, , and in Plato

Author(s): Drew A. Hyland

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1968), pp. 32-46
Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181805 .
Accessed: 19/08/2011 10:55

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.

http://www.jstor.org
 and acxain Plato
'Epc,'E7rmOu,ta,
DREW A. HYLAND

"The encomium proper is preceded by a preliminary dialectical discussion with

Agathon, the object of which is to clear the ground of some popular misconcep-
tions of the nature of Eros. The notion of Eros, it is shown, is equivalent to that
of desire (Ipcoq = s6 &iwLOuIAo5v)
... a quality, not a person."
Bury, R. G. The Symposium of Plato, page
XXXVI-XXXVII, in a discussion of Socrates'
speech.

"The subject of conversation (in the Lysis) is friendship (qX(a). But behind
this word, it is clear, as will be briefly sketched, hides the more powerful Eros...
There is hardly any terminological distinction between love and friendship,
so that, first, desire is said to wish that of which it is in want, and then that the
congenial be the object of 'love, friendship, and desire' (,roiloIxkLou 6 re "Epwqxal
h cpLXEaxal t sIouFdm 'ryX&vyL o5av, 221 E)."
Friedlander, Paul, Plato, An Introduction,
page 50-51.

It is the purposeof this essay to take some first steps towarddis-

pelling the popular conception, exemplified by the two above
quotations, that there is little or no difference in Plato's dialogues
between the three important terms "Epwq, eTctE, and ptL?.1 I
say "first steps" because the vast number of significant occurrences
of these terms in the dialogues makes it impossible to give an ex-
haustive treatment in one short paper. Consequently, I propose to
do the following: first, I shall elicit the relevant distinctions between
these terms, and the basis for the distinctions, by a careful examination
of two significant passages, Symposium200a-201b, and Lysis 221-222.
I shall attempt to show therein that although indeed these terms
have an important connection with each other, nevertheless there

1 D. N. Levin, "Some Observations Concerning Plato's Lysis", (presented at a

meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, Amherst, Massachusetts,
August 17, 1964), notes several different positions taken on the controversy
(see especially pages 12-18 including footnotes), and he himself seems to come
out in favor of some distinction at least between 'Epcogand yWLX( (pages 15-17)
However, since the distinction in question is not the central theme of his essay,
he does not offer decisive evidence for his view. I propose to do so in this essay.

32
are distinct and significant differences. I shall then consider several
relevant passages from other dialogues in which I find the distinctions
I draw supported. My claim is not, indeed cannot be, that Plato always
consistently distinguishes the terms in question, that he never uses
them interchangeably. To do so would necessitate a consideration of
every occurrence of one or more of these terms in the dialogues.
Besides, there are undoubtedly contexts in which such subtle distinc-
tions are entirely irrelevant to the point being made. In such cases,
need we doubt the sincerity or the wisdom of Socrates' words in the
Theaetetusthat "To use words and phrases in an easy-going way
without scrutinizing them too seriously is not, in general, a mark of
ill breeding; on the contrary there is something lowbred in being too
precise."2 Rather my more cautious claim will be that in at least
several important passages where the distinctions would be relevant,
Plato maintains them consistently. My suspicion is that this con-
sistency is maintained more broadly; but this cannot be proved in a
short paper. Finally, I shall offer a few suggestions as to possible
philosophic consequences that would derive from a realization of
these differences.
Let me begin with the discussion between Socrates and Agathon at
Symposium 200a-201b. Socrates is concerned to show Agathon that
'Epus is always directed, that is, it is always 'Ep; of something and
not "in itself," and also that it is always of something which it lacks.
I shall be concerned not so much with the establishing of these points
as with the careful and distinct use of the terms in question. Let me
first arrange the order of the argument, with special emphasis on the
interchange of the relevant terms, then comment on the way in
which the argument develops. The crucial passage begins at 200a2
when, having established that 'Epco always has an object, Socrates
asks Agathon to rememberwhat he thinks the object to be, and then
asks, "Does 'Epw; desire that of which it is 'Epco?" (o vEps 'exeLvou
0o5 I=v
W p@, Out&t ouTo5 i o5;). This establishes what I shall cal
for reference step one, that desire (&VnQua4x)is a possible predicate of
' desires. "This thing that it desires and loves, does it
'Epco.3 EpG.;
desire and love it having it or not having it?" (H6orepov gcwv ocaur6oi5

2 Plato, Theaetetus, 184c. Translation by F. M. Cornford.

' I do not mean to imply by the use of the term "steps" that these are necessarily
logical steps, that, say, step four follows logically from step three. I am simply
distinguishing the stages in the argument relevant to my paper.

