UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (ULP)

#1 Bankard, Inc. (Petitioner) vs. NLRC (Respondent), GR

#171664, March 6, 2013
Alleged ULP: Job Contracting/Outsourcing/Contracting-out
Was there ULP committed? NO.
Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for
prosecution thereof. -- Unfair labor practices violate the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-
organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both
labor and management, including their right to bargain
collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial
peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-
management relations.
Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be
unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair
labor practice: (c) To contract out services or functions being
performed by union members when such will interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to
self-organization.
The general principle is that the one who makes an allegation
has the burden of proving it. While there are exceptions to this
general rule, in ULP cases, the alleging party has the burden
of proving the ULP; and in order to show that the employer
committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is
required to support the claim.
Aside from the bare allegations of the Union, nothing in the
records strongly proves that Bankard intended its program,
the MRP, as a tool to drastically and deliberately reduce union
membership.
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even
if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise."
The Court has always respected a company's exercise of its
prerogative to devise means to improve its operations. Thus,
we have held that management is free to regulate, according
to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment, including hiring, work assignments, supervision
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Rommelito Francisco E. Macarayo, RNUnfair Labor PracticeLabor Arbiter Natividad Roma
 and transfer of employees, working methods, time, place and
manner of work.
Contracting out of services is an exercise of business
judgment or management prerogative. Absent any proof that
management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the
Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an
employer.
#2 Genaro Bautista (Petitioner) vs. CA (Respondents), GR #
123375, February 28, 2005
Alleged ULP: No ULP issue, WON BLR and not RTC has
jurisdiction over intra-union disputes. (YES)
Was there ULP committed? Not Applicable.
The authority of the BLR in assuming jurisdiction over a
certification election, or any inter-union or intra-union
conflicts, is found in Article 226 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
Art. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. The Bureau of
Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Division in the
regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original
and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon
request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and
intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or
problems arising from or affecting labor-management
relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or
nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation
or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which
shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary
arbitration.
It is quite clear from this provision that BLR has the original
and exclusive jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts. An intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within
or inside a labor union, and an inter-union controversy or
dispute, one occurring or carried on between or among
unions.
The subject of the case at bar, which is the election of the
officers and members of the board of KMKK-MWSS, is, clearly,
an intra-union conflict, being within or inside a labor union. It
is well within the powers of the BLR to act upon. The
petitioner is asking us to make an illogical edict by declaring
that our ruling in the ACAE case, considering that it involved
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Rommelito Francisco E. Macarayo, RNUnfair Labor PracticeLabor Arbiter Natividad Roma
 an inter-union conflict, should not apply to the instant case for
the reason that the latter involves an intra-union conflict. This,
we cannot do because the law is very clear on this matter.
#3 Rivera (Petitioner) vs. Espiritu (Respondent), GR # 135547,
January 23, 2002
Alleged ULP: No ULP issue. What is the purpose of CBA?
Was there ULP committed? Not Applicable.
A CBA is "a contract executed upon request of either the
employer or the exclusive bargaining representative
incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with
respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting
any grievances or questions arising under such agreement."
The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor-
management relations in order to create a climate of a sound
and stable industrial peace.
