates from pre-Socratic times. Mereology is
a form of study in which general principles are sought to explain the
nature of the relationship between an entity and the parts that comprise
that entity. Mereology is also concerned with the relations between the
parts to the whole along with part-to-part relationships within a whole.
Following philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, many later phi-
losophers wrote considerable amounts upon mereology including the
ontologists such as those mentioned in this book (e.g., Duns Scotus,
Aquinas, Ockham, Leibniz). More recently, mereology has appeared in
the works of writers such as Husserl, Brentano and Leniewski.
Non-Pictorial Image A non-pictorial image is a representation of the
external form of a person, event or thing in art, or a mental representa-
tion or idea that does not involve nor is expressed in pictures.
Ontology Within the discipline of philosophy, ontology is the study of
human existence and reality in the sense of the nature of being. Ontology
can also be thought of as being a theory of objects and their ties, which
allows distinctions to be made between different objects, events or
states of affairs in terms of their being real or imaginary, abstract or
concrete, relations, predications of dependencies. Ontologies may be
formal, descriptive or formalized.
Partial Order A relation between the elements of a set S that satisfies
the following three conditions:Reflexive condition: a a for each a in
S.Antisymmetric condition: for a and b in S, a b and b a can both
hold only if a = b. Transitive condition: if a, b and c are in S, then a b
and b c together imply a c. (Partial order, 2008)
Partially Ordered Set (POSET) A POSET or partially ordered set,
where a set is a well-defined collective of things, which are distinct
from all other things and where things may be objects, events or num-
bers. Furthermore, such a distinction must be based upon a specific
attribute or rule. Vogt (2005) gives the example of sets to include such
collectives as even numbers (where even number is precisely defined as
a number that is exactly divisible by 2 with no remains) and all murders
(where the rule is precisely stated as an intentional, illegal killing of a
human being).
Partial Order Scalogram Analysis (POSA, POSAC, POSAR) The
investigation of complex events, ones that are too complicated to study
as if they could be depicted and understood as a unitary or dimension
or entity (e.g., in this book the notion of what is abstract fine art and
how we perceive and understand this), is problematic as the researcher
will likely be imposing his or her conceptualizations upon the informa-
tion. In such a case a multi-dimensional approach must be adopted and
if the concept under investigation is ordered (such that one artwork, or
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 131
one aspect of an artwork, may be liked more than another, i.e., ordered
in a common direction) but not parametric in nature, then a partial
order (POSA) analysis should be employed. Another important aspect
of POSA is that the events under investigation must adequately repre-
sent a conceptual area.
Perception Perception is more than simple sensation. When a living
organism senses something it physiologically registers (through one of
the traditional five sense modalities or through other senses that detect
temperature, time, pain, and senses that detect internal states of the
body for example) the existence of a certain entity or state of affairs and
this provides data for perception. It is usually understood that percep-
tion is the identification, organization and interpretation of sense data
and that it is this perceptual rather than sensory data that allows us to
understand and interact with our environments. Perception is also the
foundation of our original real-world knowledge.
Phenomenology Central to phenomenology are notions of exploring
and describing human experience as this happens in a pre-theoretical
manner. By this it is meant that a researcher adopting this approach
attempts to observe an object or an event, or what may be thought of as
lived experience, in a manner that is as free as is possible from pre-exist-
ing theoretical assumptions and beliefs. In terms of phenomenological
approaches to the philosophy, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2013), even in
his phenomenological depiction of illness (Merleau-Ponty, 1964), has
made a seminal contribution to this field (see, Johnson, 1993, Quinn,
2009).
Quale Singular of qualia (see, Qualia)
Qualia Qualia refer to those aspects of our experiences that are qualita-