33
 I I
s7rLOu)e 'r xaXIpI, elZ' tnUlIeZ xre X pI , II
O- oV;).4 "Probably
not having," says Agathon. This I shall call step two, that 'Epod
both desires and loves, in other words, that love is in a way self-
predicative, and that besides this it also desires.
"Consider," says Socrates, "whether, rather than probable, it is
not necessary that desire desires what it lacks, or does not desire if it
does not lack." (x67nC 8&1,avXL'lo eLX6toqe M&vcyxzou'r 0' Z'7rLOLouv
'
OtWVLU.ZVOVi?VW; '=LV, 'MtOU1?LV &&v -? C' ae; i;).5 Here we have
step three, which states only (as opposed to step two) that desire
desires what it lacks. An important element in step three then, is
that it says nothing explicitly about 'Epw;. To this Agathon assents.
Socrates next enters upon some examples which both illustrate and
expand his point. The object of the examples is this: if someone who
is strong wishes to be strong, or if someone who is healthy wishes to
be healthy, what he really wishes is to continue to be strong or healthy
in the future, something which he at present lacks.6 But in the course
of these examples, a new word is introduced to express that element
of desire, namely ouXecaOL.It may seem at first that 3ou'caootand
e7rLtieZv are used interchangeably in this passage, but if this were so,
Socrates could be accused of ignoring the obvious difference that
e7r&LOtLdvis primarily, if not exclusively, a passion, whereas PoUAeaOvL
has the more intellectual connotation of "wishing" or "willing." But
he does not, I think, ignore this. Thus Socrates says at 200d, "Con-
sider, then, whether whenever you say that 'I desire things now
present,' you mean anything else than this, that 'I wish to possess
the things I now have in the future also."' This suggests that the
desire for present possessions in the future somehow loses the pas-
sionate force of a present desire (ChLOupdc) so that the more intellectual
PoU'Xo,uimis appropriate. Let us call this introduction of Poi'Xo,oa? to
refer to desire for future possession step four.
Socrates then switches back to "?p&-v"to draw his conclusion from
the examples. "But this is to love that which is not yet ready at hand
for one, nor in one's possession, the possession and preservation of
these things in future time."7 Step five seems to establish that "Epwg

4 Plato, Symposium, 200a5.

6 Ibid., 200a8.
6 Ibid., 200b8-200e.
8
7 Ibid., 200d8. "ouxo5v ?o5Yr6y'&a-lv &xeEvou&p&v, &adv 0o8e
ou'nwco?tOL[LOV MUrT45
1XCL, 6 ?et t6V 17rCL'X Xp6vov 'rac3roxetvot orCp
acO6Lxcvac xodt nop6vro;"

34
is also applicable to the possession of present blessings in the future
- that locution to which the verb Poi')?eaO is appropriate.
"This man and anyone else who desires," says Socrates, "desires
what is not ready at hand nor present to him, and what he does not
have, and what he is not himself and what he lacks, such are the
kinds of things of which desire and love are."8 Step six thus asserts
that both "Ep(o and ZatLOufL are of what one does not have, what one
is not himself, and of what one lacks.
Finally Socrates sums up the argument by establishing that vEpw4
is first of something, and second, of something which one at present
lacks (&Xo 7L C'=tv 6o"Ep&gnp&-ov ,ev 'v mVov, ?7rso ro'Cro&v
O )v&oXv
gv8eo ncpj ocUs& ;).9 The seventh and final step consists of droppingoff
the interest in e'tLOUpa and concluding exclusively concerning `EpwG.
Let us now examine the argument more closely to see what dis-
tinctions develop. Step one establishes that 'Epcjg desires, that is,
that desiring is a possible predicateof Ep,og.It does not establish that
desire is the only predicate of `Epws, nor, certainly, does it even hint
that 'Ep&o;and EtLOvCu-.are identical, as Bury would have us believe.
Step two increases the dubiousness of Bury's hypothesis when it
adds that vEpco& both desires and loves what it lacks. The only way
this could be construed as implying that 'Ep&o and eOur[Amare
identical would be to interpret the presence of the conjunction here
as a rather sophomoric redundancy on Plato's part. If vEpco=
VXLOU.dm,then the conjunction of the two is entirely unnecessary.
A much more plausible explanation would be that by ascribing both
loving and desiring as predicates of 'Ep&g, having just ascribed
desiring individually, Plato is indicating to us that there is at least
some difference between them. What the difference is has as yet not
even been hinted at. We see here only the suggestion that there is a
difference.
Step three is characterized by the fact that it tells us nothing
directly about `Epco. It does, however, tell us something about
enu&Aoc.10 It tells us that desire desires, that it is self-predicative in

