RULE 130 SECTION 33 CONFESSION

People vs. Agustin 240 S 541 [supra]

People vs. Tiozon 198 S 368

FACTS
One evening while, while the spouses were sleeping inside their house, they were awakened by the loud knocks on their door;
the husband opened the door and saw their "Pareng Troping", accused herein; her husband invited the accused, who appeared
to be very drunk, to come inside their house; once inside their house, accused sat down and the two (accused and victim)
exchanged pleasantries; she even saw the accused showing a gun to her husband and the latter even toyed with it; she got
irritated by her husband's playing with the gun, so she took a few steps away from the two, however, when she looked back to the
place where her husband and the accused was, she found out that the two had already left; five minutes later and/or after she
had heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused knocking at their door and at the same time informing her that he
accidentally shoot her husband she got scared by the appearance of the accused who was full of bloodstains so she pushed him
away from her; she immediately went to her sister-in-law Marilyn Bolima and both of them proceeded to the house of the
accused; thereat, they saw the victim lying with his face up; she took her husband's pulse and when she still felt some warmth on
his body, she sought help that her husband be brought to the hospital; accused extended his help by helping them in carrying the
victim towards the main road, however, after a few steps, he changed his mind and put down the victim; accused reasoned out
that the victim was already dead; she pushed the accused and even without the latter's help, they were able to reach the main
road; afterwhich, some of her neighbors arrived bringing with them lights; thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so she
caused the arrest of the accused.
In holding the accused-appellant guilty as above-stated, the court a quo relied on circumstantial evidence because the
prosecution failed to present an eyewitness who could give an account as to the actual shooting incident.
The court a quo found accused-appellant guilty reasonable doubt of the crime of P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery.
The Solicitor General maintains that the prosecution was able to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and prays that
subject decision be affirmed in toto.

PROSECUTION
6) The testimony of the wife that accused, immediately after the shooting incident took place admitted to her having accidentally
shoot (sic) the victim is admissible evidence against the accused declarant since this is covered by the rule on res gestae or one
of an exception to the hearsay rule.
Part of the res gestae Statement made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior tor
(sic) subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstance thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of res gestae . . .
(Sec. 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, as amended)

ISSUE
WON THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL
POSSESSION WITH MURDER AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 1 OF P.D. 1866. THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES
RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

HELD
The Court agree with the findings and conclusion of the court a quo that more than one circumstantial evidence were duly proved
and that these circumstances point, beyond reasonable doubt, to the accused-appellant as the one who shot and killed the
deceased Leonardo Bolima y Mesia. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to convict an accused, it is necessary that the
following requisites must be satisfied: (a) there must be more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute "an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the
defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that
of guilty.
The first to the sixth circumstances mentioned by the trial court were duly established and constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellant, and no other else, shot and killed the victim. We do not,
however, agree with the additional observation of the trial court, in respect to the sixth circumstance, that the statement made by
the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim immediately after the shooting incident that he accidentally shot the victim is
covered by the rule on res gestae. This is a misapplication of the rule in the instant case. Statements as part of the res gestae are
among the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The rule is that a witness "can testify only to those facts which he knows of or his own
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perceptions.17 Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as to what he heard
other persons say about the facts in dispute cannot be admitted because it is hearsay evidence. There are, however, exceptions
to this rule. One of them is statements as part of the res gestae under Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact hearsay; but it is to be admitted in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section
36, statements may be deemed as part of the res gestae if they are made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof. Statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue and giving it a legal significance may also be received as part of the res gestae.
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is not hearsay. She testified on what the accused-
appellant told her, not what any other party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The accused-appellant's statement was an
"oral confession", not a part of res gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true, which he did in this case.
In People vs. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107,116-117, We declared that a statement allegedly made by one of the accused to Natalia
Macaraeg that "we killed him" (referring to himself and his co-accused) and which Natalia repeated in her testimony in open court
was merely an "oral confession" and not part of the res gestae.
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the alleged statement of the accused-appellant is
hearsay, the latter is barred from questioning its admission due to his failure to object thereto at the time the testimony was given.
The records and the evidence fail to disclose that the prosecution presented any evidence to prove that the accused-appellant
was not authorized to possess the firearm alleged in the information. And, contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no
sufficient evidence to prove the presence of treachery. It must be stated, however, that had illegal possession of firearms been
duly proven as alleged, it would not have mattered whether the killing was simple homicide.
The prosecution did not offer any evidence to prove that the accused-appellant had no license to possess or carry the firearm in
question; it however, threw the burden on the accused-appellant to prove that he has that authority. It ruled that:
Where accused relies as a matter of defense on an exception in a statute which is not in the enacting clause by which the
offense is described and forbidden, he has the burden of proving that he is within the exception.
Where the subject matter of a negative averment in the information, or a fact relied upon by defendant as a justification or
excuse, relates to him personally or otherwise lie peculiarly within his knowledge, the general rule is that the burden of proof of
such averment or fact is on him.
In cases of illegal possession of firearms, the burden of proof as to the negative averments in the information to the effect that the
accused possesses the firearms without the corresponding license is on the defense. It is the accused who is called upon to
prove that he possesses the license. In other words, the fact relied upon by the accused as a justification or excuse being one
that is related to him personally or otherwise within his peculiar knowledge, "the general rule is that the burden of proof as to such
averment or fact is on the accused".
There being no proof that accused-appellant had no license to possess the firearm in question, he could not be convicted for
illegal possession of a firearm. The trial court then committed an error in holding the accused-appellant guilty thereof.
Accordingly, accused-appellant could only be liable for HOMICIDE since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances had
been proved.

People vs. Tujon 215 S 559

Facts: Tujon, Parola and Paredes were charged with Robbery with Homicide. Paredes remained at large. Tujon and Parola were
convicted. They allegedly robbed and killed a taxi driver.

There is no eyewitness for the prosecution. To establish the case against the accused, the prosecution relied mainly on the extra-
judicial confessions of Tujon and Parola. The confessions were signed by police detective and by the accused.

During trial, Tujon denied the charges against him. He testified that he came from the province and looked for a job in Manila. He
was arrested for unknown reasons. He also testified that he did not know his other co-accused. The policemen asked him to sign
a paper the contents of which he did not know.

Issue:

WON the confession is admissible

Held:

No. It is a matter of record that the interrogation was made in the absence of counsel de parte or de oficio and the waiver of
counsel, if made at all, was not made with the assistance of counsel as required.

It is not clear that the accused were actually offered the services of a lawyer and they refused. In any event, it is undisputed that
the waiver of the accused of their right to counsel was made without the assistance of counsel.

Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that waiver of right to counsel to be valid, must be in writing and in the presence of
counsel. Extra-judicial confessions taken without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence

People vs Ladao GR 100940-41 November 27, 2001

FACTS:
 1. Accused herein are found guilty of robbery with homicide following the death of a jeepney driver who drowned after being
tied and dumped in an estero, and the robbery of the victim and his passengers.

2. Records show that the accused herein are part of the group arrested by Caloocan police in a crackdown with the
rampant robbery and hold-up.

3. In his extra-judicial confession, Ponseca revealed that he and his other co-accused escaped [custody] and held up a
passenger jeepney driven by the victim in this case. Posecas testimony detailed how the crime was committed, including
his participation of being the one who collected the passengers belongings and the one who dumped the victim into the
estero.

a. The extrajudicial confession also details how the accused was assisted by Atty. Crisostomo, and was properly
apprised of their rights.

4. Prosecution also presented witnesses, one of which is the passenger and the other is the widow of the jeepney driver.

a. The passenger positively identified the accused as the persons who robbed them

b. The widow testified that her husband is missing and upon reporting it to the police, her husbands cadaver was
found in an estero, an autopsy of which revealed that the cause of death is drowning.

5. On the basis of the foregoing, RTC found them GUILTY of robbery with homicide.

6. Hence, this petition by Ponseca, alleging primarily that the trial court erred in considering the validity of the extrajudicial
statement, claiming that he was tortured into it.

ISSUE: W/N the extrajudicial confession is valid

HELD: Yes.

Settled is the rule that once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-
interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the one who claims that it is not has the burden of proof to
show that the confession as involuntary and untrue.

To this end, Petitioner claims that rarely is a man compelled to admit his liability and even if he does so, he would try to limit his
liability.

SC does not agree with Petitioner. The language of the confession and the details thereof could only come from a participant in
the commission of a crime. Every aspect of his confession is corroborated by the testimony of the other accused, and even
describes the manner in which the jeepney driver was thrown away.

It is also shown that the Petitioner even tried to limit his liability by saying that he did not know that the estero was filled with
water, that he did not know that the jeepney driver would drown.

Further, the confession was supported by the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. They were positively identified by the
passenger, and the passenger even supported the confession in its details. Further, the testimony of the widow finding the
cadaver of her husband in an estero further corroborates the testimony. WHEREFORE, the finding of guilt is AFFIRMED.

