G.R. No.

149560 June 10, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
QUIRICO DAGPIN y ESMADE, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 8,
convicting the appellant Quirico Dagpin y Esmade of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The appellant was charged with murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on March 20, 1996, at about 1:00 oclock dawn, in Sitio Bababon, Barangay Diwa-an, City of
Dapitan, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
home-made shotgun, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with the use of a
home-made shotgun one NILO CAERMARE thereby resulting to his instantaneous death
thereafter.
That as a result of the criminal acts of the accused, the heirs of the victim suffered the following
damages to wit:
1. Loss of earning capacity - - - - - - -
P20,000.00
2. Death Indemnity - - - - - - - - - - - - -
50,000.00
Total - - - - - - - - - - - - -
P70,000.00
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The appellant was arraigned, assisted by counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty.
The Case for the Prosecution
On November 10, 1991, Danilo Taruc and his friend, Nilo Caermare, went to Barangay Tamion,
Dapitan City, because it was a market day. The appellant was a resident of the place. Late in the
afternoon, Nilo and Danilo saw the appellant, who was with his friends. Suddenly, the appellant
boxed Nilo. As Nilo and Danilo were outnumbered, they could not retaliate.
At 7:00 p.m. on February 29, 1996, Nilo, along with Jose Bulagao and Reynaldo Bantayana,
arrived at the Sulangon National High School to attend a dance party later that evening. To pass
the time, they had a drinking spree and consumed six bottles of Tanduay rhum. At 11:00 p.m.,
while in the premises of the school, the appellant arrived, armed with a shotgun, and punched
Nilo on the mouth. Nilo fled. The appellant aimed his gun at the fleeing Nilo and pulled the
trigger three times, but the gun did not fire. Nilo returned, while the appellant fled towards the
direction of Sitio Tamion where he resided. Nilo did not report the incident to the police nor filed
charges against the appellant for any crime.
Randy Labisig, one of Nilos nephews, had seen the appellant during fiestas in Barangay Diwa-an,
Dapitan City. Randys sister, Rona Labisig, also used to see the appellant in Sulangon when she
was still studying at the Sulangon National High School. The appellant used to ride a bicycle and
would pass by the house of her aunt where she stayed.
In the evening of March 19, 1996, Randy attended a dance party at the feeding center in Sitio
Bababon, Barangay Diwa-an. At about 1:00 a.m., March 20, 1996, Randy, in the company of his
Uncle Nilo, his sisters Rena and Rona, and Mario Aliman, were on their way home from the party.
They walked along a narrow trail, single file, with Aliman walking first, followed by Rona; the
latter was followed by Rena and Nilo who walked side by side, with Randy at the tail end.
Momentarily, a man who wore a dark shirt with a baseball cap on his head came from Randys
left side and inserted himself between Nilo and Randy, in the process pushing the latter to the
right side. The man was armed with a long shotgun. Suddenly, the man raised his gun, and, with
the muzzle only about a foot away from Nilos back, pulled the trigger. Nilo fell to the ground.
When they heard the gunfire, Rona and Rena fled, but stopped at a short distance and looked
back. In the meantime, Randy was so shocked at the sudden turn of events and attempted to
help his uncle. However, the assailant returned, this time, holding an unlighted flashlight and
pressed it hard on Randys chin. Randy then saw the face of the malefactor and recognized him
as the appellant, although he did not know the latters name at the time. The appellant left and
returned shortly, this time, armed with the same long shotgun which he used to shoot Nilo. When
Randy saw the appellant cock his gun, he fled, fearing that he was about to be shot next. After a
short distance, he stopped near where his sisters Rona and Rena were, and looked back. They
saw the appellant with three other men, each holding a lighted flashlight which illumined the left
side of the appellants head. Randy, Rona and Rena then fled to the house of Melborga Taruc,
about a kilometer away from the place of the shooting, where they spent the rest of the morning.
On March 27, 1996, Randy, Rona and Rena went to the police station and saw the appellant,
whom they pointed to the police as the person who shot their uncle. It was only then that they
learned the name of their uncles assassin, Quirico Dagpin. They executed sworn statements of
their respective accounts of the killing.
City Health Officer Dr. Bernardino D. Palma performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Nilo and
signed a necropsy report containing the following findings:
1. Gunshot wounds with fracture of the left fronto-parietal bones.
2. Gunshot wounds 9 with powder burns at left infrascapular area directed downward and
anteriorly 2 pilets (sic) removed at the right chest, one was lost along transit.3
The doctor found powder burns on each of the wounds sustained by the victim, signifying that he
was shot at close range, at a distance of six inches to two feet.
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant denied killing Nilo. He testified that he was from Sitio Tamion which was adjacent
to Barangay Sulangon. He knew Nilo because the latter had a girlfriend in Sulangon, whose name
was Reina. He saw Nilo whenever the latter was with his girlfriend in Sulangon. He disliked Nilos
actuations because although the latter was not from Sulangon, he acted as if he was "the king of
Saudi Arabia" every time he was there.
On March 19, 1996, Pedro Elcamel came by and told the appellant that his daughter was going to
graduate the following day, and that he was giving a party for her at his house. Pedro asked him
to come along and butcher pigs for the occasion. He agreed, and went with Pedro to Brgy. Burgos
near the boundary of Tamion, about two kilometers from his own house. They arrived at Pedros
place at about 7:00 p.m. The appellant, Falconere Elcamel and several others butchered a pig
and made preparations for the party. The appellant slept at Pedros house that evening, and went
home only in the morning of the next day. He was already at home by 8:00 a.m.
Pedro Elcamel testified that at 6:00 a.m. on March 19, 1996, the appellant was with him at his
house in Barangay Tamion, about two kilometers away from that of the appellant. They were
there to butcher a pig for the graduation of his daughter, Maricel, the next day. With the help of
Falconere and his son, he and the appellant finished butchering the pig at 10:00 p.m. They
cooked the meat at 1:00 a.m. He left his house at 6:00 a.m. for his daughters graduation at the
Rizal Memorial Institute in Dapitan City at 8:00 a.m. He and his daughter arrived back home at
1:00 p.m. and saw the appellant helping in serving food to the guests, including the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Oyan, his sisters husband. Neither the appellant nor any of the guests told
him that there had been a killing the night before.
Rene Jauculan, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Diwa-an, testified that when he learned of the
shooting at Sitio Bababon, he was in the company of policemen. Dr. Bernardino Palma arrived at
Nilos house at about 12:00 midnight. The policemen then inquired from the people around who
the perpetrators were, but no one knew. He learned from the companions of the victim, Randy
and his sisters, Rona and Rena, Reynaldo Bantayana and Danilo Taruc, that they knew the
culprits but that they were afraid to divulge the latters identities as they had not yet been
arrested. He then learned that the appellant had been arrested for the crime a month later. He
also testified that on February 16, 1996, he received a complaint from the husband of a woman,
and a confrontation ensued between Nilo and the complainant. The matter was then settled. The
victim was also rumored to be the paramour of his cousins wife.
SPO2 Ildefonso Jamolod of the Dapitan police station testified that at 9:00 a.m. on March 20,
1996, he and Police Investigator Jonathan Bolado and Dr. Bernardino Palma arrived at the house
of Nilo where his cadaver was brought from Sitio Bababon. He talked to Nilos sister, who told
him that before his death, Nilo had two or three enemies. He was also told that the suspect was
the appellant, and relayed the information to SPO3 Manuel Acabal. He and Acabal left the next
day, March 21, 1996, and stopped by a store beyond the hanging bridge. They asked the store
owner where the appellants house was, and they were told that the appellant stayed up all night
in a drinking spree in a house about ten meters away from the store. They looked for the
appellant but failed to find him. They told the barangay captain that they wanted to talk to the
appellant and would bring the latter to the police station. The following day, March 22, 1996, the
barangay captain and the appellant arrived at the police station. SP02 Jamolod took custody of
the appellant and turned him over to SPO3 Acabal. Acabal later told him that there was no
sufficient evidence against the appellant.
SPO3 Manuel Acabal testified that he was informed by his subordinates that Nilo and the
appellant were known enemies. In the afternoon of March 20, 1996, he and his operatives left the
police station, coordinated with the barangay captain and saw the appellant in his house. He was
then brought to the police station for identification. The appellant was in the company of police
officers when he was identified by the complainant, and was then turned over to Police
Investigator SPO3 Julio Galleposo and SPO4 Segundo Balladares.
Gil Dagpin testified that he was a farmer and a carpenter, and the appellants third cousin. He
and Nilo had a disagreement sometime in 1990. During the third week of June 1996, Barangay
Captain Tarcisio Bayron told him that there had been a killing, and instructed him to go to the
police station. The appellant was also invited for questioning, and the two of them went to the
police station in the company of the barangay captain. There were persons in the police station
who stayed with the appellant. He and the appellant were entrusted to SPO3 Acabal, who
brought them to someone who told them that Nilo had been killed. SPO3 Acabal then
investigated them for about an hour. They were allowed to go back home afterwards, but the
appellant was later arrested for the killing.
Police Inspector Pepe Nortal testified that per the police blotter entry at 1:00 a.m. of March 20,
1996, the victims assailant was still unidentified. A team of police investigators and the
Assistant City Health Officer proceeded to the crime scene to investigate the killing.
After trial, the court rendered judgment finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
Wherefore, for all of the foregoing considerations and finding the guilt of the accused established
beyond reasonable doubt, herein accused Quirico Dagpin y Esmade is convicted of the crime of
MURDER charged against him, as principal by direct participation, and in the light of Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 7659, hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Nilo
Caermare, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of civil damages for (sic) death of the victim and the
added sum of P20,000.00 for consequential damages, and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.4
The appellant now assails the decision of the trial court contending that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT.5
The appellant avers that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime charged on the basis
mainly of his having been identified by Randy, Rona and Rena at the police station on March 27,
1996. He was not assisted by counsel when the three pointed to him as the culprit in the police
station. Hence, according to the appellant, such identification is inadmissible in evidence.
The appellant also contends that the trial court erred in not sentencing him to an indeterminate
penalty, since reclusion perpetua is now a divisible penalty with a range of from twenty (20)
years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that Randy, Rona and Rena, saw and
recognized the appellant as the person who shot the victim at the situs criminis. It also maintains
that the appellant was not deprived of his constitutional rights when he was identified by the
prosecution witnesses at the police station without counsel, because he was not then under
custodial investigation. It avers that the penalty meted by the trial court on the appellant is
correct.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
The evidence on record shows that even before the killing of Nilo on March 26, 1996, Randy and
Rona had already seen the appellant, although they did not know his name. This can be gleaned
from the testimony of Randy:
Q You said that you have seen the accused prior to the incident at Diwa-an. Can you tell the
Honorable Court how many times have you seen him in that place?
A We used to see each other always, Sir.
Q In what occasion (sic) you used to see him?
A I saw him especially during fiestas, Sir.
Q How many fiestas have you seen Quirico Dagpin at Diwa-an?
A Everytime there is (sic) a fiesta, we used to see each other, Sir.
Q In what place (sic) you used to see him at Diwa-an during fiestas?
A In the "Tabo" of that place.
Q But despite that fact that you used to see him at the "tabo" at Diwa-an, Dapitan City, you dont
know that this guy was actually Quirico Dagpin?
A Yes, Sir.6
Ronas testimony on this matter reads:
Q Prior to the incident at dawn of March 20, 1996, have you ever seen the accused Quirico
Dagpin?
A Yes, Sir. There were times when I saw him riding on a bicycle.
Q In what particular place have you seen him in the past?
A In Sulangon, Sir.
Q Where else?
A I used to see him in Sulangon because I once studied in Sulangon.
Q In what particular place did you usually see the accused Quirico Dagpin?
A I used to see him passing by the house of my aunt Lingling because at the (sic) time, when I
was studying in Sulangon, I was staying with my aunt Lingling.
Q Because you usually saw him in the past, that was the reason why you are familiar with his
face?
ATTY. PALPAGAN:
I object to the question, Your Honor. That is an opinion.
COURT:
Sustain, Compaero.
Q Can you inform the court how many times, more or less, have you seen the accused prior to
the incident on March 20, 1996?
A Maybe four (4) times, Sir.7
Randy and Rona recognized their uncles assassin; they were certain it was the appellant. Randy
testified how he recognized the appellant:
Q Okay, lets clarify this. The first time you observed (sic) that man, I am referring to the
assailant, was when he inserted (sic) between you and the victim while holding the rifle and shot
the victim at his back. Then he went away and went back to his place. The next time around, he
got a flashlight, pressing it at your chin, forcing you to stand, then he went away again. This time
you dont know where he placed the flashlight, got the rifle and cocked it and you ran away. Then
he went to your uncle again and shot him the second time. Is that your stand?
A Yes, Sir. After that I ran away but when I ran away, I turned my face and I saw him because he
was lighted by the light coming from the flashlight. He was bringing (sic) with him a rifle and he
shot my fallen uncle again.
Q But in the direct examination, when you were confronted several times even by the Honorable
Court, you said you were not able to recognize the person who shot first your uncle and the
person who shot again your uncle. Do you recall that?
ATTY. BALISADO:
Your Honor, please, that is (sic) well explained by the witness already. There is no use
propounding the same trend of questioning because that is (sic) already explained by the
witness.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A What I mean is that, at (sic) the first time he inserted himself between us and Nilo Caermare, I
was not able to recognize him very well but the second time when he came back, because he
was being lighted by the flashlight, that was the time when I was able to recognize him and also
the hat he was wearing.
Q You said in the direct examination that you cannot tell whether that person who shot first your
uncle was the same person who pressed the flashlight to your chin, forcing you to stand up?
A The first time he came near us, I was not able to recognize him. But the second time when he
came near us when he came back, because of the hat he was wearing, I was able to recognize
him as the very person who went first near us and inserted himself between myself and Nilo
Caermare.
Q But all you have told to this Honorable Court in my questions a while ago is that part of the
body of the assailant, especially the back part of his body was lighted, do you still recall that?
A It is not exactly the center but at the back of his neck that was lighted. Also on the left side of
his head.
Q All those times, from the time he inserted (sic) between you and the victim to the time you
held or he held the flashlight and pressed it to your chin and the next time you observed him
shot again your uncle, he was wearing a hat?
A Yes, Sir.
Q That is (sic) why you were able to identify him because of the hat that he was wearing?
A That includes also the left side of his face that was being lighted by the flashlight.8

Q Aside from the flashlight, was the man holding a gun?

A No, Sir, he was not bringing (sic) a gun but he was bringing (sic) a
flashlight.
Q You said you recognized the man. Who was that whom you recognized?
ATTY. PALPAGAN:
I pray, Your Honor, that the question be clarified. It is vague. It was not said that if that person
identified by the witness first was the one who shot the victim.
COURT:
Not actually the man who shot but the person who pressed the flashlight to his chin.
A Yes, Sir, I recognize the person.
Q Who was that person whom you recognized who pressed the flashlight to your chin?
A The man who came to me was that man.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a man whom he recognized just a while ago as Quirico Dagpin, the accused
in this case.
Q According to you, when that man whom you pointed to as Quirico Dagpin pressed his flashlight
to your chin, you were forced to stand up, is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did you do when you were forced to stand up?
A When that man pressed the flashlight to my chin, I was forced to stand up and when I was
standing, the man stepped backward and when he returned, he was bringing (sic) with him a
gun.
Q How did that man hold the gun?
A When he came near me, he was bringing (sic) the gun holding it with his two hands but the
muzzle was pointed downward.
Q What was your reaction when you saw that he was holding a gun pointed downwards?
A When that man who was bringing (sic) that gun with the muzzle pointed downward came near
me and because I noticed that there was a sound cocking the gun, I was so afraid that he might
fire the gun again. That was the time when I ran away.9
Randy testified that the man who returned with the flashlight and with the gun was the same
man who shot his uncle:
Q And that person was not holding an arm or weapon?
A At that time, he was bringing (sic) with him a flashlight.
COURT:
You have not noticed him carrying a firearm?
A But after he pressed that flashlight to my chin, Your Honor, he moved away again and when he
returned, he was bringing (sic) with him a gun.
COURT:
Proceed.
Q Do you mean to say that the person who pressed the flashlight to your chin was the same
person who got again with (sic) a gun?
A The same person, Sir.
Q So, because of the pressure exerted to your chin by that person holding the flashlight, you
stood up and when you heard the cocking of the rifle, you ran away?
A Yes, Sir, I moved forward.
Q Have you actually seen the person cocking his rifle?
A Yes, Sir, because he was very near.10
Rona testified that she herself recognized the appellant, thus:
Q You said you heard a gunfire and you turned your back and ran forward and stopped at a little
distance?
A Yes, Sir. I ran at a little distance and then I turned my back to the place where the gunburst
occurred and then I saw a man wearing [a] black t-shirt and dark pants and a hat at the time.
Q What happen (sic) while you were looking back, what did you see?
A When I looked back to the place, I saw that man at the time and he was bringing (sic) with him
a flashlight and so I just kept looking and when he returned back (sic), he was bringing (sic) with
him a gun and there were lights of flashlights coming from his back (sic).
Q Towards what direction was the flashlight directed?
A The lights of the flashlights (sic) were directed to the place where my Uncle Nilo was but I did
not see my uncle and the light lighted the left side of the face of that man wearing a hat.
Q What did that man wearing, a hat, dark t-shirt and pants do?
A I noticed that the man wearing a hat and dark t-shirt and pants was holding a gun and pointed
it downward to the place where my Uncle Nilo was and my brother Randy ran away and when
that gun burst or fired, I also ran away.
Q Did you recognize that man who fired the gun?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you point to that man if he is in court?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a man who is sporting a wrist watch with his hands folded in front of him and
is known already to the court as (sic) accused Quirico Dagpin.
ATTY. BALISADO:
If your Honor, please, may we ask that the accused be made to stand up for identification
purposes?
COURT:
He is already known to the court.
ATTY. BALISADO:
How far were you from that man who fired the gun?
A I was only very near because I was situated at the lower portion of the trail which has a
distance of about one (1) fathom from the man who fired the gun.
Q You said that the left side of the face of the man was lighted by a flashlight directed towards
the ground where your uncle was. How many flashlights did you notice?
A Three, Sir.
Q From what direction did the lights come from in relation to the gunman?
A The two (2) lights coming from the flashlights were situated at an upper portion and the third
flashlight was situated on the left side which caused the lighting of the left side of the man who
fired the gun.
Q You said after hearing the second gunburst and seeing that person who fired the gun, you ran
away. Towards what direction did you run?
A Towards our road because I was left behind in that place because my brother was already
ahead of me.
Q All right, you said you heard the gunburst and saw that (sic) man who fired the gun. The gun
was pointed down. That was the second gunfire. To whom was that gunfire directed?
A As I narrated a while ago, the gun was pointed downward to the ground.11
No less than the appellants witness, Barangay Captain Rene Jauculan, testified that when he
talked with Rona and Randy after the shooting, they confirmed to him that they knew the
suspects, but were afraid to divulge their identities before they were arrested:
Q Now, you said that the victim in this case had companions in going home, did you try to ask
who were his companions at the time of the incident when you were already in (sic) the scene of
the incident?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Who were they, if you did ask his companions?
A The two Labisigs.
Q Rona Labising (sic) and Randy Labisig, right?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did you ask also Joselito Bantayana?
A I do not know.
Q How about Danilo Taroc (sic)?
A Yes, I think he was with me.
Q How about Reynaldo Matugan?
A I am not very certain, Sir.
Q How about Reina Labisig?
A She was with him.
Q Now, did you ask them, what really happened if they were there at the scene of the incident?
A Yes, Sir, I asked them.
Q Where did you ask them, in the house or at the scene of the incident?
A In the house.
Q You mean, when you went to a certain place, these persons I mentioned or his companions
were no longer there?
A They were not there anymore.
Q Now, you had an occasion to ask them in what house?
A In the house of the father of the victim.
Q Did they tell you that they have now the suspects but they were still afraid to arrest them
because there were no policemen around?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And that was what they told you, right?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And, of course, they told you that they could not tell you because they were afraid because the
suspects were not yet arrested?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And because of that you did not insist in asking them the name of the suspects, right?
A I did not.
Q Because you leave (sic) this matter to the police?
A Yes, Sir.12
We have ruled that illumination produced by a kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow
identification of persons.13
The trial court gave credence and probative weight to the testimonies of Randy and Rona. The
well-settled rule is that findings of a trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great
weight, as the trial judge has a clear advantage over the appellate magistrate in appreciating
testimonial evidence. The trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witness
as he had the unique opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and note his demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grueling examination. Where, as in this case, there is no showing
that the trial court ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case. The findings of the trial court
are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect.14
The appellants denial of the crime charged cannot prevail over the positive declarations of
prosecution witnesses Randy and Rona.
The defense
of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses
who testified on affirmative matters. Positive identification where categorical and consistent and
without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails
over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.15
The appellant was not deprived of his right under the Constitution to be assisted by counsel
because the appellant was not subjected to a custodial investigation where he was identified by
the prosecutions witnesses in a police line-up.16 Indeed, the appellant even denied that there
was no police line-up and that he was merely with the police officers when the prosecutions
witnesses arrived in the police station.
The killing was qualified by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means or methods in the execution thereof which tend,
directly and specifically, to insure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.17 The essence of treachery is that the attack is
deliberate and without warning, done in swift and unexpected manner of execution, affording the
hapless and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.18 In this case, the victim was
shot from behind, at close range, impervious to the peril to his life. The victim was unarmed and
had no chance or means to defend himself or avert the appellants assault.
Although the Information alleges that the appellant used a gun in killing the victim, there is no
allegation therein that the appellant had no license to possess the firearm. Neither is there proof
that he had no such license. Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, an aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the Information. While the rule
became effective after the crime was committed, the same must be applied retroactively
because it is favorable to the appellant.19
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, murder is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Where no mitigating or aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of the crime, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, conformably to
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
We sustain the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim without need of any
proof.20 Exemplary damages in the amount of P25,00021 must, likewise, be awarded, in
accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, the qualifying circumstance of treachery being
present. The heirs of the victim are entitled to moral damages of P50,000,22 the prosecution
having proved, through the father of the victim, the factual basis therefor. The heirs are not
entitled to actual damages in the form of the victims unearned income because the prosecution
failed to present any documentary evidence to prove the victims employment and the amount
of his monthly salary.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City, Branch 8, finding the appellant Quirico Dagpin y Esmade guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. The appellant Quirico Dagpin y Esmade is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the
victim, Nilo Caermare, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000) as moral damages; and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000) as exemplary damages.
The award of actual damages is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147786 January 20, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA, Appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch
73, dated March 7, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 98-14724, finding appellant Eric Guillermo y
Garcia guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
In an Information dated March 23, 1998, appellant was charged by State Prosecutor Jaime
Augusto B. Valencia, Jr., of murdering his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of March 1998, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a piece of wood and a saw, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hit with
a piece of wood and thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw one Victor F. Keyser, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
When arraigned on April 3, 1998, the appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to
the charge.3
On April 23, 1998, however, appellant moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and prayed for a re-
arraignment. The trial court granted the motion and on April 28, 1998, he was re-arraigned.
Assisted by counsel de parte, he entered a plea of not guilty.4 The case then proceeded to trial.
The facts, as gleaned from the records, are as follows.
The victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing
Corp. (Keyser Plastics for brevity), with principal place of business at Sitio Halang, Lornaville, San
Roque, Antipolo City.5 Keyser Plastics shared its building with Greatmore Corporation, a
manufacturer of faucets.6 Separating the respective spaces being utilized by the two firms in
their operations was a wall, the lower portion of which was made of concrete hollow blocks, while
the upper portion was of lawanit boards.7 The part of the wall made of lawanit had two large
holes, which could allow a person on one side of the wall to see what was on the other side.8
On March 22, 1998, prosecution witness Romualdo Campos, a security guard assigned to
Greatmore was on duty. At around 8:00 a.m., he saw appellant Eric G. Guillermo enter the
premises of Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Guillermo, as he knew him to be one of the trusted
employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw Victor F. Keyser arrive. Keyser checked the
pump motor of the deep well, which was located in the area of Greatmore, after which he also
went inside the part of the building occupied by Keyser Plastics.9 Campos paid scant attention to
Keyser.
Later, at around 10:00 a.m., Campos was making some entries in his logbook, when he heard
some loud noises ("kalabugan") coming from the Keyser Plastics area. He stopped to listen, but
thinking that the noise was coming from the machines used to make plastics, he did not pay
much attention to the sound.10
At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of his duties when he
saw appellant Guillermo look through one of the holes in the dividing wall. According to Campos,
appellant calmly told him that he had killed Victor Keyser and needed Campos assistance to help
him carry the corpse to the garbage dump where he could burn it.11 Shocked by this revelation,
Campos immediately dashed off to telephone the police. The police told him to immediately
secure the premises and not let the suspect escape, 12 while a reaction team was being
dispatched to the scene.
Ten minutes later, a team composed of SPO4 Felix Bautista, SPO1 Carlito Reyes, and Police Aide
Jovenal Dizon, Jr., all from the Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, arrived at the
crime scene. With them was Felix Marcelo, an official police photographer.13 They were
immediately met by Campos, who informed them that Guillermo was still inside the building. The
law enforcers tried to enter the premises of Keyser Plastics, but found the gates securely locked.
The officers then talked to Guillermo and after some minutes, persuaded him to give them the
keys. This enabled the police to open the gate. Once inside, SPO4 Bautista and SPO1 Reyes
immediately accosted Guillermo who told them, "Sir, hindi ako lalaban, susuko ako, haharapin ko
ito." ("Sir, I shall not fight you, I am surrendering, and I shall face the consequences.")14
Guillermo was clad only in a pair of shorts, naked from the waist up. SPO1 Reyes then asked him
where the body of the victim was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening
the boxes, the police found the dismembered limbs and chopped torso of Victor F. Keyser. The
victims head was found stuffed inside a cement bag.15
When the police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he
bashed the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after Keyser fell, he dismembered the
body with a carpenters saw. He then mopped up the blood on the floor with a plastic foam.
Guillermo then turned over to the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut lumber
and a carpenters saw.16 Photographs were taken of the suspect, the dismembered corpse, and
the implements used in committing the crime. When asked as to his motive for the killing,
Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and his co-employees.17 He expressed
no regret whatsoever about his actions.18
The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Station for further investigation. SPO1
Carlos conducted the investigation, without apprising the appellant about his constitutional rights
and without providing him with the services of counsel. SPO1 Carlos requested the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct a post-mortem examination on Keysers remains. The
Antipolo police then turned over the bloodstained piece of wood and saw, recovered from the
locus delicti, to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing.
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, autopsied Keysers remains. He
found that the cadaver had been cut into seven (7) pieces.19 He found that the head had
sustained thirteen (13) contusions, abrasions, and other traumatic injuries,20 all of which had
been caused by "forcible contact with hard blunt object,"21 such as a "lead pipe, baseball bat, or
a piece of wood."22 He found the cause of death to be "traumatic head injury."23 Dr. Baluyot
declared that since the amputated body parts had irregular edges on the soft tissues, it was most
likely that a sharp-edged, toothed instrument, like a saw, had been used to mutilate the
corpse.24 He further declared that it was possible that the victim was dead when sawn into
pieces, due to cyanosis or the presence of stagnant blood in the body,25 but on cross-
examination, he admitted that he could not discount the possibility that the victim might still
have been alive when mutilated.26
Dr. Olga Bausa, medico-legal pathologist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that she
subjected the bloodstained piece of coco lumber as well as the saw recovered from the crime
scene to a bio-chemical examination to determine if the bloodstains were of human origin. Both
tested positive for the presence of human blood.27 However, she could not determine if the
blood was of the same type as that of the victim owing to the insufficient amount of bloodstains
on the items tested.28
Keysers death shocked the nation. Appellant Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was
interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters, namely: Augusto "Gus" Abelgas of ABS-
CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both interviews were subsequently broadcast
nationwide. Appellant admitted to David that he committed the crime and never gave it second
thought.29 He disclosed to David the details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the
head and cut up his body into pieces, which he placed in sacks and cartons.30 When asked why
he killed his employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not feed him
properly, and treated him "like an animal."31 Both Abelgas and David said that Guillermo
expressed absolutely no remorse over his alleged misdeed during the course of their respective
interviews with him.32
At the trial, appellant Guillermos defense consisted of outright denial. He alleged he was a
victim of police "frame-up." He testified that he had been an employee of Keyser for more than a
year prior to the latters death. On the date of the incident, he was all alone at the Keyser
Plastics factory compound as a "stay-in" employee. Other employees have left allegedly due to
Keysers maltreatment of them.33
In the morning of March 22, 1998, appellant said Keyser instructed him to report for overtime
work in the afternoon. He proceeded to the factory premises at one oclock in the afternoon, but
since his employer was not around, he said, he just sat and waited till he fell asleep.34 He was
awakened sometime later when he heard people calling him from outside. He then looked out
and saw persons with firearms, who told him that they wanted to enter the factory. Once inside,
they immediately handcuffed him and looked around the premises. When they returned, they
were carrying boxes and sacks. He said he was then brought to the police station where he was
advised to admit having killed his employer since there was no other person to be blamed.35
When he was made to face the media reporters, he said the police instructed him what to say.36
He claimed that he could no longer recall what he told the reporters. The appellant denied having
any grudge or ill feelings against his employer or his family.
On cross-examination, appellant admitted that he was the shirtless person in the photographs
taken at the crime scene, while the persons with him in the photographs were policemen wearing
uniforms.37 He likewise admitted that the cartons and sacks found by the police inside the
factory premises contained the mutilated remains of his employer.38 He claimed, however, that
he was surprised by the contents of said cartons and sacks.39 Appellant admitted that a
bloodstained piece of wood and a saw were also recovered by the police, but he insisted that the
police made him hold the saw when they took photographs.40
The trial court disbelieved appellants version of the incident, but found the prosecutions
evidence against him weighty and worthy of credence. It convicted the appellant, thus:
The guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt to the crime of murder as
charged in [the] information. WHEREFORE, the accused is meted the maximum penalty and is
hereby sentenced to die by lethal injection.
The accused is also hereby ordered to pay the mother of the victim, Victor Keyser, the following
amounts:
1. Death Indemnity P50,000.00
2. Funeral Expenses P50,000.00
3. Compensatory Damages P500,000.00
4. Moral Damages P500,000.00
5. Exemplary Damages P300,000.00
6. Attorneys Fees P100,000.00 plus P3,000.00 per Court appearance.
SO ORDERED.41
Hence, the case is now before us for automatic review.
In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN IMPOSING THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING THE FOLLOWING DAMAGES: DEATH INDEMNITY
P50,000.00; FUNERAL EXPENSES P50,000.00; COMPENSATORY DAMAGES P500,000.00; MORAL
DAMAGES P500,000.00; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES P300,000.00; AND ATTORNEYS FEES OF
P100,000.00 PLUS P3,000 PER COURT APPEARANCE.42
Briefly stated, the issues for resolution concern: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence
to prove the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) the propriety of the death penalty
imposed on appellant; and (3) the correctness of the award of damages.
Appellant contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He points out that
there is no clear showing that he was informed of his constitutional rights nor was he made to
understand the same by the police investigators. In fact, he says, he was only made to read said
rights in printed form posed on the wall at the police precinct. He was not provided with the
services of counsel during the custodial investigation, as admitted by SPO1 Reyes. In view of no
showing on record that he had waived his constitutional rights, appellant argues that any
evidence gathered from him, including his alleged confession, must be deemed inadmissible.
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the evidence clearly shows
that the appellant admitted committing the crime in several instances, not just during the
custodial investigation. First, he admitted having killed his employer to the security guard,
Campos, and even sought Campos help in disposing of Keysers body. This admission may be
treated as part of the res gestae and does not partake of uncounselled extrajudicial confession,
according to the OSG. Thus, OSG contends said statement is admissible as evidence against the
appellant. Second, the appellants statements before members of the media are likewise
admissible in evidence, according to the OSG, as these statements were made in response to
questions by news reporters, not by police or other investigating officer. The OSG stresses that
appellant was interviewed by media on two separate occasions, and each time he made free and
voluntary statements admitting his guilt before the news reporters. He even supplied the details
on how he committed the crime. Third, the OSG points out that appellant voluntarily confessed to
the killing even before the police could enter the premises and even before any question could
be posed to him. Furthermore, after the police investigators had entered the factory, the
appellant pointed to the place where Keysers corpse was found. The OSG submits that at these
points in time, appellant was not yet under custodial investigation. Rather his statements to the
police at the crime scene were spontaneous and voluntary, not elicited through questioning, and
hence must be treated as part of the res gestae and thus, says the OSG, admissible in evidence.
The OSG contends that not every statement made to the police by a suspect in a crime falls
within the ambit of constitutional protection. Hence, if not made under "custodial investigation"
or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected by the
Bill of Rights.
However, in our view, the confession appellant made while he was under investigation by SPO1
Carlito Reyes for the killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective
standards laid down by the Constitution. Under Article III of the Constitution,43 a confession to
be admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the
confession must be express; and (d) the confession must be in writing.44 In the instant case, the
testimony of SPO1 Reyes on cross-examination clearly shows the cavalier treatment by the police
of said constitutional guarantees. This can readily be gleaned from the transcript of Reyes
testimony, which we excerpt:
Q: What did you do next upon arriving at the police station?
A: When we arrived at the police station, I pointed to him and asked him to read what was
written on the wall which was his constitutional rights.
Q: Did he read the same?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: Did you ask the accused if he did understand what he read?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: So Mr. Witness, you did continue your investigation at the police station?
A: Yes, mam.
COURT:
What did the accused say when you asked him if he understood what was written on the wall
which was his constitutional rights?
A: He said he understood what was written on the wall and he has no regrets.
COURT:
Proceed.
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
Who were present at the police station during your investigation?
A: There were many people around when I conducted the investigation at the police station. My
companions were there but I do not know the other persons who were present.
Q: How was the investigation that you conducted at the police station?
A: I inquired again from Eric Guillermo why he did it, the reason why he did it.
Q: And was your investigation being recorded in the police station?
A: No, mam.
Q: Let me just clarify, I did not mean like a tape recorder. Was it written?
A: I only asked him but it was not written down or recorded.
Q: During the investigation, was there any lawyer or counsel that was called during the
investigation?
A: None, mam.
Q: Did you inform the accused that he has the right to get a counsel during the investigation?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: What did the accused say, Mr. Witness?
A: He did not utter any word.
Q: During the investigation at the police station, did you exert effort to provide him with counsel
before you asked him questions?
A: No, mam.
Q: Why?
A: Because during that time, it was Sunday afternoon and there was no counsel around and
because he already admitted that he perpetrated the crime and that was explained to him, his
constitutional rights which was on the wall. We did not provide anymore a counsel.

Q: I would just like to ask the reason why you made the accused read the written rights that was
posted on the wall of your police station?
A: So that he would be apprised of his constitutional rights.
Q: So, you mean that you made him understand his rights?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: So, you mean to say before you asked him to read his rights, you presumed that he does not
understand what his constitutional rights are?
A: I think he knows his constitutional rights because he admitted the crime.

Q: And did the accused understand his rights?

A: I believe he understood because he answered, "wala akong dapat pagsisihan." ("I have
nothing to regret.").45
Appellants alleged confession at the police station lacks the safeguards required by the Bill of
Rights. The investigating officer made no serious effort to make appellant aware of his basic
rights under custodial investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of the appellants
right to be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the
flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with
said investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that appellant had waived his
constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of counsel. As well said in People v. Dano,
even if the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even
if it had been voluntarily given.46
The right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the
part of the police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective communication that
results in an understanding of what is conveyed.47 Absent that understanding, there is a denial
of the right "to be informed," as it cannot be said that the person has been truly "informed" of his
rights. Ceremonial shortcuts in the communication of abstract constitutional principles ought not
be allowed for it diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation.
Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellants confession to SPO1 Reyes at the
Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional
safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do not apply to
spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to having
committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are
meant to preclude the slightest use of the States coercive power as would lead an accused to
admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting
the truth outside the sphere of such power.
The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the crime not just
to the police but also to private individuals. According to the testimony of the security guard,
Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the killing the appellant called him to say that he had
killed his employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos testimony was not
rebutted by the defense. As the Solicitor General points out, appellants statements to Campos
are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Under the Rules of Court,48 a declaration is
deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.49 All these requisites are present in the instant case. Appellant had just been
through a startling and gruesome occurrence, the death of his employer. His admission to
Campos was made while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence and before
he had an opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. His declaration to Campos concerned the
circumstances surrounding the killing of Keyser. Appellants spontaneous statements made to a
private security guard, not an agent of the State or a law enforcer, are not covered by the
Miranda principles and, as res gestate, admissible in evidence against him.
Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the media, appellant not only agreed to be
interviewed by the news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even
supplied the details regarding the commission of the crime to reporter Kara David of GMA
Channel 7, who testified in court, to wit:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q: Could you tell us what you found out in the interview?
A: The first question I think I asked was, if he admits the crime and he gladly said yes he did it,
the details about the crime, how he saw the body and where he put it, and the reason why he did
it.

