Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.

com +852 2600 8516

Hope over experience

Seoul
The ladys not for turning. GREED & fear refers not to the late and great Margaret Thatcher,
but rather to Fed Chairwoman Janet Yellen. After reading all of the 3,944 word speech made by
Janet Yellen at the Jackson Hole conference last Friday, GREED & fear would describe it as
neutral. US monetary policy remains data dependent while there is no recognition, let alone
admission, of the failings of unconventional monetary policy. Rather Yellen made it clear that
there was every scope in the future for a further expansion of unconventional monetary policy
even if negative rates were not mentioned. Thus she stated that future policymakers may
wish to explore the possibility of purchasing a broader range of assets, while the idea of
alternative monetary policy frameworks, such as nominal GDP targeting was also floated.

True, if Yellen was far from hawkish, Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer prompted more market
reaction with his predictably more hawkish comments. Fischer told CNBC last Friday that
Yellens speech was consistent with a possible rate hike in September and more than one rate
hike this year. In more jawboning he also told Bloomberg TV on Tuesday that US employment
is very close to full employment. Still the markets have learnt over the past two years and
more since Fischers appointment as vice chairman in June 2014 that Yellen is still running the
Federal Reserve. This is important given the obvious disagreements lurking within the Fed. It is
also why GREED & fear continues to believe that there is only likely to be another rate hike if
there is concrete evidence of accelerating wage pressures, which is why tomorrows average
hourly earnings growth number will be as important as ever. Fed funds futures priced in a 42%
possibility of a rate hike in September last Friday following Fischers comments, up from 32% a
day earlier; though that has since fallen back to 36% on Wednesday (see Figure 1).

Figure 1
Fed funds futures implied possibility of a Fed rate hike in the September and December FOMC meetings

100% (%)
21-Sep 14-Dec
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
15-Jul-16

29-Jul-16
3-Jun-16

1-Jul-16
1-Jan-16

8-Apr-16

6-May-16

12-Aug-16

26-Aug-16
20-May-16
15-Jan-16

29-Jan-16

12-Feb-16

26-Feb-16

11-Mar-16

25-Mar-16

22-Apr-16

17-Jun-16

Source: Bloomberg

Meanwhile it is important to understand that the central banking establishment assembled at

Jackson Hole last weekend still shows almost no sign of admitting the error of its ways. Rather
all the focus is on how they can experiment further in the pseudo-science that is monetary
quackery. Examples are nominal GDP targeting or a proposal raised by The Economist of a 4%
inflation target (see The Economist article The Jackson four: Should the Fed adopt Indias
inflation target, 27 August 2016). On a related point, San Francisco Fed President John
Williams argued last month that the Fed might need to raise its 2% inflation target in order to
fight the next economic downturn (see FRBSF Economic Letter: Monetary policy in a low R-star
world, 15 August 2016).

Thursday, 01 September 2016 Page 1

 
   
Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.com +852 2600 8516

Why central bankers think they can reach a 4% target benignly when they cannot even reach
2% is beyond GREED & fear. But it again suggests that the G7 central banking establishment
has learnt nothing from their empirical experience since 2008, which is simply extraordinary.
The same conclusion is formed by GREED & fear from reading Kamikaze Kurodas speech at
Jackson Hole. The only merit of this address was that it was considerably shorter than Yellens
(2113 words). Otherwise Kurodas speech contained his usual obsession with inflation
expectations. Indeed the title is Re-anchoring Inflation Expectations via Quantitative and
Qualitative Monetary Easing with a Negative Interest Rate. Unfortunately Kuroda totally failed
to address the key point, namely that the renewed decline in inflation expectations in Japan
coincided almost to the day with the Bank of Japans negative interest rate announcement in
late January (see Figures 2 & 3).