People vs Encipido 146 S 478

On March 30, 1982, Jose Lacumbes (hereinafter referred to as the DECEASED), a resident of Barangay Mabini in the
Municipality of Tubajon, Surigao del Norte, was found killed by his wife and children near the hut in their farm in Sitio Capacohan
in the same barangay. Post Mortem findings performed the following morning were:
l) Incised wound of the neck.
2) Eight [8] multiple stab wounds at the back; one [1] inch in length and two and a half [2] inches in depth.
3) Removed right external ear.
 4) Contusions left lumbar region.
5) Both hands tied at the back with rattan.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to incised wounds of the neck and multiple stab wounds at the back.
On February 2, 1983, in Criminal Case No. 14 of the Regional Trial Court, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 32 (the CASE BELOW),
the following eight (8) persons: (1) Brigido ENCIPIDO (2) Charlito MANATAD, (3) Eddie DE LA PENA (hereinafter referred to as
APPELLANTS), (4) Jesus Rubio, (5) Rudy Lumarda, (6) Jose CABAGERAN (7) Cris Ramirez, and (8) Jesus or John Doe were
charged with Murder for the death of the DECEASED. Only fly APPELLANTS were tried, the other five accused having remained
at large.
A review of the prosecution evidence presented in the CASE BELOW can begin with the testimony of Felicisimo Alciso. This
witness narrated that he went to the hut of the DECEASED in the afternoon of March 30, 1982, in order to get some chickens
which the latter had promised him but that, before reaching the hut, he heard a gunshot. He stopped and saw that the
DECEASED was being tied and subjected to fist blows. There were three persons who mauled the DECEASED, while others
stayed at a distance. Then, somebody struck the DECEASED with the butt of a gun causing the latter to fall to the ground. He
described that the hands of the DECEASED were tied at the back, ENCIPIDO was behind the DECEASED, while MANATAD and
DE LA PE;A were on the sides. 1 On orders of ENCIPIDO also known as "Commander Tanga," DE LA PE;A, also called
"Agosto de la Pena struck the Deceased's neck with a bolo which almost I severed the latter's head. Frightened, witness Alciso
fled from the scene.
After learning from friends and neighbors that those who had killed the DECEASED were detained, Alciso went to the jail to find
out for himself if they were among the group responsible for the death of the DECEASED, and because "I was afraid that I will be
the next one to be killed by them." He recognized APPELLANTS as among the suspects. When he asked DE LA PENA why he
was in jail, the latter answered that it was because they were the ones who had beheaded the DECEASED. Alciso was unable to
talk to ENCIPIDO and MANATAD.
Before Alciso there was another prosecution witness presented, Armando Bagacay whose testimony turned out to be hearsay but
which nevertheless is reproduced here to complete the evidence for the prosecution. He testified that while he was massaging
one of the accused, Rudy Lainarda on March 10, 1982, the latter told him that his ailment was caused by witchcraft of the victim,
Jose Lacumbes, and that he would seek the aid of the rebels to cut Lacumbes' head. Four days later, Bagacay met one of those
originally indicted, Jesus Rubio, who confided to him that they would cut Lacumbes' neck for making Lumarda sick and for being
responsible for all i the witchcraft in the community. Subsequently, witness Bagacay heard of the death of Lacumbes at the hands
of the rebels.
Two other prosecution witnesses supported testimony Alciso Jorge Ortega, INP Station Commander of Loreto, Agusan del Norte,
testified that when he had just arrived from Surigao City at about 2:30 o'clock P.M. of May 1, 1982, and while still at the wharf, he
was met by ENCIPIDO who introduced himself as "Commander Tanga," invited him (Ortega) for a drink so he could talk to the
latter personally. Having ac cepted the invitation, the two proceeded to a store where ENCIPIDOs fourteen companions were
already waiting. They introduced themselves as rebels and offered to help the municipal government. In the course of the
conversation, ENCIPIDO and DE LA PE;A disclosed to the Station Commander that they were the ones who had beheaded the
DECEASED, killed a certain Benny and one Balaba, and who were responsible for all the killings in Dinagat Island.
The other prosecution witness, Mariano Espina, the Municipal Mayor of Loreto, testified that in the evening of that same day of
May 1, 1982, Station Commander Jorge Ortega informed him that Commander Tanga" and his men wanted to pay him a courtesy
call. They arrived at about 8:00 in the evening at his house. They introduced themselves and placed their sidearms on a table as
a sign of goodwill. At the time, there were about 2 policemen and 3 CHDF men outside the house but no arrests were made, nor
were firearms confiscated, as a sign of reciprocal goodwill "Commander Tanga" then confided to the Mayor his mission to
cooperate with his administration as they had heard that he was a good Mayor. He also informed the Mayor that he had been a
member of the NPA since he was 13 years old; that he had already killed many people, including the DECEASED, so that the
latter could no longer harm other people with his witchcraft. For his part, DE LA PE;A brought out a sharp-pointed knife and tried
to test its sharpness, admitted having cut the neck of the DECEASED, and even showed the latter's ear, dried by that time.
The foregoing testimonies were buttressed from a most unexpected source. DE LA PE;A, to the surprise of APPELLANT
APPELLANTS' common counsel testified in open Court that, although he belonged to the group of "Commander Tanga," the
latter, MANATAD and a third individual merely forced him to join, threatening to kill him if he refused; that he was with the group
from March 28, 1982; that he was present on March 30, 1982 when "Commander Tanga" and MANATAD killed the DECEASED
but that he was merely standing by; that the duo were the first ones apprehended, and after them he was also arrested by the
CHDF.
In their defense, ENCIPIDO and MANATAD denied having I killed the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. ENCIPIDO
claimed that on March 30, 1982, he was sawing lumber from morning till 3:00 P.M. at Barangay Boa for a certain Norberto Bukid.
After working he rested in Bukid's house and did not leave the place. He further testified that he did not know the DECEASED nor
the Station Commander, nor the Municipal Mayor except when he surrendered his .45 caliber pistol to the latter on May 2, 1982
after which he was arrested. He decided to surrender his pistol because he was afraid he might be apprehended for having an
unlicensed firearm. MANATAD and DE LA PENA were also placed in jail with him. Thereafter, with seven others, he was taken to
PC head- quarters at Surigao City where they were severely maltreated and he was forced to sign an affidavit admitting that he is
"Commander Tanga" responsible for the killing of the DECEASED and other persons. He denied having admitted to the Station
Commander and to the Municipal Mayor his Identi ty as "Commander Tanga" or that he had killed the DECEASED and other
persons besides.
MANATAD, for his part, also denied all imputations against him, stating that he only came to know ENCIPIDO in jail; that he did
not know the DECEASED nor who killed him that during the whole day of March 30, 1982, he was plowing the field tenanted by
his mother-in-law at Barangay Malinao; that he started plowing early in the morning and stopped at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. after
which he stayed home. Barangay Captain Sergio Peniones partially corroborated MANATAD's testimony by stating that he saw
MANATAD plowing the i field in the morning of March 30, 1982. MANATAD's wife, Bienvenida Edusma also testified that her
husband stayed home after 5:00 o'clock P.M. of that day as he was tired after the day's work; that, in fact, she quarreled with her
husband because he refused to accompany her in bringing their sick child to Tubajon on so that she went alone carrying the child
even though she was then seven months pregnant.
In a Decision promulgated by the Trial Court on December 5, 1984, APPELLANTS were found guilty of Murder and sen tenced
to reclusion perpetua to pay damages to the heirs of the DECEASED in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay 3/8 of the costs.
On behalf of APPELLANTS, counsel de officio filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the Trial Court on December 26, 1984,
which the latter denied for having been filed more than fifteen (5) days after the promulgation date of December 5, 1984. A Notice
of Appeal filed before the then Intermediate Appellate Court was allowed as an appeal not from the judgment but from the Order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The penalty imposed by the Trial Court being reclusion perpetual the appeal was
indorsed to this instance, which we accepted in the interest of substantial justice.
APPELLANTS raise the following Assignments of Error:
A The lower Court erred in giving credence to the hearsay testimonies of prosecution witnesses Mariano Espina and
George Ortega basing therefrom its findings of conviction;
B The lower Court erred in giving credence to the incredible and hearsay testimony of Felicisimo Alciso the alleged
eyewitness;
C The lower Court erred in appreciating the so-called judicial admission of accused Eddie de la Pena as against his co-
accused Brigido ENCIPIDO and Charlito Manatad;
D The lower Court erred in convicting appellants Brigido ENCIPIDO and Charlito Manatad;
E The lower Court erred in refusing to give due course to appellants' motion for reconsideration holding that it was filed
out of time when its judgment accordingly has become final;
F The lower Court erred in convicting appellant Eddie de la Pe;a.
The evidence against APPELLANTS, taken en conjunto" justifies the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
1. Eyewitness Felicisimo Alciso positively Identified APPELLANT as among the group who led the DECEASED out of his hut, with
his hands tied behind his back, and thereafter mauled him and hacked his neck in the afternoon of March 30, 1982. The autopsy
findings, particularly, the "incised wound of the neck," "contusions left lumbar region" and "both hands tied at the back with rattan"
confirm his description of what he had witnessed.
The defense contents, however, that said witness could not have recognized APPELLANTS.
It is true that at the start of his testimony, he had stated that he did not recognize the assailants. Thus:
Q. Who were the persons who mauled Jose Lacumbes during that time?
A. I saw that there were three of them but I could not recognize them; and there were some other persons who
were staying from a distance. 2
That testimony, however, referred to the early stage of the incident when the victim was being mauled. Subsequently, in respect
of the killing itself, the witness declared:
Fiscal Sandangal
Could you not recognize the three persons who killed Jose Lacumbes?
Witness:
I could recognize the three persons who killed Jose Lacumbes. 3
Then he described specifically:
 Q. What else did you see, if any?
A. I saw that somebody was beating Jose Lacumbes with the use of a gun, and when Jose Lacumbes fell down,
Commander Tanga commanded Eddie de la Pena to cut the head of the victim but the head was not severed
from the body. 4
After pointing to the APPELLANTS in the Courtroom and replying to a question by the Court, Alciso further explained:
Court (addressing to the witness) When did you know the accused by their names?
WITNESS: In the jail your Honor. Before I met them in the jail I already recognized their faces but I just do not
know their names. Later on, I already know their names. 5
The defense further claims that Alciso could not have recognized the assailants because he was at a distance of 80 to 90 meters
away from the scene of, the crime. In another instance, however, he said that the place of the killing was about "20 arms length"
from the hut of the DECEASED, while he was also about the same distance from the hut at that time. The distances stated were
merely his estimates and can be moderately exact or moderately inexact specially with provincial folk. The important fact is that
even from where he was, he witnessed the incident and his description of it was corroborated by the admission of APPELLANTS,
themselves and supported by the autopsy findings on the cadaver. As this Court ruled in People vs. Hamtig et al., 6 the credibility
of the testimony of a witness is not affected by some flaws and inconsistencies in minor details, if as regards the main incident,
the Identities of the malefactors, the testimonies appear to be consistent with each other."
And although it was admittedly the first time that Alciso saw the malefactors, it does not necessarily follow that he could not have
recognized their faces. Persons observing a startling occurrence would strive to know the ones involved specially where as in this
case the DECEASED was not unknown to Alciso.
Next, it is argued that Alcisos testimony that he went to i the jail to verify the Identity of the malefactors is not worthy of credence.
Concededly, that actuation was unusual However, as the witness explained he did so because he feared that he may be the next
one to be Killed And the fact that he asked DE LA PE;A why the latter was in jail does not necessarily lead to the conclusion, as
alleged, that he had not witnessed the occurrence. A friendly question was more likely to evoke candid answer.
There is nothing strange either in Alcisos not having mentioned the culprits by name in his sworn statement taken more than
three months after the incident, having referred to them merely as "five persons." As is wen known "an affidavit is not prepared by
the affiant himself Omissions and misunderstanding . are not infrequent, particularly under circumstances of hurry and
impatience." 7
ENCIPIDO and DE LA PE;A verbally acknowledged their guilt before Station Commander Ortega and Municipal Mayor Espina
when they individually boasted that they had killed the DECEASED so that the latter could no longer harm other people with his
witchcraft. They admitted that they had beheaded the DECEASED. DE LA PE;A even showed the Mayor the DECEASED's
dried ear which he had severed, Further, while I i in jail, DE LA PE;A also admitted to Alciso when the latter I asked him the
reason for their confinement, that it was because they were the ones who had beheaded the DE CEASED. These oral
confessions indicating complicity in the commission of the crime with which they are charged are admissible in evidence against
the declarants ENCIPIDO and DE LA PE;A pursuant to Sections 22 8 and 29 9 of the Rules of Court. It is the fact that
admissions were made by APPELLANTS and against their own interest which gives them their evidentiary value. 10
It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS' extra-judicial confessions were independently made without collusion, are Identical with
each other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial
evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission
of the crime. 11 They are also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and
circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime charged
and proved. 12 They are what is commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the general rule that
extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof.
And while it may be that ENCIPIDOS written statement before the PC on May 6, 1982 confessing to the killing of the DECEASED
was not presented at the trial no presumption of wilful suppression of evidence may be levelled against the prosecution on
account of its non-production. Apparently, for the prosecution, it was not important or necessary to bolster up its case.
The argument that the testimonies of Station Commander Ortega, Mayor Espina, and Alciso as to the extrajudicial admissions
made to them respectively by ENCIPIDO and/or DE LA PE;A constitute hearsay, and thus inadmissible, is not well taken. Oral
confessions may be proved by any competent witness by whom they were heard, the same as any other fact:
The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to
the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood an of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim,
but in such case it must be given in its substance. (23 C.J.S. 196).
 Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he
was present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the accused.
(Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., Niblack, sec. 278, p. 551). 13
ENCIPIDOS and DE LA PE;A's extrajudicial acknowledgments of guilt to the Municipal Mayor and the INP Station Commander
are not necessarily incredible for, in their minds, they were not "confessing" but bragging of their exploits" in the belief that they
were saving the community from the witchcraft of the DECEASED and the evil doings of some people. There is no proof
whatsoever that the extrajudicial admissions in question were coerced or concocted by those officials, who are responsible public
officers and presumed to have regularly performed their functions and against whose impartiality nothing has been proven. The
fact that no arrest were made by them immediately after the disclosures do not necessarily belie their testimonies since the spirit
of "reciprocal goodwill" pervaded the encounters. Arrests were made, however, the day after, or on May 2, 1982.
APPELLANTS had the opportunity during the trial to refute their verbal admissions as in fact, they denied having made them, but
their denials do not ring with truth in the face of other inculpating evidence.
3. The additional incriminating evidence was furnished by DE LA PE;A who, in open Court, under oath, testified that he
belonged to "Commander Tanga's" group, was with them since two days before the incident, and that he was with ENCIPIDO and
MANATAD when they killed the DECEASED. DE LA PE;AS declaration confirms the existence of the group, their responsibility
for the killing and, at the very least, his presence during the commission of the crime.
True, DE LA PE;A exculpated himself by stating that he was only forced to join the group and was merely standing by when the
killing occurred. A statement involving guilt does not, however, lose its character as a confession from the fact that it was
accompanied by statements of an exculpatory nature, 14 it being "the natural tendency of every transgressor, with perhaps very
rare exceptions, to acquit himself while he can do so from all liability that might arise from his act, or at least mitigate it in the eyes
of the law and those of his fellowmen". 15 Like other evidence, it must be weighed, believed, or disbelieved in whole or in part, as
reason may decide. Herein, the exculpatory statement has been proven false by Alcisos credible account that upon ENCIPIDOS
orders, DE LA PE;A hacked the DECEASED's neck with a bolo which almost severed the latter's head, which testimony is
confirmed by the autopsy finding of "incised wound on the neck." It was likewise proven false by DE LA PE;As own extrajudicial
admission to the Municipal Mayor that he had hacked the DECEASED's neck and severed his ear, which is buttressed by the
post mortem finding of "removed right external ear."
DE LA PE;AS judicial admission is admissible not only against him but against his co-accused ENCIPIDO and MANATAD as
well. The general rule that the confession of an accused may be given in evidence against him but that it is not competent
evidence against his co-accused, admits of exceptions. Thus, this Court has held that where several accused are tried together
for the same complaint, the testimony lawfully given by one during the trial implicating the others is competent evidence against
the latter. 16 "The extrajudicial admission or confession of a co-conspirator out of court is different from the testimony given by a
co-accused during trial. The first is admissible against the declarant alone, but the second is perfectly admissible against his co-
accused," 17 who had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. In this case, counsel de officio had such
opportunity to cross-examine DE LA PE;A but did not avail of it because in his own words:
Atty Moleta: I would like to inform the Honorable Court that I am in quandary It is my duty as counsel-de-oficio to
be candid to this Honorable Court. The witness has not actually followed what I intimated to him to be the nature
of his
testimony. 18
In other words, the reason counsel refrained from cross examination was not because he was not given the opportunity to do so
but because DE LA PE;A did not follow counsel's bidding as to the nature of his testimony. The coached testimony failed but the
truth prevailed. Besides, defense counsel could have presented rebuttal evidence to overcome DE LA PE;A's testimony if he
had chosen to do so but did not.
Thus, MANATAD's direct participation in the commission of the crime with which he is charged has been established by DE LA
PE;A's declaration in open Court that "Commander Tanga and Charlito Manatad killed a certain person," and the corroborative
testimony of Alciso who categorically testified that MANATAD was on one side of the DECEASED, DE LA PE;A on the other and
ENCIPIDO at the back when they perpetrated the offense with which they are changed. In MANATAD's respect, therefore, it is
not necessary to invoke conspiracy" to support his conviction.
The defense of alibi separately interposed by ENCIPIDO and MANATAD cannot prevail over their positive Identification by
eyewitness Also by ENCIPIDOS verbal acknowledgments of guilt, and by DE LA PE;A's judicial and extra- i judicial
admission/confession, which are interlocking and ad-missible as against themselves and as against the others whom they also
implicated. Neither were ENCIPIDO and MANATAD able to prove that they were at some place for such a period of time that it
was impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Barangay Boa where ENCIPIDO
was allegedly sawing lumber was approximately 60 kilometers away, 19 and Barangay Malinao where MANATAD was
supposedly plowing the field, about 12 kilometers, 20from Barangay Mabini, Tubajon, Surigao where the incident occurred.
In the last analysis, the core issue addresses itself to the credibility of witnesses, a matter that the Trial Court had unequalled
competence to consider and decide since it was in a vantage position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses of
both sides while testifying, an opportunity not afforded to Appellate Courts. Its findings as to credibility should not be disturbed
and are entitled to great weight unless there is some fact of record that has been overlooked or the significance of which has
been misconstrued, 21 which exceptions we find absent herein.
The last assigned error delving on the refusal of the Trial Court to give due course to appellants' Motion for Reconsideration on
the ground that the judgment had become final is no longer of any consequence since all the grounds therefor have been
elevated to and considered by this Court on appeal.
In fine, the threads of evidence woven together establish APPELLANTS' guilt to a moral certainty.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed except as to the civil indemnity, which is hereby increased to
P30,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence. With proportionate costs.