COURT:
To what crime did he admit?
A: He said he got mad with (sic) his boss, so he got a piece of wood, "dos por dos," he hit his
boss in the back and then after that, I think he got a saw and sawed the body to eight pieces.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
You said the interview was done inside the room of Col. Quintana, how many were you inside the
room at that time?
A: I really could not remember but I was with my cameraman, an assistant, Col. Quintana and I
think two more escorts. I could not remember the others.
Q: You mentioned a while ago that he gladly admitted what he did, can you explain gladly
admitted?
A: Usually when I interview suspects, either they deny or [are] in hysterics, but Eric seems (sic)
calm when I interviewed him.
I said, "ginawa mo ba ang krimen," and he said, "Oo." "Hindi ka ba nagdalawang isip?" "Hindi." It
was kind of eerie.
Q: You also mentioned that he gave details of the crime he committed, aside from what you
already mentioned like his boss being hit in the head and cut to eight pieces, what did he tell
you?
A: He told me where he put it, like he looked for sacks and cartons, and he told me where he put
the head but I could not remember.
But I remember him saying he put the head in the bag and he said he asked help from the
security guard, Campos. Basically, thats it. And he told me the reason why he did it.
Q: Why did he do it?
A: Because he was not being paid for what he has done and Mr. Keyser treated him like an
animal, things like that.
He said that what he did was just right, just justice.50
The TV news reporters testimonies on record show that they were acting as media professionals
when they interviewed appellant. They were not under the direction and control of the police.
There was no coercion for appellant to face the TV cameras. The record also shows that the
interviews took place on several occasions, not just once. Each time, the appellant did not
protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even
supplied details of Keysers killing. As held in Andan, statements spontaneously made by a
suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in
evidence.51
Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that, despite the inadmissibility of appellants alleged
confession to the police, the prosecution has amply proven the appellants guilt in the killing of
Victor F. Keyser. The bare denial raised by the appellant in open court pales in contrast to the
spontaneous and vivid out-of-court admissions he made to security guard Campos and the two
media reporters, Abelgas and David. The positive evidence, including the instruments of the
crime, together with the medical evidence as well as the testimonies of credible prosecution
witnesses, leaves us no doubt that appellant killed his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser, in the
gruesome manner vividly described before the trial court.
But was appellants offense murder for which appellant should suffer the death penalty, or only
homicide for which a lesser penalty is appropriate?
Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove either treachery or evident premeditation to
qualify the killing as murder. He points out that there was not a single eyewitness to show how
the crime was committed and hence, absent an eyewitness to show the manner in which the
crime was committed, he cannot be held liable for murder.
For the appellee, the OSG submits that as recounted by the appellant himself, he repeatedly
struck the victim, with a piece of coco lumber (dos por dos), at the back of his head, while the
victims back was turned towards him. The suddenness of the attack, coupled with the manner in
which it was executed clearly indicates treachery. The OSG agrees with appellant, however, that
evident premeditation was not adequately established. Hence, we shall now deal only with the
disputed circumstance, treachery.
Treachery or alevosia is present when the offender commits any crime against persons
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from any defense which the offended
party might make.52 Two essential requisites must concur for treachery to be appreciated: (a)
the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (b) the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.53
A qualifying circumstance like treachery changes the nature of the crime and increases the
imposable penalties for the offense. Hence, like the delict itself, it must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.54 In the instant case, we find insufficient the prosecutions evidence to prove
that the attack on the victim came without warning and that he had absolutely no opportunity to
defend himself, or to escape. None of the prosecution witnesses could know how the attack was
initiated or carried out, simply because there was no eyewitness to the offense. In addition,
appellants narration in his taped interview with Channel 7 is not too clear on this point, thus:
ERIC GUILLERMO:
Mura pa rin ng mura. Nagtataka ako kung bakit ganoon na lamang kainit ito. Bigla niya akong
inano dito sa batok ko tapos itinuturo niya ang dito ko (pointing to his head) itinuturo-turo niya
ang dito ko.
Ayon mura ng mura, hindi ko napigilan ang sarili ko, dinampot ko iyong kahoy.
ARNOLD CLAVIO:
Sa mga oras na yon, nagdilim, napuno ng galit ang kanyang mga mata, nakita niya ang isang
dos por dos sa kanyang tabi at agad dinampot habang nakatalikod ang kanyang amo.
ERIC GUILLERMO:
Nang gawin ko sa sarili ko iyon kalmadong kalmado ako noong ginawa ko yon. Nasa sarili ako
noong ginawa ko iyon.
ARNOLD CLAVIO:
Hawak ang mahabang kahoy, hinampas ni Eric si Mr. Keyser, hinampas hanggang sa mawalan ng
malay. Tila hindi pa nakuntento sa kanyang nagawa, napagbalingan naman ni Eric ang isang
lagare sa kanyang tabi at isinagawa na ang karumal-dumal na krimen.55
From the foregoing, all that can be discerned is that the victim was scolding the appellant, and
the victims back was turned towards the appellant when the latter picked up the piece of wood.
It does not, however, show that there was any deliberate effort on the part of the appellant to
adopt the particular means, method, or form of attack to ensure the commission of the crime
without affording the victim any means to defend himself.
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot, the NBI pathologist who autopsied the victims body, observed that
it was difficult to determine the position of the victim in relation to his assailant.56 Nor was the
expert testimony of Dr. Baluyot definitive as to the relative position of the assailant and the
victim, to wit:
DEFENSE COUNSEL:
I would like also to ask from your medical knowledge thru the blows that the deceased received
in his head which caused the head injury, would you be able to ascertain also in what position
was the attacker or where the attacker was?
A: Based on the location of the injuries at the head, it would be very difficult to determine the
relative position of the victim and assailant as well as the position of the victim when he
sustained said injury, because there are injuries located at the front, at the left and right portions
of the head although there were none located at the back (stress supplied). Based on these
injuries, I would say that the position would probably be maybe in front, maybe to the left or the
right in order for him to inflict the injuries to the front, to the left and right sides of the head.57
Noteworthy, Dr. Baluyot pointed out that based on the injuries sustained by the victim, there is
an indication that he tried to defend himself against the blows being inflicted upon him, thus:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
Q: The wound that you found at the back of the hand, which is at the back of the right hand,
would you characterize this as [a] defense wound?
A: It is a defense wound. All injuries especially at the upper extremities they could be tagged as
defense wounds to fend offattacks and these upper extremities are usually used to protect the
head and the body.58
The gap in the prosecutions evidence cannot be filled with mere speculation. Treachery cannot
be appreciated absent the particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or
how the act unfolded and resulted in the victims demise.59 Any doubt as to its existence must,
perforce, be resolved in favor of appellant.
One attendant circumstance, however, is amply proved by the prosecutions evidence which
shows that the victims corpse was sawn by appellant into seven (7) pieces. Under Art. 248 (6) of
the Revised Penal Code, "outraging or scoffing at the corpse" is a qualifying circumstance.
Dismemberment of a dead body is one manner of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the
victim.60 In the instant case, the corpse of Victor F. Keyser was dismembered by appellant who
sawed off the head, limbs, and torso. The Information categorically alleges this qualifying
circumstance, when it stated that the appellant "thereafter, cut into pieces using said saw one
Victor F. Keyser." This being the case, as proved by the prosecution, appellant is guilty not just of
homicide but of murder.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances in the instant case, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed upon appellant.61
Both appellant and appellee claim that the trial court erred in awarding damages.1wphi1 They
submit that the trial courts award of P50,000.00 for funeral expenses has insufficient basis, for
only receipts amounting to P38,068.00 as proof of funeral expenses were presented in evidence.
Thus, this award should be reduced accordingly. Concerning the award of moral damages in the
amount of P500,000, compensatory damages also for P500,000 and exemplary damages in the
amount of P300,000, appellant submits that these cited sums are exorbitant, and not in accord
with prevailing jurisprudence. The OSG agrees, hence modification of said amounts is in order.
The amount of moral damages should be reduced to P50,000, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence, as the purpose for such award is to compensate the heirs of the victim for the
injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them.62 Award of exemplary damages is justified in
view of the gruesome mutilation of the victims corpse, but the amount thereof should also be
reduced to only P25,000, following current case law.
The award of P500,000 in compensatory damages lacks proof and ought to be deleted. The
victims mother, Remedios Keyser, testified that the victim was earning around P50,000.00 a
month63 as shown in the receipt issued by Rosetti Electronics Phils. Co.64 However, said receipt
shows that it was made out to her, and not the victim. Moreover, it does not show what period is
covered by the receipt. Hence, the actual value of the loss of earning capacity was not
adequately established. Awards for the loss of earning capacity partake of the nature of
damages, and must be proved not only by credible and satisfactory evidence but also by
unbiased proof.65
Civil indemnity for the victims death, however, was left out by the trial court, although now it is
automatically granted without need of proof other than the fact of the commission of the
crime.66 Hence, conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity should be awarded in favor of the victims heirs.
Nothing on the record shows the actual expenses incurred by the heirs of the victim for
attorneys fees and lawyers appearance fees. Attorneys fees are in the concept of actual or
compensatory damages and allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the
Civil Code,67 one of which is when the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees
should be recovered.68 In this case, we find an award of P25,000 in attorneys fees and litigation
expenses reasonable and equitable.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated
March 7, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 98-14724, finding appellant ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA
GUILTY of the murder of Victor Francisco Keyser is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants
sentence is hereby REDUCED TO RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of
the victim, Victor Francisco Keyser, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P38,068.00 as
actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P25,000.00 as attorneys fees, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDWIN MORIAL, LEONARDO MORIAL alias "CARDING" NONELITO ABION * alias "NOLY",
defendants-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
Two of the three appellants herein were sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Southern Leyte for Robbery with Homicide. The other was sentenced to suffer only the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua on account of minority. The judgment of conviction is now before this Court
on automatic review.
The information charging appellants reads as follows:
That on the 6th day of January 1996, at about 6:30 o'clock [sic] in the evening more or less, in
[B]arangay Cagnituan, [M]unicipality of Maasin, [P]rovince of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with intent of [sic] gain,
entered into [sic] the house of Paula Bandibas and Benjamin Morial and once inside did then and
there willfully and unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, box, beat and stab the victims Paula
Bandibas and Albert Bandibas, with the use of sharp-pointed weapons and stones which the
accused had provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the victims mortal
wounds which caused their instantaneous death, after [which], said accused took, stole and
carried away therefrom Cash in the amount of Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000.00) Philippine
Currency, belonging to said Paula Bandibas and Benjamin Morial, to the damage and prejudice of
the victims and of social order.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution theorized that the accused committed the robbery in the early evening of
January 6, 1996 so they would have money to spend for the dance later that night. To obtain the
money or to silence any witnesses, the accused killed the occupants of the house, Paula
Bandibas and her three-year old grandson Albert. In proving its theory, the prosecution offered
the testimonies of Gabriel Guilao, Benjamin Morial, SPO4 Antonio Macion and Dr. Teodulo Salas.
The crime allegedly took place at 6:00 in the evening in Barangay Cagnituan, Maasin, Southern
Leyte. Gabriel Guilao, 62, had just finished pasturing his horses and was on his way home. He
was passing through the road near the house of Benjamin Morial when he heard the voice of
Paula Bandibas pleading, "[P]lease don't kill me[.] I am going to give you money." Finding what
he heard "weird," Gabriel paused and remained at a distance of about eight (8) meters from the
yard of the house. From where he stood, Gabriel saw accused Nonelito Abion slap Paula
Bandibas' neck. Paula fell and was stabbed by accused Edwin Morial with a small, sharp, pointed
weapon. Accused Leonardo Morial stood outside the house.
Gabriel also saw Paula Bandibas' grandson, Albert Bandibas, run towards his grandmother's
garden. Gabriel then heard the crushing sound of a stone against flesh.
The three accused stayed in the house for about ten minutes after the killing the victims.
Thereafter, they departed and headed towards the nearby houses.2
Paula Bandibas' common-law husband, Benjamin Morial, 56, was in neighboring Barangay Maria
Clara when the incident took place. He, along with the father of accused Leonardo Morial, and
two others, Heracleo Alonzo and Leo Padilla, were having drinks in his Maria Clara residence.
Benjamin left Barangay Maria Clara the next day at 2:00 in the afternoon. He arrived in Barangay
Cagnituan, 7 kilometers away, two hours later. As was his wont, Benjamin called out Paula's
name when he was some five (5) meters from the house. This time, however, there was no
answer.
Benjamin raced to the house, heading straight to the bedroom. There, he found the clothes all
topsy-turvy. The box where he and Paula hid their money was turned upside down. Someone had
ransacked their house.
Benjamin moved back and saw Paula lying on the floor with a cut in her neck. He shouted for
help. Responding to his cries, Benjamin's neighbors, includingbarangay kagawads Patricio Abion
and Rufino Guilao, rushed to his house. Benjamin asked his neighbors to help search for Albert,
who was found shortly some 50 meters from the house. Albert Bandibas laid flat on the ground
with two stones near his head. Benjamin requested Patricio to send someone to report the
incident to the police.3
Upon learning of Benjamin's return to Barangay Cagnituan, Gabriel Guilao also hurried to
Benjamin's house.4 He revealed to the grieving Benjamin that he witnessed Paula's killing and
that the three accused, Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abion, were the
perpetrators. Benjamin advised Gabriel not to tell anyone about what he knew for fear that they
would all be killed since the Abions were "saturated in [their] place." Gabriel heeded Benjamin's
advice.5
The police arrived at around 10:00 that evening. SPO4 Antonio Macion, along with four other
police officers, investigated the tragedy. They found wounds in Paula Bandibas' stomach, breast
and neck. Albert Bandibas, on the other hand, had a contusion on the right side of his head.
Beside him were two stones.6
After examining the victims' wounds, the police officers, along with Benjamin Morial, proceeded
to the bedroom. Benjamin informed the officers that P11,000.00 was missing from the
moneybox. Other than the cash, nothing else was missing.
Outside the house, Benjamin disclosed to the officers his three suspects, the accused in this
case. He advised them, however, to bring only Leonardo and Edwin Morial into custody and not
to include Nonelito Abion, who had many relatives in Cagnituan. As a former barangay captain
of 22 years, he knew that the Abions were "most feared" in Cagnituan. Benjamin did not tell the
police that Gabriel Guilao had witnessed the incident.7
The police found Edwin and Leonardo Morial in the house of Nonelito Abion and invited the two
to the police station, where they were turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez. The investigation
conducted by SPO4 Fernandez yielded an extra-judicial confession from accused Leonardo
Morial,8 who was assisted by Atty. Tobias Aguilar.
On January 8, 1996, Dr. Teodulo Salas, a rural health physician, conducted a post-mortem
examination on the bodies of the victims. Dr. Salas found an incised wound at the upper portion
of Paula Bandibas' neck, which he believed was caused by a sharp-edged weapon or instrument,
possibly a knife. Two stab wounds on the chest below and above the right nipple, both punctured
the lung. Another stab wound at the abdomen pierced the intestine. Dr. Salas concluded that the
cause of death of Paula Bandibas is severe hemorrhages secondary to the incised wound.
On the remains of Albert Bandibas, Dr. Salas found multiple angular corrogated wounds on the
head, which could have been caused by a heavy object such as a stone. Multiple stab wounds
punctured the skull. There was also an abrasion on the right side of the face, which was grossly
swollen and disfigured. The abrasion, according to Dr. Salas, might have been caused by a piece
of wood, by friction with the ground, or by some rough material that struck the child's face. The
last injury was a stab wound on the right forehead. Dr. Salas believed that the cause of death of
Albert Bandibas is the intra-cranial hemorrhages secondary to the violent injury to the head.9
The foregoing findings and conclusions were reduced to writing in the doctor's Necropsy
Reports.10
The accused, all first-degree cousins, interposed denial and alibi as their defense. They denied
being together at the time of the incident.
Accused Nonelito Abion, 22, claimed that he was in his house at around 6:00 in the evening of
January 6, 1996. An hour later, he went to the house of his sweetheart, Rosalie Mepico, and the
two later attended a dance at around 9:30 that evening. At the dance, they occupied a table with
Renida Mepico, Renato Montederamos and Edwin Morial. Leonardo Morial, he said, was not with
them.11
Accused Edwin Morial, 18, maintained that he was also at home on January 6, 1996. He slept
from 6:00 until 7:30 in the evening. At 9:00 p.m., he went to the dance with Renato
Montederamos. Nonelito Abion and Reneda Mepico were also at the dance.12
The defense pinned its bid for exculpation on the lengthy testimony of accused Leonardo Morial,
20. He narrated as follows:
At around 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. of January 6, 1996, he was at home washing dishes. He had supper
at approximately 7:00 and went to sleep at about 7:30 or 8:00. Unlike his fellow accused,
Leonardo did not go to the dance.13
At 4:00 in the afternoon of the next day, he was in the basketball court of their barangay
watching Nonelito and Edwin playing basketball with Jaime Morial, Renato Montederamos, Jimmy
Abion, Danilo Morial and Christopher Morial, among others.14 Suddenly, they heard Benjamin
Morial shout for help several times.15 Nonelito and Edwin, along with the others in the basketball
court, all rushed to Benjamin Morial's house.16 Leonardo Morial also proceeded to Benjamin's
house after bringing home his two-year old sister.17
At the house of Benjamin Morial, they found the lifeless body of Paula Bandibas on the floor
underneath the kitchen table. Her hands were on her breast, one foot crooked and the other
straight. She had wounds in her neck and breast. The corpse exuded a bad odor. Benjamin Morial
was crying. He said that whoever killed Paula shall pay.18 Edwin asked Daniel Morial who the
suspects to the killing were. Daniel said he did not know. Edwin went home after about five
minutes.19
After viewing Paula Bandibas' remains, Leonardo went out of the house because of the
unpleasant smell and then headed home.20 Nonelito, on the other hand, departed as people
started looking for the body of Albert Bandibas since it was getting late. That was about 5:15 in
the afternoon.21
That night, Edwin and Leonardo slept at Nonelito's house. Nonelito had invited Edwin to sleep
over as they were going to dress a chicken,22 and Edwin had told Leonardo about it. The cousins
had the chicken for dinner. It was quite late when they finished their supper so Leonardo also
decided to spend the night at Nonelito's house.23 They slept at past 8:00 in the evening.24
According to Nonelito, that was not the only time that the two had slept over. He said there were
previous occasions that his cousins had spent the night at their place.25
The Abion household was to be roused from its slumber three hours later. At 11:00 p.m., the
police arrived to investigate the killing of the Bandibases. A police officer asked Edwin where he
was at 6:00 in the evening of January 6, 1996. Edwin replied that he was in their house sleeping.
They also asked the same question to Leonardo Morial, who answered that he was at home
taking care of his younger siblings. Nonelito, however, was not questioned. A policeman informed
Edwin and Leonardo that they would be brought to the police station for the continuation of the
investigation.26
Edwin and Leonardo went with the police officers and arrived at the station at around 3:00 dawn
the next day. The police told them to go to sleep.27
The suspects were interrogated after they awoke at past 6:00 that same morning. Edwin was
advised to tell the truth so he would not be killed. Nevertheless, he refused to admit his alleged
participation in the killings. Someone then struck his left hand with a pistol. His hand swelled. A
policeman in uniform warned him that if he did not tell the truth, he would be brought to the
toilet.
Sure enough, Edwin was subsequently brought to the lavatory where he was boxed at the back
and instructed to undress. As Edwin stood naked, hands on his side, six tires were placed around
his body. A towel soaked with water was pushed into his mouth. Fortunately, the towel did not go
all the way to his throat since another policeman, a certain Leoni Egido, advised Edwin's
tormentors to stop and have pity on him. Edwin said that around seven policemen were in the
toilet with him though he could not identify any of them in court. He claimed that he did not have
his hand examined by a physician since he was afraid.28
Like Edwin, Leonardo was also asked where he was on January 6, 1996 at 6:00 in the evening.
Leonardo reiterated that he was at home. He was then brought to a separate room where his
interrogation continued.
Leonardo refused to own up to the incident so a policeman called two other policemen and
directed them to gag Leonardo. The two held Leonardo's arms while the other stuffed a shirt into
his mouth. One of them inflicted three successive painful blows on Leonardo's left side as the two
others continued to hold his hands.
Leonardo was then seated and his gag removed. The police told Leonardo to confess to the
killings. Leonardo professed that he did not witness the incident and could not tell them anything
about it. Again, they gagged his mouth and the same policeman who had hit him then boxed him
twice, this time on his right side. Thereafter, they released their hold and advised him to confess
so they would not kill him. Leonardo repeated that he did not know anything about the incident.
When a policeman attempted to box him again, Leonardo finally admitted that Nonelito Abion
and Edwin Morial were responsible for the death of Paula Bandibas. Leonardo's interrogation
lasted one and a half to two hours.
Asked in court to identify the uniformed policemen who beat him up, Leonardo said he could not
recall their faces. He did not look at the policemen during his interrogation and did not see their
nameplates.
Leonardo did not ask the police for a physician to examine him nor did he tell anyone about his
injuries because he did not know he was permitted to do so.
Leonardo's statements were then reduced into writing. A policeman informed him that they were
going to contact a lawyer to assist him during the investigation. Leonardo was told that his
counsel would be a certain Atty. Aguilar whose office was very near the police station. Leonardo
consented.
Having prepared Leonardo's statement, the police then told Leonardo to come with them to Atty.
Aguilar's office, which was about 50 meters from the police station. There, he saw Atty. Aguilar
for the first time. The lawyer read to him the document and asked him whether its contents were
true. The police had instructed Leonardo to answer "yes" if he was asked that question, and
Leonardo heeded the instructions.
Leonardo denied that Atty. Aguilar examined his body for any injuries. Atty. Aguilar did ask
Leonardo if he was forced or intimidated to execute the extra-judicial confession. Leonardo,
however, did not tell his lawyer about his injuries since a police officer had warned him that he
would be mauled again should he do so. Leonardo then signed the extra-judicial confession, after
which Atty. Aguilar affixed his. The signing over, Leonardo was brought back to the police
station.29 Later in court, Leonardo claimed that he merely made up all the statements in the
document because he was afraid.
At around 8:30 that morning, Nonelito visited Leonardo and Edwin at the police station. A police
officer informed Nonelito that he was one of the suspects and handcuffed him.30
To belie Gabriel Guilao's eyewitness account, the defense also presented Patricio Abion and
Eulogio Padilla. Patricio and Eulogio purportedly saw Gabriel in Barangay Maria Clara at the
alleged time of the incident as well as the morning after.
On rebuttal, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Flora Bandibas, Martin Galope and Erlito
Bandibas.
Flora and Martin were presented to disprove the testimony of the accused that Edwin Morial was
not at the dance with his co-accused. Flora claimed that she saw the three together at the dance
with Rosalia and Reneda Mepico occupying one table. Nonelito and Edwin danced joyfully, even
somewhat unusually, and caught the attention of other people. Leonardo also danced but did not
seem to enjoy himself.31
Martin, abarangay tanod, was at the dance to help preserve the peace. He maintained that he
saw all the three accused, including Leonardo Morial, at the dance.32
The defense attempted to diminish these witnesses' credibility by showing their relation to the
victim. On cross-examination, Flora admitted that she is the wife of Ireneo Bandibas, the
barangay captain, and the son of Paula Bandibas.33 Martin Galope, for his part, said that the
same Ireneo Bandibas had appointed himbarangay tanod.34
Erlito Bandibas' testimony, on the other hand, was intended to refute the testimonies of defense
witnesses Patricio Abion and Eulogio Padilla that Gabriel Guilao, the alleged eyewitness to the
killings, was in Maria Clara at the purported time of the incident.
On sur-rebuttal, the defense again presented Eulogio Padilla to dispute the testimony of Erlito
Bandibas.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision convicting all the three accused, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused, namely: LEONARDO MORIAL,
NONELITO ABION and EDWIN MORIAL, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as defined under Article 293 and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code and are hereby sentenced as follows:
1. Accused LEONARDO MORIAL and NONELITO ABION to each suffer the supreme penalty of
DEATH by lethal injection; and
2. Accused EDWIN MORIAL, due to his minority, to suffer the lesser penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
Civilly, the three (3) accused aforenamed are held liable JOINTLY and SEVERALLY as follows:
3. To indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
4. To indemnify the heirs of Albert Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
5. To indemnify complainant Benjamin Morial the amount of P20,546.00 as actual damages for
the funeral, burial and wake expenses;
6. To pay to the heirs [the] aforementioned moral damages of P60,000.00 for each death; and
7. To restitute or restore to private complainant Benjamin Morial the P11,000.00 amount robbed;
8. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.35
Appellants' conviction rests on two vital pieces of evidence: the extra-judicial confession of
appellant Leonardo Morial and the eyewitness account of Gabriel Guilao.
The Court finds Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively
deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation.
A custodial investigation is understood to mean as "any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant manner."36 It begins when there is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect,i.e., when the police investigator
starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged
offense.37
A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights, which attach upon the
commencement thereof. These are the rights (1) to remain silent, (2) to competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other
rights.38 The prosecution must prove with clear and convincing evidence that the accused was
accorded said rights before he extra-judicially admitted his guilt to the authorities.39
Thus, the prosecution offered the testimonies of SPO4 Andres Fernandez and Atty. Tobias Aguilar.
SPO4 Fernandez testified that the investigation he conducted resulted in an admission by
Leonardo Morial that he was one of those who participated in the robbery with homicide. SPO4
Fernandez asked Leonardo whether he was willing to reduce his statement into writing and to
sign the same. The suspect answered positively. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right
"to remain silent and [to] have a counsel[,] [and informed him that] whatever will be his answer
will be used as evidence in Court."40
Leonardo told the investigator that he had no money to pay for the services of counsel. SPO4
Fernandez informed him that there are many lawyers in their municipality and named some of
them. Leonardo said he did not know any of the lawyers mentioned. SPO4 Fernandez thus
volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leonardo Morial consented. SPO4
Fernandez then contacted Atty. Aguilar.41
Atty. Tobias Aguilar arrived at about 8:00 that morning of January 9, 1996. After being introduced
to Leonardo Morial, Atty. Aguilar had a short conference with him. He asked Leonardo if he was
willing to answer the questions that may be propounded by the police investigator. Atty. Aguilar
warned him that the statements that he may give might be used in evidence against him.
Leonardo said he was willing to answer the questions voluntarily. According to Atty. Aguilar,
Leonardo was bent on revealing what really happened. Thereafter, SPO4 Fernandez conducted
the investigation in Cebuano.
Midway into the investigation, after the police investigator had asked "all the material points,"
Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator that he be given leave as he had a very important
engagement. The investigator agreed to the lawyer's request.42
Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions in his
absence. He also instructed the police that, after the written confession had been prepared, the
accused and the document containing the confession should be brought to his office for "further
examination." Atty. Aguilar was in the police station for less than thirty minutes from the start of
the interrogation.
At about 1:30 or 2:00 in the afternoon, Leonardo and his policeman-escort arrived at Atty.
Aguilar's office. Atty. Aguilar asked the accused whether he was maltreated while he was away
and examined the suspect's body for contusions or abrasions. Leonardo told him that he was not
harmed by the police officer. The lawyer then studied the document to determine whether its
contents conformed to the answers given by the accused in his (counsel's) presence. He
propounded questions to Leonardo with reference to the document. Atty. Aguilar asked him
whether he understood its contents and whether he was willing to sign it. Leonardo replied in the
positive and signed the document in the presence of Atty. Aguilar and the policeman-escort.43
SPO4 Fernandez confirmed that Atty. Aguilar left during the investigation. On direct examination,
SPO4 Fernandez said the lawyer left the station while the investigation was still going on, saying
that he had so many things to do in his office.44 On cross-examination, SPO4 Fernandez
hesitated a little when he testified that Atty. Aguilar "might" have probably gone out in the
middle of the investigation.45 Later, he clarified that while in the process of drafting the
statement, Atty. Aguilar told him that he had to go to his office to attend to some matters.46
SPO4 Fernandez added that while Atty. Aguilar was "in the police station during the
investigation," "he (Atty. Aguilar) [would] come and go but within the police station."47
During and despite Atty. Aguilar's absence, SPO4 Fernandez continued with the investigation and
propounded several more questions to Leonardo, which the latter answered.48
The Court has stressed that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a
counsel assisting him from the very start thereof.49 InPeople vs. Lucero,50 where the suspect's
counsel left just when the interrogation was starting, this Court chastised both counsel and the
trial court for their lack of zeal in safeguarding the rights of the accused.
SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming that when the lawyer left, he
knew very well that the suspect had already admitted that he (Leonardo) and his companions
committed the crime.51 Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize his abandoning his client by saying
that he left only after the latter had admitted the "material points," referring to the three
accused's respective participation in the crime.52 For even as the person under custodial
investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its
termination indeed, "in every phase of the investigation."53 An effective and vigilant counsel
"necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his
client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer
until the signing of the extrajudicial confession."54
Furthermore, Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 743855 requires that "[a]ny person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel." The last paragraph of
Section 3 of the same law mandates that "[i]n the absence of any lawyer, no custodial
investigation shall be conducted."
The right of appellant to counsel was therefore completely negated by the precipitate departure
of Atty. Tobias before the termination of the custodial investigation. InPeople vs. Deniega,56 we
explained the rationale for the rule requiring counsel's continuing presence throughout the
custodial investigation:
Conditions vary at every stage of the process of custodial investigation. What may satisfy
constitutional requirements of voluntariness at the investigation's onset may not be sufficient as
the investigation goes on. . . . The competent or independent counsel so engaged should be
present from the beginning to end,i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising
caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a
while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or
terminate the interview.
If it were true that Atty. Tobias had to attend to matters so pressing that he had to abandon a
client undergoing custodial investigation, he could have terminated the same to be continued
only until as soon as his schedule permitted, advising the suspect in the meantime to remain
silent. This he failed to do. Appallingly, he even asked his client whether he was willing to answer
questions during the lawyer's absence. The records also disclose that Atty. Tobias never informed
appellant of his right to remain silent, not even before the custodial investigation started.57
Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain silent, by his "coming
and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt departure before the termination
of the proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
contemplated when it added the modifier "competent" to the word "counsel." Neither can he be
described as the "vigilant and effective" counsel that jurisprudence requires. Precisely, it is Atty.
Tobias' nonchalant behavior during the custodial investigation that the Constitution abhors and
which this Court condemns. His casual attitude subverted the very purpose for this vital right,
which is to:
. . . curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false. What is sought to be avoided is the "evil of extorting
from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense,
the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him." These constitutional
guarantee have been made available to protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if
not physical, atmosphere of such investigation.58
Even granting that appellant consented to Atty. Aguilar's departure during the investigation and
to answer questions during the lawyer's absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right
to counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12 (3), Article III of the Constitution,
these rights cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
No such written and counseled waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.
That the extra-judicial confession was subsequently signed in the presence of counsel did not
cure its constitutional defects. InPeople vs. Compil,59 this Court held:
. . . it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his
arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police
Station where he was further questioned. And while on their way to Manila, the arresting agents
again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he confessed to the commission of
the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those instances, he was not assisted by
counsel.
The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to
extract incriminatory statements from accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been
stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has began to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to
carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not
the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus inPeople v. de Jesus
[213 SCRA 345 (1992)] we said thatadmissions obtained during custodial interrogations without
the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are
still flawed under the Constitution. [Emphasis supplied.]
Moreover, appellant's policeman-escort was also present in the lawyer's office as attorney and
client discussed the voluntariness of the latter's confession. One can hardly expect the suspect,
in the face of such intimidating presence, to candidly admit that he was coerced into confessing.
As appellant Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during custodial
investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him.60
The confession is also inadmissible against appellant Leonardo Morial's co-accused, Nonelito
Abion and Edwin Morial. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.61
An exception to theres inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to
the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
provided that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. The
exception, however, does not apply in this case since the confession was made after the alleged
conspiracy and not while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.62
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession executed by Leonardo Morial,
the conviction of appellants is fully supported by the other pieces of evidence adduced by the
prosecution. It is well settled that where there is independent evidence, apart from the accused's
alleged uncounseled confession, that the accused is truly guilty, the latter nevertheless faces a
conviction.63 Here, the testimony of eyewitness Gabriel Guilao certainly deserves credence. He
recounted before the trial court:
Q Now, do you still recall Mr. Witness where you were on January 6, 1996 at more or less
6:00 o'clock in the afternoon?
A I can remember, sir.
Q Where were you if you can recall?
A I was pasturing my horse.
Q How many horses do you have?
A One mature and one young horse, the young one is not yet tied up.
Q So you have two horses all in all?
PROS. RUIZ:
Q Do you have carabao, Mr. Witness?
A None, Sir.
Q Now, while you were pasturing your horse at more or less 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
January 6, 1996, I withdraw that question, Your Honor.
COURT:
Reform.
PROS. RUIZ:
Q Now, how long did you stay in that pasture land?
A Two minutes, Sir, then I went home.
Q So, after pasturing your horse for two minutes, after that you went home? Now, on your
way home, do you remember what happened if any?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What was that incident are you referring to?
A When I went home, I passed by on the road near the house of Benjamin Morial, then I
heard the voice of Paula saying: "please don't kill me I am going to give you money."
Q Now, when you said, Paula are you referring to Paula one of the victim in this case?
A Yes, Sir.
PROS. RUIZ
Q Now, when you heard that voice of Paula, what did you do?
A I paused for a while because what I heard I found it weird.
Q Where did you stay at that moment as what you have said that you stayed for a while?
A I stayed at a distance of about 8 meters from their yard.
Q Were there trees in the place where you were staying at that time?
A Yes, Sir.
Q While staying at the distance of 8 meters away from the yard of the house of Benjamin
Morial, what did you observe if any?
A I saw that the old woman was slapped by Nonelito Abion on her neck.
Q What else have you observed if any?
A Then the old woman was down and when she was down, this Edwin Morial stabbed her.
Q Would you please tell this Honorable Court what was that weapon used in stabbing the
old woman by Edwin Morial?
A A small sharp pointed weapon, Sir.
Q Now, have you seen Leonardo Morial in the house of Benjamin Morial?
WITNESS:
A Leonardo Morial was just outside the house of Paula Bandibas.
PROS. RUIZ:
Q What was Leonardo Morial doing outside the house of Benjamin Morial?
A He was just standing thereat.
Q Now, in your estimate, how long did Nonelito and Edwin were inside the house of
Benjamin Morial?
WITNESS:
After they have killed the old woman, two minutes . . .
ATTY. GABUCAN:
The answer is not responsive, the question was how long?
PROS. RUIZ:
That is the answer of the witness.
COURT:
Continue with the answer.
WITNESS:
A After killing the old woman, they stayed inside the house for about ten minutes, Sir.
Q Now, after ten minutes, what did they do Mr. Witness?
A They went out of the house.
PROS. RUIZ:
Q After getting out from the house, what did they do?
A They went home, Sir.
Q In what direction?
A Towards the houses nearby.64
The defense has tried to discredit Guilao by harping on the latter's relationship with private
complainant, Benjamin Morial, who is the brother of Gabriel's wife,65 conveniently forgetting that
Gabriel is also related to all of the accused who are all his nephews.66 On this score, the Court
has held that the weight of testimony of a witness is not impaired or in any way affected by his
relationship to the victim when there is no showing of improper motive on the part of the
witness.67 A person who was close to the victim would not callously violate his conscience by
blaming it on someone he believed innocent thereof,68 especially if the accused were his blood
relatives.
Anent the failure of Guilao to either attend to the victims or to report the matter immediately to
the authorities, it should be remembered that different people react differently to an unusual
event and there is no standard of behavior when a person becomes a witness to something so
shocking or gruesome as murder especially if the assailant is near.69 The initial reluctance of the
eyewitness to disclose what transpired was sufficiently explained: Gabriel, who was 62 years old
at the time of the incident, was too afraid to share what he saw even to his wife,70 and while he
wanted to tell their barangay captain, the latter was in Davao at that time.71 Instead, he made
up his mind to tell only Benjamin,72 the common-law husband of the victim Paula, which he
promptly did upon Benjamin's arrival at his house from Maria Clara.73 The failure of Gabriel to
execute an affidavit on what he witnessed was in fact due to the request of Benjamin who
advised him not to tell anybody for fear that they might all be killed,74 as the Abions were the
most feared persons in this place.75
The defense, likewise, tried to show that Gabriel could not have possibly witnessed the crime
because he was in Maria Clara at that time. Patricio Abion, a relative of the accused Nonelito
Abion,76 testified that he saw Gabriel at Maria Clara at around six o'clock in the evening of 06
January 1996,77 and again at around eight o'clock in the morning the following day.78 He
surmised that Gabriel stayed in Maria Clara because it would take him about two (2) hours of
hiking to travel from Maria Clara to Cagnituan. However, it could not be discounted that Patricio
was merely making an opinion as to the travel or hiking time of Gabriel and he also admitted that
he was not wearing a timepiece.79 Hence, as observed by the trial court, it was not farfetched
that Gabriel was in Maria Clara in the afternoon of 06 January 1996, hiked to Cagnituan in time to
witness the incident and then returned to Maria Clara in the morning of 07 January 1996 to buy
some fish.
As regards the defense testimonies that Gabriel could not have possibly seen the incident from
the trail, it should be stressed here that Gabriel categorically stated that he was about eight (8)
meters from the yard of Benjamin's house when he saw Nonelito Abion slap Paula on the neck
after which Edwin Morial stabbed her.80 In addition, defense witnesses Patricio Abion and
Eulogio Padilla even contradicted each other when the former stated it would be possible to see
the inside of the house if the light was on81 while the latter stated that any person inside could
not be seen even if the light was on.82
Pending review of this case, Gabriel Guilao filed before this Court a three-page "Manifestation
with Prayer," dated 22 June 2000, which in effect, was a recantation of his testimony in the trial
court. He declared that he was "utilized" by Benjamin Morial against the three accused because
the latter had a long-standing grudge against them and was impelled by "hatred" and a "false
sense of anger." Since Benjamin could not "pinpoint" the killer of Paula and Albert Bandibas, it
was decided that the three accused be implicated to the crime "as a way of getting revenge."
Gabriel's relation to Benjamin, whose wife is the sister of Gabriel's wife Regina, accounted for
Benjamin's influence over him. In sum, Gabriel maintained that appellants Edwin Morial,
Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abion had "nothing to do with the crime charged."
The attitude of courts towards affidavits of retraction is one of distrust, if not of disapprobation,
because
. . . affidavits of recantation can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses for monetary
consideration or through intimidation. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable for there is
always the probability that it may later be repudiated. Courts thus look with disfavor at affidavits
of retractions of testimony given in open court, and are wary or reluctant to allow a new trial
based on retracted testimony. Indeed, it would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken
before the court of justice simply because the witness later on changed his mind for one reason
or another, for such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and will place the investigation of
truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.83
Further, the defense, during the trial of this case, failed to establish any grudge or animosity
between and against the accused and Benjamin Morial, as well as against the accused and
Gabriel Guilao. In fact, when Edwin's father died, Benjamin accommodated Edwin and his mother
in his nipa house "kamalig" for more than two (2) years.84 Nonelito Abion also testified that he
could not recall having personal differences with Benjamin.85
The accused have no other excuse other than alibi. Interestingly, they all testified that they were
in their respective homes at the time of the incident. Edwin Morial was sleeping,86 Leonardo
Morial was cooking,87 while Nonelito Abion was at home, not doing anything.88 In a number of
cases, the Court has ruled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove, and it is practically worthless in the face of positive identification of the
accused.89 The Court noted that none of the accused even presented any of their supposed
home companions to prove that they were at home when the killings took place. In addition, it
was not established that it would have been physically impossible for them to be at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission.90 The house of Edwin Morial was about two hundred
(200) meters from the house of Benjamin,91 the house of Leonardo Morial only about sixty (60)
meters away,92 while the house of Nonelito Abion was about seven hundred (700) meters from
the house of Benjamin and he could negotiate the distance in about ten (10) minutes.93 Equally
unnatural were the respective reactions of the accused when the bodies of Paula and Albert were
discovered. Leonardo Morial went home after seeing the body of Paula,94 Edwin Morial looked at
the body of Paula for five (5) minutes after which he went home,95 while Nonelito Abion left the
house of Benjamin while the others who went there upon hearing the shouts of Benjamin were
still searching for the body of Albert.96 The prosecution was also able to establish that the three
accused were in one table during the benefit dance which transpired on the eve of the
incident,97 contrary to statements of Edwin Morial and Nonelito Abion.
The trial court correctly ruled when it found the accused guilty of robbery with homicide. It was
established that all the elements of the crime were present;i.e., (1) the taking of personal
property perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the property
taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain oranimus lucrandi; and
(4) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed.98
In this case, Benjamin, upon arrival at his house, found that their room was in disarray, the
clothes were scattered and the box where they kept their money was already turned upside
down.99 The amount of P11,000.00 contained in the box was already missing,100 Paula was
already lifeless101 and Albert was nowhere to be found.102
The trial court also correctly ruled that the accused conspired to commit the crime. Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony,
and decide to commit it.103 It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and
after the crime, which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.104 Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.105 To exempt himself
from criminal liability, the conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the unlawful plan to commit the felony.106
In this case, it was established that after the killing of Paula, the accused even stayed inside the
house for about ten (10) minutes,107 presumably to look for the hidden money. After about ten
(10) minutes, they left the house of Benjamin and went home.108 Clearly, Paula and Albert were
already dead or dying but not one of the accused lifted a finger to show any pity or remorse.
Hence, they should all be made liable for the crime.
Dwelling was correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because of the sanctity that
the law accords to the privacy of the human abode.109 The home is considered a sacred place to
its owners, and one who goes to another house to slander or hurt him, or do him wrong, more
guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.110 However, evident premeditation is inherent in
robbery and should not have been considered against the accused.111 Treachery could only be
appreciated in crimes against persons,112 the same way with disregard of respect due to sex
and age which can be considered only in cases of crimes against persons and honor.113
Nevertheless, accused Edwin Morial should still be spared the death penalty. The records would
show that he was a minor at the time of the execution of the crime.114 InPeople vs.
Villagracia,115 the Court ruled:
In this case, the trial court failed to consider the age of appellant Nixon Ledesma when the crime
was committed. At the time he testified on May 17, 1989, he stated that he was only 15 years
old (TSN, May 17, 1989, p. 31). No contradictory evidence was presented by the prosecution. So,
when the crime was committed on September 23, 1987, or more than a year before he was
presented as a witness, Nixon Ledesma was less than 15 years old.
InPeople vs. Lugto, 190 SCRA 754 [1990], we held that the accused has the burden of proof that
he was minor at the time of the commission of the crime. However, inPeople v. Tismo, 204 SCRA
535 [1991], we upheld appellants' claim that he was 17 years old at the time the crime was
committed even without any proof to corroborate his testimony. Considering that the prosecution
failed to present contradictory evidence, we applied to appellant therein the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority under the second paragraph of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Lugto appears to be an aberration from the long line of decisions antedating it. From U.S. v.
Bergantino, 3 Phil. 118 [1903] to People v. Ebora, 141 SCRA 282 [1986], we have consistently
ruled that, although the accused did not offer any evidence to support his claim of minority, this
fact will remain as such, until disproved by the prosecution (See also U.S. v. Barbicho, 13 Phil.
616 [1909]; U.S. vs. Agadas, 36 Phil. 247 [1917]; People v. Ebora, 141 SCRA 282 [1986]; People v.
Bernalde, 139 SCRA 426 [1986]).
Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death,
when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.
As the aggravating circumstance of dwelling attended the commission thereof, the greater
penalty,i.e., death, shall be imposed116 upon appellants Nonelito Abion and Leonardo Morial.
However, appellant Edwin Morial, who was over 15 but under 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime, is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
Accordingly, the penalty next lower,117i.e.,reclusion temporal, shall be imposed upon him in its
maximum period,118 there being one aggravating circumstance (dwelling).
Said appellant is further entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.119 Under
Section 1 thereof, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the Code for the offense. Thus,
appellant Edwin Morial is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and
one (1) day ofprision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day ofreclusion temporalas maximum.
As regards the civil liability of appellants, the award of P60,000.00 to the heirs of each victim as
moral damages is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 each, in conformity with recent
jurisprudence.120
Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be imposed
accordingly.
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Robbery with
Homicide," with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abion
are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection, while Edwin Morial, on
account of his minority, is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years
and one (1) day ofprision mayor as minimum; to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day ofreclusion temporal as maximum. The accused are likewise sentenced, jointly and
severally, to:
(1) indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as
death indemnity;
(2) indemnify the heirs of Albert Bandibas in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as
death indemnity;
(3) indemnify the heirs of Paula Bandibas and Albert Bandibas in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos for each death as moral damages;
(4) indemnify Benjamin Morial in the amount of Twenty Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Six
(P20,546.00) pesos as actual damages for the funeral, burial and wake expenses;
(5) restitute Benjamin Morial the amount of Eleven Thousand (P11,000.00) Pesos representing
the stolen money.
Costs against accused-appellants.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for the possible exercise of executive clemency or pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 139333. July 18, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CRISPIN VELARDE y BANDOJO, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A municipal mayor cannot be considered a competent and independent counsel qualified to
assist a person under custodial investigation. Hence, the extrajudicial confession taken from the
accused with His Honor as counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Without this confession, the
remaining evidence, which is circumstantial, fails the test of moral certainty. Hence, acquittal is
inevitable.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision[1] dated February 12, 1999, issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch 11), finding Crispin Velarde y Bandojo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide in Criminal Case No. 773-M-97. The
decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused CRISPIN B. VELARDE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of Rape with Homicide and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of Death and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages.[2]
The Information[3] against appellant dated June 13, 1997, reads as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of May, 1997, in the [M]unicipality of Guiguinto, [P]rovince of
Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, and by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Brenda Candelaria, a minor who
is eight (8) years of age, against her will and consent.
That on the occasion and by reason of said rape, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strangle said Brenda
Candelaria in the neck which directly caused her death.[4]
When arraigned on July 1, 1997, appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio,[5] pleaded not
guilty.[6] In due course, he was tried and found guilty.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the evidence for the prosecution as follows:
[7]
On May 11, 1997 at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, Brenda Candelaria, an eight year old
child, together with her friend Melanie Sangalang, seven years of age, was on board a pedicab
driven by appellant. Upon reaching the house of Melanie, said appellant told Melanie to alight on
the pretext that her mother might look for her. Melanie obeyed leaving Brenda inside the pedicab
with appellant continuing his driving.
In the afternoon of the same day, appellant and Brenda were seen together by Flora Bonganay in
front of the latters store located near the church in Tikay riding the same pedicab.
Later on, Angelita Robles while waiting for a ride saw appellant already alone emerging from a
place near Doa Pilar Homes Subdivision. Angelita noticed something strange in appellants
actuation as he was uneasy, haggard looking with his hair disheveled.
The following day, May 12, 1997, the naked lifeless body of Brenda Candelaria was found in a
grassy vacant lot along the Cagayan Valley Highway in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan near the
Doa Pilar Homes Subdivision. Recovered beside her body were a rubber slipper, blood stained
white sando, a blue and white striped t-shirt and a shoe string.
Dr. Dominic Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the NBI assigned at Region III, conducted a post
mortem examination on the body of the victim. His findings revealed that Brenda Candelaria was
raped and strangled to death. According to the doctor, the victim died of asphyxia by manual
strangulation.
On the other hand, based on the leads furnished by witnesses, appellant was tagged as suspect
and was brought to the Malolos Bulacan Police Station for investigation.
During his investigation, appellant, after being informed of his constitutional rights in the
presence of Atty. Danilo Domingo whom he agreed to act as his counsel, voluntarily admitted
having raped and killed the victim Brenda Candelaria. Accordingly, his extrajudicial confession
was reduced to writing which was signed by him.
It was on the bases of the foregoing occurrences that the corresponding Information for rape with
homicide was filed against appellant with the Regional Trial Court. (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellant presents his version of the incident as follows:[8]
Accused Crispin Velarde DENIED having raped and killed Brenda Candelaria. Thus,
CONT. OF DIRECT-EXAM.
OF CRISPIN VELARDE BY:
Atty. de Leon:
Q Mr. Velarde, do we understand from you that you did not rape Brenda?
A No, sir.
Q You did not kill Brenda?
A No, sir.
Q Brenda is your first cousin?
A Yes, sir.
Q Your mother and the mother of Brenda are sisters, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q If you did not rape Brenda, if you did not kill Brenda and Brenda is your first cousin, your
mother and the mother of Brenda are sisters, why were you accused of rape and killing Brenda?
Atty. Villacorta:
Objection, Your Honor, the question calls for an opinion.
Court:
Never mind, it is a matter of defense.
Witness:
A I was only suspected (n[a]pagbintangan), sir.
Atty. De Leon:
Q According to some witnesses who testified for the prosecution, they have seen you and Brenda
riding in a tricycle?
Atty. Villacorta:
No, no, not tricycle, Your Honor, pedicab:
Court:
After the incident?
Atty. De Leon:
No, no, several days before the incident. Not exactly the day of the incident. I modify the
question by adding several days before the alleged incident.
Witness:
A No, sir, that is not true.
Atty. De Leon:
Q And, there was a witness who testified here that she has seen you riding on a jeep
perspiring . . . .
Court:
Give the specific place.
Atty. De Leon:
Q The witness has seen the accused about to ride the jeep perspiring as if you have committed a
crime is it true?
A I do not know anything about it, sir.
Q But according to that witness, you were carrying a basket, is it true?
A No, sir.
Atty. De Leon:
Thats all, Your Honor please.
Atty. Villacorta:
May we be allowed to conduct the cross considering . . .
Court:
(to witness)
Q Have there been an occasion when Brenda took a ride in your tricycle you were driving?
A None, Your Honor.
Q Never?
A No, Your Honor.
Court:
Cross next time?
Atty. Villacorta:
Yes, Your Honor.
Accused declared on June 19, 1998 that he has been detained since May 12, 1997 or more than
one (1) year already because he was told that he was the one who committed a crime against his
cousin Brenda Candelaria. According to him, on the night of May 11, 1997 he was arrested while
selling balot in Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, by four (4) Barangay Officials. When said Barangay
Officials asked him where he brought the child Brenda Candelaria, he told them he dont know
[sic]. He did not insist answering them because I dont know what they were asking about the
child. He just went with them because if he will not go with them di nila lulubayan and pamilya
ko. He was brought to the Barangay Hall of Barangay Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. He was kicked and
mauled by the father and brothers of Brenda. The father of Brenda is his uncle and was the one
who hurted [sic] him. He was boxed several times, hitting him in all parts of his body. While he
was being boxed, he told them to stop because he did not know about the incident. Inside the
Barangay Hall he was nilusob), was stabbed by the eldest son (Ruel Candelaria) hitting him in his
right leg. The person who stabbed him even said: Tabla tabla na lang kami meaning manos na
lang kami sa nangyari. He did not answer because he did not know anything about the incident.
Besides, he was already bugbog sarado, meaning his body was aching and it was painful. His
hands were even tied at his back with a handkerchief by a former neighbor. After hurting him
inside the Barangay Hall he was made to sign by one of the Barangay Officials. He signed
without reading what he signed because he cannot read very well. After signing, the members of
the Barangay including the Barangay Captain, brought him to the Municipal Building on the
midnight of May 12, 1997. Upon reaching the Municipal Building he was brought to the Provincial
Hospital where his wounds were treated and [s]urtured [sic]. He was not however given
medicine. After one (1) hour he was returned to the Municipal Building by the Barangay Officials.
He was placed inside the jail where he was mauled by around eight (8) inmates. They were
asking him where the child was, but he told them he did not know. They were insisting that he
admit or to confess but he answered he did not know anything. According to him marami pong
pahirap na ginawa sa akin. Mayruon pong koriente, mayruon pong saksak sa puwit. He could not
talk because he was already hirap na hirap na. Such hurting acts were done several days, six (6)
times a day. His body was even pounded by a piece of wood hitting him in his back because he
was on a sitting position. He could not speak because of the sobrang kirot ng katawan ko.
He further declared that in the morning of May 11, 1997, he was in the basket ball court
watching the game. He came from their house because it was the birthday of his mother. They
heard mass in Tikay. He is a Catholic, a Corsilista.
The accused was candid enough to admit that the signature appearing in Exh. M is his signature;
that Atty. Domingo is known to him because he was then the Mayor of Malolos; that he hired or
engaged the services of Atty. Domingo; that he was also candid enough to testify that wala
akong alam diyan. His educational attainment was up to Grade four (4) only. He claims that he
does not know the police investigator who typed the Sinumpaang Salaysay marked Exh. M.
(Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC found the existence of enough circumstantial evidence pointing to appellant as the
culprit in the crime. It also found his written extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence. As a
consequence, it convicted him of rape with homicide and imposed upon him the supreme penalty
of death.
Hence, this automatic review.[9]
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo for the following alleged errors:[10]
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in relying merely on the weight and sufficiency of the circumstantial
evidence adduced by the prosecution and the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession of the
accused contained in his Sworn Statement made before the police authorities of Malolos,
Bulacan.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in not relying on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence presented by the
accused in support of his defense.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in finding and declaring that the accused himself was the culprit behind the
rape-slay of the victim Brenda Candelaria, which finding and declaration were based on
surmi[s]es and conjectures.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in finding and declaring that the extrajudicial confession of the accused of
May 14, 1997 (Exh. H) is admissible in evidence.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in finding and declaring that there was nothing irregular or objectionable in
Atty. Domingos representation who is a lawyer of good standing and being the local chief
executive of Malolos, Bulacan, to serve as counsel for the accused.
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in finding and declaring that the confession of the accused is considered
valid and binding upon said accused.
SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in not giving due credence to the defense of the accused of denial which
defense prevails over and above the alleged circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution.
EIGHT ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide
and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages.
NINTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused of the crime charged, with costs-de-oficio.
TENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The trial court erred in not ordering the release of the accused from confinement and detention.
The issues in this case can be compressed into two: (1) whether the extrajudicial confession of
appellant is admissible in evidence, and (2) whether the circumstantial evidence presented by
the prosecution sufficiently proves his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
First Issue:
Extrajudicial Confession
Barangay tanods and officials of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of Malolos arrested appellant while
he was selling balut on the night of May 11, 1997.[11] He was subsequently brought to the
Malolos Police Station, where he was initially incarcerated and allegedly mauled.[12] On May 14,
1997, his case was referred by the Malolos police to the incumbent mayor of Malolos, Bulacan,
Atty. Danilo Domingo, who asked that appellant be brought to him.[13] Upon the advice of the
mayor, Velardes written extrajudicial confession was taken. During the investigation, appellant
was assisted by the mayor as counsel.[14] Armed police officers were also present during the
investigation.[15]
Appellant was investigated by a PNP member of the Malolos Police Station, SPO4 Edilberto
Almazar, who testified as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness, you said that you are a police officer of Malolos Police Station?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Since when have you been connected with that station?
A: Since February 9, 1982, sir.
Q: Up to the present?
A; Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What time on May 14, 1997 did you meet that Crispin Velarde?
A: In the afternoon, sir. I cannot remember the exact time.
Q: Where did you meet him?
A: At the Malolos Police Station, sir.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Court the reason why Crispin Velarde was in the Malolos Police
Station?
A: He is the suspect in a Rape with Homicide case, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What transpired during your meeting with Crispin Velarde at Malolos Police Station?
A: We made investigations in his person, sir.
Q: When you were conducting who was conducting the investigation or the questioning?
A: I, sir.
Q: And who were the persons present while you were interrogating or conducting investigation
on Crispin Velarde?
A: Atty. Danilo Domingo, sir.
Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court why Mayor Danilo Domingo was present during the
investigation of Crispin Velarde?
xxxxxxxxx
A: He was the one assisting Crispin Velarde, sir.[16]
Yet on cross, appellant stated:
Q: Was Atty. Danilo Domingo the counsel or the lawyer of the accused when you took his
statement?
Court:
Base on your perception?
A: No, sir.
Court:
What do you mean by No
A: He is not the lawyer of Crispin Velarde, Your Honor.
Court:
Thats how you can see it at that time?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Atty. Villacorta:
Q: If he is not the counsel, what was he doing there?
A: He learned about the incident thats why he talked to the accused, sir.
Q: Did you see Mayor Domingo talking to the accused at the time this statement was being taken
by you?
A: Yes, because the three of us were there, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Before the statement was taken, where did Crispin Velarde come from?
Co[ur]t:
If you know[?]
A: He was inside the jail, sir.
Q: Municipality of what?
A: Malolos, sir.
Q: This jail, how far was it from the investigation room?
A: Very near, sir. Just downstair because the police station is located in the basement and the jail
was located upstairs.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: But no relatives of Crispin Velarde were present during the investigation?
A: I do not remember, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. De Leon:
I am asking now, who were present?
A: Atty. Danilo Domingo and myself, sir.
Q: How about other policemen?
A: And the other police officers, sir.
Q: Beside you, Atty. Domingo and the accused, there were policemen present?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many?
A: I cannot remember how many and who were they, sir.
Q: During the investigation, the policemen were armed with weapons?
A: Yes, sir.[17]
Appellant contends that the extrajudicial confession taken during the investigation is
inadmissible in evidence. We agree.
Article III Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides:
Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
The dead body of Brenda Candelaria was found in the Municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. But
appellant, a resident of Barangay Tikay, Municipality of Malolos was brought to and detained in
the Malolos Police Station, where he was investigated by the Malolos police.
Under the circumstances, Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as an independent counsel. He
was the mayor of Malolos at the time. As such, he exercised operational supervision and
control[18] over the PNP unit in that municipality. His powers included the utilization of the
elements thereof for the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes, the arrest of
criminal offenders and the bringing of offenders to justice.[19]
As mayor of Malolos, his duties were inconsistent with those of his responsibilities to appellant,
who was already incarcerated and tagged as the main suspect in the rape-slay case. Serving as
counsel of appellant placed him in direct conflict with his duty of operational supervision and
control over the police. What the Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence
of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his clients defense
without any intervening conflict of interest.[20] Evidently Atty. Domingo, being the mayor of the
place where the investigation was taken, could not act as counsel, independent or otherwise, of
appellant.
In People v. Taliman,[21] we ruled that a mayor cannot be considered the independent lawyer
referred to by the Constitution.
Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent counsel for accused during their custodial
investigation.
In People vs. Culala, we held that the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant was
inadmissible as he was assisted by the incumbent municipal attorney. In People vs. Bandula, we
held that a municipal attorney could not be an independent counsel as required by the
Constitution. We reasoned that as legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance
and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to
the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It is therefore seriously doubted
whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of
interests.
xxxxxxxxx
If in the aforecited cases, we disregarded the extra-judicial statements of the accused, how much
more must we do so now, given that it was the mayor himself, and not just the provincial
attorney, that assisted accused-appellants?[22]
Furthermore, the right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not just the mere
presence of a lawyer beside the accused.[23] The competent and independent lawyer so
engaged should be present at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution
reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while
either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or
terminate the interview. The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is
rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful
advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as
to be useless, voluntariness is impaired.[24]
During the investigation, Atty. Domingo failed to act as the independent and competent counsel
envisioned by the Constitution. He failed to give any meaningful advice to protect the rights of
appellant. The former did not even bother to inform the latter of the consequences of an
extrajudicial confession.
It is significant to point out that, during the cross-examination and perhaps in total confusion, the
investigator even went so far as to state that Atty. Domingo had not acted as appellants lawyer.
If this were so, then appellant had absolutely no counsel when his extra-judicial confession was
taken.
In whatever way we may look at the situation, it is clear that, in palpable violation of the
Constitution, appellant was not assisted by a competent and independent counsel during the
custodial investigation and the taking of his extra-judicial confession. Hence, the Court is duty-
bound to disregard it.
This Court x x x will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition
sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of government. The
admonition given by this Court to government officers, particularly those involved in law
enforcement and the administration of justice, in the case of People v. Cuizon, where NBI agents
mishandled a drug bust operation and in so doing violated the constitutional guarantees against
unlawful arrests and illegal searches and seizures, is again called for and thus reiterated in the
case at bench, to wit:
x x x. In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect
ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some
lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long
as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which
they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement.
Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers
to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish
them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law.
Truly, the end never justifies the means.[25]
Second Issue:
Circumstantial Evidence
Circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one
circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences have been derived are proven, and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such that it produces a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. These circumstances must be consistent with one another, and the only rational
hypothesis that can be drawn therefrom must be that the accused is guilty. They must create a
solid chain of events, coherent and intrinsically believable, that point to the accused -- to the
exclusion of others -- as the perpetrator of the crime; and that sufficiently overcome thereby the
presumption of innocence in his or her favor.[26]
In this case, the prosecution presented the following pieces of evidence to prove that appellant
was the perpetrator of the crime.
First, appellant was with Brenda on the morning of May 11, 1997.[27] They were also together on
McArthur Highway between three and four oclock in the afternoon on the same day, aboard a
pedicab coming from Industrial City and going south towards Manila.[28]
Second, around five thirty in the afternoon on May 11, 1997, appellant was seen alone emerging
from Jaycee Auto Repair Shop, just beside Doa Pilar Homes.[29] He looked haggard and had
disheveled hair.[30]
Third, Brendas naked, lifeless body was found at six oclock in the morning on May 12, 1997, on a
vacant lot in Doa Pilar Homes.[31]
The above set of circumstantial evidence is too general. It is also consistent with the hypothesis
that appellant is innocent. He cannot be faulted for being seen with Brenda on a pedicab, since
the records show that the two of them are first cousins who live in the same house.[32] He
cannot be faulted, either, for emerging near Doa Pilar Homes,[33] since the records show that he
lives in Barangay Tikay,[34] at the back of which is Doa Pilar Homes.[35] As Prosecution Witness
Robles testified, she also lived in Barangay Tikay, yet she waited for a jeepney in front of Doa
Pilar Homes. Evidently, it is natural for residents of Barangay Tikay to emerge in Doa Pilar Homes
and wait for a ride from there. Appellant cannot be convicted based on the circumstantial
evidence which, though proven, remains ambiguous.
The prosecution evidence leaves much to be desired. It is too full of holes. The approximate time
of death of Brenda has not been established, other than that she died less than 24 hours before
the autopsy. Such evidence shows that she could have been killed on the night of May 11, 1997
or on the early morning of May 12, 1997. By that time appellant was already in custody and,
hence, could not have been the perpetrator. The records further allude to a tee shirt found at the
crime scene. Yet, the prosecution failed to present it and have it identified. Had the police officers
and the prosecution exerted more effort in identifying its owner, a more direct link between the
crime and the perpetrator could have been established, and reasonable doubts on his identity
could have been eased.
In case of doubt, the scales must be tipped in favor of the accused. Circumstantial evidence as a
basis for criminal conviction should be weighed and accepted with great caution. Jurisprudence
teaches that it is preferable for the guilty to remain unpunished than for the innocent to suffer
unjustly[36] -- in this case, to be sentenced to die by lethal injection.
Without the extrajudicial confession, the circumstantial evidence becomes utterly insufficient to
pass the test of moral certainty.
Although the defense of appellant -- mere denial -- is weak, this fact alone cannot justify his
conviction. The burden is on the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on
him to prove his innocence. Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of
the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the
prosecution.[37] The Court cannot magnify the weakness of the defense and overlook the
prosecutions failure to discharge the onus probandi.[38]
Although the prosecution adequately proved the crime of rape with homicide in this case, it
failed to establish the identity of the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, we cannot
sustain appellants conviction. The assault on the child is unpardonable, but this Court must
uphold the primacy of the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, when
the evidence at hand miserably falls short of the quantum required to support conviction.[39]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in
Criminal Case No. 773-M-97 SET ASIDE. Appellant Crispin Velarde y Bandojo is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. He is ordered released immediately from custody unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause.
The director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to implement this Decision forthwith and
to INFORM this Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof of the date appellant was actually
released from confinement. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132374 August 22, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUCIO ALBERTO y DANAO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Subject of this appeal, which we find meritorious, is the judgment1 dated August 21, 1997, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City, convicting Lucio Alberto of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of October 1993 at about 7:30 oclock in the evening at Barangay
Gandiangan, Municipality of Imelda, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to gain and by means
of violence did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take and rob one Teresa2
Semic of cash money and by reason and on the occasion of said robbery, the above-named
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab said
Teresa Semic thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused her death
immediately thereafter.3
During his arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits then followed.
The prosecution presented as its first witness VIRGILIO ALAP-AP, barangay captain of Barangay
Israel, Imelda, Zamboanga del Sur. He testified that on the morning of October 19, 1993, he was
informed by members of his Bantay Bayan that there was a killing at Barangay Gandiangan. He
was also informed of the suspicious acts of Lucio Alberto, who would take out his bag from a sack
whenever there was no one around but would place it back when people were around. On the
basis of this information, he brought Lucio Alberto and Titing Medel to the house of the barangay
captain of Barangay Gandiangan, where they were investigated. He was informed by Titing
Medel that the slippers which were recovered near the body of Teresa Semic used to belong to
him before he exchanged it for a necklace from Alberto by way of barter. Alap-ap then
accompanied Alberto to the PNP Police station of Imelda where he was turned over to SPO1
Francisco dela Cruz. He alleged that he was present when the police conducted a physical
examination on Alberto. They discovered blood-stained currency bills amounting to a total of
P950, believed to be stolen from the victim.4
JOEL MEDEL @ TITING followed on the witness stand. He testified that on October 18, 1993, he
saw appellant Lucio Alberto outside the store of Teresa "Isang" Semic. Appellant stayed behind,
said the witness, when he went home at around 6:00 P.M. He was at the house of the barangay
captain of Gandiangan when he found out that Aling "Isang" was already dead. He stated that
the slippers found near the body of Aling "Isang" were originally his, but he bartered them to
Alberto for a necklace. He was present when the police recovered several bloodied bills in the
amount of P950 from the shoes of appellant Lucio Alberto.5
SPO1 FRANCISCO DELA CRUZ testified that he was in his house in the evening of October 18,
1993 when he received a report that there was a killing in Barangay Gandiangan. He
immediately went to the place of the incident and saw below the stairway of her kitchen outside
her house the body of Teresa covered in her own blood. He saw a pair of slippers about three
meters away from the body. He brought the slippers to their station. The following day, October
19, 1993, he went back to Barangay Gandiangan, talked with the barangay captain, and arrested
appellant on the request of the barangay captain. Upon reaching the police station, he asked
appellant to open the bag which he brought with him. Inside was a pair of short pants with
bloodstain near the zipper, a bandana, and a medallion necklace. He then asked appellant to
take off his shoes wherein an envelope was found containing P950 in different blood-stained
denominations. Three days later, he also recovered a knife from a certain Payna. Witness Dela
Cruz admitted that he was not sure whether the slippers he recovered really belonged to the
person who killed Teresa.6
On June 26, 1996, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for failure of the prosecution
to submit its formal offer of exhibits. The said order was lifted after the prosecution filed a motion
for reconsideration on July 1, 1996. Thereafter, the prosecution continued to present its evidence.
ATTY. PACIFICO T. CIMAFRANCA, of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), testified that he assisted
appellant at the time he executed his extrajudicial confession7 on January 14, 1994. He identified
said extrajudicial confession8 which was placed into the record of the trial by the court.
The last witness for the prosecution, ERNESTO PAYNA, testified that he was informed of the death
of his aunt, Santiaga Theresa9 at around 7:00 P.M. of October 18, 1993. He saw the body of his
aunt at the balcony near the stairs of her kitchen. He also saw a pair of slippers about one meter
from the body of the victim.10
On March 26, 1997, the defense orally asked for leave to file demurrer to evidence. On April 25,
1997, the demurrer was filed but it was denied on May 13, 1997. On June 25, 1997, the trial court
issued an order declaring that the accused should be deemed to have waived his right to present
evidence for the defense, and that the case be considered submitted for decision.
On August 21, 1997, the trial court promulgated its judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.1wphi1 He is hereby sentence (sic) to the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and to
pay the private offended party as indemnity the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this appeal. In his brief, appellant assigns the following as errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REINSTATING THE CASE AFTER JUNE 26, 1996 AFTER IT HAS
DISMISSED THE CASE FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO SUBMIT
ITS FORMAL OFFER OF EXHIBITS FOR ALMOST A YEAR WHEN REQUIRED TO BY THE TRIAL COURT
OVER THE OPPOSITION/OBJECTION OF THE ACCUSED AS THE SAME HAD PLACED THE ACCUSED
IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.12
Appellant contends that he was placed in double jeopardy when the trial court reconsidered its
order dismissing the case against him. More importantly, he contends that without the
extrajudicial confession placed on record,13 the evidence of the prosecution would not be able to
meet the needed quantum of proof to establish his guilt. He assails said extrajudicial confession
on the ground that it was not duly established that it was he who signed it. He also argues that at
the time said confession was executed, he was not assisted by a competent counsel of his
choice.14
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the appellee, counters that there was no violation of the
right of appellant not to be placed in double jeopardy. The OSG argues that the order of the trial
court dismissing the case was illegal and void for being issued with abuse of discretion. The trial
court did not afford any opportunity to the prosecution to be heard before it decided to dismiss
the case, contrary to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.15 It did not even
consider that even without the said formal offer of exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its
case on the basis of the testimonial evidence alone. Being void, the said order cannot have the
effect of terminating the trial and, hence, cannot serve as basis for the claim of double jeopardy.
On the claim of the defense that the needed quantum of proof to convict appellant has not been
met, the OSG maintains that appellants extrajudicial confession and the other pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution are more than enough to convict appellant.
However, the OSG recommends that the appellant should be convicted of two distinct crimes of
homicide and theft, not robbery with homicide, because from the tenor of the extrajudicial
confession, it was clear that the appellant intended to kill the victim and that the taking of the
P950.00 was a mere afterthought.16
The pertinent issues for resolution in this case are: (1) whether or not appellant was placed in
double jeopardy when the trial court reconsidered its order dismissing the case; (2) whether or
not the extrajudicial confession was admissible against appellant; and (3) whether or not the
guilt of appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The three requisites before double jeopardy can be invoked are: (1) the first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3)
the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first, or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt
to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.17 As to the first jeopardy, it only arises (1) upon a
valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has
been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted, convicted, or the case was dismissed.
In our view, it is clear that no double jeopardy has attached in this case. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the dismissal order made by the trial court was not valid and cannot be
used as basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The said right cannot be grounded on an error of
law. As held in People vs. Navarro: 18
The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to
present its evidence in support of the charge. The Court has always accorded this right to the
prosecution, and where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled the offending court
action. We have heretofore held that a purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives the
State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution its day in court. For
this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal) without due process, and, therefore, null and
void. Such dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is, due process, and,
consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double jeopardy
We agree with the OSGs contention that the trial court exceeded its authority when it dismissed
the case without giving the prosecution a right to be heard, hence there was a violation of due
process. Further, the failure of the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the
case. Even without any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case through
the testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial court reconsidered its order of
dismissal, it merely corrected itself.
On the second and third issues, appellant asks this Court to disregard the extrajudicial confession
which he had allegedly executed before and with the assistance of Atty. Cimafranca, but which
confession he denies. If disregarded, he claims that the prosecutions evidence would not be
sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
A counsel-assisted and voluntary confession is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused
especially when it is corroborated on material points by the prosecution witnesses.19 However, it
is essential that the person making the confession must be assisted by a "competent" counsel.
The meaning and standards of a "competent counsel" were explained in People vs. Deniega20 as
follows:
[T]he lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonably
possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in
the accuseds behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he
is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one
who would be merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individuals
constitutional rights. In People vs. Basay,21 this Court stressed that an accuseds right to be
informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.
Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter
could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latters relative or
person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the
accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the
police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are
generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement
authorities can be symbiotic.
The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning to
end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of
the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
On this score, we are constrained to hold that the standards of "competent counsel" elucidated in
Deniega were not met in this case. In the first place, it is clear that the appellant was not given
the option to choose his own lawyer. On its face, the preliminary statement in the extrajudicial
confession22 executed on January 14, 1994, bears this out:
EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF LUCIO ALBERTO ASSISTED BY ATTY. PACIFICO T. CIMAFRANCA,
THIS JANUARY 14, 1994 AT PAGADIAN CITY, PHILIPPINES.
Preliminary Statement I am informing you that you are under investigation in connection to
(sic) the killing of one Teresa Semic, do you need the assistance of a lawyer.
ANSWER: yes.
Additional preliminary statement Atty. Pacifico T. Cimafranca, is a Lawyer of the Public
Assistance Office, do you need his legal services to assist you.
ANSWER: Yes.
(SGD.) Lucio Alberto
The appellant was not asked whether he wishes and can afford to retain his own lawyer. He was
just told that Atty. Cimafranca was a lawyer and asked whether he needs his services. He was not
made aware that he could choose his own lawyer other than those assigned by the police or the
prosecutor. To all intents and purposes, Atty. Cimafranca can be described as a lawyer engaged
by the police since PAO lawyers are generally assigned to police stations and prosecutors offices
as part of their regular duties. As such, it cannot be denied that the relationship of Atty.
Cimafranca with the police and the prosecutor could be symbiotic. In fact, we take note that the
office of Atty. Cimafranca was even located at the provincial capitol where he was at the beck
and call of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Aside from this, we are not satisfied that Atty. Cimafranca dutifully and faithfully assisted
appellant during the course of the investigation. This is clear from his testimony in court, to wit:
Q: While in the course of taking confession you did not even give advice to Lucio Alberto when
not to answer the question and when to answer the question propounded?
A: I did not give him anymore further advice before taking down the confession into writing
because I have already warned the accused of the consequences of his confession.
Q: You did not advice Lucio Alberto?
A: No, I have warned the accused.
Q: You did not tell the accused which question are incriminating to him?
A: No more.23
It is clear from the above that Atty. Cimafranca was merely satisfied in just warning appellant of
the consequences of his confession. He did not take an active part during the actual taking of
said confession. Further, it was evident that Atty. Cimafranca did not give appellant a complete
picture of what may befall him once he executed the confession:
Q: Did you tell him that the penalty impose (sic) would be death penalty?
A: I cannot remember unless it is included there in the affidavit.24
In our view, the assistance rendered by Atty. Cimafranca during the custodial investigation failed
to meet the exacting tests laid down in People vs. Deniega, supra. Thus, we must conclude that
the so-called extrajudicial confession of appellant is inadmissible as evidence for the prosecution.
Moreover, we find that the prosecution did not even take any effort to establish that the person
who executed the said confession was the appellant. Atty. Cimafranca was not made to identify
appellant in court. Nor were the signatures or initials therein identified as appellants own.
Without said confession, the prosecutions evidence is weak. It is insufficient to sustain the
conviction of appellant.
First, the ownership of the slippers found near the body of the victim was not sufficiently
established. The prosecutions evidence seems to indicate that the owner of the slippers was Joel
Medel and not appellant. Medel testified that he bartered the slippers for a necklace. However,
he was not able to satisfactorily explain why the necklace was still in the possession of appellant
and not with him at the time the former was apprehended. Second, even the money allegedly
found in the possession of appellant was not established by the prosecution as belonging to the
victim. Third, the blood allegedly found on the money and the shorts of appellant was not
examined so that a comparison with the victims blood could be made. Fourth, the prosecution
also failed to establish the time and cause of death of Teresa Semic. All in all, the prosecution
miserably failed to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant.
The fact that appellant was not able to use his turn to present evidence in his defense and rebut
the prosecutions evidence should not be the sole determinant of his guilt. Moreover, whether
the accused decided to present evidence on his behalf or not, the burden of the prosecution to
prove its case remains. Among the fundamental rights of an accused under the Bill of Rights is to
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, the
prosecution must establish his guilt with proof beyond reasonable doubt.25 Even if the accused
should choose to remain silent, if the prosecution failed in discharging its burden, then it is not
only the accuseds right to be freed; it is, even more, the courts constitutional duty to acquit
him.26 Where it was not properly and sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant was the one who killed the victim, as in this case, his conviction could not be lawfully
sustained. His appeal should be considered favorably, and his conviction annulled. Appellant
should be freed forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 18, is
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Appellant LUCIO ALBERTO is ACQUITTED on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His immediate release from
New Bilibid Prison is hereby ordered, unless there is another lawful cause for his continued
detention. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, is directed to report
compliance with this order within five (5) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147201 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA, PATRICIO ESCORPISO y VALDEZ, MARLON BUENVIAJE y PINEDA,
and MIGUEL BUENVIAJE y FLORES, appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us is the decision of 9 November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 finding appellant Benjamin Sayaboc guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death; and
(2) finding appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel Buenviaje and
Patricio Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide.
On 17 April 1995, an information was filed charging Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, Marlon
Buenviaje, and Miguel Buenviaje with murder, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, and who were then armed
with a firearm, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with evident premeditation,
by means of treachery and with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of Joseph Galam y Antonio, by then and there suddenly firing at the said Joseph Galam y
Antonio who has not given any provocation, thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his
heirs.1
At their arraignment, appellants Benjamin Sayaboc, Patricio Escorpiso, and Miguel Buenviaje
pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder. Marlon Buenviaje, who was arrested only on 10 July
1997, also pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment.
The evidence for the prosecution discloses as follows:
At about 9:00 a.m. of 13 August 1994, while prosecution witness Abel Ramos was at a
vulcanizing shop in Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, he heard one Tessie Pawid
screaming from across the road: "Enough, enough, enough!" In front of her were Marlon
Buenviaje and Joseph Galam, who were engaged in a fisticuff. By the time Pawid was able to
subdue the two men by standing between them and embracing Galam, Buenviajes face was
already bloodied and Galams shirt collar torn. As Buenviaje was leaving, he turned to face
Galam and, with his right index finger making a slicing motion across his throat, shouted:
"Putang-ina mo Joseph, may araw ka rin, papatayin kita." Galam retorted, "Gago, traydor, gold
digger, halika." Buenviaje did not respond anymore and left on a tricycle.2
More than three months thereafter, or on 2 December 1994, Galam was shot to death at the
Rooftop Disco and Lodging House (Rooftop, for short) owned by him, which was located at
Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
According to a waitress of the Rooftop Diana Grace Sanchez Jaramillo, earlier or at 3:00 p.m. of
that fateful day, a man whom she later identified as Benjamin Sayaboc rang the doorbell of the
Rooftop and asked whether a woman wearing a green t-shirt had checked in. She answered in
the negative. As she was about to leave, Sayaboc asked another question, "What time does your
bosing arrive?" She replied that she did not know. She then went to the second floor of the
establishment.3
Tessie Pilar, the caretaker of the lodging house, narrated that between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m.
Sayaboc, who was still seated in the swing beside the information counter with his hands tucked
in the pocket of his jacket, ordered a bottle of beer. She then went up to the kitchen, but was
delayed in delivering the beer because she gave some instructions to the dishwasher. When she
gave the beer to Benjamin, the latter was angry and asked why it took her so long to bring the
beer. Thereafter, she went upstairs and chatted with Jaramillo and some other waitresses. Then
the vehicle of Joseph Galam arrived.4
Shortly thereafter, they heard four gunbursts emanating from the ground floor of the building.
When Jaramillo looked down, she saw Sayaboc shooting Galam, causing the latter to fall to the
ground face up, with blood spurting out of his chest. Sayaboc forthwith ran out and disappeared
into the darkness.5
Meanwhile, at about 5:30 p.m. of that fateful day, as Joselito Parungao, Chief Barangay Tanod of
Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, was on his way to the Kowloon Restaurant located
along the national road, he saw Marlon Buenviaje with his father Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso. The three were aboard a tricycle parked in a vacant lot between the Rooftop and
Diego Theater. The younger Buenviaje was on the drivers seat, while the older Buenviaje and
Escorpiso were inside the sidecar. Parungao ordered pancit bihon. While he was waiting outside
of the restaurant, he noticed that the tricycle was still parked in the vacant lot, and the three
occupants thereof were talking with each other. After getting his order and while he was getting
out of the restaurant, Parungao heard four gunshots coming from behind the Rooftop building. He
thereafter saw a person, whom he later came to know as Benjamin Sayaboc, walking briskly
toward the tricycle and then rode behind Marlon Buenviaje. Afterwards, the tricycle sped off
towards the center of the town.6
The employees of the Rooftop lost no time in bringing Galam to a hospital, where he was
declared dead on arrival.7 Dr. Antonio R. Labasan, who conducted an autopsy on his cadaver,
found four gunshot wounds and opined that the first two of which were inflicted from behind and
the last two were frontal.8
That evening, SPO4 Roberto Cagungao, Chief Investigator of the Solano Police Station, assigned
some investigators to go to the scene of the crime to gather evidence. At about 10:00 to 11:00
p.m., he and Lt. Alejandro Parungao brought Pilar and Jaramillo to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Pilar and Jaramillo were interviewed by the
cartographic artist, who thereafter drew a cartographic sketch showing the face of the assailant.9
On 8 March 1995, Pilar and Jaramillo identified Benjamin Sayaboc at the PNP Provincial
Headquarters in Bayombong as the gunman who shot Joseph Galam to death.10
On the afternoon of that day, SPO4 Cagungao was called to the Provincial Command
Headquarters in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, to take the statement of Sayaboc. When he arrived
at the headquarters he saw Sayaboc being interviewed by reporters inside the investigation
room. He then brought Sayaboc to the inner part of the room. Before taking the statement of
Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he wanted
to have a counsel of his own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name one, Cagungao asked the
police officers to get a lawyer. Half an hour later, the police officers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo
of the PAO, who then conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc say,
"okay," he continued the investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire
time. However, Cagungao would stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave
to go to the comfort room.11 That night Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial confession12 in
Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing Joseph Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje
for the sum of P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The
confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one Fiscal Melvin Tiongson.
At the hearing on 22 June 1999, after the prosecution rested its case, 1counsel for accused Mike
Buenviaje, Marlon Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso manifested that he be given fifteen days to
file a motion for leave to admit demurrer to the evidence.13 The trial court acceded. But instead
of filing such motion first, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence on 12 July 1999.14 The motion for
leave to file the pleading was filed the next day only.15
The trial court denied the demurrer to evidence in an order16 issued on 16 August 1999. Further,
it ruled that because of they did not seek nor were granted express leave of court prior to their
filing of the demurrer to evidence, the Buenviajes and Escorpiso were deemed to have submitted
their case for judgment in accordance with Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, only
Sayaboc was allowed to proceed with the presentation of his defense.
Sayaboc denied having committed the crime and proffered the defense of alibi. He also flatly
denied having met Atty. Cornejo or having been informed of his rights. He testified to having
been beaten by six or seven police officers in the investigating room, who then coerced him to
confess to having killed Galam.17 Apart from his testimony, he submitted a handwritten
statement dated 20 March 199518 and an affidavit dated 10 April 199519 to support his claim of
police brutality and retraction of his confession.
In its decision dated 9 November 2000,20 the trial court found Benjamin Sayaboc guilty of the
crime of murder, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and craft and price or reward as
aggravating circumstances. It then sentenced him to the maximum penalty of death. As for
Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso, the court held that the treachery
employed by Sayaboc could not be taken against them and, therefore, declared them guilty of
the crime of homicide only, with the first as principal and the two others as accomplices. Each
was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty and to pay solidarily with Sayaboc the
amounts of P115,000 as actual damages; P25,000 as moral damages; and the costs of the suit in
favor of the heirs of Joseph Galam.
From this decision, the appellants raise the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT SAYABOC GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED SAYABOC IS GUILTY, HE IS GUILTY ONLY OF THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF
ACCUSED SAYABOC WHEN IT WAS TAKEN WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A COMPETENT AND
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL NOR BY AN EFFECTIVE AND VIGILANT COUNSEL.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FATHER AND SON BUENVIAJE AND ACCUSED ESCORPISO
LIKEWISE GUILTY WHEN IT DENIED THEM THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY
THEMSELVES AND COUNSEL AFTER THEY FILED THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY
WITHOUT FIRST SEEKING EXPRESS LEAVE OF COURT.
In the first and second assigned errors, the appellants contend that the crime committed by
Sayaboc was homicide only, there being no proof of treachery because the two eyewitnesses did
not see the commencement of the shooting. Besides, treachery, as well as evident
premeditation, was not specifically designated as a qualifying circumstance in the information.
Neither can the aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward be appreciated because
they were not alleged in the information, albeit proved during trial. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require aggravating and qualifying circumstances
to be alleged in the information, are beneficial to the accused and should, therefore, be applied
retroactively.
As to the third assigned error, the appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc
may not be admitted in evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was his
counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and
effective counsel. He was ineffective because he remained silent during the entire proceedings.
He was not independent, as he was formerly a judge in the National Police Commission, which
was holding court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
Finally, appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and Patricio Escorpiso claim that they
were denied due process because they were not able to present evidence in their defense. They
ask this Court to relax the rule of criminal procedure in favor of enforcing their constitutional
right to be heard by themselves and counsel.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that Sayabocs
extrajudicial confession that he shot the victim in the back is adequate proof of treachery.
Invoking People v. Aquino,21 the OSG contends that for treachery to be considered as a
qualifying circumstance, it needs only to be specifically alleged in the information and does not
have to be preceded by the words qualifying or qualified by. As to the proven circumstances of
craft and price or reward, the same cannot be appreciated because they were not specifically
alleged in the information, as required by the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are
applicable to actions that are pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
The OSG further asserts that Sayabocs extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence against
him, since it was made after he was informed of, and accorded, his constitutional rights,
particularly the right to an independent counsel of his own choice. No evidence was adduced
during the trial to substantiate the claim that Atty. Cornejo used to be connected with the
NAPOLCOM. Moreover, this claim was made for the first time in this appeal, and was based
merely on an information furnished by defense counsel Atty. Virgil Castro (now deceased) to
Sayabocs counsel in this appeal, which makes the said information hearsay twice removed.
As to the fourth assigned error, the OSG counters that no exceptional circumstance exists in this
case that may warrant the relaxation of the rule that the denial of a unilateral demurrer to
evidence carries with it a waiver of the accuseds right to present evidence.
Beginning with the admissibility of Sayabocs extrajudicial confession, we hold that such cannot
be used in evidence in this case.
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary.22 The
condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the
constitutional requirements safeguarding an accuseds rights during custodial investigation have
been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced.
The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would
succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in
custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given
voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for
maltreatment,23 the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial
investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.24
In this case, contrary to SPO4 Cagungaos claim that he conferred with Sayaboc for half an hour
informing him about his constitutional rights, the extrajudicial confession provides only the
following:
PRELIMINARY: I would like to inform you Mr. Sayaboc that questions will be asked to you
regarding an incident last December 2, 1994 at the Rooftop, Brgy. Quezon, Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya, in connection with the shooting of Joseph Galam, owner of the said Disco House as a
result of his death. Before questions will be asked [of] you I would like to inform you about your
ri[g]hts under the new Constitution of the Philippines, as follows: That you have the right to
remain silent or refuse to answer the questions which you think will incriminate you; That you
have the right to seek the services of a counsel of your own choice or if not, this office will
provide you a lawyer if you wish.
QUESTIONS: After informing you all your constitutional rights, are you willing to give your true
statement regarding the death of Joseph Galam?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
QUESTIONS: Do you want to get a lawyer to assist in this investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir. I want to seek the assistance of Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo.
QUESTIONS: Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo is here now, do you want him to assist you in this
investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir. 25
Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains the passing of
information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed under Section 12, Article
III of the Constitution. In People v. Jara,26 the Court explained:
The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or
even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just
the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."27 It should
allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of
these rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment
of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the
police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense.
We likewise rule that Sayaboc was not afforded his constitutional right to a competent counsel.
While we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the
police, still, the facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and prosecution witness SPO4
Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the custodial
investigation. The trial court attributed the silence of Atty. Cornejo to the garrulous nature and
intelligence of Sayaboc, thus:
As already stated, Sayaboc was a garrulous man and intelligent. It was in his character for him to
want to be a central figure in a drama, albeit tragic for others. He would do what he wanted to
do regardless of the advice of others. Hence, Atty. Cornejo could only advise him of his
constitutional rights, which was apparently done. The said counsel could not stop him from
making his confession even if he did try.28
We find this explanation unacceptable. That Sayaboc was a "garrulous" man who would "do what
he wanted to do regardless of the advice of others" is immaterial. The waiver of a right is within
the rights of a suspect. What is lacking is a showing, to the satisfaction of this Court, of a faithful
attempt at each stage of the investigation to make Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his
actions. If anything, it appears that Sayabocs counsel was ineffectual for having been cowed by
his clients enthusiasm to speak, or, worse, was indifferent to it.
The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should satisfy
himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and
consequences of answering the questions propounded. In People v. Deniega,29 we said:
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if
the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of
the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless,
voluntariness is impaired.
This is not to say that a counsel should try to prevent an accused from making a confession.
Indeed, as an officer of the court, it is an attorneys duty to, first and foremost, seek the truth.
However, counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the
questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The
duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that
the right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time.
We understand the difficulty and frustration of police investigators in obtaining evidence to bring
criminals to justice. But even the hardest of criminals have rights that cannot be interfered with.
Those tasked with the enforcement of the law and who accuse those who violate it carry the
burden of ensuring that all evidence obtained by them in the course of the performance of their
duties are untainted with constitutional infirmity. The purpose of the stringent requirements of
the law is to protect all persons, especially the innocent and the weak, against possible
indiscriminate use of the powers of the government. Any deviation cannot be tolerated, and any
fruit of such deviation shall be excluded from evidence.
For these reasons, the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc cannot be used in evidence against
him. We hold, however, that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving his guilt for the
crime of homicide.
From the records of the case, there can be no doubt that Sayaboc shot and killed Galam in the
early evening of 2 December 1994. He was seen waiting at the Rooftop from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m. of
that day, shooting Galam shortly after the latters arrival, and fleeing from the scene of the crime
to a waiting tricycle. Credible witnesses described Sayabocs appearance to the police soon after
the shooting incident and prepared affidavits about the incident. They identified Sayaboc at the
police station while he was in custody, during the preliminary investigation, and, again, in open
court. Such positive identification constitutes more than sufficient direct evidence to uphold the
finding that Sayaboc was Galams killer. It cannot just be rebutted by Sayabocs bare denial and
weak alibi.
Appellants claim that the information against them is insufficient for failure to specifically state
that treachery and evident premeditation were qualifying circumstances holds no water. In
People v. Aquino,30 we held that even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such as
qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense. Nevertheless, from our review of the
case, we find that neither evident premeditation nor treachery has been sufficiently proved to
qualify the crime to murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Thus, two conditions must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present
and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as
to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be supposed. 31
In this case, the trial court concluded that the fact that the witnesses did not hear any shout or
conversation between the assailant and the victim immediately before the attack could only
mean that Sayaboc had approached his victim through stealth.32 While not improbable, that
conclusion is merely an inference. The fact remains that none of the witnesses testified as to how
the aggression began. The witnesses testified having heard four shots, the last two of which were
seen as having been fired while Sayaboc was facing Galam. The autopsy conducted by Dr.
Labasan reveals two frontal wounds at the thigh and the shoulder, and two wounds on the right
side of Galams back. Although it is plausible that the initial shots were fired from behind, such
inference is insufficient to establish treachery.33
Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance. Evident
premeditation exists when it is shown that the execution of a criminal act is preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent. The requisites of
evident premeditation are (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an
act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of
time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances
of his act.34
Without the extrajudicial confession narrating when Sayaboc was hired to kill Galam, the
testimony that the former inquired about the latter while waiting in the Rooftop from 3:00 p.m. to
6:00 p.m. of that fateful day does not prove the time when Sayaboc decided to kill Galam.
Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what
time had elapsed before that plan was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be
considered.35
The aggravating circumstances of craft and price or reward, even if proved, can neither be
considered because they were not specifically alleged in the information. Section 8, Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the information specify the
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for it to be considered in the
imposition of penalty. This requirement is beneficial to an accused and may, therefore, be given
retroactive effect.36
Thus, appellant Benjamin Sayaboc can be found guilty of the crime of homicide only, which is
punishable by reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
appreciated for or against him, the penalty to be imposed upon him should be in the medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be meted a penalty whose
minimum is within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum is within the range of
reclusion temporal in its medium period.
We cannot subscribe to the contention of appellants Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje, and
Patricio Escorpiso that the case should be remanded to the trial court because they were denied
the right to be heard by the trial court. It must be remembered that their demurrer to evidence
filed on 12 July 1999 was without prior leave of court. The motion for leave to file the said
pleading was filed only the next day. The filing of the demurrer was clearly without leave of court.
The trial court, therefore, correctly applied the rule on demurrer to evidence found in Section 15,
Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure when it disallowed the abovementioned
appellants to present evidence on their behalf.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to
present evidence for the accused.37 The rationale for this rule is that when the accused moves
for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so
in the belief that said evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to
present any evidence is negated. An accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of
judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience.
The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as
a demurrer to the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right to
present its evidence.38
The trial court, therefore, correctly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure on demurrer to evidence when it disallowed the abovementioned appellants to present
evidence on their behalf. They cannot now claim that they were denied their right to be heard by
themselves and counsel.
On the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, we find the existence of conspiracy between
Marlon Buenviaje and Sayaboc.
It has been held that price or reward is evidence of conspiracy.39 But the same was not
established by competent proof in this case. The extrajudicial confession40 and the newspaper
reports41 adduced by the prosecution, which both contained Sayabocs statement pointing to
Marlon Buenviaje as the one who paid him P100,000 to kill Galam, are inadmissible in evidence.
The first, as earlier stated, was executed in violation of Sayabocs constitutional rights. The
second are hearsay, since the authors of such reports were not presented as witnesses to affirm
the veracity thereof.42
Conspiracy need not, however, be established by direct proof; it may be shown by circumstantial
evidence.43 As correctly found by the trial court and concurred with by the OSG, the
concatenation of circumstantial evidence shows that Marlon Buenviaje conspired with Sayaboc,
thus:
1. On 13 August 1994, Marlon Buenviaje had a fistfight with Joseph Galam, causing him injuries
on his face and prompting him to make a threat to kill the latter;44
2. More than three months later, Galam was killed by Sayaboc, who had no discernible motive to
do so;45
3. Shortly after shooting Galam, Sayaboc joined Marlon Buenviaje and the other appellants in the
tricycle, which was waiting in a vacant lot near the crime scene;46
4. The tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje sped away and disappeared;47
5. Marlon Buenviaje became a fugitive from justice for a long time, or until 10 July 1997; and
6. During the pendency of the case, the relatives of Marlon Buenviaje offered prosecution
eyewitness Diana Grace Jaramillo a job abroad, allowances, and two motorcycles in consideration
of her retraction of her testimony against Sayaboc.48
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when (1) there is more than one
circumstances established; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. All these requisites are present in the case at bar. Being a conspirator
equally guilty as Sayaboc, Marlon Buenviaje must be meted the same penalty as that of
Sayaboc.
However, as to Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso, there is paucity of evidence linking them
to the killing. They might have been with Marlon Buenviaje in that tricycle, but there is nothing to
show that they knew of the conspiracy to kill Galam. Absent any active participation in
furtherance of the common design or purpose to kill Galam, their mere presence near the crime
scene or in the tricycle driven by Marlon Buenviaje does not necessarily make them conspirators.
Even knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without the cooperation and the
agreement to cooperate is not enough to establish conspiracy.49
Now on the civil liability of Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje. The trial courts award of actual
damages, representing the wake and burial expenses, is reduced to P106,436, this being the
amount supported by receipts. The award of moral damages is, however, increased to P50,000
conformably with current jurisprudence.50 In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to
P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Ecija, Branch 27, in
Criminal Case No. 2912 is MODIFIED. Appellants Benjamin Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and are each sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay jointly and severally the heirs
of Joseph Galam the amounts of P106,436 as actual damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity;
P50,000 as moral damages; and the cost of the suit. Appellants Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso are hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133685-86 May 20, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
AMADO BAGNATE, appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment rendered by the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 15) of Tabaco, Albay, finding appellant Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. T-2874 and of Rape with Homicide in Criminal Case No. T-
2875, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Death in each case.
The Information against appellant in Criminal Case No. T-2874 reads as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1997 at 1:00 oclock in the morning, more or less, at
Barangay Buhian, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and while armed with a
bolo, with nocturnity, treachery, superior strength, and with disregard of the respect due to the
victim on account of age and sex, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and hack with said bolo one AURIA BROA,1 a 70-year old blind woman, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds, which caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her legal
heirs.
ACTS CONTARY TO LAW.2
The Information in Criminal Case No. T-2875 reads:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1997 at 1:00 oclock in the morning, more or less, at
Barangay Buhian, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and by means of violence,
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with ROSALIE RAYALA, against her will and consent, and on the occasion thereof, with
intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and while armed with a bolo, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and hack aforenamed Rosalie Rayala,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts of her body, which caused
her death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.3
When arraigned on December 1, 1997, Bagnate pleaded "not guilty" to both charges against
him,4 and joint trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
In the afternoon of August 7, 1997, appellant was turned over to SPO2 Junwel Ambion for
custodial investigation. Without asking the name of appellant, SPO2 Ambion informed him in the
Bicol dialect of his right to remain silent, to be assisted by counsel, that whatever he says may
be used against or in his favor, and that he cannot be tortured or molested. Asked if he is willing
to cooperate, the accused assented and gave his name as Amado Magnate. SPO2 Ambion later
learned that appellants real name is Amado Bagnate. When appellant told SPO2 Ambion that he
is willing to confess, SPO2 Ambion again informed appellant of his rights, and asked him further if
he wants to be assisted by counsel but appellant said that his counsel was in Manila. SPO2
Ambion offered the services of Atty. Paterno Brotamonte, which appellant accepted. SPO2
Ambion then left to fetch Atty. Brotamonte whose office was located several meters away from
the police station. However, Atty. Brotamonte told SPO2 Ambion that he will just follow as he was
having his office blessing at that time. After some time, Atty. Brotamonte arrived at the police
station. Before proceeding with the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte asked the policemen to leave
the investigation room and conferred with appellant. He introduced himself to appellant and
informed him of his rights. He also asked and examined appellant to see if he was physically
harmed by the policemen and found none although Atty. Brotamonte noticed that appellants left
hand was handcuffed to the table. Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte that he is willing to give a
statement. The investigation was then conducted in the Bicol dialect, with SPO2 Ambion asking
the questions. It was translated thereafter into English with the help of Atty. Brotamonte, for the
purpose of putting it into writing. After typing the first page of the confession, Atty. Brotamonte
translated and explained the contents thereof to appellant, then Atty. Brotamonte and appellant
signed thereon. While all this was going on, SPO1 Rogelio Gonzales was taking pictures.5 The
first page of the confession reads:
PRELIMINARY : Mr. Amado Bagnate, you are in this office being investigated for your involvement
in the crimes imputed against you particularly the killing of Aurea Bronia and Rosalie Rayala and
at the same time having carnal knowledge of the two in Buhian, Tabaco, Albay. But before we
proceed in this investigation, may I inform you that under our New Constitution, you have the
right to remain silent, and that anything you may say may be used in your favor or against you in
any court proceedings in the entire Philippines; that you have the right to be assisted by a
counsel of your own choice or if you cannot afford to have one, the state represented by our
office will provide you a competent counsel; that you are free from torture or any form of
physical violence which will tend vitiate your statements. Do you clearly understand your
constitutional rights which were related to you in Bicol dialect?
ANSWER : Yes sir, I clearly understand my Constitutional Rights because it was related to me in
Bicol dialect.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you want to avail of your Constitutional rights?
ANSWER : I want to be assisted by a competent counsel.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you have a counsel of your own choice?
ANSWER : I have none sir.
INVESTIGATOR : Since you do not have your own counsel, our office will provide you one, is this
acceptable to you?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : If our office will provide you the services of Atty. Paterno Brotamonte, who is a
competent lawyer is this acceptable to you?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : May I again remind you that anything you say in this investigation may be used
in favor or against you in any court proceedings in the entire Philippines. Do you still wish to give
your free and voluntary statements?
ANSWER : Yes sir.
INVESTIGATOR : Do you understand the questions that were asked from you?
ANSWER : Yes sir, because they were related to me in Bicol dialect.
INVESTIGATOR : Are you willing to sign your given statements?
ANSWER : Yes sir.6
SPO2 Ambion then proceeded with the second and third pages of the confession, following the
same procedure of propounding the questions in the Bicol dialect and translating it thereafter
into English for each page.7 Atty. Brotamonte again read and explained the contents thereof to
appellant8 after which they again separately signed on pages two and three thereof. The second
and third pages are quoted in verbatim, to wit:
03. Q- Please state your name and other personal circumstances?
A- AMADO BAGNATE Y BRONIA, 28 years old, single, duck caretaker presently working in
Balatong Pulilan, Bulacan and a native of Buhian, Tabaco, Albay.
04. Q- When and where did the incident happened?
A- At on or about 12:30 A.M. August 7, 1997 at Buhian, Tabaco, Albay.
05. Q- Will you please narrate in detail, your knowledge of the said incident?
A- At on or about 6:00 P.M. August 6, 1997 I together with Faustino Bufi9 and Carlito Begil drink a
bottle of gin at the store of Yolanda Buban at Buhian, Tabaco, Albay and while we were drinking
said Carlito Begil told us that he will have sex with a woman on that night, however he did not
elaborate who the woman is and at about 8:00 P.M. of same date we already consumed the
bottle of gin and we decided to go home.
06. Q- Please continue
A- So I proceeded to the house of my brother-in-law Roberto Angeles to spend the night at the
said house however at on or about 12:30 A.M. August 7, 1997 I go out of the house and
proceeded to my grandparents house which is about five arms length from the house of Roberto
Angeles leaving the bolo on the ground and entered my grandparents Aurea Bronias house and
go directly on the room where Rosalie Rayala is sleeping and once inside the room I embraced
the sleeping Rosalie Rayala and started on kissing her however Rosalie Rayala spank and boxed
me but still I continued on kissing her but still he spank me, so I go out of the room and sits on
the door but Rosalie Rayala followed me so I kissed her again but she spank me again so I got
hold of the bolo and hack Rosalie Rayala hitting her on her neck which caused her to fall on the
ground and I pulled Rosalie Rayala and have carnal knowledge of her while she is still alive, while
Carlito Begil and Roberto Angeles were standing and viewing what I am doing and after satisfying
my lust said Carlito Begil goes on to of Rosalie Rayala and started on pumping her and after
satisfying his lust, my grandparent Aurea Bronia shouted although she was blind and thinks that
my grandparent Aurea Bronia heard what I am doing I hacked her on her neck and when she fall I
pulled her away from the house towards the grassy portion of the yard wherein Carlito Begil and
Roberto Angeles followed me wherein I was unable to determine who from the two had carnal
knowledge of my grandparent because I already left them and I proceeded to the main road to
Tabaco, Albay.
07. Q- Please continue further.
A- Before I finally proceeded to the main road I passed by the house of Jose which I had forgotten
his family name and Armando Bosque both Barangay Tanods of our place and told the two that is
being wanted by my godfather Julian Baloloy that there was something that happened in the
house of my grandparents house, and the two goes with me and because I was already then
frightened I just go with them and hurriedly left the place and proceeded to Roberto Angeles
house and called my sister and I was allowed to enter and I prepared a cup of coffee and after
drinking same I hurriedly left the house and finally proceeded to the highway and boarded a jeep
bound for the town proper and spend the rest of the night at the town plaza and at about 6:00
A.M. August 7, 1997 I proceeded to the church to hear mass and after that I went to my sisters
house at Tayhi, Tabaco, Albay and I eat my breakfast and after eating I left my sisters house
named Avelina Calla and it came to my mind that I will evade arrest and decided to proceed to
Metro Manila then to my place of work in Pulilan, Bulacan.
08. Q- How were you able to reach the Tabaco Police Station?
A- I was apprehended by residents of Bankilingan, Tabaco, Albay for accordingly an alarm to
apprehend me was set by elements of the Tabaco Police wherein one of them was able to trace
me but luckily I was able to evade them but finally I was apprehended at Bankilingan, Tabaco,
Albay and later on was brought to the Tabaco Police.
09. Q- How are you related with the victims namely Rosalie Rayala and Aurea Bronia?
A- This Rosalie Rayala she is my nephew and Aurea Bronia she is my grandparent.
10. Q- This investigator, had no more question to ask from you, do you have anything more to
add in this statement of yours?
A- Now no more sir, but I will just relate other details if the need arises.
11. Q- Are you willing to sign this statement of yours?
A- Yes sir.10
After appellants confession was typed and signed, Atty. Brotamonte left the police station and
went back to his office. As far as he could recall, the entire process took more than an hour.11
The next day, August 8, 1997, appellant was brought before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay. Judge Base requested the presence of Atty. Brotamonte
and subsequently examined the voluntariness and veracity of the confession as well as the
authenticity of the signatures of appellant and Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained to appellant
the consequences of his confession to the crimes charged and asked him if he was coerced into
admitting them. Judge Base inspected appellants body and asked him if he was forced or
coerced. Judge Base then asked appellant if he was still willing to sign it again and appellant
answered in the affirmative saying that his conscience bothered him. Judge Base asked him to
sign the confession again in the presence of Atty. Brotamonte, after which appellant affixed his
signature.12
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the extra-judicial confession of appellant
showed how the crimes were committed by him.
Appellant repudiated his extra-judicial confession before the trial court and assailed its
admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation of his constitutional rights, particularly his
right to a competent and independent counsel of his own choice; and that he was not fully
apprised of the consequences of his confession. He testified that the real perpetrators of the
crime were his brother-in-law, Roberto Angeles, and a certain Carlito Begil, and that he was only
forced into owning up to the crimes because Angeles threatened to harm him or his sister,
Angeless wife, if he did not do so.
Appellant recounted on the witness stand that in the afternoon of August 6, 1997, he was having
a drink with Carlito Begil and Faustino Bufe at the store of Yolanda Bulan in Buhian, Tabaco,
Albay. While they were drinking, Begil mentioned that he is planning to have sex with someone
he did not identify. They finished drinking at around 8:00 in the evening and started walking
home. While he and Begil were walking, Begil asked him to accompany him to Rosalie Rayalas
house but he declined because he was already hungry and he wanted to eat first. He then went
to the house of Roberto Angeles who is married to his sister Maria Nellie Bagnate. While he was
on the porch having a smoke, Angeles arrived very drunk. Begil arrived later. Begil and Angeles
drank "kalampunay". He took only one glass of the drink and went inside the house to get a
cigarette. When he went back to the porch, Angeles and Begil were already gone. At around
12:30 in the morning, he went inside and slept. The shout of his ninong, Julian Baloloy, telling
him to fetch a barangay tanod, awakened him. He fetched Jose Rodriquez and Armando Bosque
and they went to the house of Rosalie, located thirty meters away. He was told to build a fire
while the rest searched for "something." After idling in the yard for some time, he went back to
Angeless house to have coffee. Angeles and Begil then arrived and Angeles told him to flee or he
(Angeles) will kill his (appellants) sister. Angeles gave him P10.00. He took a jeep to Tabaco and
reached the Tabaco plaza at 2:00 in the morning. He proceeded to his sisters house, Avelina
Bagnate, in Tayhi, Tabaco, Albay, and passed the time there. Then he went to the Tabaco town
proper. He was finally arrested in Bangkilingan, Tabaco and brought to the police headquarters at
5:00 in the morning of August 7, 1997.13
The trial court found appellants extra-judicial confession admissible in evidence on which basis,
it convicted appellant of the crimes charged against him. The dispositive portion of its decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. Finding accused Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as
charged in Criminal Case No. T-2874 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to
indemnify the heirs of Auria Broa the amount of P50,000.00 as damages; and,
2. Finding accused Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide as charged in Criminal Case No. T-2875 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of Rosalie Rayala in the amount of P50,000.00 as damages.
SO ORDERED.14
In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIMES OF MURDER AND RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.15
The main issue in this case is the admissibility of appellants confession. Appellant claims that
Atty. Brotamonte was not a competent and independent counsel as he failed to advise him of the
penalty to be imposed on the crimes he was accused of committing; hence, he was not aware of
the consequences of his admissions.
To be admissible in evidence, an extra-judicial confession must be express and voluntarily
executed in writing with the assistance of an independent and competent counsel, and a person
under custodial investigation must be continuously assisted by counsel from the very start
thereof. The presence of counsel is intended to secure the voluntariness of the extra-judicial
confession, and the assistance given must be independent and competent, that is, providing full
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused.16
The rule is premised on the presumption that the accused is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere
running through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical or psychological is forcefully apparent.17 It is not intended as a deterrent to the accused
from confessing guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from
being coerced to admit any that is untrue.18 To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not
challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not
intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it
was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to
admit something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.19
In the present case, the assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more than perfunctory.
Before the onset of the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte privately conferred with appellant to
ascertain the voluntariness of his confession and to make sure that no force or duress was
employed by the police authorities on the latter to make him admit the crimes charged. He
informed appellant of his constitutional rights and was clear in explaining to him the questions
propounded by SPO2 Ambion. The testimony of Atty. Brotamonte during cross-examination
leaves no room for doubt that he adequately assisted appellant during the investigation, viz:
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
Q: Now, upon your arrival, were you offered a seat?
A: No, because immediately when I arrived I asked the accused to stand and examined the body
of the accused, if there were injury or what and I asked the accused, if these policemen inflicted
injury to him, if he was harmed and according to accused, none.
Q: And in doing that particularly, what did you do to examine the body of the accused of it bare
some signs of injury?
A: Because as a lawyer I have to protect the right of the accused. If the accused has body injury
definitely I will be requiring the policemen to submit the accused for medical examination before
the investigation will be conducted.
Q: In doing that, how did you do it to the accused?
A: I let the accused to stand and I asked him if any of the policemen harmed inflicted bodily
injury to him and he told me no one of the policemen.
Q: Any of the policemen present?
A: No, when I arrived, I request two (2) policemen to step-out because I have to talk to the
accused when I propound question and examine the body of the accused and the accused was
inside the room.
...
Q: And you were satisfied by the answer of the accused and you did not even bother to search
the body of the accused?
A: In my observation, the accused was telling the truth. Otherwise, he will inform this
representation because I already informed him that I am a lawyer and I will protect him if
somebody harmed him.
...
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
As narrated in that affidavit, I explained to the accused that before I introduced myself, I told him
that the policemen informs this representation that you are going to give your sworn statement
before the police and I told him that I am a lawyer and I will assist him until the policemen
finished the investigation and I told him to tell the truth to the policemen and told him that if you
want to give your sworn statement to the police, you can do it because that is your right under
the constitution, to remain silent.
Q: That is why for example, right to be informed; you have the right to remain silent, and
whatever you said will be used against in you, did you not explain these one by one?
ATTY. BROTAMONTE:
I explained that one by one. In fact I told the accused that the sworn statement you are going to
make now might be used against you by the police but the accused is willing to give his sworn
statement.
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
Q: I see. Now, you said that you helped in the translation of the sworn statement in the Bicol
dialect. Meaning that the questions were propounded in English and you helped the police
investigator to translate it in Bicol dialect?
A: No, when I state that I helped the police in the translation of the answer, what the policemen
were asking the witness in Bicol and they translated in English and I even helped the policemen
in the translation of the question and the answer of the witness in Bicol dialect.20
Clearly, appellant signed the confession with the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel, Atty. Brotamonte, and it was also sworn to by him before Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, who, before administering the oath to appellant, conferred
with him and informed him of his rights and the consequences of his confession. Judge Base
testified, thus:
Q: Judge, please explain to the Honorable Court the circumstances how this sworn statement,
how the affiant was able to come into your house and the sworn statement was sworn to?
ATTY. MAROLLANO:
The witness is not sure whether he was in his house or office.
A: The police investigator came to my office and informed me that they were investigating a rape
and murder case that happened somewhere in the mountain of Tabaco, Albay and informed me
that the suspect has been apprehended and that the suspect is willing to sign an affidavit of
confession so I advised the police investigator to comply strictly with respect to investigation
custodial legis and I informed him that that case should be assisted by a lawyer and the
investigator told me that he contacted Atty. Brotamonte to assist the suspect in the investigation
and I said Its better. So, after that the suspect was brought to me together with Atty. Brotamonte
because I requested Atty. Brotamonte to be present also and the suspect. I investigated the
suspect and he admitted to me that what he stated in this affidavit which is actually a confession
that he killed the two women and actually raped one of them is correct and true. So, after
explaining to him the consequence of his having confession to the crime being charged against
him and he was still willing to sign the confession I let him sign the confession in my presence
and in the presence of Atty. Brotamonte and after which I subscribed the affidavit.
PROSECUTOR BERANGO: (To witness)
Q: Now, Judge could you tell the Honorable Court while the accused was in your presence if there
was any pressure or compulsion upon the accused to sign this document?
A: When the police investigator came to me I instructed him not to use any force and when the
suspect was presented to me, actually I inspected his body if there was any sign of abrasion and
I actually asked the suspect if he was forced or coerced into signing the crime charged and he
said, no. And I asked him if this confession is voluntary and he said, yes. And he said he is being
bothered by his conscience.21
The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant of the imposable penalty of the crimes he
was to admit is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellants extrajudicial confession. Section
12 (1) to (3), Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 1722 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Thus, what the Constitution regards as inadmissible in evidence is confession given by an
accused without having been informed of his right to remain silent, or, without having been given
competent and independent
counsel, preferably his own choice, or if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not
provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in writing and not in the presence of
counsel; or, that he was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by violence or any other
means that vitiated his free will. There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a counsel to
inform an accused of the possible penalty for the crime he committed. Neither would a
presumption arise that the counsel is incompetent or not independent just because he failed to
apprise the accused that the imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit is death.
After all, the imposable penalty is totally immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his
guilt in the commission of a crime.
To be considered competent and independent for the purpose of assisting an accused during a
custodial investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to be:
".willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one
who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individuals
constitutional rights. In People v. Basay (219 SCRA 404, 418) this Court stressed that an
accuseds right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."23
As previously stated, Atty. Brotamonte ably assisted appellant during the entire procedure from
the time appellant signified his intention to give his extrajudicial confession up to the time he
signed the same. Besides, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant was not aware of the
consequences of his admissions as Judge Base explained it to appellant when he appeared
before the latter to swear to the veracity of his confession.
The Court notes that while Judge Base testified that he asked appellant to sign anew the
extrajudicial confession in his presence, the copy thereof marked as Exhibits "A", "B", and "C"
attached to the records of the case do not show any subsequent signature made by appellant.
Nevertheless, appellant did not refute Judge Bases testimony, and it does not detract the fact
that appellant executed the extrajudicial confession voluntarily with the assistance of an
independent and competent counsel, and that he subsequently acknowledged having executed
the same voluntarily and swore to its veracity before Judge Base.
Appellant failed to substantiate his bare claim that when he was brought to the Tabaco police
station, the police officers boxed and kicked him, telling him to confess to the crimes.24 As the
records show, like Atty. Brotamonte, Judge Base also asked him if he was forced to confess but
Bagnate said that he was not. If it were true that he was forced to confess to the crime, then
appellant should have complained of such abuse to Atty. Brotamonte or Judge Base as he had the
opportunity to do so when the two conferred with him on separate occasions.
Where the appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their
persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they
did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where they
did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these
should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions.25
To consider appellants allegation of maltreatment as true is to facilitate the retraction of
solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever.26
The taking of appellants confession has conformed to the safeguards of the Constitution. It
constitutes evidence of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no person of normal
mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and
conscience.27
Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial confession made by an accused,
shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
The Rule specifically requires that there should be some other evidence "tending to show the
commission of the crime apart from the confession."28 Appellants confession is corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti, that is, the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, that a crime
has actually been committed.29
The evidence of corpus delicti in both cases consists of the victims deaths, as evidenced by the
death certificates of Aurea Broa30 and Rosalie Rayala,31 and the findings of the autopsies
conducted on the victims cadavers by Tabaco Rural Health Officer Dr. Amelia Guiriba showing
that both were hacked to death and Rosalie was raped.
The autopsy on victim Aurea disclosed the following:
Hacked wound back of the neck about four (4) inches in length affecting skin, subcutaneous
tissue, muscle and the cervical bone.
Hacked wound, neck anteriorly affecting larynx about 2 inches in length.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage severe secondary to hacked wound, neck.32
While the autopsy conducted on Rosalie revealed the following:
Stabbed wound neck, posteriorly about 1 inches in length, 2 inches depth reaching the
cervical bone.
Hacked wound left shoulder about 1 inches length superficial slanting direction.
Hacked wound - right neck about 4 inches length affecting skin subcutaneous muscle & Blood
vessels, right earlobe cut.
Hacked wound below the chin about 3 inches length affecting skin and subcutaneous tissue.
Hacked wound, left neck about 5 inches in length affecting skin subcutaneous tissue, muscle,
Blood vessels and the cervical bone.
Hacked wound, left middle ear auricle about 1 inch in length, left occipital region about 1 inch in
length.
Multiple linear abrasion both scapular region.
Contusion floor of the vaginal wall.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage severe secondary to multiple hacked wound, neck.33
The foregoing findings coincide with appellants extrajudicial confession. As he stated therein, he
hacked both victims on the neck with a bolo and he dragged Aurea towards the grassy portion of
the yard. Appellant also admitted that he raped Rosalie. The autopsy report shows that Rayala
had contusions on the floor of her vaginal wall, thus confirming that Rosalie had been raped. The
autopsy report likewise confirmed that the victims suffered hack wounds on their necks. The
recovery of the bolo after appellant had left the place likewise jibes with appellants declaration
in his confession that he hacked both victims with a bolo.34 These are details that appellant
could not have known if he did not commit the crimes.
It must also be noted that appellant was arrested only five hours from the occurrence of the
crimes. It is not possible that within such short span of time, appellant would be able to know the
details of the crimes as he described them when he gave his confession if it were true that he
really did not commit them. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language
such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast
doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the
accused reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary.35
Lending additional credence to the truthfulness of appellants extrajudicial confession is the
defense evidence itself, establishing that: Around 12:00 midnight of August 7, 1997, defense
witness Julian Baloloy heard cries for help coming from the house of Aurea. Together with his son,
Rodel, who brought a flashlight, they went to the house and called out to Aurea and Rosalie but
there was no response. When they went inside the house, they saw blood and strands of hair on
the floor but there was no sign of the two. They shouted for help and Roberto Angeles, whose
house is located in front of the victims house about thirty meters away, arrived. Appellant
arrived next, saying that he just came from work and was not able to clean his hands. When
Rodel Baloloy shone his flashlight on appellant, they saw that his hands were sticky and covered
in red. Julian Baloloy then ordered appellant to fetch a barangay tanod. When Armando Bosque
and Jose Rodriguez arrived, they started to look for Aurea and Rosalie while appellant was told to
build a fire. At the back of the house, they saw impressions on the yard indicating that an object
had been dragged, after which, they found the dead bodies of Aurea and Rosalie fifty meters
away.36
Defense witnesses also testified that appellant did not join the search and therefore, the latter
could not have known or seen the injuries suffered by the victims when they were found. It has
been noted that appellant, in his confession, had accurately specified the injuries he inflicted on
both victims. Julian Baloloys testimony that they saw marks on the yard indicating that
something has been dragged corroborated appellants statement that he dragged Aurea.
Moreover, that Julian Baloloy saw appellants hand sticky and covered in red, which Baloloy
described "as if you have just slaughtered a pig and you (sic) hands smudge with blood and
when you washed your hands, it could still (sic) red," bolsters the conclusion that appellant
indeed had participated in the gruesome crimes.37
Thus, the confession of appellant being admissible in evidence and corroborated by evidence of
corpus delicti, the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of Murder and Rape with Homicide.
In imposing the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. T-2874, the trial court considered
the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, treachery, superior strength, and disregard of the
respect due to the victim on account of age and sex, as alleged in the Information, thus
qualifying the killing of Aurea to murder.
However, the Court finds that the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance
of treachery. The evidence on record does not sufficiently prove that it attended the commission
of the crime as no one actually saw the incident. The fact that Aurea was blind does not
necessarily qualify her killing as treacherous. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.38 Appellants confession merely stated: "after
satisfying his lust, my grandparent Aurea Bronia shouted although she was blind and thinks (sic)
that my grandparent Aurea Bronia heard what I am doing I hacked her on her neck and when she
fall (sic) I pulled her away from the house towards the grassy portion of the yard . . .". There is
nothing in appellants confession that demonstrates that he deliberately employed a particular
means, method or form of attack in the execution of the crime.
Neither could nocturnity be considered as an aggravating circumstance considering that it was
not shown that the darkness of the night was purposely sought by appellant to facilitate the
commission of the crime nor to ensure its execution.39
It is not disputed that the crime was committed in Aureas house. However, dwelling may not be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the consideration of his criminal liability as it is
not alleged in the Information.40
Nonetheless, it is alleged in the Information and established by the prosecution that the crime
was committed with abuse of superior strength. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 7659,41 any person who shall kill another shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by death if committed with abuse of superior strength. Hence, the
trial court correctly imposed the death penalty in Criminal Case No. T-2874.42
As regards the damages awarded to the heirs of Aurea Broa in the amount of P50,000.00, the
Court considers the same as representing civil indemnity. In murder cases, civil indemnity
requires no further proof other than death.43
The award of civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of moral damages, which is
based on a different jural foundation and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound
discretion.44 Considering that the prosecution failed to show any proof that the heirs of Aurea
Broa are entitled to moral damages, the same may not be awarded.45
In accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded in
criminal cases as part of the civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.46 Considering the generic aggravating circumstances of disregard of
age of the victim and dwelling, the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is in order.47
In Criminal Case No. T-2875, the trial court likewise correctly imposed the death penalty. Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7659 imposes the
penalty of death when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed.
The Court, however, has to modify the award of civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of Rosalie
Rayala. Recent rulings increased the amount of civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide to
P100,000.00.48 The heirs of Rosalie must be awarded the amount of P75,000.00 as moral
damages without need of proof,49 in view of the rape suffered by victim Rosalie. The fact that
the heirs suffered the trauma of mental or physical and psychological sufferings which constitute
the basis for moral damages under the Civil Code are too obvious to still require recital thereof at
trial.50
Considering that the crime of rape was committed inside the dwelling of the victim, exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should likewise be awarded to the heirs of Rosalie.
The Court finds that the heirs of both Aurea and Rosalie should be awarded the amount of
P54,259.00 as actual damages in view of the admission made by the defense that the family of
Aurea and Rosalie incurred expenses in said amount.51
Before concluding, the Court observed, as borne by the records of this case, that appellant could
not have been the only perpetrator of the crimes. As appellant revealed in his confession, he
hacked each of the victims on the neck with his bolo only once. The autopsy report, however,
shows that Aurea Broa suffered two neck wounds while Rosalie Rayala suffered five hack
wounds and one stab wound, all on the neck. Appellant confessed that he dragged Aurea
towards the grassy portion of the yard and immediately
left the scene. Yet, Rosalie was also found on the grassy portion of the yard. The autopsy report
further showed that Rosalie likewise suffered multiple linear abrasions on both scapular regions,
thus giving the impression that she was also dragged towards the yard. Somebody else must
have brought Rosalie to the place where she was found. Indeed, there are clear indications that
there are other perpetrators of the crimes of murder and rape with homicide. Appellant alone
could not have inflicted all the injuries sustained by the victims.
In view of all these circumstances, the police authorities as well as the prosecutors office of
Tabaco, Albay, should be required to apprise the Court whether or not further investigation of this
case was conducted for the identification and arrest of the other perpetrators of the crimes to
completely bring justice to their victims.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 15) of Tabaco, Albay, in Criminal
Case No. T-2874 finding appellant Amado Bagnate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as to damages. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Aurea Broa the amounts
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages; and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
The decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. T-2875, finding Amado Bagnate guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and imposing on him the penalty of death
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
victim Rosalie Rayala civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00); moral damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00); and
Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of both Aurea Broa and Rosalie Rayala the amount of Fifty-
Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-Nine Pesos (P54,259.00) as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
The Chief of the Tabaco Police Station and the Tabaco Prosecutors Office are hereby ORDERED,
with ten (10) days from receipt of copy of herein resolution, to apprise the Court whether or not
subsequent investigations were conducted to determine the other perpetrator(s) of the crimes
involved herein.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City,
sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino to death and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the
rape-slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario, Cavite on July 10, 1999.
The Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo with the crime of Rape with Homicide
alleged:
"That on or about the 10th day of July 1999, in Barangay Ligtong I, Municipality of Rosario,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Trial Court, the above-
named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with DAISY DIOLOLA Y DITALO, a
nine-year old child against the latter's will and while raping the said victim, said accused
strangled her to death."
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Accused-appellant was arraigned on July 26, 1999 and, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged, whereupon trial ensued.
Ten (10) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola, the victim's mother;
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, medico-legal officer of the NBI; Atty. Lupo Leyva; Mayor Renato Abutan of
Rosario, Cavite; Atty. Sikat Agbunag of the Public Attorney's Office; Pet Byron Buan, NBI Forensic
Biologist; Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, NBI Forensic Chemist; SPO1 Arnel Cuevas of the Rosario, Cavite
police station; and Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, both neighbors of the victim.
The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July
10, 1999, she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbor's house in Pilapil,
Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy
with her lessons. Aimee's house, where accused-appellant was also staying, is about four to five
meters away from Daisy's house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the house of her tutor. She
was wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later, Daisy came back with
accused-appellant. They were looking for a book which accused-appellant could copy to make a
drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and
accused-appellant went back to the latter's house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 o'clock
after an afternoon nap, she noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her
daughter and proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisy's tutor. Aimee's mother told Ma. Nida that
Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee
was not feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in her brother's
and sister's houses, but she was not there, either. At about 7:00 o'clock that evening, Ma. Nida
went back to her neighbor's house, and there saw accused-appellant, who told her that Daisy
had gone to her classmate's house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was
told that Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy
playing at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that Daisy
was playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television in her house, but
that Daisy later left with accused-appellant.
Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy the whole evening of June 10, 1999, a
Saturday, until the early morning of the following day, June 11, 1999, a Sunday, but their search
proved fruitless. Then, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed
that the dead body of her daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after
the "compuerta" by a certain Freddie Quinto. The body was already in the barangay hall when
Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied
around her neck. Barangay Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring Purihin reported the incident to
the Rosario police. The other barangay officers fetched accused-appellant from his house and
took him to the barangay hall. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed to accused-appellant
Gerrico Vallejo as the probable suspect since he was with the victim when she was last seen
alive.3
Another witness, Jessiemin Mataverde, testified that at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
that day, she saw Daisy playing with other children outside her house. She asked Daisy and her
playmates to stop playing as their noise was keeping Jessiemin's one-year old baby awake. Daisy
relented and watched television instead from the door of Jessiemin's house. About five minutes
later, accused-appellant came to the house and told Daisy something, as a result of which she
went with him and the two proceeded towards the "compuerta."
Jessiemin testified that at around 5:00 o'clock that afternoon, while she and her daughter were in
front of a store across the street from her house, accused-appellant arrived to buy a stick of
Marlboro cigarette. Accused-appellant had only his basketball shorts on and was just holding his
shirt. They noticed both his shorts and his shirt were wet. After lighting his cigarette, accused-
appellant left.4
Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified. She said that at about 4:30 o'clock in
the afternoon of July 10, 1999, while she and her husband and children were walking towards the
"compuerta" near the seashore of Ligtong, Rosario, Cavite, they met a fisherman named
Herminio who said that it was a good day for catching milkfish (bangus). For this reason,
according to this witness, they decided to get some fishing implements. She said they met
accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo near the seashore and noticed that he was uneasy and looked
troubled. Charito said that accused-appellant did not even greet them, which was unusual. She
also testified that accused-appellant's shorts and shirt (sando) were wet, but his face and hair
were not.5
SPO1 Arnel Cuevas testified that upon receipt of the report, Rosario Police Chief Ricardo B. de la
Cruz, Jr. responded to the call together with his men, PO2 Garcia, SPO1 Araracap and PO2 Lariza.
When they arrived, Daisy's body was already in the barangay hall. SPO1 Cuevas took
photographs of the body. At that time, Daisy was wearing pink short pants and a dirty white
panty with a dirty white sleeveless shirt wrapped around her neck. The body was afterwards
taken to the Samson Funeral Parlor in Rosario, Cavite. The inquiries conducted by the police
showed that one Freddie Quinto was fishing near the compuerta when he accidentally hit the
body of Daisy, which was in the mud and tied to the root of an aroma tree.
Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for questioning. Two others, a certain Raymond
and Esting, were also taken into custody because they were seen with accused-appellant in front
of the store in the late afternoon of July 10 1999. Later, however, the two were released. Based
on the statements of Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, the policemen went to the
house of accused-appellant at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 11, 1999 and recovered
the white basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and No. 13 printed at the back, and the
violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on it, worn by accused-appellant the day
before. The shirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were turned over to the NBI for laboratory
examination.6
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the
evening of July 11, 1999, he conducted a physical examination of accused-appellant. His
findings7 showed the following:
"PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
"Abrasions: thigh, right, antero-lateral aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 0.1 cm., knee, left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm.
legs, right anterior aspect, 28.0 x 8.0 cms., left anterior aspect, 24.0 x 10.0 cms., feet, plantar
aspects; right, 9.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 5.0 cms.
"Hematoma, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 1.0 x 0.5 cm.
"Lacerations, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 0.3 cm.
"(Living Case No. BMP-9902, p. 101, records)"
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Dr. Vertido went to the Samson Funeral Parlor in Rosario,
Cavite for an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim Daisy Diolola. The autopsy revealed the
following postmortem findings:8
"Body in early stage of postmortem decomposition characterized by foul odor, eyes and tongue
protruding, bloating of the face and blister formation.
"Washerwoman's hands and feet.
"Contusion, (pinkish) face, right, 14.0 x 10.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 6.0 cms. Contused abrasions,
forehead, 13.0 x 5.0 cms. upper lip, 5.0 x 22.0 cms., lower lip, 3.0 x 2.0 cms., neck (nailmarks)
anterior aspect, 8.0 x 5.0 cms., arms, right antero-medial aspect, middle 3rd 3.0 x 15.0 cms.
posterior aspect, upper 3rd, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left posterior aspect, 20.0 x 9.0 cms., forearm, left,
posterior aspect, 21.0 x 8.0 cms. left thumb, anterior aspect, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left middle, ring and
little fingers, dorsal aspect, .50 x 4.0 cms. knees, right, 3.0 x 2.0 cms. and left, 8.0- x 5.0 cms.,
legs, right anterior aspect, upper and middle 3rd 3.0 x 2.5 cms. foot right, dorsal aspect.
"Hematoma, periorbital right, 5.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 4.5 x 3.0 cms.
"Fracture, tracheal rings.
"Hemorrhages, interstitial, neck, underneath, nailmarks. "Petechial hemorrhages,
subendocardial, subpleural.
"Brain and other visceral organs are congested.
"Stomach, contains rice and other food particles.
"CAUSE OF DEATH: -Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation.
"GENITAL EXAMINATION: - Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, gaping and
congested. Hymen, moderately tall, thick with fresh lacerations, complete at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00
o'clock positions, edges with blood clots." [Autopsy Report No. BTNO-99-152]
Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite, testified that he was informed of the rape
and murder at past 10:00 o'clock in the evening of June 11, 1999. The mayor said he
immediately proceeded to the municipal jail, where accused-appellant was detained, and talked
to the latter. Accused-appellant at first denied having anything to do with the killing and rape of
the child. The mayor said he told accused-appellant that he could not help him if he did not tell
the truth. At that point, accused-appellant started crying and told the mayor that he killed the
victim by strangling her. Accused-appellant claimed that he was under the influence of drugs.
The mayor asked accused-appellant if he wanted to have the services of Atty. Lupo Leyva, a
resident of Rosario, as his lawyer. When accused-appellant said he did, Mayor Abutan fetched
Atty. Leyva from his house and took him to the police station about 11:00 o'clock that evening.9
Atty. Lupo Leyva corroborated Mayor Abutan's testimony. He said that upon arriving at the police
station, he asked accused-appellant if he wanted his services as counsel in the investigation.
After accused-appellant assented, Atty. Leyva testified that he "sort of discouraged" the former
from making statements as anything he said could be used against him. But, as accused-
appellant was willing to be investigated, Atty. Leyva said he advised him to tell the truth. PO2
Garcia, the investigator, informed accused-appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to be assisted by counsel and warned him that any answer he gave could and might be used
against him in a court of law. PO2 Garcia asked questions from accused-appellant, who gave his
answers in the presence of Atty. Leyva. After the statement was taken, Atty. Leyva and accused-
appellant read it and afterwards signed it. Atty. Leyva testified that he did not see or notice any
indication that accused-appellant had been maltreated by the police. In his sworn statement
(Exh. M), accused-appellant confessed to killing the victim by strangling her to death, but denied
having molested her.10
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999, he took blood
samples from accused-appellant in his office for laboratory examination to determine his blood
type. Likewise, the basketball shorts and shirt worn by accused-appellant on the day the victim
was missing and the victim's clothing were turned over to the Forensic Chemistry Division of the
NBI by PO1 Amoranto of the Rosario, Cavite police for the purpose of determining the presence
of human blood and its groups.11
The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed accused-appellant to
belong to Group "O". The following specimens: (1) one (1) white no. 13 athletic basketball shirt,
with patches "Grizzlies" in front and "SAMARTINO" at the back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9 athletic
basketball short pants; (3) one (1) white small "Hello Kitty" T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4)
one (1) "cut" pink short pants with reddish brown stains; (5) one (1) "cut" dirty white small panty
with reddish brown stains, were all positive for the presence of human blood showing the
reactions of Group "A".12
Pet Byron Buan also testified that before he took the blood samples, he had a conversation with
accused-appellant during which the latter admitted that he had raped and later killed the victim
by strangulation and stated that he was willing to accept the punishment that would be meted
out on him because of the grievous offense he had committed. Mr. Buan observed that accused-
appellant was remorseful and was crying when he made the confession in the presence of SPO1
Amoranto at the NBI laboratory.13
When accused-appellant was brought before Inquest Prosecutor Elpidia J. Itoc at around noon of
July 13, 1999 in Cavite City, accused-appellant had with him a handwritten confession which he
had executed inside his cell at the Municipal Jail of Rosario. In his confession, accused-appellant
admitted not only that he killed the victim but that he had before that raped her. Accused-
appellant said he laid down the victim on a grassy area near the dike. He claimed that she did
not resist when he removed her undergarments but that when he tried to insert his penis into the
victim's vagina, she struggled and resisted. Accused-appellant said he panicked and killed the
child. He then dumped her body in the shallow river near the "compuerta" and went home.14
Atty. Sikat Agbunag, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office, testified that at noon of July 13,
1999, while she was in their office in Cavite City, Prosecutor Itoc came together with accused-
appellant and some policemen. Prosecutor Itoc asked Atty. Agbunag to assist accused-appellant
about his confession. Atty. Agbunag read the document, informed accused-appellant of his
constitutional rights, and warned him that the document could be used against him and that he
could be convicted of the case against him, but, according to her, accused-appellant said that he
had freely and voluntarily executed the document because he was bothered by his conscience.
Accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Agbunag, then affixed his signature to the document and
swore to it before Prosecutor Itoc.15
At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron
Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-appellant, as well as buccal swabs and
hair samples from the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The
samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination.
Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests on the specimens
collected by Dr. Vertido. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido
during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of accused-appellant and the victim.16
The defense then presented as witnesses accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo and his sister Aimee
Vallejo. Their testimonies show that at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999,
accused-appellant, Aimee, and their sister Abigail were in their house in Barangay Talisay,
Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite when Daisy Diolola came to ask accused-appellant to draw her school
project. After making the request, Daisy left.17 Accused-appellant did not immediately make the
drawing because he was watching television. Accused-appellant said that he finished the drawing
at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and gave it to the victim's aunt, Glory. He then returned
home to watch television again. He claimed he did not go out of the house until 7:00 o'clock in
the evening when he saw Ma. Nida, who was looking for her daughter. Accused-appellant said he
told her that he had not seen Daisy. After that, accused-appellant said he went to the "pilapil"
and talked with some friends, and, at about 8:00 o'clock that evening, he went home.
At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 11, 1999, barangay officials fetched accused-appellant from
his house and took him to the barangay hall, where he was asked about the disappearance of
Daisy. He claimed that he did not know anything about it. Accused-appellant was allowed to go
home, but, at 11:00 o'clock that morning, policemen came and invited him to the police
headquarters for questioning. His mother went with him to the police station. There, accused-
appellant was asked whether he had something to do with the rape and killing of Daisy. He
denied knowledge of the crime.
At 4:00 o'clock that afternoon, accused-appellant accompanied the police to his house to get the
basketball shorts and shirt he was wearing the day before, which were placed together with
other dirty clothes at the back of their house. According to accused-appellant, the police forced
him to admit that he had raped and killed Daisy and that he admitted having committed the
crime to stop them from beating him up. Accused-appellant claimed the police even burned his
penis with a lighted cigarette and pricked it with a needle.
Accused-appellant confirmed that Mayor Renato Abutan and Atty. Lupo Leyva went to see him in
the investigation room of the police station and told him that they would help him if he told the
truth. Atty. Leyva asked him whether he wanted him to be his counsel, and accused-appellant
said he answered in the affirmative. He said Atty. Leyva informed him of his constitutional rights.
Accused-appellant claimed that, although he admitted to Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva the
commission of the crime, this was because the police had maltreated him. Accused-appellant
said he did not tell the mayor or Atty. Leyva that he had been tortured because the policemen
were around and he was afraid of them. It appears that the family of accused-appellant
transferred their residence to Laguna on July 12, 1999 because of fear of reprisal by residents of
their barangay.18 According to accused-appellant, Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva were not
present when he gave his confession to the police and signed the same. Accused-appellant
claims that although Exhibit "N" was in his own handwriting, he merely copied the contents
thereof from a pattern given to him by the police.19
On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the
offense charged. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused Gerrico
Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide, as
charged in the Information, accordingly hereby sentences him to the supreme penalty of DEATH.
The accused is directed to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
"SO ORDERED."20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY AND WEAKNESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
THE PROSECUTION.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE ALLEGED ORAL
CONFESSIONS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE ITS BEING HEARSAY IN NATURE.
"III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE
WRITTEN EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE SAME WAS OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE AND INTIMIDATION AND THAT THE LAWYER WHO
ASSISTED HIM DURING HIS CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DID NOT AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY GIVE
HIM EFFECTIVE LEGAL ASSISTANCE."
We find accused-appellant's contentions to be without merit.
First. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused committed the crime.21 In rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is
more often than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of the crime, where only the
victim and the rapist would have been present at the time of its commission, makes the
prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify against the
perpetrator. Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand direct evidence
proving the modality of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is unreasonable.22
Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient
to sustain a conviction if:
"(a) there is more than one circumstance;
"(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
"(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt."23
In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence establish beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of accused-appellant:
1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejo's house, where accused-appellant was residing, at 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, for tutoring.
2. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant and Daisy went together to the
latter's house to get a book from which the former could copy Daisy's school project. After
getting the book, they proceeded to accused-appellant's residence.
3. From accused-appellant's house, Daisy then went to the house of Jessiemin Mataverde where
she watched television. Accused-appellant thereafter arrived and whispered something to Daisy,
and the latter went with him towards the "compuerta."
4. At about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado and Charito Yepes saw accused-
appellant coming out of the "compuerta," with his clothes, basketball shorts, and t-shirt wet,
although his face and hair were not. According to these witnesses, he looked pale, uneasy, and
troubled (balisa). He kept looking around and did not even greet them as was his custom to do
so.
5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used as a bomber (a boat for catching fish with
dynamite) was docked by the seashore.
6. A little before 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jessiemin Mataverde also saw accused-appellant
buying a Marlboro cigarette from a store. Jessiemen also noticed that accused-appellant's clothes
were wet but not his face nor his hair.
7. By 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for her daughter, she was told by
accused-appellant that Daisy had gone to her classmate Rosario's house. The information proved
to be false.
8. Daisy's body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the river near the "compuerta."
9. During the initial investigation, accused-appellant had scratches on his feet similar to those
caused by the thorns of an aroma tree.
10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were bloodstained. The bloodstains
on accused-appellant's clothes and on Daisy's clothes were found positive of human blood type
"A."
11. Accused-appellant has blood type "O."
12. The vaginal swabs from Daisy's body contained her DNA profile as well as that of accused-
appellant.
Accused-appellant contends that the bloodstains found on his garments were not proven to have
been that of the victim as the victim's blood type was not determined.
The contention has no merit. The examination conducted by Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan of
both accused-appellant's and the victim's clothing yielded bloodstains of the same blood type
"A".24 Even if there was no direct determination as to what blood type the victim had, it can
reasonably be inferred that the victim was blood type "A" since she sustained contused abrasions
all over her body which would necessarily produce the bloodstains on her clothing.25 That it was
the victim's blood which predominantly registered in the examination was explained by Mr. Buan,
thus:26
"ATTY. ESPIRITU
Q: But you will agree with me that more probably than not, if a crime is being committed,
and it results in a bloody death, it is very possible that the blood of the victim and the blood of
the assailant might mix in that particular item like the t-shirt, shorts or pants?
A: It is possible when there is a huge amount of blood coming from the victim and the
suspect, Sir. It is possible. It will mix. Whichever is the dominant blood in it, it will be the one
which will register. For example, if there is more blood coming from the victim, that blood will be
the one to register, on occasions when the two blood mix.
Q: But in these specimens number 1 to 5, it is very clear now that only type A and no type O
blood was found?
A: Yes, sir."
Accused-appellant also questions the validity of the method by which his bloodstained clothes
were recovered. According to accused-appellant, the policemen questioned him as to the clothes
he wore the day before. Thereafter, they took him to his house and accused-appellant
accompanied them to the back of the house where dirty clothes were kept.27 There is no
showing, however, that accused-appellant was coerced or forced into producing the garments.
Indeed, that the accused-appellant voluntarily brought out the clothes sought by the police
becomes more convincing when considered together with his confessions. A consented
warrantless search is an exception to the proscription in Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution.
As we have held, the consent of the owner of the house to the search effectively removes any
badge of illegality.28
The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Viloria-Magsipoc is also questioned by
accused-appellant. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that all the samples submitted
for DNA testing were not contaminated, considering that these specimens were already soaked
in smirchy waters before they were submitted to the laboratory.
DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her genetic code.
Except for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique.29
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim's
body for the suspect's DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched
with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.30
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence
sample and the reference sample.31 The samples collected are subjected to various chemical
processes to establish their profile.32 The test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar
DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then
be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion).33 In
such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the
statistical significance of the Similarity.34
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of accused-
appellant, the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken from
her tested negative for the presence of human DNA,35 because, as Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc
explained:
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: I noticed that specimens 1 to 5 consisting of bloodstains taken from the clothing of the
victim and of the accused gave negative results for the presence of human DNA. Why is it so?
What is the reason for this when there are still bloodstains on the clothing?
A: After this Honorable Court issued an Order for DNA analysis, serological methods were
already conducted on the said specimens. And upon inquiry from Mr. Buan and as far as he also
knew of this case, and we also interviewed the mother who came over to the laboratory one time
on how was the state of the specimens when they were found out. We found that these
specimens were soaked in smirchy water before they were submitted to the laboratory. The state
of the specimens prior to the DNA analysis could have hampered the preservation of any DNA
that could have been there before. So when serological methods were done on these specimens,
Mr. Byron could have taken such portion or stains that were only amenable for serological
method and were not enough for DNA analysis already. So negative results were found on the
clothings that were submitted which were specimens no. 1 to 5 in my report, Sir.
Q: I also noticed that specimen no. 6-B consisting of the smears taken from the victim also
proved negative for human DNA, why is it so?
A: Because when we received the vaginal smears submitted by Dr. Vertido, the smear on
the slide was very, very dry and could have chipped off. I already informed Dr. Vertido about it
and he confirmed the state of the specimen. And I told him that maybe it would be the swab that
could help us in this case, Sir. And so upon examination, the smears geared negative results and
the swabs gave positive results, Sir.
Q: How about specimen no. 7, the hair and nails taken from the victim, why did they show
negative results for DNA?
A: The hair samples were cut hair. This means that the hair did not contain any root. So any
hair that is above the skin or the epidermis of one's skin would give negative results as the hair
shaft is negative for DNA. And then the nails did not contain any subcutaneous cells that would
be amenable for DNA analysis also, Sir.
Q: So it's the inadequacy of the specimens that were the reason for this negative result, not
the inadequacy of the examination or the instruments used?
A: Yes, Sir."
Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility
that the samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their
examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of
human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant:36
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: So based on your findings, can we say conclusively that the DNA profile of the accused in
this case was found in the vaginal swabs taken from the victim?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: That is very definite and conclusive?
A: Yes, Sir."
In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that
accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or
circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also
inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass
direct evidence in its effect upon the court.37 This is how it is in this case.
Second. Accused-appellant challenges the validity of the oral and written confessions presented
as evidence against him. He alleges that the oral confessions were inadmissible in evidence for
being hearsay, while the extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation.
The claim is untenable. Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him."
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision:
(1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence,
threat, and intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled
statements, given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1
of the same section.38
Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor Abutan of Rosario, Cavite and
to NBI Forensic Biologist should be deemed inadmissible for being violative of his constitutional
rights as these were made by one already under custodial investigation to persons in authority
without the presence of counsel. With respect to the oral confessions, Atty. Leyva testified:39
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: Upon meeting this Gerrico Vallejo at the police station were you able to confer with him?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did you ask him whether he really wants you to represent or assist him as a lawyer
during that investigation?
A: I did, as a matter of fact, I asked him whether he would like me to represent him in that
investigation, Sir.
Q: And what was his answer?
A: He said "yes".
Q: After agreeing to retain you as his counsel, what else did you talk about?
A: I told him that in the investigation, whatever he will state may be used against him, so
it's a sort of discouraging him from making any statement to the police, Sir."
Upon cross-examination, Atty. Leyva testified as follows:40
Q: You stated that you personally read this recital of the constitutional rights of the
accused?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: But it will appear in this recital of constitutional rights that you did not inform the
accused that the statement that he will be giving might be used against him in a court of justice?
A: I did that, Sir.
Q: But it does not appear in this statement?
PROSECUTOR LU
The best evidence will be the statement, your Honor.
ATTY ESPIRITU
The only thing that is stated here is that "Maaaring gamitin pabor o laban sa iyo."
COURT
Let the witness answer.
A: I told him that, as a matter of fact, and I also told him to tell the truth and nothing but the
truth."
The testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated by the testimony of Mayor Renato
Abutan,41 it is also confirmed by accused-appellant who testified as follows:42
"ATTY. ESPIRITU:
Q: Did Atty. Leyva explain to you the meaning and significance of that document which you
are supposed to have executed and signed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What did Atty. Leyva tell you?
A: That they are allowing me to exercise my constitutional right to reveal or narrate all what
I know about this case, Sir.
Q: Did Atty. Leyva tell you that if you do not want, nobody can force you to give that
statement?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And did he tell you that what you would be giving is an extra-judicial confession?
A: Yes, Sir."
Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the consequences of
the statements he was to make as well as the written confessions he was to execute. Neither can
he question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel during the
investigation. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being
propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from
saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed,
counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.43
Indeed, accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked whether he wanted the services of
Atty. Leyva before the latter acted as his defense counsel.44 And counsel who is provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where the latter never raised any objection
against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation but, on the contrary,
thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.45 Contrary to
the assertions of accused-appellant, Atty. Leyva was not the municipal attorney of Rosario, Cavite
but only a legal adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan.46
Accused-appellant contends that the rulings in People vs. Andan47 and People vs. Mantung48 do
not apply to this case. We disagree. The facts of these cases and that of the case at bar are
similar. In all these cases, the accused made extrajudicial confessions to the municipal mayor
freely and voluntarily. In all of them, the extrajudicial confessions were held admissible in
evidence, being the spontaneous, free, and voluntary admissions of the guilt of the accused. We
note further that the testimony of Mayor Abutan was never objected to by the defense.
Indeed, the mayor's questions to accused-appellant were not in the nature of an interrogation,
but rather an act of benevolence by a leader seeking to help one of his constituents. Thus, Mayor
Abutan testified:49
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: And during the conversation you had with Accused Gerrico Vallejo, what exactly did he
tell you?
A: At first he said that he did not do that. That was the first thing he told me. Then I told him
that I will not be able to help him if he will not tell me the truth.
Q: And what was the reply of the accused?
A: He had been silent for a minute. Then we talked about the incident, Sir.
Q: And what exactly did he tell you about the incident?
A: I asked him, "Were you under the influence of drugs at that time"?
Q: What else did he tell you?
A: I told him, "What reason pushed you to do that thing?" x x x
Q: Please tell us in tagalog, the exact words that the accused used in telling you what
happened.
A: He told me that he saw the child as if she was headless at that time. That is why he
strangled the child, Sir. ("Ang sabi niya po sa 'kin, nakita niya raw 'yung bata na parang walang
ulo na naglalakad. Kaya po sinakal niya.")
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: When you told the accused that you will help him, what kind of help were you thinking at
that time?
A: I told him that if he will tell the truth, I could help give him legal counsel.
Q: And what was the answer of the accused?
A: Yes, he will tell me the truth, Your Honor."
In People vs. Mantung,50 this Court said:
"Never was it raised during the trial that Mantung's admission during the press conference was
coerced or made under duress. As the records show, accused-appellant voluntarily made the
statements in response to Mayor Marquez' question as to whether he killed the pawnshop
employees. Mantung answered in the affirmative and even proceeded to explain that he killed
the victims because they made him eat pork. These circumstances hardly indicate that Mantung
felt compelled to own up to the crime. Besides, he could have chosen to remain silent or to do
deny altogether any participation in the robbery and killings but he did not; thus accused-
appellant sealed his own fate. As held in People v. Montiero, a confession constitutes evidence of
high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience."
And in People vs. Andan, it was explained:
"Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply
to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights
under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth."51
For the same reason, the oral confession made by accused-appellant to NBI Forensic Biologist Pet
Byron Buan is admissible. Accused-appellant would have this Court exclude this confession on
the ground that it was uncounselled and that Mr. Buan, who initiated the conversation with
accused-appellant, was part of the NBI. The issue concerning the sufficiency of the assistance
given by Atty. Leyva has already been discussed. On the other hand, the questions put by Mr.
Buan to accused-appellant were asked out of mere personal curiosity and clearly not as part of
his tasks. As Buan testified:52
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: What was the subject of your conversation with him?
A: It is customary when we examine the accused. During the examination, we talk to them
for me to add knowledge on the case, Sir.
Q: What did you talk about during your conversation?
A: I asked him if he was the one who did the killing on this victim, Daisy Diolola, Sir.
Q: And what was the reply of the accused?
A: He said yes, Sir.
Q: What else did you ask the accused?
A: I remember that while asking him, he was crying as if feeling remorse on the killing, Sir.
....
Q: And it was you who initiated the conversation?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Do you usually do that?
A: Yes, Sir. We usually do that.
Q: Is that part of your procedure?
A: It is not SOP. But for me alone, I want to know more about the case, Sir. And any
information either on the victim or from the suspect will help me personally. It's not an SOP, Sir."
The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and voluntarily given to an ordinary individual
and is, therefore, admissible as evidence.
Third. The admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellant is also attacked on
the ground that these were extracted from him by means of torture, beatings, and threats to his
life. The bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions from
the accused are not sufficient. The standing rule is that "where the defendants did not present
evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain to
the officer who administered their oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared
to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined
by a reputable physician to buttress their claim," all these will be considered as indicating
voluntariness.53 Indeed, extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary, and, in the
absence of conclusive evidence showing that the declarant's consent in executing the same has
been vitiated, the confession will be sustained.54
Accused-appellant's claim that he was tortured and subjected to beatings by policemen in order
to extract the said confession from him is unsupported by any proof:55
"ATTY. ESPIRITU:
Q: Did they further interrogate you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What else did they ask you?
A: They were asking me the project, Sir.
Q: What else?
A: That is the only thing, Sir.
Q: Who was doing the questioning?
A: The investigator, Sir.
Q: How many were they inside that room?
A: Five, Sir.
Q: They are all policemen?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Until what time did they keep you inside that room?
A: Up to 11:00 in the evening, Sir.
Q: Between 10:30 in the morning up to 11:00 o'clock in the evening, what did you do there?
A: They were interrogating and forcing me to admit something, Sir.
Q: In what way did they force you to admit something?
A: They were mauling me, Sir.
Q: The 5 of them?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: The 5 of them remained inside that room with you throughout the questioning?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: In what way did they hurt you?
A: They burned my private part with a lighted cigarette butt and pierced me with a needle,
Sir.
Q: Who did these things to you?
A: Mercado, Sir.
Q: Who is this Mercado?
A: EPZA policemen, Sir.
Q: Did the other policemen help in doing these things to you?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Were you asked to undress or you were forced to do that?
A: They forced me to remove my clothes, Sir.
Q: In what way did they force you to remove your clothes?
A: They were asking me to take off the pants which I was wearing at the time, Sir.
Q: Did they do anything to you to force you to remove your pants?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What?
A: They boxed me, Sir.
Q: What else, if any?
A: They hit me with a piece of wood, Sir.
Q: What did you feel when your private part was burned with a cigarette butt?
A: It was painful, Sir.
Q: In what part of your body were you pricked by a needle?
A: At my private part, Sir."
These bare assertions cannot be given weight. Accused-appellant testified that he was made to
stay in the municipal hall from 10:00 o'clock in the morning until 11:00 o'clock that night of July
10, 1999, during which time he was boxed, tortured, and hit with a piece of wood by policemen
to make him admit to the crime. However, accused-appellant was physically examined by Dr.
Antonio Vertido at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day. While the results show that
accused-appellant did sustain injuries, the same are incompatible with his claim of torture. As Dr.
Vertido testified:56
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q: What were your findings when you conducted the physical examination of the suspect?
A: I found abrasions, your Honor, abrasions on the thigh, knees, legs and feet of the
suspect, and I also found hematoma on the left ring finger, posterior aspect and at the same
time, a laceration on the left ring finger.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: In your findings, it appears that the accused in this case suffered certain physical injuries
on his person like this abrasion on the thigh, right anterior lateral aspect lower third of the knee,
what could have caused this injury?
A: Abrasions are usually caused when the skin comes in contact with a rough surface, Sir.
Hematoma are usually caused by a blunt instrument or object and laceration is the forcible
contact of the skin from that blunt object.
Q: I am particularly interested in your findings hematoma on the left ring finger, posterior
aspect and laceration left ring finger posterior aspect, what could have caused those injuries on
the accused?
A: My opinion to these hematoma and laceration found on the said left ring finger was that
it was caused by a bite, Sir."
If the account of accused-appellant that he was beaten up is true, Dr. Antonio Vertido would have
found more than mere abrasions and hematoma on his left finger. Dr. Vertido's findings are more
consistent with the theory that accused-appellant sustained physical injuries as a result of the
struggle made by the victim during the commission of the rape in the "compuerta."
At all events, even if accused-appellant was truthful and his assailed confessions are
inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already shown, is sufficient to establish his guilt
beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution witnesses presented a mosaic of circumstances
showing accused-appellant's guilt. Their testimonies rule out the possibility that the crime was
the handiwork of some other evil mind. These witnesses have not been shown to have been
motivated by ill will against accused-appellant.
On the other hand, no other witness not related to accused-appellant was ever called to
corroborate his claim. The defense presented only accused-appellant's sister, Aimee Vallejo, to
corroborate his story. We have held time and again that alibi cannot prosper if it is established
mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons.57 It is well settled that alibi
is the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. For this reason,
this Court looks with caution upon the defense of alibi, especially when, as in this case, it is
corroborated only by relatives or friends of the accused.58
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that "When by reason or on the occasion of the
rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death."59 Therefore, no other penalty can be
imposed on accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to the supreme penalty
of DEATH and directing him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, is hereby AFFIRMED.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon
the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of
the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130612 May 11, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, @ "JUNIOR OTOT," accused-appellant.

MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City
(Branch 57), finding accused-appellant guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to death,
and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P480,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The facts hark back to the afternoon of October 17, 1996, at around 4 o'clock, when the body of
six-year old Jennifer Domantay was found sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in Guilig, Malasiqui,
Pangasinan. The child's body bore several stab wounds. Jennifer had been missing since lunch
time.
The medical examination conducted the following day by Dr. Ma. Fe Leticia Macaranas, the rural
health physician of Malasiqui, showed that Jennifer died of multiple organ failure and
hypovolemic shock secondary to 38 stab wounds at the back. Dr. Macaranas found no lacerations
or signs of inflammation of the outer and inner labia and the vaginal walls of the victim's
genitalia, although the vaginal canal easily admitted the little finger with minimal resistance.
Noting possible commission of acts of lasciviousness, Dr. Macaranas recommended an autopsy
by a medico-legal expert of the NBI. 2
The investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino Domantay, a
cousin of the victim's grandfather, as the lone suspect in the gruesome crime. At around 6:30 in
the evening of that day, police officers Montemayor, de la Cruz, and de Guzman of the Malasiqui
Philippine National Police (PNP) picked up accused-appellant at the Malasiqui public market and
took him to the police station where accused-appellant, upon questioning by SPO1 Antonio
Espinoza, confessed to killing Jennifer Domantay. He likewise disclosed that at around 3:30 that
afternoon, he had given the fatal weapon used, a bayonet, to Elsa and Jorge Casingal, his aunt
and uncle respectively, in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan. The next day, October 18,
1996, SPO1 Espinoza and another policeman took accused-appellant to Bayambang and
recovered the bayonet from a tricycle belonging to the Casingal spouses. The police officers
executed a receipt to evidence the confiscation of the weapon. 3
On the basis of the post-mortem findings of Dr. Macaranas, SPO4 Juan Carpizo, the Philippine
National Police chief investigator at Malasiqui, filed, on October 21, 1996, a criminal complaint
for murder against accused-appellant before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malasiqui. On
October 25, 1996, Dr. Ronald Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the NBI, performed an autopsy on
the embalmed body of Jennifer. The result of his examination of the victim's genitalia indicated
that the child's hymen had been completely lacerated on the right side. Based on this finding,
SPO4 Carpizo amended the criminal complaint against accused-appellant to rape with homicide.
Subsequently, the following information was filed: 4
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1996, in the afternoon, in barangay Guilig, Municipality
of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and armed with a bayonnete, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Jennifer Domantay, a
minor of 6 years old against her will and consent, and on the same occasion, the said accused
with intent to kill, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab with the use of a
bayonnete, the said Jennifer Domantay, inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds, which resulted
to her death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
At the trial, the prosecution presented seven witnesses, namely, Edward, Jiezl, Lorenzo, all
surnamed Domantay, Joselito Mejia, Antonio Espinoza, Celso Manuel, and Dr. Ronald Bandonill, to
establish its charge that accused-appellant had raped and killed Jennifer Domantay.
Edward Domantay testified that in the morning of October 17, 1996, accused-appellant and his
two brothers-in-law, Jaime Caballero and Daudencio Macasaeb, had a round of drinks in front of
the latter's house in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Edward Domantay said that he was in front of
Macasaeb's house, tending to some pigeons in his yard. 5 After the group had consumed several
bottles of San Miguel gin, accused-appellant gave money to Edward Domantay and asked him to
buy two bottles of gin and a bottle of Sprite. 6 Edward said he joined the group and sat between
Daudencio Macasaeb and accused-appellant. 7 Edward said that accused-appellant, who,
apparently had one too many then, rolled up his shirt and said: "No diad Antipolo tan L[i]pa et
walay massacre, diad Guilig wala, walay massacren kod dia, walay onakis-akis" ("In Antipolo and
Lipa, there were massacres; here in Guilig, there will also be a massacre. I will massacre
somebody here, and they will cry and cry"). Edward Domantay saw that tucked in the left side of
accused-appellant's waistline was a bayonet without a cover handle. 8 It was not the first time
that Edward had seen accused-appellant with the knife as the latter usually carried it with him. 9
Jiezl Domantay, 10, likewise testified. She said that, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon on
October 17, 1996, she and four other children were playing in front of their house in Guilig,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Jiezl saw accused-appellant and Jennifer Domantay walking towards the
bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay where Jennifer's body was later found. Accused-appellant
was about two meters ahead of Jennifer. The bamboo grove was about 8 to 10 meters from the
house of Jiezl Domantay. 10
Lorenzo Domantay, a relative of the victim, corroborated Jiezl's testimony that accused-appellant
had gone to Amparo Domantay's bamboo grove in the afternoon of October 17, 1996. Lorenzo
said that afternoon, on his way to his farm, he saw accused-appellant about 30 meters away,
standing at the spot in the bamboo grove where Jennifer's body was later found. Accused-
appellant appeared restless and worried as he kept looking around. However, as Lorenzo was in a
hurry, he did not try to find out why accused-appellant appeared to be nervous. 11
Prosecution witness Joselito Mejia, a tricycle driver, said that, in the afternoon of October 17,
1996, he was about to take his lunch at home in Alacan, a neighboring barangay about half a
kilometer from Guilig, when accused-appellant implored Mejia to take him to Malasiqui at once.
Mejia told accused-appellant that he was going to take his lunch first, but the latter pleaded with
him, saying they will not be gone for long. Mejia, therefore, agreed. Mejia noticed that accused-
appellant was nervous and afraid. Accused-appellant later changed his mind. Instead of going to
the town proper, he alighted near the Mormon's church, outside Malasiqui. 12
In addition, the prosecution presented SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel who testified
that, on separate occasions, accused-appellant had confessed to the brutal killing of Jennifer
Domantay.
SPO1 Espinoza testified that he investigated accused-appellant after the latter had been brought
to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17, 1996. Before he commenced his
questioning, he apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel, in English, which was later translated into
Pangasinense. 13 According to SPO1 Espinoza, accused-appellant agreed to answer the
questions of the investigator even in the absence of counsel and admitted killing the victim.
Accused-appellant also disclosed the location of the bayonet he used in killing the victim. 14 On
cross-examination, Espinoza admitted that at no time during the course of his questioning was
accused-appellant assisted by counsel. Neither was accused-appellant's confession reduced in
writing. 15 Espinoza's testimony was admitted by the trial court over the objection of the
defense.
Celso Manuel, for his part, testified that he is a radio reporter of station DWPR, an AM station
based in Dagupan City. He covers the third district of Pangasinan, including Malasiqui. Sometime
in October 1996, an uncle of the victim came to Dagupan City and informed the station about
Jennifer Domantay's case. 16 On October 23, 1996, Manuel went to Malasiqui to interview
accused-appellant who was then detained in the municipal jail. He described what transpired
during the interview thus: 17
PROS. QUINIT:
Q Did you introduce yourself as a media practitioner?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourself to the accused?
A I showed to Bernardino Domantay alias "Junior Otot" my I.D. card and I presented myself as a
media practitioner with my tape recorder [in] my hand, sir.
Q What was his reaction to your request for an interview?
A He was willing to state what had happened, sir.
Q What are those matters which you brought out in that interview with the accused Bernardino
Domantay alias "Junior Otot"?
A I asked him what was his purpose for human interest's sake as a reporter, why did he commit
that alleged crime. And I asked also if he committed the crime and he answered "yes." That's it.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. QUINIT:
Q You mentioned about accused admitting to you on the commi[ssion] of the crime, how did you
ask him that?
A I asked him very politely.
Q More or less what have you asked him on that particular matter?
A I asked "Junior Otot," Bernardino Domantay, "Kung pinagsisisihan mo ba ang iyong ginawa?"
"Opo" sabi niya, "Ibig mo bang sabihin Jun, ikaw ang pumatay kay Jennifer?", "Ako nga po" The
[l]ast part of my interview, "Kung nakikinig ang mga magulang ni Jennifer, ano ang gusto mong
iparating?", "kung gusto nilang makamtan ang hustisya ay tatanggapin ko". That is what he said,
and I also asked Junior Otot, what was his purpose, and he said, it was about the boundary
dispute, and he used that little girl in his revenge.
On cross-examination, Manuel explained that the interview was conducted in the jail, about two
to three meters away from the police station. An uncle of the victim was with him and the
nearest policemen present were about two to three meters from him, including those who were
in the radio room. 18 There was no lawyer present. Before interviewing accused-appellant,
Manuel said he talked to the chief of police and asked permission to interview accused-appellant.
19 On questioning by the court, Manuel said that it was the first time he had been called to
testify regarding an interview he had conducted. 20 As in the case of the testimony of SPO1
Espinoza, the defense objected to the admission of Manuel's testimony, but the lower court
allowed it.
Dr. Bandonill, the NBI medico-legal who conducted an autopsy of the victim on October 25, 1996,
testified that Jennifer Domantay died as a result of the numerous stab wounds she sustained on
her back, 21 the average depth of which was six inches. 22 He opined that the wounds were
probably caused by a "pointed sharp-edged instrument." 23 He also noted on the aforehead,
neck, and breast bone of the victim. 24 As for the results of the genital examination of the victim,
Dr. Bandonill said he found that the laceration on the right side of the hymen was caused within
24 hours of her death. He added that the genital area showed signs of inflammation. 25
Pacifico Bulatao, the photographer who took the pictures of the scene of the crime and of the
victim after the latter's body was brought to her parents' house, identified and authenticated the
five pictures (Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E) offered by the prosecution.
The defense then presented accused-appellant as its lone witness. Accused-appellant denied the
allegation against him. He testified he is an uncle of Jennifer Domantay (he and her grandfather
are cousins) and that he worked as a janitor at the Malasiqui Municipal Hall. He said that at
around 1 o'clock in the afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was bathing his pigs outside in the
house of his brother-in-law Daudencio Macasaeb in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. He confirmed
that Daudencio was then having drinks in front of his (Macasaeb's) house. Accused-appellant
claimed, however, that he did not join in the drinking and that it was Edward Domantay, whom
the prosecution had presented as witness, and a certain Jaime Caballero who joined the party. He
also claimed that it was he whom Macasaeb had requested to buy some more liquor, for which
reason he gave money to Edward Domantay so that the latter could get two bottles of gin, a
bottle of Sprite, and a pack of cigarettes. 26 He denied Edward Domantay's claim that he
(accused-appellant) had raised his shirt to show a bayonet tucked in his waistline and that he
had said he would massacre someone in Guilig. 27
Accused-appellant also confirmed that, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, he went to Alacan
passing on the trail beside the bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay. But he said he did not know
that Jennifer Domantay was following him. He further confirmed that in Alacan, he took a tricycle
to Malasiqui. The tricycle was driven by Joselito Mejia. He said he alighted near the Mormon
church, just outside of the town proper of Malasiqui to meet his brother. As his brother did not
come, accused-appellant proceeded to town and reported for work. That night, while he was in
the Malasiqui public market, he was picked up by three policemen and brought to the Malasiqui
police station where he was interrogated by SPO1 Espinoza regarding the killing of Jennifer
Domantay. He denied having owned to the killing of Jennifer Domantay to SPO1 Espinoza. He
denied he had a grudge against the victim's parents because of a boundary dispute. 28 With
respect to his extrajudicial confession to Celso Manuel, he admitted that he had been
interviewed by the latter, but he denied that he ever admitted anything to the former. 29
As already stated, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads: 30
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused, Bernardino
Domantay @ "Junior Otot" guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Rape with Homicide
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation and as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 and accordingly, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
death by lethal injection, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the total amount of Four
Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P480,000.00), 31 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleges that: 32
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION[S] MADE BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his alleged confessions to SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and
Celso Manuel are inadmissible in evidence because they had been obtained in violation of Art. III,
12(1) of the Constitution and that, with these vital pieces of evidence excluded, the remaining
proof of his alleged guilt, consisting of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 33
Art. III, 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, "when the investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect." 34 R.A. No. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an
individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning. 35
Decisions 36 of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the
evening of October 17, 1996, 37 he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal
slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the
rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution applied to him. SPO1 Espinoza narrated
what transpired during accused-appellant's interrogation: 38
[I] interrogated Bernardino Domantay, prior to the interrogation conducted to him, I informed him
of his constitutional right as follows; that he has the right to remain silent; that he has the right
to a competent lawyer of his own choice and if he can not afford [a counsel] then he will be
provided with one, and further informed [him] that all he will say will be reduced into writing and
will be used the same in the proceedings of the case, but he told me that he will cooperate even
in the absence of his counsel; that he admitted to me that he killed Jennifer Domantay, and he
revealed also the weapon used [and] where he gave [it] to.
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made
in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is
inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant should
have been excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it
were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree." As explained in People v. Alicando: 39
. . . According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible.
Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act,
whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized
evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegal
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-appellant's confession to the radio
reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In People v.
Andan, 40 the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews
with the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his
answers without the assistance of counsel, this Court said: 41
[A]ppellant's [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and
the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he was interviewed was
"tense and intimidating" and was similar to that which prevails in a custodial investigation. 42 We
are not persuaded. Accused-appellant was interviewed while he was inside his cell. The
interviewer stayed outside the cell and the only person besides him was an uncle of the victim.
Accused-appellant could have refused to be interviewed, but instead, he agreed. He answered
questions freely and spontaneously. According to Celso Manuel, he said he was willing to accept
the consequences of his act.
Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers around because about two to
three meters from the jail were the police station and the radio room. 43 We do not think the
presence of the police officers exerted any undue pressure or influence on accused-appellant and
coerced him into giving his confession.
Accused-appellant contends that "it is . . . not altogether improbable for the police investigators
to ask the police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some incriminating information from the
accused." 44 This is pure conjecture. Although he testified that he had interviewed inmates
before, there is no evidence to show that Celso was a police beat reporter. Even assuming that
he was, it has not been shown that, in conducting the interview in question, his purpose was to
elicit incriminating information from accused-appellant. To the contrary, the media are known to
take an opposite stance against the government by exposing official wrongdoings.
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the interview
was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to
the killing our of fear. As already stated, the interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6
days after accused-appellant had already confessed to the killing to the police.
Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti,
namely, the fact of death of Jennifer Domantay. In addition, the circumstantial evidence furnished
by the other prosecution witnesses dovetails in material points with his confession. He was seen
walking toward the bamboo grove, followed by the victim. Later, he was seen standing near the
bamboo grove where the child's body was found. Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An extrajudicial confession
made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by
evidence of corpus delicti.
4. Evidence necessary in treason cases. No person charged with treason shall be convicted
unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
Accused-appellant argues that it was improbable for a brutal killing to have been committed
without the children who were playing about eight to ten meters from Amparo Domantay's grove,
where the crime took place, having heard any commotion. 45 The contention has no merit.
Accused-appellant could have covered the young child's mouth to prevent her from making any
sound. In fact, Dr. Bandonill noted a five by two inch (5" x 2") contusion on the left side of the
victim's forehead, which he said could have been caused by a hard blunt instrument or by impact
as her head hit the ground. 46 The blow could have rendered her unconscious, thus precluding
her from shouting or crying.
Accused-appellant also contends that the testimony of Jiezl Domantay contradicts that of Lorenzo
Domantay because while Jiezl said she had seen accused-appellant walking towards the bamboo
grove, followed by the victim, at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996. Lorenzo
said he saw accused-appellant standing near the bamboo grove at about the same time.
These witnesses, however, did not testify concerning what they saw exactly the same time. What
they told the court was what they had seen "at around" 2 o'clock in the afternoon. There could
have been a between difference in time, however little it was, between the time Jiezl saw
accused-appellant and the victim walking and the time Lorenzo saw accused-appellant near the
place where the victim's body was later found. Far from contradicting each other, these
witnesses confirmed what each had said each one saw. What is striking about their testimonies is
that while Jiezl said she saw accused-appellant going toward the bamboo grove followed by the
victim "at around" 2 o'clock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996, Lorenzo said he had seen
accused-appellant near the bamboo grove "at around" that time. He described accused-appellant
as nervous and worried. There is no reason to doubt the claim of these witnesses. Lorenzo is a
relative of accused-appellant. There is no reason he would testified falsely against the latter.
Jiezl, on the other hand, is also surnamed Domantay and could also be related to accused-
appellant and has not been shown to have any reason to testify falsely against accused-
appellant. At the time of the incident, she was only 10 years old.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court is convinced of accused-appellant's guilt with respect to the
killing of the child. It is clear that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant is guilty of homicide. Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 [parricide] shall kill another
without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article
[murder], shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
The killing was committed with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. The record shows that the victim, Jennifer Domantay, was six years old at the time of
the killing. She was a child of small build, 46" in height. 47 It is clear then that she could not have
put up much of a defense against accused-appellant's assault, the latter being a fully grown man
of 29 years. Indeed, the physical evidence supports a finding of abuse of superior strength:
accused-appellant had a weapon, while the victim was not shown to have had any; there were 38
stab wounds; and all the knife wounds are located at the back of Jennifer's body.
But we think the lower court erred in finding that the killing was committed with cruelty. 48 The
trial court appears to have been led to this conclusion by the number of wounds inflicted on the
victim. But the number of wounds is not a test for determining whether there was circumstance.
49 "The rest . . . is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the victim's
suffering thus . . . there must be proof that the victim was made to agonize before the [the
accused] rendered the blow which snuffed out [her] life." 50 In this case, there is no such proof of
cruelty. Dr. Bandonill testified that any of the major wounds on the victim's back could have
caused her death as they penetrated her heart, lungs and liver, kidney and intestines. 51
Second. There is, however, no sufficient evidence to hold accused-appellant guilty of raping
Jennifer Domantay. Art. 335. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in part provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprive of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
As the victim here was six years old, only carnal knowledge had to be proved to establish rape.
Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily
connections with a woman. 52 For this purpose, it is enough if there was even the slightest
contact of the male sex organ with the labia of the victim's genitalia. 53 However, there must be
proof, by direct or indirect evidence, of such contact.
Dr. Ronald Bandonill's report on the genital examination he had performed on the deceased
reads: 54
GENITAL EXAMINATION; showed a complete laceration of the right side of the hymen. The
surrounding genital area shows signs of inflammation.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS: 1) Findings at the genital area indicate the probability of penetration of that area by a
hard, rigid instrument.
Hymenal laceration is not necessary to prove rape; 55 neither does its presence prove its
commission. As held in People v. Ulili, 56 a medical certificate or the testimony of the physician is
presented not to prove that the victim was raped but to show that the latter had lost her virginity.
Consequently, standing alone, a physician's finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was
lacerated does not prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other evidence proving
carnal knowledge that rape may be deemed to have been established. 57
This conclusion is based on the medically accepted fact that a hymenal tear may be caused by
objects other than the male sex organ 58 or may arise from other causes. 59 Dr. Bandonill
himself admitted this. He testified that the right side of the victim's hymen had been completely
lacerated while the surrounding genital area showed signs of inflammation. 60 He opined that
the laceration had been inflicted within 24 hours of the victim's death and that the inflammation
was due to a trauma in that area. 61 When asked by the private prosecutor whether the
lacerations of the hymen could have been caused by the insertion of a male organ he said this
was possible. But he also said when questioned by the defense that the lacerations could have
been caused by something blunt other than the male organ. Thus, he testified: 62
PROS. F. QUINIT:
Q Now, what might have caused the complete laceration of the right side of the hymen, doctor?
A Well, sir, if you look at my report there is a remark and it says there; findings at the genital
area indicated the probability of penetration of that area by a hard rigid instrument.
Q Could it have been caused by a human organ?
A If the human male organ is erect, fully erect and hard then it is possible, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q In your remarks; finding at the genital area indicates the probability of penetration of that area
by a hard rigid instrument, this may have also been caused by a dagger used in the killing of
Jennifer Domantay is that correct?
A Well, sir when I say hard rigid instrument it should not be sharp pointed and share rigid, it
should be a hard bl[u]nt instrument.
Q Do you consider a bolo a bl[u] instrument, or a dagger?
A The dagger is a sharp rigid but it is not a bl[u]nt instrument, sir.
Q This Genital Examination showed a complete laceration of the right side of the hymen, this
may have been possibly caused by a dagger, is it not?
A No, sir. I won't say that this would have been caused by a dagger, because a dagger would
have made at its incision . . . not a laceration, sir.
Q But this laceration may also have been caused by other factors other the human male organ, is
that correct?
A A hard bl[u]nt instrument, sir could show.
Q My question is other than the human male organ?
A Possible, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q You mentioned that the hymen was lacerated on the right side?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And if there is a complete erection by a human organ is this possible that the laceration can
only be on the right side of the hymen?
A Yes, your Honor, its possible.
Q How about if the penetration was done by a finger, was it the same as the human organ?
A Well, it defends on the size of the finger that penetrat[es] that organ, if the finger is small it
could the superficial laceration, and if the finger is large then it is possible your honor.
Q How about two fingers?
A Possible, sir.
To be sure, this Court has sustained a number of convictions for rape with homicide based on
purely circumstantial evidence. In those instances, however, the prosecution was able to present
other tell-tale signs of rape such as the location and description of the victim's clothings,
especially her undergarments, the position of the body when found and the like. 63 In People v.
Macalino, 64 for instance, the Court affirmed a conviction for the rape of a two-year old child on
the basis of circumstantial evidence. 65
The Court notes that the testimony or medical opinion of Dr. Gajardo that the fresh laceration
had been produced by sexual intercourse is corroborated by the testimony given by complainant.
Elizabeth that when she rushed upstairs upon hearing her daughter suddenly cry out, she found
appellant Macalino beside the child buttoning his own pants and that she found some sticky fluid
on the child's buttocks and some blood on her private part.(Emphasis in the original)
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is no circumstantial evidence from which to infer that
accused-appellant sexually abused the victim. The only circumstance from which such inference
might be made is that accused-appellant was seen with the victim walking toward the place
where the girl's body was found. Maybe he raped the girl. Maybe he did not. Maybe he simply
inserted a blunt object into her organ, thus causing the lacerations in the hymen. Otherwise,
there is no circumstance from which it might reasonably be inferred that he abused her, e.g.,
that he was zipping up his pants, that there was spermatozoa in the girl's vaginal canal.
Indeed, the very autopsy report of Dr. Bandonill militates against the finding of rape. In
describing the stab wounds on the body of the victim, he testified: 66
[A]fter examining the body I took note that were several stab wounds . . . these were all found at
the back area sir . . . extending from the back shoulder down to the lower back area from the left
to the right.
Considering the relative physical positions of the accused and the victim in crimes of rape, the
usual location of the external bodily injuries of the victim is on the face, 67 neck, 68 and anterior
portion 69 of her body. Although it is not unnatural to find contusions on the posterior side, these
are usually caused by the downward pressure on the victim's body during the sexual assault. 70
It is unquestionably different when, as in this case, all the stab wounds (except for a minor cut in
the lower left leg) had their entry points at the back running from the upper left shoulder to the
lower right buttocks.
It is noteworthy that the deceased was fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt when her body
was immediately after it was found. 71 Furthermore, there is a huge bloodstain in the back
portion of her shorts. 72 This must be because she wearing this piece of clothing when the stab
wounds were inflicated or immediately thereafter, thus allowing the blood to seep into her shorts
to such an extent. As accused-appellant would naturally have to pull down the girl's lower
garments in order to consummate the rape, then, he must have, regardless of when the stab
wounds were inflicted, pulled up the victim's shorts and undergarments after the alleged rape,
otherwise, the victim's shorts would not have been stained so extensively. Again, this is contrary
to ordinary human experience.
Even assuming that Jennifer had been raped, there is no sufficient proof that it was accused-
appellant who had raped her. He did not confess to having raped the victim.
From the foregoing, we cannot find that accused-appellant also committed rape. In the special
complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established
beyond reasonable doubt. 73
Third. The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer Domantay the
amount of P30,000.00 as actual damages. However, the list of expenses produced by the victim's
father, Jaime Domantay, only totaled P28,430.00. Of this amount, only P12,000.00 was
supported by a receipt. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides that a party may recover actual or
compensatory damages only for such loss as he has duly proved. Therefore, the award of actual
damages should be reduced to P12,000.00.
In addition, the heirs of Jennifer Domantay are entitled to recover exemplary damages in view of
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Art. 2230 of the Civil
Code provides for the payment of exemplary damages when the crime is committed with one or
more aggravating circumstance. An amount of P25,000.00 is deemed appropriate. 74
In accordance with our rulings in People v. Robles 75 and People v. Mengote, 76 the indemnity
should be fixed at P50,000.00 and the moral damages at P50,000.00. 77
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is rendered FINDING
accused-appellant guilty of homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength and sentencing him to a prison term of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERING him to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Domantay the amounts of P50,000.00, as indemnity, P50,000.00, as moral damages,
P25,000.00, as exemplary damages, and P12,000.00, as actual damages, and the
costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138403 August 22, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLLY ABULENCIA Y COYOS, defendant-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
In the multitude of cases which passed this Court, we did not flinch in sending men rapacious of
the flesh to the gallows. Lamentably, there still remains such callous men who commit
unimaginable acts and even concoct tales, no matter how absurd, just to exculpate themselves.
The case at bench is an illustration.
On August 4, 1998, a cold-blooded ravager, Rolly Abulencia y Coyos, preyed on ten-year old
Rebelyn Garcia.
In the early morning of the following day, Rebelyn's lifeless, naked body was found floating at the
Colobong creek in San Manuel, Pangasinan, with marks of bruises, burns and injuries manifesting
that she was defiled and later drowned to death.
In an Information dated September 7, 1998, docketed as Criminal Case No. U-9777, Abulencia
was charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, Urdaneta City for rape with homicide.
The Information reads:
"That on or about August 4, 1998, between 5:00 o'clock P.M. to 8:00 o'clock in the evening, at
barangay San Juan, San Manuel, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloneously (sic) have
carnal knowledge of one REBELYN GARCIA y AGAPAY, a minor 10 years of age. That by reason
thereof, to conceal his criminal act, with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously drown said Rebelyn Garcia y Agapay in the San Juan River of said municipality. The
body of the victim was later retrieved at the Colobong Creek at Sitio Casilagan, Brgy. San Juan,
San Manuel, Pangasinan, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
"Contrary to Art. 266-A, No. 1(d), Republic Act No. 8353, in relation to Art. 249, Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659."1
When arraigned, with the assistance of counsel, Abulencia pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the
prosecution presented six (6) witnesses, namely: Dr. Asuncion Tuvera, PO3 Avelino Sandi, PO3
Randy Bergado, Dennis Mojares, Reynaldo Garcia, Jr. and Reynaldo Garcia, Sr. The defense
presented, as lone witness, Abulencia himself.
The facts are not disputed:
Rebelyn Garcia, the victim, was a 10-year old2 lass from Poblacion, Asingan, Pangasinan and a
fourth grader at the Narciso Ramos Elementary School. She is the daughter of Reynaldo and
Alicia Garcia.3
On August 4, 1998, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Rebelyn's brother, Reynaldo Garcia, Jr.,
and a jeepney driver were at the Asingan jeepney terminal waiting for passengers.4
After two (2) hours, accused Rolly Abulencia arrived and invited Reynaldo to a drinking spree.5
Reynaldo joined Abulencia and one Reynaldo Pascua in drinking Red Horse beer at the Asingan
jeepney terminal. At about 12 o'clock noon, each one had consumed about four (4) bottles of
beer.6
Thereafter, Reynaldo and Abulencia rode a tricycle and proceeded to the former's residence at
Poblacion, Asingan where they again drank beer and later slept on a bamboo bed (papag).
Rebelyn was then inside the house. At that time, her parents were not around.7
Reynaldo and Abulencia woke up at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that day. Abulencia
then asked permission to buy dilis from a nearby store. But Reynaldo, noticing that Abulencia
was drunk, advised the latter not to leave.8 Abulencia ignored Reynaldo and went out. Rebelyn
tagged along.9
Abulencia and Rebelyn never returned, although the store where they were supposed to buy dilis
is merely 40 meters away from the house.10 Thereupon, Reynaldo and his family started looking
for the two as far as Rosales, Pangasinan but failed to find them.11
About 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Abulencia surrendered to Mayor Felipe Sevilleja of San Manuel,
Pangasinan. PO3 Randy Bergado, a PNP officer assigned in San Manuel who was then in the
mayor's house, was informed by Abulencia that "he had a small girl companion that he
accidentally bumped at the Aburido bridge" and who "might have been dead because the flow of
the river is so fast."12
PO3 Bergado immediately turned over Abulencia to the San Manuel police station. Forthwith, PO3
Avelino Sandi entered the incident in the police blotter. Abulencia was later detained.13
At about 6:00 o'clock the following morning (August 5, 1998), Rebelyn's lifeless, naked body was
found floating at the Colobong creek near the Aburido bridge at Sitio Casilagan, San Juan, San
Manuel, Pangasinan.14
Dr. Asuncion Tuvera, Municipal Health Officer, conducted an autopsy on the victim's cadaver. The
doctor's autopsy report states:
"A. External Findings:
Head lacerated wound about 1 cm. in length at the corner of the left eye (superficial)
- Multiple hematoma, contussion forehead;
- Lacerated wound about 1 inches in length at the frontal area;
- 2 lacerated wound about one inch + 0.5 inch. respectively, at the rt. temporal area.
- lacerated wound about 0.5 cm. In length at the rt. lower lip
Chest hematoma at the upper portion of the sternum
Extremeties Multiple burn on both upper arms.
Genitalia - Multiple vaginal wall and hymenal laceration
NOTE:
Vaginal smear taken for the presence of spermatozoa. Result is negative.
"B. Internal Findings:
Lungs - presence of H20 in the lung tissues.
"CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardio-respiratory arrest 2 drowning; shock 2 rape."15
Dr. Tuvera further found that the multiple lacerations on the vaginal wall and hymen of Rebelyn's
genitalia indicate that a hard object, probably an erect penis, was inserted therein;16 and that
the presence of a large amount of water in Rebelyn's lungs indicates that she was submerged
and drowned.17
Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of DZWN Bombo Radio, testified that on August 6, 1998,
when he interviewed Abulencia at the Municipal Jail of San Manuel, Pangasinan, the latter
admitted having raped Rebelyn and that she fell off the bridge.18 The interview was tape-
recorded, which tape Mojares identified and presented in court.19
In his defense, accused Rolly Abulencia denied the charge. In gist,20 the following is his story:
After he left the Garcia residence at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 4, 1998 to
buy dilis in the market, he noticed Rebelyn Garcia following him. But he just ignored her.
However, upon reaching the market, he decided not to buy dilis anymore. Instead, he went home
to Binalonan, Pangasinan. He then proceeded towards San Manuel while Rebelyn continued to
follow him closely. Annoyed, he told her he was going to San Manuel, but she insisted on
following him because she wanted to go to his house. They then took the provincial road, but
upon reaching the Aburido bridge, he distanced himself from the girl. However, she ran towards
him. While she was running, he tried to tell her to go home, but in doing so he accidentally
tripped (napatid) her off, causing her to fall from the bridge. He got nervous and proceeded to
the house of his Auntie Deciang Delfin and asked her to accompany him to the authorities so he
could surrender. They approached Mayor Sevilleja of San Miguel, Pangasinan.
After the trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered its decision dated March 16, 1999,
convicting accused Rolly Abulencia of the crime as charged. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds ROLLY ABULENCIA Y COYOS, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of aggravated RAPE WITH HOMICIDE (punishable under Article 266-A, No. 1(d) and Article
266-B, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 8353, in relation to Article 249, Revised Penal Code and
Republic Act No. 7659) and the Court sentences Rolly Abulencia to suffer the penalty of DEATH,
to be implemented in the manner provided for by law. Ordering the accused to indemnify the
heirs of Rebelyn Garcia, the sum of P75,000.00 damages, and another sum of P20, 000.00 for
exemplary damages plus P6,425.00 as actual damages."
xxx xxx xxx"21
Appellant Rolly Abulencia bewails his conviction, asserting that the court a quo:
"I
"x x x GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING (HIM) OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED PRINCIPALLY ON
THE MEDICO-LEGAL FINDINGS (EXHIBIT "A") AND DESPITE THE PAUCITY OF DIRECT EVIDENCE
POINTING TO (HIM) AS THE CULPRIT IN THE . . . INCIDENT.
"II
"x x x ERRED IN RELYING ON THE VULNERABILITY OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE RATHER THAN THE
STRENGTH OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE IN FINDING A VERDICT OF GUILT AGAINST (HIM)."22
Appellant mainly contends that there is no direct evidence linking him to the commission of the
crime and that the findings of the medico-legal officer are not sufficient to warrant his conviction
by the trial court.
This Court does not agree.
Normally, the crime of rape whether simple, qualified or complexed with other crimes is
committed in seclusion, thereby rendering its prosecution difficult owing to the absence of
witnesses to its commission.
The prosecution of such crime becomes even more intricate and complex if homicide is
committed since the victim herself would no longer be able to testify against the perpetrator. In
most cases, only circumstantial evidence available to prove its commission.23
The absence of direct evidence, however, does not preclude the conviction of a person accused
of the complex crime of rape with homicide. Circumstantial evidence can be as potent as direct
evidence to sustain a conviction provided that there is a concurrence of all the requisites
prescribed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, thus:
"SECTION 5. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
"(a) There is more than one circumstance;
"(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
"(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt."24
Likewise, this Court has held that an accused can be convicted based on circumstantial evidence
if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.25
Admittedly, in the case at bar, the trial court relied solely on circumstantial evidence in finding
that the appellant is guilty as charged and it did so correctly.
It is established from the testimony of prosecution witness Reynaldo Garcia, Jr. that he met the
appellant in the morning of that fateful day of August 4, 1998 and later, both engaged in a
drinking spree; that they slept on the papag of Garcia's house in the afternoon of that day; that
the victim Rebelyn, was also in the same house at that time; that after waking up, the appellant
left the house at about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon to buy dilis in the nearby store located 40
meters away, the victim tagging along; that the appellant and Rebelyn never returned; that in
the evening of the same day, the appellant surrendered to Mayor Sevilleja, reporting that he was
with the victim when the latter allegedly fell from the bridge after he "accidentally tripped
(napatid) her" off; that the appellant admitted having raped the victim in a tape interview by
Dennis Mojares, another prosecution witness; that the victim was found dead the following
morning floating at the Colobong creek near the Aburido bridge; and that the autopsy conducted
on her cadaver shows that she was sexually abused and, thereafter, brutally killed.
The appellant himself admitted that he was alone with Rebelyn in the evening of August 4, 1998.
His only defense is that Rebelyn died because she accidentally fell from the bridge. We find her
tale so fantastic to be accorded any iota of credibility. This is his incredible story:
"COURT: How about Rebelyn when you left the house?
"A I saw Rebelyn when I was on my way to the market, sir, she was at my back.
"Q On your way, Rebelyn was following you in the market?
"A Yes, sir.
"ATTY. FLORENDO: When did you notice Rebelyn to be following you?
"A When she was at my back, sir.
"Q And when you noticed that she was following you, what did you do?
"A I did not mind, sir.
"COURT You just ignored her?
"A Yes, sir.
"ATTY. FLORENDO: And you were able to reach the public market?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Upon reaching the public market, what happened?
"A I decided to go home, sir.
"COURT: But you were able to buy dilis?
"A No more, sir, but I decided to go home.
"Q Whereat?
"A Binalonan, Pangasinan, sir.
"ATTY. FLORENDO: Where was Rebelyn when you decided to go home?
"A She was at my back following me sir.
"COURT: You said you decided to go home to Binalonan, Pangasinan did you take a jeep?
"A No, sir, I just walked.
"Q From the public market of Asingan to Binalonan you just walked?
"A I walked but I was not able to reach Binalonan, sir.
"Q You decided to go home not to buy dilis anymore?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And you thought of going home?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Were you able to go home?
"A No, sir.
"Q From the public market where did you go?
"A San Juan, San Manuel, Pangasinan, sir.
"Q From the public market where did you go?
"A I proceeded to San Manuel, Pangasinan.
"Q What did you take in going to San Manuel, Pangasinan?
"A I just walked, sir.
"Q You mean to say that you walked this distance from the public market of Asingan to San
Manuel, Pangasinan?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q From the public market proceeding to San Manuel, where was Rebelyn?
"A She was at my back, sir.
"ATTY. FLORENDO: While you were walking towards San Manuel, Pangasinan, did you ever talk to
Rebelyn?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q You mean to tell us that Rebelyn was already walking with you side by side?
"A Yes, sir.
"COURT: Did you tell Rebelyn that you are proceeding to San Manuel, Pangasinan?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Despite of that she is still following you?
"A Yes, sir.
"ATTY. FLORENDO: By the way, while you were at the public market at Asingan, Pangasinan, did
Rebelyn ever talk to you?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q What else did she tell you?
"A She told me that she will go to our house, sir.
"Q She told you that she pay a visit to your house?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q While walking with Rebelyn what place were you able to reach?
"A Aburido, sir.
"COURT: What route did you take going to San Manuel, Pangasinan?
"A The provincial road, sir.
"ATTY. FLORENDO: While you were at the Aburido bridge what were you doing with Rebelyn?
"A I was running away from her, sir.
"Q You were running away from Rebelyn why?
"A Because I want her to be left, sir.
"Q And what did Rebelyn do when you tried to run away from her?
"A She ran following me, sir.
"Q By the way, what is that Abundo bridge?
"A A cemented bridge, sir.
"Q So, when she ran towards you, what happened, Mr. Witness?
"A I accidentally tripped (napatid) her, sir.
"Q When you said that you accidentally tripped Rebelyn what happened to her?
"A She fell to the bridge.
"Q When Rebelyn fell to the bridge what else happened?
"A I went home, sir.
xxx xxx xxx"26
We cannot accept as a valid defense such kind of tale which is highly preposterous and obviously
contrary to the common experience of mankind. Time and again, we declared the legal truism
that "evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must be credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by the impact of events and
testimony colored by the inconscious workings of the mind. No better test has yet been found to
measure the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common
experience of mankind."27
Appellant's defense is a mere denial which is intrinsically weak. To merit credence, it must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability.28 This, the appellant failed to do.
Even granting that Rebelyn fell from the bridge, the autopsy report of Dr. Tuvera does not
support such incident.
As found by Dr. Tuvera, Rebelyn's body bore injuries not attributable to a fall. There were multiple
cigarette burns on both her upper arms.29 Her genitalia showed multiple lacerations on the
vaginal wall and hymen extending to the upper part of the urethra.30
Anent the injuries found in Rebelyn's genitalia, Dr. Tuvera observed:
"COURT What does multiple vaginal wall laceration indicate?
"A It indicates that in the vaginal area, a foreign object was inserted, there is contact, sir.
"Q What is your conclusion?
"A Probably a male genitalia or any hard object, sir.
"Q What does multiple laceration on the vaginal wall to the urethra indicate?
"A It indicates that there is a contact in the genitalia, it may be caused by erect penis or
genitalia of a male or maybe caused by a hard object, sir."31
And this fact is more revealing. Rebelyn's body was found naked. If she merely fell from the
bridge, as appellant wants us to believe, it is highly improbable that the current of the river
would totally undress her.
The appellant also contends that the absence of spermatozoa in Rebelyn's genitalia and the
failure of Dr. Tuvera to show that the lacerations were fresh do not prove that the victim was
raped.
This argument does not persuade us. The absence of spermatozoa does not negate a finding of
rape considering that its presence is not an essential element of the crime.
The totality of all the circumstances obtaining, taken together with the condition of Rebelyn's
body when found, eloquently indicate that the appellant sexually assaulted her before drowning
her to death.
It bears stressing that appellant admitted having raped Rebelyn when he was interviewed by
Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of Bombo Radio. Mojares' testimony lends support to our
conclusion. We have held that "a confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not
shown that said reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under
circumstances where it is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear."32
After considering all the evidence presented, this Court is constrained to affirm the appealed
decision of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon the appellant. We, however, modify
the same insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned. Although this matter has not been
raised by the parties, especially the Solicitor General, it is a settled rule that in a criminal case,
an appeal to the Supreme Court throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty
of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether they are
made the subject of assignments of error or not.33
With regard to the civil indemnity, the trial court awarded only P75,000.00. Current jurisprudence
has fixed at P100,000.00 the civil indemnity in cases of rape with homicide, which is fully
justified and properly commensurate with the seriousness of that special complex crime.34
The trial court did not award moral damages to the victim's family. Based on prevailing
jurisprudence, however, moral damages may be awarded to the heirs of the victim without need
for pleading or proof of its basis for their mental, physical and psychological sufferings are too
obvious to still require their recital at the trial. Hence, moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 must be awarded.35
In People vs. Lagarto,36 we held that attendant circumstances may be considered to determine
civil liability. Thus, in view of the evident cruelty inflicted upon Rebelyn, as shown by the multiple
burns and contusions on her body, we grant the award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00.37
Four members of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
majority members that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision convicting ROLLY ABULENCIA y COYOS of the crime of rape
with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION insofar as the civil aspect is concerned. Appellant is thus ordered to PAY the heirs
of Rebelyn Garcia P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and P6,425.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the certified true copy of the record of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,

- versus -
EDNA MALNGAN y MAYO,
Appellant.

G. R. No. 170470

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

September 26, 2006

x----------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The Case

For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01139 promulgated on
2 September 2005, affirming with modification the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal Case No. 01-188424 promulgated on 13 October 2003, finding
appellant Edna Malngan y Mayo (Edna) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson
with Multiple Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of six (6) people, and sentencing her to
suffer the penalty of death.

The Facts

As summarized[3] by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts are as follows:

From the personal account of Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman in the area, as well as
the personal account of the pedicab driver named Rolando Gruta, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on
January 2, 2001 when Remigio Bernardo and his tanods saw the accused-appellant EDNA, one
hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., with her head turning in different directions,
hurriedly leaving the house of her employer at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila. She
was seen to have boarded a pedicab which was driven by a person later identified as Rolando
Gruta. She was heard by the pedicab driver to have instructed that she be brought to Nipa
Street, but upon her arrival there, she changed her mind and asked that she be brought instead
to Balasan Street where she finally alighted, after paying for her fare.

Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos group later discovered
that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the housemaid. Barangay Chairman Bernardo and
his tanods responded to the fire upon hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen
from the Fire District 1-NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire.

When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay Hall, he received a report from
pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also a tanod, that shortly before the occurrence of the
fire, he saw a woman (the housemaid) coming out of the house at No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut,
Tondo, Manila and he received a call from his wife telling him of a woman (the same housemaid)
who was acting strangely and suspiciously on Balasan Street. Barangay Chairman Bernardo,
Rolando Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the woman who was
later identified as the accused-appellant. After Rolando Gruta positively identified the woman as
the same person who left No. 172 Moderna Street, Balut, Tondo, Manila, Barangay Chairman
Bernardo and his tanods apprehended her and brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation.
At the Barangay Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr. and whose house was
also burned, identified the woman as accused-appellant EDNA who was the housemaid of
Roberto Separa, Sr. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant
EDNAs bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in
the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall that she set her
employers house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she
wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going
home.

Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo
Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was
further investigated and then detained.

When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she
had the opportunity to ask accused-appellant EDNA at the latters detention cell why she did the
burning of her employers house and accused-appellant EDNA replied that she set the house on
fire because when she asked permission to go home to her province, the wife of her employer
Roberto Separa, Sr., named Virginia Separa (sic) shouted at her: Sige umuwi ka, pagdating mo
maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis, pagdating mo maputi ka na (TSN, January 22, 2002, p.6) (Go
ahead, when you arrive your color would be fair already. Ride a broomstick, when you arrive your
color would be fair already.) And when Mercedita Mendoza asked accused-appellant EDNA how
she burned the house, accused-appellant EDNA told her: Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo,
sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay (TSN,
January 22, 2002, p. 7.) (I crumpled newspapers, lighted them with a disposable lighter and
threw them on top of the table inside the house.)

When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network, accused-appellant EDNA

while under detention (sic) was heard by SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan as having admitted the crime
and even narrated the manner how she accomplished it. SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan was able to
hear the same confession, this time at his home, while watching the television program True
Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas also of ABS-CBN Network.

The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house of Roberto Separa, Sr. and other adjoining
houses and the death of Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa together with their four (4)
children, namely: Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.

On 9 January 2001, an Information[4] was filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 41, charging
accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with Multiple Homicide. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 01-188424. The accusatory portion of said Information provides:

That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent
to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire
upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden
materials located at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting crumpled newspaper
with the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited house
and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued
and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by
fire; that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire, the following, namely,

1. Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age

2. Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3. Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4. Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5. Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6. Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age

sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately thereafter.[5]

When arraigned, accused-appellant with assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded[6] Not Guilty to
the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.[7]

The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, SPO4[8] Danilo Talusan, Rolando Gruta,
Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and Rodolfo Movilla to establish its charge that accused-
appellant Edna committed the crime of arson with multiple homicide.