Figure 2
Japanese consumers' estimated average inflation expectations (12m ahead)

(%YoY) Inflation expectations by consumers (12m ahead)

4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
04

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16
Aug

Aug

Aug

Aug

Aug

Aug

Aug

Aug

Aug

Aug

Aug

Aug
Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec

Dec
Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr

Apr

Note: All households. Estimated price expectations a year ahead. Source: CLSA, Japan Cabinet Office - Consumer Confidence
Survey

Figure 3
Japan core CPI inflation (adjusted for sale tax hike effect)

1.5 (%YoY)

1.0

0.5

0.0

(0.5)
Japan core CPI (excl. fresh food)
(1.0) CPI excl. food & energy
CPI excl. fresh food & energy
(1.5)
11
11
11
11
11

12
12
12
12
12

13
13
13
13
13

14
14
14
14
14

15
15
15
15
15

16
16
16
11

12

13

14

15

16
Jul

Jul

Jul

Jul

Jul

Jul
Jan

Jan

Jan

Jan

Jan

Jan
May

Nov

May
Mar

Sep
Nov

May

Nov

May
Mar

Sep
Nov

May
Mar

Sep

Mar

Sep
Nov

May
Mar

Sep

Mar

Source: Statistics Bureau, Bank of Japan, CLSA

Kuroda does not want to dwell on this point for the obvious reason that it would draw attention
to the fact that his monetary policy is not working in the manner hoped for. Rather Kuroda was
at pains to point out that the BoJ would take additional easing measures without hesitation in
terms of three dimensions - quantity, quality, and the interest rate - if it is judged necessary for
achieving the price stability target.

Thursday, 01 September 2016 Page 2

 
   
Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.com +852 2600 8516

That would certainly suggest more aggressive easing at the next BoJ meeting on 20-21
September given that the latest inflation data has again highlighted the extent to which the BoJ
is short of its target. Thus, core CPI inflation, excluding fresh food, fell from minus 0.4%YoY in
June to minus 0.5% in July, while the BoJs new core inflation measure, CPI excluding fresh
food and energy, decelerated from 0.7%YoY to 0.5%YoY (see Figure 3). Still the real question,
as has been discussed here on several occasions, is whether Kurodas claimed freedom of
action is limited by political factors given both the negative political and market reactions to
negative rates. GREED & fears assumption continues to be that the BoJ Governor has been
reined in by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe but hopes to check this out in a pending visit to Japan
later this month.

If the G7 central banking establishment is still committed to its unconventional course, there
are more and more voices questioning the approach. An example worth mentioning this week
was an op-ed article published in The Wall Street Journal last Friday by former Fed Governor
Kevin Warsh. Titled provocatively The Federal Reserve needs new thinking; Warsh wrote: Its
models are unreliable, its policies erratic and its guidance confusing. It is also politically
vulnerable.

Naturally GREED & fear agrees with all of the above. But it is particularly interesting to see a
recent member of the Federal Reserve Board (Warsh stepped down on 31 March 2011) make
the point about political vulnerability. Clearly the Fed would be a lot more politically vulnerable
in the wake of a Trump victory than a Clinton one. This raises the issue of whether Trump has
blown his candidacy in recent weeks with his decline in the polls from the July high (see Figure
4) and yet another change of campaign manager. This is clearly a risk given the Democrats
have successfully made the Donalds temperament the key issue in recent weeks. Still in
GREED & fears view it is still premature to write off the Donald completely though he is clearly
on the ropes. The email and Clinton foundation issues remain points of vulnerability for the
Democratic campaign though the media establishment will try to play them down as old news.
But for Trump to have a chance of winning he has to stay on message and avoid being
provoked into gratuitous fights with people who do not matter. That, clearly, does not come
easily!

Figure 4
US presidential election opinion polls (Clinton vs Trump)

51 (%) Clinton Trump

49

47

45

43

41

39

37

35
Jan 16 Feb 16 Mar 16 Apr 16 May 16 Jun 16 Jul 16 Aug 16
Note: Average of various polls. Source: RealClearPolitics, CLSA

In the Philippines at the end of last week, primarily to speak at an internal corporate event,
GREED & fear is not inclined to reduce the current 4x overweight in the Asia Pacific ex-Japan
portfolio. But GREED & fear is not inclined to raise it either.