People vs Janjalani 639 S 157

Elmer Andales- conductor

Baharan and Trinidad- two men who planted bomb in bus

Asali-bomb maker

Facts:

On feb 14 2005, a bus was going from Navotas to Alabang. Two men got on the bus. Both seemed suspicious according to Elmer
Andales, the conductor. The two men alighted in Ayala Ave. and the bus exploded. After the explosion, the spokesperson for abu
sayyaff announced over radio that the explosion was a valentines gift.

Accused Asali, member of abu sayaff, gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive
devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that
they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.

Asali testified that he had given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. Accused
contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: w/n Asalis testimony admissible? Yes

Held: It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made
during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in
court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.[27]
Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:

[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession
may be given in evidence against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarants co-accused
since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial where the party
adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercenes admission
implicating his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant
Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-
accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence against the latter.[28]

RULE 130 SECTION 36 HEARSAY RULE

People vs. Valero 112 S 661

Lucila Valero alias Rosing and Alfonsito Valero alias "Pipe" were accused in the Municipal Court of San Rafael, Bulacan in two
separate complaints, one of double murder and the other of frustrated murder.
After the preliminary investigations, the complaints against Alfonsito Valero were dismissed "on the ground that he is a deaf-mute
and, therefore, all the proceedings against him were beyond his comprehension". Lucila Valero remained as the sole defendant.
After the trial in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan where the records were later forwarded for appropriate proceedings, the
trial Court convicted Lucila Valero of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder and imposed upon her the
extreme penalty of death.
Hence, this automatic review.
The following facts are not disputed. In the morning of February 22, 1969 between 7:00 and 9:00 o'clock of Saturday, Michael,
aged 9 months, and Annabel, aged 1 year and 9 months, both of whom are the children of Ceferino Velasco, died of poisoning
after eating bread containing endrin, a commercial insecticide. Likewise, Imelda, another minor child of Ceferino, tasted the
poisoned bread and would have died as a consequence were it not for the timely medical assistance given her. All these three
minor children were in the balcony of their house at San Rafael, Bulacan, when they partook of the poisoned bread.
On the same morning at about the same time that the three minor children partook of the poisoned bread, three (3) puppies of
Ceferino Velasco under the balcony also died of poisoning.
Earlier that same morning at about 6:00 o'clock, Ceferino Velasco, father of the victims, was seen throwing poisoned rats into a
river near his house. Investigations were conducted by Cpl. Bucot and Pat. Arturo Ventuso both of the Police Department of San
Rafael, Bulacan. Upon their arrival, they saw the dead bodies of Michael and Annabel in the house of Ceferino Velasco and the
dead puppies under the balcony. They also saw several pieces of sliced pan scattered in the sala of the house, near the balcony,
and under the balcony. They picked up some pieces of sliced bread under the balcony, wrapped them in a piece of paper and
submitted them to a chemist for examination. It was found that the bread contained endrin, a poisonous insecticide. The two
minor children, Michael and Annabel, were also autopsied and the necropsy reports showed that both children died of poisoning
by endrin. Samples of the blood and internal organs of both Michael and Annabel were also examined by a chemist and it was
found that they contained endrin.
The evidence of the prosecution and the defense conflict as to the source of the poisoned bread. The evidence of the prosecution
shows that the poisoned bread was given to the children by Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, a deaf-mute brother of the defendant
Lucila Valero, and that it was Lucila Valero who gave the bread to Pipe for delivery to the minor children. On the other hand, the
defendant Lucila Valero denies that she ever gave bread to her deaf-mute brother, Pipe, for delivery to the minor children. The
evidence for the defense tends to show that the Velasco children might have eaten one of the sliced poisoned bread used by
their father in poisoning rats in his garden.
It is not denied that Ceferino Velasco has a vegetable garden in his yard. He uses an insecticide called Polidol to spray the
vegetable and uses the same insecticide to kill rats. According to the testimony of the defendant, which was never rebutted by
Ceferino Velasco, Ceferino also planted vegetables in the yard of the defendant whose house is just across the street from the
house of Ceferino Velasco. She further testified that Ceferino dipped sliced bread into an insecticide called endrin, dried them up
and later used the poisoned bread as a bait to kill rats in the yard located by the side of his house. 1
More of the controversial facts will be presented in the following discussion.
We first discuss and assess the evidence for the prosecution. Out of the nine witnesses for the prosecution three witnesses,
namely Rodolfo Quilang, Federico Jaime, and Ceferino Velasco were presented to prove that the defendant Lucila Valero gave
the poisoned bread to her deaf-mute brother Pipe with the alleged instruction to deliver the bread to the Velasco children.
We now analyze the testimonies of these three witnesses:
1. Rodolfo Quilang
Only Rodolfo Quilang, among the nine prosecution witnesses testified that he saw the defendant Lucila Valero deliver "something
wrapped in a piece of paper" 2 to her deaf-mute brother Pipe with the alleged instruction by sign language to deliver the same to
the Velasco children. Quilang never saw what was inside the piece of paper. At the time Quilang saw the delivery to Pipe of the
wrapped object, the defendant and her brother were in the balcony of their house, which was just near the gate of Ceferino
Velasco's house where he (Quilang) was standing. Upon receipt of the wrapped object, Pipe allegedly proceeded towards
Velasco's house.
According to Quilang, he was "in the act of leaving Velasco's gate when Pipe "was entering the gate of Ceferino Velasco". 3
Whether or not Quilang saw the delivery to the Velasco children of the "something wrapped in a piece of paper" is a question that
involved this star prosecution witness into a series of self-contradictions, aptly called by the appellant's counsel as a "series of
basic somersaults" which earned for Quilang a reprimand from the trial Judge, who, surprisingly later, based the conviction mainly
on the testimony of this flip-flopping witness.
In his affidavit, dated March 8, 1972 (Exhibit "4", p. 437, Record of murder case) or three (3) years after the poisoning of the
Velasco children, Quilang stated that he actually saw Pipe deliver the wrapped object to the children.
The tendency of Quilang to prevaricate is shown not only in his self-contradictory statements on the witness stand but also in the
other portions of the record. The first statement of Quilang (Exhibit "4", p. 437, Record of the Murder case) is dated March 8,
1972. This date appears twice in the affidavit, first at the end of the affidavit and second, in the jurat. In both places of the
affidavit, the words "March" and "1972" are typewritten by the same typewriter used in typing the entire affidavit. The date,
however, was left blank so that originally what appeared at the end of the affidavit and in the jurat was practically "March 1972
". Apparently, the affidavit must have been prepared in March of 1972. The date "8", presumably the date of the swearing before
the Fiscal, was typewritten with a different typewriter on the blank space.
On the witness stand, Quilang stated that he made an affidavit on February 23, 1969. 11 He must have made this statement to
make it appear that he was not an "eleventh-hour witness" as alleged by the defense. When confronted with the discrepancies in
the date appearing in his affidavit, to wit, March 8, 1972, and his testimony on the witness stand, he insisted that the correct date
was February 23, 1969 and that either the Fiscal or the one acting in his behalf committed the error in indicating the date in his
affidavit. 12 It is incredible that a Fiscal administering the oathtaking on February 23, 1969 and signs the jurat postdates the oath-
taking to March 8, 1972, three years later.
There are other equally strong considerations indicating the lack of credibility of Quilang. He is what the appellant's counsel calls
an "eleventh-hour witness". When the complaint for frustrated murder and the complaint for murder, both dated March 11, 1969,
were filed with the Municipal Court of San Rafael, Bulacan, Rodolfo Quilang was not listed as one of the several witnesses.
Quilang never made any statement to the police who initially investigated the case nor to the Philippine Constabulary which made
its own investigation. When the Municipal Court asked searching questions from several witnesses during the first stage of the
preliminary investigation on March 12, 1969, only Ceferino Velasco, Concepcion Velasco, Delfin Senorosa, Federico Jaime and
Demetria Manalastas were investigated. Rodolfo Quilang was not one of them. 13
Again, when the information for frustrated murder (pp. 87 to 88, Record of Frustrated Murder case) and the information for
murder (p. 76, Records of Murder case) were filed in February 1971, the star witness, Rodolfo Quilang, was not listed among the
nine (9) prosecution witnesses. Then on September 15, 1975 or six (6) years after the tragedy, Quilang was suddenly sprung as
the star witness, the only witness who allegedly saw the delivery by the defendant to Pipe of "something wrapped in a piece of
paper" with the alleged instruction by sign language to deliver the same to the Velasco children. Without the testimony of Quilang,
there would be no evidence to show that the poisoned bread which was allegedly delivered by Pipe to the Velasco children came
from the defendant. Realizing that there was a missing link, the prosecution thought of presenting Quilang to provide the missing
link six years after the occurrence of the tragedy.
This witness, Aniceto Decalos, a neighbor and old friend of Ciriaco Jimenez, like the alleged eyewitness Candido
Autor did not figure in the list of witnesses for the prosecution, either in the criminal complaint filed by PC Capt.
Golez or in the Fiscal's indictment. His name was not amongst those who gave affidavits to back up the criminal
charge. This gives the impression that Aniceto Decalos, the neighbor of the deceased, was but an eleventh-hour
witness. To take his testimony on its face value, we fear, is to rate truth so lightly. 14
2. Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco
On the other hand, both Ceferino Velasco and Federico Jaime did not see the delivery by the defendant to her deaf-mute brother
"something wrapped in a piece of paper". They never saw or heard her giving any instruction to Pipe to deliver the wrapped
object to the children. Both claimed that they learned or obtained the information from Pipe after interviewing him by means of
sign language. Which the trial Court accepted as competent, trustworthy and credible
There is nothing in the foregoing testimony pointing to the defendant Lucila Valero as the source of the poisoned bread. What is
evident is nothing but confusion. What Jaime asked from Pipe was "Who gave the bread to the children?" The evidence of the
prosecution already shows that Pipe gave the bread to the children. In reply, it seems that Pipe pointed to the defendant who was
standing nearby.
Here, the confusion is clear. Pipe could not have said that his sister handed over the poisoned bread to the children because the
evidence of the prosecution shows that Pipe himself, gave the bread to the children. It is clear that Pipe did not understand the
sign language of Jaime and vice-versa.
The testimony of Ceferino Velasco, father of the victims, did not help the prosecution much either. There is nothing in the
testimony indicating that the deaf-mute, Pipe, pointed to her sister Lucila Valero as the source of the poisoned bread. We have
examined the entire transcript of the stenographic notes, and, except the aforequoted portions of the testimony of Federico Jaime
and Ceferino Velasco, there is nothing in the record showing that Pipe communicated to the prosecution witnesses by
comprehensible sign language that his sister was the source of the poisoned bread.
Aside from the foregoing observation, there are several compelling reasons that should have made the trial Court reject the
testimony of both Jaime and Velasco.
Pipe who was the alleged source of the vital information for the prosecution was never presented as a witness either for the
prosecution or for the defense. Jaime and Velasco were presented as prosecution witnesses to convey to the Court what they
learned from Pipe by sign language.
The evidence is purely hearsay. 17 The presentation of such evidence likewise violates the principle of res inter alios acta. The
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. 18
With particular reference to the testimony of Ceferino Velasco, its admission cannot be justified by claiming that it is a part of the
res gestae. When Pipe allegedly revealed to Ceferino Velasco that the source of the poisoned bread was the defendant, the
children had not eaten or tasted it. Nobody was yet poisoned. Stated otherwise, there was no startling Occurrence yet. 19
With reference to the testimony of Jaime, there is no showing that Pipe made the extrajudicial revelation spontaneously when he
was still under the influence of a startling occurrence. Pipe made his extrajudicial revelation not spontaneously but after an
interview through the complicated process of sign language.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or evidence that
violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any
probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. 20But admissibility of evidence should
not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value. 21
To give weight to the testimonies of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco, whether considered as hearsay evidence or as part of
res gestae and make the same the basis for the imposition of the death penalty gravely violates the constitutional right of the
defendant to meet the witnesses face to face and to subject Pipe to the rigid test of cross-examination, the only effective means
to test the truthfulness, memory, intelligence, and in this particular case, the ability of the deaf-mute, Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, to
communicate with the outside world. In conflict between a provision of the constitution giving the defendant a substantive right
and mere technical rules of evidence, we have no choice but to give effect to the constitution.
The cross-examination of Pipe, the source of the vital information for the prosecution, would have shown clearly his
incompetence as a witness. During the preliminary investigation in the Municipal Court, experts on deaf-mutes like Belen
Herreros who is the official interpreter of the only school for the deaf and the blind in the Philippines, assisted by Mrs. Felicidad
Vinluan who is the principal of the school of the deaf and the blind, Mesdames Gilda Tatum and Salud Natividad, examined
Alfonsito Valero alias Pipe and reported to the Municipal Court that "questions addressed to him (Alfonso Valero) and answers
given by him cannot be accurately interpreted". 22
As a result of the testimonies and the report made by the aforementioned experts, the Municipal Court dismissed the murder and
frustrated murder cases against Alfonsito Valero, alias Pipe, who was then the co-accused of Lucila Valero, "on the ground that
he (Pipe) is a deaf-mute and, therefore, all the proceedings against him were beyond his comprehension". 23
Even prosecution witnesses Ceferino Velasco and Federico Jaime admitted on cross-examination that their interpretations of the
sign language of Pipe were only guess work.
Obviously the trial Court committed the grave error of accepting, and worse still, of giving weight to the testimonies of Federico
Jaime and Ceferino Velasco interpreting the alleged extrajudicial information to them by sign language of Pipe, when the source
of the information himself, Alfonsito Valero alias Pipe, would have been an incompetent witness had he taken the witness stand.
When Jaime allegedly learned from Pipe that the latter's sister was the source of the poisoned bread, the defendant was only at
the gate of the Velascos near Jaime but he did not confront her.
The natural reaction of Jaime who is the uncle of the mother of the victims 27, upon learning the killer of his relatives would have
been a violent action or at least an angry confrontation. Neither did Ceferino Valero confront Lucila Valero upon allegedly learning
that the latter poisoned his children.