In construing a CBA, the courts must be practical and realistic
and give due consideration to the context in which it is
negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve.
The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary
collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of
the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the
peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting
industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latters closure. We
find no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of
the Labor Code.
Article 253-A has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote
industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the
agreement sought to promote industrial peace at PAL during
its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfies the first purpose of
Article 253-A. The other is to assign specific timetables
wherein negotiations become a matter of right and
requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A, prohibits the parties
from waiving or suspending the mandatory timetables and
agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.
#4 Vicente Almario (Petitioner) vs. PAL, Inc. (Respondent), GR
# 170928, September 11, 2007
Alleged ULP: No ULP issue, CBA interpretation between parties;
Unjust enrichment of Petitioner at the expense of PAL
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 Was there ULP committed? Not applicable.
The CBA is the law between the contracting parties
the collective bargaining representative and the employer-
company. Compliance with a CBA is mandated by the
expressed policy to give protection to labor. In the same
vein, CBA provisions should be "construed liberally rather than
narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a
practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due
consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and
purpose which it is intended to serve." This is founded on the
dictum that a CBA is not an ordinary contract but one
impressed with public interest. It goes without saying,
however, that only provisions embodied in the CBA should be
so interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised by
a contracting party does not find print in the CBA, it is not a
part thereof and the proponent has no claim whatsoever to its
implementation.
It bears noting that when Almario took the training course, he
was about 39 years old, 21 years away from the retirement
age of 60. Hence, with the maturity, expertise, and
experience he gained from the training course, he was
expected to serve PAL for at least three years to offset "the
prohibitive costs" thereof.
Admittedly, PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable
him to acquire a higher level of skill, proficiency, or technical
competence so that he could efficiently discharge the position
of A-300 First Officer. Given that, PAL expected to recover
the training costs by availing of Almarios services for
at least three years. The expectation of PAL was not fully
realized, however, due to Almarios resignation after only
eight months of service following the completion of his
training course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the
costs of training without violating the principle of unjust
enrichment.
#5 International School Alliance of Educators (Petitioner) vs.
Leonardo Quisumbing (Respondent), GR # 128845, June 1,
2000
Alleged ULP: No ULP, Validity of CBA provision regarding foreign-
hire teachers versus local-hire teachers in terms of salary and
benefit difference.
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 Was there ULP committed? Not Applicable.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon
by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and
penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a female
employee as against a male employee for work of equal
value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence
that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires.
The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer
accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal
work. This presumption is borne by logic and human
experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the
rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives
less or why the others receive more. That would be adding
insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that
employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee
is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden.
There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25%
more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both
groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions.
#6 Pepsi-Cola Product PH (Petitioner) vs. Molon et. Al.
(Respondents), GR # 175002, February 18, 2013
Alleged ULP: Union Busting
Was there ULP committed? NO.
Under Article 276(c) of the Labor Code, there is union busting
when the existence of the union is threatened by the
employers act of dismissing the formers officers who have