Thursday, 01 September 2016 Page 3

 
   
Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.com +852 2600 8516

The macro case for the Philippines was outlined here last week (see GREED & fear - Indian
employment and King of England musings, 25 August 2016), in the sense that the latest GDP
data has further highlighted evidence of an accelerating private sector-driven investment cycle.
The gross fixed capital formation to nominal GDP ratio increased from 21.4% in 2015 to 23.7%
in 1H16, the highest level since 1997 (see Figure 5). GREED & fears base case is that the
investment cycle will continue. Indeed it should accelerate given all the evidence is that new
president Rodrigo Duterte is an action man who has a specific agenda to accelerate PPP
infrastructure projects. The Duterte governments goal is to roll out 17 PPP infrastructure
projects worth P580bn for bidding before the end of 2017. By contrast, the Aquino government
awarded only 12 projects worth P197bn after the programme was launched in late 2010.

Figure 5
Philippines gross fixed capital formation as % of nominal GDP

25 (%GDP)
Philippines gross fixed capital formation as % of nominal GDP
24

23

22

21

20

19

18

17
1H16
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Source: CEIC Data, CLSA

Figure 6
Philippines public infrastructure spending

1,000 (P bn) Philippines public infrastructure spending (%GDP) 6

900 as % of GDP (RHS)
5
800
700
4
600
500 3
400
2
300
200
1
100
0 0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: Department of Budget and Management (DBM), CLSA

Still construction on one nearly completed project, namely a connector road linking airport
terminals, was the main reason why it took GREED & fear 3.5 hours to drive the 7km from
Manila Ninoy Aquino International Airport to a Makati hotel last Thursday night and more than
two hours to leave the vicinity of the airport itself. Meanwhile, in the proposed Budget for 2017
sent to Congress in mid-August, public infrastructure has an allocation of P860.7bn or 26% of
the entire budget. This is 13.8%YoY higher than this years allocation and equivalent to 5.4% of
GDP (see Figure 6). Duterte wants to increase infrastructure spending to 7% of GDP within his
term in office which runs for six years. His government is also looking at an increased budget

Thursday, 01 September 2016 Page 4

 
   
Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.com +852 2600 8516

deficit of P478bn or 3% of GDP in 2017 (see Figure 7). This would be the highest fiscal deficit
relative to GDP since 2010.

Figure 7
Philippines fiscal deficit

600 (P bn) (%GDP) 4.0

Philippines fiscal deficit as % of GDP (RHS)
3.5
500
3.0
400
2.5

300 2.0

1.5
200
1.0
100
0.5

0 0.0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: Department of Budget and Management (DBM), CEIC Data, CLSA

If all this is evidence of an economy running on domestic demand, and GDP growth would be
much stronger if the negative drag from external trade is excluded (see Figure 8), the reason
why GREED & fear will not raise the weighting further, beyond high valuations, is that some sort
of a discount has to be built in for political uncertainty. This is because Duterte is an unknown
quantity not only to GREED & fear but also, more importantly, to the big business groups that
have long dominated the Philippine economy. The word in Manila is that no big business group
funded Dutertes last minute presidential campaign, partly because no one expected him to win
and partly because Duterte did not want to become obligated. This creates an unprecedented
situation in Philippine politics. Indeed it is worth noting again Dutertes remarkable victory,
given that he only announced his candidacy in November 2015 and given that he does not
come from Luzon, the dominant island where 57m or 57% of the population lives. Indeed this
would be like a non-Javanese president running Indonesia, an unacceptable prospect to most
Javanese.