Moreover, when Ceferino Velasco made a sworn statement on February 25, 1969 or three (3) days after the poisoning of his
children, he declared that he did not know who gave the poisoned bread to his children.
But when he took the witness stand on July 23, 1975 or six years later, he declared that on that very morning of February 22,
1969, he learned from Pipe, when the latter was in the act of delivering the bread to the children, that the source of the bread was
the defendant Lucila Valero. 30
When confronted during the cross-examination with the previous affidavit (Exhibit "1-d"), Ceferino Velasco admitted that he made
the answers in the affidavit. This answer prompted the Court to remark: "There seems to be inconsistency". 32 We may add that
the inconsistency is on the very fact in issue, namely, the guilty participation of Lucila Valero.
When further repeatedly asked by the defense counsel why Ceferino did not state in his affidavit (Exh. 1-d) that he learned that
Lucila was the source of the poisoned bread, he gave irresponsive and evasive answers. 33
When a witness makes two sworn statements and these two statements incur in the gravest contradictions, the
Court cannot accept either statements as proof. 34
A witness who changes his name and statements, like a Chameleon changes color, does not inspire
confidence. 35
Obviously, Ceferino Velasco is a lying witness. If Ceferino Velasco really learned from Pipe that Lucila Valero poisoned his three
children, he might have become violent. Surprisingly, he kept quiet. He did not confront Lucila Valero. 36
The reason is that the first suspicion of Ceferino Velasco when his three children were still suffering from the effects of the poison
was that his children were "nausog" (victim of witchcraft).
Aside from the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution, there are other considerations which negate the guilt of the
defendant.
There was no motive for Pipe and Lucila Valero to poison the three children. Both Pipe and Lucila Valero loved the children.
Ceferino Velasco admitted that even when Pipe was only a small boy, the latter frequented his house to visit his
children. 39 When the children were dying because of the poison, Pipe alternately fanned Michael and Annabel.
The prosecution, however, claims that the motive of the poisoning was the quarrel in the morning of February 21, 1969 between
Demetria Manalastas, mother of the victims, and the defendant Lucila Valero. The cause of the quarrel was the interference of
the defendant to protect the children from the scolding and maltreatment to their own mother. The interference was resented by
Manalastas prompting her to say to the defendant "Don't interfere in the matter because I am scolding these children of
mine." 40 The defendant is not a relative of the Velasco children. Her intervention in their behalf only shows her affectionate
concern for them. The defendant quarrelled with Demetria Manalastas, not with the Velasco children. There is no motive
whatsoever for the defendant to poison the children. Even Ceferino Velasco, father of the victims, stated that the cause of the
quarrel was "Wala pong kabagay-bagay" meaning, "very trivial". 41 The quarrel was not a sufficient cause to commit a heinous
crime.
This leaves Us speculating as to the source of the poisoned bread. Rodolfo Quilang stated that he saw the defendant give Pipe
"something wrapped in a piece of paper." According to Ceferino Velasco in his Affidavit of February 25, 1969, Pipe gave to his
children "isa pong pandesal". 42 He practically reiterated this statement during his testimony on July 23, 1975 when he described
what Pipe allegedly brought as "just one piece of wrapped bread". 43
But when the police investigated the premises of the house of Ceferino Velasco in the morning of February 22, 1969, they found
not only one pandesal but "several sliced pan" scatterred in the sala, near the balcony, and under the balcony. 44 According to
the defendant, in her testimony not rebutted by the prosecution, Ceferino Velasco, who was her tenant, dipped sliced pieces of
bread in endrin dried them up and used them as bait in his barn. As a matter of fact, at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of February
22, 1969, Ceferino Velasco threw into a nearby river a long string of poisoned rats. Three puppies died of poisoning under the
balcony. The rats, the dogs, or maybe even his minor children must have found the poisoned slices of bread somewhere in the
barn or in the house, scattered them, and the children, not knowing the danger of the poison, ate them.
The thought that he might have poisoned his own children must have caused Ceferino Velasco some kind of trauma. So galling
to a father is the thought that he, himself, might have caused the death of his two children and the near death of a third child,
albeit unintentionally, that his natural reaction is to escape from it by throwing the blame to someone else not only to appease his
own conscience but also to avoid embarassment before his relatives, friends and neighbors.
The tragic poisoning of the three children is unfortunate. The tragedy was compounded when the trial Court imposed the death
penalty on the accused although the evidence against her does not justify a conviction. Inspite of the self-contradictions of
Rodolfo Quilang on very material points noticed by the trial Judge, himself, Quilang's obvious tendency to prevaricate and the fact
that he is what the appellant's counsel calls an "eleventh-hour witness", which is true, and inspite of the incompetence of the
testimonies of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco whose testimonies are hearsay evidence, and the practical impossibility of
interpreting correctly the sign language of Pipe, the trial Judge readily accepted their testimonies as basis for imposing the death
penalty in gross violation of the hearsay rule and the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witness face to face (in the
instant case, the deaf-mute, Pipe), and to cross-examine Pipe in order to determine his ability to communicate with the outside
world.
Realizing that there is completely no motive for the defendant to commit the heinous crime, the trial Judge conjured up something
as the probable cause that might have impelled the defendant to commit the crime. The conjecture of the Judge is stated, thus:
There is something disquieting about those seemingly unfading smiles on the face of the accused; with her
sharp, penetrating look, her unsolicited smiles are clues to her real personality; they forebode some out-of-the
ordinary dispositions in the inner recesses of her mind; perhaps, only a trained psychiatrist or an experienced
psychologist could fathom or decipher the meaning of this characteristic of the accused; it is unfortunate that the
prosecution and the defense have chosen not to delve into the personality of the accused; however, because of
these queer manifestations on the facial expressions of the accused, could she have intended to produce the
gravity of her felonious act; had she a fore-knowledge that the poisons used to kill rats or insects would also
cause death to the children. Was her intention merely to cause some malady or discomfort to the children to
shout and vent her hatred on the mother of the children. These are some questions that find no definite answer
from the records of these cases; these questions notwithstanding, the court strongly feels that it is not entirely
improbable for the accused to possess a violent or cruel disposition ... 45
In effect, motive was not necessary to compel the defendant to commit the crime because according to the observation of the
Judge, she was suffering from some kind of psychiatric abnormality or mental disorder that can make her violent.
It is most unfair for the trial Judge to unexpectedly spring the aforementioned observation in his decision without having
mentioned it in the course of the trial. Such a procedure is unfair to the accused, for she is thereby deprived of her chance to
either deny or affirm the truth of such a very material finding which has important bearing in the judgment. This procedure of the
trial Judge practically denies the accused the right to due process.
The surprising finding of the trial Judge goes far beyond mere observation on the manner a witness testified, which admittedly
may be considered subjectively by the Judge in evaluating the credibility of the witness. The surprising finding of the Judge
relates not only to the credibility of a witness but to the sanity of the defendant. Its aim is not only to weigh the testimony of the
witness but to establish a motive for the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, finding that the prosecution has not established the guilt of the defendant, We hereby reverse the decision of the
trial Court and instead render judgment of acquittal without cost.