S Ibid., 200el. xxl o5roq &pmxal &XXoqniq 6 &kntOu(13v'ro5 ph &'rotLouxxl SroV 0v?
7rpOvrO; xoc 6 * lXCL XMt 8 IAj a-LV XT6q xma o5 kvgt4 &aCrt,roLat r',r-m ta'rlv &v
J &rLOuJAC -C xOd 6 Ip@ &FTEV;
9 Ibid., 200e8.
10Liddell and Scott, under "&1=0u[&" say that "'r IntOu?.ov ... equals &tOU[Eda."
Although this may at times be debatable, it serves the point here; step three is
about kMOu)imd, not 'Epw,.

35
the same way as 'Epcoc.'Epo~ and sLOu&4othus have this much in
common: they both desire. 'Epco, however loves (4p5) as well, i.e.,
it too is self-predicative. One possible distinction between 'Epco and
6t0u,LOa now begins to emerge: they both desire, but only "Epc?
has been said to love. It may be that an0u[u(m can only desire, whereas
'Epcogcan both desire and love. Nor ought we to be surprised that
such a difference arises. After all, VmOu,ul0 is characterized by Plato
in the Phaedrus as but the lowest faculty of the soul, as an unruly
monster which must be constrained, sometimes violently constrained,
by the higher faculties in order to prevent it from gaining complete
mastery over the soul,1" whereas 'Epco is portrayed in the same
dialogue as divine madness, the source of inspiration to "divine
philosophy.112There must, then, be some other element in 'Epco&in
addition to its capacity to desire, which gives it the divine status
which ehr&[da lacks. Looking forward to the "ascent passage" of the
Symposium, the charioteer image of the Phaedrus, and even the cave
analogy of the Republic, we could well suspect that it will be some
element of rationality which will accomplish this enhancement of
'Epco. When we think of the brute desire (EtLOu[da) of which 'Epco
is capable, modified by a more rational element, our thought ought
to turn to the possibilities offered by y6ac as a source of insight.
Perhaps qtXEm is also involved in 'Epo in a way which distinguishes
'Epw from e.mOuiEa. To explore this possibility, we must turn to certain
important passagesin Plato's dialogue on (pLkax, the Lysis.
The Lysis is a dialogue whose ostensible concern is the nature of a
friend (pLX6;)or more broadly, of friendship (pLXcx).'8It might be
pointed out that the very fact that Plato wrote one dialogue on
friendship (ypXoc) and two on 'Epco indicates that he at least makes a
distinction between these two terms, even if his commentators do not.
What concerns us here, however, are certain illuminating statements
on the possible relationship between 'Epw4, 9c0LX, and C7nLO04dc.Near
the end of the dialogue, Socrates is pointing out that cXLaineed not
be of what is absolutely evil or absolutely good, but possibly of
something neither evil nor good. He says at one point, "Is it possible
for one desiring and loving not to befriend (p6elv) that which he
desires and loves?" (otov re oi9v earLv i7Ou&oUvrx' xC?L&pAv'a orouTOU

"I Plato, Phaedrus, 246ff.