Figure 8
Philippines real GDP growth and domestic demand growth

14 (%YoY) Real GDP growth Real domestic demand growth

12

10

-2
06
06

07
07

08
08

09
09

10
10

11
11

12
12

13
13

14
14

15
15

16
16
06
06

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11
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15
Jun

Jun

Jun

Jun

Jun

Jun

Jun

Jun

Jun

Jun

Jun
Mar

Mar

Mar

Mar

Mar

Mar

Mar

Mar

Mar

Mar

Mar
Sep
Dec

Sep
Dec

Sep
Dec

Sep
Dec

Sep
Dec

Sep
Dec

Sep
Dec

Sep
Dec

Sep
Dec

Sep
Dec

Note: Domestic demand = household consumption + government expenditure + gross capital formation (GDP less net exports
and statistical discrepancy). Source: CEIC Data, PSA, CLSA

Thursday, 01 September 2016 Page 5

 
   
Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.com +852 2600 8516

The fact that the big business groups do not really know Duterte, and have not really done
much business in his home city of Davao, means that they are all desperately trying to get to
know him. It also means they would be potentially deterred from investing if they encounter
some unpleasant surprises. Still for now his platform seems to be eminently pro-business while
his economic ministers are orthodox. The government has proposed to lower income tax rates
for individuals and corporations from the present ceilings of 32% and 30% respectively to 25%.
To offset the revenue losses from such tax cuts, the government has proposed to expand the
value-added tax base by eliminating some VAT exemptions and to index fuel excise taxes to
inflation. All this should be viewed positively by the private sector. Still any changes in taxation
will have to be approved by the legislature.

The Duterte line is that he has no interest in economics, and indeed does not pretend to have
any, and is happy to leave business to businessmen providing they pay their taxes which would
seem entirely reasonable. Executing infrastructure projects is something he does understand,
however, which is why the construction sector should be an area for investors to focus on
during his administration. By contrast, residential property has in GREED & fears view already
seen its best days in this cycle. This is because remittances have slowed significantly and are
likely to continue to do so (see Figure 9), while up to one third of residential property demand
still comes from overseas workers.

Figure 9
Growth in Philippines overseas workers cash remittances

30 (%YoY)

25

20

15

10

(5)
1H16
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Source: CEIC Data, CLSA

But to get back to Duterte the current noise in Manila is not about economics. Rather it is about
the energetic way Duterte has gone about implementing his campaign promise to go after drug
dealers and the colourful way he has responded to international criticism of that campaign.

The word is that about 2,000 drug dealers have so far been killed since Duterte was
inaugurated in a process which critics allege lacks any kind of due process, a criticism Duterte
does not deny since he has specifically pledged to kill anyone caught drug dealing without any
due process. This is a programme carried out vigorously by the new chief of national police he
has appointed, General Ronald Bato dela Rosa, who has seemingly assumed rock star status
in the Philippines. To state the obvious, the Duterte law-and-order campaign is very popular on
the street. Indeed this is why he was elected with such an impressive majority. Remember
Duterte won 39% of the vote in the May presidential election (see Figure 10).

Still the elite is becoming nervous, if only because of the growing international media focus on
Dutertes drug war and Dutertes inflammatory rhetoric in response to growing international
criticism of his policies. The United Nations, the American ambassador and sundry others have
already been targets of what local press critics describe as the new presidents foul language.

Thursday, 01 September 2016 Page 6

 
   
Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.com +852 2600 8516

Figure 10
Philippines 9 May 2016 presidential election results (% of vote)

45% (%)
39.0%
40%

35%

30%

25% 23.4%
21.4%
20%

15% 12.7%

10%

5% 3.4%

0%
Rodrigo Duterte Manuel Roxas Grace Poe Jejomar Binay Miriam Defensor
Santiago
Source: COMELEC

To GREED & fear a lot of this is just noise. Duterte is simply implementing policies promised in
his election campaign and has certainly got a democratic mandate. Still there is a small but not
zero risk of a formal international reaction. Politically correct socially responsible investing
(SRI) is a growing trend, be it well intentioned or a clever marketing gimmick dependent on the
point of view taken. So far the criteria employed in such SRI investing are based on micro
analysis of individual corporates practices. But what if a whole country is excluded, based on
some such subjective criteria? Such a development is not GREED & fears base case. But the
possibility is not zero, most particularly if Duterte continues to employ aggressive rhetoric
which only attracts unnecessary media attention internationally. The extremely fit 71-year-old
Philippine president, a nocturnal animal though like Donald Trump not a drinker, has a habit of
holding impromptu 2am press conferences. Meanwhile, the amount of assets managed under
SRI criteria at the start of 2014 is shown in the table below (see Figure 11).