People vs. Damaso - 212 S 547

The accused-appellant, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion,
together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @
Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz
(Records, p. 3). Such information was later amended to exclude all the above-enumerated persons except the accused-appellant
from the criminal charge. The amended information reads:
That an or about the 19th day of June, 1988, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Basilio DAMASO @ Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza
@ KA DADO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, have in his possession, custody and control
one (1) M14 Rifle bearing Serial No. 1249935 with magazine and Fifty-Seven (57) live ammunition, in furtherance
of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, filed against said accused in the above-entitled
case for Violation of Republic Act 1700, as amended by Executive Order No. 276.
Contrary to Third Paragraph of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866. (Records, p. 20)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged (Records, p. 37). Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The counsel for accused-appellant interposed his
objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal
for lack of a search warrant. On these bases, he, thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused
(TSN, December 28, 1989, p. 139). On January 17, 1990, the trial court rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias Ka Dado guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree Number 1866, and considering that the Violation is
in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3
of Presidential Decree Number 1866 hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
The M14 Rifle bearing Serial Number 1249935 and live ammunition and all the articles and/or items seized on
June 19, 1988 in connection with this case and marked and submitted in court as evidence are ordered
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, the same to be turned over to the Philippine Constabulary
Command at Lingayen, Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)
Thus, this present recourse with the following assignment of errors:
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF, OR
INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION DESPITE THE WOEFULLY
INADEQUATE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
B. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
SUBVERSION WAS NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS EVIDENCE THE FIREARMS DOCUMENTS AND
ITEMS LISTED IN EXHIBIT E AFTER THEY WERE DECLARED INADMISSIBLE WITH FINALITY BY ANOTHER
BRANCH OF THE SAME COURT AND THE SAID EVIDENCE ARE THE FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTIONS TO QUASH FILED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BECAUSE THE SEPARATE CHARGE FOR SUBVERSION AGAINST HIM ABSORBED THE CHARGE FOR
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS IN FURTHERANCE OF OR INCIDENT TO, OR IN CONNECTION
WITH THE CRIME OF SUBVERSION. (pp. 55-66, Rollo)
The antecedent facts are set forth by the Solicitor General in his Brief, as follows:
On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd PC
Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA
members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio
Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons
apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village.
They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items (pp. 4, 6-7, tsn, October
23, 1989).
After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented apartment of
Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda
Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza, herein appellant.
She guided the group to the house rented by appellant. When they reached the house, the group found that it
had already been vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Bernie
Mendoza, the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house
rented by appellant. The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the
group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in
the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon
entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan,"
xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco
(namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Maries Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group
requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the
rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio,
artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro an(d) Laguna and other items. They confiscated the
articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the
house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house
and owned the items confiscated therefrom (pp. 8-12, tsn, ibid; pp. 2-4, 6, 8-10, 31, tsn, October 31, 1989). (p. 5,
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 91, Rollo)
While We encourage and support law enforcement agencies in their drive against lawless elements in our society, We must,
however, stress that the latter's efforts to this end must be done within the parameters of the law. In the case at bar, not only did
We find that there are serious flaws in the method used by the law officers in obtaining evidence against the accused-appellant
but also that the evidence as presented against him is weak to justify conviction.
We reverse.
The records of this case show that the accused-appellant was singled out as the sole violator of P.D. No. 1866, in furtherance of,
or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. Yet, there is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact
that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were
found or the owner of the said items. The prosecution presented two witnesses who attested to this fact, thus:
Lieutenant Candito Quijardo
Fiscal
Q How about this Bernie Mendoza, who was the one renting the house?
A He was not around at that time, but according to Luz (Tanciangco) who mentioned the name
Bernie Mendoza (as) the one who was renting the house and at the same time claiming that it
was Bernie Mendoza who owns the said items. (TSN of October 31, 1989, p. 40)
xxx xxx xxx
Q I am showing you another picture which we request to be marked as Exhibit "K-2," tell us if it
has any connection to the house?
A The same house, sir.
Q Now, this person who according to you allegedly occupied the house at Bonuan Gueset, by the
name of Bernie Mendoza, in your capacity as a Military officer, did you find out the identity?
A I am not the proper (person) to tell the real identity of Bernie de Guzman.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court the proper person who could tell the true identity of Bernie
Mendoza?
A The Intelligence of the Pangasinan PC Command.
 Q Can you name these officers?
A Captain Roberto Rosales and his assistant, First Lt. Federico Castro. (ibid, pp. 54-55)
M/Sqt. Artemio Gomez
Q That underground house, do you know who was the principal occupant of that house?
xxx xxx xxx
A During our conversation with the occupants, they revealed that a certain Ka Bernie is the one
occupying the house, Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso.
. . . (TSN, December 27, 1989, pp. 126-128)
Clearly, the aforequoted testimonies are hearsay because the witnesses testified on matters not on their own personal
knowledge. The Solicitor General, however, argues that while the testimonies may be hearsay, the same are admissible because
of the failure of counsel for appellant to object thereto.
It is true that the lack of objection to a hearsay testimony results in its being admitted as evidence. But, one should not be misled
into thinking that since these testimonies are admitted as evidence, they now have probative value. Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, cannot be given credence. In People vs. Valero, We emphatically declared that:
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay evidence or
evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not
give such evidence any probative value. The lack of objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible.
But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected
to or not has no probative value.
(L-45283-84, March 19, 1982, 112 SCRA 675, emphasis supplied)
It is unfortunate that the prosecution failed to present as witnesses the persons who knew the appellant as the lessee
and owner of the M-14 rifle. In this way, the appellant could have exercised his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses and to cross-examine them for their truthfulness. Likewise, the records do not show any other evidence which
could have identified the appellant as the lessee of the house and the owner of the subversive items. To give probative
value to these hearsay statements and convict the appellant on this basis alone would be to render his constitutional
rights useless and without meaning.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will not prosper,
the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is enshrined in the Constitution (Article III, Section 2). The purpose of the
law is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home by
officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted (see
Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646). However, such right is not absolute. There are instances when a warrantless search and
seizure becomes valid, namely: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in
plain view (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, L-58889, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 267, 276). None of these exceptions is present in
this case.
The Solicitor General argues otherwise. He claims that the group of Lt. Quijardo entered the appellant's house upon invitation of
Luz Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados, helper of the appellant; that when Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw
a copier machine, computer, M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, radio set and more subversive items; that technically speaking,
there was no search as the group was voluntarily shown the articles used in subversion; that besides, a search may be validly
conducted without search warrant with the consent of the person searched in this case, appellant's helper and Luz Tanciangco
allowed them to enter and to look around the appellant's house; and that since the evidence seized was in plain view of the
authorities, the same may be seized without a warrant.
We are not persuaded. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot be
waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf
(De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695). In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his house at that time Luz
Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 10). We Find no
evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his helper,
that the appellant had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz
Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given
any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance
to justify indifference to the basic principles of government (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235). As a consequence, the
search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could
have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to
the house of the appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records), does not grant them the license to go inside his house. In Alih v.
Castro, We ruled that:
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where
the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were
worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises
in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the
orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the
petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion. (G.R. No. 69401, June 23, 1987, 151 SCRA 279,
286)
Another factor which illustrates the weakness of the case against the accused-appellant is in the identification of the gun which
he was charged to have illegally possessed. In the amended information (supra, pp. 1-2), the gun was described as an M-14 rifle
with serial no. 1249935. Yet, the gun presented at the trial bore a different serial number. The Solicitor General contends that the
discrepancy is merely a typographical error.
We do not think so. This glaring error goes into the substance of the charge. Its correction or lack of it could spell the difference
between freedom and incarceration of the accused-appellant.
In crimes of illegal possession of firearm as in this case, the prosecution has the burden to prove the existence of the firearm and
that the accused who possessed or owned the firearm does not have the corresponding license for it. Since the gun as identified
at the trial differs from the gun described in the amended information, the corpus delicti (the substance of the crime, the fact that
a crime has actually been committed) has not been fully established. This circumstance coupled with dubious claims of
appellant's connection to the house (where the gun was found) have totally emasculated the prosecution's case.
But even as We find for the accused-appellant, We, take exception to the argument raised by the defense that the crime of
subversion absorbs the crime of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of or incident to or in connection with the crime of
subversion. It appears that the accused-appellant is facing a separate charge of subversion. The defense submits that the trial
court should have peremptorily dismissed this case in view of the subversion charge. In People of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et
al., We set forth in no uncertain terms the futility of such argument. We quote:
If We are to espouse the theory of the respondents that force and violence are the very essence of subversion,
then it loses its distinction from rebellion. In People v. Liwanag (G.R. No. 27683, 1976, 73 SCRA 473, 480
[1976]), the Court categorically distinguished subversion from rebellion, and held:
Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called, is a crime
distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and
taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation
or membership in a subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a
public uprising and taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere
membership in a subversive association is sufficient and the taking up of arms by a member of a
subversive organization against the Government is but a circumstance which raises the penalty
to be imposed upon the offender. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, in the case of Buscayno v. Military Commission (G.R. 58284, 109 289 (1981]), this Court said that
subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security, while rebellion is a crime against public order. Rising
publicly and taking arms against the Government is the very element of the crime on rebellion. On the other
hand, R.A. 1700 was enacted to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) , other similar associations
and its successors because their existence and activities constitute a clear, present and grave danger to national
security.
The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 states that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion, and other illegal means. This is a
recognition that subversive acts do not only constitute force and violence (contrary to the arguments of private
respondents), but may partake of other forms as well. One may in fact be guilty of subversion by authoring
subversive materials, where force and violence is neither necessary or indispensable.
Private respondents contended that the Court in Misolas v. Panga impliedly ruled that if an accused is
simultaneously charged with violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the doctrine of absorption of common crimes
as applied in rebellion would have found application therein. The respondents relied on the opinion of this Court
when it said:
. . . in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH
 THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez,
Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this case.
This is however a mere obiter. In the above case, the Court upheld the validity of the charge under the third
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866. The Court opined that the dictum in the Hernandez case is not applicable in
that case, considering that the legislature deemed it fit to provide for two distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession
of firearms qualified by subversion (P.D. 1866) and (2) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the
Government (R.A. 1700). The practical result of this may be harsh or it may pose grave difficulty on an accused
in instances similar to those that obtain in the present case, but the wisdom of the legislature in the lawful
exercise of its power to enact laws is something that the Court cannot inquire into . . . (G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April
22, 1992).
Nonetheless, the evidence in hand is too weak to convict the accused-appellant of the charge of illegal possession of firearm in
furtherance of, or incident to or in connection with the crime of subversion, We are therefore, left with no option, but to acquit the
accused on reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costs de oficio.