12 Ibid., 244-246.
18 See D. N. Levin, op. cit. (n. 1), pages 9-10 for a discussion of this.

36
0o eOtU.tL Xm,LcPp T (pLXBEZV;).14To which Lysis replies, "It seems to
me not." This sentence is most instructive, for it directly mentions
and relates the three terms in question. It suggests that it is impossible
for one desiring and loving (7rtLOouivat. xocLipxv-dr) not to befriend
(FI? t9Xev)its object. That is, if one both desires and loves (erLOUie
xal kp-), he must also befriend (pLXd) as well. Now, we would hardly
want to say that if one simply desired, he would also befriend. 'ETLOu-
tLCx,as the lower passion, would hardly deserve such a close association
with the more rational yLX(c. The question as to whether one who
loves (4p) also befriends (pXct) is more difficult, but probably con-
tains the crux of our problem. I offer the following suggestion: it
begins to look as though qLX6must be more closely associated with
'Epw; than with C'mOulA.A hierarchy begins to emerge, with &rLOu-
.daC
at the bottom and (pLXL at the top, and these two terms mediated,
as it were, by 'Epwg, which contains elements of both. The criterion
of this hierarchy clearly is involved with the degree of rationality
implicit in the terms. 'E=Oufao, the lower passion, contains virtually
no rationality. In fact, it is a constant hindrance to reason, as we learn
in the Phaedrus.'L'Ep&s, as we learn from Diotima's revelation,
contains a considerable element of reason or deliberative ability. It
acts as the mediator between gods and men.16 In its mythical pre-
sentation as the son of Poros and Penia, it is described as "... plotting
after beautiful things and good things, being manly and energetic
and impetuous, a clever hunter, always weaving plots, desirous of
thoughtfulness, inventive, a philosopher throughout its life.. ".17
Moreover, in the famous "ascent passage",'8 we leam that as the
degree of reason in 'Epcs increases, whereby one turns his attention
to increasingly higher objects of love, 'Ep&q becomes transformed,
in its highest manifestation, into p)LX, indeed the cpLXEm
for aocptx,

1 Plato, Lysis, 221b. I have adopted "to befriend" for

"qlXtlv", because it
seemed the most plausible way to maintain the connection between qLxelvand
TOA (friendship). However, it is in fact an inadequate translation, because it
fails to bring out the subtlety of the distinction between (pOXcv, and &p&.v in this
sentence. The point is that 9LxCLvhas less 17:LO[uLEain it than does &p&v. But "to
befriend" is too weak. Both Ip&cv and 9LXclvshould really be translated "to love"
with the former understood to be somewhat stronger than the latter.
15 Plato, Phaedrus, 247b, and elsewhere.
16 Plato, Symposium, 202e.
17 Ibid., 203b-204, not to mention that in this description
'Epcq is the veritable
image of Socrates.
Is Ibid., 210-212b.

37
 or philosophy. 00kXa,then, is 'Epcosmodified by an increased degree
of rationality. At the risk of being capricious we could say that the
highest pursuit of man is not "erosophy"but "philosophy" because
by the time man reaches his highest condition, the erotic drive which
started him on his way has been modified, but not sublimated, by
an increased rationality, so that it becomes a pXtocfor wisdom. In
fact, it is precisely this increased degree of rationality which has
enabled man to settle his erotic drive on its most proper and highest
object, wisdom itself. To hold such a view is not, of course, to maintain
that there is no relation whatsoever between these terms. That even
the two extremes, pL?Eand e.LOUVd4x,are somewhat related is shown
by a statement which Socrates makes shortly after the last quotation
from the Lysis, at 221d. "Desire is the cause of friendship, and that
which desires is a friend to that which it desires, at the time when it
desires." (4 FtOuliEm'rn ?tLcx,aoclx(a, xal 'o Z7rL0uLoiUvrp[LXov Z'oTv
'O6'Z o6 C7tlOu4LC xal' 6o'-e 6 7LOt .u...).19
i Thus the desiring (so
ZmLOt)ou)v)becomes a friendto that which it desiresin orderto possess it.
This illustrates that the two terms are related but different. Again,
that Z'nu&.da is the cause of friendship also indicates that at least the
extremes, cpL?,Land etLOuj.do are different, unless we wanted to hold
the unlikely view that tLEot is a causa sui. This is reiterated in another
way a few sentences later when Socrates argues that although we
desire what we lack, nonetheless, "Love and friendship and desire,
as it seems happens to be of what belongs to it." (soiu o'Lxetou , c
gOtX?V, 0 T 9p O YnTqLX( XOCl4) C7MOUpLLOCL
xaL TUyXxVELo?ia).20 The fact
that all three terms are mentioned again indicates that they are
different, yet the content of the statement itself suggests another
important similarity. Although all three are of what they do not
have, their objects nonetheless are what belong to them, what is
properto them.21
Let us now return to the order of argument in the Symposium. Step
four contains the introduction of Po&'sXaeOt to apply to the desire for
present possessions in the future. It is important to see that PoUAXaOt
has at least this much in common with spav and &C70utOZV; it too is

19 Plato, Lysis, 221d3.

30 Ibid., 221e3.
31 Let us remind ourselves again that to construe the ascription of the same

predicate to these terms as an indication of their identity would be a wholly

unsatisfactory procedure.