tive in nature. Qualia are subjective and embody our feelings and expe-
riential aspects of our encounters with the world. Qualia comprise our
feelings and experiences of abstract art and what differentiate different
experiences that we may have of a variety of artworks. Often, qualia
have been thought of as phenomena that are available through our
conscious introspection.
Realism Individuals who hold the philosophical orientation of being a
realist believe in the existence of reality and that this existence is inde-
pendent of those observing. Thus, on this view we perceive things as
they actually are. Physical laws govern objects in the world and these
exist independently of whether someone is observing or not. There
are sub-qualifications or sub-descriptions of realism. For example, the
belief that specific objects and theories are real is known as scientific
realism. In the fine arts, realism refers to art that aims to portray its
content matter truthfully or clearly representatively. Realism is also a
movement within painting from the nineteenth century.
Representationalism (see indirect realism)
Sense Data Sense data are theoretical constructs that have been posited
as being components of the visual perception process. Specifically, sense
data are mind-dependent entities of which we are consciously aware
during perceiving visually. Sense data theorists are confident that our
sense data, in normal viewing conditions, constitute veridical images in
our mind of what we are looking at. For example, when we look at a
black cat the image is black and cat shaped. Sense data are theoretically
simplistic as they possess the properties they appear to have.
Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) Smallest space analysis is a technique
through which data is analysed to reveal similarities present within a
set of data. This analysis results in a series of two-dimensional plots in
which items are plotted in Euclidean space to display proximity rela-
tionships between the items in the analysis. Analyses are performed
using non-metric statistical software (SSA) developed by Guttman and
Lingoes in which items are displayed visually to as closely as possible
preserve the order of ranking of inter-item correlations that represents
the order of ranking of distances between items in plots. In the visual
output of SSA, items that are closer together are both more correlated
and more similar in terms of concepts related to the design of the items
in the analysis. Items are partitioned to reflect conceptual content.
Veridical Perception Through sense organs organisms (including human
beings) are able to orient themselves within the environments in which
they find themselves. However, for the sensory information they receive
has to be accurately represent and correspond to the physical reality of
the environment. It is this accurate correspondence between what we
register through our senses and reality that facilitates all of our interac-
tions with the external world. This direct perception of things in the
world as they exist and that does correspond to reality is called veridical
perception. As well as simply registering events in the world in an accu-
rate manner, veridical perception also allows us to perceive objects and
other events as being constant. By this I mean, for instance, that objects
in the world move relative to us and in doing this they change in appar-
ent size and shape. It is through a process of veridical perception that
we are able to perceive these sensorially changing entities as remaining
the same object with relatively constant features and characteristics.
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INDEX
A autographic, 55
abstract art, viiiix defined, 4
characteristics of, 78 fine. See fine art
Crowthers characteristics for artists understanding of PhD in fine
structuring, 957 art, mapping sentence of, 934
defined, 4 autographic arts, 55
partial ordering of, 11324
perception of. See perception
two-dimensional, ixxi, 18 B
abstraction, 6, 7, 8, 40, 44, 106 Bacon, Francis, 1, 2, 3, 8, 55, 112
defined, 5 beliefs, and perception, 21, 22
geometric, 91, 120 Brancusi, Atelier, 2, 3
adverbalists account of perception, Brito, Radulphus, 79
1819
allographic arts, 55
Aquinas, Thomas, 79 C
Aristotle, 5, 39 Canter, Dacid, 58, 63
categorical ontology, 667, 778, categorial mereology, 53
80 categorical ontology, ixx, 667, 7782
understanding of perception, mapping sentence for, 99100
6876 categorical systems, 901
art categorization, 513
abstract. See abstract art cognitive neuroscience, 36
allographic, 55 and Gestalt psychology, 425