Agcaoli vs. Molina 249 S 482

The members of the bench are, undoubtedly, expected to be knowledgeable in the law, its basic tenets and principles.
Unfortunately, respondent judge fell short of the norm.
The instant case was brought to this Court in connection with the order 1 of complainant Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili dated
9 August 1993 charging Judge Adolfo B. Molina with grave ignorance of the law in relation to Criminal Case No. 10-435,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rolando Anama," for homicide. A directive was contained in said order to furnish this
Court with a copy thereof "for its information and appropriate action."
In the aforecited order, complainant judge alleged that respondent, in conducting the preliminary investigation of the above-
mentioned criminal case, failed to exercise utmost care in the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, Rolando
Anama, based as it was, merely on the statements of two (2) witnesses who had no personal knowledge of the commission of
the offense charged.
Such action, complainant judge averred, was a clear violation of section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which requires that
before a warrant of arrest is issued, "the judge must personally determine the existence of probable cause from an examination
under oath of the complainant and his witnesses." 2
Mere hearsay evidence cannot be the basis that probable cause exists, stated complainant judge. There must be something
more concrete.
Consequently, in the same order, complainant judge recalled the warrant of arrest and the order directing its issuance and
directed the National Bureau of Investigation, through Regional Office No. 2, Ilagan, Isabela, to conduct an investigation in order
to avoid a possible miscarriage of justice.
In his Comment, respondent admitted that he was the inquest judge in the preliminary investigation of the above entitled case
and finding the existence of probable cause, he ordered the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused and as the
case was cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, it was forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Aparri, Cagayan. 3
Respondent explained that since the case was cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the Provincial Prosecutor's Office, which
has the final say and disposition on the existence of probable cause on cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, should
carry the brunt of the responsibility for "erroneous" finding of probable cause. 4
Respondent judge argued that the findings of complainant judge in his 9 August 1993 order is his opinion-argument and
contended that "the proper remedy for a seemingly weak probable cause finding is a reinvestigation." 5
On 17 November 1993, Judge Antonino A. Aquilizan, Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Branch 10
denied with finality the motion filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Melencio Unciano for reconsideration of the 9 August 1993
order of then Presiding Judge Emerito M. Agcaoili and dismissed the aforestated criminal case provisionally on grounds of
absence of probable cause against the accused. 6
In its report and evaluation dated 26 April 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that respondent be
admonished to be more careful in the determination of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. Thus,
opined the Office of the Court Administrator:
Close perusal of the records disclosed that the complaining witnesses do not have personal knowledge of the
facts which became the basis of the filing of the crime charged and of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. From
 the affidavits of the affiants alone (Rollo, pp. 6-7), it is very clear that they learned the killing of victim Virgilio
Capa from a certain Wilma Anama. Respondent Judge, however, on the basis of the said affidavits, issued an
Order dated October 8, 1992 directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest for the temporary confinement of the
accused. Thereafter, the warrant of arrest was issued on the same day.
Respondent Judge in issuing the warrant of arrest failed to observe the elementary requirement that the
complainant and his witnesses should have personal knowledge of the commission of the offense charged. Just
like in the issuance of search warrants, mere hearsay evidence, cannot, standing alone, justify the issuance of a
warrant of arrest (See Quintero vs. National Bureau of Investigation, G.R. 35149, June 23, 1988, Padilla J).
Respondent Judge should be reminded that under Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules on Evidence, "A witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, . . . (309)".
We concur with the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator.
Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a warrant of arrest shall be issued only when the
"municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing in the form of searching
questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice." This is in conformity with the constitutional mandate that no "warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 7
In turn, probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. 8
Although the foregoing provisions seemingly grant judges wide latitude and unbridled discretion in determining probable cause,
an elementary legal principle must not be compromised hearsay evidence cannot be the basis of probable cause. The rules on
evidence are explicit. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception. 9 Hearsay evidence, therefore, has no probative value whatsoever. 10 Yet, in the case at bench,
respondent judge found probable cause and even issued an arrest warrant on the basis of the testimonies of Mencelacion
Padamada and Rosita Castillo which were obviously hearsay. Consider the preliminary investigation conducted by respondent
judge
We are as perplexed as complainant judge Agcaoili why Wilma Anama, who apparently witnessed the alleged crime or has
personal knowledge thereof, was not summoned by respondent for investigation. She could have been the key to determining
whether or not Rolando Anama was the probable perpetrator of the grisly killing.
Respondent cannot pass the blame and burden to the provincial prosecutor. The determination of probable cause is a function of
the judge and is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this
determination. 12
Liberty, in any part of the civilized world is a basic human right, the curtailment of which must be in strict conformity with the
procedure laid down by law. It is, therefore, this constant reminder which compels us to remain ever vigilant.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to comply with the pertinent rules on the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
resolution be entered in his record.

People vs. Brioso 37 S 336

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra, in its Criminal Case No. 626, finding the two appellants Juan
Brioso and Mariano Taeza guilty of murder, and sentencing each to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Silvino Daria in the sum of P6,000.00 but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
An information filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated 16 January 1967 charged the two accused, Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza,
with the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1966, in the Municipality of Tayum, Province of Abra, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with firearms of different
calibers, by confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent to kill and without justifiable
motive, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault,
attack and shot one, Silvino Daria, inflicting upon him multiple gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body,
which wounds caused his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, to wit: (a) treachery
and evident premeditation; (b) advantage was taken of superior strength; and (c) with the use of firearm.
The records of the case show that on 23 December 1966, between 8 and 9 in the evening, the spouses Silvino Daria and Susana
Tumalip were in their house at barrio Tiker, Tayum, Abra. The husband was making rope in the annex of their house, while the
wife, four meters away, was applying candle wax to a flat iron. Silvino Daria was using a lamp where he worked. Outside, the
night was bright because of the moon overhead.
Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was alarmed by the barking of dogs. She peeped through a crack in the wall
of her house and saw appellants herein pass southward in the direction of the house of Silvino Daria that was six meters away.
Brioso was carrying a long gun. Her suspicions awakened, she went downstairs and, shielded by the fence, witnessed each
appellant point a gun at the bamboo wall of Daria's house. Two detonations followed, and thereafter she heard Daria moaning
and his wife call for help, saying her husband had been shot. Bernal went to the house and found the victim prostrate, wounded
and unable to speak. The widow, however, testified that right after being shot, she rushed to her husband's side and he told her
that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Silvino Daria expired one hour later as a result of gunshot wounds in the
abdomen and leg. A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the widow, Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to the two
accused as the killers (Exhibits "B" and "C," respectively).
The cause of the death of Silvino Daria was "Shock due to severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds at the abdomen
and leg," as found by Dr. Isabelo B. Lucas, Municipal Health Officer of Tayum, Abra, contained in his Medico-Legal Necropsy
Report, Exhibit "A".
The motive for the killing appears to have been the disapproval by the spouses Silvino and Susana Daria of Mariano Taeza's
courtship of their daughter, Angelita. Angelita was even sent to Manila for her to avoid Mariano Taeza. The courtship is admitted
by Mariano Taeza.
The two accused appealed the conviction and assigned the following errors as committed by the court a quo:
1. The lower court erred in relying on the uncorroborated and contradictory testimony and statement of the
prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal on the physical identity of the accused;
2. The lower court erred in disregarding the affidavit (Exhibit 2) of Antonio Daria, son of the deceased, clearing
the accused Mariano Taeza, which affidavit had been identified in court by the fiscal before whom the same was
executed; and
3. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder.
The assigned errors are discussed together, being closely inter-related.
We find no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material points. She stated that she did not see Mariano Taeza
carry a gun when both the accused passed by. But this brief observation does not necessarily mean that he was not actually
armed or carrying a gun on his person. The fact that he did was proved when both the said accused were seen pointing their
respective gun at the victim and each subsequently fired once at him, Taeza using a short weapon (t.s.n. Millare, page 17) that
could have been carried concealed in his person.
The house of Cecilia Bernal was only six meters away from that of Silvino Daria's. The night was brightly illuminated by the moon.
Cecilia Bernal had known both accused for a long time and it is admitted that they also know her. There could have been no
difficulty in identifying the accused under the circumstances.
Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of murder against the above-said accused, considering that
Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the deceased by a first degree cousin. Even Juan Brioso specifically said that he knew of no
reason why she should testify against him. Hence, her statement that she came to court only to tell the truth should be believed.
The witness also stated that she was hard of hearing and could not understand some of the questions; thus, the alleged
inconsistencies in her testimony do not detract from the "positive and straightforward"1 identification of the accused as the ones
who were seen at the scene of the crime and who actually shot Silvino Daria.
It is noteworthy that the trial judge observed witness Bernal closely, warning her several times not to exaggerate, yet in the
decision gave her full credence, being obviously satisfied of her truthfulness.lwph1.t The general rule, based on logic and
experience, is that the findings of the judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not disturbed on appeal, unless there
are substantial facts and circumstances which have been overlooked and which, if properly considered, might affect the result of
the case,2 which in this case have not been shown to exist.
Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the victim, who told his wife that it was Juan
Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged by
the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely
inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of impending death,3considering that he died only one hour after being
shot.
The defense of both the accused is alibi. Mariano Taeza's own account was that in the evening of 23 December 1966 he was at
the barrio clinic of Tiker playing the guitar with Antonio Daria (son of the deceased), Narciso Valera and Jose Cabais. While in the
said place, they heard two gun explosions. Soon afterwards, Macrino Arzadon and Taurino Flores came running towards them,
informing Antonio Daria that his father was already dead.
Exhibit "2," the alleged affidavit of Antonio Daria, was presented in court to corroborate Mariano Taeza's testimony. But while the
said affidavit was identified by the Provincial Fiscal as having been subscribed and sworn to before him, he also stated that he
did not know Antonio Daria personally and that was the only time he appeared before him. Exhibit "2" does not have the seal of
the Fiscal's Office. Moreover, the said exhibit was never identified by the supposed affiant and there was no opportunity for the
prosecution to cross-examine him. As stated in People vs. Mariquina4, affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants
themselves but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants' statements, which may thus be either committed or
misunderstood by the one writing them. For this reason, and for the further reason that the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. In view hereof, We find Exhibit "2" of no probative value, and that
the lower court did not err when it rejected the same. In this connection, it is markworthy that the prosecuting attorney stated in
open court that Antonio Daria had also executed another affidavit (Exhibit "D") in the Fiscal's office "to the effect that he went to
the office of defense counsel, ...... and there affixed his thumbmark on a statement that was never read to him." Be that as it may,
not one of the other persons who, Mariano Taeza claimed, were with him in the barrio clinic (Narciso Valera and Jose Cabais)
was produced in court to support his alibi. Mariano Taeza's testimony, therefore, remains uncorroborated. It has been repeatedly
held that in the face of direct evidence, alibi is necessarily a weak defense and becomes more so if uncorroborated. 5 It is worse
if the alibi could have been corroborated by other persons mentioned by the accused but they are not presented. 6
By Mariano Taeza's own admission, he and the other accused, Juan Brioso, are close friends. It was shown that Mariano Taeza's
house is only about two hundred meters from that of Silvino Daria's and that the barrio clinic is only about eighty to one hundred
meters from the said victim's place. Mariano Taeza himself stated that Silvino Daria died "may be less than thirty minutes, may be
five minutes" after his arrival at the victim's house with the latter's son and other persons. As held in another case 7 the defense
of alibi is so weak that in order to be believed there should be a demonstration of physical impossibility for the accused to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Mariano Taeza was so near the victim's house that it was easy for
him to be there when the shooting occurred.
The other accused, Juan Brioso, stated that he was in sitio Catungawan, barrio Basbasa, Tayum, on 23 December 1966. He was
there upon invitation of his first cousin, Nestorio Flores, to cut and mill sugar cane. He left his house in Addamay at 8 in the
morning of the said day, arriving in Catungawan before the noon meal. They cut sugar cane from 4 to 5 in the afternoon. At 6:30,
after supper, he, his cousin, and the latter's son, Felix Flores, started milling the sugar cane which they had cut. The milling lasted
up to 2 in the early morning of the following day. He never left the place where they were milling. He learned of the death of
Silvino Daria only when he returned to Addamay because his parents informed him of the news. He admitted knowing Cecilia
Bernal and that she likewise knows him.
He denied being a close friend of Mariano Taeza (thereby contradicting Mariano Taeza's testimony)8; denied that he had gone to
the house of Angelita Daria, and his having knowledge of the courtship of Angelita by Mariano Taeza; or that both of them used to
drink and go out together. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he went with Mariano Taeza when they attended
dances. One such occasion was during the birthday of his first degree cousin in Addamay way back in 1965.
Nestorio Flores was presented to corroborate the alibi of the accused. But while both exhibited wonderful memory as to what
happened between sunset and midnight of 23 December 1966, they contradict each other as to what happened in the earlier
hours or events. As already stated, Juan Brioso testified that he left his place in Addamay at 8 in the morning and arrived at his
cousin's house before the noon meal of 23 December 1966; but Nestorio Flores asserted that it was 8 in the morning when Juan
Brioso arrived. Brioso claimed that they cut sugar cane from 4 to 5 in the afternoon of the said day. His cousin testified that they
cut sugar cane in the morning after Brioso's arrival until lunchtime. Brioso stated that they milled sugar cane for the third time in
that place in 1966, the first occasion being on 29 November, and the second on 8 December. Flores denied this, saying that they
did not cut sugar cane in November, 1966, although in other years they did. He further stated that it was already in December of
that year that Brioso came. In fact, the same witness showed uncertainty as to the exact date, when he answered even on direct
examination that "may be that was the time when he came."9 In cases of positive identification of the culprit by reliable witnesses,
it has been held that the defense of alibi must be established by "full, clear and satisfactory evidence." 10 It is obvious that this
witness, who is a close relative of the accused, was merely presented in court in an attempt to save Juan Brioso from punishment
for the crime committed. We believe the trial court when it found that the witness has an interest in the fate of the accused Juan
Brioso, and, therefore, his testimony should not be given credence.
Evidence also shows that from Tiker to Catungawan is only about nine kilometers and only a two-hour walk. The place is also
accessible by motor transportation, although motor vehicles are allegedly rare in the said place. As in the case of Mariano Taeza,
it was not physically impossible for Juan Brioso to be at the locus criminis at the time the crime was committed.
It has been clearly and sufficiently proved that the killing of Silvino Daria was qualified by treachery (alevosia)." 11The victim was
quietly making rope in his own house. He was caught off-guard and defenseless when suddenly and unexpectedly the two
accused fired at him. He had no chance either to evade or repel the aggression. The trial court correctly held that treachery
absorbs nocturnity and abuse of superior strength. 12 But while these aggravating circumstances are always included in the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the commission of the crime in the victim's dwelling is not, 13 hence the crime is murder
attended by one aggravating circumstance, which has been held to be present where the victim was shot inside his house
although the triggerman was outside. 14 There being no mitigating circumstance to offset it, the apposite penalty is death.
However, for lack of sufficient votes, the penalty imposable is reduced to life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the sentence under appeal is affirmed, with the sole modification that the amount of the indemnity is increased to
P12,000.00. 15