38
always of that which it lacks.22But 3Ou'XeAocthas the sense of deli-
lacks.
beration or reasoning for what one wishes, which sense &rntOuV.C
That is, the differencebetween the simple present desire (C'tMOUpit)
and the assessment that the object is also desirable in the future (for
which Poi'XeaOa is employed) is that the latter requires some element
of deliberation as to the value (or at least desirability) of the object.
At Republic438 aff., a passage we shall considerlater, Socrates satisfies
Glaucon that an &ItLOuji( like thirst, makes no value judgment as to
its object; it desires not good drink, but simply drink. Poueaott,
on the other hand, suggests the deliberative or rational element
whereby we assess the object of our desire as worth having in the
future. Socrates' examples in the present passage are instructive in
this regard. His examples of things which we wish for (3ouX6,eOoc) in
the future are strength, health, and wealth.23Evidence for my view
that these things require some deliberation before one seeks them
(and are not simply objects of erLu&.do)is that these are precisely
the three examples which Glaucon uses at Republic 357c to convince
Socrates of a "third class" of goods which require activities painful
and unpleasant in themselves (exercise, being healed, working) but
which are tolerated and considered good because of their good conse-
quences.
As step five indicates, this reasoned desire for present possessions
in the future qualifies as `Epw4. "This is to love that which is not
present to one, and which he does not have..." ('Ouxo5vroi5t6y'ea'sV
~xexsou9pV, 8 O57rcW JroL[Lov -IarV oi &ZXeL...),24This too suggests
Oc-rx
that the introduction of the deliberation involved in Po'X?rOoct lifts
the status of the merely passionate &97c&4doto the level of "Ep&g.
Again we can argue that central to the distinction between es;tu41(a
and 'Epcs is the presenceof rationality in 'Epw;.
Thus, concludes Socrates in step six, both desire and love are of
what one does not have, of what one is not, and of what one lacks.
This is consistent, because as we have seen, both"Epco and e&irLQt
desire, and one desires what one lacks. This conclusion, then, concerns
only the fundamental similarity between "Epto and Our?LEa Socrates
does not state explicitly the difference between these terms. That
remainsthe enterpriseof the reader.
In the summary of his discussion with Agathon, Socrates ceases
22 Plato, Symposium, 200b.
23 Ibid., 200d.
'4 Ibid., 200d8.

39
mentioning both 'Ep; and krOupia and concludes exclusively con-
cerning"Epw. This is because the stated topic of conversationis 'Epcoc
not C'Ovudca.We have learned about &7rLOutLm too in this discussion,
as well as about cpOEm,but the explicit purpose in the context of
the Symposium has been to determine certain things about "Epco;.
We have learned that "Epoj is always directed towards an object,
and that its object is always something that it lacks.
In the context of these remarks about the nature of 'Epwq in the
Symposium, we have seen the necessity of making a more complex
distinction between three related but different terms: C7LOu['to, 'Epo;,
and cptXM.Let me try to sum up in a coherent fashion the distinctions
which have so far emerged. 'EmtOu[da we know to be the lowest
faculty of the soul, the brute desire to possess what one lacks. 'Epco;
also desires,but unlike mLOutita, which only desires,'Epwo both
desires and loves. The difference between 'Epo and ?tLOu,u(a,then
must lie in this "and loves." I have suggested that the qualitative
differencebetween 'Epco& and 'r=Ouda( lies in the presenceof rationality
in 'Epwg.In its purest form, the modificationof the desirefor possession
by rationality or contemplation is y&X6.The aspect of "Epwsand
ctoc is thus a rational or contemplative aspect which is usually
accompaniedby desire.
I propose now to cite several passages both in the Symposium and
in other dialogues, in which the thesis that there is a distinction
between L7tOUi.to,"Ep&gand ytEa, and that the distinction hinges
on the presence and degree of reason in each, is borne out. At the
same time I shall begin to suggest certain philosophic consequences
which follow therefrom.
To take the "ascent passage" of the Symposium first; in that pas-
sage we are presented with the erotic ascent of a lover and potential
philosopher from the love of one beautiful body, through the love of
all physical beauty, through the love of increasingly higher objects,
to the love of the beauty of knowledge, and finally to the love of
Beauty itself. This ascent is endlessly rich with philosophicpossibilities,
but we must confine ourselves here to an examination of what it can
tell us about the distinction between 'Epco;, mOu,i(mand ypLX(m.
The first thing to notice is the first step: "It is necessary"says Diotima,
"for one rightly pursuing this business to begin when he is young by
pursuing beautiful bodies, and first if he is rightly led by his leader,
he will love one body and in it he will beget beautiful speeches."25
25 Ibid., 210a4.