P.M. Hackett, Psychology and Philosophy of Abstract
Art: Neuro-aesthetics, Perception and Comprehension,
DOI10.1057/978-1-137-48332-4
138 INDEX
colour, 15, 24, 27, 102 mapping sentence to understanding,

See also red light phenomenon using, 915
Common Power Model, 745 ontological understanding of, 547
common sense realism. See direct psychological research into, 401
realism fly agaric (Amanita Muscaria), 7980
contextual visual space
characteristics for structuring, 957
correspondence relationship, 1048 G
cost category, 82 Gestalt psychology, xiii, 415, 47n11,
Crowther's ontology 75
characteristics for structuring, 957 basic principles, 42
mapping sentence for, 99100 cognitive neuroscience and, 425
partial ordering of, 10413 grid image variation, mapping
sentence for defining, 913
Guttman, Louis
D facet theory, 5765
Dahlstrom, Daniel, 12 Guttman Scale, 57
direct perception, 2830
direct realism, 1315
nave, 14, 26 H
scientific, 14 Hackett, Paul, 9n3, 40, 52, 65
disjunctive accounts of perception, hallucination, 1617, 20, 21, 22, 29, 43
201 Hasse diagram, 1034, 115, 116
dynamic causal modelling, 39 Henry of Ghent, 79
Hepburn, Ronald, 4
hermeneutic consistency, 601, 64,
E 656
element. See facet element Heron, Patrick, 7
Emin, Tracey, 55 Husserl, Edmund, 12
empeiria, 76, 84n16
epistemological dualism, 31n2
I
externalist accounts of perception, 13
illusion, 1617, 20, 21, 22, 26, 43
exteroception, 71
indirect perception, 238
indirect realism, 1519, 26
institutional category, 82
F
intentional theory of perception, 212,
facet element, 59, 91
25, 26
facet theory, xixii, 5765
internalist accounts of perception, 13
philosophical approach to, 5960
qualitative, 59, 63
research, 63 K
figureground relationships, 43, 44 Kandinsky, Wassily, 5, 7, 120
fine art, 6, 25 Kelly, Ellsworth, 2
INDEX 139
Klein Group diagram or model, 6 O

Krauss, Rosalind, 56, 9n3 objects of perception, 7781
ontological domain, mapping, 658
ontological understanding of fine art,
L 547
linguistic mereology, 60 ontology, 513, 634
Locke, John, 1415 categorical, 667, 7782
defined, 64
structured, 61, 64
M over-determination, 18
Malevic, 5
mapping sentence, xixii, 57, 59, 60,
623, 64, 658, 1204 P
of artists understanding of PhD in partially ordered set (POSET), 11,
fine art, 934 102, 103
for categorical ontology, 667, partial ordering, 97101
801, 99100 of abstract art, 11324
for defining grid image variation, axioms of, 1024
913 of Crowther's ontology, 10413
hermeneutic consistency, validity of, Partial Order Scalogram Analysis
656 (POSA), 11113, 11920, 122,
to understanding fine art, using, 123
915 Perception, viiviii, 1131
Marmodoro, Anna, viii, 6875, 84n15 of art, 513, 901
Martin, Agnes, 7 direct, 2830
materials category, 82 disjunctive accounts of, 201
mereology, 83n1 externalist accounts of, 13
categorial, 53 indirect, 238, 26
defined, 612 internalist accounts of, 13
linguistic, 60 multimodal, 701
structured, 60 objects of, 7781
Mixed Content Model, 723 phenomenalism and, 1920
Mondrian, 5, 7 phenomenology and, 223
multimodal perception, 701 process of, 6876
multiple artworks, 56 realism and, 1319
Multiple Sensors Model, 73 theories of, 1213
Peter of Auvergne, 79
phantasia, 76
N phenomenalism, 1920
neuroscience, 36, 47n4 phenomenology, 223
cognitive, 36, 425 philosophy, 28
visual, 37 of facet theory, 5960
neuroscientific approaches to visual linguistic, 4
perception, 3640
140 INDEX
Picasso, Pablo, 1, 2, 8, 105, 108, 112, S