SPO4 Danilo Talusan, arson investigator, testified that he was one of those who responded to the
fire that occurred on 2 January 2001 and which started at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo,
Manila. He stated that the fire killed Roberto Separa, Sr. and all the other members of his family,
namely his wife, Virginia, and his children, Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.; the fire also
destroyed their abode as well as six neighboring houses. He likewise testified that he twice heard
accused-appellant once while the latter was being interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of
ABS-CBN, and the other time when it was shown on channel 2 on television during the airing of
the television program entitled True Crime hosted by Gus Abelgas confess to having committed
the crime charged, to wit:

Pros. Rebagay:
Based on your investigation, was there any occasion when the accused Edna Malngan admitted
to the burning of the house of the Separa Family?

xxxx

Witness:
Yes, sir.

Pros. Rebagay:
When was that?

A: On January 2 she was interviewed by the media, sir. The one who took the coverage was
Carmelita Valdez of Channel 2, ABS-CBN. They have a footage that Edna admitted before them,
sir.

Q: And where were you when Edna Malngan made that statement or admission to Carmelita
Valdez of ABS-CBN?

A: I was at our office, sir.

Q: Was there any other occasion wherein the accused made another confession relative to the
admission of the crime?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When was that?

A: Last Friday, sir. It was shown in True Crime of Gus Abelgas. She was interviewed at the City Jail
and she admitted that she was the one who authored the crime, sir.

Pros. Rebagay:
And where were you when that admission to Gus Abelgas was made?

A: I was in the house and I just saw it on tv, sir.

Q: What was that admission that you heard personally, when you were present, when the
accused made the confession to Carmelita Valdez?
A: Naglukot po siya ng papel, sinidihan niya ng lighter at inilagay niya sa ibabaw ng mesa yung
mga diyaryo at sinunog niya.

xxxx

Q: Aside from that statement, was there any other statement made by the accused Edna
Malngan?

A: Yes, sir. Kaya po niya nagawa yon galit po siya sa kanyang amo na si Virginia, hindi siya
pinasuweldo at gusto na po niyang umuwi na (sic) ayaw siyang payagan. Nagsalita pa po sa
kanya na, Sumakay ka na lang sa walis. Pagbalik mo dito maputi ka na. (sic) Yon po ang sinabi ng
kanyang amo.

Atty. Masweng:
That was a statement of an alleged dead person, your Honor.

Court:
Sabi ni Valdes, ha?

Pros. Rebagay:
Sabi ni Edna Malngan kay Carmelita Valdez, Your Honor.

Court:
Double hearsay na yon.

Pros. Rebagay:
No, Your Honor, the witness was present, Your Honor, when that confession was made by the
accused to Carmelita Valdez.[9]

Rolando Gruta, the pedicab driver and one of the barangay tanods in the area, testified:

Pros. Rebagay:
Mr. Witness, what is your profession?

A: Sidecar driver, sir.

Q: On January 2, 2001 at around 4:45 in the morning, do you recall where were (sic) you?

A: I was at the corner of Moderna Street, sir.

Pros. Rebagay:
And while you were at the corner of Moderna St., what happened if any, Mr. Witness?

A: I saw Edna coming out from the door of the house of Roberto Separa, sir.

Q: Do you know the number of the house of the Separa Family?

A: 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.

xxxx

Q: And you said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family. How far is that
house from the place where you were waiting at the corner of Moderna and Paulino Streets?

A: About three meters from Moderna and Paulino Streets where my pedicab was placed. My
distance was about three meters, sir.

xxxx

Q: And how did you know that the house where Edna came out is that of the house of the Separa
Family?

A: Mismong nakita po ng dalawang mata ko na doon siya galing sa bahay ng Separa Family.

Q: How long have you known the Separa Family, if you know them?

A: About two years, sir.

Q: How about this Edna, the one you just pointed (to) awhile ago? Do you know her prior to
January 2, 2001?

A: Yes, sir. I knew(sic) her for two years.

Court:
Why?

Witness:
Madalas ko po siyang maging pasahero ng aking pedicab.

Pros. Rebagay:
How about the Separa family? Why do you know them?
A: They were the employers of Edna, sir.

Q: You said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family. What happened when
you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family?

A: Wala pa pong ano yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar.

Q: And what did you observe from Edna when you saw her coming out from the house of the
Separa family?

A: Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palinga-linga.

xxxx

Q: After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?

A: Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.

Q: Where?

A: To Nipa Street, sir.

Q: Did you bring her to Nipa Street as she requested?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: You said that you brought her to Nipa Street. What happened when you go (sic) there at Nipa
Street, if any?

A: Nagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po.

Q: What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three minutes?

A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her directly to Balasan Street, sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened after that?

A: When we arrived there, she alighted and pay (sic) P5.00, sir.

Q And then what transpired after she alighted from your pedicab?

Witness:
I went home and I looked for another passenger, sir.

Pros. Rebagay:
After that, what happened when you were on you way to your house to look for passengers?

A Nakita ko na nga po na pagdating ko sa Moderna, naglalagablab na apoy.

Q: From what place was that fire coming out?

A: From the house of Roberto Separa Family, sir.

xxxx

Pros. Rebagay:
After you noticed that there was a fire from the house of Roberto Separa Family, what did you do
if any?

A: Siyempre po, isang Barangay Tanod po ako, nagresponde na po kami sa sunog. Binuksan na
po ng Chairman naming yung tangke, binomba na po naming yung apoy ng tubig.

Q: After that incident, Mr. Witness, have you seen Edna Again (sic).

A: No, sir.

Pros. Rebagay:
And after that incident, did you come to know if Edna was apprehended or not?

xxxx

A: I was called by our Barangay Chairman in order to identify Edna, sir.

x x x x[10]

Remigio Bernardo, Barangay Chairman of the area where the fire occurred, stated:
Pros. Rebagay:

On January 2, 2001, do you recall if there is a fire that occurred somewhere in your area of
jurisdiction, particularly Moderna Street?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, where were you when this incident happened?

A: Kasi ugali ko na po tuwing umagang-umaga po ako na pupunta sa barangay Hall mga siguro
6:00 or 5:00 o clock, me sumigaw ng sunog nirespondehan namin iyong sunog eh me dala
kaming fire.

Court:
You just answer the question. Where were you when this incident happened?

Witness:
I was at the Barangay Hall, Your Honor.

Pros. Rebagay:
And you said that there was a fire that occurred, what did you do?

Witness:
Iyon nga nagresponde kami doon sa sunog eh nakita ko iyong sunog mukha talagang arson dahil
napakalaki kaagad, meron pong mga tipong Iyong namatay po contractor po iyon eh kaya siguro
napakaraming kalat ng mga pintura, mga container, kaya hindi po namin naapula kaagad iyong
apoy, nasunog ultimo iyong fire tank namin sa lakas, sir.

Pros. Rebagay:
Now, will you please tell us where this fire occurred?

A: At the house of the six victims, sir.

Q: Whose house is that?

A: The house of the victims, sir.

xxxx

Pros. Rebagay:
You said that you responded to the place, what transpired after you responded to the place?
A: Iyon nga po ang nagsabi may lumabas na isang babae po noon sa bahay na nagmamadali
habang may sunog, me isang barangay tanod po akong nagsabi may humahangos na isang
babae na may dalang bag papunta po roon palabas ng sasakyan, sir.

Q: And so what happened?

A: Siyempre hindi naman ako nagtanong kung sino ngayon may dumating galing na sa bahay
naming, may tumawag, tumawag po si Konsehala Alfonso na may isang babae na hindi mapakali
doon sa Calle Pedro Alfonso, ke konsehal na baka ito sabi niya iyong ganito ganoon
nirespondehan ko po, sir.

Q: Where did you respond?

A: At Balasan, sir, but its not the area of my jurisdiction.

xxxx

Q: What happened when you reached that place?

A: Siya po ang nahuli ko doon, sir.

Court:
Witness pointing to accused Edna Malngan.

Pros. Rebagay:
And what happened?

A: I brought her to the barangay hall, sir.

Q: And what happened at the barangay hall?

A: Inembestigahan ko, kinuha naming iyong bag niya, me lighter siya eh. Inamin niya po sa amin
na kaya niya sinunog hindi siya pinasasahod ng more or less isang taon na eh. Ngayon sabi ko
bakit eh gusto ko ng umuwi ng probinsya ang sabi sa akin ng amo ko sumakay na lang daw po
ako ng walis tingting para makauwi, sir.

Atty. Herman:
We would like to object, Your Honor on the ground that that is hearsay.

Pros. Rebagay:
That is not a hearsay statement, Your Honor, straight from the mouth of the accused.
Atty. Herman:
Its not under the exemption under the Rules of Court, Your Honor. He is testifying according to
what he has heard.

Court:
Thats part of the narration. Whether it is true or not, thats another matter. Let it remain.

Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are telling you this?

A: Iyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid, siyempre may sunog
nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan para saktan hindi ko maibigay
papatayin siya gawa ng may namatay eh anim na tao and namatay, kaya iyong mga tao
kinokontrol siya madidisgrasya siya dahil pin-pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na iyon libo
iyong nakapaligid doon sa barangay hall napakahirap awatin. Gustong-gusto siyang kunin ng
mga taong-bayan, nagalit dahil ang daming bahay hong nasunog.[11]

For her part, Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of the Separa Family and whose house
was one of those destroyed by the fire, recounted:

Pros. Rebagay:
Madam Witness, on January 2, 2001, do you recall where were you residing then?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where were you residing at?

A: At No. 170 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, sir.

Q: Why did you transfer your residence? Awhile ago you testified that you are now residing at
147 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, Manila?

A: Because our house was burned, sir.

Q: More or less, how much did the loss incurred on the burning of your house (sic)?

A: More or less, P100,000.00, sir

Q: Do you know the accused in this case Edna Malngan?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know her?

A: She is the house helper of the family who were (sic) burned, sir.

Q: What family?

A: Cifara (sic) family, sir.

Q: Who in particular do you know among Cifara (sic) family?

A: The woman, sir.

Q: What is the name?

A: Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic), sir.

Q: Are you related to Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic)?

A: My husband, sir.

Q: What is the relationship of your husband to the late Virginia Mendoza Cifara (sic)?

A: They were first cousins, sir.

Q: How far is your house from the house of the Cifara (sic) family?

A: Magkadikit lang po. Pader lang ang pagitan.

Q: You said that Edna Malngan was working with the Cifara (sic) family. What is the work of Edna
Malngan?

A: Nangangamuhan po. House helper, sir.

Q: How long do you know Edna Malngan as house helper of the Cifara (sic) family?

A: I cannot estimate but she stayed there for three to four years, sir.

Q: Do you know who caused the burning of the house of the Cifara (sic) family?

Witness:
Edna Malngan, sir.

Pros. Rebagay:
Why do you know that it was Edna Malngan who burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?

A: When the fire incident happened, sir, on January 3, we went to San Lazaro Fire Station and I
saw Edna Malngan detained there, sir.

Q: And so what is your basis in pointing to Edna Malngan as the culprit or the one who burned
the house of the Cifara (sic) family?

A: I talked to her when we went there at that day, sir.

Q: What transpired then?

A: I talked to her and I told her, Edna, bakit mo naman ginawa yung ganun?

Q: And what was the answer of Edna?

A: She answered, Kasi pag nagpapaalam ako sa kanyang umuwi ng probinsya, nagpapaalam po
siyang umuwi ng probinsya ang sinasabi daw po sa kanya ni Baby Cifara (sic) na, (sic)Sige umuwi
ka, pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis pagdating mo maputi ka na.

Pros. Rebagay:
What is the basis there that she was the one who burned the house of the Cifara (sic) family?

A: I also asked her, Paano mo ginawa yung sunog? She told me, Naglukot ako ng maraming
diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at hinagis niya sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng
bahay. (sic)[12]

Lastly, the prosecution presented Rodolfo Movilla, owner of the house situated beside that of the
Separa family. He testified that his house was also gutted by the fire that killed the Separa family
and that he tried to help said victims but to no avail.

The prosecution presented other documentary evidence[13] and thereafter rested its case.

When it came time for the defense to present exculpatory evidence, instead of doing so,
accused-appellant filed a Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence[14] and the corresponding
Demurrer to Evidence[15] with the former expressly stating that said Demurrer to Evidence was
being filed x x x without express leave of court x x x.[16]

In her Demurrer to Evidence, accused-appellant asserts that the prosecutions evidence was
insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the following reasons:[17] (a) that she
is charged with crime not defined and penalized by law; (b) that circumstantial evidence was
insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (c) that the testimonies given by the
witnesses of the prosecution were hearsay, thus, inadmissible in evidence against her.

The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition to accused-appellants Demurrer to Evidence.

On 13 October 2003, acting on the Demurrer to Evidence, the RTC promulgated its Judgment[18]
wherein it proceeded to resolve the subject case based on the evidence of the prosecution. The
RTC considered accused-appellant to have waived her right to present evidence, having filed the
Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court.

In finding accused-appellant Edna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with
Multiple Homicide, the RTC ruled that:

The first argument of the accused that she is charged with an act not defined and penalized by
law is without merit. x x x the caption which charges the accused with the crime of Arson with
Multiple Homicide is merely descriptive of the charge of Arson that resulted to Multiple Homicide.
The fact is that the accused is charged with Arson which resulted to Multiple Homicide (death of
victims) and that charge is embodied and stated in the body of the information. What is
controlling is the allegation in the body of the Information and not the title or caption thereof. x x
x.

xxxx

The second and third arguments will be discussed jointly as they are interrelated with each other.
x x x.

xxxx

[W]hile there is no direct evidence that points to the accused in the act of burning the house or
actually starting the subject fire, the following circumstances that show that the accused
intentionally caused or was responsible for the subject fire have been duly established:

1. that immediately before the burning of the house, the accused hurriedly and with head turning
in different directions (palinga-linga) went out of the said house and rode a pedicab apparently
not knowing where to go x x x;

2. that immediately after the fire, upon a report that there was a woman in Balasan St. who
appears confused and apprehensive (balisa), the Barangay Chairman and his tanods went there,
found the accused and apprehended her and brought her to the barangay hall as shown by the
testimony of Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo; and

3. that when she was apprehended and investigated by the barangay officials and when her bag
was opened, the same contained a disposable lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of the
Barangay Chairman.

[T]he timing of her hurried departure and nervous demeanor immediately before the fire when
she left the house and rode a pedicab and her same demeanor, physical and mental condition
when found and apprehended at the same place where she alighted from the pedicab and the
discovery of the lighter in her bag thereafter when investigated indisputably show her guilt as
charged.

If there is any doubt of her guilt that remains with the circumstantial evidence against her, the
same is removed or obliterated with the confessions/admissions of the commission of the offense
and the manner thereof that she made to the prosecution witnesses Barangay Chairman Remigio
Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza and to the media, respectively.

xxxx

[H]er confessions/admissions are positive acknowledgment of guilt of the crime and appear to
have been voluntarily and intelligently given. These confessions/admissions, especially the one
given to her neighbor Mercedita Mendoza and the media, albeit uncounselled and made while
she was already under the custody of authorities, it is believed, are not violative of her right
under the Constitution.

The decretal part of the RTCs Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby denied and judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Arson with Multiple Homicide or Arson resulting to the death of six (6) people and sentencing her
to suffer the mandatory penalty of death, and ordering her to pay the heirs of the victims
Roberto Separa, Sr. and Virginia Separa and children Michael, Daphne, Priscilla and Roberto, Jr.,
the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for each victim and the amount of One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as temperate damages for their burned house or a total of Four
Hundred Thousand (P400,000.00) Pesos and to Rodolfo Movilla the amount of One Hundred
[Thousand] (P100,000.00) Pesos.

Due to the death penalty imposed by the RTC, the case was directly elevated to this Court for
automatic review. Conformably with our decision in People v. Efren Mateo y Garcia,[19] however,
we referred the case and its records to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.

On 2 September 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC,
the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed October 13, 2003 Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 41, finding accused-appellant Edna Malngan y Mayo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Arson with multiple homicide and sentencing her to suffer the DEATH
PENALTY is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that she is further ordered to pay P50,000.00
as moral damages and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the victims who
perished in the fire, to be paid to their heirs. She is ordered to pay Rodolfo Movilla, one whose
house was also burned, the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damage.

Pursuant to Section 13 (a), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004, the
Court of Appeals, after rendering judgment, hereby refrains from making an entry of judgment
and forthwith certifies the case and elevates the entire record of this case to the Supreme Court
for review.[20]
It is the contention of accused-appellant that the evidence presented by the prosecution is not
sufficient to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the crime charged.
In support of said exculpatory proposition, she assigns the following errors[21]:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE PROSECUTION IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED; and

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AND GIVING CREDENCE TO THE HEARSAY
EVIDENCE AND UNCOUNSELLED ADMISSIONS ALLEGEDLY GIVEN BY THE ACCUSED TO THE
WITNESSES BARANGAY CHAIRMAN REMIGIO BERNARDO, MERCEDITA MENDOZA AND THE MEDIA.

There is no complex crime of Arson with (Multiple) Homicide.

The Information in this case erroneously charged accused-appellant with a complex crime, i.e.,
Arson with Multiple Homicide. Presently, there are two (2) laws that govern the crime of arson
where death results therefrom Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 7659,[22] and Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1613[23], quoted
hereunder, to wit:

Revised Penal Code:

ART. 320. Destructive Arson. x x x x

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death
results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]

Presidential Decree No. 1613:

SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. If by reason of or on the occasion of the arson death
results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]

Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended, with respect to destructive arson, and the provisions of PD No.
1613 respecting other cases of arson provide only one penalty for the commission of arson,
whether considered destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom. The raison d'tre is
that arson is itself the end and death is simply the consequence.[24]

Whether the crime of arson will absorb the resultant death or will have to be a separate crime
altogether, the joint discussion[25] of the late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and Mme.
Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, on the subject of the crimes of arson and murder/homicide, is
highly instructive:
Groizard says that when fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in a
house and that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the
Penal Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should
be purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take
life.[26] In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is
murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be
absorbed by the crime of arson.[27]

xxxx

If the house was set on fire after the victims therein were killed, fire would not be a qualifying
circumstance. The accused would be liable for the separate offenses of murder or homicide, as
the case may be, and arson.[28]

Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is
de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the
burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the
crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main
objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to
as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the
objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but
fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct
crimes committed homicide/murder and arson.

Where then does this case fall under?

From a reading of the body of the Information:

That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent
to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire
upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden
materials located at No. 172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting crumpled newspaper
with the use of disposable lighter inside said house knowing the same to be an inhabited house
and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued
and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by
fire; that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire, the following, namely,

1. Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age

2. Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3. Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4. Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5. Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6. Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age

sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately thereafter.[29]
[Emphasis supplied.]
accused-appellant is being charged with the crime of arson. It it is clear from the foregoing that
her intent was merely to destroy her employers house through the use of fire.

We now go to the issues raised. Under the first assignment of error, in asserting the insufficiency
of the prosecutions evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant
argues that the prosecution was only able to adduce circumstantial evidence hardly enough to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She ratiocinates that the following circumstances:

1. That immediately before the burning of the house , the accused hurriedly and with
head turning in different directions (palinga-linga) went out of the said house and rode a pedicab
apparently not knowing where to go for she first requested to be brought to Nipa St. but upon
reaching there requested again to be brought to Balasan St. as shown by the testimony of
prosecution witness Rolando Gruta;

2. That immediately after the fire, upon a report that there was a woman in Balasan St.
who appears confused and apprehensive (balisa), the Barangay Chairman and his tanods went
there, found the accused and apprehended her and brought her to the barangay hall as shown
by the testimony of Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo; and

3. That when she was apprehended and investigated by the barangay officials and when her bag
was opened, the same contained a disposable lighter as likewise shown by the testimony of the
Barangay Chairman.[30]

fall short of proving that she had any involvement in setting her employers house on fire, much
less show guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given that it is a fact that housemaids are the first
persons in the house to wake up early to perform routine chores for their employers,[31] one of
which is preparing and cooking the morning meal for the members of the household; and
necessity requires her to go out early to look for open stores or even nearby marketplaces to buy
things that will complete the early meal for the day.[32] She then concludes that it was normal
for her to have been seen going out of her employers house in a hurry at that time of the day
and to look at all directions to insure that the house is secure and that there are no other persons
in the vicinity.[33]

We are far from persuaded.

True, by the nature of their jobs, housemaids are required to start the day early; however,
contrary to said assertion, the actuations and the demeanor of accused-appellant on that fateful
early morning as observed firsthand by Rolando Gruta, one of the witnesses of the prosecution,
belie her claim of normalcy, to wit:

Q: You said you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family. What happened when
you saw Edna coming out from the house of the Separa Family?

A: Wala pa pong ano yan naisakay ko na siya sa sidecar.

Q: And what did you observe from Edna when you saw her coming out from the house of the
Separa family?

A: Nagmamadali po siyang lumakad at palinga-linga.

xxxx

Q: After she boarded your pedicab, what happened, if any?

A: Nagpahatid po siya sa akin.

Q: Where?

A: To Nipa Street, sir.

Q: Did you bring her to Nipa Street as she requested?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: You said that you brought her to Nipa Street. What happened when you go (sic) there at Nipa
Street, if any?

A: Nagpahinto po siya doon ng saglit, mga tatlong minuto po.

Q: What did she do when she asked (you) to stop there for three minutes?

A: After three minutes she requested me to bring her directly to Balasan Street, sir.

xxxx

We quote with approval the pronouncement of the RTC in discrediting accused-appellants

aforementioned rationale:

[O]bviously it is never normal, common or ordinary to leave the house in such a disturbed,
nervous and agitated manner, demeanor and condition. The timing of her hurried departure and
nervous demeanor immediately before the fire when she left the house and rode a pedicab and
her same demeanor, physical and mental condition when found and apprehended at the same
place where she alighted from the pedicab and the discovery of the lighter in her bag thereafter
when investigated indisputably show her guilt as charged.[34]

All the witnesses are in accord that accused-appellants agitated appearance was out of the
ordinary. Remarkably, she has never denied this observation.
We give great weight to the findings of the RTC and so accord credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as it had the opportunity to observe them directly. The credibility given by
trial courts to prosecution witnesses is an important aspect of evidence which appellate courts
can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe them, particularly their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by counsels. Here, Remigio
Bernardo, Rolando Gruta and Mercedita Mendoza are disinterested witnesses and there is not an
iota of evidence in the records to indicate that they are suborned witnesses. The records of the
RTC even show that Remigio Bernardo, the Barangay Chairman, kept accused-appellant from
being mauled by the angry crowd outside of the barangay hall:

Pros. Rebagay:
Now, who were present when the accused are (sic) telling you this?

A: Iyon nga iyong mga tanod ko, mamamayan doon nakapaligid, siyempre may sunog
nagkakagulo, gusto nga siyang kunin ng mga mamamayan para saktan hindi ko maibigay
papatayin siya gawa ng may namatay eh anim na tao and namatay, kaya iyong mga tao
kinokontrol siya madidisgrasya siya dahil pin-pointed po siya, Your Honor, iyong dami na iyon libo
iyong nakapaligid doon sa barangay hall napakahirap awatin. Gusting-gusto siyang kunin ng mga
taong-bayan, nagalit dahil ang daming bahay hong nasunog.[35]

Accused-appellant has not shown any compelling reason why the witnesses presented would
openly, publicly and deliberately lie or concoct a story, to send an innocent person to jail all the
while knowing that the real malefactor remains at large. Such proposition defies logic. And where
the defense failed to show any evil or improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses,
the presumption is that their testimonies are true and thus entitled to full faith and credence.[36]

While the prosecution witnesses did not see accused-appellant actually starting the fire that
burned several houses and killed the Separa family, her guilt may still be established through
circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[37]

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
facts in issue may be established by inference.[38] It is founded on experience and observed
facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the
facts sought to be proved.[39] In order to bring about a conviction, the circumstantial evidence
presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.[40]

In this case, the interlocking testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, taken together, exemplify
a case where conviction can be upheld on the basis of circumstantial evidence. First, prosecution
witness Rolando Gruta, the driver of the pedicab that accused-appellant rode on, testified that he
knew for a fact that she worked as a housemaid of the victims, and that he positively identified
her as the person hurriedly leaving the house of the victims on 2 January 2001 at 4:45 a.m., and
acting in a nervous manner. That while riding on the pedicab, accused-appellant was unsure of
her intended destination. Upon reaching the place where he originally picked up accused-
appellant only a few minutes after dropping her off, Rolando Gruta saw the Separas house being
gutted by a blazing fire. Second, Remigio Bernardo testified that he and his tanods, including
Rolando Gruta, were the ones who picked up accused-appellant Edna at Balasan Street (where
Rolando Gruta dropped her off) after receiving a call that there was a woman acting strangely at
said street and who appeared to have nowhere to go. Third, SPO4 Danilo Talusan overheard
accused-appellant admit to Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of Channel 2 (ABS-CBN) that said
accused-appellant started the fire, plus the fact that he was able see the telecast of Gus Abelgas
show where accused-appellant, while being interviewed, confessed to the crime as well. The
foregoing testimonies juxtaposed with the testimony of Mercedita Mendoza validating the fact
that accused-appellant confessed to having started the fire which killed the Separa family as well
as burned seven houses including that of the victims, convincingly form an unbroken chain,
which leads to the unassailable conclusion pinpointing accused-appellant as the person behind
the crime of simple arson.

In her second assigned error, accused-appellant questions the admissibility of her uncounselled
extrajudicial confession given to prosecution witnesses, namely Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita
Mendoza, and to the media. Accused-appellant Edna contends that being uncounselled
extrajudicial confession, her admissions to having committed the crime charged should have
been excluded in evidence against her for being violative of Article III, Section 12(1) of the
Constitution.

Particularly, she takes exception to the testimony of prosecution witnesses Remigio Bernardo and
Mercedita Mendoza for being hearsay and in the nature of an uncounselled admission.

With the above vital pieces of evidence excluded, accused-appellant is of the position that the
remaining proof of her alleged guilt, consisting in the main of circumstantial evidence, is
inadequate to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We partly disagree.

Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

xxxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

We have held that the abovequoted provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation when
the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect.[41] Said constitutional guarantee has also been extended to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for
questioning.[42]

To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy
the following requirements:

(1) it must be voluntary;

(2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(3) it must be express; and
(4) it must be in writing.[43]
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance,
may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and
(3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning
of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed
several houses as well as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore,
already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of
the Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellants
confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in response to the interrogation
made by the latter admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rights
under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of
accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found
by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in
violation of her constitutional rights.

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellants confession to Barangay Chairman

Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should
well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to
those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed the offense as what
happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the
neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas house. The testimony
of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant,
admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional guarantee.
Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the
individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with
the relation between a private individual and another private individual as both accused-
appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are.[44] Here, there is no
evidence on record to show that said witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately,
accused-appellants uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted
by the RTC.

Accused-appellant likewise assails the admission of the testimony of SPO4 Danilo Talusan.
Contending that [w]hen SPO4 Danilo Talusan testified in court, his story is more of events, which
are not within his personal knowledge but based from accounts of witnesses who derived
information allegedly from the accused or some other persons x x x. In other words, she objects
to the testimony for being merely hearsay. With this imputation of inadmissibility, we agree with
what the Court of Appeals had to say:

Although this testimony of SFO4 Danilo Talusan is hearsay because he was not present when Gus
Abelgas interviewed accused-appellant EDNA, it may nevertheless be admitted in evidence as an
independently relevant statement to establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement or the
fact that the statement was made [People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 103547, July 20, 1999, 310 SCRA
621 citing People v. Cusi, Jr., G.R. No. L-20986, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 944.]. In People vs.
Velasquez, G.R. Nos. 132635 & 143872-75, February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA 455, the Supreme Court
ruled that:

Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the
fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the
statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.[45]

As regards the confession given by accused-appellant to the media, we need not discuss it
further for the reporters were never presented to testify in court.
As a final attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant asserts that since the identities of the
burned bodies were never conclusively established, she cannot be responsible for their deaths.

Such assertion is bereft of merit.

In the crime of arson, the identities of the victims are immaterial in that intent to kill them
particularly is not one of the elements of the crime. As we have clarified earlier, the killing of a
person is absorbed in the charge of arson, simple or destructive. The prosecution need only
prove, that the burning was intentional and that what was intentionally burned is an inhabited
house or dwelling. Again, in the case of People v. Soriano,[46] we explained that:

Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of Arson, it may be inferred from the acts of
the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act; and
when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to
produce further evidence of his wrongful intent.[47]

The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of?

As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive arson,
under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; and 2) simple
arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is based on the kind, character and
location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused,[48] to wit:

Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious
burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft,
factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group
of persons.[[49]] The classification of this type of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively
discourage and deter the commission of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of
properties and protect the lives of innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves
only destruction and despair in its wake; hence, the State mandates greater retribution to
authors of this heinous crime. The exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime takes
into consideration the extreme danger to human lives exposed by the malicious burning of these
structures; the danger to property resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is normally
difficult to adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the
perpetrators; and, the greater impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric of the
nation. [Emphasis supplied.]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death should
result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal Code
remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning of
public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA
7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These include houses, dwellings, government
buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial
establishments.[[50]] Although the purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high
incidence of fires and other crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy and
preserve the social, economic and political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty
to be meted to offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to
lessen the severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed, depending on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied.]

To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal
Code (as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.[51] On the
other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser
degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words,
Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may
nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances
present. [Emphasis supplied.][52]