40
We see here that although Plato begins the erotic ascent to philosophy
on a much more concrete level than many philosophers would be
willing to grant, he has still not begun at the most concrete level.
For Plato has Diotima begin this ascent at what is already a fairly
advanced stage of development; the young person in question has
already discerned the beauty of the physical body, and picked out
that quality as worthy of love. The higher level of this first step is also
indicated by the manner of generation which results; the lover will
generate not human children, or even sexual gratification, but "beauti-
ful speeches" (?o6youxocXoi))in the soul of the beloved. A prior stage
of development, then, would have been an undiscerning or indiscri-
minate desire for the possession of the physical body, a desire whose
generative issue would have been sexual gratification, or at best (if
the affair were heterosexual) human children. But what else would
that desire be but &7rLOuutO ? This ascent is an ascent of "Ep&o,and
therefore does not begin with the absolutely lowest level, which would
be &7rOu,(ac.A complete ascent would necessitate a beginning with
pure i'mOultm,or desire for the possession of a physical body, that is,
for sexual intercourse. Plato has given us that beginning in an earlier
ascent just prior to the present one, which was stated in terms of
the desire (ZhrOudoc) for generation.26There, the ascent began with the
lOUpd for procreation, which was characteristic even of beasts, and
ascended to such higher procreations as the works of Homer and
Hesiod, and the laws of Solon and Lycurgos. If we were now to juxta-
pose these two ascents, we would see that the first ascent constituted
the absolute beginning, whereas the beginning of the second ascent,
the one now in question, already represents a certain stage of deve-
lopment. And what precisely is that stage? It is the stage of dis-
criminating or reasoning capacity which our earlier analysis suggested
differentiates'Epoc from Cr&LOdcu.
It is also worth noting that the highest stage of the earlier ascent
(of desire for procreation),laws and politics (exemplifiedby Solon and
Lycurgus),27 is but a middle level in the more famous ascent of the
love of beauty.28 Whatever the deeper reasons for this, it reveals
that m7rOu[Aoc and 'Ep&4overlap, but 'Ep(o has higher manifestations
than does 'LmOu[da,in particular the two highest steps on the philo-
sophic ascent, love of knowledge (popOL,a6E) and love of Beauty
26 Ibid., 207-210.
27 Ibid., 209d.
28 Ibid., 210c.

41
Itself (ypXoaopc).This was indicated in our analysis by the fact that
'Ep&o and C'=Oudaboth desire - this is where they overlap - yet the
reasoning ability of which "Epwgis capable makes it higher.
A look at the transitions in the erotic ascent to Beauty Itself
again shows the involvement of reason and "Epcoq. For the redirection
of one's "Ep&ofrom one step to another, for instance from the love
of one beautiful body to the love of all physical beauty, is accomplish-
ed when one realizes (VVonamV rO)29 that the beauty of all physical
things is related. Thus the ascent of "Epcog,the redirection of one's
'Epwg on increasingly worthy objects, is possible because of the in-
creased presenceof reasonin "Ep&o.
In the last two steps of the ascent, the love of all knowledge, and
the love of Beauty Itself, one's "Ep&;has become so imbued with
reason that it is more properly called (cpLoc,indeed, the pL?Wafor
aop6x.For in the next to the last step, the love of the beauty of all
knowledge (ZhUaTn[), the aspirant is partaking "in unencumbered
philosophy" (v pXoaoptoc aOp06v),30 and of course, in the last step,
the glimpse of Beauty Itself, one is at the level of philosophy too.
This also supports the results of our earlier analysis; the difference
between "Ep&gand cpcaois one of degree. And the degree in question
is the degree of reason which is present in one's "Ep&g.Thus the
''ascent passage" is entirely consistent with the results of our earlier
analysis, both in regard to the orderof the hierarchy (efLQu[dc-'Epwq-
ypaLXL)and in regard to the principle of differentiation: the presence
and degreeof reason.
My thesis also finds ample support in Plato's other great dialogue
on 'Ep&o, the Phaedrus. To take the "negative way" first; in the
speech of Lysias, and more importantly, in the first speech of Socrates
for which he must later offer a recantation, "Ep(o4is indeed identified
with ehnNu,i.. He "defines""Epcog in this speech as "irrationaldesire"
(' &veu Xoyou ebtLOtdo)31 which, far from inspiring one to philosophy
as the Symposium suggests, rather prevents both the lover and his
beloved from pursuing "divine philosophy."32It is clear throughout
these first two speeches that "Epc is interpreted, and censured, as
This is why both speeches
irrationaland harmfulsexual lust, or ehr&tLta.
advocate that one avoid relationships with lovers. Yet Socrates
29 Ibid., 210b.
20 Ibid., 210d6.
al Plato, Phaedrus, 238b7.
32 Ibid., 239b.

