JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

It is the competence or power of a court to render a judgment that will bind the parties
involved.
Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired the moment he invokes the power of the court by
instituting the action by the proper pleading.

Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired when he enters his appearance (voluntary
appearance) or by the coercive power of legal process exerted by the court over him
personal or substituted service of summons
o EX: If appearance is for the sole purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the court.

Note: Question of erroneous service of summons must be raised before judgment is

rendered, or this would be a case of waiver. Defective service may be cured by actual receipt
of summons or if in any other manner, knowledge of the existence of the case.

CASES:

International Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)

FACTS:

Appellant is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business in St. Louis,
Missouri, and is engaged in the manufacture and sale of shoes and other footwear. It
maintains places of business in several states. Appellant has no office in Washington, and
makes no contracts either for sale or purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no stock of
merchandise in that state, and makes there no deliveries of goods in intrastate commerce.
During the years from 1937 to 1940, now in question, appellant employed eleven to thirteen
salesmen under direct supervision and control of sales managers located in St. Louis. These
salesmen resided in Washington; their principal activities were confined to that state, and they
were compensated by commissions based upon the amount of their sales. Appellant supplies
its salesmen with a line of samples, each consisting of one shoe of a pair, which they display
to prospective purchasers. On occasion, they rent permanent sample rooms, for exhibiting
samples, in business buildings, or rent rooms in hotels or business buildings temporarily for
that purpose. The cost of such rentals is reimbursed by appellant.The authority of the
salesmen is limited to exhibiting their samples and soliciting orders from prospective buyers,
at prices and on terms fixed by appellant. The salesmen transmit the orders to appellant's
office in St. Louis for acceptance or rejection, and, when accepted, the merchandise for filling
the orders is shipped f.o.b. from points outside Washington to the purchasers within the state.
No salesman has authority to enter into contracts or to make collections.

Washington sued Defendant to recover unpaid unemployment taxes and served

Defendant in two ways: (1) by mail and (2) by serving one of its salesmen within the state.
Defendant appealed from a verdict for Washington, claiming that Washington had no personal
jurisdiction over Defendant. Appellant also insists that its activities within the state were not
sufficient to manifest its "presence" there, and that, in its absence, the state courts were
without jurisdiction, that, consequently, it was a denial of due process for the state to subject
appellant to suit. It refers to those cases in which it was said that the mere solicitation of
orders for the purchase of goods within a state, to be accepted without the state and filled by
shipment of the purchased goods interstate, does not render the corporation seller amenable
to suit within the state. And appellant further argues that, since it was not present within the
state, it is a denial of due process to subject it to taxation or other money exaction. It thus
denies the power of the state to lay the tax or to subject appellant to a suit for its collection.

ISSUE:

Is service of process upon Defendants agent sufficient notice when the corporations
activities result in a large volume of interstate business so that the corporation receives the
protection of the laws of the state and the suit is related to the activities which make the
corporation present?

HELD:

YES. In order for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant
must have such minimum contacts with the state so that exercising jurisdiction over the
defendant would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their

de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence, his presence within the territorial
jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.

For the terms "present" or "presence" are used merely to symbolize those activities of the
corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process. Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation
with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.

Applying standards set in jurisprudence, the activities carried on in behalf of appellant in

the State of Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and
continuous throughout the years in question. They resulted in a large volume of interstate
business, in the course of which appellant received the benefits and protection of the laws of
the state, including the right to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The
obligation which is here sued upon arose out of those very activities. It is evident that these
operations establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it
reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice,
to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there. Hence, we
cannot say that the maintenance of the present suit in the State of Washington involves an
unreasonable or undue procedure.

We are likewise unable to conclude that the service of the process within the state upon
an agent whose activities establish appellant's "presence" there was not sufficient notice of
the suit, or that the suit was so unrelated to those activities as to make the agent an
inappropriate vehicle for communicating the notice. It is enough that appellant has established
such contacts with the state that the particular form of substituted service adopted there gives
reasonable assurance that the notice will be actual. Nor can we say that the mailing of the
notice of suit to appellant by registered mail at its home office was not reasonably calculated
to apprise appellant of the suit.

Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)

FACTS:

A foreign corporation, owning gold and silver mines in the Philippine Islands, temporarily
carried on in Ohio (during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines) a continuous and
systematic, but limited, part of its general business -- consisting of directors' meetings,
business correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries, purchasing of
machinery, etc. While engaged in doing such business in Ohio, its president was served with
summons in an action in personam against the corporation filed in an Ohio state court by a
nonresident of Ohio seeking approximately $68,400 in dividends claimed to be due her as a
stockholder and $2,500,000 damages, largely because of the company's failure to issue to
her certificates for 120,000 shares of its stock.The cause of action did not arise in Ohio, and
did not relate to the corporation's activities there.

ISSUE:
 Can a state exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the cause of
action does not arise in the state or relate to any of the corporation's activities in the state?

HELD:

The essence of the issue here, at the constitutional level, is a like one of general fairness
to the corporation. Appropriate tests for that are discussed in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, supra, at 326 U. S. 317-320. The amount and kind of activities which must be
carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the forum so as to make it reasonable and
just to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of that state are to be determined in each
case. The corporate activities of a foreign corporation which, under state statute, make it
necessary for it to secure a license and to designate a statutory agent upon whom process
may be served provide a helpful, but not a conclusive, test.On the other hand, if the same
corporation carries on, in that state, other continuous and systematic corporate activities as it
did here -- consisting of directors' meetings, business correspondence, banking, stock
transfers, payment of salaries, purchasing of machinery, etc. -- those activities are enough to
make it fair and reasonable to subject that corporation to proceedings in personam in that
state, at least insofar as the proceedings in personam seek to enforce causes of action
relating to those very activities or to other activities of the corporation within the state.

The company's mining properties were in the Philippine Islands. Its operations there
were completely halted during the occupation of the Islands by the Japanese. During that
interim, the president, who was also the general manager and principal stockholder of the
company, returned to his home in Clermont County, Ohio. There, he maintained an office in
which he conducted his personal affairs and did many things on behalf of the company. He
kept there office files of the company. He carried on there correspondence relating to the
business of the company and to its employees. He drew and distributed there salary checks
on behalf of the company, both in his own favor as president and in favor of two company
secretaries who worked there with him. He used and maintained in Clermont County, Ohio,
two active bank accounts carrying substantial balances of company funds. A bank in Hamilton
County, Ohio, acted as transfer agent for the stock of the company. Several directors'
meetings were held at his office or home in Clermont County. From that office, he supervised
policies dealing with the rehabilitation of the corporation's properties in the Philippines, and he
dispatched funds to cover purchases of machinery for such rehabilitation. Thus, he carried on
in Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities
of the company. He there discharged his duties as president and general manager, both
during the occupation of the company's properties by the Japanese and immediately
thereafter. While no mining properties in Ohio were owned or operated by the company, many
of its wartime activities were directed from Ohio and were being given the personal attention
of its president in that State at the time he was served with summons.

Without reaching that issue of state policy, we conclude that, under the circumstances
above recited, it would not violate federal due process for Ohio either to take or decline
jurisdiction of the corporation in this proceeding.

World-Wide Volkwagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)

FACTS:

Respondents Harry and Kay Robinson purchased a new Audi automobile from petitioner
Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (Seaway), in Massena, N.Y. in 1976. The following year, the
Robinson family, who resided in New York, left that State for a new home in Arizona. As they
passed through the State of Oklahoma, another car struck their Audi in the rear, causing a fire
which severely burned Kay Robinson and her two children.The Robinsons subsequently
brought a products liability action in the District Court for Creek County, Okla., claiming that
their injuries resulted from defective design and placement of the Audi's gas tank and fuel
system. They joined as defendants the automobile's manufacturer, Audi NSU Auto Union
Aktiengesellschaft (Audi); its importer, Volkswagen of America, Inc. (Volkswagen); its regional
distributor, petitioner World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. (World-Wide); and its retail dealer,
petitioner Seaway. Seaway and World-Wide entered special appearances, claiming that
Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over them would offend the limitations on the State's
jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.World-Wide is
incorporated and has its business office in New York. It distributes vehicles, parts, and
accessories, under contract with Volkswagen, to retail dealers in New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut. Seaway, one of these retail dealers, is incorporated and has its place of
business in New York. Insofar as the record reveals, Seaway and World-Wide are fully
independent corporations whose relations with each other and with Volkswagen and Audi are
contractual only. Respondents adduced no evidence that either World-Wide or Seaway does
any business in Oklahoma, ships or sells any products to or in that State, has an agent to
receive process there, or purchases advertisements in any media calculated to reach
Oklahoma.

ISSUE:

Can a forum state exercise in personam jurisdiction over a party when that party's only
connection with that forum state is that some of the products distributed/sold by that party
were involved in a tortuous act in that state?

HELD:
No. We find in the record before us a total absence of those affiliating circumstances that
are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state court jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on no
activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They close no sales and perform no services there. They
avail themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They solicit no
business there either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to
reach the State. Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to
Oklahoma customers or residents, or that they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to
serve the Oklahoma market. In short, respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one, isolated
occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that
a single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to suffer an
accident while passing through Oklahoma.

It is argued, however, that, because an automobile is mobile by its very design and
purpose, it was "foreseeable" that the Robinsons' Audi would cause injury in Oklahoma. Yet
"foreseeability" alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under
the Due Process Clause. If foreseeability were the criterion,every seller of chattels would, in
effect, appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. His amenability to suit would travel
with the chattel.

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)

FACTS:

Respondent lives and works in California. She and her husband brought this suit against
the National Enquirer, Inc., its local distributing company, and petitioners for libel, invasion of
privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional harm. The Enquirer is a Florida corporation with
its principal place of business in Florida. About 600,000 of those copies, almost twice the level
of the next highest State, are sold in California. Respondent's and her husband's claims were
based on an article that appeared in the Enquirer's October 9, 1979, issue. Both the Enquirer
and the distributing company answered the complaint and made no objection to the
jurisdiction of the California court.
 Petitioner South is a reporter employed by the Enquirer. He is a resident of Florida,
though he frequently travels to California on business. South wrote the first draft of the
challenged article, and his byline appeared on it. He did most of his research in Florida,
relying on phone calls to sources in California for the information contained in the article.
Shortly before publication, South called respondent's home and read to her husband a draft of
the article so as to elicit his comments upon it. Aside from his frequent trips and phone calls,
South has no other relevant contacts with California.

Petitioner Calder is also a Florida resident. He has been to California only twice -- once,
on a pleasure trip, prior to the publication of the article and once after to testify in an unrelated
trial. Calder is president and editor of the Enquirer. He "oversee[s] just about every function of
the Enquirer." He reviewed and approved the initial evaluation of the subject of the article and
edited it in its final form. He also declined to print a retraction requested by respondent.
Calder has no other relevant contacts with California.

Petitioners were served with process by mail in Florida and caused special appearances
to be entered on their behalf, moving to quash the service of process for lack of personal
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Can a state exercise jurisdiction over a petitioner if the he aimed "bad actions" towards
that forum state?

HELD:

Yes. A state can exercise jurisdiction over a petitioner based on the "effects test" - a state
has power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a party who causes effects in a state by an
act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from these effects.

The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California resident. It
impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in
California. The article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms
both of respondent's emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was
suffered in California. In sum, California is the focal point both of the story and of the harm
suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the "effects" of
their Florida conduct in California. Their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were
expressly aimed at California. Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article
that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew
that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and
works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation. Under the circumstances,
petitioners must "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there" to answer for the truth of
the statements made in their article.

An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from persons
who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in California.