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 been duly-elected in accordance with its constitution and by-
laws.
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the
workers' right to organize. The prohibited acts are related
to the workers' right to self-organization and to the
observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no
matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices. The only
exception is Article 248(f) [now Article 257(f)].
Mindful of their nature, the Court finds it difficult to attribute
any act of union busting or ULP on the part of Pepsi
considering that it retrenched its employees in good
faith. As earlier discussed, Pepsi tried to sit-down with its
employees to arrive at mutually beneficial criteria which
would have been adopted for their intended retrenchment.
The fact that Pepsis rightsizing program was implemented on
a company-wide basis dilutes respondents claim that Pepsis
retrenchment scheme was calculated to stymie its union
activities, much less diminish its constituency.

#7 T & H Shopfitters Corp. et. al. (Petitioners) vs. T & H

Shopfitters Corp. Workers Union (Respondents), GR # 191714,
February 26, 2014
Alleged ULP: Restriction of Respondents right to self-
organization
Was there ULP committed? YES.
Article 256. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for
prosecution thereof.Unfair labor practices violate the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-
organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both
labor and management, including their right to bargain
collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial
peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-
management relations.
The questioned acts of petitioners, namely: 1) sponsoring a
field trip to Zambales for its employees, to the exclusion of
union members, before the scheduled certification election; 2)
the active campaign by the sales officer of petitioners against
the union prevailing as a bargaining agent during the field
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Rommelito Francisco E. Macarayo, RNUnfair Labor PracticeLabor Arbiter Natividad Roma
 trip; 3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the
polling center; 4) the continuous hiring of subcontractors
performing respondents functions; 5) assigning union
members to the Cabangan site to work as grass cutters; and
6) the enforcement of work on a rotational basis for union
members, all reek of interference on the part of
petitioners.
Indubitably, the various acts of petitioners, taken together,
reasonably support an inference that, indeed, such were all
orchestrated to restrict respondents free exercise of their
right to self-organization. The Court is of the considered view
that petitioners undisputed actions prior and immediately
before the scheduled certification election, while seemingly
innocuous, unduly meddled in the affairs of its employees in
selecting their exclusive bargaining representative.
Petitioners had no business persuading and/or
assisting its employees in their legally protected
independent process of selecting their exclusive
bargaining representative. The fact and peculiar timing of
the field trip sponsored by petitioners for its employees not
affiliated with THS-GQ Union, although a positive enticement,
was undoubtedly extraneous influence designed to impede
respondents in their quest to be certified. This cannot be
countenanced.
More importantly, petitioners' bare denial of some of the
complained acts and unacceptable explanations, a mere
afterthought at best, cannot prevail over respondents'
detailed narration of the events that transpired. At this
juncture, it bears to emphasize that in labor cases, the
quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise.
#8 UST Faculty Union (Petitioner) vs. UST (Respondent), GR #
180892, April 7, 2009
Alleged ULP: USTs bargaining with Gamilla group, but such
group was not validly elected.
Was there ULP committed? NO.

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Rommelito Francisco E. Macarayo, RNUnfair Labor PracticeLabor Arbiter Natividad Roma
 Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for
prosecution thereof.Unfair labor practices violate the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-
organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both
labor and management, including their right to bargain
collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial
peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-
management relations.
The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has
the burden of proving it. While there are exceptions to this
general rule, in the case of ULP, the alleging party has the
burden of proving such ULP.
In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the
Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the
claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
It is not USTs responsibility to inquire upon the veracity that
the Gamilla group is a validly-elected bargaining agent for the
union.
In sum, petitioner makes several allegations that UST
committed ULP. The onus probandi falls on the shoulders of
petitioner to establish or substantiate such claims by the
requisite quantum of evidence. In labor cases as in other
administrative proceedings, substantial evidence or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
sufficient to support a conclusion is required. In the petition at
bar, petitioner miserably failed to adduce substantial evidence
as basis for the grant of relief.
#9 Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Bandolino LMLC
(Petitioners) vs. NLRC (Respondents), GR # 125195, July 17, 1997
Alleged ULP: Restraint/Coercion by ER prior to Union Registration
Was there ULP committed? YES.
While generally speaking factual findings of administrative
agencies are not subject to review by this Court, it is equally
established that the Court will not uphold erroneous
conclusions which are contrary to the evidence because then
the agency would be guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. Nor

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 is this Court bound by conclusions which are not supported by
substantial evidence.
The substantial evidence rule does not authorize any finding
to be made just as long as there is any evidence to support it.
It does not excuse administrative agencies from considering
contrary evidence which fairly detracts from the evidence
supporting a finding. In this case, the labor arbiter's finding of
illegal dismissal was based not only upon the private
respondents' "off the record" offer containing illegal conditions
but also on facts of record found by the arbiter which the
NLRC disregarded. These are: (1) that following the order for
"rotation," some of the petitioners were made to surrender
their ID's and (2) that although the "rotation scheme" was
ostensibly implemented because of the Shoemart strike, even
after the strike had ended, petitioners' attempts to return to
work were thwarted. In truth, private respondents' claim that
petitioners, who were regular employees, were put on rotation
while the casual workers were not because petitioners were
skilled and it was much easier for them to find new jobs only
succeeds in revealing their real intention.
It is untenable for the Solicitor General to contend, that
petitioners were dismissed for their refusal to return to work.
Petitioners did not refuse to work. They responded promptly to
private respondents' telegrams and expressed their intention
to resume work immediately. This is clear from their letter to
the management on September 3, 1992 as quoted above.
Moreover, it has been ruled that mere failure to report for
work after notice to return does not constitute abandonment
or bar reinstatement. Thus, petitioners may even be
considered dismissed without cause as a result of private
respondents' refusal to accept them, in addition to having
been earlier dismissed by being put on "rotation."

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