42
insists that he make a recantation for this speech because it was a
"sin against 'Epw,"33 the sort of thing one would expect to hear from
sailors who had never experienced any higher love.34 Clearly then,
this interpretationof "Epwgis to be rejected.
The more positive statement of the nature and function of the
soul's 'Epwq in Socrates' second speech offers even stronger support
for my thesis. There the famous charioteer image is presented; the
soul is likened to a team of horses and a charioteer. The black,
ugly, unmanageable horse, it is usually agreed, represents desire, or
entOu[LEo.The handsome white horse, more obedient to the orders
of the charioteer, represents spirit (Ouli6q).The distinction between
'Epw; and kn&Ou[Aa.
is clear from the outset; ?shOur.ta, represented by
the black horse, is the lowest and most unruly faculty of the soul, a
constant danger to its higher functions. 'Epcoq,however, is divine
madness which pervades the whole soul. Indeed, one crucial difference
between 'Epw~ and inOuti?M is the relation of each to the charioteer,
reason. 'En&sL'o.c,the black horse, resists and disobeys the charioteer
whenever possible.35'Ep&o, on the contrary, finds its fulfillment (in
philosophy) only when the charioteer is in proper command. Per-
vading the whole soul, "Epwqcontains in its nature desire, spirit, and
reason. But its fulfillment requires that the reason which is part of
its nature exhibit its presence and control over its ?tnLOU[.da36 This
should be sufficient to show that it is only when reason is sufficiently
present and active in 'Ep&qthat 'Epw; can achieve its highest mani-
festation, in philosophy. Remembering that at this highest mani-
festation, "Epcosis indeed a cpLXEa,we can see that this passage alsois
consistent with the distinction, however slight, between "Epwqand
tEoc,a distinction of which Plato indicates he is aware at Phaedrus
255e, where the young beloved mistakes his feelings of "Ep&gfor
cpLXt.Thus all the distinctions which we found present in the Sym-
posium are also present in the Phaedrus; 'Epco, kbrOupdo, and cpLtX
are all differentiated, and the principle of differentiation is the pre-
sence and degree of reason.
I wish now to turn briefly to the Republic where support is also
present for my view. It will be remembered that one stage in my
88 Ibid., 242e4.
84 Ibid., 243c5.
85 Ibid., 253e, 254a, 254c, el. al.
Il This is a constant theme throughout the speech. See especially the remark of
of Socrates at 256a8.

43
argument from the Symposium concerned the introduction of the
term "PoueafxL" which was to be distinguished from ?UL#OuLCZV and
which pointed the way to 4p&v.37The distinction between ?7rVrLOUZV
and poUAeaOaL is indicated in the Republic at 437b-c, where Socrates
is establishing the tripartite division of the soul. He wants to show
that desire (e7tOu[L(a)is one of these parts, and in so doing says,
"What then, said I, of thirst and hunger and the desires generally,
and again (my italics) willing and wishing..." (-r[ou'v; jv8'y6')c aLt4v
xalJ~
7t?lVmV XMt 6X,( x5 T'r O XeLvxaL 'rs po,a...)
e'7r& OUtL'M XOcdt
My point here is that by distinguishing the desires (k e'7vOu[Eoc;)
from wishing ('r6 PouieaOoc), indeed emphasizing the distinction by
the use of "and again" (xot oa5),we see that that distinction is held
consistently in this dialogue too.38Again, this by way of support for
the difference between 'Epw and ehr&u,uL,Socrates at 438a is satis-
fying Glaucon that desire, qua desire, is only of its object, with no
furtherqualifications. He warns Glaucon,
"'Let no one then,' said I, 'disconcert us when off our guard with the objection
that everybody desires not drink but good drink (4g oC8clg7noTro5&ntLOu"Zt &X
Xp and not food but good food because all men desire good (7r6iv'T?
ro'roo3)
yip &pa-r&v&yaxO&v ln&rOto5atv)and so if thirst is desire it would be of good
drink or of good whatsoever it is; and so similarly of other desires."'"8