Prescinding from the above clarification vis--vis the description of the crime as stated in the
accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged with
the crime of Simple Arson for having deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of
ROBERTO SEPARA and family x x x knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a
thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said
building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People v. Soriano.[53]
The accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular house. Unfortunately, the blaze
spread and gutted down five (5) neighboring houses. The RTC therein found the accused guilty of
destructive arson under paragraph 1[54] of Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659. This Court, through Mr. Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:
x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties
burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited
houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended
Information particularly refer to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The
applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal
Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be
construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and
(b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Incidentally, these elements
concur in the case at bar.[55]
As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having
intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said conflagration
likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if proved, as it was
proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of the crime of simple
arson. Such is the case notwithstanding the error in the designation of the offense in the
information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the facts constituting the crime
alleged therein.[56] What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violate, x x x, but the description
of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.[57]
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No. 1613
categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. - If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death
results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis supplied.]
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information, the imposable
penalty on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
Apropos the civil liabilities of accused-appellant, current jurisprudence[58] dictate that the civil
indemnity due from accused-appellant is P50,000.00 for the death of each of the victims.[59]
However, the monetary awards for moral and exemplary damages given by the Court of Appeals,
both in the amount of P50,000.00, due the heirs of the victims, have to be deleted for lack of
material basis. Similarly, the Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages to Rodolfo Movilla in
the amount of P50,000.00 for the destruction of his house, also has to be deleted, but in this
instance for being improper. Moral damages cannot be award by this Court in the absence of
proof of mental or physical suffering on the part of the heirs of the victims.[60] Concerning the
award of exemplary damages, the reason for the deletion being that no aggravating
circumstance had been alleged and proved by the prosecution in the case at bar.[61]
To summarize, accused-appellants alternative plea that she be acquitted of the crime must be
rejected. With the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals. It is indubitable that accused-appellant is the author of the crime of
simple arson. All the circumstantial evidence presented before the RTC, viewed in its entirety, is
as convincing as direct evidence and, as such, negates accused-appellants innocence, and when
considered concurrently with her admission given to Mercedita Mendoza, the formers guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is twice as evident. Hence, her conviction is effectively justified. More
so, as it is propitious to note that in stark contrast to the factual circumstances presented by the
prosecution, accused-appellant neither mustered a denial nor an alibi except for the proposition
that her guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2 September 2005, in CA G.R. CR
HC No. 01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the conviction of accused-appellant EDNA
MALNGAN Y MAYO is concerned. The sentence to be imposed and the amount of damages to be
awarded, however, are MODIFIED. In accordance with Sec. 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613,
accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of each of the victims P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 133570-71 January 15, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
NERIO SUELA y HEMBRA, EDGAR SUELA y HEMBRA and EDGARDO BATOCAN, appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In this Decision, the Court visits and applies existing jurisprudence on the right to competent and
independent counsel of persons under custodial investigation. It also reiterates the long-standing
judicial policy that procedural laws which are favorable to the accused shall be given retroactive
effect. Inasmuch as the aggravating circumstance of disguise was not alleged in the Information,
it cannot now be appreciated to increase the penalty to death, notwithstanding the fact that the
new rule requiring such allegation was promulgated only after the crime was committed and
after the trial court had already rendered its Decision.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision1 dated January 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, (Branch 95), finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
with homicide and simple robbery. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the following:
"1. In Crim. Cases Nos. Q-96-64616 and Q-96-65071, the Court finds the accused Nerio Suela y
Hembra and Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide defined in and penalized by paragraph I, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, and, there being one aggravating circumstance of
disguise (par. 14, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code) and no mitigating circumstance to offset the
same, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and are ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the late Geronimo Gabilo y Hostallero the amount of P50,000.00, as death
indemnity; P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; P125,250.00, as actual and compensatory
damages; and P2,8[8]0,000.00, as loss of earnings based on the formula (2/3 x (80-44) or 24
years life expectancy by P120,000.00 reasonable average net annual earnings.
"The three accused are further ordered to return to Director Nilo Rosas the three (3) cameras
worth P25,000.00; assorted jewelry worth P120,000.00 and cash money in the amount of
P500,000.00. If the three (3) cameras and the assorted jewelry can no longer be returned, the
three (3) accused are hereby ordered to instead pay the value thereof in the total amount of
P145,000.00;
"2. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-64618, the Court finds the accused Edgar Suela y Hembra GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Robbery defined in and penalized by paragraph
5, Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum, as the minimum
penalty to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum, as
the maximum penalty; and,
"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. Q-96-64617 and Q-96-65072, the Court finds the accused Nerio Suela y
Hembra, Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan NOT GUILTY of the Crime of Carnapping as
defined in and penalized by Rep. Act. 6539, as amended by Rep. Act 7659, and hereby ACQUITS
them for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
"The Sony TV set (Exh. 'E') and the Citizen gold wrist watch (Exh. 'T-1') are hereby ordered
returned to Director Nilo Rosas upon the final disposition of the cases.
"The motorcycle (Exh. 'FF') under the name of the accused Edgardo Batocan shall be kept by the
Court until the final disposition of the cases.
"All the three (3) accused are ordered to pay the costs.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."2
The Information3 against Nerio Suela and Edgar Suela in Criminal Case No. Q-96-64616 reads as
follows:
"That on or about the 26th day of July 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating with another person whose true name, identity and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, by means of
force upon things, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one GERONIMO
GABILO Y HOSTALLERO in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned
said accused managed to enter the house of complainant located at No. 95 B-5 A. Melchor St.,
Xavierville Subd., Loyola Heights, this City, by barging into the door of said house and once
inside took, robbed and carried away the following, to wit:
one (1) 14" Sony Trinitron colored TV
P 12,000.00
three (3) cameras
25,000.00
assorted jewelries
120,000.00
cash money
500,000.00
all in the total amount of P657,000.00, Philippine Currency, and on the occasion of said Robbery,
the said accused pursuant to their conspiracy, with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted and
employed personal violence upon the person of said GERONIMO GABILO Y HOSTALLERO, by
stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Geronimo Gabilo y Hostallero, in the total amount aforementioned."
The Information4 against Edgardo Batocan in Criminal Case No. Q-96-65071 reads as follows:
"That on or about the 26th day of July, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating with NERIO SUELA Y HEMBRA and EDGAR SUELA Y
HEMBRA who are being charged with the same offense at Regional Trial Court Branch 79 and
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-64616, and mutually helping one another, by means of force
upon things, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one NILO ROSAS Y LANETE
in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place afor[e]mentioned said accused entered the
house of complainant located at 95 Melchor St. Xavierville Subd., Loyola Heights, this City, by
barging into the door of said house and inside took, robbed and carried away the following, to
wit:
one (1) 14" Sony Trinitron colored TV
P 12,000.00
three (3) cameras
25,000.00
assorted jewelries
120,000.00
cash money
500,000.00
all in the total amount of P657,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of Nilo
Rosas y Lanete in the aforementioned amount of P657,000.00, and on the occasion of said
Robbery, the said accused pursuant to their conspiracy, with intent to kill, attacked, assaulted
and employed personal violence upon the person of said GERONIMO GABILO Y HOSTALLERO, by
stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Geronimo Gabilo y Hostallero."
The Information5 against Edgar Suela in Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618 reads as follows:
"That on or about the 18th day of January 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
with intent to gain, and by means of intimidation against person, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob/extort one NILO ROSAS Y LANETE in the manner as follows: on the
date and place aforementioned, the said accused called up by phone the Executive Secretary of
said complainant and demanded the amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, in exchange
for the information regarding the robbery case and slaying of Geronimo Gabilo on July 26, 1995,
as in fact said accused, took, robbed and carried away the aforesaid amount of P200,000.00,
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party."
When arraigned on September 24, 1996, appellants, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not
guilty."6 In due course, they were tried and found guilty by the court a quo.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the evidence for the prosecution in this wise:7
"On July 26, 1995, between 11:00 P.M. and 12:00 midnight, private complainant Director Nilo L.
Rosas was at the master's bedroom located at the second floor of his townhouse residence at
#95 B-5 A. Melchor Street, Xavierville Subdivision, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. He was watching
television thereat, together with his adopted son, Norman Rosas, and his former co-teacher and
good friend, Geronimo 'Gerry' Gabilo, who at that time was engaged in the real estate business.
Suddenly, three persons sporting ski masks, bonnets and gloves, brandishing handguns and a
knife, barged into the room. The tallest of the three, with a height of about five feet and five
inches, reached for the light switch and turned it off. The three intruders then shouted 'dapa,
dapa.' So Director Rosas, Gerry Gabilo, and Norman Rosas dropped to the floor with their faces
facing the bed. Two of the malefactors turned off the television set, and tied their hands at their
backs, with the use of hankies and telephone cord. The room remained illuminated by the light
coming from a walk-in closet and from the lamp post outside fronting the room, and from the
lights of the neighboring townhouses.
"The shortest of the three malefactors, about five feet tall, poked the barrel of his gun on the
chin of Director Rosas, then inside Rosas' mouth. At the same time, using his free hand, the same
malefactor poked a knife on the right side of Rosas' neck. The other man, who was the second to
the tallest, with a height of about five feet three inches, while holding a penlight in one hand,
and a gun on the other, threateningly told Rosas, 'Nakikita mo ba iyan? Nararamdaman mo ba
iyan?', to which Director Rosas replied 'Opo, opo.' The two then ordered Rosas to 'ilabas ang
iyong mga pera.' All that time, while the two were with Director Rosas, the other man, the tallest
of them, stood in front of the mirror by the side of the door, facing and brandishing a gun
towards Norman Rosas. Director Rosas did not heed the order to bring out the money even
though Gabilo advised him, saying 'Nilo ilabas mo na.' However, Gabilo stood up, and even with
his hands tied at the back, went towards the second compartment of the television rack and
reached for an envelope containing his money. He handed the envelope to the shortest of the
three fellows, who, upon seeing the money inside the envelope, closed it. Director Rosas knew
that the envelope contained P200,000.00 as Gabilo had informed him of the amount earlier that
evening. Forced to reveal that his money was in the walk-in closet, the second tallest of the three
malefactors poked a gun on Director Rosas' neck, forced him to get up, kicked and pushed him
towards the closet. When the fellow could not open the closet, he asked Rosas for the key. When
he was informed that the key was inside his wallet which was on top of the drawer beside his
bed, the fellow opened the wallet and took all the money he found in it: two (2) $100.00 bills and
ten (10) P1,000.00 bills. With the key, he thereafter opened the closet. He then asked where the
money was. When Director Rosas told him that it was inside his suitcase, the fellow tried opening
it but failed. So he ordered Director Rosas to open it but the latter also failed as he had difficulty
doing so since his hands were still tied at his back. The fellow, however, subsequently opened
the suit case himself and got all the money in it amounting to P300,000.00. He also took the
valuables he found inside the suit case, viz., a gold-plated Citizen wristwatch engraved at the
back with 'N.L. Rosas' and some rings and bracelet valued at P20,000.00, more or less. The
malefactors also took with them three (3) automatic cameras valued at P25,000.00 each, and
bottles of cologne costing about P10,000.00. While leaving Director Rosas lying on the floor near
the closet, the second tallest of the three, together with the shortest fellow, went to Gabilo and
dragged and pushed him. They demanded that Gabilo give them his car key, which he did. They
then dragged Gabilo out of the room and proceeded downstairs. The second tallest fellow went
back to Director Rosas and said 'Mabait ka, mabait ka' but warned him not to follow them
downstairs because 'puputok ang granada sa daanan mo.' He then placed a gag inside Director
Rosas' mouth, tying it with a piece of cloth. Upon sensing that the three were already downstairs,
Director Rosas tried to follow them but his adopted son, Norman Rosas, pleaded 'Daddy, daddy,
huwag kang sumunod, baka patayin ka nila.' After about two (2) minutes, a long moaning sound
was heard coming from downstairs, which sound resembled Gabilo's voice. After a while, he
heard the engine of Gabilo's car, a Nissan Sentra car with plate no. TEB-258, running and he later
found out that they had also carted away his Sony Trinitron colored television set. Sensing that
the malefactors had left, he went downstairs and saw Gabilo slump[ed] on the floor in his blood.
When he saw that Gabilo was motionless, he went back to the second floor and told his son to
rouse their housemaid, Pinky Maalac, who was asleep on the third floor of their townhouse.
They then sought help from their neighbors. The first to assist them was a medical doctor who,
upon examining Gabilo, informed them that the latter was already dead. At the Quezon City
Medical Center where Gabilo was subsequently brought, he was pronounced dead-on-
arrival.1wphi1.nt
"Early morning, the following day, July 27, 1995, upon receiving the report from the Quezon City
Medical Center regarding the stabbing incident which resulted to the death of Gerry Gabilo,
Captain Alejandro Casanova, SPO3 Jesus Patriarca, and SPO2 Reynato Resurrecion, all of the
Quirino District Police Station, Station 9, Anonas Road, Quezon City, proceeded to the crime
scene. SPO3 Jesus Patriarca was assigned as lead investigator of the case. The autopsy
conducted on Gabilo showed that he died of hemorrhage due to multiple (five) stab wounds. To
shed light on the incident, several persons, including private complainant Director Rosas, his
adopted son, Norman Rosas, his brother, Romulo Rosas, their housemaid, Pinky Maalac, William
Hostillero, Ruben Pacuntad, Joven Maalac and Rodito Gabilo, were summoned and interviewed
by the police. The same, however, did not result to any breakthrough for the case. When they
were subjected to a lie detector test by the NBI, the results were negative.
"Gabilo's Nissan Sentra vehicle was recovered by the operatives of the Western Police District as
it was found abandoned at P. Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. At the back seat floor of the
car, a black bonnet was found.
"After almost five (5) months of no leads towards solving the case, on January 15, 1996, Araceli
Tubaga, Director Rosas' executive secretary at his DECS office at Misamis Street, Bago Bantay,
Quezon City, received a call from a male person who requested to speak with Director Rosas.
When Tubaga requested to get his message as the director could not go to the phone, he told her
to relay to Rosas that he has information as to the identity and whereabouts of those responsible
for the death of his friend, Gabilo. He told her that he is willing to give the information in writing
in exchange for P200,000.00. He then said that he will call again for Rosas' response to his offer.
In reaction, Director Rosas, accompanied by Tubaga, went to the Quirino District Police Station to
inform Capt. Casanova about the call. Capt. Casanova came up with the plan to entrap the caller.
At noon the following day (January 16, 1996), the unidentified caller called again. When told that
Director Rosas was accepting his offer, he instructed Tubaga to meet him the following day
(January 17, 1996) at noon at the Ninoy Aquino Park, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. He told her to
bring with her the amount of P200,000.00 which should be placed in a plastic bag, and to bring
flowers with her so he could easily identify her. Director Rosas informed Capt. Casanova about
the conversation.
"On January 17, 1996, about 10:00 A.M. Tubaga went to the Max's Restaurant at the Quezon City
Circle and met Capt. Casanova and the other policemen, in preparation for the entrapment.
Carrying with her the boodle money in a Unilane Food Mart plastic bag, she proceeded to the
Ninoy Aquino Park and waited but the caller did not appear. About 5:00 P.M. that afternoon, the
caller called her at the office and informed her that he will meet her the following day (January
18, 1996) at the same time and place. Thus, the following day, she waited for him at the
designated spot. Shortly after, a male person approached her and asked if she was the one with
whom he talked with over the phone. When she answered in the affirmative, he handed her an
envelope while she handed him the plastic bag containing the boodle money. While he was
untying the plastic bag to check its contents, the police officers who were posted in the vicinity
pounced on him and effected his arrest. He was brought to Police Station 9. This person was later
identified as appellant Edgar Suela.1wphi1.nt
"While on board the vehicle on their way to the police station, in the presence of appellant Edgar
Suela, Capt. Casanova, and the other policemen, SPO3 Patriarca opened the envelope which
Tubaga had earlier received from appellant Edgar Suela. It contained a handwritten note which
reads:
1. Nerio Suela ang utak nang pag-paslang
2. TV color and ibedensia nasa bahay niya. Ang tunay na pangalan National ngayon ay pinalitan
nang Panasonic.
3. Ang knife na ginamit nasa bahay niya 8 [sic].
When he asked Edgar Suela who wrote it, he answered 'Ako po, sir.' When he further asked as to
who is Nerio Suela, Edgar answered that he is his brother and is the driver of Director Rosas.
"With that information, appellant Nerio Suela was immediately arrested at Director Rosas' office.
When Nerio confirmed the contents of his brother Edgar's letter, Capt. Casanova directed SPO1
Carlos Nicolas and PO2 Orlin Comia to accompany Nerio to his residence at Kaibigan Street
Street, Kalayaan B, Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City. Thereat, they recovered the Sony
Trinitron TV, and a knife with a wooden scabbard.
"While under detention, the Suelas expressed their desire to give an extra-judicial confession.
Hence, on January 19, 1996, between 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, SPO3 Patriarca,
together with Capt. Casanova and another police officer, brought the Suelas to the office of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), located at the second floor, Hall of Justice, Quezon City.
When they arrived there, Atty. Confesor Sansano and Atty. Florimond Rous were manning the IBP
office. When the police informed them of their purpose, Atty. Sansano separately interviewed
each of the Suelas first, informed them of their constitutional rights, insured that they
understood the import of their confession, physically examined them for any sign of
maltreatment or force, and after satisfying himself that the suspects' intention was voluntary on
their part and that it was his legal assistance that they were willing to secure, he allowed the
police to take down their individual extra-judicial confessions. Atty. Sansano was present all
throughout the time that the Suelas were individually propounded with questions. Thereafter,
both were brought before the Assistant City Prosecutor where they affirmed their confessions
under oath in the presence of Atty. Sansano who assisted them. The following morning, January
20, 1996, the Suelas were again brought before Assistant City Prosecutor Ibuyan for inquest
investigation where they again affirmed under oath the contents of their extra-judicial
confessions.
"In their extra-judicial confessions, the Suelas mentioned appellant Edgardo Batocan, their
townmate, as a participant in the crime. Thus, his name was included in the criminal
informations, and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.
"Sometime in the second week of March 1996, a team composed of SPO3 Patriarca, Capt. Nestor
Abalos, and SPO2 Jesus Casica, together with the father of the Suela brothers, went to Jaro,
Leyte, to serve the warrant of arrest on appellant Batocan. In coordination with Sr./Insp. Benjamin
Labadia, the Chief of Police in Jaro, Leyte, the arrest of appellant Batocan was effected. He was
immediately brought to Manila and was detained at the Quezon City Police Station 9. The
operatives were able to recover the gold-plated Citizen watch of Rosas from Batocan's girlfriend
at Barangay San Agustin, Jaro, Leyte. The brand-new Honda motorcycle registered in appellant
Batocan's name was shipped from Leyte to Quezon City as Batocan had admitted that he had
bought it sometime in July 1995 with his share from the loot of the robbery. While in police
custody, appellant Batocan also indicated his desire to give an extra-judicial confession. Thus, on
March 31, 1996, about 3:30 P.M., he was brought by SPO2 Reynato Resurreccion to the same IBP
office and gave his confession in the presence and with the assistant of Atty. Flormind [sic] Rous,
which statement he subscribed before an Assistant City Prosecutor and later re-affirmed before
an inquest Fiscal." (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) summarized appellants' version of the
incident as follows:8
"On July 26, 1995, Edgardo Batocan was in his hometown in Jaro, Leyte where he worked as a
farmer. Sometime in March 1996, and while on board his motorcycle, he was arrested by the
police. He bought the motorcycle from an uncle with the money that his sister gave him. No
citizen gold wristwatch was seized from him upon his arrest.
"After his arrest he was brought to Quezon City and investigated. He had no knowledge nor any
participation in the crime that occurred on July 26, 1995, at the residence of Director Nilo Rosas.
He was forced and threatened by the police officers to admit and confess to the crimes. He was
also forced to sign a typewritten extrajudicial confession, the contents of which he did not know
as he was not allowed to read it nor was it read to him. No lawyer was present at that time and
he only met Atty. Rous for the first time in court. He recalled however, that during his brief visit
at the IBP-Quezon City Chapter office, in the afternoon of March 13, 1996, he saw, but did not
talk to Atty. Rous, the one who limps, whom he recognized when the latter testified in Court. He
was brought before the Assistant City Prosecutor for inquest but the fiscal did not explain to him
the contents of his written statement. He was not adept at reading because he only reached first
year high school. No copy of his supposed statement was given him. He did not complain to the
fiscal nor to any government agency about the alleged coercion and threats of the police. He
only told his lawyer, Atty. Tabang and his brother Jimmy Batocan about it. He is not angry at the
Suelas for falsely implicating him. In jail, he confronted the brothers and was told that they were
merely forced by the police officers so that they could be freed. The Suelas had many friends but
they pointed to him because they thought that the police will no longer bother to pursue him
because he lived in a very far place in Leyte. He knew the Suela brothers because they were his
barriomates in San Agustin, Jaro, Leyte. Although he came to Manila in 1992 to work until 1994,
he did not visit the Suelas or any of his friends from his barrio. He could not recall his exact
Manila address.
"Nerio Suela worked as a driver of Director Nilo Rosas at DECS 1993 up to 1995. Geronimo Gabilo
was formerly his co-employee thereat as the latter was the one responsible for his employment
with Director Rosas. In the months of June and July 1995, he was mostly at home because he was
recuperating from an operation (for appendectomy). He was on leave and reported back to work
only on July 30, 1995. It was then that he learned about the untimely demise of Gerry Gabilo. The
police and the NBI did not investigate him, not until after his arrest on January 18, 1996 by the
Quezon City police.
"He had no knowledge nor participation in the killing of Gerry Gabilo nor in the robbery that
occurred at the residence of Director Nilo Rosas on the night of July 26, 1995. After his arrest, he
was brought to Danarra Hotel where he was manhandled and boxed and his head submerged in
the toilet bowl. He was forced to sign a piece of paper. He also met his brother Edgar at the same
hotel. He was not allowed to read the paper which he was forced to sign. He found out later on
that this was the statement or his supposed extra-judicial confession. From the hotel, he was
brought to his house where the police took away his television set (TV) and a knife with
scabbard. Director Rosas gave him the tv set after Gabilo's death. At that time, he did not notice
why the 'Sony' brand name was scrapped and replaced by the name 'National'. The next day, he
was brought to the City Hall where he was given a lawyer whom he does not know and whose
name he could not even recall. The lawyer showed him a paper and asked him if the signature
thereon was his. The lawyer did not ask him anything more. The former did not explain to him
that said paper was his alleged admission to the crimes for which he was arrested and detained.
He met Atty. Sansano for the first time in the court room during the hearing of these cases and
not on January 19, 1996. He could not recall if Atty. Sansano was the same one who was
presented to him when he was brought to the City Hall after his arrest. After this, he was brought
before the Assistant City Prosecutor.
"He sustained hematomas (pasa) from the man-handling by his police captors but he did not
show them to the Assistant City Prosecutor or the lawyer at the IBP, Quezon City office nor did he
file any complaint against the police. He recanted his confession in his counter-affidavit.
"He knew Edgardo Batocan well because they grew up together in the same town in Leyte. On
July 26, 1995, he was at home at Batasan Hills, Quezon City, the whole time. He was playing
chess with his neighbor Mang Tancio during the time of the incident.
"While inside the prison cell, he was convinced by his officemates at the DECS-NCR and by Capt.
Casanova to write Director Rosas a letter on January 31, 1996. The contents of this letter was
merely dictated to him by the police.
"Edgar Suela admits to having called up the office of Director Nilo Rosas and in proposing a trade
off of P200,000.00 in exchange for the information he would give about the identities and
whereabouts of the robbers. He learned from his brother Nerio that Director Rosas placed a
reward money for whoever can provide such an information. At the agreed time and date of the
'trade off', the police apprehended him and changed the original note he gave with another
written note the contents of which, the police forced and dictated to him. During his
investigation, the police employed threats, intimidation and physical force to make him admit to
the crime, and to sign a statement or confession. Together with his brother, he was brought to
the office of the IBP in Quezon City, a lawyer talked to him and he identified this person in court
as Atty. Sansano. At the IBP office, he was asked to sign his supposed extrajudicial confession.
Later on, he executed a Counter-Affidavit wherein he assailed the voluntariness of his forced
confession and recanted the contents thereof.
"He has no knowledge about the killing of Gerry Gabilo nor about the robbers who invaded
Director Rosas' house.
"On July 26, 1995, he was on his tour of duty as security guard of Hoctagon Security Agency at
his assigned post at Northridge Elementary School, along Mother Ignacia Street, Timog Avenue,
Quezon City. Edgardo Batocan was his acquaintance since childhood and the last time he saw the
latter was in 1990 at Jaro, Leyte. He did not see Batocan in his hometown when he got married in
November 1995. He did not implicate Batocan. He learned about the death of Gerry Gabilo when
he came back to Manila after his wedding.
"Joselito Jacinto testified that Nerio Suela wanted him to repair the latter's television set. The
defect of said tv, pertain only to the channeling. He asked Suela for money to buy the spare
parts. On August 19, 1995, he met Nerio Suela and his boss, Director Rosas at the SM parking lot.
Rosas gave Nerio some money which the latter in turn gave him for the TV spare parts and
repair.
"Dionesio Ador had seen Edgardo Batocan in Jaro, Leyte on July 26, 1995. The motorbike of
Batocan is an old red Honda. He saw Batocan used a new motorbike in December 1995 in their
barrio. He does not know the Suela brothers. Batocan had been in their barrio all his life and had
not left their place." (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The court a quo ruled that appellants had been assisted by competent and independent counsel
during the execution of their extrajudicial confessions. It gave credence to the testimonies of
Atty. Sansano and the police officers and thus admitted in evidence the said confessions.
The letter of Nerio Suela addressed to Director Rosas asking for forgiveness, as well as the
discovery of the stolen TV set and knife in the former's house, further convinced the trial court of
appellants' guilt. Finding the presence of one aggravating circumstance (disguise) with no
mitigating circumstance to offset it, the trial court sentenced them to death.
Hence, this automatic review before us.9
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, Appellant Edgardo Batocan ascribes to the trial court the following alleged errors:10
"I. The trial court gravely erred in considering Edgardo Batocan's extra judicial confession as
admissible evidence against him.
"II. The trial court erred in admitting and appreciating the wristwatch as evidence against
Edgardo Batocan.
"III.The trial court erred in convicting Appellant Batocan of robbery with homicide."
Appellants Nerio and Edgar Suela, on the other hand, fault the trial court with the following
supposed errors:11
"I. The court a quo erred in considering the extr[a]-judicial confessions of Edgar Suela and Nerio
Suel[a] are admissible against them;
"II. The court a quo erred in considering the letter of Nerio Suela to Director Nilo Rosas as
evidence against him;
"III. The court a quo erred in convicting Edgar Suela for simple robbery under Art. 294, no. 5, of
the Revised Penal Code.
"IV. The court a quo erred in convicting Edgar Suela and Nerio Suela [of] robbery with homicide."
Basically, the assigned errors boil down to four: (1) whether the extrajudicial confessions of
appellants are admissible in evidence; (2) whether the wristwatch and the letter (of Nerio Suela)
are admissible in evidence; (3) whether appellants can be convicted of robbery with homicide;
and (4) whether Edgar Suela is guilty of robbery for demanding P200,000 as payment for
information on the robbery-slay case.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confessions
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
xxx xxx x x x."
In People v. Labtan,12 we explained that "[t]he right to counsel is a fundamental right and
contemplates not a mere presence of the lawyer beside the accused." Furthermore, an effective
and vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically [requires] that the lawyer be present and able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should
ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully
understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his
constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional
rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent."13
True, counsel does not necessarily have to dissuade the person under investigation from
confessing. But his bounden duty is to properly and fully advise his clients on the nature and
consequences of an extrajudicial confession.
In People v. Deniega,14 the Court explained:
"The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if
the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of
the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be useless,
voluntariness is impaired. If the lawyer's role is reduced to being that of a mere witness to the
signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating therein compliance with the accused's
constitutional rights, the constitutional standard guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1) is not
met. The process above-described fulfills the prophylactic purpose of the constitutional provision
by avoiding the 'pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from
the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense' and ensuring
that the accused's waiver of his right to self incrimination during the investigation is an informed
one in all aspects."
The modifier competent and independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. It
stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable
lawyer.15
With respect Edgardo Batocan, we hold that his extrajudicial confession was obtained in violation
of his constitutional rights. This appellant did not finish first year high school.16 Yet Atty. Rous,
who is touted by the prosecution as a competent and independent counsel, interviewed Batocan
-- before the latter gave his confession -- for only around "five minutes."17 After this initial
interview, Atty. Rous just listened nonchalantly to the questions propounded by the police and to
the answers given by Batocan. Counsel was not even sure that he had explained to appellant the
consequences of his extrajudicial confession. Furthermore, Atty. Rous' attention was divided while
attending the custodial investigation as he was also looking over another paper work on his
desk.18
In view of these proven circumstances, we are not convinced that counsel had fully explained to
Batocan his constitutional rights and what they entailed or the nature and the consequences of
an extrajudicial confession -- explanations that would have enabled him to make an informed
judgment on whether to confess; and if so, on what matters. There is no showing that Atty. Rous
properly explained the choices or options open to appellant, a duty expected of any counsel
under the circumstances. In sum, he did not turn out to be the competent and independent
counsel envisioned by the Constitution.
We now go to the extrajudicial confessions of Edgar and Nerio Suela. Atty. Sansano supposedly
stood as counsel for the Suela brothers during their custodial investigation. He testified on how
he discharged his duties as follows:
"Q: Did you also inform them of the nature of the charge against them and the circumstances
s[u]rrounding the taking of their statement?
A: I did not have the opportunity to inform them about the nature of their charge because at
that time, when they introduced to me, I have not yet informed them what they are going to do
and what being took their statement.
Q: In other words, Mr. Witness, you did not inform the[m] that the [imposable] penalty in this
crime is death?
A: Well, during my personal interview as I said, at that time, I don't even know that they are
charged for Murder and Homicide.
Q: But anyway, Mr. Witness, when this case was brought to you by the police officer, you
really informed that the crime charged was robbery-homicide, Carnapping and extortion?
A: Nobody informed me about the nature of the charge as they stated. They were just
brought before me there. I was asked to provide the free legal assistance other than the
investigation conducted by the police officer.
Q: Did you not ask the police why these people were brought to you?
A: They told me that they are going to be asked questions, to be investigated in connection
with that incident in Dr. Rosas home.
Q: And did you not ask the police what was that incident?
A: The police told me already that the two boys were going to give statement in connection
with that incident in Dr. Rosas house where one was killed in the house of Dr. Rosas.19
xxx xxx xxx
Q: But, nevertheless, Mr. Witness, it was the policeman who choose you to be the lawyer to
assist?
A: No, sir, the police only thru their duties, to suggest or provide where counsel can be
sought, now, it happened that under our agreement, with the police, if the two boys were going
to give their statement and if the declarant got no lawyer that they will bring them to the IBP
because we even provide the assistance that are needed in order to be able to conduct an
investigation."20 (Italics supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
"Q: Anyway, you already knew that the incident of robbery and killing of a person was
involved, is that right?
A: Yes sir, after the investigation.
Q: So when you already knew the possible charge based on the testimony of the two
declarants?
A: Yes sir, it was robbery with homicide.
Q: You said a while ago that your duty as assisting counsel was only to advise the suspects
one of which is to advise them that they can if they do not want to answer those questions that
they would think damaging then they can do that?
A: Yes sir, and the best evidence is the evidence that they gave in their statements.
Q: Now, since you advised them about damaging testimonies, did you not advise them that
to make a confession would be damaging to themselves as assisting counsel?
A: The confession became clearly damaging only after the answers were given following the
question but as I said, at that stage I did not stop the declarant from giving his answer because if
I objected then that would be an obstruction in the investigation itself."21
Evidently, Atty. Sansano did not understand the exact nature of appellants' rights to counsel and
to remain silent during their custodial investigations. He viewed a refusal to answer as an
obstruction in the investigation. This shows that he was incapable or unwilling to advise
appellants that remaining silent was a right they could freely exercise without fear of any
untoward consequence. As counsel, he could have stopped his clients from answering the
propounded questions and advised them of their right to remain silent, if they preferred to do so.
That the process of investigation could have been "obstructed" should not have concerned him
because his duty was to his clients and not to the prosecution or to the police
investigators.1wphi1.nt
Moreover, when he interviewed appellants, he did not even bother to find out the gist of their
proposed statements in order to be able to inform them properly of the nature and consequences
of their extrajudicial confessions. Clearly and sadly, appellants were not accorded competent and
independent counsel whom they could rely on to look after their interests.
"In People v. dela Cruz, we stated that 'a confession made in an atmosphere characterized by
deficiencies in informing the accused of all rights to which he is entitled would be rendered
valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is, by non-compliance with the procedural and
substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now
further implemented and ramified by statutory law.'"22
Where the prosecution failed to discharge the State's burden of proving with clear and
convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he
extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative
value.23
The extrajudicial confessions of all three appellants are thus inadmissible in evidence.
Second Issue:
Admissibility of Wristwatch and Letter
Wristwatch
Edgardo Batocan allegedly confessed in Leyte that the stolen Citizen wristwatch had been given
to his girlfriend. When he rendered this confession, he did not execute any written waiver of his
right to remain silent or of his right to counsel. "Any admission wrung from the accused in
violation of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence against him."24 Therefore, his
alleged statement as to the location of the wristwatch is inadmissible.
Furthermore, the prosecution's claim that the wristwatch was recovered from his girlfriend is
hearsay and hence, has limited probative value.25 The prosecution did not present anyone who
had actually witnessed the alleged recovery of the wristwatch from the girl. S/Insp. Benjamin
Labadia recounted the incident in this plainly insufficient manner:
"Q: Alright Mr. Witness, you said that a wrist watch was also a part of the loot and that
Batocan told your team that it was in the custody of his sweetheart. When so informed that this
wrist watch was in the custody of his sweetheart, what did the police operatives do?
A: The police operatives together with Edgardo Batocan went to the place and when they
came back, I did not go with them, the wrist watch was already in the possession of the Quezon
City Police operative, Sir.
Q: Did you actually see, Mr. Witness when the team proceeded to the place where the
sweetheart of accused Edgardo Batocan was staying, give this wrist watch to the Quezon City
Police operatives?
A: I said, Sir. I did not accompany them."26
As for the wristwatch itself, we agree with appellant that its seizure, if it was really taken from
Batocan's girlfriend, was irregular. As succinctly explained in Batocan's Brief:
"x x x. Clearly, the watch was taken without a search warrant and not as an incident of a valid
arrest. The seizure was irregular. There is also no evidence on record that it was taken under any
of the exempting circumstances where a warrantless seizure is permissible. It was not shown if
the girlfriend voluntarily and validly consented to the taking x x x. Lacking such evidence, no
presumption of regularity can be assumed.
'Where the search was conducted with irregularity, i.e. without a warrant, the Court cannot
appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.'
(People vs. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72).
"The wristwatch is clearly a fruit of a 'fruit of a poisonous tree.' As such, it should not have been
admitted and appreciated against the accused."27
Letter
Nerio Suela also contends that his January 31, 1996 letter to Director Rosas is inadmissible in
evidence. The letter reads as follows:
"Jan-31-96
"Dearest Sir DIR. NILO ROSAS
"Sir matagal kona sana ito ipagtapat sa iyo dahil tuwing kitay nakikita na lumoloha ka parang
hindi ako maka hinga ng sisikip and aking dibdib. Tuwing tayo'y nasa simbahan homihinge ako
ng tawad sa panginoon ang nagawa kong ito nararamdaman ko na parabang hinde niya
tinatanggap.
"Sir napakalaki ng nagawa kong kasalanan sa iyo at sana bigyan mo pa ako ng isang
pagkakataon pagsisihan ko lahat ang pagkakasala sa iyo babagohin ko na ang buhay ko
maglilingkod ako sa diyos.
"Sir nandito ako sa likod ng bakal na rihas halos lahat ng oras ng dadasal ako bigyan mo pa ako
ng isang pagkakataon patawaring mo ako.
"Sir alam ng diyos na hindi ako ang kriminal may kinalaman lang ako inamin ko na lang. Para
naman magkaroon ng lonas yong problima mo hindi narin ako makatiis hindi pa makatolog. Lalo
na nakikita kita na ng hihirap ang inyong katawan lalo na ang in kalooban sana sir bigyan mo pa
ako ng isang pagkakataon patawarin mo ako isa rin ako na anak ng diyos na naligaw ng langdas
ngayon pinagsisihan ko lahat ang nagawa kong kasalanan sir ayaw ko pang mamatay maliliit ang
aking mga anak mahal ako ng aking asawa.
"Sir. Edgardo Batokan ang pumatay kay Sir JERRY sangayon nandoon siya sa Jaro Leyte Bo. San
Agostin. Sir hinde ko maggawang pomatay ng tao somama lang ako dahil baka kayo ang patayin
nang doon lang ako sa may pito. Yung kapatid ko namana siya ang may baril siya and nanotok si
Edgardo Batokan siya ang komoha ng pira tapos omalis na kami ako ang ng drive ng kotse. Tapos
inewan namin sa Ricto tapos ng hiwalay hiwa na kame yon tike. Dian ng kapatid ko.
"Sir patawarin mo na ako hinde naman akong masamang tao na pasama lang ako.
"Sana po & sir babaan mo naman ang aking sintinesia ayaw ko pang mamatay.
Nerio Suela
(signed)
Quezon City Jail
Sir. Sagotin mo naman
itong sulat ko
(signed)"28
This letter was properly identified. Nerio was no longer under custodial investigation when he
wrote it. In open court, he admitted having written it. Thus, contrary to his contention, the fact
that he was not assisted by counsel when he wrote it will not make the letter inadmissible in
evidence. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities.29 Hence, the letter is admissible
in evidence.
Third Issue:
Liability for Robbery with Homicide
Without the wristwatch and the uncounseled extrajudicial confessions, are the remaining pieces
of evidence still sufficient to prove appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt? Fortunately for the
prosecution, our answer is "Yes."
Excluding the wristwatch and the written extrajudicial confessions, the material evidence on
record are as follows:
1) The testimony of the medicolegal officer in conjunction with the medico legal Report30 which
proved the existence of five stab wounds on the cadaver of Geronimo Gabilo;
2) The stolen colored Sony television set and the knife used in stabbing Geronimo Gabilo, which
were recovered from the house of Nerio Suela;
3) The handwritten letter of Nerio Suela asking for forgiveness and admitting his participation in
the crime;
4) The handwritten tip on the identity of the malefactors voluntarily handed by Edgar Suela to
Araceli Tubaga, which -- in open court -- he admitted having written. It states:
'1. Nerio Suela ang utak ng pagpaslang
'2. TV color and evidencia nasa bahay niya ang tunay na pangalan national ngayon ay pinalitan
ng Panasonic
'3. Ang knife na ginamit nasa bahay niya 8 inc.'
5) The testimony of Director Rosas who narrated how three hooded men brandishing guns and a
knife barged into his room on the night of January 18, 1996, and hogtied him, Gabilo and
Norman.31 They were then threatened and intimidated into giving the location of their money
and valuables, which the criminals eventually took.32 The malefactors then dragged Gabilo
downstairs.33 Shortly, thereafter, he followed them and found Gabilo in a pool of his own
blood.34 He observed that the height and built of the three malefactors were the same as those
of appellants;35
6) The oral admissions made by Nerio Suela and Edgardo Batocan to Director Rosas and his
officemates. Rosas testified as follows:
"Q After Nerio Suela was told that somebody will be talking with him thru the phone, what
happened next, if any?
A Nerio Suela pale faced, admitted the commission of the crime and he was very apologetic
to me and he said: "Sir, patawarin mo po ako sa aking nagawa, nagkamali lang po ako, tulungan
naman po ninyo ako", those were the statements of Mr. Nerio Suela as he was being interrogated
by Mr. Patriarca.
Q What else did he tell you?
A Those were the only statements that I actually heard from Nerio Suela.36
xxx xxx xxx
Q Again, do you know a person by the name of Edgardo Batocan?
A I learned about him only from the letter of Nerio Suela and also when I met him on March
13, 1996, sir.
Q: Where did you meet this Edgardo Batocan for the first time, Mr. Witness?
A: I met him in the second floor of station 9 along Anonas Street.
Q: Under what circumstances were you able to meet him?
A: Upon his arrest on March 13, 1996 at around 3:00 in the afternoon, I was called by the
Station Commander of Station 9 to meet Mr. Edgardo Batocan and present also during that time
were the relatives of Gerry Gabilo, sir.
Q: What transpired when you met Edgardo Batocan in the office of the Station Commander of
Station 9?
A: We talked about the crime and he mentioned to us that it was Nerio Suela who planned
the whole thing at their place and the plan was hatched three days before the commission of the
crime on July 26, 1995.
Q: What else did he tell you, Mr. Witness, at that time?
xxx xxx xxx
A: He insisted that it was actually Mr. Nerio Suela who masterminded because on the way
down from the second floor, Mr. Gerry Gabilo was pleading with him for them not to harm him
and felt quite remorseful when he was already about to stab my friend but it was Nerio Suela
who pushed him to kill Gerry and then one of my staff even asked him "how many times did you
stab, Mr. Gabilo?"
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did Edgar Batocan answer to one of your staff?
A: He answered that he hit him five times, sir.
COURT:
Q: You were present when your staff member asked Edgardo about the question?
A: Yes, I was there.
Q: You were also present when Edgardo Batocan gave the answer?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Was there any investigation being conducted by the police at that time you were talking
with Edgardo Batocan?
A: There was none, Your Honor.
Q: Or you were alone with Edgardo Batocan together with your staff member?
A: We were left alone at the second floor with some of my staff member together with the
family of Gerry Gabilo, so we were asking him the circumstances on how he did it and so forth
and so on.
Q: Did he ask for forgiveness?
A: No, he did not Your Honor.37
Edgardo Batocan's confession to Rosas who is not a police officer is admissible in evidence.38
The Rules state that "the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against
him."39 Batocan's verbal declarations are not covered by Sections 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of
the Constitution,40 because they were not extracted while he was under custodial investigation.
In People v. Tawat,41 the Court declared:
"The rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard is he heard and understood all of it. An
oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its
substance."
"Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a
person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance of
the conversation or statement made by the accused."
These pieces of evidence sufficiently prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the
crime of robbery with homicide.
Identities of Appellants As Malefactors
Edgardo Batocan's oral admission to Rosas that he stabbed Gabilo five times dovetails on
material points with the letter of Nerio. In turn, Nerio's letter to Rosas asking for forgiveness and
admitting his participation in the crime, taken together with the recovery from his house of the
stolen TV and knife used in killing Gabilo; plus the oral admission of Batocan and the written tip
of Edgar Suela pointing to him as the mastermind prove beyond reasonable doubt his identity as
one of the malefactors.
The evidence showing the identity of Edgar Suela are circumstantial in character. It is basic that
an accused may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone, provided that: (a)
there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.42 In the present case, all these requirements are satisfied.
These circumstances may be summarized, thus: (1) Edgar's intimate personal knowledge of the
details of the crime which he wrote down as tips; (2) as a security guard, he possessed a gun on
the night of the incident; (3) he was the brother of one of the malefactors and a friend of the
other; (4) the interlocking admissions to Director Rosas of Batocan and his brother Nerio point to
Edgar as their cohort; (5) Rosas also identified him as one of the malefactors. These are duly
proven circumstances which sufficiently establish beyond reasonable doubt his identity as one of
the malefactors.
Conspiracy
The three malefactors arrived together at the house of Director Rosas. They were all wearing ski
masks and were all sporting weapons. While one was threatening Rosas, the other was
intimidating Gabilo and the third was pointing his weapon on Norman. After getting the money
and valuables of Gabilo and Rosas, all three went downstairs together, two of them dragging
Gabilo with them. Upon the instruction of Nerio, Batocan stabbed Gabilo five times. They finally
left together in the same car, with Nerio driving. These acts of the three appellants before, during
and after the crime clearly indicate a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments. Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.43
Hence, although Nerio and Edgar Suela did not themselves stab Gerry Gabilo, they are still liable
for his death as principals because the existence of conspiracy makes the act of one the act of
all.44 Moreover, whenever the complex crime of robbery with homicide is proven to have been
committed, all those who took part in the robbery are liable as principals even though they did
not actually take part in the killing.45
Proper Penalty
The current Rules on Criminal Procedure require that even generic aggravating circumstances
must be alleged in the Information. Thus, Section 9 of new Rule 110 states:
"Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
In People v. Mauricio,46 the Court elucidated:
"The use of the word 'must' indicates that the requirement is mandatory, therefore failure to
comply with Sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at
the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not stated in the
information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application
insofar as they benefit the accused."
In the present case, the aggravating circumstance of disguise which was appreciated by the
court a quo was not alleged in the Informations against appellants. Following the above-cited
new rule and current jurisprudence, we cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of
disguise against appellants. The special complex crime of robbery with homicide carries the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. There being no appreciable aggravating circumstance,
the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, in People v. Catubig,47 we held that while a non-alleged but proven aggravating
circumstance cannot be used to increase the penalty, nonetheless it can be the source of civil
awards. Hence, we retain the trial court's civil grants in this regard.
Fourth Issue:
Robbery
On the trial court's sentence of robbery in Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618, we agree with the
recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General that Edgar Suela should be acquitted. The
OSG explained:
"Simple robbery is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons as
distinguished from the use of force upon things, but the extent of the violence or intimidation
does not fall under pars. 1 to 4 of Article 294 (Revised Penal Code) [p. 175, Criminal Law, Book II,
Vol. IV, Ambrosio Padilla, 1990].
"Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove that appellant Edgar Suela
employed force or intimidation on private complainant Rosas by instilling fear in his mind so as to
compel the latter to cough out the amount of P200,000.00. Instead, what was established was
that he had agreed to give the P200,000.00 in exchange for information regarding the identity
and whereabouts of those who robbed him and killed his friend (TSN, November 4, 1996, p. 7;
TSN, November 5, 1996, pp. 4-9). There was no showing that appellant Edgar Suela had exerted
intimidation on him so as to leave him no choice but to give the money. Instead, what is clear
was that the giving of the money was done not out of fear but because it was a choice private
complainant opted because he wanted to get the information being offered to him for the
consideration of P200,000.00 (TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 5-17; ibid., Decision, p. 15). In fact,
the money was delivered not due to fear but for the purpose of possibly having a lead in solving
the case and to possibly bring the culprit to justice (ibid.). As such, the elements of simple
robbery have not been established in the instant case, hence, appellant Edgar Suela should be
acquitted of that charge."48
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED and the appealed Decision MODIFIED. We
AFFIRM the judgment insofar as it refers to Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-64616 and Q-96-65071 but
REDUCE the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The award of civil indemnities is also AFFIRMED. In
Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618 for simple robbery, Edgar Suela y Hembra is ACQUITTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122485 February 1, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent and unexposed to the
ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing experience that destroys not only her future but of the
youth population as well, who in the teachings of our national hero, are considered the hope of
the fatherland. Once again, the Court is confronted by another tragic desecration of human
dignity, committed no less upon a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12 years, has
yet to knock on the portals of womanhood, and met her untimely death as a result of the
"intrinsically evil act" of non-consensual sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of
death, rape is an ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor does there exist
any other rational justification other than lust. But those who lust ought not to last.
The Court quotes with approval from the People's Brief, the facts narrating the horrible
experience and the tragic demise of a young and innocent child in the bloody hands of appellant,
as such facts are ably supported by evidence on record: 1*
Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on November 20, 1953. His
task was to take care of Isip's house which was under construction adjacent to her old residence
situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
But he stayed and slept in an apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the
unfinished house (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 5-10).
The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. She used to pass
by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the compound yard, catching maya birds
together with other children. While they were playing, appellant was always around washing his
clothes. Inside the compound yard was a septic tank (TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31;
September 6, 1995, pp.17; 20-22).
On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around
10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked
permission from Isip to go out with his friends (TSN, September 6, 1995; pp. 9-11).
Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store fronting the compound,
saw Ma.Victoria on that same day three to four times catching birds inside Isip's unfinished house
around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The unfinished house was about 8 meters away from Rivera's
store (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 9-11).
On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his in-law's house
between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office regarding changes on the trip of President Fidel V.
Ramos. The house of his in-laws was near the house of Isip. On his way to his in-law's house, Sgt.
Suni met appellant along Dian Street. That same evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m., he saw
Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate of the unfinished house (TSN, September 27, 1995, pp.
3-7; 14-17).
Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw.
Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none left of it. She notice that appellant
appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was disarrayed; he was drunk and was
walking in a dazed manner. She asked why he looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he
left and walked back to the compound (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).
Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing. She last saw her
daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow hair ribbon, printed blue blouse,
dirty white panty, white lady sando and blue rubber slippers (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the following day, June 26,
1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando
Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant alighted at the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and
had thereafter disappeared (TSN, September 20, 1995, pp. 4-9; September 27, l995; pp. 14-17).
That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the
septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira
Chan (TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).
With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved from the
septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without underwear. Her face bore bruises. Results
of the autopsy revealed the following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,
Contusions, suprapubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm. angle of the left eye, lateral aspect, 2.5 x 1.5
cm. left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect, right, 2.0 x 1.0 cm. and left, 7.0 x 6.0
cm., left iliac area, 9.0 x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular area, left, posterior aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular
area, right 4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5 cm. lumbar area, left 7.0 x 8.0 cm. arm,
left, posterior aspect, middle third, 11.00 x 4.0 cm elbows, right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0
cm, forearms, left, posterior aspect, lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left, dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9
cm. thighs; right antero-lateral aspect, upper 33rd , 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right anterior aspect, lower
3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm. and left antero-lower 3rd, 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right, lateral aspect, 1.5 X 1.0
cm. lateral mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot, left, dorsal aspect 2.2 x 1.0 cm.
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks, neck, subepicardial, subpleural petechial
hemorrhages.
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.
Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury, Contributory.
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o'clock position
corresponding to the face of a watch edges congested with blood clots. (TSN, August 18, 1995; p.
4; Record, p. 126).
Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were informed by Isip that
her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing. According to her, it was unlikely for
appellant to just disappear from the apartment since whenever he would go out, he would
normally return on the same day or early morning of the following day (TSN, September 6, 1995,
pp. 6-11-27).
SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of appellant was working in
a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan City. They proceeded to said place. The owner of
the factory confirmed to them that appellant used to work at the factory but she did not know his
present whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on the other hand, informed them that appellant
could possibly be found on 8th Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).
The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the house under
construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt
and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma.
Victoria. They also found inside another room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that
of appellant. Also found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an
underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as
appellant's belongings. These items were brought to the police station (TSN, August 14, 1995,
pp. 10-13; August 18, 1995, pp. 3-8; August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).
A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to the office of the
Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano retrieved the victim's underwear from
the septic tank (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 3-8; 14-17).
After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in Barangay Obario Matala,
Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with the
assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he
narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when appellant came face to face
with the victim's mother and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and
killing the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators (TSN, August 14,1995, pp.
13-21).
Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an Information which
reads: 2
That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years
old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse
with said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO against her will and without her consent; that on
the occasion of said sexual assault, the above-named accused, choke and strangle said MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim died.
Contrary to law. 3
to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting
appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a total of
P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by electricution (sic). He is likewise condemned
to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Ma. Victoria Chan the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the
further sum of P23,000.00 for the funeral, burial and wake of the victim.
Let the complete records of the case be immediately forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court
for the automatic review in accordance to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.
SO ORDERED. 4
Upon automatic review by the Court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
(RPC), as amended, 5 appellant insists that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution against him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his
testimony summarized by the trial court, appellant offered his version of what transpired as
follows:
(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the
brother of Maria Isip, appellant's employer. After consuming three cases of red horse beer, he
was summoned by Isip to clean the jeepney. He finished cleaning the jeepney at 12 o'clock noon.
Then he had lunch and took a bath. Later, he asked permission from Isip to go out with his
friends to see a movie. He also asked for a cash advance of P300.00 (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp.
4-5-5).
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out with his friend, opted to rejoin
Gregorio Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session. They consumed one case of red horse
beer. Around 6 o'clock p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, fetched him at Gregorio Rivera's house. They
went to Zaldy's house and bought a bottle of gin. They finished drinking gin around 8 o'clock
p.m. After consuming the bottle of gin, they went out and bought another bottle of gin from a
nearby store. It was already 9 o'clock in the evening. While they were at the store, appellant and
Zaldy met Boyet. After giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant left (TSN, October
16, 1995, pp. 6-7).
On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera
informed him that there was none left of it. He left the store and proceeded to Isip's apartment.
But because it was already closed, he decided to sleep at the second floor of Isip's unfinished
house. Around 10 o'clock p.m., Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying a cadaver. The two placed the
body inside the room where appellant was sleeping. As appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him
a knife. Zaldy and Boyet directed him to rape the dead body of the child or they would kill him.
He, however, refused to follow. Then, he was asked by Zaldy and Boyet to assist them in bringing
the dead body downstairs. He obliged and helped dump the body into the septic tank.
Thereupon, Zaldy and Boyet warned him that should they ever see him again, they would kill
him. At 4 o'clock the following morning, he left the compound and proceeded first to Navotas and
later to Batangas (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan, Batangas. The police
officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in Manila. There, appellant heard the
police officer's plan to salvage him if he would not admit that he was the one who raped and
killed the victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was
assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession
(TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 9-11). 6
This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in the review
thereof since "there can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe . . . than the termination
of a human life." 7 For life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never be restored.
In order therefore, that appellant's guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons why, as
the records are not shy, for him to verify.
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellant's proffered excuse are
sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any
direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of
direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on
evidence 8 and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, 9 conviction may be had on circumstantial
evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 10 Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may
surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court. 11
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which
upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellant's guilt beyond the
shadow of reasonable doubt. These circumstantial evidence are as follows:
FIRST Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law of Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished
big house where the crime happened and the septic tank where the body of Maria Victoria Chan
was found in the morning of June 26, 1995 is located, categorically testified that at about 9:00 in
the evening on June 25, 1995, accused Larry Mahinay was in her store located in front portion of
the compound of her sister-in-law Maria Isip where the unfinished big house is situated buying
rice noodle (lugaw). That she noticed the accused's hair was disarranged, drunk and walking in
sigsagging manner. That the accused appeared uneasy and seems to be thinking deeply. That
the accused did not reply to her queries why he looked worried but went inside the compound.
SECOND Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto C. Suni, categorically testified that on June 25, 1995
between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way to his in-laws house, he met accused Larry
Mahinay walking on the road leading to his in-law's residence which is about 50 to 75 meters
away to the unfinished big house of Maria Isip. That he also saw victim Maria Victoria Chan
standing at the gate of the unfinished big house of Maria Isip between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same
evening.
THIRD Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house where victim's body
was found inside the septic tank, testified that accused Larry Mahinay is her houseboy since
November 20, 1993. That in the morning of June 25, 1995, a Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked
permission from her to leave. That after finishing some work she asked him to do accused Larry
Mahinay left. That it is customary on the part of Larry Mahinay to return in the afternoon of the
same day or sometimes in the next morning. That accused Larry Mahinay did not return until he
was arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995.
FOURTH Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a passenger jeepney driver plying the route
Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which include Dian St., Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, pinpointed the accused Larry Mahinay as one of the passengers who boarded his
passenger jeepney on June 26, 1995 at 2:00 early morning and alighted on top of the overpass of
the North Expressway.
FIFTH Personal belongings of the victim was found in the unfinished big house of Maria Isip
where accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of the incident. This is a clear indication that the
victim was raped and killed in the said premises.
There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (sic) fabricated or there
was any reason for them to testify falsely against the accused. The absence of any evidence as
to the existence of improper motive sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive exists
and that the testimonies of the witnesses, therefore, should be given full faith and credit. (People
vs. Retubado, 58585 January 20, 1988 162 SCRA 276,. 284; People vs. Ali L-18512 October 30,
1969, 29 SCRA 756).
SIXTH Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been
informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public
Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said
confession of accused Larry Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is
believed to have been freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper
authorities of any maltreatment on his person (People vs. delos Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984;150
SCRA 311). He did not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his
statement on July 8, 1995 that he was forced, coersed or was promised of reward or leniency.
That his confession abound with details know only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the
Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed
and explained to the accused his constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving
of the testimony. That he signed the statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the Public
Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner
of the investigation and the physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings shows
that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory
substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the accused that he pushed the victim and the
latter's head hit the table and the victim lost consciousness.
Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya, tapos tumama
iyong ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakatulog siya tapos ni-rape ko na siya.
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the statement. There were no
medical certificate submitted by the accused to sustain his claim that he was mauled by the
police officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as a result of
violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency nor that the
investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct facts narrated in said affidavit; the
confession of the accused is held to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily given. (People v.
Tuazon 6 SCRA 249; People v. Tiongson 6 SCRA 431, People v. Baluran 52 SCRA 71, People v.
Pingol 35 SCRA 73.)
SEVENTH Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open Court that he was notable to enter the
apartment where he is sleeping because it was already closed and he proceeded to the second
floor of the unfinished house and slept. He said while sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying
the cadaver of the victim and dumped it inside his room. That at the point of a knife, the two
ordered him to have sex with the dead body but he refused. That the two asked him to assist
them in dumping the dead body of the victim in the septic tank downstairs. (Tsn pp. 8-9 October
16, 1995). This is unbelievable and unnatural. Accused Larry Mahinay is staying in the apartment
and not in the unfinished house. That he slept in the said unfinished house only that night of June
25, 1995 because the apartment where he was staying was already closed. The Court is at a loss
how would Zaldy and Boyet knew he (Larry Mahinay) was in the second floor of the unfinished
house.
Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by Zaldy and Boyet in the room at the
second floor of the unfinished house where accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping, why will Boyet
and Zaldy still brought the cadaver upstairs only to be disposed/dump later in the septic tank
located in the ground floor. Boyet and Zaldy can easily disposed and dumped the body in the
septic tank by themselves.
It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room where accused Larry
Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to have sex with the dead body of the child.
We have no test to the truth of human testimony except it's conformity to aver knowledge
observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous. (People
vs. Santos L-385 Nov. 16, 1979)
EIGHT If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to disposed/dumpted the
body of the victim in the septic tank, he could have apprise Col. Maganto, a high ranking police
officer or the lady reporter who interviewed him. His failure and omission to reveal the same is
unnatural. An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of
crime as a matter of preservation and self-defense and as a precaution against prejudicing
himself. A person's silence therefore, particularly when it is persistent will justify an inference
that he is not innocent. (People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5 July 21, 1978).
NINTH The circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his consciousness of guilt.
He left the crime scene on the early morning after the incident and did not return until he was
arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995. 12
Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: 13
1). An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and
3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with homicide
defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11,
R.A. 7659, which provides:
When and how rape is committed - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious: and
3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall
be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed the penalty shall be
death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2.) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3.) When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4.) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5.) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) disease.
6.) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement agency
7.) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation. 14
At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime against
chastity, 15 although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been re-
classified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be
prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the offended party.
The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a woman by
force and without consent. 16 (Under the new law, rape may be committed even by a woman
and the victim may even be a
man.) 17 If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial
18 not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, 19 but the absence of a free
consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction will therefore lie, provided
sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was
violated, as in this case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven but also
the other element that the perpetrator's evil acts with the offended party was done through
force, violence, intimidation or threat needs to be established. Both elements are present in this
case.
Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was adequately proven. This
is shown from the testimony of the medical doctor who conducted post mortem examination on
the child's body:
Q: And after that what other parts or the victim did you examine?
A: Then I examined the genitalia of the victim.
Q: And what did you find out after you examined the genitalia of the victim?
A: The hymen was tall-thick with complete laceration at 4:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock position
and that the edges were congested.
Q: Now, what might have caused the laceration?
A: Under normal circumstances this might have (sic) caused by a penetration of an organ.
Q: So, the laceration was caused by the penetration of a male organ?
A: Adult male organ, sir.
Q: You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness?
A: I am very sure of that. 20
Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself admitted that he
had sexual congress with the unconscious child.
15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o oras na iyon?
S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE MARIA, yung malaking bahay na ginagawa, tapos
dumating yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya sa kuwarto hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos
tinulak ko siya. Tapos tumama yung ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakakatulog na siya tapos ni rape
ko na siya.
16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang babae na sinasabi mo?
S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white short placed atop this investigator's table. Subject
evidence were part of evidences recovered at the crime scene).
17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung batang babae?
S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na alam ang ginagawa ko.
18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka nasobrahan ng lasing?
S: Red Horse po at saka GIN.
19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape yung batang babae?.
S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas.
20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari?
S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng Linggo, hindi ko na matandaan kung anong petsa,
basta araw ng Linggo.
21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?
S: Sa Dian, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, M.M.
22. T: Alam mo ba ang pangalan ng batang babae na ni rape mo?
S: Hindi ko po alam.
23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo na ang pangalan ng batang babae na iyong ni rape at
pinatay ay si MA. VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan mo ha ito?
S: Oho.
24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka ba?
S: Naka-isa po.
25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng "NAKARAOS", maaari bang
ipaliwanag mo ito?
S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.
26 T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte na katawan ng batang babae yung iyong ari?
S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae.
27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa ang sumunod mong ginawa?
S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace.
28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. VICTORIA matapos mong itulak sa terrace?
S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.
29. T: Saan makikita yung poso negra na sinasabi mo?
S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA.
30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay si MA. VICTORIA sa poso-negra?
S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.
31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya?
S: Natatakot po ako.
32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?
S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama, natatakot ako sa mga pulis.
33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya sa poso-negra?
S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na siya sa poso-negra.
34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na ito, mayroon ka kasama?
S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.
35. T: Noong mga oras o sandaling gahasain mo si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, buhay pa ba siya o patay
na?
S: Buhay pa po.
36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?
S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace. 21
In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victim's vagina; rather the
slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ is enough to consummate the
sexual intercourse. 22 The mere touching by the male's organ or instrument of sex of the labia of
the pudendum of the woman's private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.
From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was indeed employed
upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellant's own account, he pushed the victim
causing the latter to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It was at that instance that
he ravished her and satisfied his salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at
the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had not
given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.
Another thing that militates against appellant is his extra judicial confession, which he, however,
claims was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. But his contention is belied
by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him
his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the
assisting lawyer:
Q Will you please inform the Court what was that call about?
A We went to the station, police investigation together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we were
told by Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the crime of, I
think, rape with homicide.
Q And upon reaching the investigation room of Valenzuela PNP who were the other person
present?
A Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and other investigator inside the
investigation room and the parents of the child who was allegedly raped.
Q And when you reached the investigation room do you notice whether the accused already
there?
A The accused was already there.
Q Was he alone?
A He was alone, sir.
Q So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and the other PNP Officers,
what did they tell you, if any?
A They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the
crime charged, sir.
Q By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?
A Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorney's Office.
Q Was he also present at the start of the question and answer period to the accused?
A No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left alone.
Q But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the question and answer period start?
A If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the afternoon, sir.
Q And when this question and answer period started, what was the first thing that you did as
assisting lawyer to the accused?
A First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the constitution.
Q What are those right?
A That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the right of a counsel of his own choice
and that if he has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and that he has the right to
refuse to answer any question that would incriminate him.
Q Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of accused Larry Mahinay, do you recall
whether this constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced in writing?
A Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by Police Officer Alabastro.
Q I show to you this constitutional right which you said were reduced into writing, will you be
able to recognize the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether that is the same document you
mentioned?
A Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into writing.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked as our Exhibit A. proper.
Q Do you recall after reducing into writing this constitutional right of the accused whether you
asked him to sign to acknowledge or to conform?
A I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer Alabastro.
Q But you were present?
A I was then present when he signed.
Q There is a signature in this constitutional right after the enumeration, before and after there
are two (2) signatures, will you please recognize the two (2) signatures?
A These were the same signatures signed in my presence, sir.
Q The signature of whom?
A The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures identified by my compaero be encircled
and marked as Exhibit A-1 and A-2.
Q After you said that you apprised the accused of his constitutional right explaining to him in
Filipino, in local dialect, what was the respond of the accused?
A Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his statement.
Q What was the reply?
A He said "Opo".
Q Did you ask him of his educational attainment?
A It was the Police Officer who asked him.
Q In your presence?
A In my presence, sir.
Q And when he said or when he replied "Opo" so the question started?
A Yes, sir.
Q I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of rights, were you present also when he
signed this waiver?
A Yes, sir, I was also present.
Q Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver?
A I had also explained to him, sir.
Q In Filipino?
A In Tagalog, sir.
Q And there is also a signature after the waiver in Filipino over the typewritten name Larry
Mahinay, "Nagsasalaysay", whose signature is that?
A This is also signed in my presence.
Q Why are you sure that this is his signature?
A He signed in my presence, sir.
Q And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The first one is when Larry Mahinay
subscribed and sworn to, there is a signature here, do you recognize this signature?
A This is my signature, sir.
Q And immediately after your first signature is a Certification that you have personally
examined the accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary executed the Extra Judicial
Confession, do you recognize the signature?
A This is also my signature, sir. 23 (emphasis supplied).
Appellant's defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of the victim and
forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of
New Jersey, 24
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must
be credible in itself - such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve
as probable under the circumstances. We have no test or the truth of human testimony, except
its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these
belongs to the miraculous, and is outside of judicial cognizance.
Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses. Settled is the rule
that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the
trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied
to the appellate courts. 25 In this case, the trial court's findings, conclusions and evaluation of
the testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with the highest respect, 26 the same being
supported by substantial evidence on record. There was no showing that the court a quo had
overlooked or disregarded relevant facts and circumstances which when considered would have
affected the outcome of this case 27 or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of
the court below. The absence of any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal witnesses
for the prosecution all the more strengthens the conclusion that no such motive exists. 28
Neither was any wrong motive attributed to the police officers who testified against appellant.
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 "when by reason or on occasion of
the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." This special complex crime is
treated by law in the same degree as qualified rape - that is, when any of the 7 (now 10)
"attendant circumstances" enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the
penalty is death. In cases where any of those circumstances is proven though not alleged, the
penalty cannot be death except if the circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect the imposition of
the proper penalty in accordance with Article 53 of the RPC However, if any of those
circumstances proven but not alleged cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance
under Articles 14 and 15, the same cannot affect the imposition of the penalty because Article 63
of the RPC in mentioning aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in Articles 14 and 15.
Under R.A. No. 8353, if any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the information/complaint, it
may be treated as a qualifying circumstance. But if it is not so alleged, it may be considered as
an aggravating circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death - subject to the usual proof
of such circumstance in either case.
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for the crime of
"rape with homicide", the court has no option but to apply the same "regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime" 29
in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC, as amended. 30 This case of rape with homicide carries
with it penalty of death which is mandatorily imposed by law within the import of Article 47 of
the RPC, as amended, which provides:
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws,
except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission
of the crime or is more than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of
the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of
the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
(emphasis supplied).
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death penalty, appellant tried to
alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years and a few months old at the time he
committed the rape and thus, covered by the proscription on the imposition of death if the guilty
person is below eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the crime. 31 Again, the
record rebuffs appellant on this point considering that he was proven to be already more than 20
years of age when he did the heinous act.
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any
of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the
civil indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00). 32
In addition to such indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of
the Civil Code 33 in such amount as the court deems just, without the necessity for pleading or
proof of the basis thereof. 34 Civil indemnity is different from the award of moral and exemplary
damages. 35 The requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering provided in Article 2217
of the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is "recognized that the victim's injury is inherently
concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the
award of moral damages". 36 Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape carries with it the
award of moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 37
Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was attended by one or
more aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code 38 after proof that the
offended party is entitled to moral, temperate and compensatory damages. 39 Under the
circumstances of this case, appellant is liable to the victim's heirs for the amount of P75,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against
an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the
people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or
investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and
again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation 40 in accordance with the
Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: 41 It is high-time to educate our law-
enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda
rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal
developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a
language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that anystatement he makes may
be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of
an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will
be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may
be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid
waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer
(either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor,
priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be
visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It
shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it
must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or
stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes
such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
Four members of the Court although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People v. Echegaray 42 that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, is unconstitutional nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote,
that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the award of civil
indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00 moral
damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 144639. September 12, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENNY GO, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On direct appeal before this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41,
in Criminal Case No. 99-174439 finding appellant Benny Go guilty of violating Section 16, Article
III in relation to Section 2 (e-2), Article I of Republic Act No. 6425,[1] as amended, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00.
The Information filed against appellant charged as follows:
That on or about June 14, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without being
authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) knot tied
transparent plastic bag containing TWO HUNDRED FOUR (204) grams of white crystalline
substance known as Shabu containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[3]
Subsequently, at the pre-trial conference on August 10, 1999, the parties stipulated that (1) the
subject Search Warrant is valid; and (2) the Forensic Chemist conducted only a qualitative
examination on the subject specimen.[4]
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector Edwin Zata, Forensic
Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory; (2) PO2 Gerardo
Abulencia (PO2 Abulencia); (3) SPO1 Edgardo G. Fernandez (SPO1 Fernandez); and (4) SPO1 Ver
M. Serquea (SPO1 Ver Serquea) whose testimonies sought to establish the following facts:
On April 28, 1999, SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea and a confidential informant conducted a test
buy operation at the residence of appellant at 1480 General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila during
which they purchased from him P1,500.00 worth of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
[5] The police officers did not immediately arrest him, however. Instead, they applied for a
Search Warrant for appellants residence from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City[6]
based on their firm belief that there was a large quantity of illegal drugs in his house.[7]
On June 14, 1999, a raiding team composed of SPO1 Fernandez and SPO1 Serquea, together with
PO2 Abulencia, PO3 Noel Adtu and PO2 Gerardo Jimenez,[8] proceeded to appellants above-said
residence armed with Search Warrant No. 99-0038[9] issued by Br. 109 of the RTC of Pasay City
commanding them to make an immediate search anytime of the day or night of appellants
residence and to seize and take possession of METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu),
weighing scale, other drug paraphernalias and proceeds of the above crime.
Soon after the police officers arrived at appellants residence at around 6:00 in the evening,[10]
they, to enable them to gain entry to the two-storey house, sideswept (sinagi) a little appellants
Toyota Corolla GLI car which was parked outside.[11] Jack Go, appellants son and the only one
present at the house at the time, thereupon opened the door of the house and the policemen at
once introduced themselves, informed him that they had a warrant for the search of the
premises, and promptly handcuffed him to a chair. SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea and PO2
Abulencia entered the house, while PO3 Adtu and PO2 Jimenez remained outside. [12]
On instruction of SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea left to summon barangay officials to witness
the search. SPO1 Serquea returned five minutes later with Barangay Kagawads Gaspar Lazaro
(Kagawad Lazaro) and Emmanuel Manalo (Kagawad Manalo) who were advised by SPO1
Fernandez to be witnesses to the search and to afterwards sign the inventory receipt and
affidavit of orderly search.
As instructed, the two barangay kagawads proceeded to the upper floor of appellants house with
SPO1 Serquea and PO2 Abulencia.[13] While SPO1 Fernandez, who remained downstairs in the
sala,[14] instructed the handcuffed Jack Go to witness the search, the latter refused since there
will be no more left in the sala of the house anyway there is a barangay official.[15]
In the course of the search of the premises which took place from 6:00 to 11:00 in the evening,
[16] Kagawad Lazaro and PO2 Abulencia recovered one knot tied transparent plastic bag
containing white crystalline substance[17] from the drawer of a cabinet.
Also seized from the residence of appellant were the following: (a) one plastic bag containing
yellowish substance[18] found by SPO1 Serquea;[19] (b) a weighing scale discovered by SPO1
Fernandez; (c) assorted documents; (d) passports; (e) bank books; (f) checks; (g) a typewriter;
(h) a check writer; (i) several dry seals and (j) stamp pads;[20] (k) Chinese and Philippine
currency;[21] (l) and appellants Toyota Corolla GLI[22] car (the car).
The plastic bag containing the white crystalline substance was marked by SPO1 Fernandez as
EGF-A-1, while the plastic bag with the yellowish substance was marked as EGF-A-2.[23]
With the exception of the car, all the seized items were brought to the dining table on the ground
floor of appellants house for inventory.[24]
In the meantime, appellants wife Shi Xiu Ong and his friends Samson Go and Peter Co arrived
one after the other at the house.[25] Appellant himself arrived at 9:30 in the evening when the
search was almost through.[26]
After the inventory had been taken, SPO1 Fernandez prepared a handwritten Inventory
Receipt[27] and a document captioned Affidavit of Orderly Search,[28] the contents of which he
read to appellant. On instruction of SPO1 Fernandez, Jack Go also explained the contents of the
documents to appellant who then signed them as did kagawads Manalo and Lazaro and Jack Go
as witnesses.[29]
The police officers then brought appellant, his wife, son and friends, along with the seized items,
to Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila for verification and investigation.
Appellant was detained while the others were eventually released. [30] The arresting officers
jointly prepared an Affidavit of Arrest dated June 15, 1999[31] which, among other things,
contained an enumeration of the seized items identical to that in the handwritten Inventory
Receipt. And SPO1 Fernandez prepared a Return of Search Warrant 99-0038 dated June 18, 1999
and a referral paper 1st Indorsement[32] with the same enumeration of seized items.
Also on June 15, 1999, SPO1 Serquea brought the plastic bag containing the white crystalline
substance (Exhibit A) and the plastic bag containing the yellowish substance (Exhibit B) to the
PNP Crime Laboratory[33] together with a request for laboratory examination.[34] Upon
examination, Exhibit A was found to contain 204 grams of white crystalline substance containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.[35] Exhibit B, on the other hand, was found
negative for any prohibited and/or regulated drug.[36]
Meanwhile, the seized documents, passports, dry seals and stamp pads were brought to the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,[37] while the bank books were forwarded to the
corresponding banks for verification.[38]
The prosecution presented in evidence the Yamato weighing scale,[39] claimed to have been
recovered by SPO1 Fernandez from the top of appellants refrigerator,[40] although it was not
among those listed in the handwritten Inventory Receipt, Affidavit of Arrest or Return of the
Search Warrant.[41] Also presented by the prosecution, as a hostile witness, to corroborate in
part the foregoing facts was Kagawad Lazaro. He claimed, however, that the first page of the
handwritten Inventory Receipt submitted in evidence had been substituted with another,
asserting that he and the other witnesses affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of the
first page of the handwritten Inventory Receipt which they were asked to sign whereas that
submitted in court did not bear their signatures.[42]
Kagawad Lazaro further claimed that the first entry on the first page of the Inventory Receipt,
whereon he and his co-witnesses affixed their signatures, reading Chinese Medicine had been
replaced with undetermined quantity of white crystalline granules;[43] that what was recovered
from the room of Jack Go by PO2 Abulencia was Exhibit B, the plastic bag containing the
yellowish powder, and not Exhibit A, the plastic bag containing the suspected shabu; and that
Exhibit A was not even among the items seized and inventoried.[44]
The defense, which adopted the testimony of Kagawad Lazaro, presented appellant, his son Jack
Go, and Kagawad Manalo whose version of the facts of the case follows:
In November 1998, while appellant was walking along Gen. Luna Street, he was accosted by
SPO1 Serquea and another police officer who accused him of manufacturing shabu and divested
him of money amounting to more than P5,000.00. He was later released as the policemen could
not charge him with anything.[45]
On July 14, 1999 at around 5:30 in the afternoon, Jack Go opened the door of their house after
hearing somebody shout that the car had been bumped. Five armed policemen then entered the
house, one of whom handcuffed him while two went up to the upper floor of the house and
searched for about thirty (30) minutes. [46]
At past 6:00 p.m., as the two kagawads entered the house which was already in disarray, SPO1
Fernandez formed two groups to conduct the search at the second floor: (1) that of PO2
Abulencia, with Kagawad Lazaro to serve as witness, and (2) that of SPO1 Serquea, with
Kagawad Manalo to serve as witness.[47]
PO2 Abulencia, together with Kagawad Lazaro, searched the room of Jack Go. SPO1 Serquea,
accompanied by Kagawad Manalo, searched the study room where he seized documents,
passports and assorted papers.
SPO1 Serquea and Kagawad Manalo then proceeded to the room of appellant followed by PO2
Abulencia and Kagawad Lazaro. From the room of appellant, the policemen seized documents,
passports, bankbooks and money.[48]
After the search, the policemen and barangay kagawads went down with three boxes containing
passports, money and assorted Chinese medicine.[49]
When appellants wife arrived at around 7:30 p.m.,[50] SPO1 Fernandez ordered her to open the
safe (kaha de yero) inside appellants room where the police officers seized money, passports,
bankbooks, Chinese currency and pieces of jewelry.[51]
The seized items were placed on appellants table on the first floor of the house where they were
inventoried by SPO1 Fernandez[52] during which the barangay kagawads did not see either
Exhibit A, the plastic bag containing the suspected shabu, or the weighing scale.[53]
After SPO1 Fernandez prepared a two-page Inventory Receipt and Affidavit of Orderly Search, he
asked Jack Go to sign the receipt. While Jack Go initially refused, he eventually did sign both
documents without having read them completely after he was hit by the policemen. The two
barangay kagawads also signed both pages of the Inventory Receipt as witnesses.[54]
When appellant arrived at around 8:30 p.m., he was handcuffed and likewise made to sign the
Inventory Receipt without having been able to read its contents.[55] Jack Go was prevented from
explaining its contents to him.[56]
The first page of the handwritten Inventory Receipt presented in court, which includes an
undetermined quantity of white crystalline granules placed inside a transparent plastic envelope
as among those seized from the residence of appellant, does not bear the signatures of
appellant, the kagawads and Jack Go, hence, it is not the same first page of the handwritten
Inventory Report on which they affixed their signatures.[57] In fact the policemen did not leave a
copy of this Inventory Receipt with either appellant or the barangay kagawads.[58]
The policemen continued to search appellants residence until around 11:00 p.m. when they
brought appellant, Jack Go, Shi Xiu Ong, Samson Go and Peter Co, together with the seized
items, to Bicutan.[59]
On the way to Bicutan, PO2 Abulencia, who boarded the same vehicle as appellant, told the latter
that the policemen wanted P10,000,000.00 from him or he would be charged with possession of
illegal drugs. The amount demanded was later reduced to P5,000,000.00, then to P2,000,000.00,
and finally to P500,000.00. Appellant refused, however, to heed the policemens demands since
he did not commit any crime.[60]
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court rendered the appealed Decision on June 7, 2000, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby ordered rendered finding the accused Benny Go guilty of the
offense charged in the information and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and the Clerk of Court
is hereby directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for proper disposition, upon the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.[61]
His Motion for Reconsideration[62] of the decision having been denied by Order of July 24, 2000,
[63] appellant lodged the present appeal. In his Brief,[64] he assigns the following errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCORDING THE POLICE OFFICERS THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IN IMPLEMENTING THE SEARCH WARRANT BASED
ON THEIR TESTIMONIES, THERE BEING CONVINCING PROOFS TO THE CONTRARY.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 204 GRAMS OF SHABU WAS RECOVERED FROM THE
HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON JUNE 14, 1999 BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF PO1
GERARDO ABULENCIA AND THE SUPPORTING INVENTORY RECEIPT, BOTH OF WHICH WERE
COMPLETELY CONTRADICTED BY THE PROSECUTION WITNESS BARANGAY KAGAWAD GASPAR
LAZARO AS WELL AS BY DEFENSE WITNESSES.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF TWO HUNDRED FOUR (204) GRAMS OF SHABU AS CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE (sic) PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA
AND A FINE OF ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), INSTEAD OF ACQUITTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[65] (Emphasis supplied)
During the pendency of the appeal, appellant filed a verified Motion for Return of Personal
Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia dated September 10, 2001[66] praying for the release of
the following seized properties:
a. several pcs. transparent plastic envelopes
b. one (1) unit Toyota Corolla GLI with PN UTT 658
c. Cash amounting to Fifty Two Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos (P52,760.00) in different
denominations
d. Twenty-Five Thousand Chinese Yuan (CY25,000.00)
e. Sixty-Seven (67) pieces of Chinese passports
f. Twenty-Eight (28) pieces of assorted bankbooks
g. Two Hundred Eighty Five (285) pieces of assorted checks
h. Fifty-Three (53) pcs. rubber stamp and related paraphernalia
i. One (1) piece Underwood typewriter with SN 9861952
j. One (1) piece check writer
k. Two (2) pieces of dry seal
m. Five (5) boxes of assorted documents
n. Three (3) bags of assorted documents[67]
This Court is thus called upon to determine (1) whether appellants guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt; and (2) whether the items enumerated in appellants Motion for Return of
Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia, which items are allegedly not among those
particularly described in Search Warrant No. 99-0038, should be returned to him. These issues
shall be resolved in seriatim.
Illegal Possession of 204 Grams of Shabu
As appellant questions the legality of the search of his residence, the actions of the police
officers, as agents of the State, must be carefully considered in light of appellants right against
unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the
Constitution.[68]
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is a purely judicial question
determinable from a consideration of the attendant circumstances including the purpose of the
search, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.[69]
Since no presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer to justify an encroachment of
rights secured by the Constitution,[70] courts must cautiously weigh the evidence before them.
As early as in the 1937 case of People v. Veloso,[71] this Court held:
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory
provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise, it is void. The proceedings upon search warrants,
it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known
to law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which
excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrant
will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical
accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer
undertakes to justify under it.[72] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Indeed, a strict interpretation of the constitutional, statutory and procedural rules authorizing
search and seizure is required, and strict compliance therewith is demanded because:
x x x Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace
and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private
affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search
and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.[73]
In arriving at the appealed decision, the trial court placed greater weight on the testimony of the
police officers to whom it accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, viz:
Coming to the first issue raised, the Court gives credence to the testimonies of the police officers
and accords them the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. The Court has
observed the demeanor of the witnesses and finds the prosecution witnesses more credible than
the defense witnesses. x x x
On the other hand, there is no showing that the police officers had ill motive when they applied
for and secured the Search Warrant, raided the house of the accused and arrested him. Accused
is a Chinese national who appeared to have no quarrel with the arresting police officers and thus
the police officers had no reason to fabricate or trump up charges against him. Hence, there
appears to be no reason the police officers should not be accorded the presumption of regularity
in the performance of their duty. As held by the Supreme Court, (L)aw enforcers are presumed to
have regularly performed their official duty, in the absence of the evidence to the contrary. x x x
We see no valid obstacle to the application of the ruling in People vs. Capulong, (160 SCRA 533
{1988}) that credence is accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who are law
enforcers for it is presumed that they have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
convincing proof to the contrary. The appellant has not shown that the prosecution witnesses
were motivated by any improper motive other than that of accomplishing their mission. (People
of the Philippines, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. Said Sariol Y Muhamading, accused-appellant, 174 SCRA
238).[74] (Emphasis supplied)
At the same time, the trial court based its finding that the search of appellants residence was
proper and valid on the so-called Affidavit of Orderly Search.
On the second issue raised, the validity of the Search Warrant is clearly shown by the Affidavit of
Orderly Search signed by the accused and his son Jack Go and his witnesses Salvador Manalo
and Gaspar Lazaro. Such Affidavit of Orderly Search coupled with the testimonies of the police
officers have clearly established the propriety and validity of the search.[75] (Emphasis supplied)
The rule that a trial courts findings are accorded the highest degree of respect, it being in a
position to observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses,[76] is not absolute
and does not apply when a careful review of the records and a meticulous evaluation of the
evidence reveal vital facts and circumstances which the trial court overlooked or
misapprehended and which if taken into account would alter the result of the case.[77]
In the case at bar, an examination of the testimonies of the police officers brings to light several
irregularities in the manner by which the search of appellants residence was conducted.
By PO2 Abulencias own account, in order to enter the premises to be searched, the police officers
deliberately side-swiped appellants car which was parked alongside the road, instead of following
the regular knock and announce procedure as outlined in Section 7 (formerly Section 6), Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.[78]
Q Mr. Witness, how did you enter the house of Benny Go?
A Its really heard (sic) to enter the house. Before the door, there was a still (sic) supporting the
door and they will not allow us to enter because they dont know us. Then, in order that we could
enter the house, we side swept (sinagi) a little the vehicle that was parked in front of their house.
And their neighbor knocked at the house of the subject and thats the time that we were able to
enter.[79] (Emphasis supplied)
Since the police officers had not yet notified the occupant of the residence of their intention and
authority to conduct a search and absent a showing that they had any reasonable cause to
believe that prior notice of service of the warrant would endanger its successful implementation,
the deliberate sideswiping of appellants car was unreasonable and unjustified.
Also by PO2 Abulencias own account, upon entry to appellants residence, he immediately
handcuffed Jack Go to a chair. Justifying his action, PO2 Abulencia explained that not only was he
unfamiliar with Jack Go and unsure of how the latter would react, but it was a standard operating
procedure:
Pros. Rebagay:
Now, what happened on June 14, 1999 at 6:00 p.m. when you were armed with the Search
Warrant issued by Judge Lilia Lopez?
A We entered inside the house of the subject and we were able to see (nadatnan naming) Jack
Go, the son of Benny Go, sir.
xxx
Q And what was the reaction of Jack Go, if any?
A We introduced ourselves as police officers and we have a Search Warrant to conduct a search
to the above subject place and also we handcuffed Jack Go to the chair, sir.
Q Why did you do that, Mr. witness?
A Hindi naming kakilala iyong mga tao, sir kaya ganoon ang ginawa namin para hindi kami
maano, eh hindi naming kabisado iyong ugali, sir.
Pros. Rebagay:
And is that an (sic) standard operating procedure Mr. witness, when you are serving a search
warrant?
A Yes, sir.[80] (Emphasis supplied)
There is no showing, however, of any action or provocation by Jack Go when the policemen
entered appellants residence. Considering the degree of intimidation, alarm and fear produced in
one suddenly confronted under similar circumstances, the forcible restraint of Jack Go all the
more was unjustified as was his continued restraint even after Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and
Manalo had arrived to justify his forcible restraint.
While Search Warrant No. 99-99-0038 authorized the immediate search of appellants residence
to seize METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), weighing scale, other drug paraphernalias
and proceeds of the above crime, the policemen, by SPO1 Fernandezs admission, seized
numerous other items, which are clearly unrelated to illegal drugs or illegal drug paraphernalia:
Q In the presence of the barangay officials, what are those items which you seized or your
raiding team seized, if any?
A With the permission of the Honorable Court, Your Honor, can I take a look at my notes.
Court
Proceed.
Witness
Thank you very much.
A Seized or confiscated form the said residence are: (1) undetermined quantity of white
crystalline granules placed inside the transparent plastic envelope, (2) undetermined quantity of
yellowish powder placed inside the transparent plastic envelope; (3) several pieces of
transparent plastic envelopes; (4) one unit Toyota Corolla GLI with Plate No. UPT-658; (5)
P52,760.00 in different denominations; (6) 25,000.00 Chinese Yuan; (7) 67 pieces of Chinese
passports; (8) 28 pieces of assorted bank book; (9) 285 pieces of assorted checks; (10) 53 pieces
rubber stamps and related paraphernalia; (11) one piece Underwood typewriter with Serial No.
9861952; (12) one piece checkwriter; (13) two pieces dry seals; (14) 5 boxes of assorted
documents; (15) 3 bags of assorted documents; and I will add another one Your Honor, a
weighing scale.[81]
While an inventory of the seized items was prepared, also by SPO1 Fernandezs admission, it did
not contain a detailed list of all the items seized, particularly the voluminous documents:
Q Why is it that you did not make a detailed inventory or receipt of the passports? Why did you
not give any detailed receipt or inventory on the passports.
A There were lots of documents during the time on the table, voluminous documents that I was
not able to make a listing of the said passports.
Q And it was only this October 8, 1999 or four months after that you made a detailed receipt of
those seized items, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
Q Is it your standard operating procedure that when there are voluminous seized items you will
not (sic) longer made (sic) an inventory report, am I right?
A Its not an SOP.
Q Why did you not make a detailed inventory or receipt?
A As Ive said earlier, its voluminous. [82] (Emphasis supplied)
In Asian Surety And Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera,[83] this Court stressed the necessity for a
detailed receipt of the items seized in order to adequately safeguard the constitutional rights of
the person searched:
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of
Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. Going over the
receipts (Annexes B B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4 of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one
bordereau of reinsurance, 8 fire registers, 1 marine register, four annual statements, folders
described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big carton folders; folders of various
sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and kind of documents contained in the folders of
which there were about a thousand of them that were seized. In the seizure of two carloads of
documents and other papers, the possibility that the respondents took away private papers of
the petitioner, in violation of his constitutional rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents virtually
had a field day with the broad and unlimited search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their
passport.[84] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
After the inventory had been prepared, PO2 Abulencia presented it to appellant for his
signature[85] without any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to sign such
receipt and to the assistance of counsel. Neither was he warned that the same could be used as
evidence against him. Faced with similar circumstances, this Court in People v. Gesmundo[86]
stated:
It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-appellant that marijuana
was found in her possession but said admission embodied in a document entitled PAGPATUNAY
previously prepared by the police, is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant for
having been obtained in violation of her rights as a person under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense. The records show that the accused-appellant was not informed of her
right not to sign the document; neither was she informed of her right to the assistance of counsel
and the fact that the document may be used as evidence against her.[87] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
In People v. Policarpio,[88] this Court held that such practice of inducing suspects to sign receipts
for property allegedly confiscated from their possession is unusual and violative of the
constitutional right to remain silent, viz:
What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to be silent and
that he may refuse to give a statement which may be used against him, that is why he refused to
give a written statement unless it is made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper
he signed to this effect. However, he was made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic
bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by signing a receipt and to sign a
receipt for the P20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried marijuana leaves he sold to Pat. Mangila.
Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged receipts
which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. Indeed it is
unusual for appellant to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police
officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is a
violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent whereby he was made to admit
the commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in
violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence.[89] (Emphasis supplied)
The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative of
appellants custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the manner
by which the raiding team conducted the search of appellants residence.
At the same time, it is unclear whether appellant was furnished a copy of the Inventory Receipt
as mandated by Sec. 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[90]
Q Now, while you were making an inventory of that, am I right, that you did not give a copy to
Benny Go, am I right?
A I gave them a xerox copy. I remember I gave them a xerox copy.
Q Is there any proof that they received an inventory report?
A Nothing, sir.[91]
Moreover, an examination of Exhibit Z, the Return of Search Warrant No. 99-0038 submitted by
SPO1 Fernandez to Br. 109 of the RTC of Pasay City was not verified under oath,[92] as required
by Section 12 (a) (formerly Section 12), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[93]
The delivery of the items seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and
accurate inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the
substitution of said items by interested parties.[94] Under Section 12 of Rule 126,[95] the judge
which issued the search warrant is mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for (1)
the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property received, (2) delivery of the seized property to
the court, together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items seized. Any violation of the
foregoing constitutes contempt of court.
Given the foregoing deviations from the normal and prescribed manner of conducting a search,
as disclosed by the members of the raiding team themselves, the reliance by the trial court on
the disputable presumption that the police officers regularly performed their official duty was
evidently misplaced.
The Affidavit of Orderly Search is not of any help in indicating the regularity of the search. Not
having been executed under oath, it is not actually an affidavit, but a pre-prepared form which
the raiding team brought with them. It was filled up after the search by team leader SPO1
Fernandez who then instructed appellant to sign it as he did instruct Jack Go, Kagawad Manalo
and Kagawad Lazaro to sign as witnesses.
More importantly, since the Affidavit of Orderly Search purports to have been executed by
appellant, the same cannot establish the propriety and validity of the search of his residence for
he was admittedly not present when the search took place, he having arrived only when it was
almost through.
Q And while your officers and the barangay kagawad were searching the house Mr. Benny Go is
not yet present in that house, am I right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you made to sign Benny Go in the inventory receipt when the search was already over, am
I right?
A He was already present when I was making the inventory. He arrived at around 9:30.
Q Yes, and the search was already finished, am I right?
A Almost through.[96]
In fine, since appellant did not witness the search of his residence, his alleged Affidavit of Orderly
Search, prepared without the aid of counsel and by the very police officers who searched his
residence and eventually arrested him, provides no proof of the regularity and propriety of the
search in question.
On the contrary, from the account of the police officers, their search of appellants residence
failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly Section 7), Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses. No search
of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. (Underscoring supplied)
As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted that the search of
the upper floor, which allegedly resulted in the recovery of the plastic bag containing the shabu,
did not take place in the presence of either the lawful occupant of the premises, i.e. appellant
(who was out), or his son Jack Go (who was handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor). Such a
procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by law are prevented from actually observing and
monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the spirit and letter of the law:
Furthermore, the claim of the accused-appellant that the marijuana was planted is strengthened
by the manner in which the search was conducted by the police authorities. The accused-
appellant was seated at the sala together with Sgt. Yte when they heard someone in the kitchen
uttered ito na. Apparently, the search of the accused-appellants house was conducted in
violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically provides that no search of
a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2)
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is
mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is in
fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code.
As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al. a
procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises
unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to
witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the
house, is violative of both the spirit and letter of the law.[97] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the search at the second
floor is of no moment. The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the
witnesses in whose presence the search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, Section 8,
Rule 126 provides that the search should be witnessed by two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the
premises or any member of his family. Thus, the search of appellants residence clearly should
have been witnessed by his son Jack Go who was present at the time. The police officers were
without discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law.
The claim of SPO1 Fernandez and PO2 Abulencia that Jack Go voluntarily waived his right to
witness the search, allegedly because there would be no one left in the sala and anyway
barangay officials were present, cannot be accepted. To be valid, a waiver must be made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.[98] Furthermore, the presumption is always against the
waiver of a constitutionally protected right.[99]
While Jack Go was present from the time the raiding team entered the premises until after the
search was completed, he was, however, handcuffed to a chair in the sala. [100] All alone and
confronted by five police officers who had deprived him of his liberty, he cannot thus be
considered to have voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his right to witness the search
of the house. Consent given under such intimidating, coercive circumstances is no consent within
the purview of the constitutional guaranty.[101]
The search conducted by the police officers of appellants residence is essentially no different
from that in People v. Del Rosario[102] where this Court observed:
We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small canister was actually seized
or confiscated at the residence of accused-appellant. In consequence, the manner the police
officers conducted the subsequent and much-delayed search is highly irregular. Upon barging
into the residence of accused-appellant, the police officers found him lying down and they
immediately arrested and detained him in the living room while they searched the other parts of
the house. Although they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called in
only after the policemen had already entered accused-appellants residence (pp. 22-23, tsn,
December 11, 1991), and, therefore, the policemen had more than ample time to plant the
shabu. Corollary to the Constitutional precept that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved (Sec. 14 (2), Article III, Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines) is the rule that in order to convict an accused the circumstances of
the case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence (People
vs. Tanchoco, 76 Phil. 463 [1946]; People vs. Constante, 12 SCRA 653 [1964]; People vs. Jara, 144
SCRA 516 [1986]). The facts of the case do not rule out the hypothesis that accused-appellant is
innocent.[103] (Emphasis supplied)
The raiding teams departure from the procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, taken together with the numerous other irregularities attending the search of appellants
residence, tainted the search with the vice of unreasonableness, thus compelling this Court to
apply the exclusionary rule and declare the seized articles inadmissible in evidence. This must
necessarily be so since it is this Courts solemn duty to be ever watchful for the constitutional
rights of the people, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.[104] In the oft-quoted
language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been
protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed.[105]
(Emphasis supplied)
In all prosecutions for violation of The Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence of the dangerous drug
is a condition sine qua non for conviction since the dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of
the crime.[106] With the exclusion of Exhibit A, the plastic bag containing the shabu allegedly
recovered from appellants residence by the raiding team, the decision of the trial court must
necessarily be reversed and appellant acquitted.
What is more, a thorough evaluation of the testimonies and evidence given before the trial court
fails to provide the moral certainty necessary to sustain the conviction of appellant.
In particular, Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo, the two witnesses to the search chosen by
the police officers in substitution of Jack Go, both categorically testified under oath that no shabu
was recovered from appellants residence by the police. Thus, Kagawad Lazaro testified that the
plastic bag containing white crystalline granules, later found positive for shabu, was not
recovered from the room of Jack Go:
Atty. Reyes:
You were shown a while ago by the prosecution of (sic) an Inventory Receipt allegedly prepared
by Officer Fernandez which includes the list of the items seized from the premises of Benny Go,
now, you said that theres no white crystalline granules included in that list which you signed
during the inventory?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you recall what was the first item included in that list which you signed in the first page?
A Chinese medicine, sir.
Q Now, you also testified that you were with Officer Abulencia when you conducted the search
inside the room of Jack Go, now, did you recover anything from the room of Jack Go?
A PO2 Abulencia recovered one small plastic in the drawer of Jack Go and Naphthalene balls, sir.
xxx
Atty. Reyes:
If that small plastic will be shown to you, will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Reyes:
I have here a plastic which contained yellowish powder. Could you go over this and tell us if this
was the one recovered from the room of Jack Go?
A This is the one, sir.
Q I have here another plastic containing white crystalline substance marked by the prosecution
as Exh. A. Will you tell us if this is also recovered from the room of Jack Go?
A No, this was not recovered from the room of Jack Go, sir.
Q During the preparation of the inventory of the seized items, was this also included?
A I did not see that, sir.[107] (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Kagawad Manalo testified that neither the plastic bag of shabu nor the weighing scale
was among the seized items inventoried by the raiding team:
Q You said that you were present during the time when SPO1 Fernandez was preparing the
inventory of all the items taken from the premises of Benny Go, can you recall what are these
items?
A Yes sir, assorted Chinese medicines, assorted documents, papers, passports, stamp pad,
bankbooks and checks and it was placed in five (5) boxes and three (3) ladies bag.
Q What about a weighing scale? Is there a weighing scale, Mr. Witness?
A I did not see any weighing scale, sir.
Q How about drugs or shabu contained in a plastic pack?
A I did not see any also.[108] (Emphasis supplied)
On rebuttal, SPO1 Fernandez alleged that the two barangay kagawads were lying when they
claimed that no shabu was recovered from appellants residence, and implied that they had been
asked to falsify their testimonies in court:
Pros. Rebagay:
Mr. witness, when Salvador Manalo testified before this Honorable Court when he was confronted
with Exh. B which is the inventory receipt the said witness denied that the first page of Exh. B"
was genuine on the fact that his signature and likewise [that of] his co-colleague did not appear
on the first page of the said inventory receipt, what can you say to that statement made by
Salvador Manalo?
A Well, it has not been our practice to let the witness sign on the first page of the 2-page
inventory receipt and with regards to the said inventory receipt that he signed on June 4, it is the
same inventory receipt that I prepared, sir.
xxx
Q Likewise, Mr. witness, the said witness Salvador Manalo also denied that the shabu which is the
subject of this case has never been recovered by them, what can you say to that?
A Well, its a lie, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because when the illegal drug was found by PO2 Abulencia, he was accompanied by Gaspar
Lazaro at that time. Then he called my attention and he also called the attention of SPO2
Serquea as well as the attention of Mr. Salvador Manalo. When I went upstairs, they were already
inside the said room so the five of us saw the illegal drugs, sir.
xxx
Pros. Rebagay:
Mr. witness, when Salvador Manalo testified here on cross-examination, he mentioned that after
the search of the house of Benny Go, a certain investigator, a policeman pretended that he is
making a follow-up with respect to the search made by you and your team, will you please tell us
if immediately after the incident or after the investigation conducted by the City Prosecutors
Office when you had an occasion to meet Salvador Manalo after that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what happened to that meeting with Salvador Manalo after the preliminary investigation?
Witness:
Because during the preliminary investigation, we were surprised why our witness has taken side,
it is on the side of the accused Benny Go so I decided to pay him a visit that day after that
confrontation on June 23 and I asked him what happened, tinanong ko siya kung ano ang
nangyari bakit mukhang nakampi na siya roon sa kabila. Ang sagot niya sa akin ang sabi sa amin
ni Atty. Galing kakausapin ka rin niya. That is the exact words.
Atty. Reyes:
We will object to that for being hearsay. May we move that the latter portion be stricken off the
record.
Court:
Let it remain
Pros. Rebagay:
And will you please tell us exactly when this incident occur (sic), Mr. witness?
A That was after June 23, sir.
Q Where?
A At his store in A. Linao Street, Paco, sir.
Q And what was your response after you heard that answer from Salvador Manalo, if any, Mr.
witness?
Witness:
Siyempre nagtaka ako, bakit ganoon ibig sabihin implied baka nagka-aregluhan na, iyan ang
iniisip ko, sir.[109] (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, no further evidence, aside from the foregoing allegations and suspicions of SPO1
Fernandez, was ever presented to substantiate the claim that the two kagawads had deliberately
falsified their testimonies. On the contrary, it appears that the police officers did not actively
pursue their complaint for obstruction of justice against the two kagawads with the Department
of Justice. Moreover, to completely discount the testimonies of kagawads Lazaro and Manalo
would be tantamount to having no witnesses to the search of appellants residence at all except
the police officers themselves, a situation clearly contrary to the tenor and spirit of Section 8 of
Rule 126.
The prosecutions attempt to introduce the weighing scale, supposedly seized during the search,
only casts more doubt on its case. Said weighing scale was conspicuously absent from the
enumeration of seized items in the handwritten Inventory Receipt, the Return of the Search
Warrant and the Affidavit of Arrest prepared by the police officers. SPO1 Fernandezs claim that
the omission was an honest mistake, to wit:
Pros. Rebagay
Q Mr. Witness, a while ago you added another item which was not included in the inventory list
and this was the weighing scale. Please tell us, why is it only now that you are adding it to the list
of those items that you seized?
A Well, with all honesty Your Honor, I cannot offer any alibi except to say that I committed an
honest mistake when I did not include that weighing scale in the inventory receipts.[110]
does not inspire credence. Neither does SPO1 Serqueas explanation:
Q What was the search warrant all about? It commands you to search and seize what items?
A Regarding drugs, drug paraphernalias and proceeds of the crime, sir.
Atty. Reyes:
What else?
A Weighing scale, sir.
Q Weighing scale is included in the search warrant. So the warrant specifically commands you to
seize drugs, drug paraphernalias and weighing scale?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you read this Affidavit of Arrest before you signed this. Did you notice that the weighing
scale is not included here?
A Yes, sir. Now I noticed.
Q No, during the time that you signed this?
A No, sir.
Q You did not notice that?
A No, sir.
Q As well as the time when Officer Fernandez was preparing this Inventory, you did not call his
attention that there are some items missing in that Inventory?
A I did not call his attention. Honestly speaking (unfinished)
xxx
A Honestly speaking, we confiscated so many evidence including papers, boxes, voluminous
quantity of evidence recovered and only one officer is conducting the Inventory. We cannot
conduct Inventory two at a time or three at a time, only one. Because maybe, you see, hes only
one. Maybe he did not list it because of that so many evidence confiscated.
Atty. Reyes:
But the weighing scale is not a small item, is that correct? Its a big item?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you want to tell us that you missed that item?
A I was not the one who missed it, sir.
Q How about your Affidavit of Arrest?
A Officer Fernandez prepared that Affidavit, sir.
Q So you are not the one who prepared this? You merely signed it?
A I signed it in their presence, sir.[111]
The foregoing explanations are improbable and far from persuasive. Considering that a weighing
scale was among the items particularly described in Search Warrant No. 99-0038, it would be
expected that the police officers would be actively searching for it and, if found, they would take
care to include it in the inventory and the return of the search warrant. But while numerous
seals, stamps, checks and documents not described in the search warrant were seized and
carefully inventoried by the raiding team, none of the five police officers bothered to point out
that the weighing scale had not been included in the inventory.
The implausibility of the story put forward by the police officers leads to no other conclusion than
that the weighing scale was introduced as an afterthought in order to bolster the case against
appellant.
With the persistence of nagging doubts surrounding the alleged discovery and seizure of the
shabu, it is evident that the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proof and overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence. It is thus not only the accuseds right to be freed; it
is, even more, this Courts constitutional duty to acquit him. [112] Apropos is the ruling in People
v. Aminnudin,[113] viz:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said I think it is less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. [114]
Return of Seized Property Not Described in the Search Warrant
Turning now to the Motion for Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia, the
general rule is that only the personal properties particularly described in the search warrant may
be seized by the authorities. Thus, in Tambasen v. People,[115] this Court held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted
beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable
searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed (Corro v. Lising,
137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]; Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v.
Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]).[116] (Emphasis supplied)
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence
obtained through a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under the following
circumstances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[117]
To be valid, therefore, the seizure of the items enumerated in appellants Motion for Return of
Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia must fall within the ambit of Search Warrant No.
99-0038 or under any of the foregoing recognized exceptions to the search warrant requirement.
In this regard, the raiding team sought to justify the seizure of the car, the Fifty Two Thousand
Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos (P52,760.00) in different denominations, and the Twenty Five
Thousand Chinese Yuan (CY25,000.00) as either proceeds of the offense or means of committing
an offense within the purview of the warrant. Thus PO2 Abulencia testified:
Q And how about the money, Mr. witness? Why did you confiscate the money?
A Its considered as proceed of the crime, sir.
Q How about the vehicle, Mr. witness? Why did you took (sic) custody of the vehicle when it was
not listed in the search warrant?
A This is part and parcel of the evidence, sir. Because its being used in transporting drugs, sir.
[118]
Similarly, with respect to the car, SPO1 Fernandez stated:
Q This vehicle, Toyota Corolla GLI with Plate No. PNU-TT-658, where was it during the time that
you. . . (unfinished)
A It was parked in front of the house of Benny Go.
Q And you seized it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A Because during the surveillance operation we saw some known pusher riding in that car?
Q Who are these drug pushers?
A One of those guys is Mr. Peter Co, also a subject of our investigation.
Q Which (sic) you released after the arrest, after he was invited for investigation in your office on
June 14, 1999?
A Yes, sir.[119]
The foregoing rationalizations are unacceptable. Admittedly, neither the money nor the car was
particularly described in the search warrant. In seizing the said items then, the police officers
were exercising their own discretion and determining for themselves which items in appellants
residence they believed were proceeds of the crime or means of committing the offense. This is
absolutely impermissible. It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional requirement
that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers
of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a
sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and
confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. [120]
At the same time, the raiding team characterized the seizure of the assorted documents,
passports, bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as seizure of
evidence in plain view. [121]
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.[122]
This Court had the opportunity to summarize the rules governing plain view searches in the
recent case of People v. Doria, supra, to wit:
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly
view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery
inadvertent. (Underscoring supplied; citations omitted)[123]
Measured against the foregoing standards, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the
passports, bankbooks, checks, typewriter, check writer, dry seals and stamp pads and other
assorted documents does not fall within the plain view exception. The assertions of the police
officers that said objects were inadvertently seized within their plain view are mere legal
conclusions which are not supported by any clear narration of the factual circumstances leading
to their discovery. PO2 Abulencia could not even accurately describe how the raiding team came
across these items:
Q This Box A marked as Exhibit G, in what part of the room did you recover this?
A We recovered all the evidence within our plain view, sir. The evidence were scattered in his
house. I cannot remember whether Box A or Box B, but all the evidence were within our plain
view thats why we confiscated them, sir.
Q What do you mean by plain view?
A Nakikita namin, sir. Yung kitang-kita namin.
Q Where in the premises of Benny Go did you see all these documents?
A Ground floor and upstairs but mostly in the ground floor, on the table and on the floor, sir.
Atty. Reyes:
This Box A marked as Exh. G contains what documents again?
A Can I see my notes, sir?
Atty. Reyes:
Go ahead.
A Box A contains different bundle of pieces of document, NBI and BI clearances, Application of
Chinese National, different papers, sir.
Q Can you remember where in particular did you recover these documents?
A I cannot remember, sir.
Q All of these documents were recovered primarily on the ground floor and on the second floor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where in particular at the second floor, there are three to four rooms there?
A Sir, nandoon sa mesa lahat iyan eh don sa taas rin may mesa din doon at saka doon naming
nakuha ang ibang mga dokumento.
Q Is (sic) that room belongs (sic) to Jack Go?
A I dont know, sir, but all these (sic) evidence were recovered from the house of Benny Go.[124]
SPO1 Fernandezs account of how he came across the dry seals, rubber stamps and papers is just
as opaque:
Q For how long have you been inside the house of Benny Go when you noticed these dry seals?
A I think more than an hour, I dont exactly remember the time.
Q But during the time you have not yet noticed the documents which you brought to this Court,
what call (sic) your attention was these dry seals first?
A Well, actually the dry seals and the rubber stamps were all placed atop the table and as well as
the documents because the box where the documents were placed are half opened. They are
opened actually thats why I saw them.
Q So, you first saw the rubber stamps and the dry seals, is that correct? Because they are atop
the table?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then later on you also saw the documents?
A Yes, sir its beside the table.
Q Contained in a box half opened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Which did you touch first, the rubber stamps, the dry seals or the documents?
A I did not touch anything, I only inventoried that when the searching team were through with
what they are doing. Now, all the evidence were placed atop the dining table, located also at the
sala of the house or at the dining area. Then, thats when I asked some of my co-members to
place all those document and the other confiscated items atop the table also.[125]
The foregoing testimonies are clearly evasive and do not establish how the police officers
became aware of the seized items which were allegedly within their plain view.
Finally, it appears from the testimony of SPO1 Fernandez that the supposed illegal character of
the items claimed to have been seized within the plain view of the policemen was not readily and
immediately apparent. Rather, the suspicions of the policemen appear to have been aroused by
the presence of the numerous passports and immigration documents which they discovered in
the course of their search. After they confirmed that appellant was not operating a travel agency,
they concluded that his possession of said documents and passports was illegal even though
they could not identify the alleged law supposedly violated.[126]
To be sure, the policemen also filed a complaint against appellant for alleged possession of
instruments or implements intended for the commission of falsification under paragraph 2 of
Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps also found in
appellants residence.[127]
However, the illegal character of said dry seals and stamp pads cannot be said to have been
immediately apparent. For SPO1 Fernandez had to first make an impression of the dry seal on
paper before he could determine that it purported to be the seal of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation. [128] The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not
established until after they had been turned over to the Chinese embassy and Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation for verification. It is, therefore, incredible that SPO1 Fernandez
could make such determination from a plain view of the items from his vantage point in the sala.
In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the
plain view doctrine to justify the seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The things
belonging to appellant not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly
described, must thus be ordered returned to him.[129]
Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps have
been certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,[130] they may
not be returned and are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of
according to law.[131] Moreover, the various bankbooks and passports not belonging to
appellant may not be ordered returned in the instant proceedings. The legality of a seizure can
be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.[132]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, convicting appellant
Benny Go of violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2 (e-2) Article I of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Benny Go is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and is hereby ordered immediately
RELEASED from confinement, unless he is lawfully held in custody for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to forthwith IMPLEMENT this Decision and
to INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually
released from confinement.
Appellants Motion For Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia is GRANTED IN
PART, and the trial court is hereby ordered to return to him those items seized from the subject
premises which belong to him as listed in said Motion.
The subject shabu is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the trial court is hereby
directed to deliver and/or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.
The two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation are likewise ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State for proper
disposition.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142932 May 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOEL GONZALES, JOSEPH BERNALDEZ, and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused,
JOEL GONZALES and ROMEO BERNALDEZ, accused-appellants
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, 11th
Judicial Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental, insofar as it finds accused-appellants Joel
Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty as principals of the complex crime of robbery with
homicide and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim
Nicanor Suralta in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P2,425.00, plus the costs of
the proceedings.
Accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez were charged with Joseph Bernaldez with
robbery with homicide under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code in an information which
alleged -
That on or about July 5, 1992, in the Municipality of San Isidro, Province of Davao Oriental,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of violence and intimidation, with intent to gain, in conspiracy with one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away "Seiko" diver's watch
valued at P1,000.00, one "Sanyo" cassette valued at P600.00 and cash amounting to P2,725.00,
with a total value of FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (P4,325.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, belonging to Nicanor Suralta to the damage and prejudice of his heirs,
represented by his widow, Carolita U. Suralta in the aforestated sum; and on the occasion
thereof, the said accused, armed with an unlicensed handgun and a knife, with intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm one
NICANOR SURALTA, thereby inflicting upon the latter wounds which caused his death.1wphi1.nt
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
When arraigned on December 1, 1992, the three entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon they
were tried.3
On June 4, 1992, the accused filed a Joint Petition with Leave of Court for Reinvestigation, which
the court granted. As a result of the reinvestigation, a Motion to Dismiss with respect to accused
Joseph Bernaldez was filed. On September 9, 1993, the court issued an order stating -
On record is a motion to dismiss dated September 7, 1993 filed by OIC 1st Asst. Prov'l.
Prosecutor Pableo B. Baldoza. Finding the grounds stated therein to be well-taken and in order,
said motion is granted.
WHEREFORE, the case against accused Joseph Bernaldez only is hereby ordered dismissed. The
Provincial Warden is hereby directed to release immediately from custody the person of Joseph
Bernaldez, if there is no other case that will warrant his further confinement in jail.
SO ORDERED.4
Thereafter, trial proceeded against accused-appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez.
The facts are as follows:
At about 9:30 o'clock in the evening of July 5, 1992, the spouses Nicanor and Carolita Suralta had
visitors at their house in Bagsac, Manikling, San Isidro, Davao Oriental. Nicanor was having drinks
with Arsenio Abonales, Bobong Lamanilao, and Nicasio Lamanilao when two armed men, one
carrying a gun and the other a knife, suddenly entered the house through the kitchen door. The
one carrying a gun had a bonnet over his face, with only his eyes exposed, while the other one
carrying a knife had the lower half of his face covered with a handkerchief. The knife-wielder held
Chona, the third child of the Suralta spouses, and announced a holdup. All persons in the house
were ordered to go inside the bedroom, about two meters away from the sala. There, the man
with a gun demanded a gun and money from Nicanor. Nicanor answered that he had no gun, but
asked his wife to give money to the holduppers. Carolita gave P2,100.00, which was intended to
be deposited in the bank, to the knife-wielder, who placed it in his pocket. Then the knife-wielder
ransacked the cabinet and took the remaining amount of P325.00, which was intended for the
school expenses of the Suralta children. In addition, he took the family's Sanyo cassette recorder
and some clothes. The holduppers also divested Arsenio Abonales, one of the guests, of his Seiko
diver's wristwatch and then left.5
As the holduppers were leaving, two gunshots rang out. Carolita thought that the first one was a
mere warning shot, but later Nicanor was heard moaning. Carolita became hysterical after seeing
her husband lying in a pool of his own blood. Nicanor was immediately brought to the Lupon
Emergency Hospital where he was given first aid. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Tagum
Regional Hospital but he eventually died.6 The death certificate (Exh. B) states the cause of his
death as -
Immediate Cause: CARDIO-RESPIRATORY ARREST
Antecedent Cause: MULTIPLE [GUNSHOT WOUNDS] PENETRATING ABDOMEN PERFORATING WITH
MASSIVE CONTAMINATION, PERFORATING CECUM, APPENDECIAL TRANSECTION MESENTERIC
VISSEL, ILEUM, JEJUNUM & SIGMOID
Other significant conditions contributing to death: HYPOVOLEMIA.7
The incident was reported to the San Isidro Police on the same night. Carolita Suralta and Arsenio
Abonales gave descriptions of the holduppers and told the responding police investigators that
they would be able to recognize the suspects if they saw them again.8
On July 12, 1992, there was another holdup inside the ACF passenger bus compound in the
neighboring municipality of Magdug, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental. The police team sent
to investigate the incident was able to pick up suspects,9 one of whom was accused-appellant
Joel Gonzales. He was wearing a wristwatch (Exh. A) and had a handgun (Exh. H). Other items,
consisting of watches, a cassette recorder (Exh. D), a chain saw, and spare parts, were recovered
from his house, some of which were claimed by passengers of the ACF bus line.10
Police Inspector Arnold Malintad of Governor Generoso, head of the team investigating the
robbery of the ACF bus compound, informed Capt. Adane Sakkam, Police Chief of San Isidro,
about the apprehension of accused-appellant Gonzales and the recovery of the items from him.
Accordingly, on July 14, 1992, Capt. Sakkam, Carolita Suralta, and Arsenio Abonales proceeded to
the Governor Generoso Police Station. Carolita and Arsenio identified accused-appellants Joel
Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez as the holduppers. Joel Gonzales was identified as the man
armed with a gun who wore a bonnet to cover his face, while Romeo Bernaldez was identified as
the knife-wielder who wore a handkerchief to cover the lower portion of his face.11
Carolita volunteered that accused-appellant Bernaldez is in fact her nephew. Carolita and Arsenio
said that they were able to recognize the suspects despite their disguises because they were
only one to two meters away from each other during the holdup, and the rooms of the house
were well-lighted.12 In addition, Carolita was able to identify the Sanyo cassette recorder (Exh.
D) as the one taken from their house because of the broken antennae and the name "Nick
Suralta" written inside the battery compartment. On the other hand, Arsenio likewise identified
the Seiko diver's watch (Exh. A) as his.13
Accused-appellants put up the defense of denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales testified that he was in Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso,
Davao Oriental the whole day of July 5, 1992 working in his mother-in-law's farm, piling coconut
palm leaves together with his brother-in-law. In the evening, he had supper in his house and slept
there together with his family.14
On July 13, 1992, Gonzales was suffering from a fever. While he was sleeping, he was awakened
by Policeman Danny Cabanilas, Inspector Arnold Malintad and Eddie Tano, who took him to the
Governor Generoso police station in connection with a robbery in the ACF bus compound. At the
police station, he was investigated by Inspector Malintad and thereafter put in jail. While inside
the jail, people came to see him. Malintad pointed at him and asked a woman companion if he
was one of the persons who committed the robbery in San Isidro. The woman answered, "I do not
know them." For this reason, both Malintad and the woman left. However, upon their return, the
woman said that she recognized the men and pointed to him and accused-appellant Romeo
Bernaldez as those who were involved in the robbery.15
On July 31, 1992, accused-appellant Gonzales was taken to Mati by Policemen Ernesto Bahan and
Alfredo Castro, but, before reaching Mati, somewhere in Baas, they alighted from the jeep and
he was made to kneel. He was beaten up by Bahan and Castro with the use of an armalite and
hit on the chest and the back. He was then brought to the Mati Cemetery and there forced to
confess. Thereafter, he was placed inside an open tomb for 12 minutes and then he was taken to
the Mati Municipal Jail. After three days, he was taken to Governor Generoso. He denied
participation in the crime and stated that the cassette recorder and other items were not
confiscated from him.16
For his part, accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez claimed that at around 9:30 o'clock in the
evening of July 5, 1992, he was sleeping in his house in Tibanban, Governor Generoso together
with his father, mother, and two sisters. On July 13, 1998, he went to the Municipal Jail of
Governor Generoso to answer accusations by the police that he was concealing a firearm. At the
police station, he was investigated by Inspector Malintad for the firearm he allegedly kept, which
he denied. He was later placed in jail.17 Inspector Malintad, however, testified that Bernaldez
was actually arrested in his house in Tibanban.18
Romeo Bernaldez further testified that on July 14, 1992, Carolita Suralta, accompanied by
Policemen Sakkam and Malintad, went to the jail and made the prisoners stand up, after which
they went to Malintad's office. Then, the two returned to the jail cell after a few minutes and
Carolita pointed to him as among those involved in the robbery.19
Romeo Bernaldez also said that his residence was approximately 25 kilometers from Manikling,
San Isidro, where the robbery with homicide took place, and could be reached by several means
of land transportation.20
Except for accused-appellants, no other witness was presented by the defense.
Thereafter, SPO4 Ernesto Bahan was presented to rebut accused-appellant Joel Gonzales's
testimony. According to Bahan, at around 5 o'clock in the morning of July 21, 1992, he left for
Governor Generoso on official mission together with SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, and PO3
Hassan, upon order of his superior to fetch Joel Gonzales, per letter-request of Assistant
Provincial Director Supt. Melchisedeck Barggio. Acting on said letter-request, Judge Rodolfo
Castro of Municipal Trial Court of Mati ordered Inspector Malintad, the Chief of Police of Governor
Generoso, to turn over Joel Gonzales. The party left Sigaboy, Governor Generoso at past 11
o'clock in the morning and arrived in Mati at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of July 21,
1992. To support his statement, SPO4 Bahan read to the court page 362 of the police blotter for
July 21, 1992, 1350H, to wit:
SPO3 Bahan, SPO3 Castro, SPO1 Lindo, PO3 Jaljis, PO3 Azan arrived [at the] Police Station from
Governor Generoso and brought in the person of Joel Gonzales regarding the request of Chief
Inspector Melchisedeck C Bargio PNP Davao Or Provincial Command, Mati Dvo Or to Mun. Trial
Court of Governor Generoso, Province of Davao Or duly signed by [Judge] Rodolfo Castro to turn
over the custody of accused to Mati Police Station for investigation, in relati[on] to CC No. 7183
for Robbery with Homicide which is now pending in the Mun. Trial Court of Mati, same the Chief of
Police of Governor Generoso granted to be brought at Mati Police Station provided that maximum
security must be implemented and to be returned said to Governor Generoso Police Station
within three (3) days same said Joel Gonzales also involved in Robbery with Homicide in CC No.
7183 as pinpointed by two witnesses subject is hereby placed under police custody as per verbal
order of OIC SPO1 Fortuna to the Jailer guard "BJMP" SPO3 Cabillada.21
SPO4 Bahan denied having taken accused-appellant Joel Gonzales to the Mati Cemetery. He said
that when they arrived in Mati, he immediately turned over Joel Gonzales to the Chief of Police,
who then turned him over to the investigating section.22
He further testified that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales was taken to Mati in connection with
Criminal Case No. 7183. Although SPO4 Bahan admitted he had been administratively charged
with maltreating detention prisoners, he said the case was later dismissed and he was
exonerated.23
After trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court finding accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of
its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as Principal[s] of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and hereby sentences
each of them to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to
indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of the victim, Nicanor Suralta, the sum of P50,000.00,
to indemnify also jointly and severally said heirs the sum of P2,425.00, plus the costs of the
proceedings.
The cassette [recorder] (Exhibit "D") is ordered returned to the Suralta family, while the
wristwatch (Exhibit "A") to Arsenio Abonales.
SO ORDERED.24
Counsel for accused-appellant Joel Gonzales assigns the following errors allegedly committed by
the trial court:
I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECIDING THAT THE ACCUSED WERE POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED BY PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II. THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION DURING THE TRIAL ARE INADMISSIBLE
IN LAW.25
On the other hand, the Public Attorney's Office, on behalf of both accused-appellants, assigns the
following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE IDENTITIES OF THE ASSAILANTS
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED
BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.26
We find accused-appellants' contentions to be without merit.
After reviewing the records of this case, we find that the prosecution evidence establishes the
guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction for robbery with homicide
requires proof of the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with violence or
intimidation against persons or with force upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another;
(c) the taking be done with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof, homicide in its generic sense is committed. The offense becomes
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if
the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. Even the Public Attorney's Office
concedes that the prosecution was successful in proving the commission of the crime,
questioning only the identification made by the prosecution witnesses of accused-appellants as
the perpetrators of the crime.27
First. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving credence to the identification
made by the two prosecution witnesses, Carolita Suralta and Arsenio Abonales. They argue that
the manner by which accused-appellants were identified was suggestive and showed partiality.
They argue further that, most often, the bereaved families of victims are not concerned with the
accuracy of identification because they are overwhelmed by passion for vindication, regardless of
whether or not the suspect is the real culprit.
This contention is without merit. We find no reason for setting aside the lower court's conclusion
on the accuracy and correctness of the witnesses' identification of the accused-appellants as the
persons who robbed the Suralta spouses and the couples' guest Arsenio Abonales and killed
Nicanor Suralta. It is the most natural reaction of victims of criminal violence to strive to
ascertain the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was
committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a lasting
impression on the victims' minds which cannot be easily erased from their memory.28 There is
no evidence to show that the eyewitnesses were so paralyzed with fear that they mistook
accused-appellants for the men who robbed and killed the victims. On the contrary, fear for one's
life may even cause the witness to be more observant of his surroundings.29 Experience shows
that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes,
eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, attain a high degree of reliability in identifying
criminals.30 The desire to see that justice is done will not be served should the witness abandon
his conscience and prudence and blame one who is innocent of the crime.31
Indeed, prosecution witnesses positively and categorically identified accused-appellants as the
armed men who held them up on July 5, 1992 and killed the victim. There was no possibility of
mistaken identification because prosecution witnesses were able to observe their movements
and their body built and height despite the fact that accused-appellants covered their faces.32
As Carolita Suralta testified:
COURT TO THE WITNESS:
Q You stated that one of the robbers was wearing a bonnet, is that right?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And at that time when he was wearing a bonnet, you were not able to identify him?
A I cannot recognize him, but I can recognize his voice and his actions.
Q Why is it that you can recognize his voice and his actions?
A When they got inside, Your Honor.
....
Q How is it that you can recognize his voice and his movements that he is the accused Joel
Gonzales, considering that he was wearing a bonnet and he is not even your neighbor?
A Because at the time he said, "silence", I recognized his voice, Your Honor.33
Accused-appellants' counsels attempted to confuse prosecution witnesses during the trial by
using the word "recognize" to simultaneously mean identification of face and knowledge of the
name. But the witnesses were able to stand their ground. We agree with private prosecutor that
a mistake is likely when one equates knowing the person by his movements and by his voice
with knowing a person by his name. Although the names of accused-appellants were supplied by
the police, the witnesses nevertheless recognized accused-appellants when they visited them in
the Governor Generoso jail.34 What is important is not the ability of an eyewitness to give the
true and correct names of the accused, but rather his ability to identify the persons actually seen
committing the offense.35
Moreover, in the absence of proof that a witness is moved by improper motive, it is presumed
that he was not so moved and, therefore, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.36 That
presumption has not been overcome in this case. Consequently, the identification of accused-
appellants as the killers of Nicanor Suralta stands. Nor is motive for the killing important when
there is no doubt as to the identity of the perpetrators of the crime.37 But here the motive is
plain: the victim was killed to rob him of his possessions.
Furthermore, alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive
identification of accused-appellants. The defense of denial and alibi, unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, is self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
positive testimonies of credible witnesses.38
Second. Accused-appellant Gonzales contends that during the interrogation and investigation, he
and his co-appellant Romeo Bernaldez were not informed of their rights to remain silent and to
secure the services of counsel, in violation of 2 and 12, Art. III of the Constitution. Hence, their
admission of the commission of the crime is inadmissible in evidence against them.
This contention lacks merit.
Inspector Arnold Malintad testified that on July 14, 1992, accused-appellant Joel Gonzales was
picked up at around 8:00 a.m. near his residence in Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso. Accused-
appellant Gonzales had a handgun tucked in his waistline and was wearing a wristwatch.
According to Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant Gonzales admitted participation in the crime
upon interrogation and voluntarily surrendered the stolen goods to him.
ATTY. LADERA:
Q Where did you pick up Joel Gonzales?
A At Barangay Tandang Sora, Governor Generoso.
....
Q In his residence?
A In the vicinity of his residence.
Q Where?
A At the barangay road.
Q Was he sitting or standing?
A He was standing.
Q He was not bringing anything?
A A handgun and a wristwatch.
Q When did you recover the cassette [recorder]?
A I told him to turn over the loot of the ACF.
Q You told the accused to turn over the loot[?]
A Yes.
....
Q Where?
A He was apprehended with the gun and the wristwatch and I brought him to the police
station and interrogated him and after the interrogation, he accepted the commission of the
crime and he told me that he will voluntarily surrender the items in his house.
....
Q When you went to the house of Joel Gonzales, when was that that you said he voluntarily
turned over the loot?
A On that date.
Q The time when you went to the house?
A Yes.
....
Q Did you have any search warrant?
A I did not go inside the house.
Q How many of you went to the house?
A About ten (10).
Q You were armed?
A Yes.
Q You surrounded the house of Joel Gonzales?
A No, because it is only a matter of asking his wife to surrender the items.39
To be sure, accused-appellants were already under custodial investigation when they made their
admissions to the police. At that point, the investigation had ceased to be a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime and had began to focus on the guilt of a suspect and for this reason the latter
were taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom in a substantial way.40 Hence, the
admissions made by accused-appellants are inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Art. III, 2(1)
and (3) of the Constitution. However, the defense failed to raise its objections to the admissibility
of these statements immediately, as required by Rule 132, 36, when Inspector Malintad was
presented as a witness for the prosecution or when specific questions concerning the confession
were asked of him. Consequently, accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their right to
object to the admissibility of Inspector Malintad's testimony.41 Indeed, it was even the defense
counsel who provided the opportunity for Inspector Malintad to elaborate on the circumstances
of accused-appellant Gonzales' admission in the course of his cross-examination of the said
witness.
Inspector Malintad also claimed that accused-appellant Joel Gonzales told him that one of his
companions was Romeo Bernaldez. He said:
ATTY. LOPEZ: (CROSS EXAMINATION)
For accused Romeo Bernaldez.
....
Q So, this Romeo Bernaldez was not a suspect in the Robbery?
A He was picked up later.
Q Where did you pick him up?
A At Tibanban.
Q Why did you pick him up?
A It was Joel Gonzales who told me.
Q You mean to tell us that Joel Gonzales told you that Romeo Bernaldez is one of his
companions?
A Yes and he told us that he is in Barangay Tibanban and we picked him up.42
On the other hand, Capt. Sakkam testified that when he was in the Municipal Jail at the Police
Station of Governor Generoso in order to identify the suspects, he asked them who killed the
victim and accused-appellant Romeo Bernaldez answered that it was accused-appellant Joel
Gonzales.
COURT:
....
Q Were you able to talk with all the accused?
A When I saw them, I asked one of them as to who killed the victim, and the other one
answered - I was not responsible in the killing - and he said, "Joel Gonzales killed the victim".
Q Who was the one who told you that the one who shot the victim was Joel Gonzales?
A It was Romeo Bernaldez, the short one.43
Such admission by accused-appellant Bernaldez may be taken as evidence against his co-
appellant Joel Gonzales. For the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply
to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime.44
Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales also contends that Inspector Malintad had no warrant when the
latter conducted a search of his residence. He contends that the alleged items taken during the
robbery in the ACF bus compound and the cassette recorder and wristwatch are inadmissible in
evidence against him.
This contention deserves no merit. As explained by Inspector Malintad, accused-appellant Joel
Gonzales voluntarily surrendered the stolen goods to him. When he went to the house of
accused-appellant Joel Gonzales, the watches, cassette recorder, chainsaw, and spare parts were
given to him. What thus happened was a consented search, which constitutes a waiver of the
constitutional requirement for a search warrant. It has been held that the right to be secure from
an unreasonable search may be waived either expressly or impliedly.45 And when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable search and seizure, as in this case, the
exclusionary rule (Art. III, 3(2)) in the Constitution does not apply.
Third. Accused-appellant Joel Gonzales denies that the stolen goods had been taken from him.
Inspector Malintad testified that he recovered watches, a cassette recorder, a chainsaw, and
spare parts from accused-appellant Joel Gonzales when he arrested the latter in his house. There
is no reason to doubt Inspector Malintad's claim that the stolen items were indeed recovered
from accused-appellant Gonzales. These items were definitively identified by the owners as those
taken from them. Between the testimonies of the police officers, who enjoy the presumption of
regularity in their duties, and the bare denials of accused-appellants, we are more inclined to
believe the police officers. This is true especially considering that the police officers have not
been shown to have any motive to testify falsely against accused-appellants.
Rule 131, 3(j) of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides "that a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned
by him." Since the subject items were found in the possession of accused-appellant Joel
Gonzales, he is then presumed to be the taker of the stolen items. Accused-appellant Gonzales
was unable to satisfactorily explain his possession of the stolen items.
All told, we hold the evidence in this case establishes the guilt of accused-appellants beyond
reasonable doubt. Under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
the penalty for robbery with homicide ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the
absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the trial court on accused-appellants.
The Court likewise sustains the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the
victim, Nicanor Suralta, the same being in line with prevailing jurisprudence.46 An additional
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be awarded in favor of the heirs of the
victim. Such damages require no further proof other than the death of the victim.47 The
restitution of the cash and of the stolen items to their respective owners ordered by the trial
court is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated February 10, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial
Region, Branch 6, Mati, Davao Oriental is AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-
appellants Joel Gonzales and Romeo Bernaldez are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of Nicanor Suralta the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,425.00 as restitution for the stolen cash, plus costs of the
proceedings. The cassette recorder is ordered returned to the heirs of Nicanor Suralta, and the
wristwatch to Arsenio Abonales.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149723 October 27, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
August 31, 2001 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 20431 which granted
the Motion for Bail2 of accused-appellant, herein respondent Victor Keith Fitzgerald, (Fitzgerald).
The facts are of record.
An Information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Olongapo City and docketed
as Criminal Case No. 422-94, charged Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with Violation of Art. III,
Section 5, paragraph (a), subparagraph (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610,3 allegedly committed
as follows:
That sometime in the month of September 1993, in the City of Olongapo, Zambales, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD,
actuated by lust, and by the use of laced drugs ("vitamins") willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
induced complainant "AAA,"4 a minor, 13 years of age, to engage in prostitution by then and
there showering said "AAA" with gifts, clothes and food and thereafter having carnal knowledge
of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her damage and prejudice.5
After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a Decision dated May 7, 1996, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Victor Keith Fitzgerald GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Violation of Section 5, Paragraph (a) sub-paragraph 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, with all the accessory penalties attached therewith; and to indemnify the
private complainant "AAA" the amounts of P30,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
The Lingap Center of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in Olongapo
City shall hold in trust the said awards and dispose the same solely for the rehabilitation and
education of "AAA", to the exclusion of her mother and her other relatives.
The accused under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code shall be credited in full of his preventive
imprisonment if he has agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise to only 4/5 thereof.
Upon completion of the service of his sentence, the accused shall be deported immediately and
forever barred from entry to the Philippines.
In Criminal Case No. 419-94 for Rape, the accused is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.6
Fitzgerald applied for bail which the RTC denied in an Order dated August 1, 1996, which reads:
xxxx
In fine, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the Prosecution during the hearing on the bail
petition, the Court is of the considered view that the circumstances of the accused indicate
probability of flight and that there is undue risk that the accused may commit a similar offense, if
released on bail pending appeal.
WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Petition for Bail pending appeal
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.7
Fitzgerald appealed to the CA which, in a Decision8 dated September 27, 1999, affirmed the RTC
Decision, thus:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, with the modification that the penalty imposed on the accused-appellant is
imprisonment of Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal to
Twenty (20) years and One (1) day of Reclusion Perpetua, the decision of the court a quo is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9
Fitzgerald filed a Motion for New Trial10 and a Supplemental to Accused's Motion for New Trial11
on the ground that new and material evidence not previously available had surfaced. The CA
granted the Motion for New Trial in a Resolution dated August 25, 2000, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appellant's Motion for New Trial dated October 14, 1999 is GRANTED. The
original records of this case is hereby REMANDED to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City Branch 75 who is DIRECTED to receive the new evidence material to
appellant's defense within sixty days from receipt and thereafter to submit to this Court the said
evidence together with the transcript of stenographic notes together with the records of the case
within ten (10) days after the reception of evidence. The Motion to Transfer appellant to the
National Penitentiary is DENIED.12 (Emphasis ours)
The People (petitioner) filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 from the August 25, 2000 CA
Resolution while Fitzgerald filed a Motion to Fix Bail with Manifestation.14 Both Motions were
denied by the CA in its November 13, 2000 Resolution.15 In denying Fitzgerald's bail application,
the CA held:
[T]his Court hereby RESOLVES to:
xxxx
2. DENY accused-appellant's Motion to Fix Bail with Manifestation, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which provides:
"Sec. 7. Capital Offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal procecution."
In the case at bar, the maximum imposable penalty in accordance with Republic Act 7610
otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act is reclusion perpetua. As it is, the evidence of guilt is strong, hence, We hold
that his motion for bail cannot be granted at this point.
With regard to his alleged physical condition, let it be stressed that accused-appellant is not
precluded from seeking medical attention if the need arises provided the necessary
representations with the proper authorities are made.
SO ORDERED.16 (Emphasis ours)
The People filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari17 docketed as G.R. No. 146008
questioning the August 25, 2000 and November 13, 2000 CA Resolutions. The petition was
dismissed in a Resolution18 dated January 15, 2001, which became final and executory on May
2, 2001.19
Meanwhile, on December 3, 2000, Fitzgerald filed with the CA a Motion for Early Transmittal of
the Records and for the Re-Examination of the Penalty Imposed, and a Motion for Bail.20 The
People filed its Comment21 to both Motions.
On August 31, 2001, the CA issued the herein assailed Resolution22 granting Fitzgerald's bail
application, thus:
xxxx
Be that as it may, while We maintain that, as it is, the evidence of guilt is strong, We have taken
a second look at appellant's plea for temporary liberty considering primarily the fact that
appellant is already of old age23 and is not in the best of health. Thus, it is this Court's view that
appellant be GRANTED temporary liberty premised not on the grounds stated in his Motion for
Bail but in the higher interest of substantial justice and considering the new trial granted in this
case. Accordingly, appellant is hereby DIRECTED to post a bail bond in the amount of
P100,000.00 for his temporary liberty provided he will appear in any court and submit himself to
the orders and processes thereof if and when required to do so. The appellant is likewise
refrained from leaving the country now or in the future until this case is terminated. Accordingly,
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is ORDERED to include appellant in its hold departure
list xxx.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis ours)
Thereafter, the RTC ordered Fitzgerald's temporary release on
September 4, 2001 upon his filing a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00.25
Hence, the People filed this Petition to have the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution annulled and set
aside. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail
despite the fact that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and
the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 It also questions the jurisdiction of the CA to act on said
Motion, considering that the case had been remanded to the RTC for new trial.27
In his Comment and Memorandum, respondent counters that the grant of new trial negated the
previous findings of the existence of strong evidence of his guilt;28 and justifies his provisional
release on humanitarian grounds, citing as an extraordinary circumstance his advanced age and
deteriorating health.29
The petition is meritorious.
We resolve first the preliminary question of whether the CA, after issuing its August 25, 2000
Resolution granting a new trial, still had jurisdiction to act on respondent's Motion to Post Bail.
Our ruling on this matter, however, shall be limitted to the effect of the August 25, 2000 CA
Resolution on the latter's jurisdiction; it shall have no bearing on the merits of said Resolution as
this has been decided with finality in G.R. No. 146008.
According to petitioner, considering that the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution, referring the case to
the RTC for new trial, had become final and executory on May 2, 2001 when this Court denied its
petition for review in G.R. No. 146008, then, when the CA issued the August 31, 2001 Resolution
granting respondent bail, it had been stripped of jurisdiction over the case.30
Petitioner is mistaken.
When this Court grants a new trial, it vacates both the judgment of the trial court convicting the
accused31 and the judgment of the CA affirming it,32 and remands the case to the trial court for
reception of newly-discovered evidence and promulgation of a new judgment,33 at times with
instruction to the trial court to promptly report the outcome.34 The Court itself does not conduct
the new trial for it is no trier of facts.35
However, when the CA grants a new trial, its disposition of the case may differ, notwithstanding
Sec. 1,36 Rule 125 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides for uniformity in
appellate criminal procedure between this Court and the CA. Unlike this Court, the CA may
decide questions of fact and mixed questions of fact and law.37 Thus, when it grants a new trial
under Sec. 14, Rule 124, it may either (a) directly receive the purported newly-discovered
evidence under Sec. 12,38 or (b) refer the case to the court of origin for reception of such
evidence under Sec. 15.39 In either case, it does not relinquish to the trial court jurisdiction over
the case; it retains sufficient authority to resolve incidents in the case and decide its merits.
Now then, the CA, in its August 25, 2000 Resolution, ordered: first, the remand of the original
records of the case to the RTC; second, that the RTC receive the new evidence material to
appellant's defense within 60 days from receipt of the original records; and third, that the RTC
submit to it the said evidence together with the transcript of the case within 10 days after
reception of evidence.40 From the foregoing dispostion, it is evident that the CA retained
appellate jurisdiction over the case, even as it delegated to the RTC the function of receiving the
respondent's newly-discovered evidence. The CA therefore retained its authority to act on
respondent's bail application. Moreso that the the original records of the case had yet to be
transmitted to the RTC when respondent filed his bail application and the CA acted on it.
With that procedural matter out of the way, we now focus on the substantive issue of whether
the CA erred when it allowed respondent to bail.
The right to bail emenates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person
in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys,41 be
allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court,
as required under specified conditions.42
Implementing Sec. 13,43 Article III of the 1987 Constitution, Sections 444 and 5, Rule 114 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth substantive and procedural rules on the disposition of
bail applications. Sec. 4 provides that bail is a matter of right to an accused person in custody for
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,45 but a matter of
discretion on the part of the court, concerning one facing an accusation for an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of his guilt is strong.46 As
for an accused already convicted and sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail
may be denied or revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the
circumstances under Sec. 5, paragraphs (a) to (e), to wit:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a
notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved
by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice
to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense
while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be recalled that herein respondent was charged with violation of Section 5, par. (a), sub-
paragraph (5), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a crime which carries the maximum penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He was later convicted by the RTC for a lesser crime which carried a sentence
of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
These circumstances are not altered when the CA granted a new trial.47 As already discussed,
the CA retained appellate jurisdiction over the case even as it ordered the remand of the original
records thereof to the RTC for reception of evidence. In retaining appellate jurisdiction, it set
aside only its own September 27, 1999 Decision but left unaltered the May 7, 1996 RTC Decision.
In fact, in its August 31, 2001 Resolution, the CA emphasized:
As we have pointed out earlier, the propriety of appellant's conviction of the offense charged as
well as the penalty imposed thereto should be resolved during the appreciation of the new trial
after considering the new evidence which appellant insist would prove his innocence.48
The May 7, 1996 RTC Decision, therefore, remained operative. And under said Decision,
respondent stood sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding six years.
Moreover, both the RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of the existence of strong
evidence of the guilt of respondent.49 These findings were not overturned when the CA granted
a new trial. Under Section 6 (b), Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allows for reception of newly-
discovered evidence but maintains evidence already presented or on record. And if there has
been a finding that evidence is strong and sufficient to bar bail, that too subsists unless, upon
another motion and hearing, the prosecution fails to prove that the evidence against the accused
has remained strong.50 In the present case, no new evidence had since been introduced, nor
hearing conducted as would diminish the earlier findings of the RTC and CA on the existence of
strong evidenc against respondent.
In sum, the circumstances of the case are such, that for respondent, bail was not a matter of
right but a mere privilege subject to the discretion of the CA to be exercised in accordance with
the stringent requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 114. And Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of bail
upon evidence of the existence of any of the circumstances enumerated therein 51 such as those
indicating probability of flight if released on bail or undue risk that the accused may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
As it is, however, the CA, in its August 31, 2001 Resolution, admitted respondent to bail based,
"xxx not on the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail xxx," but "xxx primarily [on] the fact that
[he] is already of old age and is not in the best of health xxx," and notwithstanding its finding
that "xxx as it is, the evidence of guilt is strong xxx."52 The Resolution disregarded substantive
and procedural requirements on bail.
It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the Motion filed
by respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not
a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail.53 It may be that the trend now is for
courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick.54 There may also be an existing
proposition for the "selective decarceration of older prisoners" based on findings that recidivism
rates decrease as age increases.55 But, in this particular case, the CA made no specific finding
that respondent suffers from an ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during
trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. It merely declared respondent not
in the best of health even when the only evidence on record as to the latter's state of health is
an unverified medical certificate stating that, as of August 30, 2000, respondent's condition
required him to "xxx be confined in a more sterile area xxx."56 That medical recommendation
was even rebuffed by the CA itself when, in its November 13, 2000 Resolution, it held that the
physical condition of respondent does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while
confined in prison.57
Moreover, there is a finding of record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar
offense. In its August 1, 1996 Order, the RTC noted that the circumstances of respondent indicate
an undue risk that he would commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal.58 The
RTC explained its findings thus:
Dr. Aida Muncada, a highly competent Psychiatrist, testified that phedophilia is a state of sexual
disorder and sexual dysfunction. It is intense and recurrent. The possibility of the commission of
a similar offense for which the accused was convicted is great if the accused will be exposed to
"stress" and if an opportunity to commit it lurks.59
The foregoing finding was not traversed or overturned by the CA in its questioned Resolution.
Such finding, therefore, remains controlling. It warranted the outright denial of respondent's bail
application. The CA, therefore, erred when it granted respondent's Motion for Bail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The bail bond posted by respondent is CANCELLED. Let an ORDER OF ARREST ISSUE
against the person of the accused, Victor Keith Fitzgerald.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent
Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before
warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail
and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to
these two novel questions is "No." The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the
exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set
aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application for the
issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the
same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent
Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently
and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this
Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondents temporary liberty at ONE MILLION
PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the
respondent in its Hold Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and
the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.
5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through
diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16,
1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them
to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department
of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was,
however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially,
the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it
reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution
has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by
the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition
which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that
Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with
the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United
States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax
evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US
Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001
and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f
and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition
prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No.
1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest
warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure
adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In
his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he
be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court
below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest
and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered
his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez
to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides
for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4,
Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as
bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant
of the existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public respondent
received no evidence of special circumstances which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender a
well-founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by
the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo T.
Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589,
relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of
the subject bail orders." 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled
to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled
to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we
shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioners failure
to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA),
instead of in this Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will
guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the
Extradition Court: "(1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties
to submit their respective memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a
reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent
nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as
the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid
extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons:
"(1) even if the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes
cognizance of the issues and decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this
Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent
that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled
on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial
guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are
pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless
guided by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant
bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause
adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing
extradition treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior
court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors
imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law,
(2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the Court
has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of
certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have
already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from
being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of
public interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we
stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman,
and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition
in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the
present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest
because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution.
Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would
only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and
again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy
disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and
proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus,
and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings
constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide
lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty
and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain
and give effect to its intent. 25 Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of
extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of
extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating
the arrest and the custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals
from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has
become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with
criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the
major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the
only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court
competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law. 31
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be
restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals
seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the
threat of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits
of a State, so the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty
of return to the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad
in order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition arrangements
flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does
the commission of crime itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is
to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government.
More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime
prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards
globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and
progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this
irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring
of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to
cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own
country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that
both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly
authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the
capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to
be extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon
extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that
will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been
directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not
criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in
extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.
His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence
of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding
allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence
to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a
fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally,
unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has
the final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the
Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the
demands of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the
guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the
extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a
measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of
a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the
function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that
jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine
whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person
sought is extraditable. 39
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and
our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its
implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting
state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our
country before the world community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering
into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under
the Treaty. 42 This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the
conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he
demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is
entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other
government is under obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must be
ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can
ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart
their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited
have a propensity to flee. Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in
the requesting country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right
before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested
state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is
charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting
state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an
ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and
the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from
fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive
from justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking
his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that
such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -- including
terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily
deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is
as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that
procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately
upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable,
summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the
order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served
any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest
and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the
answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time
fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly
served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for hearing the
issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate"
to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for
hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing
parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and giving them time to prepare and
present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
"immediate." The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole,
as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as
speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination
to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the
knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards
the arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were
the following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage --
trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department
of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted
evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated
exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the
Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers"
and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for
Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the
Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty
Steward" and enclosed Statements in two volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records
adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who
should immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the ends of justice." He could have
determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point
of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist.
In the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for
extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable
cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee." 50