119 Scotus, Duns, 79, 80, 84n17
Plato, 5, 77 Searle, John
product category, 82 theory of direct perception, 2830
proprioception, 71 sense data, 15, 1718, 22, 27, 28
psychological processes category, 82 sensibles
psychological research into abstract common, 69, 70, 72, 73, 745, 76
fine art, 401 special, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76
Simon of Faversham, 79
singular artworks, 56
Q smallest space analysis (SSA), 589
qualia, 238, 31n8, 31n9, 36, 47n1 Smith, David, 7
functional aspects of, 24 stratigraphy, 111, 1245n12
qualitative facet theory, 59, 63 structure, 238, 61, 68
structured mereology, 60
structured ontology, 61, 64
R Structure of the Personality Beliefs
Ratio Model, 73 Questionnaire-Short-Form, 83n7
realism Stubbs, George, 55
direct, 1315 Substantive Mode, 74, 75, 76
indirect, 1519 supperadditative growth, 37
and perception, 1319
qualia, 26
receptive field (RF), 37, 44 T
red light phenomenon, 24, 27 theories of perception, 1213
See also colour
Relative Identity Model, 734
representational theory of perception. V
See intentional theory of veridical perception, 16, 20, 21, 22,
perception 29
retinotopic representations, 47n5 visual neuroscience, 37
Richter, Gerhardt, 7 visual perception, 28
Rodin, 1516 neuroscientific approaches to, 3640
Roth, Bjrn, 3
Roth, Dieter, 3
Rothko, Paul, 2
Russell, Bertrand, 17

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PSYCHOLOGY AND

Paul M.W. Hackett

ISBN 978-1-137-48331-7 ISBN 978-1-137-48332-4 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016941188

The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

In Fine Art and Perceptual Neuroscience (Hackett, 2013), I first proposed

attempt to clarify the process of human perception, I introduce readers of

of art, in this essay I will place boundaries around my consideration of

PERCEIVING ANDUNDERSTANDING TWO-DIMENSIONAL

a categorical ontology for understanding differences within abstract fine

that addresses perception. Consequently, I will also draw upon my writ-

MAPPING SENTENCES ANDFACET THEORY

Due to the multiplicity of perspectives I employ, I offer a challenge

activity in the brain generates subjective conscious experience such as the

1 Defining Two-Dimensional Abstract Art 1

3 Expanding Theoretical Complexity 35

4 Perceptual Content, Process andCategorial Ontologies 51

5 Mapping Sentence and Partial Order Mereology for

Glossary of Terms 127

Fig. 4.1 Mapping sentence for the validity of hermeneutic consistency

Table 3.1 Gestalt principles of perception 42

Defining Two-Dimensional Abstract Art

Keywords Abstract art Abstraction Fine art Perception

The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 1

DEFINITIONS OFART ANDABSTRACT FINE ART

ing art will be defined broadly as both a process and a product of

Krauss (1994) has suggested a framework for understanding abstract art in

such practice, these artists have offered theoretical testaments of elucida-

or dreamlike phenomena. Crowther claims that his list comprehensively

Abstract An abstract painting may be considered a configuration of marks

Keywords Perception Fine art Art Abstract art Perception of art

The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 11

perception has been investigated and theorized about by scholars, each

ies specific notions regarding metaphysical and ontological perspectives.

DIRECT ANDINDIRECT REALISM

Locke goes on to say that in contradistinction secondary qualities of an

The Thinker, the sculpture causes an internal mental two-dimensional set

ars have resorted to notions of psychological constructs to account for this

Questions arise when considering the dualist position as providing

DISJUNCTIVE ACCOUNTS OFPERCEPTION

ment, which through denying the similarity of veridical and non-veridical

THE INTENTIONAL OR REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY

The intentional theory of perception is sometimes called representational-

Intentionalists understand that both veridical and non-veridical percep-

of as what it is like to be experiencing the perception of the receding road

INDIRECT PERCEPTION: QUALIA ANDSTRUCTURE

1. Irrevocable (qualia are undeniable);

Kanai and Tsuchiya (2012) further note that mandatory fusion is

(2007, p133) says, I am a qualia realist. I believe that specifically phe-

of the neural filling-in phenomena; Purves and Lotto (2003) demon-

SEARLES THEORY OFDIRECT PERCEPTION

ist theoreticians that I have mentioned. Searle continues by naming some

process to be active, to involve action or to be goal directed. However, a

of two hats which he calls phenomenological and epistemological percep-

Lean, M. (2013). Sense-perception and matter: A critical analysis of C.D.

Stroll, A. (2000). Twentieth-century analytic philosophy. New York: Columbia

Expanding Theoretical Complexity

Abstract I introduce psychological and neuroscientific approaches to

Keywords Visual neuroscience Psychology Gestalt psychology

The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 35

lish the conceptual worth of qualia as providing useful means to aid in