RULE 130 SECTION 37 DYING DECLARATION

People vs. De Joya 203 S 343

In an Information dated 5 May 1978, appellant Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz was charged before the Regional Trial Court, 3rd
Judicial Region, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan with the crime of robbery with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1978, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Pioquinto de Joya y Cruz, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
and, by means of violence and intimidation, take, carry and cart away two (2) rings, one (1) necklace, one (1)
piece of earring, belonging to Arnedo Valencia y Angeles and Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac, to their damage and
prejudice in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P550.00); and that on the occasion of the said robbery
and for the purpose of enabling him to take the said properties, the accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with treachery, evident premeditation and great advantage of superior strength, with intent to kill,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac by stabbing and
hitting the latter on her neck and other parts of her body with pointed instrument causing injuries which directly
caused the death of the said Eulalia Diamse Vda. de Salac.
That in the commission of the offense, the following aggravating circumstances were present (1) abuse of
superior strength; (2) committed in the dwelling of the offended party; (3) disregard of age and sex; (4) abuse of
confidence.
Contrary to law. 1
At arraignment, appellant De Joya pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision dated 16 May 1986
convicting De Joya of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide, committed with the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, old age,
disregard of sex the victim a woman 88 years old, the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim. The
accused being 72 years old death penalty cannot be imposed against him as provided in Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Court therefore, sentences the accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P20,000.00 and to pay damages in the amount of P550.00.
The bond of the accused is ordered cancelled and the accused to be confined immediately in the National
Penitentiary pending review of his case by the Supreme Court.
The Clerk of Court is ordered to immediately forward the record of this case to the Supreme Court for review.
SO ORDERED. 2
In this appeal, appellant raises a number of issues all of which, however, amount to one basic assertion: that the lower court
erred in concluding that appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The facts have been summarized in the brief of the Solicitor General in the following manner:
The spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin
Valencia and Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St., Baliuag,
Bulacan. (TSN, June 11, 1981, p. 2). Both spouses are teachers by profession.
Arnedo Valencia teaches at the Tiaong Elementary School at Barrio Tiaong, Baliuag, Bulacan whereas Herminia
Valencia teaches in an intermediate school at Baliuag, Bulacan. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 7).
In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Her mother Eulalia Diamse
was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the television set. (TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 3).
Her Son Alvin likewise left for school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were
dismissed and he proceeded home. (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 8).
 At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses Valencia's neighbor by the name of Gloria
Capulong, together with a friend, went out of the former's house to visit a friend. While at her yard, Gloria
Capulong looked back to the direction of the Valencia's house. She noticed appellant Pioquinto de Joya standing
and holding a bicycle at the yard of the Valencia's. (TSN, June 11, 1981, pp. 2-4).
When Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down prostrate and drenched with her
own blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her. He then held her hands and asked her: "Apo,
Apo, what happened?". (TSN, March 11, 1980, p. 10).
. . . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these words, she let go of Alvin's
hand and passed away. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 14 and 17).
Alvin then called for his Nana Edeng and told her to see his lola because she was drenched with her own blood.
His Nana Edeng told him to immediately see his mother Herminia Salac-Valencia to inform her of what
happened. (TSN, Id).
Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: "Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched in her own blood." (TSN, March 11,
1980, p. 20).
Herminia immediately ran outside the school, flagged down a tricycle and went home. Alvin followed, riding his
bicycle (TSN, Id., p. 21). When she reached their house, she found her mother lying prostrate in her own blood at
their sala in front of the television. Her mother's hands were stretched open and her feet were wide apart. Blood
was oozing out of her mother's ears. She then embraced her mother and placed her on the sofa. She asked Alvin
and the tricycle driver to call Dr. Delfin Tolentino. (TSN, October 12,1978, pp. 25-26).
Dr. Tolentino arrived at around 4:00 o'clock that same afternoon and examined the body of Eulalia Diamse. Said
doctor declared that said Eulalia Diamse had a heart attack which caused her death. When asked by Herminia
Valencia why her mother's ears were punctured, no reply was given by said doctor. Herminia requested for a
death certificate, but Dr. Tolentino did not issue one and instead immediately left. (TSN, Ibid., pp. 27-29).
Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The right earring of her mother
was likewise missing. All of these were valued [at] P300.00 (TSN, Id., p. 15).
That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor ransacked. The contents of the wardrobe closet
(aparador) were taken out. Its secret compartment/box was missing. And the lock of the aparador was destroyed.
(TSN, October 12, 1978, pp. 15-17).
When she went upstairs after putting her mother on a bed at the ground floor, she found the two (2) rooms
thereat in disarray. She then caused the rooms and things photographed by a certain Ricardo Ileto (Exhibits "A"
to "A-11"; TSN, October 12, 1978, p. 17).
Later, Herminia went to Dr. Adela Cruz and pleaded [with] said doctor to issue a death certificate so that her
mother could be embalmed. (TSN, Id., pp. 33-34).
On the same night, Herminia found a beach walk step-in (Exhibit "B") by the side of the cabinet near the door of
their room downstairs, more or less one meter from where the victim was lying prostrate. (TSN, October 12,1978,
pp. 24-25).
Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size, as the other half of the pair she
bought for her husband Arnedo but which she gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein appellant, before
Christmas of 1977 when she saw the old and wornout pair of slippers of the latter. (TSN, Ibid.).
Appellant Pioquinto de Joya visited the wake only once. During the second day of the four-day wake, Herminia
saw herein appellant Pioquinto de Joya enter the kitchen and peep under the cabinet of the (Valencia's) house.
(TSN, Id.).
On February 3, 1978, a post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Romulo Madrid, a medico-legal officer of
the National Bureau of Investigation. Per examination, the cause of the death arrived by Dr. Madrid was "shock,
secondary to punctured wound neck" (Exhibit "D-1") situated at the right side of the neck, just below the right ear
wherein it went out thru and thru, opposite, almost in the same location, from one side of the neck to the opposite
side. (Exhibit "D-2").
In its decision, the trial court became quite clear as to the factors which led to the judgment of conviction against appellant. These
factors, as set out in the decision of the trial court, were the following:
In the case at bar, the prosecution relied heavily on the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim as
testified to by the witnesses and proven during the trial, also the dying statement of the deceased, which are:
Herminia testified that two weeks before the incident the accused and the deceased quarreled over a bicycle
which the former took from their house without the consent of the latter; that Exhibit "B" (step-in beach walk type)
 which was found near the cabinet one meter away from the body of the victim was identified by Herminia as the
step-in that she gave to the wife of the accused and which she saw accused wearing on January 29, 1978 when
she visited them in their house; the testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of
January 31, 1978 at around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of Herminia standing and holding a bicycle; the accused
admitted, although his wife is the sister of the husband of Herminia he never visited the deceased during the four
days that it was lying in state without any justifiable reason and contrary to the ordinary experience of man; last
but most convincing is the dying statement of the deceased when her grandson Alvin asked her "Apo, Apo, what
happened?" and she answered, "Si Paki", then she expired. When Alvin was asked during his testimony who is
this Paki, he identified the accused. The accused during his testimony never denied that he is called Paki.
The foregoing circumstances established during the trial plus the dying statement of the deceased leads only to
one fair and reasonable conclusion, that the accused is the author of the crime.
Analyzing the above portion of the decision, the elements taken into account by the court in convicting appellant De Joya of
robbery with homicide may be listed as follows:
1. The dying statement made by the deceased victim to her grandson Alvin Valencia a 10-year old boy: "Si
Paqui";
2. The quarrel, which, according to Herminia Valencia, daughter of the deceased victim, took place two weeks
before the robbery and homicide, between the appellant and the deceased over the use of a bicycle which
appellant allegedly took from the Valencia's house without the consent of the victim;
3. The rubber slipper, one of a pair, ("step-in beach walk type") which according to Herminia, she found near a
cabinet in their house one (1) meter away from the body of the victim, and which Herminia identified as one of the
pair that she had given to the wife of the accused the previous Christmas Season;
4. Accused was seen by one Gloria Capulong around 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 in the yard of
the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing;
5. The statement of appellant that he did not visit the deceased during the four-day wake.
We turn first to the dying statement made by the victim when the 10-year old Alvin Valencia asked his grandmother who was
sprawled on the floor of their house drenched with blood: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui".
After uttering those two words, she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of appellant Pioquinto de Joya. It must
be noted at once, however, that the words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. Those two words
could have been intended to designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they had been intended
to designate the subject, we must note that no predicate was uttered by the deceased. If they were designed to designate the
object of a verb, we must note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be
related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?"
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that
the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any
given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. 3 The
doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof. Wigmore's classic work:
The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered must not be merely
apart of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is immaterial
how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished
or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement which thus
remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary statement is not
receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of
the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told
only a portion of what he might have been able to tell. 4 (Emphasis supplied)
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is that since
the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have
been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to
the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received. 5
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the deceased was
cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by
uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had thrust some sharp instrument through and
through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her
communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying
declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.
The other elements taken into account by the trial court are purely circumstantial in nature. When these circumstances are
examined one by one, none of them can be said to lead clearly and necessarily to the conclusion that appellant had robbed and
killed the deceased Eulalia Diamse. The quarrel over the use of the bicycle which was supposed to have taken place two weeks
before Eulalia's death does not, in our view, constitute adequate proof of a motive capable of moving a person to slay another in
such a violent and gory manner. Failure to prove a credible motive where no identification was shown at all, certainly weakens
the case of the prosecution.
The testimony of Herminia Valencia about the single slipper that she found near or under the cabinet in the living room where
Eulalia Diamse was slain, can scarcely be regarded as conclusive evidence that such slipper was indeed one of the very same
pair of slippers that she had given to appellant's wife, who was also the sister of Herminia's husband. Rubber or beach, walk
slippers are made in such quantities by multiple manufacturers that there must have been dozens if not hundreds of slippers of
the same color, shape and size as the pair that Herminia gave to appellant's wife. And even if conclusive identification of the
slippers had been offered, and it is assumed that appellant (rather than his wife) had worn those very slippers on that fatal
afternoon, still the presence of that singular slipper did not clearly and directly connect the appellant to the robbery or the slaying.
At most, under that assumption, the presence of that slipper in the house of the Valencias showed that the accused had gone to
the house of the Valencias and there mislaid that slipper. We note in this connection, that appellant himself had testified that he
did enter the house of the Valencias that afternoon, but after the killing of Eulalia Diamse had been perpetrated, and there had
found many persons in the house viewing the body.
The testimony of Gloria Capulong that she saw the accused in the afternoon of 31 January 1978 around 3:00 p.m. in the yard of
the Valencias, standing and holding a bicycle and doing nothing is, by itself, not proof of any act or circumstance that would show
that appellant had perpetrated the slaying or the robbery. The behaviour of the appellant, as testified to by Gloria Capulong, offers
no basis for supposing that appellant, himself 72 years of age, had just slain an 88-year old woman by skewering her through the
neck and had ransacked both floors of the Valencia house.
Appellant's failure to present himself to pay his respects to the deceased or her immediate family during the four-day wake, does
not give rise to any inference that appellant was the slayer of Eulalia Diamse. Appellant had explained that he had been busily at
work, sewing and carrying on his trade as a tailor. Appellant, as already noted, had dropped in the Valencias' house in the
afternoon Eulalia Diamse was killed and had viewed the body (before it was lying in state) along with several other persons. His
reluctance or inability to participate in the formal wake is not necessarily a sign of guilt. We are unable to agree with the trial
judge that such behaviour was "contrary to the ordinary experience of man" although respect for the dead is a common cultural
trait of the Filipinos.
In the Solicitor-General's brief, it is casually contended that the circumstantial evidence against appellant included: "the attempt
on the part of appellant Pioquinto de Joya through his counsel to settle the case amicably." 6 We have examined the testimony
that the Solicitor General pointed to in referring to a supposed attempt to settle the criminal charge amicably. That testimony,
given by Arnedo Valencia, son-in-law of the deceased Eulalia Diamse and brother-in-law of appellant Pioquinto de Joya.
We find the above testimony quite impalpable and inconclusive so far as a supposed attempt of appellant, through his counsel, to
offer a compromise on the criminal charge is concerned. We are aware of the provision of Section 24 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court which provides that
Sec. 24. Offer to compromise not admission. An offer of compromise is not an admission that anything is due,
and is not admissible in evidence against the person making the offer. However, in criminal cases which are not
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not, however, feel justified in concluding from the above testimony from a member of the (extended) family of the
deceased victim that "an offer of compromise" had been made "by the accused" nor that "an implied admission of guilt" on the
part of the appellant may be reasonably inferred in the instant case. The trial court itself made no mention of any attempt on the
part of appellant to settle the criminal case amicably through the defense counsel; we must assume that the trial court either did
not believe that appellant had tried to compromise the criminal case or considered that appellant could not fairly be deemed to
have impliedly admitted that he had indeed robbed and killed Eulalia Diamse. A much higher level of explicitness and specific
detail is necessary to justify a conclusion that an accused had impliedly admitted his guilt of a crime as serious as robbery with
homicide.
The totality of the case made out against appellant De Joya thus consists of an incomplete, aborted, dying declaration and a
number of circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not necessarily give rise to a compelling inference that appellant had
indeed robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that the sum total of the evidence in the instant
case is insufficient to induce that moral certainty of guilt which characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The conscience of
the Court remains uneasy and unsettled after considering the nature and speculative character of the evidence supporting the
judgment of conviction.
The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant's guilt of the crime of robbery and homicide was not shown
beyond reasonable doubt.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 16 May 1986 is hereby REVERSED and appellant Pioquinto de Joya is
hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