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori,
for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting
documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did
exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon
failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of
immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision. Evidently,
had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided.
It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in nature.
Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that
there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something
not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous
treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the
reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less
reasonable x x x ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the
request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample
opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the
escape of the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a
notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires
only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may
produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants
of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the
extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the "judge must have sufficient
supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct
a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo
hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine
complainants and their witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge
and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be
discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and
necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so
desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly
make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature
of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to
justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different
procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in
view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study
them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form
and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person
sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and
witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned
to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the
warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the
petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our
opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail
of all persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the
ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition
proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution
granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest
warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies
only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It
does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61
Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right
to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that
the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is
not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are
separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for
bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one
shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings
does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that
the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the same time, point out
that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64 Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the present case, respondent will be given full
opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate
deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be
arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court the Petition with its supporting
documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges independent prima facie determination that
his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and
(3) his opportunity, once he is under the courts custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the
no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of
the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from
continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of
taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its
treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time
that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty
without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the governments interest
in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the
suppression of crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process
rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable
government interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead
of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good
policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or
excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape
from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty --
expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not
granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to
the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.1wphi1.nt
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to
Article 14 67 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily
surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention
pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the
Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy
disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the
judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as
the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we
believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to
extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every
person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential
extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and
granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail,
the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter of reciprocity,
those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially
from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the
above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court
realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of
police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any
intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that
the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or
compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it
also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling
enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully
examined these circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district
of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already
debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is
suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his
full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.
This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed
and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or
hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is
being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a
prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people
are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or
the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most
compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of
those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A
police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification
in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to
all those belonging to the same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in
Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition.
Hence, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the
extradition case against their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution
of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his
claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it
would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We
must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to
determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not
to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the
constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the
proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of
this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the
grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance
for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It
would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings
even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he
learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not
actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot
be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he
hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet
fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within
reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for
Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime
after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been
previously denied. In the present case, the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on
the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in
fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more
than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively
private respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only petitioners
application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents prayer for temporary liberty.
Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the
application for bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy
Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in
Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the great majority of cases in this
Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential
extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by
both parties and "Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in which the main topic was
Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial
court would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his
voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand.
Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the
inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal
arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his
legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and
Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated
and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any
useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings, 74 which our
Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and
deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on
the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when
a case is one of extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair.
Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the
rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request
expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced
during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the
person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state
in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that
the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in
the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the
ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending
criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional
rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to
police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or
jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima
facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance,
whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is
extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further
documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima
facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the
petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants
have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and
no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling
circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail
therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In
extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of
the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is
sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and
the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible
with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its
authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-
independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out
of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of
implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to
prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-
due process" every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become
not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in
good faith with a treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should
not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay,
mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international
cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate
that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it
granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is
CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings
before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty
with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No.
99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz,
private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to
vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The
petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting
bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect
on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request
for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an
application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of
habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest
void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became
final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part,
private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for
bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-
95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying
his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20,
2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The
petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails
in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for
hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that
there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a
right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh
process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the
first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective
extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC
of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person
has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v.
Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec.
18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail
merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this
Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the
individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained
global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international
sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may
properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the
subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II
resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as
violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under
the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the
individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life,
liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty,
the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon
the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in
granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the principles set forth
in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life,
liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention
and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this
Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in
light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in
order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the
pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines
under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for
failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal.
After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To
refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to
law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the
machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation
proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled
that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released
on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff
relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed
in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is
not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at
the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty
imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction,
and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a
criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is
not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment
may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations
between different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and
to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it
entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means
employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is
shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the
"immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest
of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to
ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and
that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if
a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a
criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime.
By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted
the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is
no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of
extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the
"temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the
assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective
extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should
be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats
the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive
an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof
of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used
in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee
must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all
the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is
not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If
not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention;
and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126995 October 6, 1998
IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES,
respondents.
RESOLUTION