Figure 11
SRI assets by region 20122014

US$bn 2012 2014 %chg

Europe 8,758 13,608 55%
US 3,740 6,572 76%
Canada 589 945 60%
Australia/NZ 134 180 34%
Asia 40 53 32%
Total 13,261 21,358 61%
Source: Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (GSIA) - Global Sustainable Investment Review, 2014

Still it is already clear that Duterte is onto something in his drug war. This is because the
campaign has already revealed the extent to which the Philippines has been used by Chinese
gangs in the region as a cartel for narcotics production and exports. In that sense the
Philippines has been at risk of becoming a narco-state with the drug cartels owning politicians.
In this sense Dutertes campaign is both bold and courageous, though it does also raise the
question of how many Manila condos have been bought with proceeds from drug dealing.

Returning to more orthodox macro factors, the continuing investment-driven domestic boom
and the lack of exports is increasing the risk that Philippines loses the current account surplus

Thursday, 01 September 2016 Page 7

 
   
Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.com +852 2600 8516

which it has been enjoying since 2003 (see Figure 12). Thus, real gross fixed capital formation
surged by 27.2%YoY in 2Q16 while exports of goods declined by 11.4%YoY in US dollar terms
in June (see Figure 13). With remittance growth slowing to 3.2%YoY in US dollar terms in 1H16
the reality is that the current account surplus was running at only 0.6% of GDP in 1Q16, down
from 3.2% in 1Q15 and 2.9% in 2015. CLSAs economics team forecasts a current account
surplus of only 0.7% in 2016 and a swing into deficit of 0.3% of GDP in 2017. Still the positive
point is that the BPO story continues to kick in and is poised to overtake remittance income by
2017. BPO revenues increased by 16%YoY to almost US$22bn in 2015 or 85% of cash
remittances, and are projected by the Information Technology and Business Process Association
of the Philippines (IBPAP) to reach US$25bn this year and about US$29bn in 2017 (see Figure
14). By way of comparison, cash remittances rose by 4.6%YoY to US$25.8bn in 2015 and were
up 3.2%YoY to US$13.2bn in 1H16. At the current growth rate remittances will reach
US$26.6bn this year and US$27.4bn in 2017.

Figure 12
Philippines current account as % of GDP

6 (%GDP) Philippines current account as % of GDP

5
4
3
2
1
0
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

1Q16

Source: CEIC Data, BSP, CLSA

Figure 13
Philippines export growth and import growth

50 (%YoY, 3mma) Export growth

40 Import growth
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
May 09

Mar 10

May 14

Mar 15
Jun 06
Nov 06

Sep 07

Jul 08
Dec 08

Jun 11
Nov 11

Sep 12

Jul 13
Dec 13

Jun 16
Jan 06

Apr 07

Feb 08

Jan 11
Oct 09

Aug 10

Apr 12

Feb 13

Oct 14

Aug 15
Jan 16

Source: CEIC Data

Thursday, 01 September 2016 Page 8

 
   
Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.com +852 2600 8516

Figure 14
Philippines BPO revenues to remittances ratio
30 BPO revenues (%) 110
(US$bn)
Overseas remittances 100
25 BPO revenues / remittances (RHS) 90
80
20
70
60
15
50
40
10
30
5 20
10
0 0

2016E

2017F
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015
Source: CLSA, BSP, IT & Business Process Association of the Philippines (IBPAP)

Figure 15
Philippines underemployment rate

27 (%) Philippines underemployment rate

25

23

21

19

17

15
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

Source: Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)

Meanwhile, the ongoing contribution to domestic demand provided by the twin engines of
remittances and BPO covers up the lack of job generation from an overall macroeconomic basis.
This is why the official underemployment rate is still a high 18.4% (see Figure 15). It is also
worth noting the dismal performance of agriculture. Real GDP growth for the agriculture sector
declined by 2.1%YoY in 2Q16 (see Figure 16).