People vs. Dunig 215 S 469

There were two witnesses who allegedly saw the killing, not to mention the victim herself, who identified her assailant shortly
before she died. Yet the Solicitor General, who is usually for sustaining the conviction by the trial court, in unconvinced and has
asked for its reversal.
Pacifico Dunig was formally charged with the murder of Marilyn Canatoy, then 14 years old, in an information filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The allegation was that on April 5, 1990, in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, he repeatedly stabbed and
thus killed the said girl, the attack being accompanied with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. 1
To prove its case, the prosecution presented three witnesses, besides the doctor who testified on the cause of the victim's death.
These were Maylin Montes, her sister, Katherine Montes, and their mother, Teresita Montes.
Maylin Montes, who was ten years old at the time of the trial, said that at about 7 o'clock in the evening of April 4, 1990, she,
Katherine, a certain Flory, and her Ate Marilyn went to sleep at the resthouse belonging to one Atty. Andrade. Marilyn slept in a
bamboo bed, and the rest of them slept under the bed. Maylin said that at about 3 o'clock in the morning, she saw Dunig stab
Marilyn in the neck three times. The three girls ran to Andrade's house about 8 meters away where her father and mother were
staying. Marilyn did, too, and collapsed at the door. 2
Katherine Montes, thirteen years old at that time, corroborated her sister's testimony. She said she also saw Dunig running away
after she heard her Ate Marilyn screaming. She said she ran to the house ahead of Marilyn and she heard the stricken girl say,
"Nanay, nanay, sinaksak ako ni Pico." 3 "Pico" is Dunig's nickname.
Teresita Montes, the girls' mother, declared on the stand that at about 9 o'clock in the morning of April 4, 1990, she saw Pico and
her niece Marilyn quarreling. At about 3 o'clock the following morning, she was awakened when Marilyn knocked at her door.
Marilyn's neck was bleeding, and she cried to her: "Nanay, nanay, bigyan ninyo ako ng katarungan dahil sinaksak ako ni Pico." A
minute later, she died. Behind Marilyn were Maylin, Katherine and Flory. 4
Dr. Nicanor Cruz informed the court that Marilyn died of hemorrhage due to multiple stab and incised wounds in the neck. He
opined uncertainly that the victim might or might not have been able to speak or run to the house after the stabbing. 5
Dunig's defense was alibi. He said that on the night in question, he was alone in a nipa hut in Matinbubong, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, where he went to sleep at 9 p.m. and awoke the following morning at 6 o'clock. He swore he was not in the resthouse
where, and at the time, Marilyn was killed. 6
Judge Amado M. Calderon, disbelieving him, found him guilty as charged. 7 This Court, after considering the evidence, holds that
the conviction cannot stand.
Alibi is unquestionably a weak defense, and it is clearly so in the case at bar. Dunig has not presented a single witness to
corroborate him. There is also the admitted fact that the nipa hut where he supposedly slept was only a kilometer away from the
scene of the crime.
However, we have repeatedly stressed that a person's conviction must rest not on the weakness of his defense but on the
strength of the prosecution. The accused can rely on the constitutional presumption of his innocence. It is for the prosecution to
overcome that presumption with convincing proof that the accused is guilty; otherwise, he must be absolved. In the case at bar,
we find that the prosecution has not proved its case.
The testimonies of the two alleged eyewitnesses to the killing are not believable. While insisting that she saw Dunig stab Marilyn,
Maylin also admitted that it was pitch dark when they awoke and there was not a single light in the resthouse or nearby. (Or from
the moon either, for that matter.) Katherine said she only saw "what looked like a shadow" and concluded it was Dunig. Assuming
the sisters did wake up when Marilyn screamed, it would have taken some time before their eyes could get accustomed to the
darkness. Yet both said they immediately recognized the accused-appellant.
If there was anything certain about their testimonies, it was their certainty that the resthouse was dark when they allegedly saw
Dunig stabbing their cousin. Maylin agreed it was "so dark." Katherine demurred, saying "it was not too dark." So much for the
sisters for the hence. Now for their mother.
There is some confusion as to who arrived first in the house, Katherine saying it was she, Maylin and Flory who did while Teresita
Montes, her mother, said it was Marilyn. But that is not really important. What is Teresita's testimony that Marilyn said to her a
minute before the girl died: "Nanay, nanay, bigyan ninyo ako ng katarungan dahil sinaksak ako ni Pico."
If it is true that the victim did make the statement before she died, it should qualify as a dying declaration and so can be
considered an exception to the hearsay rule. Nonetheless, it cannot be automatically accepted as a truthful accusation and is still
subject to the test of credibility.
A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence on the theory that a person who knows he is on the verge of death is not
likely to make a false accusation. However, the declaration, albeit presumably in good faith, may still be based on an erroneous
identification of the declarant's killer.
In the case at bar, it has been established by the testimonies of the Montes sisters that the resthouse was dark, if not, indeed,
completely dark. Like the other there girls who were sleeping with her, Marilyn could not possibly have seen the person who was
attacking her. At best, she could probably only surmise it was Dunig, but that was a most uncertain identification. A surmise is not
evidence. A man's honor and liberty cannot be forfeited because the victim supposedly pointed to him as her killer although she
could not possibly have seen the person who was stabbing her in the dark.
At that, we cannot even be certain that the dying Marilyn really made that declaration against Dunig. By corroborating their
mother's testimony, Maylin and Katherine may have instead enfeebled it because their own credibility regarding what they said
they saw in the dark resthouse is also suspect. It must also be noted that the doctor who autopsied the victim's body was not sure
if Marilyn would have been able to speak at all after she was stabbed because of the severity and location of her
wounds. 11 Significantly, the statement she supposedly made to Teresita was strenuously long for a person who died a minute
later.
It would seem that the mother and her daughters have put two and two together and come out with a sum of five. Teresita makes
much of the quarrels of Marilyn and Pico to bolster her belief that Dunig is the girl's killer. Such quarrels, if true, may be evidence
of motive but not necessarily of murder. In fact, Katherine said that the day before Marilyn was killed, Dunig was in the resthouse
and apparently in good spirits, as he was strumming his guitar and singing.
It is noteworthy that Katherine, seeing what looked like a shadow ("parang shadow") pass by her in the dark that morning,
immediately concluded it was Dunig who had stabbed Marilyn. As for Maylin, she was sure Dunig was the killer for the
preposterous reason that he was in the resthouse in the afternoon of April 4, 1990.
The evidence of the prosecution is a slender reed. It cannot sustain a conviction. The defense is weak, but the prosecution is
even weaker, based as it is mainly on the narration of the alleged eyewitnesses who claimed to have seen the killing, one in total
darkness and another in near total darkness that enabled her to see a shadow that passed by her. The tales are implausible. We
cannot accept them. The Court has no choice but to exonerate the accused-appellant because his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
The following observations in People vs. Pecardal 13 are appropriate:
A life has been taken and justice demands that the wrong be redressed. But the same justice that calls for
retribution cannot convict the prisoner at bar whose guilt has not been proved. Justitia est duplex, viz., severe
puniens et vere praeveniens. Even as this Court may punish, so too must it protect. Conceivably, the conviction
of the accused-appellant could add another victim in this case.
Accordingly, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and must be released
immediately. It is so ordered.

People vs. Amaca 277 S 215 [supra]

US vs. Antipolo 37 P 726 [supra]