PURISIMA, J.:
This scenic Philippine archipelago is a citadel of justice, due process and rule of law. Succinst and
clear is the provision of the constitution of this great Republic that every accused is presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. [Art. 111, Sec. 14(2)]. As held in People of the Philippines
vs. Ellizabeth Ganguso y Decena (G.R. No. 115430, November 23, 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-
275):
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt
standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused
from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it
discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be
entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of
proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The
conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.
So also, well settled, to the point of being elementary, is the doctrine that when inculpatory facts
are susceptible to two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for
conviction. (People of the Philippines vs. Eric F. Timtiman, G.R. No. 101663, November 4, 1992,
215 SCRA 364, 373 citing People vs. Remorosa, 200 SCRA 350, 360 [1991]; People vs. Raquel,
265 SCRA 248; People vs. Aranda, 226 SCRA 562; People vs. Maongco, 230 SCRA 562; People vs.
Salangga, 234 SCRA 407).
Mindful of and guided by the aforecited constitutional and legal precepts, doctrines and
principles prevailing in this jurisdiction, should petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration be
granted?
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 17450 before the Sandiganbayan, the Information indicting
Imelda R. Marcos and Jose P. Dans, Jr. for a violation of Section 3(9) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, alleges:
That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro-
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R.
MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then Chairman and Vice-Chairman,
respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created
under Executive Order No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand Marcos, while in the
performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the
crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring
with one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease
Agreement covering LRTA property located in Pasay City, with the Philippines General Hospital
Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled off to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, with Presiding Justice Francis
E. Garchitorena, as Chairman and Justices Jose S. Balajadia and Narciso T. Atienza, as members.
On September 15, 1993, when the First Division failed to comply with the legal requirement of
unanimity of its three members due to the dissent of Justice Narciso T. Atienza, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and
designating Justices Augusto M. Amores and Cipriano A. Del Rosario, as additional members.
On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Presiding Justice Garchitorena requesting that he
be given fifteen (15) days to send in his Manifestation. However, on the same day, September
21, 1993, when Justice Balajadia and Presiding Justice Garchitorena agreed with the opinion of
Justice Del Rosario, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued Administrative Order No. 293-93,
dissolving the Special Division of Five, without waiting for Justice Amores' manifestation. Justice
Garchitorena considered the said request of Justice Amores as "pointless because of the
agreement of Justice Balajadia and the undersigned to the conclusion reached by Justice
Atienza". Thus, on September 24, 1993, the now assailed decision was handed down by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Under the aforequoted Information charging accused Imelda R. Marcos and Jose P. Dans, Jr. with a
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, the following elements of the offense charged must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: 1] that the accused acted as a public officer; 2] that
subject Contract or transaction entered into by the latter is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
There is no dispute that sometime in the year 1984, the herein petitioner, Imelda R. Marcos, was
Minister of Human Settlement while Jose P. Dans, Jr. was the Minister of Transportation and
Communication. The two served as ex oficio Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the
Light Rail Transport Authority (LRTA). Petitioner Marcos was also Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI).
On June 8, 1984, petitioner, in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI, and Jose P. Dans, Jr. as Vice
Chairman of LRTA, signed the Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B") by virtue of which LRTA leased to
PGHFI subject lot with an area of 7.340 square meters, at a monthly rental of P102,760.00 for a
period of twenty-five (25) years.
On June 27, 1984, the PGHFI, represented by its Chairman Imelda R. Marcos, and Transnational
Construction Corporation, represented by its President Ignacio B. Gimenez, signed the Sublease
Agreement (Exhibit "D"), wherein said lessee rented the same area of 7.340 square meters for
P734,000.00 a month, for a period of twenty-five (25) years.
For executing the aforesaid Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B"), petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr. were
indicted in the said Information, for conspiring and confederating with each other in entering into
subject Lease Agreement alleged to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
After trial, as earlier alluded to, the Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr.
of the offense charged.
On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of this court came out with its decision affirming the
judgment, as against petitioner Imelda R. Marcos in G.R. No. 126995, but reversing the same
judgment, as against Joe P. Dans, Jr., in G.R. No. 127073.
In affirming the judgment of conviction against petitioner, the Third Division found the rental
price stipulated in the Lease Agreement, (Exhibit "B") unfair and unreasonably low, upon a
comparison with the rental rate in the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit "D"), which contract
petitioner subsequently signed on behalf of PGHFI, with TNCC. Undaunted, the petitioner
interposed the present Motion for Reconsideration.
The pivot of inquiry here is whether all the elements of the offense charged have been duly
substantiated. As regards the first element, did petitioner Imelda R. Marcos enter into the Lease
Agreement marked Exhibit "B" as a public officer? As clearly stated on the face of the subject
contract under scrutiny, it petitioner signed the same in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI and
not as Human Settlement Minister nor as ex-officio Chairman of LRTA. It was Jose P. Dans, Jr. who
signed said Contract, as ex-officio Vice Chairman of LRTA. Although petitioner was the ex-officio
Chairman of LRTA, at the time, there is no evidence to show that she was present when the
Board of Directors of LRTA authorized and approved the Lease Agreement sued upon.
In light of the foregoing antecedent facts and circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that
petitioner did not sign subject Lease Agreement as a public officer, within the contemplation of
RA 3019 and, therefore, the first element of the offense charged is wanting.
It bears stressing, in this connection, that Jose P. Cans, Jr., the public officer who signed the said
Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B") for LRTA, was acquitted.
As regards the second element of the offense that such Lease Agreement is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the respondent court based its finding thereon
against the petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr., on a ratiocination that while the rental price under the
Lease Agreement is only P102,760.00 a month, the monthly rental rate under the Sub-lease
Agreement is P734,000.00. After comparing the two rental rates aforementioned, the respondent
court concluded that the rental price of P102,760.00 a month is unfair, unreasonable and
disadvantageous to the government.
But Exhibit "B" does not prove that the said contract entered into by petitioner is "manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government." There is no established standard by which Exhibit
"B"'s rental provisions could be adjudged prejudicial to LRTA or the entire government. Exhibit
"B" standing alone does not prove any offense. Neither does Exhibit "B" together with the Sub-
lease Agreement (Exhibit "D") prove the offense charged.
At most, it creates only a doubt in the mind of the objective readers as to which (between the
lease and sub-lease rental rates) is the fair and reasonable one, considering the different
circumstances as well as parties involved. It could happen that in both contracts, neither the
LRTA nor the Government suffered any injury. There is, therefore, insufficient evidence to prove
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Verily, it is too obvious to require an extended disquisition that the only basis of the respondent
court for condemning the Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B") as "manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government" was a comparison of the rental rate in the Lease
Agreement, with the very much higher rental price under the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit "D").
Certainly, such a comparison is purely speculative and violative of due process. The mere fact
that the Sub-lease Agreement provides a monthly rental of P734,000.00 does not necessarily
mean that the rental price of P102,760.00 per month under the Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B") is
very low, unreasonable and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. There
are many factors to consider in the determination of what is a reasonable rate of rental.
What is more, as stressed by Jose P. Dans Jr., when subject Lease Agreement was inked, the
rental rate therein provided was based on a study conducted in accordance with generally
accepted rules of rental computation. On this score, Mr. Ramon F. Cuervo, Jr., the real estate
appraiser who testified in the case as an expert witness and whose impartiality and competence
were never impugned, assured the court that the rental price stipulated in the Lease Agreement
under scrutiny was fair and adequate. According to him, witness, the reasonable rental for
subject property at the time of execution of Exhibit "B" was only P73,000.00 per month.
That the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit "D") was for a very much higher rental rate of
P734,000.00 a month is of no moment. This circumstance did not necessarily render the monthly
rental rate of P102,760.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the lessor. Evidently, the
prosecution failed to prove that the rental rate of P102,760.00 per month was manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government. Not even a single lease contract covering a
property within the vicinity of the said leased premises was offered in evidence The disparity
between the rental price of the Lease Agreement and that of the Sublease Agreement is no
evidence at all to buttress the theory of the prosecution, "that the Lease Agreement in question
is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government". "Gross" is a comparative term.
Before it can be considered "gross", there must be a standard by which the same is weighed and
measured.
All things viewed in proper perspective, it is decisively clear that there is a glaring absence of
substantiation that the Lease Agreement under controversy is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government, as theorized upon by the prosecution.
Furthermore, that the lessee, PGHFI, succeeded in obtaining a high rental rate of P734,000.00 a
month, did not result in any disadvantage to the government because obviously, the rental
income realized by PGHFI from the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit "D"), augmented the financial
support for and improved the management and operation of the Philippine General Hospital,
which is, after all, a government hospital of the people and for the people.
Another sustainable ground for the granting of petitioner's motion for reconsideration is the
failure and inability of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was present when the Board of
Directors of LRTA authorized and approved the Lease Agreement complained of. Albeit, petitioner
was ex oficio chairman of the Board of Directors of LRTA when the said Lease Agreement was
entered into, there is no evidence whatsoever to show that she attended the board meeting of
LRTA which deliberated and acted upon subject Lease Agreement (Exhibit "B"). It is thus beyond
cavil that petitioner signed the said Lease Agreement as Chairman of the PGH Foundation, Inc., a
private charitable foundation, and not as a public officer.
Neither can petitioner be considered as in conspiracy with Jose P. Dans, Jr., who has been found
without any criminal liability for signing the same Lease Agreement. Absent any conspiracy of
petitioner with Dans, the act of the latter cannot be viewed as an act of the former. Petitioner is
only answerable for her own individual act. Consequently, petitioner not having signed Exhibit
"B" as a Public officer, there is neither legal nor factual basis for her conviction under Section
3(g) of Rep Act 3019.
It beers repeating that apart from the Lease Agreement and Sub-lease Agreement marked
Exhibits "B" and "D", respectively, the prosecution offered no other evidence to prove the
accusation at bar.
What makes petitioner's stance the more meritorious and impregnable is the patent violation of
her right to due process, substantive and procedural, by the respondent court. Records disclose
that: (a) the First Division of the Sandiganbayan composed of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and
Associate Justices Balajadia and Atienza could not agree on whether to convict or acquit the
petitioner in the five (5) criminal cases pending against her. Justice Atienza was in favor of
exonerating petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451 and 17452. Justices Garchitorena and
Balajadia wanted to convict her in Criminal Case Nos. 17450, 17451, 17452 and 17453. As there
was no unanimity of votes in Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452; (b) on September 15, 1993,
in accordance with Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 1606, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued Adm. Order No.
288-93 constituting a Special Division of five (5) justices, and naming thereto, Justices Augusto
M. Amores and Cipriano A. del Rosario; (c) on September 21, 1993, Justice Amores sent a written
request to Presiding Justice Garchitorena asking that he be given fifteen (15) days to submit his
Manifestation; (d) on the same day, September 21, 1993, however, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
and Justices Balajadia and del Rosario, after attending a hearing of the Committee of Justice of
the House of Representatives, lunched together in a Quezon City restaurant where they
discussed petitioner's cases in the absence of Justices Atienza and Amores and in the presence of
a non-member of the Special Division. Thereat, Presiding Justice Garchitorena, and Justices,
Balajadia and del Rosario agreed with the position of Justice Atienza to acquit petitioner in
Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451 and 17452 and to convict her in the other cases; and (e) when
the Justices returned to the official workplace of Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Garchitorena
issued Adm. Order No. 293-93 dissolving the Special Division.
Such prodedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its
"decision" convicting petitioner for the following reasons, viz:
First. Section 4, Rule VI categorically provides that "sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en
banc or division, shall be held in its principal office in the Metropolitan Manila where it shall try
and determine all cases filed with it . . .." This rule reiterates Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, creating the Sandiganbayan.
Second. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not allow unscheduled discussion of cases. We take
judicial notice of the procedure that cases in all courts are carefully calendared and advance
notices are given to judges and justices to enable them to study and prepare for deliberation.
The calendaring cases cannot be the subject of anybody's whims and caprices.
Third. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not also allow informal discussion of cases. The
deliberations in case at bar did not appear on record. The informal discussion of the three
justices came to light only when petitioner moved to inhibit Presiding Justice Garchitorena after
her conviction by the resuscitated First Division. Presiding Justice Garchitorena, in a paper
entitled "Response," revealed for the first time the informal discussion of petitioner's cases at an
unnamed restaurant in Quezon City. There is no way to know how the discussion was conducted
as it was not minuted.
Fourth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the presence of a non-member in the
deliberation of cases. In the case at bar a certain justice was present when Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, Justice Balajadia, and Justice del Rosario discussed petitioner's cases while taking
their lunch in a Quezon City restaurant.
Fifth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the exclusion of a member of a Division,
whether regular or special, in the deliberation of cases. Justices Atienza and Amores were
members of the Special Division but were not present when petitioner's cases were discussed
over lunch in a Quezon City restaurant. They ware not notified of the informal, unscheduled
meeting. In fact, Justice Amores had a pending request for 15 days to study petitioner's cases. In
effect, Atienza and Amores were disenfranchised. They were denied their right to vote for the
conviction or acquittal of petitioner.
These irregularities violated the right of petitioner to be tried by a collegial court. Under PD No.
1606, as amended, and pursuant to the rules of Sandiganbayan, petitioner cannot be convicted
except upon the vote of three justices, regardless of whether her cases are before a regular
division of three (3) justices or a Special Division of five (5) justices. But more important than the
vote of three (3) justices is the process by which they arrive at their vote. It is indispensable that
their vote be preceded by discussion and deliberation by all the members of the division. Before
the deliberation by all, any opinion of a justice is but tentative and could be changed. It is only
after all the justices have been heard should the justices reach a judgment. No one opinion can
be denigrated in importance for experience shows that an opinion that starts as a minority
opinion could become the majority opinion after the collision of views of the justices. The right of
the petitioner, therefore, is the right to be heard by all the five justices of the Special Division.
She is entitled to be afforded the opinion of all its members.
In the case at bar, Presiding Justice Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five
(5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that
stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new
justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the
cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change
their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot
deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be
true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled
meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion
contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for
before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.
We reject the rationalization that the opinion of Justice Amores was of de minimis importance as
it cannot overturn the votes of the three justices convicting the petitioner. This is a mere
guesswork. The more reasonable supposition is that said opinion could have changed the
opinions of the other justices if it is based on an unbiased appreciation of facts and an
undistorted interpretation of pertinent laws. For we cannot unreasonably suppose that Presiding
Justice Garchitorena and Justices Balajadia and Atienza are bigots who will never change their
opinions about the guilt of the petitioner despite a better opinion.
Yet, that is not all the value of the aborted opinion of Justice Amores. If it were an opinion for the
acquittal of the petitioner, that opinion will have an added value when petitioner appeals her
conviction to this Court. Again, depending on its scholarship, that minority opinion could sway
the opinion of this Court towards the acquittal of petitioner.
Prescinding from those premises, it is indisputable that the decision of the First Division of the
respondent Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is void for violating her right to substantive
and procedural due process of law.
It is opined, however, that this case should be remanded to the respondent Sandiganbayan for
re-decision by a Special Division of 5. As a general rule, a void decision will not result in the
acquittal of an accused. The case ought to be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings for a void judgment does not expose an accused to double jeopardy. But the present
case deserves a different treatment considering the great length of time it has been pending
with our courts. Records reveal that petitioner was first indicted in Criminal Case No. 17450 in
January 1992. More than six (6) years passed but petitioner's prosecution is far from over. To
remand the case to the Sandiganbayan will not sit well with her constitutional right to its speedy
disposition. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution assures "all persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This
right expands the right of an accused "to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial . . ." in
criminal case guaranteed by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. It has a broadening
effect because Section 16 covers the periods before, during and after trial whereas Section 14(2)
covers only the trial period. 1 Heretofore, we have held that an accused should be acquitted
when his right to speedy trial has been violated. Thus, in the early 1936 case of People vs.
Castaeda, et al., 63 Phil 480, 485, 486, a ponencia of Mr. Justice Laurel, we held:
A strict regard for the constitutional rights of the accused would demand, therefore, that the case
be remanded to the court below for new trial before an impartial judge. There are vital
considerations, however, which in the opinion of this court render this step unnecessary. In the
first place, the Constitution, Article III, section 1, paragraph 17, guarantees to every accused
person the right to a speedy trial. This criminal proceeding has been dragging on for almost five
(5) years now. The accused have twice appealed to this court for redress from the wrong that
they have suffered at the hands of the trial court. At least one of them, namely, Pedro Fernandez
(alias Piro), had been confined in prison from July 20, 1932 to November 27, 1934 for inability to
post the required bond of P3,000 which was finally reduced to P300. The Government should be
the last to set an example of delay and oppresson in the administration of justice and it is the
moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the accused
to come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody of the law. (Conde
vs. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil., 650).
We reiterated this rule in Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, viz: 2
2. More specifically, this Court has consistently adhered to the view thatb a dismissal based on
the denial of the right to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt
at continuing the prosecution or starting a new one would fall within the prohibition against an
accused being twice put in jeopardy. The extensive opinion of Justice Castro in People vs. Obsania
noted earlier made reference to four Philippine decisions. People vs. Diaz, People vs. Abao,
People vs. Robles, and People vs. Cloribel. In all of the above case, this Court left no doubt that a
dismissal of the case, though at the instance of the defendant grounded on the disregard of his
right to a speedy trial was tantamount to an acquittal. In People vs. Diaz, it was shown that the
case was set for hearing twice and the prosecution without asking for postponement or giving
any explanation failed to appear. In People vs. Abao, the facts disclosed that there were three
postponements. Thereafter, at the time the resumption of the trial was scheduled, the
complaining witness as in this case was absent, this Court held that respondent Judge was
justified in dismissing the case upon motion of the defense and that the annulment or setting
aside of the order of dismissal would place the accused twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. People vs. Robles likewise presented a picture of witnesses for the prosecution not
being available, with the lower court after having transferred the hearings on several occasions
denying the last plea for postponement and dismissing the case. Such order of dismissal,
accordirig to this Court "is not provisional in character but one which is tantamount to acquittal
that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense." This is a summary of
the Cloribel case as set forth in the above opinion of Justice Castro. "In Cloribel, the case dragged
for three years and eleven months, that is, from September 27, 1958 when the information was
filed to August 15, 1962 when it was called for trial, after numerous postponements, mostly at
the instance of the prosecution. On the latter date, the prosecution failed to appear for trial, and
upon motion of defendants, the case was dismissed. This Court held, "that the dismissal here
complained of was not truly a "dismissal" but an acquittal. For it was entered upon the
defendants" insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the
prosecution's failure to appear on the date of trial." (Emphasis supplied)" There is no escaping
the conclusion then that petitioner here has clearly made out a case of an acquittal arising from
the order of dismissal given in open court.
The rationale for both Section 14(2) and section 16 of Article III of the Constitution is the same,
"justice delayed is justice denied." Violation of either section should therefore result in the
acquittal of the accused.
There are other reasons why the case should not be remanded to the court a quo. Three justices
of the Special Division, namely Justice Atienza, Balajadia and Amores have already retired.
Presiding Justice Garchitorena is still with the respondent court but his impartiality has been
vigorously assailed by the petitioner. Mr. Justice Francisco of the Third Division of this Court noted
that Presiding Justice Garchitorena's undue interference in the examination of witness Cuervo
relealed his bias and prejudice against petitioner. 3 As Mr. Justice Francisco observed "the court
questions were so numerous which as per petitioner Dans count totaled 179 compared to
prosecutor Querubin's questions which numbered merely 73. More noteworthy, however, is that
the court propounded leading, misleading, and baseless hypothetical questions rolled into one."
4 Mr. Justice Francisco's opinion was concurred by Mr. Justice Melo. Truly, even Mr. Chief Justice
Narvasa, Madam Justice Romero and Mr. Justice Panganiban who voted to convict petitioner did
not refute Mr. Justice Francisco's observations on the lack of impartiality of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena. They disregarded Mr. Ramon F. Cuervo's testimony and based the conviction of
petitioner purely on the documentary evidence submitted by the People. Moreover, all the
evidence in the case at bar are now before this Court and to avoid further delay, we can evaluate
the evidence. In fact, the same evidence has been passed upon by the Third Division of this
Court in formulating its judgment of affirmance sought to be reconsidered. Certainly, it will be
sheer rigmarole for this Court to still remand the case for a Special Division of five of the
Sandiganbayan to render another decision in the case, with respect to the herein petitioner.
I consider this opinion incomplete without quoting herein the following portion of the concurring
and dissenting opinion of former Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco dated January 29, 1998:
Thus, purely from the legal standpoint, with the evident weakness of the prosecution's case and
the procedural aberrations that marred the trial, it is simply unsound and impossible to treat
differently each petitioner who found themselves in one and the same situation. Indeed, our
regained democracy, creditably, is successfully bailing us out from the ruins of the authoritarian
regime, and it expects that government efforts in going after the plunderers of that dark past
remain unrelenting and decisive. But let us not, in our anxiety to carry out this duty, for a
moment forget that our criminal justice system is not a popularity contest where freedom and
punishment are determined merely by the fame or infamy of the litigants. "The scales of justice",
it has been aptly said, 5 "must hang equal and, in fact, should even be tipped in favor of the
accused because of the constitutional presumption of innocence. Needless to stress, this right is
available to every accused, whatever his present circumstance and no matter how dark and
repellent his past." Culpability for crimes Must always take its bearing from evidence and
universal precepts of due process lest we sacrifice in mocking shame once again the very
liberties we are defending.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration is hereby
GRANTED and petitioner Imelda R. Marcos is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127158 March 5, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE @ "JUN TAGAY" and NONITO JAMILA, JR., y CANTO, accused,
JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE @ "JUN TAGAY", accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Criminal Case
No. Q-95-61405, convicting appellant Julio Herida y Bernabe, alias "Jun Tagay," of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In an Information dated May 16, 1995, Julio Herida and Nonito Jamila, Jr., were charged by the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City with murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of May, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring together, confederating with two (2) other persons whose true names, identities and
personal whereabouts have not yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, qualified by treachery and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of
superior strength, did, then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of HERLITO DELARA2 y VILLAS, by then and there
mauling and stabbing him with the use of knives and bolos, hitting him on the different parts of
the body, thereby inflicting upon said Herlito Delara serious and mortal stab wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Herlito Delara.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On July 31, 1995, Herida and Jamila, Jr., were arraigned. They respectively pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.1wphi1.nt
The facts in this case are as follows: On May 14, 1995, the residents of Purok 4-B, Luzon Avenue,
Barangay Culiat, Quezon City celebrated their fiesta. The affair had been unremarkable until
about 6:30 P.M. when several gunshots shattered the early evening calm. Prosecution witness
Tomas Baniquid was preparing his family's evening meal when he heard the shots. Shortly
thereafter, he sensed a commotion right outside his house. Tomas peeped from his window and
saw three armed men ganging up on a person already prostate on the ground. Tomas could not
immediately identify the prostate figure as the latter's shirt had been pulled over his head.
However, he recognized the three attackers as Edmund Tracilla, Edmund's brother-in-law who
was known only as "Rene," and appellant Julio Herida. Rene hacked the man on the ground
several times with a bolo. Edmund also held a bladed weapon and repeatedly stabbed the
prostate figure. Appellant bashed the chest and head of the victim with a 4-inch concrete hollow
block. Despite his injuries, the latter managed to fend off his attackers and remove the shirt that
covered his face. Tomas then recognized Herlito Delara. Delara rose and ran towards his house,
which was 10 meters away. Edmund, Rene, and appellant pursued him.4
Delara reached his house bloodied from all the wounds he received. His common-law spouse,
Delina Duyon5 met him. He ordered her to close the door saying that certain persons were trying
to kill him. Delina was about to close the door when she saw Rene, Edmund, and appellant
approaching, followed by a fourth person, whom she later identified as Nonito Jamila, Jr. Nonito
managed to insert his hands through the door and tried to pull Delara outside. Delina screamed
for help. The attackers retreated and subsequently left.6
Delara was brought to a hospital, but eventually died as a result of the wounds he sustained.
Dr. Maria Cristina B. Freyra, medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police Northern District
Command Central Crime Laboratory, autopsied Delara's corpse. She found that the victim had
sustained twenty-three (23) injuries, namely: four (4) hack wounds, four (4) incise wounds, two
(2) laceration wounds, two (2) stab wounds, and ten (10) abrasions.7 She identified the hack
wound on the right side of the head, the lacerated wound in the same area, and the stab wound
on the left chest as the fatal injuries.8
On the evening of May 14, 1995, Edmund, Nonito, and appellant were invited by barangay peace
officers to shed light on the incident. Rene, who was not from the neighborhood, was nowhere to
be found. Edmund claimed that he had a wounded foot as a result of a bottle-throwing incident
earlier that day and asked permission to have it treated. It was granted but he went into hiding.9
He and Rene were not criminally charged.
Both appellant and Nonito denied any participation in the killing of Delara. Nonito averred that he
had known his co-accused only for five (5) months. At the time of the incident, he was inside his
house, while talking to appellant who was outside. Suddenly, Delara arrived, brandishing a
revolver and shouting that he was going to kill appellant. Nonito testified that he did not see
Delara fire his gun, but claimed that the first shot almost hit him and his co-accused. Upon
seeing Delara point his gun at appellant, Nonito pulled the latter inside and closed the door.10
Appellant's testimony essentially corroborated Nonito's story. He declared that at the time of the
incident, Nonito and he were having a conversation when the latter suddenly pulled him inside
the house. Once inside, Nonito allegedly told him that Delara was standing outside with a gun
pointed at him. Appellant never saw the victim approach or fires his pistol. Once inside, however,
he heard Delara shout that he was going to kill somebody. After that appellant heard five (5)
gunshots.11 He said that he had no quarrel with Delara at the time of the incident. He admitted,
however, that Delara was angry at him because of a previous misunderstanding. Delara had
previously hired appellant to do carpentry work on the former's house. Appellant, however, did
not complete the task as he had another contract and recommended another carpenter who
botched the job. This angered Delara.12 Delara's animosity resulted in his stabbing appellant.
For this, he filed a complaint against Delara.13 Appellant insists, however, that they had
amicably settled their differences before the May 14th incident.14
Jessie Suarez, the last defense witness, testified that at 6:00 P.M. on May 14, 1995, he was at the
residence of a certain Junior Canis playing cards with him, Cris Ong, and the two accused. Delara
then approached the house of Canis, threatening to kill appellant. Delara was carrying a .38
caliber revolver. Delara then fired six (6) times at appellant. All his shots missed appellant who
was pulled into the house by Nonito, his co-accused. Delara then ran away, pursued by Edmund
and Rene.15
On September 20, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of MURDER, (as) defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, there being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and further ordered to pay
the heirs of Herlito Delara the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) as actual
damages, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages and ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages. As to the accused NONITO
JAMILA y CANTO, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of MURDER, as charged, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused Nonito Jamila y Canto may now be released unless he is being held for some other legal
cause.
SO ORDERED.16
Hence, the instant appeal. Appellant now assigns the following as errors allegedly committed by
the trial court:
1. THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT ALL ELEMENTS TO QUALIFY THE
KILLING OF DECEASED DELARA INTO MURDER WERE ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
BY THE PROSECUTION.
2. THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT [WITH] HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY ACTING WITH OBVIOUS BIAS AND
PREJUDICE DURING THE TRIAL OF THIS CASE.
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES DESPITE
THE FACT THAT DELINA HERIDA IS NOT THE PROPER OR OFFENDED PARTY.
In his first assigned error, appellant contends that there is neither treachery nor evident
premeditation present in this case. He relies on People v. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 (1995) where we
held that the aggravating circumstances which would qualify a killing to murder must be proven
as indubitably as the crime itself.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure the
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.17 We agree with appellant that nowhere in the assailed judgment is it shown how the trial
court arrived at its conclusion that the killing of Delara was attended by treachery. In convicting
appellant of murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, the trial court gave great
weight to the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Tomas Baniquid. The latter testified, however,
that he only peeped through the window some ten (10) minutes after the gunshots had ceased
and after hearing a commotion outside his house. He saw the three assailants, appellant
included, ganging up on the victim who was already lying on the ground, but nonetheless doing
his best to fend off the attack. Clearly, when Baniquid looked outside, the tumult was already
well in progress. There is absolutely no showing from his testimony how the attack commenced;
no indicia whether the attack was so sudden and unexpected that it afforded the victim no
chance to defend himself. In the absence of this information, treachery cannot be established
from the circumstances. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence as clearly as the killing itself.18 Where the attack was not treacherous, the
number of aggressors would constitute abuse of superior strength.19 Abuse of superior strength,
therefore, qualifies the killing as murder.20
In finding the killing aggravated by evident premeditation, the trial court characterized the
method of attack as deliberately and consciously adopted by the three attackers. For evident
premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven: (1) the time when the accused
decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow
the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.21 In the instant case, however, there is
no showing of the time when appellant and his confederates decided to commit the crime.
Neither is there proof to show how appellant and the other two assailants planned the killing of
the victim. Nor is there any evidence showing how much time elapsed before the plan was
executed. Absent all these, the conclusion by the trial court that evident premeditation qualified
the killing of Delara is devoid of any factual mooring.
Appellant next claims that there is absolutely no showing that assailants conspired to kill Delara.
He insists that the record does not show that he participated in the planning, preparation, and
killing of Delara. Appellant contends that, assuming without admitting, that he did bash the
victim with a concrete hollow block, his acts were spontaneous and independent of the attack
with the bladed weapons of the other two assailants. He could only be liable for the abrasions
caused by the blows he delivered with a concrete hollow block, which were neither fatal nor the
primary cause of death.
Conspiracy is deemed to arise when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of
an agreement of the parties to commit the crime.22 It may be inferred from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or from the acts of the accused before, during,
and after the crime which point to a joint design, concerted action and commonality of sentiment
or interest.23 Once proved, the act of one becomes the act of all. All the conspirators are
answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their participation. In this case,
the prosecution's evidence indubitably shows that appellant acted in concert with Edmund and
Rene to kill Delara. First, while Rene and Edmund were hacking and stabbing the victim,
appellant was with them, pounding him with a concrete hollow block. Evidently, appellant was
performing overt acts, which directly or indirectly contributed to the execution of the crime.
Second, after the victim somehow managed to fend off his attackers and flee, all three attackers
pursued him. This is a transparent manifestation of their common sentiment to inflict harm and
injury upon Delara. Clearly, the aforementioned acts point to a common purpose, concert of
action, and community of interest among the assailants. In conspiracy, it is immaterial who
inflicted the fatal blows. A conspirator, no matter how minimal his participation, is as guilty as
the principal perpetrator of the crime.
On the second assigned error, appellant avers that the trial court judge exhibited bias or
prejudice against him. Appellant points out that over seventy percent (70%) of the testimonies of
the prosecution's material witnesses were elicited by the judge, while the cross-examination of
the defense witnesses was to a large extent conducted by the judge himself. He submits that
under these circumstances, his right to a fair and impartial trial was violated.
The transcripts of the proceedings show that the trial court did intensively question the
witnesses. For instance, of the 182 questions asked of prosecution eyewitness Tomas Baniquid,
79 or roughly 43% of the total came from the judge. However, we note that the judge also
intensively questioned witnesses of the defense. When appellant took the stand, 63 questions
were added, with 27 or approximately 43% asked by the judge. The intensive questioning of the
witnesses, however, was necessary. The sworn affidavits of the material witnesses were adopted
as their direct testimonies, subject to cross-examination. Since affidavits are generally taken ex
parte and are often incomplete or even inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the
investigating officer,24 the trial court had to ask many questions to clarify important matters.
The judge's behavior under this circumstance cannot be considered biased or prejudiced. Judges
are, after all, not mere referees in a boxing bout, whose only task is to watch and decide the
results.25 Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of
evidence and have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved,
clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points that are overlooked by counsel.
On the third assigned error, appellant questions the award of damages in favor of the victim's
common-law wife, since she is neither a legal heir of the victim nor the offended party in this
case.
A careful reading of the decretal portion of the assailed judgment will show, however, that no
such award was made to Delina Duyon a.k.a. "Delina Delara." Rather, the award of damages was
made in favor of "the heirs of Herlito Delara."
To reiterate, prosecution eyewitness Tomas Baniquid positively identified appellant as one of the
three assailants who, acting in concert, assaulted and killed Herlito Delara. Appellant has shown
no reason why Baniquid, who has been his long-time neighbor, should falsely testify against him.
Against such positive identification, appellant's bare denial of any participation in the killing of
Delara must fall.26 The testimony of a single witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to
sustain a conviction even for murder.27 We find that the prosecution has successfully proven
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the award of damages to "the heirs" of the victim
is legally justified.1wphi1.nt
Some modifications in the award of damages, however, are necessary. The trial court awarded
the heirs of the victim P40,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. Award for actual damages are given only to claims that are
duly supported by receipts.28 In the present case, the records show that the claims duly
supported by receipts are the funeral services amounting to P18,000.0029 and P1,380.00
representing the cost of materials30 for the wooden crate used in shipping the remains of the
victim to Occidental Mindoro for burial. All the other claimed expenses lack documentary proof.
The actual damages awarded must therefore be reduced to P19,380.00, as substantiated by the
evidence. Moral damages can be awarded only upon sufficient proof that the aggrieved party is
entitled thereto.31 Here, the fact that the heirs of Herlito Delara suffered mental anguish,
nervous shock or serious anxiety was not adequately shown. We must, therefore, delete the
award of moral damages. The award of exemplary damages must likewise be struck down, since
no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime.32 Finally, we note that the
trial court did not grant an indemnity ex delicto which current jurisprudence sets at P50,000.
Hence, it is now in order to award such amount to the victim's heirs.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Criminal Case
No. Q-95-61405 finding appellant Julio Herida y Bernabe @ "Jun Tagay" guilty of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Herlito
Delara the amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity and P19,380.00 as actual damages. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132577 August 17, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 45399 entitled "Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb v. Hon. Amelita Tolentino, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, People of the Philippines
and Lauro Vizconde" which set aside the order of respondent judge therein denying herein
respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb's request to take the depositions of five (5) citizens and
residents of the United States before the proper consular officer of the Philippines in Washington
D.C. and California, as the case may be.1wphi1.nt
The factual and procedural antecedents are matters of record or are otherwise uncontroverted.
Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 95-404 for Rape
with Homicide entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al." presently
pending before Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, presided by Judge Amelita
G. Tolentino.
During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a Motion
To Take Testimony By Oral Deposition1 praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of the
following:
1.] Steven Bucher
Acting Chief, Records Services Branch
U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
425 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20536
U.S.A.
2.] Debora Farmer
Records Operations, Office of Records
U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Washington D.C.
U.S.A.
3.] Jaci Alston
Department of Motor Vehicles
Sacramento, California
U.S.A.
4.] Ami Smalley
Department of Motor Vehicles
Sacramento, California
U.S.A.
5.] John Pavlisin
210 South Glasell, City of Orange
California, 92666
U.S.A.
before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of
presenting them as witnesses in court alleging that the said persons are all residents of the
United States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court had no
jurisdiction over them.
Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned
individuals whose testimonies are allegedly "material and indispensable" to establish his
innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides that:
Sec. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may
be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who
had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may by used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the
testimony of the deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an
officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association
which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose
if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; (2) that the witness is out of the province and a
greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition;
or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition
to be used;
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require
him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced and any party may introduce
any other parts. (emphasis supplied).
The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that: 1.] Rule 24,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the representation of respondent-accused, has no
application in criminal cases; 2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure,
being a mode of discovery, only provides for conditional examination of witnesses for the
accused before trial not during trial; 3.] Rule 19, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense
outside Philippine Jurisdiction.2
In an Order dated June 11, 1997, the trial court denied the motion of respondent on the ground
that the same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court.3
A motion for reconsideration4 thereto on the grounds that: 1.] The 1997 Rules of Court expressly
allows the taking of depositions, and 2.] Section 11 of Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court
expressly allows the taking of depositions in foreign countries before a consul general, consul,
vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, was likewise denied by the trial
court in an order dated July 25, 1997.5
Dissatisfied, respondent elevated his cause to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
certiorari6 naming as respondents therein the Presiding Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, the People
and private complainant Lauro Vizconde. In the petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45399,
respondent Webb argued that: 1.] The taking of depositions pending action is applicable to
criminal proceedings; 2.] Depositions by oral testimony in a foreign country can be taken before
a consular officer of the Philippine Embassy in the United States; and, 3.] He has the right to
completely and fully present evidence to support his defense and the denial of such right will
violate his constitutional right to due process.
Commenting7 on the petition, the People contended that the questioned orders of the Presiding
Judge are well within the sphere of her judicial discretion and do not constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and that if at all, they may be considered
merely as errors of judgment which may be corrected by appeal in due time because: a.] The
motion failed to comply with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; b.]
The conditional examination must be conducted before an inferior court; and c.] The examination
of the witnesses must be done in open court.
In his Comment,8 private respondent Lauro Vizconde sought the dismissal of the petition
contending that:
1.] The public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner [now
herein respondent] Webb's motion to take testimony by oral deposition dated 29 April 1997 as
well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated 23 June 1997 for not being sanctioned by
the Rules of Court.
a.] The public respondent correctly held that Rule 23, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure finds no application in criminal actions such as the case at bar.
b.] The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure only provides for conditional examination of witnesses before trial but not during trial.
c.] The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does
not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside of
Philippine jurisdiction.
2.] The public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner
Webb's motion to take testimony by oral deposition considering that the proposed deposition
tends only to further establish the admissibility of documentary exhibits already admitted in
evidence by the public respondent.
On February 6, 1998, the Fourth Division9 of the Court of Appeals rendered judgment,10 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated 11 June 1997
(Annex "A" of the Petition) and 25 July 1997 (Annex "B" of the Petition) are hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. It is hereby ordered that the deposition of the following witnesses be TAKEN
before the proper consular officer of the Republic of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and
California, as the case maybe:
(a) Mr. Steven Bucher;
(b) Ms. Deborah Farmer;
(c) Mr. Jaci Alston;
(d) Ms. Ami Smalley; and
(e) Mr. John Pavlisin.
SO ORDERED.
From the foregoing, the People forthwith elevated its cause to this Court by way of the instant
petition dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration for the following reasons: 1.]
The rule that the petitioner should first file a motion for reconsideration applies to the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and there is no similar
requirement in taking an appeal from a final judgment or order11 such as the present appeal by
certiorari; 2.] Section 4, Rule 45 in requiring a petition for review on certiorari which indicates
that "when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed" implies that petitioner
need not file a motion for reconsideration; 3.] The questions being raised before the Court are
the same as those which were squarely raised before the Court of Appeals;12 4.] The issues
being raised here are purely legal;13 5.] There is an urgent need to resolve the issues
considering that the trial of the accused in the criminal case is about to end; and, 6.] The nature
of this case requires a speedy and prompt disposition of the issues involved.14
What are challenged before this Court are interlocutory orders and not a final Judgment. The
respondent has filed his Comment15 which We treat as an Answer. The petitioner, in turn, filed a
Reply.16 The petition is ripe for decision.
In urging this Tribunal to exercise its power of review over the assailed decision of the Appellate
Court, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error
I
IN RULING THAT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS.
II
IN RULING THAT THE DEPOSITION MAY BE TAKEN BEFORE A CONSULAR OFFICER OF THE
PHILIPPINES WHERE THE PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES RESIDE OR ARE OFFICIALLY STATIONED.
III
IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE TRIAL COURT.
which can be reduced to the primordial issue of whether or not the trial judge gravely abused her
discretion in denying the motion to take testimony by oral depositions in the United States which
would be used in the criminal case before her Court.
In setting aside the order of the trial judge, the Appellate Court's Fourth Division reasoned, inter
alia, thus:
Settled is the rule that the whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the
court fully and completely available for justice. Thus, as the Supreme Court has ruled in Manila
Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General and reiterated in subsequent cases:
. . . The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which give the opportunity for the
most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by
natural justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the
powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties
before it. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action. It may be said in passing that
the most salient objection which can be urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the
exercise of the court's powers by technicalities that part of its authority effective for justice
between the parties is many times an inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of
procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of the contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which the courts are
always striving to secure the litigants. It is designed as the as the means best adapted to obtain
that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the
court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on
the other [,] the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself
open to grave criticism.17
In the light of the foregoing judicial precedent, this Court finds that the public respondent gravely
abused her discretion in denying the motion to take the deposition of the witnesses for petitioner.
While petitioner had invoked Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rule of Court, which is found under the
general classification of the Civil Procedure, it does not prevent its application to the other
proceedings, provided the same is not contrary to the specific rules provided therein. Indeed, the
Rules of Court is to be viewed and construed as a whole, and if the Supreme Court had
compartmentalized the same into four divisions, it was, as petitioner had claimed, for the
purpose of organization and expediency and not, for exclusivity.
To be sure, a reading of the rules on criminal procedure, specifically Section 4, Rule 119 vis--vis
Section 1, Rule 23 would reveal no inconsistency so as to exclude the application of the latter
rule in criminal proceedings. Section 4, Rule 119 refers to the conditional examination of
witnesses for the accused before trial, while Section 1, Rule 23 refers to the taking of deposition
witnesses during trial. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
While the taking of depositions pending trial is not expressly provided [for] under the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, we find no reason for public respondent to disallow the taking of the same in
the manner provided for under Section 1 of Rule 23 under the circumstances of the case. To
disallow petitioner to avail of the specific remedies provided under the Rules would deny him the
opportunity to adequately defend himself against the criminal charge of rape with homicide now
pending before the public respondent and, further, [it] loses sight of the object of procedure
which is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.
xxx xxx xxx
Even granting arguendo that Rule 23 is to be exclusively applied to civil actions, the taking of the
deposition of petitioner's US-based witnesses should be still allowed considering that the civil
action has been impliedly instituted in the criminal action for rape with homicide. Since public
respondent has jurisdiction over the civil case to recover damages, she exercised full authority to
employ all auxiliary writs, processes and other means to carry out the jurisdiction conferred and
[to] adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding which includes the application of the rule
on depositions pending action under Rule 23 in the case pending before her.
Second. Depositions obtained during trial in a foreign state or country may be taken before a
consular office of the Republic of the Philippines where the deponent resides or is officially
stationed.18 Section 5, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is thus clearly inapplicable in the instant
case since the same relates to the examination of witnesses under Section 4 thereof and not
Section 1 of Rule 23. Consistent with the procedure provided [for] under Rule 23, the deposition
of the petitioner's witnesses, which include four (4) officials of the United States government, will
be taken before a consular officer of the Philippines where these witnesses reside or are officially
stationed, as the case may be.
The denial of petitioner's right to present his witnesses, who are residing abroad, based on a very
Shaky technical ground, is tantamount to depriving him of his constitutional right to due process.
This Court recognizes the impossibility of enforcing the right of petitioner to secure the
attendance of the proposed witnesses through compulsory process considering that they are
beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts. Petitioner, however, is not without any remedy and
he correctly sought to secure the testimonies of his witness through the process of taking their
depositions pending the trial of Criminal Case No. 95-404 in the court below under Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court. In any event the prosecution would have the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses for accused Hubert Webb (petitioner herein) since they will be given the opportunity to
cross-examine the deponents as in accordance with Section 3 to 18 of Rule 132.19
Furthermore, no prejudice would be suffered in the taking of the depositions of petitioner's US-
based witness(es). On the other hand, a denial of the same would be prejudicial to petitioner-
accused since he would be denied an opportunity to completely present his evidence, which
strikes at the very core of the due process guarantee of the Constitution. To reiterate, it is not the
function of this Court to second-guess the trial court on its ruling on the admissibility of the
pieces of documentary evidence as well as the latter's witnesses,20 but it is definitely within this
court's inherent power to scrutinize, as it does in the case at bench, the acts of respondent judge
and declare that she indeed committed grave abuse discretion in issuing the questioned Orders.
In the final analysis, this Court rules that the denial of the deposition-taking amount to the denial
of the constitutional right to present his evidence and for the production of evidence in his
behalf. The denial is not justified by the flimsy reason that Sec. 1 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
is not applicable to the criminal proceedings. To rule that petitioner cannot take the testimony of
these witnesses by deposition it to put [a] premium on technicality at the expense of the
constitutional rights of the accused, which this court is not inclined to do. Particularly where the
issue of the guilt or innocence of the petitioner is bound to hinge heavily upon the testimonies of
his US-based witnesses, it behooves upon public respondent not only to guarantee that accused
is given a reasonable opportunity to present his evidence, but also to allow him a certain latitude
in the presentation of his evidence, lest he may be so hampered that the ends of justice may
eventually be defeated or appear to be defeated. Finally, even if respondent's contention is
correct, it cannot be denied that the case at bar includes the recovery of the civil liability of the
accused, which normally is done through a civil case.
We disagree.
As defined, a deposition is
The testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written interrogatories, not in open court,
but in pursuance of a commission to take testimony issued by court, or under a general law or
court rule on the subject, and reduce to writing and duly authenticated, and intended to be used
in preparation and upon the trial of a civil or a criminal prosecution. A pretrial discovery device
by which one party (through his or her attorney) ask oral questions of the other party or of a
witness for the other party. The person who is deposed is called the deponent. The deposition is
conducted under oath outside of the court room, usually in one of the lawyer's offices. A
transcript word for word account is made of the deposition. Testimony of [a] witness, taken
in writing, under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer in answer to questions or
interrogatories . . .21
and the purposes of taking depositions are to: 1.] Give greater assistance to the parties in
ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; 2.] Provide an effective means of
detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses; 3.] Make available in a simple,
convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved except with great
difficulty; 4.] Educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and
defenses thereby encouraging settlements; 5.] Expedite litigation; 6.] Safeguard against surprise;
7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify and narrow the issues; and 9.] Expedite and facilitate both
preparation and trial.22 As can be gleaned from the foregoing, a deposition, in keeping with its
nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not during trial. In fact, rules on
criminal practice particularly on the defense of alibi, which is respondent's main defense in the
criminal proceedings against him in the court below states that when a person intends to rely
on such a defense, that person must move for the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within
the time provided for filing a pre-trial motion.23
It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for seeking the deposition of the
foreign witnesses is "to foreclose any objection and/or rejection of, as the case may be, the
admissibility of Defense Exhibits "218" and "219"." This issue has, however, long been rendered
moot and academic by the admission of the aforementioned documentary exhibits by the trial
court in its order dated July 10, 1998.24
In fact, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the evidence to be obtained through
the deposition-taking would be superfluous or corroborative at best. A careful examination of
Exhibits "218" and "219" readily shows that these are of the same species of documents which
have been previously introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial court in its order dated
July 18, 1997 which We noted in Webb, et al. v. People of the Philippines, et al.25 wherein We
pointed out, among others, "[t]hat respondent judge reversed this erroneous ruling and already
admitted these 132 pieces of evidence after finding that "the defects in (their) admissibility have
been cured though the introduction of additional evidence during the trial on the merits"."26
Indeed, a comparison of Exhibit "218-A" which is a U.S. Department of State Certification issued
by Joan C. Hampton, Assistant Authenticating Officer of the said agency, for and in the name of
Madeleine K. Albright, stating that the documents annexed thereto were issued by the U.S.
Department of Justice as shown by seal embossed thereon,27 with other exhibits previously
offered as evidence reveals that they are of the same nature as Exhibits "42-H"28 and "42-M".29
The only difference in the documents lies in the fact that Exhibit "218-A" was signed by Joan C.
Hampton for and in behalf of the incumbent Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright whereas,
Exhibits "42-H" and "42-M" were signed by Authenticating Officer Annie R. Maddux for and in
behalf of former Secretary of State Warren Christopher.30
A comparison of Exhibit "218-B"31 with the other documentary exhibits offered by respondent,
likewise discloses that its contents are the same as Exhibits "42-I"32 and "42-N."33 The only
difference in the three exhibits, which are actually standard issue certification forms issued by
the U.S. Department of Justice with blanks to be filled up, is that Exhibit "218-B" is dated
February 5, 1997 and signed by one of the U.S. Attorney General's several Deputy Assistant
Attorneys for Administration for and in her behalf, while Exhibits "42-I" and "42-N" are both dated
September 21, 1995 with another of the said deputies signing both documents.34
Still comparing respondent's Exhibit "218-F,"35 which is likewise a standard issue U.S.
Department of Justice Certification Form, with other documents previously introduced as
evidence reveals that it is the same as Exhibits "39-D"36 and "42-C."37 The only differences in
these documents are that Exhibit "218-F" is dated October 13, 1995 and is signed by Debora A.
Farmer while Exhibits "39-D" and "42-C" are both dated August 31, 1995 and signed by Cecil G.
Christian, Jr., Assistant Commissioner, Officer of Records, INS.38
Still further scrutinizing and comparing respondent's Exhibit "218-G"39 which was also
introduced and admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibit "207-B"40 shows that the document
has been earlier introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial court an astounding seven
(7) times, particularly as Exhibits "34-A", "35-F", "39-E", "42-D", "42-P", "50" and "50-F."41 The
only difference in these document is that they were printed on different dates. Specifically,
Exhibits "218-G" as with Exhibits "34-A", "35-F", "50", and "52-F" were printed out on October 26,
199542 whereas Exhibit "207-B" as with Exhibits "39-E", "42-D" and "42-F" were printed out on
August 31, 1995.43
In fact, the records show that respondent's: a.] application for Non-Commercial Driver's License;
b.] Documentary records based on Clet's Database Response; c.] Computer-generated thumb-
print; d.] Documentary records based on still another Clet's Database Response, and e.] The
Certification issued by one Frank Zolin, Director of the State of California's Department of Motor
Vehicles, were already introduced and admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibits "66-J", "66-K",
"66-H", "66-I" and "66-L", respectively.44
It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing factual circumstances only; serves to
underscore the immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S.
based witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in denying
respondent's motion to take them, the trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it
perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not
reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record. In this regard, it bears
stressing that under Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. The court may stop the introduction of
further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that
more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive.
But this power should be exercised with caution. (emphasis and italics supplied.)
Needless to state, the trial court can not be faulted with lack of caution in denying respondent's
motion considering that under the prevailing facts of the case, respondent had more than ample
opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense. Certainly, a party can not feign denial of due
process where he had the opportunity to present his side.45 It must be borne in mind in this
regard that due process is not a monopoly of the defense. Indeed, the State is entitled to due
process as much as the accused.46 Furthermore, while a litigation is not a game of technicalities,
it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.47
The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.48 The
deposition taking can not be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons.49 Discretion has to be
exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. There is no
indication in this case that in denying the motion of respondent-accused, the trial judge acted in
a biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. Grave abuse of discretion ". . . implies such
capricious, and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other
words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act all in contemplation of Law."50
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess or
jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.51
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, the remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the public respondent acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave
abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply
because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used
to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is
not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal or a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or
mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as a court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing
more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil
action for certiorari.52
Whether or not the respondent-accused has been given ample opportunity to prove his
innocence and whether or not a further prolongation of proceedings would be dilatory is
addressed, in the first instance, to the sound discretion of the trial judge. If there has been no
grave abuse of discretion, only after conviction may this Court examine such matters further. It is
pointed out that the defense has already presented at least fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four
hundred sixty-four (464) documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as those to be
produced or testified to by the proposed foreign deponents. Under the circumstances, we sustain
the proposition that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decide that the
evidence on the matter sought to be proved in the United States could not possibly add anything
substantial to the defense evidence involved. There is no showing or allegation that the
American public officers and the bicycle store owner can identify respondent Hubert Webb as the
very person mentioned in the public and private documents. Neither is it shown in this petition
that they know, of their own personal knowledge, a person whom they can identify as the
respondent-accused who was actually present in the United States and not in the Philippines on
the specified dates.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated February 6, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 45399 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City is ordered to proceed posthaste in the trial of
the main case and to render judgment therein accordingly.
[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the
rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But
even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the
State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very
little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and
liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against
those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation.
With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the
State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and
inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in
the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more
attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of
rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple
shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between
the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to
preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted
against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to
impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a
stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly
because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly
clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him
directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person
who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as
provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any
and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties
and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA
7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a),
3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c)
Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art.
183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No.
142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses
under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits
and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised
were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the
vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion
thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558
finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on
which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition
to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply
to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the
issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and,
(c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with
the Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a
legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional
adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is
forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another.
Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords
to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and
act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in
favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the
provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to
sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as long as there is some basis for
the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the
case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient
to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course,
where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must
be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the
validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently
explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and
prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series
of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary
benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or
by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance
or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained.
It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with
its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes
is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES &
Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by
Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire
BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE
of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A
series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the
TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS,
MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR
LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF
THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION
ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none -
that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions
clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions,
according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague
and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void
merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every
word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness
or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from
the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[8] The
intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to
use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and
"series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is
to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and
temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular
meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually
became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A
COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE
HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more
means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are
included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of
one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts.
It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we
seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a
very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have
here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts
may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the
words a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as.
Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But
when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling
under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the
National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts
falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1).
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2
of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal
which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common
goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of
action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall
scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal
acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-
for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various
ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense
must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie
of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes
an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a
standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities.[11]
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free
from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness"
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather
than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the
act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and
overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law."[13] The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."[14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."[15] The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court
ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which,
by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial
challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct
that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct
of others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved
is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in
the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied'
to a particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground
that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the
Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction
of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for
the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that
is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be
decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.
[26] In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged
to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.[27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder
Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real.
Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to
furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of
the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will
take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and
validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law
is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that
the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by
reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal
implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and
emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the
law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable
construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo
challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise
and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give
fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted"
benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad
faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the
discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest
partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the
different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be
committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the
indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without
justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa.,
405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative
Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice
and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the
act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving
any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the
term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was
understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners'
objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder
Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of
overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.[29] The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is
critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free
society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government
cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt
with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the
realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.[30] The following exchanges between Rep.
Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the
House of Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in
the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find
him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right
of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100
million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation,
bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of
the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the
robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was
charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two.
Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the
totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be
taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in
the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality
of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it
is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the
crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one
essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of
defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or
P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts
involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these
transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder
(underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution
to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers
from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove
beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series
which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no
need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by
the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information
for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need
not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the
raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very
acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises
where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in
Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion
is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a
combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment
of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
"pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged,
(as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it
the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law
without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised
Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder
Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused
charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of
the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence
and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we
can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes
charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the
crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be
culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is
not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case
for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a
means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4
is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the
rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing
rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for
a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of
such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a
result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not
really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other,
especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se
which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be
proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that
the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is
the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada
made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence
for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy
or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript
quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule
of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of
attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the
pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite
mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of
plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It
is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it
does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is
no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."[35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have
been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the
heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished
with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes,
this Court held in People v. Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human
being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to
dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or
resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide,
infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than
three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were
made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive
arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or
raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very
nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of
the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in
which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the
political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality
that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an
actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it
governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes
like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause
further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se[37] and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be
absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of
the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to
the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary
effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high
places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become
more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and
more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically
catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread
like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation.
The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate
this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of
national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal
statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger
for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism
and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130663 March 20, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANGELES STA. TERESA, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In convicting an accused who has pleaded "guilty," the trial court should not be satisfied by his
admission of guilt of the crime charged. By the same token, the defense counsel is duty bound to
defend his client, protect his rights and fulfill the stringent standard set by the Constitution and
the Rules of Court on due process. For the rank failure of both the trial court and the defense
counsel to observe appellant's right to due process, this Court cannot affirm his conviction. A
remand to the trial court is thus in order.1wphi1.nt
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision1 dated May 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, finding Angeles Sta. Teresa guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of raping his 12-year old daughter and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death. The
decretal portion of said Decision is worded as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds, and so holds, that the accused ANGELES
STA. TERESA y PROTESTA is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of [r]ape and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and for him to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P50,000.00, as moral and exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED."2
Upon a complaint filed by his daughter, Lorna Sta. Teresa, appellant was charged with rape on
March 10, 1997, in an Information which reads as follows:
"That sometime in the month of October, 1996, at Brgy. Soledad, Municipality of Sta. Rosa,
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his own minor
daughter LORNA STA. TERESA, who is about 12 years old, taking advantage of her tender age
and innocence, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW."3
When arraigned on May 7, 1997, appellant with the assistance of his counsel de oficio4 pleaded
"not guilty."5 But after the prosecution presented its witnesses -- Dr. Maria Lorraine De Guzman,
medico-legal officer, and the rape victim -- appellant, on May 16, 1997, withdrew his plea of "not
guilty" and changed it to a plea of "guilty."6 He said that he "had no intention to commit such act
at the time but because I was drunk, I was not on my right mind x x x."7 He then asked that he
be pardoned for his deed.8
After such manifestation, the prosecution decided to dispense with the presentation of other
testimonial evidence and formally offered their exhibits to the trial court. When asked for
comment by the trial court, appellant's counsel de oficio responded, "[c]onsidering that the
accused openly admits his guilt, I am not anymore in a position to oppose the said formal offer of
exhibits."9
The trial court then admitted all the documentary exhibits offered by the prosecution without any
comment and/or objection from the defense counsel. It granted the motion of appellant to
change his plea to one of guilt. Thereafter, it re-read to the accused the complaint filed against
him, interpreted it and explained it in a language which he understood -- all these with the
assistance of his counsel de oficio.
The trial court then called appellant to the witness stand. There, he testified how the rape
occurred. After testifying, he asked for pardon and, if not forthcoming, then leniency because he
was not in his right mind and senses when the rape incident occurred.10
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general summarizes the evidence for the prosecution in this wise:11
"One night in October 1996, appellant brought complainant, her [sic] daughter, in a hut
belonging to his cousin in Barangay Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija. While she was sleeping, she
was awakened when she felt that someone was removing her short pants and panties. She saw
appellant. When he had disrobed her, appellant also removed his clothes. Appellant inserted his
penis into the vagina of complainant. Her private organ bled and she felt something slippery
come out of her organ.
"Complainant narrated to her employer Marites Eugenio that she was raped by her own father.
Eugenio accompanied complainant to the Paulino J. Garcia Memorial Research and Medical
Center, where she was examined by Dr. Ma. Lorraine de Guzman at about 2:20 p.m. of February
28, 1997. Dr. de Guzman examined complainant and found in her organ, 'multiple old healed
laceration at 3, 5, 6, and 9 o'clock.' The 'vaginal opening admits 1, 2 fingers easily'." (citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellant's version of the incident is as follows:12
"1. The accused-appellant is a resident of Pasakaw, Camarines Sur. He has a wife by the name of
Virgie Sta. Teresa. They have five children. The complainant is the eldest.
"2. Sometime in October 1996, accused-appellant accompanied complainant to Nueva Ecija to be
employed as helper in the house of Marites Eugenio.
"3. While in Nueva Ecija, the accused-appellant temporarily resided at the hut owned by accused-
appellant's cousin situated in Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.
"4. One night sometime in October 1996, the accused-appellant got so drunk that he was not
conscious of what he was doing. He did not recognize who he was with. Out of instinct, he made
advances to make love with the person he was with who happened to be his daughter. The
complainant freely and voluntarily consented. She was over twelve (12) years old at that time.
"5. The following day, the accused-appellant accompanied the complainant to the house of
Marites Eugenio situated [at] Barangay Burgos, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija to be employed as
helper."
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court, after evaluating the prosecution evidence and considering appellant's admission
of the crime, convicted him of rape and sentenced him to death. Wrote the trial judge:13
"Therefore, after a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the
defense, this Court is morally convinced, and so holds, that there is not a shred of doubt that the
prosecution's case was duly proven by direct evidence which taken collectively, in essence and in
all respects led to the logical conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged in the complaint.1wphi1.nt
"It is [a] tough task imposing the death penalty, and this Presiding Judge finds it not an easy task
to do so and is pained no end whenever the opportunity arises. While it is true that humans
should be compassionate of their fellows, the situation with judges, however, requires of them to
be discriminating in this regard. For, '[w]hile compassion is, in itself a virtue, it cannot and should
not replace justice under law, in this particular case, justice to the victim.' It should be stressed
here that our present society has long since advanced from that dark age of man's history where
might and brute force had ruled supreme and absolute. Our present time is now ruled by law and
moral persuasions; where the greater interest of the greater number of people is held high in the
balance of justice. x x x"
Thus, this automatic review before us.14
Issues
In his Brief, appellant submits that the court a quo committed the following errors:15
"I
The 'plea of guilty' made by the accused-appellant was qualified and conditional. Thus, the court
a quo gravely erred in not entering a plea of not guilty for the accused-appellant and in not
affording the latter the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence in blatant violation of his
right to due process.
"II
The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of the material
inconsistencies and improbabilities that tainted the testimony of the private complainant.
"III
The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of the fact that the
testimony of the private complainant is contrary to the common knowledge and experience of
mankind.
"IV
The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant in spite of complainant's
failure to offer any resistance prior to and even during her alleged rape[.]"
The Court's Ruling
We find that the stringent constitutional standards impelled by due process have not been
complied with in the court a quo, thus necessitating the remand of this case for further
proceedings.
First Issue:
Appellant's Qualified and Conditional Plea
The imposition of the death penalty obligates this Court to review closely the judgment of
conviction, not only on whether appellant committed the crime of rape against his own minor
daughter, but also whether his constitutional rights have been duly observed and protected
before and during his trial.
As aforediscussed, appellant initially entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the victim and
the medico-legal officer testified against him, his counsel de oficio manifested that his client
wanted to change his plea of "not guilty" to one of "guilty."
The trial judge then conducted an inquiry into the voluntariness of the change of plea and
appellant's full comprehension of its consequences. However, we believe that the trial judge fell
short of the exacting standards set forth in Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as follows:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. -- When the accused pleads guilty
to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf.
As can be gleaned from this Rule, the trial court must, if the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, first, conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full
comprehension of the consequences thereof; second, require the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and third,
ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.
The trial court asserts that it has conducted a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his plea
of "guilty." We are not persuaded.
As explained in People v. Alicando,16 a searching inquiry occurs when the plea of guilt is based
on a free and informed judgment, focusing on the voluntariness of the plea and the full
comprehension of the consequences.
As shown in the records of the case, the trial court, after a brief exchange of remarks with
appellant's counsel de oficio, and finally with appellant himself, issued the following Order dated
May 16, 1997, or nine (9) days after the accused was initially arraigned, as follows:17
"After the prosecution rested its case, the accused, instead of presenting defense evidence,
through his counsel de oficio Atty. Angelito Adriano, manifested that he is withdrawing his former
plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty.
"The Court granted said motion and the complaint was again read, interpreted and explained to
the accused in a language which he speaks and with the assistance of his counsel and he
pleaded guilty and said plea was accordingly entered into the records.
"Furthermore, he was called to the witness stand and he testified that all he wants is for her [sic]
daughter and the Court to pardon him and if the same is not possible, that leniency be extended
to him because he was only so drunk at the time of the incident and he was not then on his right
mind and senses.
xxx xxx x x x"
We hold that the abbreviated and aborted presentation of the prosecution evidence and
appellant's improvident plea of guilty, with the scanty and lackluster performance of his counsel
de oficio, are just too exiguous to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at
work enough to snuff out the life of a human being. As exemplified in People v. Bermas:18
"x x x The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed
with or performed perfunctorily.
"The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the
accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the
cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the
lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of
the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the
fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to
counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his
client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation."19
Using this standard, we believe that the defense counsel's conduct falls short of the commitment
and zeal required of him as appellant's attorney. Barely nine (9) days after appellant pleaded "not
guilty" to the crime charged, his counsel de oficio made a manifestation in open court that his
client is changing his plea to that of "guilty."
Considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the penalty, we find Atty.
Adriano's performance as counsel de oficio utterly wanting. As a lawyer sworn to uphold justice
and the law, he had the bounden duty to exert utmost efforts to defend his client and protect his
rights, no matter how guilty or evil he appears to be. This duty becomes more compelling if his
client is accused of a grave crime and is in danger of forfeiting his life if he is convicted.
To buttress the lack of zeal shown in defending appellant, Atty. Adriano failed to appear during
the promulgation of the assailed RTC Decision. In fact, the trial judge appointed another counsel
de oficio, Atty. Bayani Dalangin, for the purpose of promulgating the aforesaid Decision.20
As the proceedings in the court a quo failed to observe the exacting standards of constitutional
due process, we have no other choice but to remand the case to the court a quo for further and
appropriate proceedings conformably with what we have heretofore expressed. The other
assigned errors committed by the court a quo will no longer be addressed because of the order
of remand. During the remand proceedings, the trial court, the prosecutors and the defense
counsel would be well-advised to read and observe this Court's pronouncements in, among
others, People v. Bello,21 People v. Tizon,22 People v. Nadera Jr.,23 People v. Abapo,24 aside from
People v. Durango25 and People v. Bermas.26
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 27, is hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 7411 is remanded to it for further
proceedings, with all deliberate speed, in accordance with this Decision.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129691 June 29, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE LOMBOY @ "JOSE," accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Acquittal is inevitable if inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt. Conviction must rest on the moral certainty of appellant's guilt brought
about by the totality of the prosecution's evidence.
The Case
Jose Lomboy appeals the February 14, 1997 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Carlos City, Pangasinan (Branch 57), finding him guilty of (A) frustrated murder, sentencing him
to seven (7) years of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal in Criminal Case No. SCC-2014; and (B) illegal possession of explosive (hand grenade),
imposing upon him "eighteen (18) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua."
Two separate Informations both dared March 26, 1993, were filed against appellant by the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor. The first, 2 for frustrated murder, reads:
That on or about December 25, 1992, at Barangay Angatel, [M]unicipality of Urbiztondo,
[P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then
and there, wi[l]lfully, unlawfully and feloniously throw a [hand grenade] thereby hitting Barangay
Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan, inflicting upon him the following injuries:
Acute subaural hematoma, brain laceration shrapnel injury
the accused having thus performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of [m]urder as a consequence but, which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the accused and is due to the timely and able medical
assistance afforded to Barangay Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan which prevented his death, to his
damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code. 3
The second Information 4 charged appellant with illegal possession of explosive (hand grenade),
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about December 25, 1992, at Barangay Angatel, [M]unicipality of Urbiztondo,
[P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did, then and there, wi[l]lfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control[,] [a hand grenade], without first securing the necessary permit
and license to possess the same[,] which he used in the commission of the crime of [f]rustrated
[m]urder.
Contrary to P.D. 1866. 5
The appellant was arraigned on May 26, 1993, 6 and he pleaded 7 not guilty to both charges.
Thereafter, the two cases were heard jointly. 8 After trial, the lower court promulgated the
assailed Decision, 9 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the accused, JOSE LOMBOY, alias "Jose," is hereby found:
Under Criminal Case No. SCC-2014: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
FRUSTRATED MURDER herein charged, defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Art.
6 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced, under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of from [s]even (7) [y]ears of prision mayor to
[t]hirteen (13) [y]ears and [f]our (4) [m]onths of reclusion temporal, and to indemnify Brgy. Cap't.
Benjamin Pidlaoan in the amount of P300,000.00.
Under Criminal Case No. SCC-2015: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of [i]llegal
[p]ossession of [e]xplosive ([h]andgrenade) defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No.
1866, as herein charged, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment,
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, of [e]ighteen (18) [y]ears and [e]ight (8) [m]onths of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. 10 (Emphasis in the original).
In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal was filed directly with this Court. 11
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, 12 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
On December 25, 1992, about 1:00 o'clock a.m., private complainant Barangay Captain
Benjamin Pidlaoan, together with Barangay Kagawad Marcelino C. Tapiador and Mardonio
Tampico, were on their way home from a Christmas dance party of Barangay Angatel, Ubiztondo,
Pangasinan. While walking along the barangay road and about 8 meters from the house of
Rodolfo Marcelo, they saw a man lying face down by the roadside. When they were about 5 or 6
meters away, the man by the roadside directed a flashlight at them. Pidlaoan, in turn, flashed his
flashlight at the man who was wearing a maong jacket. They recognized the man to be appellant,
a 27-year-old barangay mate of theirs.
Pidlaoan approached appellant and held the latter's left hand to help him get up. Appellant's
right hand was noticeably on his stomach as if holding something. After helping him up, Pidlaoan
asked him why he was lying down by the road to which he did not answer. When asked as to who
his companion was, appellant replied that he was with Rodolfo Marcelo. Since the latter's house
was just nearby, or only about 5 to 6 meters away, Pidlaoan stood by the left side of appellant
and held him by the back collar of his jacket with his (Pidlaoan's) right hand, and pulled him
towards the direction of Marcelo's house. While near the front gate of Marcelo's house and while
calling for Marcelo to come out, Marcelo's young son who stood about 10 meters away from
them, uttered "take care Barangay Captain because he has [a] grenade with him".
Suddenly, appellant managed to free himself from Pidlaoan's hold and moved about 3 meters
backwards. He then got a grenade from inside his jacket and held it on one hand, with the other
hand removing the pin thereof with a pulling movement. While shouting "vulva of your mother,
we will all die", appellant threw the grenade in the direction of Pidlaoan and the same landed
near him. Thereafter, there was an explosion and thick smoke.
When Kagawad Tapiador, who was only about 5 meters away from appellant, recognized that
what appellant was holding was a hand grenade, he ducked with his face down.
When Tapiador and Tampico saw that Pidlaoan was seriously wounded as he could not even
stand, they brought him to the clinic of Dr. Serafino Padlan at Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. He was
later transferred to the Villaflor Doctor's Hospital in Dagupan City.
Upon receipt of a radio message about the explosion incident from Col. Ernesto Palisoc, SPO1
Tandoc and SPO2 Renato Solomon were dispatched at about 7:00 A.M. to investigate. Upon
learning that Pidlaoan was brought to the Padlan clinic, they rushed thereto. They, however, were
unable to speak with him as he was in critical condition having sustained a wound on his head.
Thus, they instead proceeded to the scene of the incident at Barangay Angatel where they were
able to recover five (5) empty bullet shells of M-14 and M-16 armalite rifles; one (1) hand
grenade handle. 13 (citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
For his part, appellant submits the following as the fact of the case: 14
LAMBERTO 15 LOMBOY, brother-in-law 16 of accused-appellant testified that on December 25,
1992 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening while inside his house at Barangay Angatel,
Urbiztondo, his brother Jose Lomboy and Boy Ferrera dropped at his house and invited him to
attend a Christmas dance ball. He told them to go ahead and he will just follow them soon. He
and Dominador Lomboy, another brother[,] left the house at past 8:00 o'clock in the evening and
proceeded to the Christmas party. While he was watching the party, he saw Brgy. Capt. Pidlaoan
[arrive] carrying a hand grenade hanging [from] the left pocket of his camouflage jacket[,]
together with Mardonio Tampico[,] who was carrying an M-16 rifle[,] and Marcelino Tapiador
carrying an M-14 rifle. (emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
JOSE LOMBOY, accused-appellant testified that on December 25, 1992, at around 1:00 o'clock
early dawn, he was [in front] of the house of his barkada, Rodolfo Marcelo conversing with him
when he noticed some people walking along the road so he focused his flashlight at them. He
saw Brgy Capt. Pidlaoan together with his aide, Mardonio Tampico and Barangay Kagawad
Marcelino Tapiador. They were carrying two (2) long firearms and a [hand grenade] hanging
[from] the pocket of Brgy. Capt. Pidlaoan who approached him, held his collar and struck him in
the face, hitting his left cheekbone and on the head with the [use] of [the] hand grenade which
was removed from his pocket. The trio mauled and gang[ed]-up on him, and when the Barangay
Captain loosened his hold on him he was able to run [towards] the back of Rodolfo Marcelo's
house planted with banana and coconut trees. They ran after him and kept on shooting but he
was not hit because he ran in a zigzag manner. Brgy. Capt. Pidlaoan threw the [hand grenade] at
him but when it exploded, the former was hit instead and got seriously injured. He went to his
aunt's house for fear that Brgy. Capt. Pidlaoan will kill him and he stayed there for one (1) week
until he was arrested by SPO1 Tandoc and SPO2 Solomon accompanied by Cesar Pidlaoan, son of
the victim who squeezed his neck. He was incarcerated at Urbiztondo Municipal jail and on
January 4, 1993, he was brought to Bolingit Hospital for medical treatment. 17 (emphasis in the
original, citation omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court accepted the version of the prosecution as credible and rejected that the defense,
ruling thus:
First, in view of the completely opposite claims of the prosecution and the defense as to who
pulled the pin of, and threw, the [hand grenade], the matter of motive has assumed a special
importance in [unraveling] the mystery; and, on this issue, the accused claimed that, just before
the explosion of the [hand grenade], when he asked Brgy. Cap't. Pidlaoan why the latter was
hitting him on the face and head with a [hand grenade], said barangay captain purportedly
replied, "Vulva of your mother, I'll surely kill you now because you are a family of thieves. . . . We
were not able to kill you on 3rd of January, I'll surely kill you now, you can't escape."[,] said
accused explaining that the barangay captain was referring to an alleged incident in the early
dawn of January 3, 1992, when the house he, his mother and sister are living in was shot at,
although he did not know then who did the [alleged] shooting. The Court finds this story of the
accused, besides being uncorroborated, not to be worthy of belief for the following reasons:
(a) It is merely based on the accused's conjecture that Brgy. Cap't. Pidlaoan had anything to do
with the alleged shooting up of accused's house on January 3, 1992, assuming this without any
basis, to have actually happened;
(b) The presumption that Brgy. Cap't. Pidlaoan is a reasonable and responsible public official of
his barangay is not rebutted by the uncorroborated claim of the accused that by merely
suspecting him and his family as "a family of thieves", he would shoot up their house and would
kill the accused right on the road in front of the house of the accused's barkada, Rodolfo Marcelo;
(c) It is unnatural and contrary to logic that the barangay captain would confess to the crime of
shooting up to the house of the accused months prior the present incident before carrying out his
alleged intention to kill the accused;
(d) In view of all the foregoing, the Court traces the ill-motive to kill the barangay captain to the
accused who was harboring the belief that it was the barangay captain who shot up the house
where he (The accused) and his mother and sister were then sleeping and who was purportedly
accusing them of being "a family of thieves."
Second, it is established that two kinds of armalite rifles were fired [at] the scene of the crime,
and it is claimed by the accused that he saw the barangay captain's two companions to be
carrying these firearms as they approached him, if it is really true that it was the intention of said
barangay captain to kill him, because he belonged to a family of thieves and he could not
escape, the barangay captain and/or his companions should have shot him with the armalite
rifles, not the [hand grenade] just to kill one person putting to risk not only the target but the
persons nearby, including the thrower himself if thrown not far enough.
Third, well-established is the rule on evidence that flight is an evidence of guilt; and in the
instant case, as the [hand grenade] exploded, the accused ran away from the scene and
proceeded to Malasiqui where he stayed in the house of his aunt, Leoning Gonzales, at Brgy.
Lokeb Norte, for about one (1) week until he was arrested thereat by Urbiztondo policemen
accompanied by Brgy. Cap't. Pidlaoan's son, Cesar. . . . .
Fourth, the claim of the accused that he was being mauled by Brgy. Cap't. Pidlaoan and his
companions when he was able to free himself from the hold of the barangay captain, is belied by
the very Medico-Legal Certificate and the testimony of Dr. Conrado H. Cuison, M.D. who
examined and treated him and who prepared said document, which the defense presented as
evidence of his alleged injuries . . . 18 (emphasis in the original).
The Issues
Appellant submits that the court a quo committed the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
FRUSTRATED MURDER AS CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SCC-2014 DESPITE THE WEAKNESS
AND INSUFFICIENCY OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF EXPLOSIVES AS CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SCC-2015 DESPITE
THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY. 19
The main issues to be resolved are the credibility of the prosecution's single eyewitness and the
verity of his testimony.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Main Issue
Credibility of Prosecution's Lone Eyewitness
As a general rule, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses in a matter that particularly falls
within the authority of the trial court, as it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witness on stand. For this reason, appellate courts accord its factual findings and assessments of
witnesses with great weight and even finality, barring arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance. 20 We find, however, that the court a quo overlooked
several circumstances of weight and substance, which create reasonable doubt on the
appellant's culpability.
Testimony Is Dubious
The trial court relied mainly on the testimony of the lone prosecution eyewitness, 21 Barangay
Kagawad Marcelino Tapiador. In light of the well-settled norm that the testimony of a witness
must conform with knowledge, observation and common experience of mankind, 22 the Court
meticulously reviewed Tapiador's testimony and concluded that his account was dubious.
First, Tapiador testified that about 1:00 a.m., while walking along the barangay road with Mariano
Tampico and Barangay Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan, they saw the appellant lying face down on the
road shoulder. Tapiador allegedly "sensed" that Jose Lomboy had "bad intentions," 23 but the
former did not convey his feelings to his companions. Nonetheless, Pidlaoan collared the
appellant as if he had just committed a crime. 24 Tapiador narrated the events in this wise:
ATTY. SORIANO.
Q At about 1:00 o'clock on that December 25, 1992 in the morning, do you remember where you
were, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you then, Mr. Witness at that time?
A We were walking towards another occasion, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Do you remember of any unusual incident that took place on that precise time and on that
place, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that, Mr. Witness?
A While we were walking along the road, we saw a man lying with his face down along the
shoulder of the road.
Q When you mentioned we were walking, to whom [we]re you referring to.
A Brgy. Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan and Mardonio Tampico, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. SORIANO.
Q On that precise moment that you have seen as you mentioned a person lying down, what
happened next if there is any?
A The man lying down flashed his flashlight towards us and . . . Brgy. Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan .
. . flashed his flashlight towards him and then the Barangay Captain approached him.
Q You said you [saw] a person lying down, who is that person who is lying down?
A Jose Lomboy, sir.
Q Are you referring to the accused whom you have pointed earlier, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. SORIANO.
Q After Brgy. Captain Pidlaoan made Jose Lomboy stand, what transpired next if there is any, Mr.
Witness?
A He was asked what he was doing there and who was his companion.
Q To whom [was] question directed to Mr. Witness?
A Jose Lomboy, sir.
Q And what was the answer of Jose Lomboy if there is any, Mr. Witness?
A His companion was Rodolfo Marcelo, sir.
Q And what did the Brgy. Captain do if there is any, Mr. Witness after that?
A He collar[e]d Jose Lomboy and he accompanied him to the house of Rodolfo Marcelo.
xxx xxx xxx 25 (emphasis ours)
The improbabilities in the foregoing narration are readily apparent. It is unnatural for one to lie
down near a road at one o' clock in the morning during the cold season for no particular reason.
Indeed, when asked on cross-examination whether the appellant appeared to be drunk or was
doing anything illegal, the witness replied in the negative. Moreover, if it was true that appellant
intended to commit a crime, his actuations as described by the eyewitness spoke otherwise. If
appellant had evil designs that night, why did he point his flashlight towards his targets
Pidlaoan and his companions thereby attracting their attention? Why did he lie face down on
the road in plain view of passersby? Instead, he should have positioned himself in an
inconspicuous place and waited, unnoticed, for the right opportunity from a safe distance to
throw the grenade at the group.
Second, Tapiador stated categorically that he did not see any firearms or hear any gunshots
during the incident. The pertinent part of his testimony is as follows:
ATTY. SAMSON
Q Is it not a fact that you and Brgy. Captain before the explosion were armed?
A None, sir.
COURT.
Q You were not on patrol duty then?
A No, sir, but we attended the Christmas Party.
Q Did you not attend the Christmas Party as security to maintain peace and order?
A No, sir.
ATTY. SAMSON.
Q You are a Brgy. Kagawad of Brgy. Angatel, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Just immediately after the explosion, did you not hear the firing of guns?
A None, sir. 26 (Emphasis supplied.).
The physical evidence on record controverted the foregoing assertions. Reports of what
happened were transmitted over the radio as a shooting incident and not merely as an explosion,
as Tapiador would have us believe. The investigating officer, SPO1 Rodrigo Tandoc, testified: 27
Q. What was that radio message all about that was sent to your office by Col. Palisoc?
A. He informed our office that there was a shooting incident, sir.
Furthermore, Tandoc declared that he and his team recovered at the scene of the crime several
bullet shells of M-16 and M-14 rifles, along with a grenade shrapnel. 28 In fact, the Appellee's
Brief admits that the two companions of Pidlaoan were armed with armalite rifles. 29
Third, Tapiador testified that the victim took the appellant to the front of Marcelo's house and
that, by implication, the incident took place there. The witness said:
ATTY. SORIANO.
Q And what did the Brgy. Captain do if there is any, Mr. Witness after that?
A He collar[e]d Jose Lomboy and he accompanied him to the house of Rodolfo Marcelo.
Q What particular part of the house of Rodolfo Marcelo did Brgy. Captain take Jose Lomboy?
A Near the front of his house, sir. 30
This would necessarily mean that the grenade exploded at or near the front of Marcelo's house.
According to the Appelle's Brief, the barangay captain collared the accused and took him to that
particular place; after the latter freed himself, he stepped backwards and "threw the grenade in
the direction of Pidlaoan and the same landed near him." 31 The eyewitness was categorical
when he testified that the entire incident took place at or near the front of Marcelo's house.
But according to SPO1 Tandoc, the center of the explosion was located at the back portion of
Marcelo's house where there were banana and coconut trees.
ATTY. R. SAMSON
Q You said that you have gathered evidence at the scene of the explosion. When you said you
gathered, you and you companions were the [ones] who personally gathered these evidences
like the empty shells of M-16 and M-14 and the handle of the grenade, is that not correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you personally gathered some of them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you try to determine the center of the explosion of the hand grenade as duty investigator?
A Yes, sir.
Q From the center of the explosion of the hand grenade, is it near the trees like banana tree?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is it not a fact also that a domesticated animal died because of that explosion of the hand
grenade?
A I do not know if that animal died but it was hit, sir.
Q What domesticated animal was that?
A Carabao, sir.
Q And that domesticated animal was hit; that domesticated animal was found near the center of
the explosion?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you try also to find out the condition of the surroundings of the center of the explosion?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is it not a fact that near the center of the explosion you can find several banana trees as well
as coconut [groves]?
A There were, sir.
Q And the center of the explosion is likewise near the house of Rodolfo Marcelo?
A Yes, sir.
Q And just at the back of the house of Rodolfo Marcelo there were coconut [groves] and banana
plantations?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q A while ago you have stated that the center of the explosion was near the banana trees, how
far is the center of the explosion from the nearest banana tree? [I]s it less than a meter from the
nearest banana tree, the center of explosion?
A More of or less 1 meter, sir. 32
The investigating officer was clear and certain in stating that the center of the blast was about a
meter away from the nearest tree at the back of the house. Clearly, the location of the grenade
blast scuttles the theory of the prosecution, which is based entirely on the testimony of Tapiador.
His story was that appellant was brought by the victim to the front of the house; that Marcelo's
son who was outside the house warned them of the grenade in appellant's possession; and that
appellant loosened the victim's grip on him, made three steps backward and threw the grenade
at the victim. But the fact that the center of the explosion was at the back of the house shows
that this story was untrue.
It should also be emphasized that the lone eyewitness was unsure of the events that transpired
after a child had allegedly warned them. During cross-examination, said eyewitness faltered
while answering several questions:
ATTY. SAMSON
Q After the boy uttered the words, he has a [hand grenade] and as you have demonstrated, Brgy.
Captain pushed his right hand backward as if he is removing something, did I get you right that
when he removed his right hand backward as if he is removing something, the right hand of Brgy.
Captain Benjamin Pidlaoan was placed at the back collar of Jose Lomboy loosened or detached?
COURT
You reform so that witness will .....
ATTY. SAMSON
Q You said that Jose Lomboy [swung] his right arm towards his back. When he swung his arms
towards at the back, what happened?
A He moved backward by around 3 steps.
Q And that was the very moment that he threw the hand grenade?
A He first talked, sir.
Q What did he say?
A "Vulva of your mother, we will all die."
Q And that was the distance of 3 steps backwards?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was the very moment he threw the [hand grenade]?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q Did you notice where the grenade came from?
A Inside his jacket, sir.
Q Will you please assure the Court that it was the right hand of Brgy. Captain which was holding
the back collar of Lomboy?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you are also sure that it was the right hand of Jose Lomboy which is swung backwards?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was the Brgy. Captain in relation to Jose Lomboy, as he was holding the back collar of
Lomboy?
A He was besides Jose Lomboy sir.
Q The right side of Jose Lomboy?
A Left side, sir.
Q But you are pointing to your right side?
A He turned, sir.
Q So the Brgy. Captain was in the left side of Lomboy using his right hand, when he was holding
the back collar of Lomboy?
A Yes, sir.
Q And at that time they were both facing the same direction?
A Yes, sir.
Q With that position, it was then that Lomboy swung his right hand?
A Witness demonstrating by swinging his right arm side[ways].
Q So, in other words, what he did was to hit the Brgy. Captain with his right elbow?
A I don 't know anymore, sir.
Q So he did not actually swing his right arm backwards as you claimed first because, what he did
now is just to turn around and swing his right elbow as if to hit the Brgy. Captain?
A Yes, of course, because he was loosening the [grip] of the Brgy. Captain.
Q So he used his right hand now in order to grip or did he swing the right arm?
A I could not tell anymore, sir, if he used his right hand in removing the grip of the brgy. Captain
because of his position with his elbow turning around. 33
The Grenade Story
Most important, the prosecution failed to provide a satisfactory answer to the very crucial
question identified by the trial court itself: Who "pulled the pin of, and threw, the hand grenade
that exploded?" 34 To this, the prosecution answered based on the testimony of Tapiador that (1)
he saw appellant holding a grenade, and (2) a child warned them that appellant had a grenade.
Such answer cannot be given credence for several reasons.
One, Tapiador provided conflicting testimony on whether he saw the appellant holding a grenade.
In his direct testimony, he stated:
ATTY. SORIANO
Q How about the accused Jose Lomboy, what was his reaction when there was a [caution] made
by that alleged person?
A Jose Lomboy struggled and then he loosened himself [from] the Brgy. Captain and moved
backward around 3 meters.
Q And on that, what happened next if any, Mr. Witness?
A He was already holding a grenade, the other hand with the grenade and the other hand with
the pin with his two (2) hands meeting each other.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. SORIANO
Q And how about you, what did you do when accused Jose Lomboy uttered those words "Baonina
yon amin, onpatey tila dia"?
A When I saw that it was a grenade the[n] I lay with my face down, sir. [sic]
Q By the was Mr. Witness, when the accused threw the [hand grenade] to the place of the Brgy.
Captain, what is your distance [from] the accused?
A Around 6 meters away, sir.
Q How do you know that it was a grenade that the accused was holding, Mr. Witness?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS
A Because we were illuminated by a light and I know that kind of grenade sir. 35
On cross-examination, however, he said that he could not see what appellant was holding. He
testified thus:
ATTY. SAMSON
Q You want to convey to this court that after that boy uttered that Jose Lomboy had a [hand
grenade], Brgy. Captain [Pidlaoan] instead loosened his grip o[n] the . . . collar of Jose Lomboy?
ATTY. SORIANO
That was already answered several times in direct and cross, your Honor.
COURT
Witness may answer.
A No, sir, just after the boy uttered those words.
COURT
He [was not saying anything], he was just demonstrating. The witness demonstrated by raising
his right arm and swinging it backwards as if removing something from behind him.
ATTY. SAMSON
Q And of course Jose Lomboy was at that time not yet holding anything?
ATTY. SORIANO
Your Honor, what particular moment.
ATTY. SORIANO [sic]
On that very moment, your Honor.
COURT
Witness may answer as the question is explained on that very moment.
WITNESS
A I could not see what he was holding because, it was night time and although he was holding
something since grenade is very small, so even though the witness [sic] is demonstrating as if he
was removing something then I could not see anymore.
ATTY. SAMSON
Q You mean to say therefore that you were not illuminated by electric lights, because you said
you can not recognize him?
A There was a light, sir. 36
This conflict in the testimony of the eyewitness regarding an important factual detail belies the
truthfulness of the prosecution account.
Two, Kagawad Tapiador testified that there was a child, who warned them of the fact that the
appellant was armed with a hand grenade. On direct examination, Tapiador narrated:
ATTY. SORIANO
Q At that precise time when they were in front or near the house of Rodolfo Marcelo, what
transpired next if any, Mr. Witness?
A Upon reaching in front of the house of Rodolfo Marcela, there was a child who uttered "take
care Brgy. Captain because he has a grenade with him".
Q And what is the distance of that person who mentioned the Barangay Captain, Mr. Witness?
A Around 10 meters away, sir. 37
On cross-examination, Tapiador identified the child as Rodolfo Marcelo's son. However,
notwithstanding his claim that the place was illuminated by an electric bulb, he was not able to
describe the child on further questioning, viz.:
ATTY. SAMSON
Q Do you know that boy who [uttered]?
A He is the child of Rodolfo Marcelo, sir.
Q You know him personally?
A Only that night, sir.
Q But you did not mention his name in your affidavit, is that correct?
A I don't know his name.
Q But you know that he is the son of Rodolfo Marcelo?
A Yes, sir, that's what I [said].
Q You mean to say that when that boy [uttered] the words, he was inside the house of Rodolfo
Marcelo?
A No sir.
Q Where was he?
A He was on the ground, sir.
Q Around how old is that boy, if you know?
A I don 't know, sir.
Q Could you approximate the age of that boy by his look?
A No sir.
Q [How a]bout the height of that boy?
A Of course it is night time, sir, and something happened.
Q You mean to say because it's night time, you can not recognize him?
A No more, sir, because it was so sudden.
Q So in other words, you [did] not [recognize] him, you don't know if he is a boy or an old man?
A I saw that it is a boy but I could not recognize [him]. 38
Truth to tell, there was no child involved in the incident, because all the children of Rodolfo
Marcelo were already asleep according to the testimony of SPO1 Rodrigo Tandoc. 39 We note that
the child was not presented in court. We have said that the failure to present a witness to
establish one's thesis may imply that the testimony would be adverse if presented. 40 It should
be added here that Mardonio Tampico, the other companion who could have easily corroborated
the account given by Tapiador, was not presented either.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The Court notes that the trial court gave misplaced and erroneous emphasis on the weakness of
the evidence for the defense. In its assailed Decision, the lower court insisted that the ill motive
imputed to Pidlaoan was "uncorroborated, not . . . worthy of belief." 41 Worse, it concluded in a
rather cavalier manner that such imputation suggested bad faith on the part of appellant. This
was speculative and immaterial. Likewise, the court a quo manifested a wrong perspective in
erroneously focusing on the alleged failure of the appellant to prove that the victim and his
companions mauled him.
After belaboring the perceived weakness in the assertions of the appellant, the trial court
concluded that the prosecution's version was more credible. It held:
In the light of all the foregoing findings, the Court holds that the aforestated version of the
prosecution is far more credible than that of the accused, and that the prosecution's evidence is
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was accused, Jose Lomboy, who pulled the
pin of[f], and threw, the [hand grenade] . . . . 42 (emphasis ours)
Well-entrenched is the doctrine that a finding of guilt must rest the on the prosecution evidence,
not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense. 43 The burden of proving
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt rest upon the prosecution. 44 The lower court erred in
relying on the alleged weakness of the defense. To our mind, when the trial court said that the
prosecution's version "was far more credible," what it actually meant was that the prosecution's
version was more probable. Verily, guilt cannot be shown by mere speculations or even
probabilities, whether the offense be malum prohibitum or malum in se. 45
Appellant's Flight
The lower court held that appellant's flight may be an indication of his guilt, but it did not explain
why. 46 Evidently, it was unsure of the import and significance of appellant's act. In People v.
Cario, 47 we stressed that flight may indicate guilt in certain instances, but it cannot, by itself,
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, appellant departed from the scene of the
incident, because he was afraid that the victim would kill him. 48 Furthermore, the lower court
should have considered the uncontroverted fact that the victim's son had choked the appellant
while the latter was incarcerated, 49 a clear indication that the threat to appellant's life was real.
Verity of Defense's Allegations
It is noteworthy that the pieces of physical evidence, which contradict the prosecution's account,
support the story of appellant. He said that he was talking with some friends at the house of
Rodolfo Marcelo when some people approached them. He focused his flashlight and saw
Barangay Captain Pidlaoan, Tapiador and Mardonio Tampico. The three were carrying two rifles,
while a hand grenade was hanging from Pidlaoan's pocket. The three mauled appellant, who
thereafter ran towards the back of Marcelo's house when he was able to free himself. The three
fired their rifles at him; fortunately, he was not hit. It was then that Pidlaoan threw the grenade,
which exploded at the back of the house and blasted him instead.
The bullet shells found in the crime scene, as well as the initial report that what happened was a
shooting incident, belie Tapiador's statement that he did not see any firearms or hear any
gunshots. On the other hand, they confirm appellant's theory that the barangay captain and his
companions fired at him.
Finally, the fact that the center of the explosion was at the back of Marcelo's house discredits the
prosecution's claim that appellant threw the grenade at the victim who was standing in front of
the house. At the same time, it supports the story of the appellant that the barangay captain
threw the grenade at him while he was running towards the back of the house.
Indubitably, the pieces of physical evidence present a scenario that completely negates the
prosecution's account. Indeed, these established and uncontroverted facts rebut the trial court's
theory and affirm that of the appellant. Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction." 50 Perforce,
acquittal is inevitable. 51
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and
VACATED. Appellant Jose Lomboy is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. The director
of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to cause the release of appellant forthwith, unless
the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform this Court of his release or the
reasons for his continued confinement, within ten days from notice. No costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139610 August 12, 2002
AUREA R. MONTEVERDE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Time and time again, this Court has emphasized the need to stamp out graft and corruption in
the government. Indeed, the tentacles of greed must be cut and the offenders punished.
However, this objective can be accomplished only if the evidence presented by the prosecution
passes the test of moral certainty. Where doubt lingers, as in this case, the Court is mandated to
uphold the presumption of innocence guaranteed by our Constitution to the accused.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 29, 1999
Decision1 and February 3, 2000 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Criminal
Case No. 18768. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused AUREA
MONTEVERDE y RASUELO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of
Commercial Document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and in default of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is
hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of SIX (6) MONTHS of Arresto Mayor as minimum, to SIX
(6) YEARS of Prision Correccional as maximum, to pay a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) pesos
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with all the accessory penalties of the law,
and to pay the cost.
"She shall be credited with the full period of any preventive imprisonment suffered, pursuant to
and as mandated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 85.
"The facts from which the civil liability may arise not being indubitable, there is no
pronouncement as to the same.
"The bailbond of herein accused is hereby ordered cancelled."3
The assailed resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
This case originated from the Information dated February 4, 1993, signed by Special Prosecution
Officer Gualberto J. dela Llana with the approval of then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
Charging petitioner with estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the accusatory
portion reads thus:
"That on or about January 17, 1991, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer, being the Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo,
Manila with intent to defraud, and by taking advantage of [her] official position and to liquidate
the funds donated/granted by the Philippine Games and Amusement Corporation submitted
Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the amount of P13,565.00 allegedly issued by
Sanford Hardware when in truth and in fact said sales invoice is falsified and later did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her
personal use and benefit, to the damage of the Government and which crime was committed in
relation to her office."4
During her arraignment on April 5, 1993, petitioner, assisted by her counsel de parte,5 pleaded
not guilty.6 After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner of the crime of
estafa, but convicted her of falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of the facts is curtly summarized by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) as follows:
"Petitioner Aurea A. Monteverde was from 1991 to 1993 the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 124
of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo, Manila. In that capacity, she received the amount of
P44,800.00 from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). The amount was
spent for lighting, cleanliness and beautification programs of the Barangay. To liquidate the
amount, she submitted a financial statement (Exhibits 1 to 1-A-3) with copies of sales
invoices/receipts to PAGCOR.
"Sometime in August 1991, Antonio R. Araza, Jose Salvatierra, Santos L. Lopez, and Narciso Cruz,
residents of Brgy. 124, charged Petitioner and Bella Evangelista, then Barangay Treasurer, with
Malversation of the following funds: 1.) P82,500.00 from [the] Barangay General Fund; 2.)
P44,800.00 from the PAGCOR; and 3.) P600.00 allowance of Kagawad Lito Galinda for the period
July 16, to December 1990. The complaints were docketed as OMB-0-91-12694 and OMB-0-92-
0643 (Exhs. A, B and C)."7
Version of the Defense
The foregoing account is reiterated by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
Memorandum.8 The petitioner did not submit her own Memorandum, but merely adopted the
position of the OSG which recommended her acquittal.
Version of the Sandiganbayan
The foregoing narration does not adequately explain the evidence. In fairness to the
Sandiganbayan ("SBN" hereafter) which is being faulted with reversible errors by petitioner and
the OSG, we deem it prudent to quote the facts and the evidence it relied upon in its assailed
Decision, as follows:
"EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
In its bid to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the People presented the
following documentary evidence:
1. Exhibit A which is a letter complaint addressed to the Ombudsman dated September 2, 1991
signed by Santos Lopez, Narciso Cruz, Antonio Araza and Jose Salvatierra;
2. Exhibit B which is a Joint-Affidavit of the said four (4) complainants subscribed and sworn to
before a Notary Public on September 8, 1991;
3. Exhibit C which is a letter dated June 13, 1991 signed by complainants Jose Salvatierra and
Antonio Araza addressed to Mr. Manuel de la Fuente of the Chief Barangay Bureau, City of Manila;
4. Exhibit D which is the cover of the Booklet of Sales invoice[s]/Receipts of Sanford Hardware.
5. Exhibit D-1 which is the duplicate original copy of Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated July 20, 1981
listing only three (3) items;
6. Exhibit D-1-A which is a genuine machine copy of Exhibit D-1;
7. Exhibit E which is a machine copy of an official receipt with Aurea Monteverde appearing as
buyer and listing eleven items as articles purchased;
8. Exhibit E-1 which is a certification of Luz Co, Manager of Sanford Hardware stating that Exhibit
E is not a genuine reproduction of the duplicate original;
9. Exhibit F (offered lately) is a xerox copy of Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991;
10. Exhibit G is a machine copy of an undated letter signed by Bella Evangelista authorizing
Antonio Araza to verify the authenticity of Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the sum
of P13,565.00
as well as witnesses Luz Co y Tan and Antonio Araza y Reposo.
"LUZ CO y TAN declared that she is the manager of Sanford Hardware since 1976, that Exhibit D-
1 which is [a] duplicate copy of Invoice No. 21568 dated July 2, 1981 where the amount of
purchase is only P157.00 is the invoice used by her firm in the conduct of its business; that
Exhibit E was not her receipt and that she executed a certification to that effect (Exhibit E-1)
when required by a male person; that she does not know the entries appearing in Exhibit E but
the entries in Exhibit D-1 are of her business; that Sanford Hardware is owned by [her] sister-in-
law Delia Co; that there are three copies of the sales invoice her business is issuing, and the third
copy or last copy is the one left in the store, and that the one who approached her and asked
about Exhibit E is one Narciso Cruz and when she answered that she did not issue Exhibit E she
was requested to execute an affidavit; that she does not know accused Aurea Monteverde and
that she had no delivery of hardware materials to the Barangay on January 17, 1991 (TSN May
14, 1993).
"It was the testimony of ANTONIO ARAZA that he is a resident of 2256 Malaya St., Balut, Tondo,
Manila and that he secured a copy of Exhibits E and F from the Barangay Treasurer; that he
brought the same to the owner of the Sanford Hardware for verification; that Luz Co to whom he
talked x x x in said store manifested that said Exhibits E and F are not issued by the firm; and for
which he requested Luz Co to issue a certification (Exhibit E-1); that after realizing that the
receipts used by the accused are falsified receipts, he signed letter complaints and [a] Joint-
Affidavit together with Santos Lopez, Narciso Cruz and Jose Salvatierra, and charged the accused
before the Ombudsman; that the money involved in this case are barangay funds because it was
donated by the PAGCOR to the Barangay and he was able to secure a copy from the PAGCOR
evidencing that it was donated to the Barangay but the copy was submitted to the Ombudsman;
that the Barangay Treasurer lent to him the receipts with the advice to verify it from the
proprietor of [the] Hardware and she even gave a letter of authorization to him (Exhibit G); that
the P13,565.00 appearing in Exhibits E and F was not used to buy electrical materials or
lightings, and the bulbs in the Meralco post were donated by Councilor Rene Jose (TSN March 18,
1994).
"EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED
"The defense presented eighty-one (81) Exhibits with Exhibits 35 to 80 dealing with certificates
of commendation in favor of the accused during her stint as Barangay Chairman from 1991 to
1993 and even prior to her being a Barangay Chairman. Exhibits 1 with its submarkings (Exhibits
1-A to Exhibits 1-A-3) is a letter of the accused addressed to Alice LI Reyes of the PAGCOR with
attachment she captioned Financial Statement; Exhibits 2 to 15 are Sales Invoices/Receipts from
different hardware stores and individuals while Exhibits 16 and 17 are pictures depicting a
basketball court portion thereof being sub-marked, and Exhibits 18 to 32 are fifteen (15) pictures
depicting different alleys at Barangay 124. Exhibit 33 is a turn-over certificate/record of the
Barangay properties signed by the incoming Barangay Chairman with the third page submarked
as Exhibits 33-A to 33-b-2; and Exhibit 34 is the counter-affidavit of the accused sworn to before
a Notary Public on September 5, 1991. Exhibit 81 is a Joint-Affidavit of Alfonso Cua Jr. and Joel
Magbanua.
"Aside from her, the accused presented ALFONSO CUA, JR. whose testimony is as follows: that he
knows the accused to be the Chairman of Barangay 124 from 1991 up to 1992 while he was a
Barangay Tanod in the said Barangay; that one project of the accused was the installation of
lights or lighting the streets and playgrounds in the Barangay; that in January 1991 materials
were delivered to the house of the Barangay Chairman (accused) and around three (3) days
thereafter, he helped in the installation of the electrical materials consisting of electrical wirings,
electrical tapes, bulbs, lamps and lamp covers, and it took them (he and the husband of the
accused) about three Sundays in doing so; that he executed a Joint-Affidavit together with one
Joel Magbanua in connection with the incident (Exhibit 81) (TSN April 2, 1997).
"Testifying in her behalf accused took the witness stand and declared:
That she was the Barangay Chairman in Brgy. 124 since 1989 to 1994; that in January 1991 she
received donation or cash money in the amount of P44,800.00 from PAGCOR which she used in
Barangay projects like lighting, and cleanliness and beautification; that she reported the matter
to PAGCOR and submitted [a] financial statement (Exhibits 1 to 1-A, 1-A-1); that when she
purchased electrical and hardware items from Sanford Hardware she was issued a receipt
(Exhibit 9) and considering Exhibit D-1 and D-1-A, it would appear that Sanford Hardware issued
two (2) receipts; she denied the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents,
and claimed that with the meager amount involved, she is not going to sacrifice her good name
and reputation; she then identified x x x several awards she received (Exhibits 35 to 79); that she
was the one who personally purchased the items in Exhibit F, and she actually paid the same in
cash for which she was issued Exhibit 9 (Exhibit F and 9 contain the same items); that the receipt
was issued in her name and the money was in her possession that was why it was she and not
the Barangay Treasurer who personally made the purchase; that the PAGCOR check was issued in
her name and was directly given to her and so she was the one who encashed the check
accompanied by one of the councilors but she did not turn over the cash to the treasurer; that
even after she came to know of the existence of Exhibit E, she did not go to Sanford Hardware to
inquire about the said document; that the original of the said exhibit was given to her but she
submitted it to PAGCOR. (TSN September 3, November 5, 1996 and April 1, 1997)."9
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The assailed Decision noted that petitioner was supposed to have been charged with the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. However, there was no
clear allegation in the Information that the falsification was a necessary means to commit the
estafa.10 Nevertheless, going along "with the supposition" that a complex crime had been
charged, the SBN held:
"Despite the ambiguity and disquietude, however, the court is constrained to go with the
supposition that what has been charged is that of a complex crime, otherwise the logical
consequence is that the accused has been indicted with two crimes - that of Estafa and that of
Falsification of Commercial Document which is not beneficial to her."11
The anti-graft court acquitted petitioner of estafa, because there was no evidence that funds had
been misappropriated or converted.12 Neither was there proof that petitioner had been required
to account for the money received.13 Without these proofs, no conviction for estafa was
possible.14
However, the court a quo convicted her for allegedly falsifying the document she had submitted
to show that the P13,565 donated by PAGCOR was used and spent for lighting materials for her
barangay. According to the SBN, the falsification became very clear when the document was
compared with another one purporting to be a duplicate original presented by the prosecution.15
While the prosecution did not present any proof evidencing that it was petitioner who had caused
the falsification, the SBN relied on the presumption that in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation, a person who is found in possession of a forged document, and who uses it, is the
forger.16
Nevertheless, petitioner was not convicted of falsification as defined by Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, because there was no proof that she had taken advantage of her position in
committing the crime.17 Instead, she was convicted of falsification under Article 172.18
Hence, this Petition.19
Issues
The OSGs Memorandum which recommended acquittal, and which petitioner adopted, raised the
following issues:
"Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in:
[1.] finding petitioner guilty of falsification despite its finding that no estafa was committed[;]
[2.] holding that Exhibit 9, a sales invoice, was a commercial/public document[; and]
[3.] applying the presumption that petitioner was the author of falsification in the absence of any
proof that she benefited from it."20
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Nature of Complex Crimes
Appellant was purportedly charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a
commercial document. However, even if the SBN itself doubted whether the Information had
properly charged a complex crime, it was, as quoted earlier, "constrained to go along with the
supposition that what has been charged is that of a complex crime, otherwise the logical
consequence is that the accused has been indicted with two crimes -- that of Estafa and that of
Falsification of Commercial Document which is not beneficial to her."21
We clarify. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,22 a complex crime refers to (1) the
commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a
single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for committing the other (or others).23
Negatively put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are committed, but not
by a single act; or (2) committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the other
(or others).24
Using the above guidelines, the acts attributed to petitioner in the present case cannot
constitute a complex crime. Specifically, her alleged actions showing falsification of a public
and/or a commercial document were not necessary to commit estafa. Neither were the two
crimes the result of a single act. The OSG correctly observed:
"x x x. The alleged falsification happened after the money was spent and to explain how it was
expended. Thus there is no complex crime since the falsification is not a necessary means for
committing the estafa (as charged) or malversation (as suggested by Sandiganbayan in its Order
dated February 1, 2000). If at all, it was intended to conceal the estafa or malversation."25
Well-known is the principle that an information "must charge only one offense, except when the
law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses."26 When more than one offense is
charged, the accused may move to quash the information.27
In the present case, the accused should have objected to the Information on the ground that
more than one offense was charged therein. For her failure to move to quash the indictments,
she is deemed to have waived her right to be tried for only one crime.28 Furthermore, she did
not object to the submission of evidence that tended to prove the offenses charged in the
Information -- estafa and falsification. Verily, when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information, but the accused fail to object to the defect before trial, the trial court
may convict them of as many offenses as are charged and proven, and impose on them the
penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each.29
On the basis of the foregoing, we reject the argument of petitioner that since she was acquitted
of estafa, she could no longer be convicted of falsification of a commercial document. Having, in
effect, been charged with two distinct crimes, acquittal in one will not necessarily lead to
acquittal in the other. Each crime will be evaluated based on its own merits, and conviction will
depend on the proof of the elements of each particular offense.
Let us assume that petitioner has correctly been charged with a complex crime, as the SBN
supposed. Still, acquittal from a component offense will not necessarily lead to an acquittal from
the other (or others).
When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is axiomatic that
the prosecution must allege in the information and prove during the trial all the elements of all
the offenses constituting the complex crime.
We stress that the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the component crimes and the
acquittal arising therefrom will not necessarily lead to a declaration of innocence for the other
crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to
establish one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the others, so long
as they are proved.30
Second Issue:
Nature of Sales Invoice
The OSG agrees that the subject Sales Invoice is a public and/or a commercial document within
the meaning of "falsification" as defined under the Revised Penal Code.
Both the OSG and the OSP agree that a private document acquires the character of a public
document when it becomes part of an official record and is certified by a public officer duly
authorized by law.31 The OSP aptly explained this point as follows:
"x x x, [I]f the document is intended by law to be part of the public or official record, the
preparation of which being in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the
government, the falsification of that document, although it was a private document at the time of
its falsification, is regarded as falsification of public or official document.
"Prosecution witness Luz Co testified that the duplicate original of Sales Invoice No. 21568 was
submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Thus this Sales Invoice is intended to be part
of the public records and the preparation thereof is required by BIR rules and regulations.
Moreover, Sales Invoice No. 21568 formed part of the official records of PAGCOR when it was
submitted by petitioner as one of the supporting papers for the liquidation of her accountability
to PAGCOR."32
Neither can it be denied that the Sales Invoice is also a commercial document. Commercial
documents or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade
or credit transactions.33 This Court has previously characterized such documents in this wise:
"x x x. In most cases, these commercial forms [receipts, order slips and invoices] are not always
fully accomplished to contain all the necessary information describing the whole business
transaction. The sales clerks merely indicate a description and the price of each item sold
without bothering to fill up all the available spaces in the particular receipt or invoice, and
without proper regard for any legal repercussion for such neglect. Certainly, it would not hurt if
businessmen and traders would strive to make the receipts and invoices they issue complete, as
far as practicable, in material particulars. These documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft
of probative value but vital pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They are written
memorials of the details of the consummation of contracts."34 (Italics supplied)
Third Issue:
Proof of Guilt
The gut issue in this case is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of petitioner with regard to the crime of falsification. A determination of this question
will necessarily require an examination of the facts as presented before the Sandiganbayan.
As a rule, an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises only questions of
law.35 However, this Court, in exceptional cases, has taken cognizance of questions of fact in
order to resolve legal issues. This is especially true in cases in which a palpable error or a grave
misapprehension of facts was committed by the lower court.36 Criminal cases elevated by public
officials from the SBN deserve the same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal cases
brought up by ordinary citizens, simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence
must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt in both instances. Indeed, in a criminal
case, a persons life or liberty is at stake.37
Petitioner asserts that the SBN erroneously applied the presumption that the possessor of a
forged or falsified document who uses it is the author of the forgery or falsification. The OSG
concurs with her on this point. That is why it recommended that she be acquitted.
We agree. To our mind, the prosecutions evidence is not sufficient to convict. As correctly
observed by the OSG, the Decision of the SBN is based on the assumption that there was only
one set of sales invoices issued by Sanford Hardware. On such a premise, petitioners Exhibit 9
thus becomes obviously falsified when compared with respondents Exhibit D-1. But on the
premise that the two Exhibits are two different Sales Invoices, falsification becomes doubtful. The
OSG is correct in observing as follows:
"x x x. For petitioner or anybody acting on her behalf to falsify the customers copy of Sales
Invoice No. 21568, she/he would have to erase or cover with correction fluid the spaces
pertaining to the name of the customer, date, quantity, unit, description of articles, unit price
and amount, before the insertions could be written. Neither the appealed decision nor the
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) point out various tell-tale signs of falsification despite
opportunity of the prosecution to see the original of Exh. 9. The only observation the respondent
Court mentioned was with respect to the date: [t]he superimposition of January 17, 1991 is too
apparent to be disregarded, and the alteration of the date has affected both the veracity and the
effects of the said document. But the changing of the date was the easiest to accomplish. The
more cumbersome, as they affect wider space, would [have been] the name of the customer and
the purchases. The total absence of any hint or sign of alteration on these areas is revealing."38
The only logical explanation for the existence of both Exhibits 9 and D- 1 is that there are two
extant documents. Whether one is the original and the other is falsified depends on the proof.
This the prosecution had to prove, but unfortunately failed to. In all criminal prosecutions,
without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt remains with the prosecution.39
Further, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove each and every element of the crime charged in
the information.40 We repeat that, in this case, it failed to discharge this duty. We quote with
approval the OSGs disquisition on these two documents as follows:
"A comparison between Exh. D-1 and Exh. 9 shows that there are two (2) sets of Sales Invoice
No. 21568. While the form is identical in most respects, there are three (3) telling differences: (1)
the type set of the sales invoice numbers are different, (2) the bottom left of Exh. D-1 indicates
the name of the printing press while no such information is indicated anywhere in Exh. 9, and (3)
the bottom right of Exh. D-1 states the BIR permit which does not appear in Exh. 9. Who could
have printed Exh. 9 is anybodys guess. It is possible that petitioner or any person acting on her
behalf had a printing company copy this particular Sanford Hardware invoice so she could use it
to liquidate the PAGCOR funds she received. However, it is equally possible that Sanford
Hardware had printed two (2) sets of the same receipts, one to reflect the real business
transaction, the other one - a sanitized version - for the consumption of the BIR people. Not one
of these possibilities has been actually proven, but neither was their improbability
established."41 (Italics supplied)
Indeed, the OSG points out that there are material differences between Exhibits 9 and D-1. These
include: 1) the discrepancy in the "type set" or fonts used for the sales invoice numbers in the
two Sales Invoices; 2) the presence of the name of the printing press at the bottom left corner of
Exhibit D-1 and its absence in Exhibit 9; and 3) the presence of the BIR permit in Exhibit D-1 and
its absence in Exhibit 9. It is possible that Exhibit 9 was printed by petitioner or anyone acting on
her behalf to facilitate the liquidation of funds. But it is equally possible, as the OSG points out,
that Sanford Hardware caused the printing of two sets of receipts to serve its own purposes.
However, none of these possibilities was either actually proven or definitely ruled out by the
prosecution. At bottom, there is no clear and convincing evidence to prove that Exhibit 9 was
falsified.
The SBN relied on the settled rule that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one found in
possession of -- and who used, took advantage of or profited from -- a forged or falsified
document is the author of the falsification and is therefore guilty of falsification.
To convict petitioner of falsification would mean that the prosecution was able to establish that
Exhibit 9 was a falsified copy of an original document. But the rule itself shows that it cannot be
applied to the present case, because Exhibit 9 (Sales Invoice No 21568) was not established
beyond reasonable doubt to have been forged or falsified. At the very least, it may be a second
document that may or may not have been printed by petitioner herself.
Respondent claims that the original document is Exhibit D-1 but, as adverted to earlier, Exhibit 9
was not satisfactorily demonstrated to be a copy thereof. In other words, Exhibit 9 being different
from Exhibit D-1, the prosecution cannot be deemed to have presented an original document, of
which Exhibit 9 is a falsified copy.
The question is: who made this second document marked Exhibit 9? Petitioner consistently
maintains that Exhibit 9 was issued to her by Sanford Hardware when she purchased the items
mentioned therein. On the other hand, the manager of Sanford Hardware denies having issued
such document. Indeed, it is a time-honored principle42 that greater probative value is accorded
to a positive than to a negative testimony. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by the OSG:
"x x x [Petitioner] denied the accusation and insisted that she would not sacrifice her name and
reputation for the meager amount involved. She submitted photographs that the lighting of
alleys in Barangay 124 was completed. There was positive testimony by Alfonso Cua, one of the
persons who installed the articles listed in Sales Invoice No. 21568. The prosecution failed to
rebut these."43 (Citations omitted)
One final point. The SBN held that the "accused refused to present the original of Exhibit 9," and
that it would have been so "easy x x x to ask for a subpoena to direct x x x the PAGCOR to
produce the original copy, and yet the accused satisfied herself in presenting Exhibit 9 -- a mere
xerox copy of the supposed document." But, as pointed out by the OSG in its Memorandum,44
the original of Exhibit 9 was presented in court during the November 5, 1996 hearing after a
subpoena duces tecum had been issued to PAGCOR, and Prosecutor Pimentel "confirmed that the
x x x xerox copies are faithful reproductions of the original."45
In all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute for proof in establishing the guilt of the
accused.46 Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where there is
reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have
been established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of
long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a
matter of right.47
Although the evidence for the defense may be frail, criminal conviction must come, not from its
weakness, but from the strength of that for the prosecution.48
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution SET ASIDE.
Petitioner is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113804 January 16, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SERGIO BATO and ABRAHAM BATO, accused,
ABRAHAM BATO, accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of an eyewitness, the guilt of an accused may be established by circumstantial
evidence. Such evidence, however, must still pass the test of moral certainty. When inadequate
and uncorroborated, circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction. Specifically, where the
state's evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the
guilt of the accused, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.
The Case
This postulate is applied by this Court in reversing the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 finding
Sergio and Abraham Bato guilty of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.
In an Information dated July 7, 1989, Leyte Provincial Prosecutor Joventino P. Isidro charged the
brothers Bato with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of May, 1988 in the Municipality of Pastrana, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound one Ernesto Flores, Sr. with deadly
weapons locally known as "sundang" which the accused had provided themselves for the
purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon said Ernesto Flores, Sr. several wounds on the
different parts of his body which wounds caused his death. 2
Contrary to law.
On January 15, 1990, the accused were arraigned in the Waray dialect which they understood
and spoke. Assisted by Counsel Benjamin Pore, both pleaded not guilty. 3 After due trial, the trial
court 4 rendered a decision, 5 the dispositve portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds each of the accused Abraham and Sergio, both surnamed "Bato"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. With the abolition of the capital punishment in the 1987 Constitution, the
penalty of Murder should now be Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion
Perpetua. In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the penalty imposable is in its medium
period or from EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY TO TWENTY (20)
YEARS.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are each imposed the penalty of TEN (10) YEARS
AND ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Mayor as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by law,
to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Ernesto Flores, Sr. in the sum of
P50,000 and to pay the corresponding costs. 6
Both accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On January 26, 1994, the said Court promulgated
the assailed Decision affirming their guilt and increasing the penalty to reclusion perpetua in
view of this Court's rulings in People vs. Benitez, Jr. 7 and People vs. Muoz 8. Pursuant to Section
13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, 9 the appellate court, instead of entering judgment, certified
the case to the Supreme Court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, since the crime for which the appellants were charged, tried and convicted is
Murder, the penalty provided for by law is reclusion perpetua, within the power of the Supreme
Court to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari (sec. 5-(2)-(d), Art. 8,
1987 Const.), this criminal case is hereby certified to the Supreme Court. 10
In a Resolution dated June 29, 1994, this Court First Division) informed the parties that they may
file additional briefs. Conformably, the parties complied with said Resolution within the extended
period granted them. 11
On July 28, 1994, during the pendency of the appeal, Sergio Bato died at the Leyte Regional
Prison due to cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to acute beriberi. 12 Death before a final
judgment extinguishes both the criminal and the civil liability (ex delicto) of an accused. 13
Hence, this Decision pertains only to the appeal of Abraham Bato.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely: Ernesto Flores, Jr., 14 son of the victim, and
Dr. Virisimo Opiniano 15 who conducted the autopsy. The prosecution's version of the facts was
summarized by the solicitor general as follows:
On May 9, 1988 at about three o'clock in the afternoon, Ernesto Flores, Jr. together with his father
Ernesto Flores, Sr., were going home from Barangay Tingib, Pastrana, Leyte to San Agustin, Jaro,
Leyte. While passing by Barangay Hibucawan, they were called by the two appellants, Abraham
and Sergio, both surnamed Bato, to join them in a drinking spree in the house of Paran Lescabo,
which Ernesto, Sr. accepted. Ernesto, Jr. sat about two (2) meters away from his father while the
latter joined appellants for two hours drinking tuba. When his father was already drunk,
appellants tied him (father) with his hands placed at the back. Later, he saw appellants bring his
father to somewhere else. Seeing his father being held, he ran away, as he was afraid he would
also be taken by appellants (tsn, 6-18-90, pp. 3-10).
It was only the following morning that they found his father already dead at the Binaha-an River,
five kilometers away from the place where he last saw him in the previous afternoon. He
immediately reported the incident to the Barangay Captain of Barangay Tingib. The latter
informed the police department about the incident. Many policemen responded and the dead
body of his father was brought to the Municipal Building of Pastrana, Leyte (tsn, 6-18-0, pp. 10-
11).
At the Municipal Building of Pastrana, Leyte, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Virisimo Opiniano,
conducted the autopsy on the body of the deceased Ernesto Flores, Sr. He found that the
deceased sustained five hacking and seven stab wounds. The cause of death is shock, secondary
to a hacking and almost decapitating wound (Exhibit "A" and "B"). 16
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the accused raised the defense of denial. They maintained that their
identification as the alleged perpetrators of Ernesto's murder was merely an afterthought,
necessitated by a dearth of strong evidence on the part of the prosecution. They presented as
witness Pfc. Benjamin Montanejos, 17 who affirmed that the entry he made in the police blotter
18 did not mention the accused as suspects in the crime. He further testified that it was the
barangay captain who reported the incident to the police, contradicting Ernesto Jr. who claimed
that he did so. 19
Ruling of the Trial and the Appellate Courts
The trial court ruled that the prosecution witness, Ernesto Jr., positively identified the accused
who invited him and his father for a drink. He witnessed how they tied the hands of Ernesto Sr.
before they took him away. That the police blotter failed to state the names of the assailants did
not negate appellant's participation in the slaying. Further, the entry was based on the
information relayed not by the witness himself but by the barangay chairman, who had not
witnessed the incident. 20 The trial court further appreciated the aggravating circumstance of
treachery.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court and further declared that the totality of
the prosecution evidence "constitute[d] more than sufficient incriminatory and inculpatory
circumstances" to reach the conclusion that the appellants killed the victim. The appellate court
declared:
Ernesto's testimony is clear. He pointed to and positively identified Abraham Bato and Sergio
Bato as the persons who invited his father to drink with them while he and his father passed by
Barangay Hibucawan. His father accepted the invitation and[,] with them for two hours[,] drank
tuba at the house of Lescabo. All the while, Ernesto sat there about two meters away from his
father. He saw his father drunk, and, under that condition, also saw Abraham and Sergio tied [sic]
his father's hand with a rope and placed [sic] them at the back, then they brought him away with
them, to what direction, "I do not know because I ran as I was also afraid" as "they might bring
me also." He learned of his father's death on the following day, that they found him at the
Binaha-an River, about 5 kilometers away from the house of Paran Lescabo. Ernesto added on
cross-examination that after his father was taken by the duo, he went homeward, arrived there
at about 6:00 p.m., told the incident to his mother, then they slept and that "it was only the
following morning when they look [sic] for his father"; that he and his mother reported the
incident to the Barangay Captain of Tingib, and together with barangay captain, they found his
father dead at the Binaha-an River, and then they reported the incident to the police authorities.
21
Like the trial court, the appellate court found that Ernesto Jr. "positively identified" the Bato
brothers as the killers of his father could not have been mistaken, as he had known them long
before the commission of the offense, a fact not rebutted by the defense.
The Court of Appeals further opined that it was a natural human behavior for Ernesto Jr. to get
frightened and to wait for daybreak before looking for his father and reporting the incident to the
authorities. The appellate court noted that it was nighttime when Ernesto Jr. reached home, and
that he did not know where to look for his father.
Assignment of Errors
In their brief 22 before the Court of Appeals, the accused assigned the following errors: 23
I. The lower court erred in finding that there was positive identification of the accused-appellants.
II. The lower court erred in finding that accused-appellants employed treachery in the
commission of the offense.
In his additional brief 24 submitted before this Court, Appellant Abraham Bato further contends
that the appellate tribunal gravely erred in increasing to reclusion perpetua the penalty imposed
by the trial court.
This Court's Ruling
Pursuant to the doctrine that appeals involving reclusion perpetua are subject to a review de
novo, this Court pored over the entire records of both lower courts and concluded, after careful
deliberation, that the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. The circumstantial evidence adduced
by the prosecution fails to evoke moral certainty that appellant is guilty.
Circumstantial Evidence Palpably Insufficient
The conviction of Appellant Abraham Bato is based on circumstantial evidence gleaned from the
sole testimony of the son of the deceased. True, in the absence of direct proof, a conviction may
be based on circumstantial evidence, 25 but to warrant such conviction, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 26
Hence, it has been held that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion, to the exclusion of any other, that the accused are guilty. The
circumstances proved must be concordant with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is guilty and, at the same time, inconsistent with any hypothesis other than that of
guilt. 27 As a corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and
every hypothesis consistent with his
innocence. 28
Prosecution's Main
Evidence Circumstantial
Aside from the doctor who conducted the post mortem examination on the cadaver of the
deceased, the only other witness for the prosecution was Ernesto Jr., who testified mainly as
follows: 29
Q What happened since you said you were at Tingib at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May
9, 1988?
A When we passed by Hibucawon, they called my father for a drink.
Q This Brgy. Hibucawon belongs to what municipality?
A Jaro, Leyte.
PROSECUTOR DAGANDAN:
Q You said that they called your father, who is this "they" you referred to?
A Abe Bato and Sergio Bato.
Q Where were Abraham Bato and Sergio Bato when they called your father?
A They were drinking in the house of Paran.
Q Do you know the real name of this Paran?
A I only know him as Paran.
Q What is his family name?
A Loscabo.
Q Where is this house of Paran Loscabo located?
A Barangay Hibucawon, Jaro, Leyte.
Q In what manner was your father called by Abe Bato and Sergio Bate?
A They called my father to a drink.
Q What did your father do?
A He approached Sergio Bato and Abe Bato, and he drank because he was offered to drink.
Q Where were you when your father was called by Sergio Bato and Abe Bato?
A I was near.
PROSECUTOR DAGANDAN:
Q Where were you when your father was called, at what distance were you to your father?
A About two (2) meters (from the witness stand).
Q Did you come to know if there were other persons present aside from your father and the two
accused?
A Yes, but I do not know them.
Q Approximately, how many persons were present who were gathered?
A They were many persons.
Q Approximately, how many?
A More than ten (10).
Q Since you said you were near your father when you approached them, what did Abraham Bato
and Sergio Bato got to do with your father when your father approached them?
A They first offered my father a drink.
Q Whay drink was offered?
A Tuba.
Q Did your father accept the offer?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q For how long did he stay in that group?
A He stayed long.
Q How about you, where did you stay while your father was drinking?
A I was at a certain distance but I did not get near them.
Q At about what time did the drinking spree last?
A Two (2) hours.
Q After two hours, what happened, if any?
A When my father was already drank, they tied my father.
Q Who tied your father?
A Abe Bato and Sergio Bato.
Q With what object or material was your father tied?
A Rope.
Q How was your father tied with the rope?
A They tied him with a rope and both hands were placed at the back.
Q After that, what happened?
A They brought my father.
Q Who is this "they" who brought your father?
A Abe Bato and Sergio Bato.
Q How did you come to know that your father was brought somewhere?
A I saw them bringing my father.
Q To what directions was your father brought?
A I do not know because I ran away as I was afraid.
Q Immediately before you ran away, where was your father.
A They were bringing and holding my father.
Q You said you were afraid, why were you afraid?
A I was afraid because they might bring me also.
Q Did you come to know what happened to your father?
A I learned the following day that my father died because they brought him.
In sum, therefore, the witness established only the following circumstances surrounding the
crime: (1) that the Bato brothers invited the victim and his son for a drink; (2) that after two
hours of drinking, said brothers suddenly tied the hands of the older Flores and took him away;
and (3) that the following day, the body of the victim, which sustained several hack and stab
wounds, was recovered at the Binaha-an River, about five kilometers away from where he was
last seen by the witness.
After a careful perusal of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we believe that appellant's
authorship of the crime was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Lapses in the
Prosecution Evidence
Ernesto Jr. admitted that there was no enmity or bad blood between his father and the accused.
He further asserted that there was no altercation during the drinking spree. Likewise, he made no
statement that the Bato brothers, at the time, earned any bladed weapon which could have been
used in his father's murder. Moreover, he did not see where the appellants brought his father
after they had tied his hands. More significantly, he failed to testify on how his father was killed,
who, killed him, or even when he was killed. These lacunae in the prosecution account
necessarily spawn doubts in the mind of a reasonable person. Because the appellants tied the
victim's hands, can it be inferred that they intended to kill him, and actually killed him? Where
did the accused take him? What happened between the time the accused tied the victim and the
following morning when his lifeless body was found? There is absolutely no evidence of what
transpired during that interval. The prosecution, in effect, asked the courts merely to guess or to
surmise that the accused must have killed the victim during such interregnum. But conjectures,
surmises and suspicions cannot take the place of evidence, particularly where as in this case
contrary suspicions, surmises queries can also be floated and believed.
It is also noteworthy that Ernesto Jr. did not attempt to attract the attention of other people who
were nearby at the time, or to seek their aid. Instead, he ran home and related the events to his
mother. Oddly, he hand his mother reacted not by reporting the matter to the police, or even just
to their barangay chairman, their council members or their neighbors. They simply slept the
night away!
Notwithstanding the presence of other persons who were nearby when the appellants tied the
hands of the victim, the prosecution failed to present any other witnesses to corroborate Ernesto
Jr.'s testimony. As it was, his testimony was grossly insufficient and sorely in need of
corroboration. It has been held that circumstantial evidence which has not been adequately
established, much less corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction. 30
Comparable Cases
In People vs. Roluna, 31 the trial court's conviction of the appellant for kidnapping with murder
was based merely on the testimonies of two witnesses one of whom allegedly saw the
appellant tie the hands of the victim before taking him away, and the other purportedly saw the
victim walking with hands tied and the appellant following him. Declaring that the said
circumstances were insufficient to convict the appellant, this Court held that the "conviction of
accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to rest on
the vague and nebulous facts established by the prosecution. . . [T]he evidence presented by the
prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish the
alleged liability of accused-appellant for the death of Moronia."
In People vs. Argawanon, 32 appellant therein was charged and convicted of murder by the trial
court. In acquitting the appellant, the Court explained:
Furthermore, if indeed the two (2) Castro brothers were watching the cockfight when the alleged
four (4) persons attacked Pat. Castro, it is quite difficult to comprehend that, considering that he
(witness) was only six (6) meters away from his brother, nothing was done to him as he was able
to run and hide. It seems out of the ordinary that the assailants, allegedly, two (2) of them armed
with .45 caliber pistols would let Jennis Castro (an eye witness to the killing) loose and not put
him out of the way. It is also quite unbelievable that despite his said distance, he (Jennis Castro)
was able to identify the accused-appellant and was able to hear one of the assailants shout . . . .
In addition to the above extrajudicial statements of Jennis Castro, the trial court considered the
following circumstantial evidence in convicting the appellant Lambujon, to with: his presence at
the house of one of the accused during the raid, the revolver of Pat. Castro which was allegedly
found in accused-appellant's possession during the raid; positive testimony of Jennis Castro that
the one who fired the second shot was the one wearing a blue T-shirt. We do not agree with the
trial court's conclusion that the aforecited evidence are corroborative of Jennis Castro's
incriminating testimony against the accused-appellant. Circumstantial evidence may be
characterized as that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue
may be established by inference. This Court cannot infer from said evidence, the identity of the
victim's assailant nor the actual participation of the appellant Lambujon in the crime charged. 33
In People vs. Ragon, 34 there was no actual witness to the killing of a tricycle driver, but
appellant therein, with two others, was identified as the last passenger of the victim before the
cadaver was found hours later. Relying on purely circumstantial evidence, the trial court
convicted the appellant of murder. On appeal, this Court acquitted him. Holding that there was
no sufficient evidence to establish his actual participation in the killing, we concluded:
Circumstantial evidence is akin to a tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when
interwoven, and cannot be plucked out and considered one strand at a time independently of the
others. If the picture does not point to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, conviction based thereon will not weather judicial scrutiny. A painstaking
review of the records of this case convinces us that the story pieced together by the trial court
from the evidence of the prosecution provides no moral certainty of appellant's guilt. . . . 35
Presumption of Innocence
Not Overturned
In the instant case, the totality of the prosecution evidence does not constitute an unbroken
chain leading, beyond reasonable doubt, to the guilt of the accused.
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. 36 Where the state fails to meet the quantum of proof required
to overcome the constitutional presumption, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, regardless of
the weakness or even the absence of his defense. 37 By constitutional fiat, the burden of proof is
accordingly vested in the prosecution. 38
In acquitting the herein appellant, this Court is not decreeing the did not participate in the killing.
It is merely ruling that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to overturn the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Abraham Bato is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. His RELEASE from
confinement is immediately ORDERED, unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
The director of prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five days from receipt of this
Decision, of the actual date the appellant is released. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139180 July 31, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO RIVERA, accused- appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a review pursuant to Rule 122, 10 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the decision,1
dated June 22, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, finding accused-
appellant Rolando Rivera guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to
pay the offended party, Erlanie Rivera, the sum of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The information against accused-appellant charged
That sometime in the month of March 1997, in barangay Santiago, municipality of Lubao,
province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused ROLANDO RIVERA, by means of violence, threat and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and maliciously succeeded in having carnal knowledge
[of] his 13 year old daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera, against the latters will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.2
When the information was read to him in the local dialect (Pampango) during his arraignment on
September 30, 1997, accused-appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged,3 whereupon trial was held.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Erlanie Rivera, her aunt, Marietta
Pagtalunan, and Dr. Demetria Barin, who conducted the physical examination of complainant.
Complainant Erlanie Rivera testified that sometime in March 1997, her younger sister, Zaira,4
was taken by their parents to the Escolastica Romero Memorial Hospital in Lubao, Pampanga.
Complainants mother stayed with her sister in the hospital, but her father, herein accused-
appellant, went back home to Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga. At around 11 oclock in the evening of
the same day, complainant was awakened as accused-appellant started kissing her and fondling
her breasts. Complainant tried to resist by kicking and pushing accused-appellant, but her efforts
were to no avail. Accused-appellant removed her shorts and panty, touched her private parts,
and then had sexual intercourse with her. After he was through with her, accused-appellant told
complainant not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill complainants mother and
sister. Hence, when her mother came home the following day, Erlanie did not tell her what had
happened because she was afraid of accused-appellant.
On April 9, 1997, however, Erlanie, in the presence of her mother, told her aunt, Marietta
Pagtalunan, and her grandmother, Maxima Payumo, that she had been raped by accused-
appellant. For this reason, she was referred to Dr. Barin for physical examination. She also
executed a sworn statement before the police of Lubao, Pampanga.5
Erlanie testified that she became pregnant as a result of the rape committed against her by
accused-appellant, but the pregnancy was aborted.6 On cross-examination, she said she was 13
years old at the time of her testimony, the second child in the family. She said that her parents
were not on good terms with each other and that she knew that her father had a mistress. Atty.
Mangalindan, then defense counsel, questioned Erlanie about other supposed acts of molestation
committed by accused-appellant against her previous to the rape subject of the present case,
but, upon objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the question on the ground that
it concerned matters not covered by her direct examination.7
Erlanie testified that her mother, grandmother, aunt, and a certain Nora Baluyut were present
when she made her sworn statement before the police. She said that her father raped her only
once, sometime in March 1997. She could not remember the exact date when she was raped by
accused-appellant, but she did remember that the same took place in March as her sister, Zaira,
was hospitalized at the time. When the rape occurred, her younger brother and sister were in
their house asleep. She did not tell her mother after the latter had returned home that she had
been raped by accused-appellant because she was afraid of her father who had threatened her.
After the rape, accused-appellant would only come home on Sundays.8
Questioned further on cross-examination, Erlanie said that she gave her sworn statement before
the police and that her answers to questions asked during her direct examination were freely
given without coaching by anyone. She could understand Tagalog, the language used in her
sworn statement. She told the court that she struggled against accused-appellant, kicking and
pushing him, but she was overpowered by her father. At that time, Erlanies younger sister,
Corazon, was lying beside her, but Erlanie did not shout even when her father succeeded in
penetrating her. Erlanie could not remember how long the sexual act took place, but she felt
something like urine come out of her fathers penis after he was finished with her. Erlanie
testified that she was 12 years old when she was raped by her father.9
On re-direct examination, when asked about the discrepancy between her testimony that her
mother returned home only the day after the rape and her statement in her affidavit that
accused-appellant slept beside her mother after the rape, Erlanie replied that she made a
mistake as the incident narrated in her affidavit referred to a different occasion when no rape
was committed against her by accused-appellant.10
The next witness for the prosecution was Marietta Pagtalunan, complainants aunt and the sister
of complainants mother, Evangeline. Marietta corroborated Erlanies testimony that the latter
told her sometime in April 1997 that she had been raped by accused-appellant. Marietta said she
took complainant to Dr. Barin, who examined complainant.11
Dr. Demetria Barin was Chief Physician of the Escolastica Romero District Hospital. Her findings
are as follows:
P.E. FINDINGS:
- No signs of external Physical Injuries
I.E. FINDINGS:
HYMEN - healed laceration at 3:00 oclock
VAGINA - Admits one finger with ease two fingers with difficulty
UTERUS - not enlarged
LMP - March 3, 1997
Pregnancy Test (+)12
Dr. Barin testified that on April 10, 1997, she examined complainant Erlanie Rivera and found
that the victim had an injury in the hymen at the 3 oclock position which could possibly have
been caused by the insertion of a hard object, such as a male organ. Dr. Barin testified that
complainant Erlanie went back to see her on May 2, 1997 because she suffered from vaginal
bleeding indicative of a threatened abortion. She said that she found that complainant was then
pregnant. Upon examination of the patient at that time, Dr. Barin found that abortion had not yet
taken place and prescribed medicines for the complainant. Erlanie was subjected to another
pregnancy test on May 13, 1997, but the result was negative. Dr. Barin stated that the vaginal
bleeding suffered by complainant could have caused the abortion of the fetus.13
Thereafter, the defense presented its evidence. Accused-appellant, his sister, Concepcion Sayo,
and Natividad Pinlac, Records Officer of the Escolastica Romero District Hospital, were presented
as witnesses.
Accused-appellant denied that he raped Erlanie Rivera. He alleged that the rape charge was filed
against him because his wife, Evangeline, had a paramour and resented him because he hurt
her. He explained that he saw his wife talking with another man in their house and beat her up
on April 1, 1997 because he heard that she had a lover. He also said that his wife was angry with
him because he had a mistress who stayed in their house for three weeks. He further stated that
his wifes relatives were likewise angry with him because he caused the lot owned by his father-
in-law in Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga to be registered in his name. He said that he was compelled
to sign a waiver of his rights over the land owned by his parents-in-law.14 The defense presented
a letter to accused-appellant written by his wife, who was asking him to sign a document so that
she could attend to it before he got out of prison.15
The defense also offered as evidence a document, designated as Waiver of Rights,16 signed by
accused-appellant, in which he acknowledged that he was a tenant of a parcel of land and that
he waived and voluntarily surrendered his right over the said landholding to the "SMPCI,"
recommending that a certain Ponciano Miguel be given the land to work on the same. The
document was identified by accused-appellant in open court. He said that Ponciano Miguel was a
first cousin of his wife and that he signed the document because his wifes relatives promised
him that he would get out of prison after signing the document.17
Another witness for the defense was Concepcion Sayo, accused-appellants sister, who testified
that in March 1997, accused-appellant lived with her family in Malawak, Bustos, Bulacan, to help
her husband operate a fishpond. She said that accused-appellant stayed in their house during
the entire month of March, except in March 19, 1997 when he stayed with their sister, Perla, in
Tibagan, Bustos, Bulacan.18
The last defense witness was Natividad Pinlac, Records Officer of the Escolastica Romero District
Hospital, who identified19 a certification, dated April 29, 1999, in which it was stated that Zaira
Rivera was confined at that hospital from March 1 to March 2, 1997.20
On June 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, the court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
as charged. For having violated Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act 7659, with the attendant circumstances that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is the father of the victim and absent any circumstance that could mitigate the
commission thereof, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death by
lethal injection.
In line with established jurisprudence, said accused is also ordered to indemnify the offended
party Erlanie Rivera in the sum of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.21
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
1. The lower court failed to observe the constitutional right of the Accused-Appellant to due
process and right to counsel;
2. The lower court failed to consider the evidence of the Accused-Appellant.22
I. Accused-appellant invokes his right to due process of law. He claims that he was denied the
same because: (a) the trial judge disallowed his lawyer from cross-examining Erlanie Rivera
concerning the latters sworn statements on the ground of irrelevance and immateriality; (b) the
trial court denied the motion made by accused-appellants counsel de oficio to postpone the
cross-examination of Dr. Barin, the examining physician, because of which the said counsel
consequently waived the cross-examination of Dr. Barin; (c) the judge propounded numerous
questions to accused-appellant during his cross-examination by the prosecutor; and (d) the trial
courts decision was promulgated just one day after accused-appellant submitted his
memorandum.
Procedural due process simply means that a person must be heard before he is condemned. The
due process requirement is a part of a persons basic rights, not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.23 Considering both the evidence and the law
applicable to this case, we hold that accused-appellant has been accorded his right to due
process.
A. One basis for accused-appellants contention that he was denied due process is the refusal of
the trial judge to allow Atty. Mangalindans questions concerning the other alleged acts of
molestation committed by accused-appellant against complainant. Accused-appellant argues
that no legal ground exists for the trial courts ruling.
The transcript of stenographic notes concerning this incident shows the following:
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Q You mentioned in your testimony that you were molested by your father since 1996.
COURT:
Are you referring to a chain of events because police station you are referring is something there
are two places this girl testified that she was raped, you referred to us Acts of Lasciviousness and
she did not testified about that, that is another case with another Court, we are only trying here
a rape case that is only they you never mention. Only on the matters that she testified (sic).
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
But this is also related to the rape case your Honor because I will confront it with another form of
a question.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Q Prior to this incident, were you molested by your father?
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:
Immaterial, your Honor, whatever acts w[ere] done by the accused is not a subject of the case at
bar.
COURT:
Let us confine [questioning] to the complaint at bar which is a rape case.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
This is related to the incident because we are here your Honor to prove, we are trying to discredit
her testimony. We will just direct our question touching on the direct examination.
COURT:
Only on the matters that she only testified that is only thing you can cross-examine. Only
matters testified which is only a rape case let us not dwell the Court knows there are other cases
Acts of Lasciviousness pending in the lower Court at the proper Court otherwise if I will allow you
to ask questions on other matters specially I know you are pinpointing the Acts of Lasciviousness
you are prolonging this case here (sic).
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
I am trying to discredit the witness as one where the credibility as witness here your Honor is
very important. I stated before our main cross-examination is the accused is not a plan in such
case, although I do sympathize (sic). We would like to propound question that will discredit her as
witness and a complainant not with her testimony alone. Our center of cross-examination is to
discredit her as complaining witness that is why our question may not be limited to be accepted
under the rule of cross-examination your Honor the cross-examination your Honor the cross-
examiner is not limited on the direct-testimony of the witness but he can propound questions
which may petition or destroy the credibility of the witness that is our view point (sic).
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:
We cannot dispute the right of accused to discredit or to adopt our credibility of our witness, but
it should be done in the proper way, not to ask immaterial questions which are not related.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
The rule for cross-examination insofar as to destroy the credibility of the witness is not only
limited to what the Honorable Fiscal we came approach of so many cross-examinations goes
allow your Honor under the rules of Court insofar as this case is related to the present case we
are trying, this is very related because even the witness I have transcript in my hand, testified
not only the rape case your Honor she had testified by direct-examination the preparatory acts
before the testimony of rape that she was been molested early, finger of the father, this were
testified through by the witness, it is here direct-testimony it is not limited (sic).
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:
Prior to this incident were you molested by your father, obviously your Honor the question is not
relevant.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Your Honor please Im very disagreeable (sic), I have not with me the transcript but I have read
that you [can] ask questions concerning the rape case.
COURT:
A question referring to events prior to the complaint at bar.24
The trial court later issued an order, dated December 9, 1997, the pertinent parts of which
provided:
After private complainant testified on direct-examination, counsel for accused attempted to
cross-examine her on matters relevant to the complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness which was
objected to by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Arturo G. Santos on the ground that private
complainant did not testify on that matter but limited her testimony on the rape case only.
Counsel for the accused argued that although that is correct nonetheless because [of] the sworn
statement executed by private complainant identified by said witness in her direct examination
and marked as Exhibit "C" for the prosecution, he is at liberty to cross-examine the witness on all
matters stated in her sworn statement including that portion touching on the acts of
lasciviousness subject matter of another case before another court.
The Court sustained the objection. Section 6, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence provides that
"the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy
and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts
bearing upon the issue."
The witness testified only on the rape case. She did not testify anything about acts of
lasciviousness committed upon her person. She may not therefore be questioned on this matter
because it is not connected with her direct testimony or has any bearing upon the issue. To allow
adverse party to cross-examine the witness on the acts of lasciviousness which is pending trial in
another court and which the witness did not testify is improper.
Questions concerning acts of lasciviousness will not in any way test the accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or the reverse. On the contrary such questions, if
allowed, will unduly burden the court with immaterial testimonies.25
In another order, dated January 13, 1998, the trial court gave accused-appellants counsel 20
days within which to elevate its ruling to the appellate court.26 The records reveal, however, that
no such petition was filed by Atty. Mangalindan as regards this particular matter.
The question, therefore, is whether the trial court correctly disallowed accused-appellants
counsel from questioning complainant as regards the other supposed acts of lasciviousness
contained in her sworn statement. On this point, Rule 132, 6 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the
adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with
sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest,
bias or the reverse and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution
which provides that the accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to face and in
Rule 115, 1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him.27 The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility,
expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination
testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters
which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the
constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.28
The right of the accused to cross-examine a witness is, however, not without limits but is subject
to the rules on the admissibility and relevance of evidence. Thus, in People v. Zheng Bai Hui,29
this Court upheld the ruling of the trial judge disallowing the questions propounded by the
accuseds counsel on the ability of the arresting officer to distinguish between tawas and shabu
without a laboratory examination, the academic degree of his training instructor, and the
officers authorship of books on drug identity and analysis for being irrelevant, improper, and
impertinent.
In this case, accused-appellants counsel argued that his questions to Erlanie on the other acts of
lasciviousness supposedly committed by accused-appellant against her were for the purpose of
testing her credibility. There was, however, no showing on his part how these questions had any
bearing on complainants credibility or on the truth of her claims. One is led to suspect that the
purpose of these questions was to confuse complainant into committing mistakes in her answers
during cross-examination that accused-appellants counsel could later use to possibly put
complainants credibility, not to mention her character, in question.
Accused-appellant insists that his counsel should have been allowed to ask questions in relation
to the sworn statement executed by complainant. He cites Rule 132, 17 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence which provides that:
When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one
party, the whole of the same subject matter may be inquired into by the other.
Neither can this rule be invoked to justify the questioning of complainant which the trial court did
not allow. As the above provision states, this rule applies to parts of "an act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record" which is given in evidence.
Indeed, the records show that after Erlanie had finished with her direct examination on
November 25, 1997, the trial judge granted the motion made by Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan,
accused-appellants private counsel, to postpone Erlanie Riveras cross-examination to allow him
time to secure copies of the transcript of stenographic notes of Erlanies testimony and thus
enable him to fully question complainant.30 Erlanie was first cross-examined on December 2,
1997, but several postponements, namely, on January 13, 1998,31 February 10, 1998,32 March
12, 1998,33 March 31, 1998,34 April 7, 1998,35 May 12, 1998,36 May 26, 1998,37 May 28,
1998,38 and June 11, 1998,39 on Erlanies cross-examination took place because of the failure of
Atty. Mangalindan to appear on the said trial dates. Erlanies cross-examination was continued on
July 14, 1998 and July 23, 1998. Her cross-examination by accused-appellants counsel was
thorough and covered various subjects, such as the nature of the relationship between her
parents, who were present during the execution of her sworn statement, whether the same had
been executed by her voluntarily, the date when she was raped by accused-appellant the reason
for her delay in reporting the rape committed by accused-appellant, her understanding of
Tagalog, who were with her in the house at the time of the rape, the details surrounding the rape
committed against her, and her age. It is evident that accused-appellant and his counsel were
given ample opportunity to conduct the cross-examination of Erlanie Rivera in order to test her
truthfulness.
B. The record shows that because accused-appellants private counsel was not present when Dr.
Barin testified, Atty. Eddie Bansil was appointed by the trial court as accused-appellants counsel
de oficio for that particular hearing. Atty. Bansil moved for the postponement of the witness
cross-examination, but the trial court denied his request because, on the one hand, accused-
appellant was a detention prisoner and Dr. Barin was a very busy person, while, on the other
hand, Atty. Bansil had heard the testimony of the said witness. Atty. Bansil then decided not to
cross-examine Dr. Barin.40
Accused-appellant now contends that the trial judge denied the motion of Atty. Bansil for
postponement because he was biased against him. Accused-appellant claims that the counsel de
oficio was not familiar with the facts of his case and was thus in no position to cross-examine Dr.
Barin.
While the Constitution recognizes the accuseds right to competent and independent counsel of
his own choice, his option to secure the services of a private counsel is not absolute. For
considering the States and the offended partys right to speedy and adequate justice, the court
may restrict the accuseds option to retain a private counsel if the accused insists on an attorney
he cannot afford, or if the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or if the attorney declines
to represent the accused for a valid reason.41
The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a counsel de oficio to represent accused-appellant on
October 6, 1998 because his regular counsel, Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan, was absent without
any explanation. Atty. Mangalindan had previously been granted several postponements. As this
Court ruled in another case:
. . . Courts are not required to wait indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the accused as
they are also mandated to promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor should
they countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy requires that the
trial continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was adequately represented by counsels
who were not shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him.42
Atty. Bansil was present and heard the testimony of Dr. Barin, the prosecution witness, on that
day. Dr. Barins testimony on direct examination was simple, containing primarily a discussion of
her findings on the hymenal laceration sustained by complainant. Her testimony did not require
considerable study and extraordinary preparation on the part of defense counsel for the purpose
of cross-examination. It seems Atty. Bansil no longer found it necessary to cross-examine Dr.
Barin.
Moreover, beyond stating that Dr. Barin was a vital witness, accused-appellant has not indicated
what questions his counsel wanted to ask from Dr. Barin. It may well be that these questions do
not exist at all and that the importance given by accused-appellant to counsel de oficios failure
to cross-examine the witness is exaggerated. Indeed, a medical examination of the victim,
together with the medical certificate, is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element
of rape.43 The primordial issue in this case remains to be whether the complainants testimony,
not Dr. Barins, established beyond reasonable doubt the crime of rape.
C. Accused-appellant likewise points to the trial judges questions propounded to him during his
cross-examination as an indication of the latters partiality for the prosecution.
We find no merit in this contention. Where the trial court is judge both of the law and of the facts,
it is oftentimes necessary in the due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge
to re-examine a witness so that his judgment, when rendered, may rest upon a full and clear
understanding of the facts.44 Our reading of the transcript of stenographic notes in this case
shows that the trial judge merely wanted to clarify certain points relating to the defense of
accused-appellant and not to establish his guilt. It is a judges prerogative to ask questions to
ferret out the truth.45 It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveals
certain truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party.46 As this Court held:
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for the defense in an
effort to develop the truth and to get at the real facts affords no justification for a charge that he
has assisted the prosecution with an evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he had
intimidated the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway
in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the
record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts,
and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of
justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop
some material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such
question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the
willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He
may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the
truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend
to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. . .47
D. We also find no merit in accused-appellants argument that he was denied due process
considering the speed with which the trial court rendered judgment against him, which judgment
was promulgated one day after he filed his memorandum.
The decision rendered by the trial court gives a clear account of the facts and the law on which it
is based. It discusses in full the courts findings on the credibility of both the prosecution and
defense witnesses and its evaluation of the evidence of both parties. What we said in the
analogous case of People v. Mercado48 applies to this case:
. . . A review of the trial courts decision shows that its findings were based on the records of this
case and the transcripts of stenographic notes during the trial. The speed with which the trial
court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious performance of its
function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings
have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long
before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period
between the filing of accused-appellants memorandum and the promulgation of the decision
was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long
as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but
reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due
dispatch. . .
II. Coming now to the merits of this case, we find that the evidence proves beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of accused-appellant. In reviewing rape cases, we have been guided by the
following principles: (a) An accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove, and even more
difficult to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution
must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense.49
A. Well-settled is the rule that the lone testimony of a rape victim, by itself, is sufficient to
warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be credible. It has likewise been established that
when a woman declares that she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to mean
that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility the accused can
be convicted on the basis thereof. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole
evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainants
testimony.50
Considering complainants tender age, her shy demeanor, and manner of testifying in court, the
trial court found Erlanies testimony to be straightforward, natural, and convincing and accorded
the same full faith and credit.51
Complainant told the court how she was awakened because accused-appellant kissed her and
fondled her breasts. She narrated that she tried to resist accused-appellants advances by
pushing and kicking him, but the latter succeeded in ravishing her. She told of how her father
threatened to kill her mother and her siblings if she reported the incident. Despite the lengthy
cross-examination of accused-appellants counsel, she remained firm and steadfast in her story
of how she was raped by her father. Her narration not only rings true and sincere but is
consistent and unshaken on its material points. Complainants testimony is fully corroborated by
the medical findings of Dr. Barin who examined complainant shortly after she had been raped.
She found complainant to have suffered a hymenal laceration at the 3 oclock position which
could have been caused by the penetration of a hard object, such as a male organ.
Complainants failure to remember the date of the commission of the rape cannot be taken
against her. The exact date when complainant was sexually abused is not an essential element of
the crime of rape.52 Nor does the fact that complainant was sleeping beside her sister when the
rape occurred detract from her credibility. The possibility of rape is not negated by the fact that
the presence of even the whole family of the accused inside the same room produced the
possibility of discovery. For rape to be committed, it is not necessary for the place to be ideal, for
rapists respect neither time nor place for carrying out their evil designs.53
In sum, accused-appellant failed to show any reason why this Court should disbelieve
complainants testimony. Indeed, the gravity of filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a
nature that a daughters accusation must be taken seriously. It is against human experience for a
girl to fabricate a story which would drag herself and her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless it
is the truth. More so when her charge could mean the execution of her own father, as in this
case.54
Accused-appellants counsel on cross-examination made much of the discrepancy between
complainants sworn statement where she stated that accused-appellant slept beside her mother
after the rape55 and her testimony that her mother returned home from the hospital only the
day after the rape took place.56 It must be pointed out, however, that discrepancies between a
witness affidavit and his testimony in open court does not necessarily impair his credibility.
Affidavits, which are taken ex parte, are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of
searching inquiries by the investigating officer.57
Moreover, whether accused-appellant slept alone or with complainants mother after committing
the rape of complainant is of no moment as it is a minor point that does not reflect on the
commission of the crime itself. The rule is that discrepancies and inconsistencies on minor
matters neither impair the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflect
on the witness honesty. Such inconsistencies may in fact strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of the witness as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.58
Accused-appellant contends that complainant could not have been raped on March 1 or 2, 1997,
the dates when her sister Zaira was hospitalized, because she had her last menstrual period on
March 3, 1998 and thus she could not have gotten pregnant as a result of the rape. He argues
that a woman who had her monthly period cannot be impregnated as a result of sexual
intercourse five days before or five days after her last menstruation.59
Accused-appellant does not, however, cite any legal or medical authority for his thesis, except
what he claims to be common knowledge. On the other hand, we have previously held that it is
hard to ascertain the exact date of fertilization inasmuch as more than two weeks is considered
to be the life span of the spermatozoa in the vaginal canal.60 Hence, even granting that
complainant could not have been impregnated by accused-appellant during the period alleged
by him, it remains possible for complainant to have gotten pregnant afterwards. More
importantly, it must be emphasized that pregnancy is not an element of the crime of rape and is,
therefore, totally immaterial to the question of accused-appellants guilt.61 In other words,
accused-appellant being the cause of complainants pregnancy is a non-issue in the prosecution
of the crime of rape. What should not be lost sight of is the fact that complainants testimony
constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her
without her consent, and such fully established the crime of rape.
B. Accused-appellant imputes ill motive on the part of complainants mother and her relatives for
bringing charges against him. He claims that complainants mother resented the fact that he
used to beat her up out of jealousy and that he had several paramours in the past. He further
asserts that his wifes relatives were angry with him because of the land which he caused to be
registered in his name to the prejudice of the latter.
This allegation is without merit. Accused-appellant makes it appear that complainants mother
was responsible for the filing of this case against him. This is not so. For that matter, his wife did
not testify against him. It was his daughter, complainant, alone who denounced him in court.
Accused-appellants claim that the motivation for the filing of this case was the animosity of his
wifes relatives towards him caused by his land-grabbing of their land is likewise without any
basis. It may be that his wifes relatives took advantage of his incarceration and made him sign
his waiver of rights over the land.62 But this does not necessarily mean they conspired to
persecute him. It is noteworthy that accused-appellant never claimed that the document which
he signed (Exh. 3) existed before the filing of the criminal complaint against him or that his wifes
relatives fabricated the charge against him because of his failure to sign the same.
Indeed, what accused-appellants defense cannot explain is the hymenal laceration sustained by
complainant or the steadfastness she has exhibited in pursuing the charge against her own
father. It is doubtful that complainant would let herself be embroiled in a petty family dispute in
exchange for her honor and dignity. We cannot believe that a young girl, like complainant, would
invent a sordid tale of sexual abuse by accused-appellant unless it was the truth.63 Where there
is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness should
testify against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, her testimony is trustworthy.64
Accused-appellant also raises the defense of denial and alibi. But the bare denial of accused-
appellant cannot overcome the positive declarations of complainant. Denial, when
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, constitutes negative self-serving evidence
which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness who
testified on affirmative matters.65
Accused-appellants sister, Concepcion Sayo, testified that accused-appellant lived with her
family in Bulacan at the time of the rape. No other witness not related to accused-appellant,
however, was called to corroborate her claim. We have already held that the defense of alibi
cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not by credible
persons. It is not improbable that these witnesses would freely perjure themselves for the sake of
their loved ones.66 Accused-appellants defense thus fails to convince this Court.
C. The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, we think that the imposition of the death penalty by
the trial court is erroneous. It is settled that to justify the imposition of the death penalty, both
the relationship of the victim and her age must be alleged and proved.67 Thus, in People v.
Javier,68 where the victim was alleged to be 16 years old at the time of the commission of the
rapes, it was held:
. . . Although the victims age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of the victim is
particularly necessary in this case considering that the victims age which was then 16 years old
is just two years less than the majority age of 18. In this age of modernism, there is hardly any
difference between a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old one insofar as physical features and
attributes are concerned. A physically developed 16-year old lass may be mistaken for an 18-
year old young woman, in the same manner that a frail and young-looking 18-year old lady may
pass as a 16-year old minor. Thus, it is in this context that independent proof of the actual age of
a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is
indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in
Republic Act No. 7659. In a criminal prosecution especially of cases involving the extreme
penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which an accused is charged must be established by the prosecution in
order for said penalty to be upheld.
A duly certified certificate of live birth showing complainants age, or some other official
document on record, such as a school record, has been recognized as competent evidence.69
In this case, although complainants minority has been alleged in the information, no
independent evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove the same. Complainant did not
even state her age at the time of the rape during direct examination; it was only during her
cross-examination when she stated that she was 12 years old at the time she was raped by her
father.70
Nor was her birth certificate or baptismal certificate or any school record presented by the
prosecution to prove the age of Erlanie at the time of the rape. Not even her mother, whose
testimony could have been sufficient to prove the age of complainant,71 testified in this case.
What was relied upon by the trial court was that fact that the age of the victim was undisputed
by the defense.72 It also took judicial notice of the victims minority on account of her
appearance.73
We do not agree with this conclusion. The trial court can only take judicial notice of the victims
minority when the latter is, for example, 10 years old or below. Otherwise, the prosecution has
the burden of proving the victims age at the time of the rape and the absence of denial on the
part of accused-appellant does not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden.74 In a
similar case, People v. Tundag,75 in which the trial court took judicial notice of the minority of the
victim who was alleged to be 13 years old, we ruled:
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsels
admission, thereof acceding to the prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as
to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of
such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of
the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed,
by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
The prosecution having failed to present evidence as to complainants age, accused-appellant
can be convicted only of simple rape, for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Consequently, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 made by the trial court
cannot be sustained. Such amount can only be awarded if the crime of rape was effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the
applicable amendatory laws.76 Accordingly, the civil indemnity awarded to complainant must be
reduced to P50,000.00 in consonance with current rulings.77
The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to complainant is correct. Moral
damages is awarded in rape cases without need of showing that the victim suffered from mental,
physical, and psychological trauma as these are too obvious to require recital by the victim
during trial.78
In addition to the damages given by the trial court, exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 should likewise be awarded in favor of complainant. Accused-appellant being the
father of complainant, such relationship can be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance warranting the award of exemplary damages. In rapes committed by fathers
against their daughters, such award may be imposed to serve as a deterrent to other parents
similarly disposed to commit the same crime.79
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, finding
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay complainant Erlanie
Rivera the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 135222. March 04, 2005]
PETER ANDRADA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Peter Andrada, petitioner, assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated September 18, 1997 in CA-G.R. CR No. 15851 and its
Resolution[2] dated August 13, 1998.
In an Information dated January 7, 1987, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged
petitioner with frustrated murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of September 1986, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and hack one ARSENIO UGERIO on the head twice with a bolo thereby inflicting upon
latter: hacking wound, head, resulting in 1) skull and scalp avulsion vertex; 2) depressed
comminuted skull fracture, right parieto occipital with significant brain laceration; operation
done; craniectomy; vertex debridement; craniectomy; right parieto occipital; dural repair;
debridement, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder
as a consequence thereof, but nevertheless, the felony was not consummated by reason of
causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely medical attendance
extended to Arsenio Ugerio which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned on February 9, 1987, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. The hearing of the case ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on September 23, 1986, at around 11:30 in the evening,
T/Sgt. Teodolfo Sumabong, of the defunct Philippine Constabulary (PC), was resting in the PC
barracks at Camp Dado Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet when one Rommel Alcate called up
requesting police assistance. Alcate claimed that a group of persons was suspiciously roaming
around his boarding house in Ferguson Street, Baguio City.
Sgt. Sumabong and two of his companions, Sgt. Gaces and Cpl. Arsenio Ugerio, went to Alcetes
boarding house, arriving there past midnight. However, according to Alcate, the suspicious
persons have left.
On their way back to the camp at around 1:15 in the morning, the group dropped by Morlows
Restaurant, Bokawkan Street, Baguio City, for a snack. They ordered coffee and sandwiches.
While they were waiting to be served, a woman passed by their table. While Cpl. Ugerio was
talking to her, a man, later identified as Peter Andrada, herein petitioner, approached the former
and scolded him. Sgt. Sumabong, identifying himself as a PC non-commissioned officer, advised
petitioner to pay his bill and go home as he was apparently drunk.
Petitioner heeded Sgt. Sumabongs advice for he paid his bill and left the restaurant with his
companions. While Sgt. Sumabong was paying his bill, he heard Cpl. Ugerio, seated about a
meter away, moaning in pain. When Sgt. Sumabong turned around, he saw Cpl. Ugerio sprawled
on the floor. Petitioner was hacking him on the head with a bolo. Sgt. Sumabong approached
them but petitioner ran away, followed by a companion. Sgt. Sumabong chased them but to no
avail.
Upon Sgt. Sumabongs instruction, Sgt. Gaces brought Cpl. Ugerio, the victim, to the St. Louis
University Hospital. Then Sgt. Sumabong reported the incident to the police station at Camdas
Road and thereafter proceeded to the hospital. When he returned to the police station, he
learned that petitioner was arrested in a waiting shed at the corner of Camdas Road and
Magsaysay Avenue.
The arresting officers then brought petitioner back to the restaurant where they recovered the
bolo used in hacking the victim. Witnesses to the incident were interviewed by the police and
they pointed to petitioner as the culprit.
Dr. Francisco Fernandez, a neuro-surgery consultant, found that the victim suffered two (2) major
injuries. The first was a scalping avulsion, around 5 centimeters wide, i.e., the chopping off of a
part of the victims skull. The second was a depressed fracture, about 6 centimeters wide, found
on the right parieto occipital area of the skull. Either wound, being fatal, would have caused the
death of the victim had it not been for a timely medical treatment. After three (3) days, the
victim was transferred to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City. Because of the injuries he
sustained, he has remained incapable to remember or recall visual stimuli or information.
Petitioner interposed self-defense and invoked the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. His version is that he and one Romy Ramos were drinking beer with a hospitality girl
named Liza inside Morlows Restaurant, when three military men occupied the table next to them.
They had pistols tucked in their waists. Without any warning or provocation, two of the men,
whom he identified as Cpl. Ugerio and Sgt. Sumabong, approached him, slapped his face several
times and pointed their guns to his head. They cursed him and threatened to summarily execute
him because he was so boastful. Cpl. Ugerio then collared him and dragged him outside the
restaurant, while Sgt. Sumabing followed. Fearful that he might be killed, petitioner pulled out his
bolo, wrapped in a newspaper, from his waist and swung it at the two military men. He did not
see if he hit any of them. Then he ran to his house in Camdas Subdivision. He checked to see if
his mother or grandmother was at home so either of them could assist him in surrendering to the
police. But neither was present. On his way to surrender to the police, he met his mother
accompanied by a policeman. They then proceeded to the police sub-station at Magsaysay
Avenue where he surrendered.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which is quoted
below, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused PETER ANDRADA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder.
The Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 20 days as
MINIMUM to 14 years, 10 months and 20 days as MAXIMUM; to indemnify the sum of P3,000.00,
representing part of the victims expenses for medical services and medicine, and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial courts Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION
THAT THE APPELLANT IS SENTENCED TO AN INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF FOUR (4) YEARS AND
TWO (2) MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECIONAL, AS MINIMUM, TO EIGHT (8) YEARS AND TWENTY
(20) DAYS OF PRISION MAYOR, AS MAXIMUM.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The Court of Appeals, in modifying the imposable penalty, found that petitioner is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority as he was only 17 years, 9 months and 20 days
old at the time of the incident.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the Appellate Court in
its Resolution dated August 13, 1998.
Hence, the instant petition.
The issues for our resolution are: (1) whether petitioners right to due process was violated; (2)
whether his plea of self-defense is in order; (3) whether the crime committed is frustrated murder
or frustrated homicide; and (4) whether he is entitled to any mitigating circumstance, assuming
he is guilty.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the trial
court violated his constitutional right to due process. He contends that his counsel:
1. Failed to present all the witnesses who could have testified that he is innocent of the crime
charged;
2. Failed to present the medical certificate showing the injuries inflicted upon him by the victim;
3. Did not notify him to attend the hearing when Sgt. Sumabong was cross-examined; and
4. Failed to submit a memorandum.
In sum, petitioner ascribes gross incompetence or gross negligence to his counsel.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that there was no violation of petitioners right
to due process. Petitioner was represented by counsel of his choice. If the latters performance
and competence fell short of petitioners expectations, then he should not blame either the trial
court or the Court of Appeals.
In criminal cases, the negligence or incompetence of counsel to be deemed gross must have
prejudiced the constitutional right of an accused to be heard.[6]
In the following cases, we held that there has been gross negligence or incompetence on the part
of counsel for the accused, thus:
In US v. Gimenez,[7] we remanded a criminal case for new trial when counsel for an accused
inadvertently substituted a plea of guilty for an earlier plea of not guilty, thus resulting in the
precipitate conviction of his client.
In Aguilar v. Court of Appeals and People,[8] we ordered a dismissed appeal from a conviction for
estafa to be reinstated after it was shown that the failure to file the appellants brief on time was
due to sheer irresponsibility on the part of appellants counsel.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[9] we remanded the case for reception of evidence after
counsel for the accused filed a demurrer to the evidence notwithstanding that his motion for
leave of court was denied, thus precluding the accused to present his evidence.
In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[10] we ordered a new trial after a showing that counsel for the
accused abandoned her without explanation.
In People v. Bascuiguin,[11] we held that the arraignment is not valid. The accused was not
properly represented by counsel de officio since he merely conferred with his client for a few
minutes and advised him to plead guilty to the crime of rape with homicide.
None of the foregoing incidents is present in the instant case. Instead, records show that counsel
for petitioner actively participated in the cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution
to test their credibility. At any rate, the fact that he did not choose to present other witnesses did
not affect any of petitioners substantial rights. Besides, said counsel might have valid reasons
why he did not call to the witness stand those witnesses.
We note that petitioner was present during the hearing. If he believed that his counsel de parte
was not competent, he could have secured the services of a new counsel. He did not. Having
decided to retain the services of his counsel during the entire proceedings, petitioner must be
deemed bound by any mistake committed by him. For if an accused feels that his counsel is
inept, he should take action by discharging him earlier, instead of waiting until an adverse
decision is rendered and thereupon blame his counsel for incompetence.[12]
The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer.
Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy
of certain evidence, the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to
summon witnesses, and to argue the case, unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from
properly presenting his case, do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence.[13]
Having found that petitioners counsel was not so inept or motivated by bad faith, or so careless
and negligent of his duties as to seriously prejudice the substantial rights of petitioner or prevent
him from putting up a proper defense, we hold that he is bound by the decisions of his counsel
regarding the conduct of the case.[14]
On the second issue, petitioner invokes self-defense. Hence, it is incumbent upon him to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. For in invoking self-
defense, the accused admits killing or seriously wounding the victim and thus, has the burden to
justify his act.[15] The requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation of
the part of the person defending himself.[16]
We find that the petitioner has not adequately discharged his burden of proving the elements of
self-defense. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time he hacked the
victim, the latter was still seated while he (petitioner) was behind him. Indeed, how could there
be an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim at that instance? Petitioners bare assertions
that the victim slapped him, poked a handgun at him, and threatened to salvage him were not
duly proved by the evidence for the defense. Rather, the prosecution established that it was
petitioner who unexpectedly attacked the victim from behind. Clearly, the aggressor was
petitioner. Since the first element of self-defense is not present here, such defense must fail.
On the third issue, petitioner contends that assuming he is guilty, he should only be convicted of
frustrated homicide, not frustrated murder. He insists that treachery was not present. His hacking
the victim was a spur-of-the-moment act prompted by self-preservation.
We are not persuaded. There is alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
especially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself from any defense which
the offended party might make.[17] We agree with the lower courts that the petitioner planned
to kill the victim with treachery in mind. At that time, the victim was seated, having just finished
a meal at a late hour. His back was towards petitioner when the latter, without warning, hacked
him twice on his head with a bolo. The attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim had
no opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself.
Considering that petitioner had performed all the acts of execution which would have resulted in
the death of the victim, had it not been for timely medical assistance, a cause not of the will of
the petitioner, and considering further the presence of treachery, then, the crime committed is
frustrated murder, not frustrated homicide.
On the fourth issue, petitioner insists that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
should have been appreciated in his favor.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that petitioner, after attacking the victim, ran away. He was
apprehended by responding police officers in the waiting shed at the corner of Cambas Road and
Magsaysay Avenue. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the surrender must be
spontaneous, made in such a manner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save
them the trouble and expenses that would be necessarily incurred in his search and capture.[18]
Here, the surrender was not spontaneous.
Anent the modification of the penalty by the Court of Appeals, the same is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 18,
1997 and its Resolution dated August 13, 1998 in CA-G.R. CR No. 15851 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121176 May 14, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARLON PARAZO y FRANCISCO, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
Before Us for automatic review is the Joint Decision 1 dated March 24, 1995 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, convicting appellant for Rape and Frustrated
Homicide, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
and Frustrated Homicide and therefore sentences him to suffer the penalty of:
1. Death in Criminal Case No. 6167-AF and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages (People vs. Perez, 175 SCRA 203);
2. Eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium period in
Criminal Case No. 6168-AF, and pay damages to the offended party in the amount of P30,000.00,
and
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
We find on record the following facts:
On January 7, 1995, Cristina Capulong filed with the RTC of Cabanatuan City, a complaint
accusing Marlon Parazo y Francisco of the crime of rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of January 1995, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
motivated by lewd design and by means of threat, force and intimidation and with the use of a
knife, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complainant, against the latter's will and consent and to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Also on January 7, 1995, an Information was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Marius L. Abesamis
accusing Marlon Parazo y Francisco of the crime of Frustrated Homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of January, 1995, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of one CRISTINA CAPULONG y AROCENA, by stabbing the
latter with the use of knife, thereby inflicting upon her stab wounds on the different parts of her
body that would ordinarily cause her death, and said accused having thus performed all the acts
of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide, as a consequence thereof, but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason independent of his will, that is, by the timely medical
assistance rendered unto the aforesaid Cristina Capulong y Arocena.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Upon arraignment on January 25, 1995, the accused pleaded not guilty in Crim. Case No. 6167
for Rape. Meanwhile, on January 30, 1995, the Judge handling Crim. Case No. 6168 for Frustrated
Homicide, granted the Asst. City Prosecutor's motion for consolidation of Crim. Case No. 6168
with Crim. Case No. 6167. On February 1, 1995, the accused pleaded not guilty in Crim. Case No.
6168 for frustrated homicide.
Complainant Cristina Capulong y Arocena, 21 years old, single, a 4th year college student of
Araullo University at Cabanatuan City, testified that: On January 6, 1995, at around 3:30 o'clock
in the morning, she was sleeping in her room in a boarding house in Mabini Extension,
Cabanatuan City, when she was suddenly awakened because someone was ransacking her
things near her feet. The man whom she identified in court as the accused, then pointed a knife
at her and motioned to her to keep quiet. She pleaded with him for mercy and to spare her life
but the accused suddenly boxed her twice in her stomach, poked the knife at her neck, and
forcibly undressed her. Then, the accused, still pointing the knife at her neck, forcibly inserted his
private part on her private part and she felt pain. While she was being raped by the accused, the
latter dropped the knife on the table. She managed to grope for the knife and was able to stab
him. The accused got up, took the knife from her and in turn stabbed her on her right side. While
they were struggling near the door, the accused stabbed her again, this time, in her breast. After
the accused had left thinking that she was already dead since she lay slumped on the floor, she
was able to stand up even though blood was spurting from her wounds. She went to the
adjoining room and knocked at the door. She felt she was going to die because of her stab
wounds. Her boardmate Josie Martinez, a nurse at the P.J.G. Hospital, and her landlady brought
her to the Good Samaritan Hospital. While she was at the x-ray room of the hospital, a policeman
came to investigate about the incident. There she made a statement to the police. She was
operated on and stayed in the hospital for eight (8) days. 4
Another prosecution witness, SPO2 Nemensio Atendido, 41 years old, a police investigator,
recounted that: On January 6, 1995, at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning, he was in the Police
Station at General Luna, when an unidentified nurse at Good Samaritan Hospital informed their
station through telephone that they have a victim of a stabbing incident. He was immediately
dispatched to said hospital. He found the victim (complainant) inside the emergency room of the
hospital. Upon questioning her, he found out that aside from having been stabbed, she was also
raped. He also found out that the assailant was showing her an ATM card which bears the name
of a certain Ariel Parungao. The victim supplied to him Ariel Parungao's address at 106 Barangay
Rizdeliz of Cabanatuan City. When he brought Ariel Parungao before the victim, the latter told
him that he was not the one. So, he went to the victim's boarding house but he failed to gather
information therefrom. He went back to the victim and talked to her some more. He thought it
strange that the assailant who was unable to talk would identify himself through an ATM card.
From the owner of the ATM card, he learned that on January 2, 1995, an unidentified person
forcibly entered their house and took away personal property belonging to him, such as ATM
card, camera and P800.00 cash. He was able to determine that the accused was the perpetrator
of the crime because the victim told him that she was able to stab the accused once or more
than once. So, he sounded off an alarm to all the hospitals in Cabanatuan City telling them that if
a male person with stab wounds will be admitted to the hospital, to please inform him so he can
conduct the proper investigation. At around 6:00 o'clock on the same morning, an information
was given to him through telephone by a nurse and a doctor at the P.J.G. that there was a male
patient bearing stab wounds who was admitted thereto. He immediately went to the P.J.G.
hospital and there he saw the accused. The reason why he zeroed in on accused Marlon Parazo
was that this person has previous records in their office that he was always accused of breaking
and entering other people's home for purposes of thievery from 1991 up to 1994 and as a matter
of fact, last August 1994, he went out from jail. On that particular morning there were no other
incidents regarding a male person who sustained stab wounds as far as other hospitals are
concerned. Since he could not bring the accused to the complainant nor the complainant to the
accused as both were in critical condition, he brought a photographer to the hospital where the
accused was confined and had the latter's photograph taken. When he showed to the victim, the
accused's photo, the former identified the latter as her assailant. On cross-examination, this
witness said that it took only one or two hours to develop the pictures; 5 that he asked her why
she was certain that the man in the photo was her assailant; and that the victim said the room
was lighted. 6
Another prosecution witness, Dr. Ricardo Gavino, 38 years of age, married, a doctor by
profession, testified that: He is connected with the Nueva Ecija Good Samaritan Hospital as a
Consultant in the department of Surgery. In the early morning of January 6, 1995, he was called
to the hospital as a certain patient with stab wounds was admitted and said patient needs
immediate operation. He did the operation on said patient. Based on their examination, he found
out that the two stab wounds caused injuries which penetrated the plevical cavity, hitting the
lung and the edge of the liver causing sanctioning of air and causing malfunctioning and
collapsing of the left lung. He issued a medical certificate after performing the operation with
respect to the victim Cristina Capulong. Prior to the operation, while he was interviewing the
patient at the emergency room about her medical history, the patient told him that she was
stabbed by the accused while she was being sexually abused by the same man. With respect to
the physical examination of the victim, the doctor made the following findings:
Finding: Internal examination admits one finger with ease, meaning to say, that the vaginal
opening admits one finger with ease, with no resistance at all, positive with fresh laceration at 7
o'clock position, no bleeding was noted. With whitish male secretion from the vaginal canal. 7
He also testified that from the findings he had that morning, and in his experience, he thinks that
the patient was really raped. 8
For his part, accused Marlon Parazo, 24 years old, single, jobless and a resident of Palayan City,
denied complainant's accusations and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that from the
early evening of January 5, 1995 up to the early morning of January 6, 1995, he was in his
father's house in Palayan City. His companions therein were his father Terry, his mother Shiela,
Loida and Naty Parungao. On cross-examination, he testified that he knows how to ride a motor
vehicle and he frequently visited Cabanatuan City to buy clothes. In the morning of January 6,
1995, he was admitted in the P.J.G. hospital with stab wound which was caused by a woman
whom he did not know. When asked in what particular place he was stabbed, the accused replied
it was in Palayan City. No other defense witnesses were presented.
After trial, a joint decision was rendered by the trial court in the two cases, which as heretofore
mentioned, convicted accused of both crimes of rape and frustrated homicide.
In this appeal, accused-appellant raises the sole error that:
The lower court erred in not appreciating the defense of the accused-appellant that he was not at
the scene of the crime when the alleged incident took place, a defense sufficient to overcome
and destroy the evidence presented by the prosecution which would have warranted the
acquittal of the accused-appellant. 9
The lower court's decision should be affirmed.
This Court will not interfere with the trial court's judgment on the trustworthiness of witnesses
unless there appears on record facts and circumstances of real weight which might have been
overlooked or misapprehended. 10 In the case at bar, there appears no such facts and
circumstances which the trial court might have overlooked or misapprehend.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether or not such is in
conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind. 11 All the witnesses
for the prosecution testified in a simple, straightforward manner and their declarations jibed in
such a way that nobody could doubt the truthfulness of all their testimonies which are consistent
with common experience and the natural course of things. More specifically, the complainant
herein who testified in a categorical, candid, spontaneous and frank manner, is a credible
witness. 12 On cross-examination by the defense counsel, she remained unshaken.
On the other hand, accused-appellant's claim that he was sleeping in their house at the time of
the incident, remained unsubstantiated and uncorroborated. As aptly pointed out by the trial
court, and the Court quotes with approval, viz:
The Court has not been remiss in its duty of extending all opportunities to the accused for him to
adduce evidence for his defense. Pursuant to the accused's request, subpoena were issued to his
father, mother and sister to be his witnesses apparently to corroborate his assertion that he slept
in their house in Palayan City on the night in question. But that his parents and sister-despite due
notice to them to appear on February 21 and 22, 1995, both at 8:30 o'clock in the morning did
not appear, at the least to show sympathy, and at most to lend credence to his allegation that
he, indeed, slept at home on the night of the incident, only casts doubt on the truthfulness of his
claim.
That not one of his parents or brothers or sisters appeared in court, even as a mere show of
sympathy, speaks ill of the accused. For no parents most of all a mother would abandon their
kith and kin, that is, if he were one devoid of evil in his character or is capable of telling the truth
worthy of belief.
With the accused facing a heinous charge, and, for lack of convincing corroborative witness risks
receiving a death sentence, how easy for any of his relatives to come forth and vouch that his
allegations were true and without any tint of confabulation, Such absence of filial support only
strengthens the court's belief that the accused is capable of the atrocious deed he is now
accused of.
Denials unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative, self-serving evidence
which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. 13
Accused-appellant's denial and alibi do not inspire belief. When confronted with the question of
how he sustained his stab wounds on January 6, 1995, all he could say was that a woman did it
and he does not know why the woman stabbed him. He failed to explain the surrounding
circumstances when he was stabbed. The Court cannot simply choose to believe appellant's bare
assertions as against the prosecution's concrete evidence. Moreover, accused-appellant claims to
have been in Palayan City all the time and yet the hospital (P.J.G.) where he was confined due to
his stab wounds was located in Cabanatuan City. This further disproves his claim that he was with
his parents and sisters in his father's house in Palayan City from the evening of January 5 to the
early morning of January 6, 1995.
Time and again, it has been held that alibi is a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution's witness who has no motive to testify falsely
against him. 14
Thus, the Court finds that the trial court correctly convicted accused-appellant of both crimes.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, 15 provides that, "Whenever
the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death."
Death and reclusion perpetua are principal indivisible penalties. 16
Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides the Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.
The pertinent provision thereof reads:
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code states that the following are aggravating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . that it be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given
provocation;
The crime of rape was committed in the boarding house where the complainant was staying.
Dwelling may be aggravating even if it does not belong to the victim. 17 The dwelling need not
be owned by the victim. The Code speaks of "dwelling", not domicile. 18 In People vs. Daniel, 19
where the victim was raped in the boarding house where she was a bedspacer, this Court held
that:
. . . her room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article
14(3) of the Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the
place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home
the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended. . . .
And in People vs. Sto. Tomas, 20 where the victim was killed in her mother's house where she
was temporarily staying to avoid appellant in their conjugal house, this Court held that dwelling
is aggravating even if victim's stay in the house is temporary. "Dwelling is considered an
aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human
abode. According to one commentator, one's dwelling place is a 'sanctuary worthy of respect'
and that one who slanders another in the latter's house is more guilty than he who offends him
elsewhere." 21 "Cuello Calon says that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows
greater perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm." 22
Within the ambit of the law applicable, nighttime and unlawful entry may be considered as
aggravating circumstances, thus: In People vs. Garcia (No. L-30449. Oct. 31, 1979, 94 SCRA 14)
and People vs. Palon, (No. L-3271, Feb. 20, 1984) this Court emphasized the two tests for
nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance:
There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the objective test, under
which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense; and the
subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the
offender. These two tests should be applied in the alternative. . . . In this case, the subjective test
is not passed because there is no showing that the accused purposely sought the cover of
nighttime. There are other similar cases on this point. 23
We find, however, that a discussion or further survey on these aspects would no longer be
necessary because when in the commission of the offense, there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty of death shall be applied. 24 Thus, with the presence of one
aggravating circumstance, i.e., dwelling, the law has made it inevitable under the circumstances
of this case that the greater penalty of death shall be applied.
While compassion is, in itself, a virtue, it cannot and should not replace justice under law, in this
particular case, justice to the victim. 25 The narration of the witnesses for the prosecution would
show how brave enough the victim was, to defend her honor and her life; how SPO2 Nemensio
Atendido proved true to his duty, relentless in his search for the perpetrator of the crimes; and
how Dr. Ricardo Gavino likewise quickly responded to the call and performed a successful
operation on the victim. The prosecuting fiscal and the judge also did their best to give justice to
the victim. All their efforts must not be put to naught.
In the case for frustrated homicide, the same carries with it the penalty of prision mayor. There
being one (1) aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, the imposable
penalty is the maximum period of prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
accused-appellant should be meted the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum penalty to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as maximum
penalty.
The Court notes that the trial judge failed to consider the aggravating circumstance of dwelling in
determining the penalties to be imposed in the two cases. This is a flaw or defect which is too
prevalent coming in appealed criminal cases before us. Judges of the lower courts are hereby
reminded of their duty to consider in all cases, the proper appreciation of aggravating and/or
mitigating circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime, which is decisive in
determining whether the penalty should be increased or decreased, and would thus contribute to
the orderly administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the joint decision appealed from dated March 24, 1995, is hereby AFFIRMED with
respect to Crim. Case No. 6167, and accused Marlon Parazo y Francisco is found guilty of the
crime of rape under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and is sentenced to the penalty of
death, with two (2) members of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua.
The decision appealed from with respect to Crim. Case No. 6168, for frustrated homicide is
MODIFIED in that the accused is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of
prision correccional as minimum penalty to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as
maximum penalty.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 128823-24 December 27, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, accused-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO FLORES, JR., y FLORES ALIAS "PESIONG", accused-appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
An assault on sexual innocence can open a floodgate of emotions. This Court, however, cannot
allow emotions to drown an accuseds right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
For automatic review before this Court is the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan finding accused-appellant Pedro Flores Jr. y Flores alias "Pesiong" guilty of
two counts of rape of his then 11 year old daughter and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death in each.
The complaints against accused-appellant filed on February 3, 1997 read as follows:
Criminal Case No. U-9184:
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT1
The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, grade three pupil and a resident of Sitio
Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby accuses PEDRO
FLORES, JR., Y FLORES for the crime of "RAPE", committed as follows:
That on the 9th day of December 1996, in the morning at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran
West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually abuse the herein complaining
witness FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, all against her will.
x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Criminal Case No. U-9185:
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT2
The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, grade three pupil and a resident of Sitio
Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby accuses PEDRO
FLORES, JR., Y FLORES, ALIAS "PESYONG", committed as follows:
That on the 28th day of December 1996, in the evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran
West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually
abuse the herein complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES, an 11 years old and daughter of the
herein accused with the use of sharp pointed bladed weapon and all against her will.
x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Arraigned on February 10, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.3
Culled from the records of the case are the following facts established by the prosecution:
On December 5, 1996, private complainant Filipina L. Flores (Filipina), 11 years old at the time,
and her younger sister Catherine were left to the care of their father, herein accused-appellant,
at their family residence in Sitio Buenlag, Barangay Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
their mother Marcelina L. Flores having departed for Singapore to work as an overseas contract
worker.
After partaking of supper on the night of December 9, 1996,4 accused-appellant asked Filipina to
accompany him to the comfort room situated outside their house,5 claiming that he was afraid of
ghosts.6 Albeit Filipina did not believe7 him, she acquiesced because her mother had told her to
always obey her father.8
When accused-appellant came out of the comfort room, he ordered Filipina to remove her short
pants, threatening her with death if she disobeyed,9 and made her lie down.10 He then removed
his short pants and brief and, against her will, he inserted his finger and later his penis into
Filipinas vagina11 where she later felt hot fluid.12
Accused-appellant thereafter wiped Filipinas vagina and his hand, threatened to kill her if she
reported what he did, directed her to put on her shorts, and they both went home. The following
morning, Filipina reported the incident to her "Inang Lorie" whose full name is Norielyn Antonio,
the aunt of her mother, who told her that if her father would sexually assault her again, he would
have him detained.
Nineteen nights later or on December 28, 1996, as Filipina lay asleep in their house, she was
awakened when accused-appellant touched her right foot.13 Armed with a knife14, accused-
appellant told her not to talk15 and ordered her to remove her short pants and panty. She
complied. Accused-appellant thereupon removed his short pants and brief and went on top of her
chest during which she tried to push him away but failed.
Accused-appellant then inserted his finger into Filipinas vagina for some time,16 wiped his
hands, and then inserted his penis for a long time as he was sucking her breast. Filipina felt
accused-appellants semen drop into her private organ where she noticed the presence of blood
and a bit of whitish substance.
Accused-appellant later wiped her vagina with a towel. The following morning, private
complainant again reported the matter to her grandaunt Norielyn,17 and to her playmate Carla
Salvador.18
On January 31, 1997, Filipina, accompanied by Norielyn, a relative, and a tricycle driver-neighbor,
reported the matter to the Philippine National Police of Urdaneta where she gave a statement.
On the same day, she, still accompanied by Norielyn, submitted herself to a medical examination
at the Don Amadeo J. Perez, Jr. Memorial General Hospital the results of which are contained in a
medical certificate19 showing the following:
(-) Negative menarche
- Multiple deep healed lacerations all over the labia majora.
- Admits examining finger with ease.
- (+) sticky whitish discharge.
Dr. Jeanna B. Nebril, the examining physician, found the presence of "deep-healed lacerations all
over the labia majora"20 which deep-healed lacerations connote, according to the doctor, the
application of force, possibly two weeks before the examination.
Denying the accusations, accused-appellant claimed as follows:
Filipina, whom he whipped in the afternoon of December 9, 1996 for not attending school on the
6th, 7th and 8th of December that year and for having received money from her classmate,21
was not in their house on the night of December 9, 1996 because she was in the house of
Norielyn. Neither was she in their house on the night of December 28, 1996 as she was at the
house of his mother Margarita Flores22 in Cafloresan.
Accused-appellants testimony was corroborated by his mother Margarita, and his teenaged
children Benito and Baby Jean Flores who were staying in his mothers house. It was also
corroborated by another teenaged child, Jocelyn Flores, who was staying in the house of
accused-appellants mother-in-law, Lourdes Lazo, also in Barangay Nancamaliran West.23 Jocelyn
added that Filipina had intimated to her that she fabricated the rape charges because their
maternal grandmother Lourdes wanted their father, accused-appellant, jailed as he begrudged
him for having eloped with their mother,24 and that Lourdes threatened her with abandonment
or detention in jail in case she defied, and promised to give her jewelry, shoes and dress if she
agreed to carry out her desire.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of Statutory Rape and sentenced her to
death in both cases in its April 7, 1997 Joint Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is rendered CONVICTING PEDRO FLORES, JR. Y FLORES ALIAS PESIONG
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape, an offense defined and penalized under
paragraph 3, Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1, Republic Act 7659
aggravated by relationship, the Court sentences, PEDRO FLORES, JR. Y FLORES ALIAS PESIONG as
follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9184 to suffer the penalty of DEATH; ordering Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores
alias Pesiong to pay Filipina the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, plus all the necessary penalties and costs.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9185 to suffer the penalty of DEATH; ordering Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores
alias Pesiong to pay Filipina the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, plus all the necessary penalties and costs.
Pedro Flores, Jr. y Flores alias Pesiong shall be committed immediately to the National Bilibid
Prisons. The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to transmit the entire records of this case to
the Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines for automatic review of this Decision.
In view of the penalty of death imposed by the court a quo, the case is now before this Court on
automatic review. Accused-appellant assigns as errors the following:
I. THAT THE FILING OF THE CASE [AT BAR] WAS MOTIVATED BY SOME FACTORS OTHER THAN THE
TRUTH AS TO ITS COMMISSION, AND SO THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE ACQUITTED.
II. THAT THE COURT [A QUO] ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT THAT THE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME WHEN THE
ALLEGED INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE, A DEFENSE SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME AND DESTROY THE
TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT THAT WOULD HAVE WARRANTED THE ACQUITTAL OF THE
ACCUSED-APELLANT.
It is settled that in a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case open for review, and it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment
appealed from, whether they are made the subject of assignment of errors or not.25
It is at once apparent, from a reading of the above-quoted complaints, that accused-appellant
was denied the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. This right has the following objectives: 26
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make the defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution for the
same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law
to support a conviction if one should be had.
The right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy.27 Hence, it is imperative that the
complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such,
an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed.28 For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is
alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information.29
The court a quo found accused-appellant guilty of Statutory Rape under Article 33530 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R. A. No. 7659 (which restored the death penalty for heinous
crimes effective December 31, 1993) which provides:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed.--- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse between a man and
a woman under the circumstances enumerated in the penal code.31 Thus, to sustain a
conviction, the complaint or information must allege that the accused had carnal knowledge of or
sexual intercourse with the private complainant. In the criminal complaints at bar, however, no
such allegation was made.
The allegation that accused-appellant did "sexually abuse" Filipina does not suffice. In the recent
case of People v. Lito Egan alias Akiao32, this Court ruled that "although the prosecution has
proved that [the therein private complainant] Lenie was sexually abused, the evidence proffered
is inadequate to establish carnal knowledge."33 Hence, sexual abuse cannot be equated with
carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse.34 The allegation in the instant criminal complaints that
accused-appellant "sexually abuse[d]" the private complainant cannot thus be read to mean that
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse with the private complainant.
This Court is not unaware of the rule in case there is a variance between allegation and proof as
etched in Section 4 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.35
The case at bar, however, is not one of variance between allegation and proof. The recital of
facts in the criminal complaints simply does not properly charge rape, "sexual abuse" not being
an essential element or ingredient thereof.
Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of acts of lasciviousness or of any offense for that
matter under our penal laws. It is settled that what characterizes the charge is the actual recital
of facts 36 in the complaint or information. For every crime is made up of certain acts and intent
which must be set forth in the complaint or information with reasonable particularity of time,
place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In other words, the complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged37, the accused being presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.38
And even under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act),39 accused-appellant cannot be held
liable. Section 5 of said Act provides:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -- Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are
not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with the intent to
engage such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3815, for rape or lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period; and
(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the
establishment where the prostitution takes place or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of
entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or which engages in prostitution in addition to
the activity for which the license has been issued to said establishment. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
Section 2 (g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases40, issued pursuant to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7610, defines "sexual abuse" by
inclusion as follows:
Sexual abuse includes 1) the employment, use, persuasion, enticement, or coercion of a child to
engage in, or assist another person to engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or 2)
the molestation, 3) prostitution, or 4) incest with children. (Underscoring supplied)
From this broad, non-exclusive definition, this Court finds that the phrase "sexually abuse" in the
criminal complaints at bar does not comply with the requirement that the complaint must
contain a specific averment of every fact necessary to constitute the crime. Notably, the phrase
"sexual abuse" is not used under R.A. No. 7610 as an elemental fact but as an altogether
separate offense. Above-quoted Section 5 thereof enumerates the punishable acts that must be
alleged in the complaint or information to hold an accused liable, none of which is reflected in
the complaints at bar charging accused-appellant.
The case of People v. Cruz 41 is instructive. There the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R
read:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter either by raping her or
committing acts of lasciviousness on her, which has debased, degraded and demeaned the
intrinsic worth and dignity of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied)
Finding the above-quoted information void, this Court held:
The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape or acts of lasciviousness
under the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, which charges accused-appellant of a
violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act), "either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness."
It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information do not constitute an offense. The
information does not cite which among the numerous sections or subsections of R.A. No. 7610
has been violated by accused-appellant. Moreover, it does not state the acts and omissions
constituting the offense, or any special or aggravating circumstances attending the same, as
required under the rules of criminal procedure. Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:
Designation of the offense.The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statue, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
The allegation in the information that accused-appellant "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness on her" is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the offense as required
under Section 8, for these are conclusions of law, not facts. The information in Criminal Case No.
15368-R is therefore void for being violative of the accused-appellants constitutionally-
guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
(Emphasis & underscoring supplied)
As held by this Court in the above-case of Cruz, the allegation in the information that the therein
accused-appellant sexually abused the therein private complainant by either raping or
committing acts of lasciviousness on her "is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the
offense as required under Section 8 [of Rule 110], for these are conclusions of law, not facts."
Nothing less can be said of the criminal complaints in the cases at bar. They are void for being
violative of the accused-appellants constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
This Court thus takes this occasion to remind public prosecutors of their crucial role in crafting
criminal complaints and information. For all efforts may be rendered futile and justice may be
denied by a failure to state "the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense" as
exemplified by the present case.
The foregoing disquisition leaves it unnecessary to dwell on accused-appellants assigned errors
or of other errors including failure to allege relationship in the first complaint, and lack of proof of
minority in both cases.
WHEREFORE, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. U-9184 and U-9185 are hereby declared null
and void for being violative of the constitutional right of accused-appellant Pedro Flores, Jr. y
Flores alias "Pesiong," for Rape to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Hence, the cases against him are hereby DISMISSED.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accused-appellant
unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the Court accordingly
within 10 days from notice.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123094 January 31, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUISITO PAGLINAWAN, accused-appellant.