Since hrrLu.Ltcais not to be understood as discriminating between

objects as to their goodness, it must surely be differentiated from
'Epus which in the Symposiumis defined as "of the eternal possession
of the good."40
Finally, to point to one of the so-called "earlier dialogues," the
Charmidesoffers appropriate support for some of the distinctions I
have drawn.4"At Charmides167e, Socrates is concerned to call into
question the possibility that wisdom should have no subject matter
of its own, but rather be "the science of sciences." To repudiate this,

87 Above, pp. 38-39.

38 On the other hand, see Republic 439a9, where Socrates uses Po6Xvrau as virtual-
ly synonymous with kn&Outet, where the subtle distinction between them is not
important.
39 Translation is that of Paul Shorey. See also 439a-b.
40 Plato, Symposium, 206a. Notice that at Symposium 205a, Diotima, by way
of correcting Aristophanes, asserts that people will even cut off a part of them-
selves if they think it will bring them good.
41 I wish to thank David Gallop for pointing out these passages to me. The
interpretation of them presented here is of course my own responsibility.

44
he cites several parallel cases where, he suspects, the implausibility
wil be obvious. Three of these examples are especially relevant to
the present problem, for they again indicate a consistent maintenance
of the relevant distinctions on Plato's part. Socrates says at 167e,
"Could there be any desire (7rt0upAm)which is not the desire of any pleasure,
but of itself and of all other desires? Certainly not. Or can you imagine a wish
(Po0X7atq)which wishes (Ao6XrcxL)for no good, but only for itself and all other
wishes? I should answer no. Or would you say that there is a love (fpcom) which
is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves? I should not."'2

We notice first that the three terms are distinguished, supporting

the thesis of this paper. But the way in which they are distinguished,
namely, according to their objects, is also significant. The object of
&vutAais pleasure. This differentiates it from 'Epcos both in this
dialogue and in Socrates' speech in the Symposiun. Significantly
enough, the object of "Epcosis the Charmidesis beauty (sorxocX6v)
whereas that of Pou'-aL is the good (ro6&yaO6v).In the Symposium
both Agathon and the young Socrates begin with the view that 'Epco;'
object is the beautiful but are corrected by Diotima, who shows that
'Ept' true object is the good." Perhaps we could say that this transi-
tion was prefigured by the transition which I treated earlier" from
?7mOlutoAto 'Epco;, where these two terms were mediated, as it were,
by ,Bou')CGaO,whose object, we learn now in the Charmides,is the good.
If so, we see again the remarkableconsistency with which Plato used
these important terms.
Still further, we see again that one consequence of the different
objects of Oupidcxand Pou'i)Xa (pleasure and the good) is that
PoUA-mLq requires, over and above the simple desire for the object,
the deliberative ability wherewith to assess that its object is good,
once again supporting the distinction drawn earlier between these
two terms.46
Such is the evidence I wish to put forward for the hierarchical
distinction between brLOu,da, 'Epus, and cparabased on the degree
and presence of reason. Some of the consequences of this view for the

4I Translation is that of Jowett.

48 Plato, Symposium, 205-206a.
44 Above, pp. 38-39.
"6 That the object of 'Epws also involves this deliberative ability is supported
by a general consideration of Socrates's speech in the Symposium, but especially
by the correction mentioned above, that 'Epcw most proper object is really the
good.

45
Symposium, and in particular for the important "ascent passage",
I have already noted. I would like to conclude by suggesting a far
more pervasive consequence. If Plato is indeed suggesting, as I
maintain, that reason is not merely occasionally interrelated with,
but indeed part of the very nature of "Epcoq,as opposed to desire,
then he forces us to reconsider the notion, popular in his day as it is
today, that love is necessarily and unambiguously in the realm of
the irrational. By extension he forces us to reconsider such clear-
cut distinctions in Greek thought as Nietzsche popularized between
the Dionysian and the Apollonian. Finally by lifting 'Ep&ofrom the
realm of "irrational feeling," Plato avoids the rather bizarre conse-
quence that philosophy, which is after all a species of love, would,
while standing as the champion of rationality, have its base in the
utterly, exclusively, irrational. As Nietzsche himself said in Thus
Spoke Zarathustra: "True, we love life, not because we are used to
living but because we are used to loving. There is always some madness
in love. But there is always some reasonin madness."46

46 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by Walter Kaufmann in The

Portable Nietzsche, Viking Press, New York, page 153.

Trinty College,Hartford,Connecticut.

46