Still underemployment rates and agriculture are not the priorities of the stock market. If the
investment cycle continues, the stock market should continue to outperform despite the high
valuations, as it has done in an Asia Pacific ex-Japan context since 2004 (see Figure 17). CLSAs
Philippine universe of 40 stocks under coverage now trades at 18.6x 2016 forecast earnings
and 16.4x 2017 earnings, assuming 13.2% earnings growth this year and 13.7% next year.
Still it is also worth stressing for those not restricted by liquidity criteria that there is a big
divergence in valuations between the overall market of 272 listed stocks and the 23 stocks
which comprise the MSCI Philippines Index (see Figure 18). Thus, the Philippine stocks outside
the MSCI Philippines universe now trade on an average 14x forward PE, compared with 21x for
the MSCI Philippines universe.

Thursday, 01 September 2016 Page 9

 
   
Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.com +852 2600 8516

Figure 16
Philippines real GDP growth by major industries

20 (%YoY) Agriculture Industry Services

15

10

-5

-10
Mar 06

Sep 06

Mar 07

Sep 07

Mar 08

Sep 08

Mar 09

Sep 09

Mar 10

Sep 10

Mar 11

Sep 11

Mar 12

Sep 12

Mar 13

Sep 13

Mar 14

Sep 14

Mar 15

Sep 15

Mar 16
Source: CLSA, PSA, CEIC Data

Figure 17
MSCI Philippines relative to MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex-Japan

280 (1/1/88=100)
MSCI Philippines relative to MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex-Japan Index
250

220

190

160

130

100

70

40
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Source: CLSA, Datastream

Figure 18
Philippines SE All Shares Index and MSCI Philippines forward P/E

22 (x) MSCI Philippines Index Philipines SE All Shares Index

21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
Mar 15

May 15

Jun 15

Jul 15

Sep 15

Nov 15

Dec 15

Mar 16

May 16

Jun 16

Jul 16
Jan 15

Feb 15

Apr 15

Aug 15

Oct 15

Jan 16

Feb 16

Apr 16

Aug 16

Source: Datastream

Thursday, 01 September 2016 Page 10

 
   
Christopher Wood christopher.wood@clsa.com +852 2600 8516

Finally, GREED & fear has been in Korea since the middle of this week. Comments on Korea will
be deferred for another week. But one small change will be made in the Asia ex-Japan long-
only portfolio. The existing investment in Naver will be increased by one percentage point with
the money raised by shaving the investment in Astra International (see Figure 19).

Figure 19
Asia ex-Japan thematic equity portfolio for long-only absolute-return investors
Australia gold mining 4% Newcrest Mining
China internet media 5% Tencent
China technology 5% Sunny Optical
Hong Kong insurance 4% AIA Group
India autos 4% Maruti Suzuki
India banks 13% HDFC Bank (5%), IndusInd Bank (5%), Bank of Baroda (3%)

India housing finance 10% HDFC (4%), GRUH Finance (3%), Indiabulls Housing Finance (3%)
India infrastructure 3% Bharti Infratel
India media 4% Zee Entertainment
India non-bank finance 5% Bajaj Finance
India property 7% Prestige Estates (4%), DLF (3%)
India software 3% Persistent Systems
Indonesia autos 3% Astra International
Korea internet media 4% Naver
Philippines banks 8% Metrobank (4%), BDO Unibank (4%)
Philippines consumer 4% Universal Robina
Philippines infrastructure 4% Metro Pacific
Philippines media 3% ABS-CBN
Taiwan technology 4% Largan Precision

Thailand healthcare 3% Bangkok Dusit

Note: Readers should refer to the relevant CLSA research reports for detailed analysis & disclosures. Source: CLSA

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