MENDOZA, J.:
This in an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Butuan City, finding
accused-appellant guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim P10,000.00 as compensatory damages and
P50,000.00 as indemnity.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about the 20th day of March, 1989, at 9:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
Barangay Lingayao, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and fire
with an Armalite M16 Rifle, the house of Segundino Senados, Sr. inflicting mortal wounds to Jerry
Senados, a seven (7) year old child of Segundino Senados, Sr. and Millianita Senados, who was
sleeping thereat at that time and which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW : Article 248, Revised Penal Code.
Five witnesses were presented for the prosecution: the spouses Segundino and Millianita
Senados, the parents of the victim, PO3 Bernabe Pedregosa, Paquito Garcia, and Sgt. Romeo
Minerva.
Segundino and Millianita Senados testified that on March 20, 1989, at around 9:30 in the
evening, they were in their house in Lingayao, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte, with their eight
children. They were on the second story of their house, lying on the floor about to sleep. The
second floor was lit by a 10-watt fluorescent bulb. There were no partitions nor beds. Suddenly,
they heard a gunshot which struck the light source, throwing the entire room in darkness. After
about five minutes, four bursts of gunfire directed at their house followed. These were made at
short intervals, each burst lasting for about five minutes. Segundino told his wife and children to
lie on their stomachs. Millianita said that while the firing continued, she called on the assailants
to stop. When she touched one of her children, she felt blood on one of them. She also felt blood
on her right foot.
When the firing finally stopped, Segundino and Millianita went towards one side of their house
and peeped through a hole on the wall. They saw accused-appellant armed with an M16 Armalite
rifle looking at their house. The couple said that they saw the face of accused-appellant clearly
and recognized him because there was light from a 50-watt incandescent bulb on the ground
floor of their house. After about two minutes, accused-appellant left.
When Segundino checked on the members of his family, he found his wife and his child Junior
Senados injured, while another child, Jerry Senados, was dead. With the help of Nestor Patombon
and other neighbors, Segundino was able to take his wife Millianita and child Junior to the
hospital. Patombon was the detachment commander of the Civilian Home Defense Force Unit
(CHDFU) and a member of the 23rd Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
On March 27, 1989, seven days after the incident, Segundino went to the police station and
executed an affidavit identifying accused-appellant as the assailant. He said that earlier, on
March 23, 1989, he had gone to the police station to give to the chief of police a statement,
although this was not reduced into writing. Segundino and Millianita said they wanted to give
information to the police and no one else, and did not think of telling Patombon anything about
what they knew. Moreover, Segundino said, he was more concerned about the safety of his
family. On the other hand, Millianita said that did not then point to accused-appellant as the
assailant for fear that he might flee before the police could make an arrest.2
Sgt. Romeo Minerva and PO3 Bernabe Pedregosa, station commander and member, respectively,
of the Las Nieves police station, testified that, on March 24, 1989, at around 3:00 in the
afternoon, they went to the town proper of Lingayao to investigate the strafing incident in the
evening of March 20, 1989.1wphi1.nt
Sgt. Romeo Minerva testified that, based on information furnished by Segundino Senados the day
before, he and Pedregosa looked for accused-appellant on March 24, 1989. They found accused-
appellant in front of the house of Patombon and questioned him about the incident on March 20,
1989. Sgt. Minerva said that accused-appellant refused to talk in a public place but said he was
willing to do so in his house. Accordingly, they proceeded to accused-appellant's house, about 50
meters away, where the latter allegedly confessed to the crime and said that he did it because of
a land conflict with the Senados family.3
PO3 Pedregosa, on the other hand, testified that he went with Sgt. Minerva to Lingayao in
response to a report made by the barangay captain of Lingayao that a strafing incident took
place days earlier. He said he did not know who the suspect was, but when he and Sgt. Minerva
passed by the house of Patombon and asked the people around about accused-appellant,4 the
latter approached them and then and there confessed that he was the one who strafed the house
of the Senadoses.5
Both witnesses said they left accused-appellant and did not arrest him because they did not have
any warrant for his arrest.
Paquito Garcia, a resident of Lingayao, testified that, on the night of March 20, 1989, he was in
the house of a certain Esther Precioso in Barangay Lingayao when he heard gunshots. While he
was walking home, he met one Cipriana Osinaga who asked him where the sound of gunshots
came from. He answered that it seemed to have come from the direction of the Agusan River.
While passing by the house of Francisco Olor, the latter also asked him where the gunshots came
from, to which Garcia gave the same answer. About two minutes later, Garcia said he saw
accused-appellant under the house of Francisco Olor. Accused-appellant was holding an M16
Armalite rifle. The house of Francisco Olor had a high flooring with no walls under it. Garcia said
accused-appellant appeared agitated. When asked where the gunshots could have come from,
accused-appellant answered that they might have come from the direction of the Agusan River.
Garcia quoted accused-appellant as saying that he was on alert because he was marked for
liquidation by the NPA. Garcia further testified that he had seen accused-appellant on previous
occasions carrying an armalite rifle although he could not say the exact occasions.6
The defense presented two witnesses: Nestor Patombon and accused-appellant Luisito
Paglinawan.
Nestor Patombon was the detachment commander of the CHDFU in Las Nieves and a member of
the 23rd Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. He testified that on March 20, 1989, at around
9:00 in the evening, while he was watching television in his house, he heard gunshots a which
lasted for about five to seven minutes. When he went out of his house to investigate, he saw five
members of his unit, including accused-appellant. After a while, one of the Senados children
arrived asking for help because their house had been fired upon. Patombon said he and his men
then proceeded to the house of the Senadoses about 300 to 400 meters away. Upon arrival
there, he asked Segundino Senados if he had seen the person who had shot at their house, but
Segundino did not, know because it was dark. Patombon said he went inside the house and saw
Jerry Senados dead and Millianita Senados wounded. He and his men then took the injured to the
hospital. Patombon testified that the Senadoses never pointed to accused-appellant as the
culprit.
Accused-appellant Luisito Paglinawan, on the other hand, testified that he was a member of the
CHDFU in Lingayao, under Sgt. Nestor Patombon. In the evening of March 20, 1989, at around
9:30 p.m., he was sleeping in his house when he was awakened by the sound of gunfire. So,
bringing with him his carbine, he went to the CHDF detachment half a kilometer away where his
commander, Sgt. Nestor Patombon, and the other members of his unit were. They went to the
place of the Senadoses and found Jerry Senados dead and Junior Senados and his mother
Millianita Senados wounded. The injured victims were taken to the hospital in Patombon's
jeepney.
Accused-appellant confirmed that he was questioned by two policemen for five minutes on March
24, 1989, but he denied he never admitted that he committed the crime. He also denied being
involved in any land conflict with the Senados family.
Several days after this incident, but before he was charged in court, accused-appellant went to
Siquijor. After six months, he returned to Lingayao and it was then he was arrested.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Luisito Paglinawan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder charged in the information and imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of
the crime except treachery which qualified the offense to murder.
The accused is ordered to pay the Spouses Segundino and Millianita Senados compensatory
damages in the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,00.00) Pesos representing burial expenses. In
addition, the accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Jerry Senados the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Court dated
August 30, 1990 (People vs. Yeban).
The accused is entitled to the full benefits of his preventive imprisonment conformably with Art.
29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He shall serve his sentence at the Davao Prison and
Penal Farm at Panabo, Davao del Norte.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant assigns the following errors as having been allegedly committed by the trial:
I. THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR NOT
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION WHAT THE DEFENSE HAD PERSISTENTLY CLAIMED THAT THE
FAILURE OF SPOUSES SEGONDINO AND MILLIANITA SENADOS TO REPORT FOR MANY DAYS THAT
APPELLANT WAS THE ASSAILANT OF THEIR SON AND HAD SHOT MILLIANITA SENADOS' FOOT
SHATTERED WHATEVER CREDENCE CAN BE GIVEN TO HER TESTIMONY ON THE IDENTIFICATION
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED SERIOUSLY IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED
BY THE SENADOS SPOUSES WHO THEY SAID STAYED FOR SOMETIME AT THE SCENE OF THE
CRIME AFTER THE LAST BURST OF GUNFIRE EVEN AS THE ASSAILANT HAD EARLIER SHOT A
LIGHT BULB PRECISELY TO PREVENT BEING IDENTIFIED.
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE IDENTIFICATION
OF APPELLANT AS THE ASSAILANT ON THE BASIS OF THE VOICE OF SEGUNDINO SENADOS
DURING HIS TESTIMONY THAT, ACCORDING TO THE TRIAL COURT, EXUDED WITH CONFIDENCE
EVEN AS IN THE SAME JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION, IT ALREADY RULED THAT THE PURPORTED
CONFESSION OF APPELLANT WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED SERIOUSLY WHEN IT ALLUDED MOTIVE TO KILL THE SENADOS
DESPITE THE WEAKNESS OF THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE CONCLUSION WAS DRAWN.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED IN THE ABSENCE OF THE QUANTUM
OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
First. Accused-appellant points out that the Senados spouses did not immediately point to him as
the culprit but only did so seven days after the incident. He argues that this fact is fatal to the
case of the prosecution, because it casts doubt on his identification as the assailant.
The contention is without merit.
It is settled that the delay of a witness in revealing the identity of the perpetrator of a felony
does not affect his credibility if such delay is adequately explained.8 In the case at bar,
Segundino Senados had good reason for not telling Patombon that he had seen accused-
appellant holding an M16 Armalite shortly after the strafing of their house.
Accused-appellant was a member of the CHDFU under Sgt. Patombon. Considering this
circumstance, the Senados spouses, in their desire to save their family, could have decided to
keep mum about what they know until such time that they saw the police. The immediate
concern of Segundino and Millianita Senados after the strafing of their house was their safety
and that of their children. One child had already died, and it was understandable that they were
concerned that no further lives would be lost. At the same time, they needed the help of Sgt.
Patombon, because he had a vehicle which they could use to transport the injured to the
hospital. So, they had of necessity to ask him for help. There is thus nothing strange in their
decision not to tell him the identity of the suspect.
Segundino testified thus:9
Q While he was in your house with his men, you talked with each other you and Sgt. Patombon, is
it not?
A Yes, we talked.
Q You told him that it was the accused in this case who shot your house?
A No, sir, I did not tell him.
Q Why did not you tell him when he was the first authority that you saw?
A I have forgotten about it because my first reaction was to save may family.
Q You wanted too seek justice, is it not?
A Yes, of course.
Q That was your thoughts also when Sgt. Patombon went to your house, is it not?
A What was on my mind at that time, because I was confused, was to save my family and to
bring the injured to the hospital, I did not think about justice yet.
Q According to you Sgt. Patombon was the detachment commander of the CHDF Unit in
Lingayao. Did he not ask you who shot at your house?
A No, he did not ask.
Q When he went to your house and stayed there for 5 minutes did he ask you who shot your
house?
A He was just silent, sir.
Q Okay, did he ask you why you went to his house and asked for help?
A No, he did not ask.
Q How did he know that you would be requesting for the use of his jeep?
A I told him about the shooting and he was aware of it because of the gunfires.
xxx xxx xxx
Q The fact that according to you it was the accused who shot your wife wounding her on the foot,
that hurt your feelings, is it not Mr. Senados?
A Yes, very much.
Q And despite all these hurts and anguish that you feel, you never told the very first authority
what you saw that it was the accused who was the person who shot your wife and son, is it not?
A All I can is that, at that time I was not able to tell them because I was concerned with my
family and in bringing them to the hospital in Tungao.
xxx xxx xxx
Q As you saw one of your children died and buried, you feel hurt and anguish, and as you saw
your wife languishing in the hospital you also feel hurt and anguish. Now, who was the very first
military officer whom you told about the incident?
A I did not tell anything to any military, it was the police whom I told. I have never confided to
the military.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Let us now be certain because you might have forgotten the events at that time. The first time
you reported to Sgt. Minerva, the Station Commander of Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte, was only
on the 27th day of March, 1989, is that right?
A I went there twice. It was on the second visit in Las Nieves when my affidavit was taken.
Q When you reported for the first time to the police station of Las Nieves when was that?
A Less than a week after the incident happened.
Q Would you say on the 5th day after March 20, 1989?
A I am not sure but what I am sure of is that on the second visit on the 27th, the affidavit was
taken.
Q The first time you reported to the police station, did you tell Sgt. Minerva that it was the
accused who shot at your house killing your son and wounding your wife?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A Yes, sir, I am sure.
Q Are you sure that it was Sgt. Minerva to whom you made the report?
A Yes sir, I am sure.
In the same manner, Millianita Senados testified:10
Q According to you wanted to bring Paglinawan to justice because your son died and you were
injured, and you were also afraid, so you wanted to tell first the military or police official who the
author of the crime was, is it not?
A Yes, Sir, we went to Minerva.
Q Are you referring to the chief of police?
A Yes.
Q Did you tell Minerva that the person who shot at you and your son as well as your house was
Paglinawan?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you tell him?
A When we were already there in Tungao and when my big toe was already healed, that's the
time I told him.
Q How many days after the incident?
A About two (2) weeks after.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Do you know that there was a member of the 23rd Army Battalion by the name of Nestor
Patombon residing near your house?
A Ernesto Patombon.
Q But he was a member of the 23rd Army Battalion based in Lingayao, is it not?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You knew him to be an army officer, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, it was Nestor or Ernesto Patombon whom you asked that you be transported to the
Tungao Hospital, is it not?
A Yes, Sir, because I requested his vehicle.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You knew Patombon to be an army officer and that your son was already dead and you were
wounded, you were angry and you were afraid, did you tell him who shot you and killed your
son?
A We did not tell anything to Patombon because we were in a hurry then to the hospital and
besides it is in our minds that we will tell the incident to the chief of police.
Q You told nobody other than Patombon that it was Paglinawan who shot your son before you
went to the police?
A Nobody.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Listen carefully, don't smile because your son died, you were injured, you were angry and you
wanted that this people be brought to justice, did you not tell Patombon who is a military officer
that it was Paglinawan who shot you and your son?
A I did not tell Patombon. I reserved it to the chief of police because we intended to file a
complainant against Paglinawan.
Q There were other people within the vicinity when you took a ride on that jeep, is it not?
A Yes.
Q You did not tell anyone of them that it was Paglinawan who shot your son and shot you, is that
correct?
A I did not tell anybody because I am afraid that this Paglinawan might flee away. I just reserved
to tell that to the chief of police.
Q But Patombon is an army official why were you afraid that Paglinawan would escape?
A I only intended to tell this incident to the chief of police, Minerva.
Q As an express of your grief because your son died, did it not occur to your mind to tell just
anyone that Paglinawan shot your son?
A At that time, I will never tell anyone because Paglinawan might escape.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Who were on that jeep aside from you and your son?
A My cousin was with me.
Q Could you give us the name of your cousin?
A Antonio Ranuco, my cousin, my son Junior together with my husband and the driver whose
name I do not know.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Your cousin, Antonio Ranuco, was not in your house when it was shot at, is that correct?
A Yes, Sir, he was on the road.
Q You did not even tell your own cousin, Antonio Ranuco, that it was Paglinawan who shot at you
and your son?
A I did not for fear that he might reveal that information to others and Paglinawan may succeed
in escaping.
Thus, the Senados spouses were justified in not pointing accused-appellant to Patombon.
Moreover, there was no considerable delay in reporting the incident to the police. Segundino
went to Sgt. Minerva three days after the incident to identify accused-appellant as the suspect.
This was confirmed by Sgt. Minerva himself and that was the reason they looked for accused-
appellant on March 21, 1989. The police officers acted on the lead furnished by Segundino.
Accused-appellant himself admits that the two policemen questioned him on that day.
Second. Accused-appellant points to the fact that the assailant shot the 10-watt bulb on the
second floor of the Senados house so that he would not be seen. If this were so, there was no
reason he did not also shoot the incandescent bulb on the first floor.
There is no evidence to show that the assailant purposely shot the bulb on the second story of
the house as to prevent his recognition. For aught that we know, the bulb was hit because the
house war strafed. The purpose of the culprit was to kill the occupants of the house. It was only
incidentally that the bulb also got hit.
Indeed, accused-appellant was positively identified as the culprit by the Senados spouses. The
trial court correctly relied on the testimony of the Senados spouses that they saw accused-
appellant in the premises of their house at the night of the incident. As the trial court said:
Situated on an elevated position on the second floor of their 2-storey house, with the 10-watt
fluorescent lamp put off after having been hit by the first shot, Segundino and Millianita Senados,
in the darkened room, have better means and opportunity of vision to see outside the house. The
50-watt incandescent lamp on the first floor provided the illumination of the premises where the
assailant was standing. Let it be noted with significance, that accused Luisito Paglinawan is the
husband of the niece of complainant Millianita Ranuco Senados. The offended party and the
accused live in the same barangay and practically see each other often. Undoubtedly, accused
Luisito Paglinawan an is known to Millianita and her husband. . . . Their testimony was natural
and the recollection of the horrible experience they have undergone appeared to have been
effaced from their memory as they recounted them with conviction and determination as if the
gate of recall was pried open.
It is established that conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court, as well as the assessment
of the credibility of witnesses, are binding on us except when there are facts and circumstances
of weight and influence overlooked by the lower court which could alter the result.11 This case
does not fall under the exception.
Moreover, there was motive for accused-appellant to commit the crime. As Millianita Senados
testified:
His motive is that the land that was the share of my brother Vicente was sold to Florencio Bajao.
Then I redeemed the property from Florencio Bajao and in the case before Branch 1, the Court
ruled that I should be the one to till his land. Thus, I took possession of the land depriving the
father of the accused Evidejo Paglinawan from tilling the land as well as his father-in-law,
Francisco Olor, from continuing their work on that land.
Third. Accused-appellant went to Siquijor and did not return to Barangay Lingayao until six
months later and it was only then that he was finally arrested. It is now claimed that he went to
Siquijor to claim his father's share in the land of his grandparents. This explanation is
unsubstantiated. Moreover, his claim is doubtful because the fact is that his father was still alive.
The inescapable conclusion is that he fled to Siquijor after he was questioned by the police.
Hence, the rule that the flight of an accused is evidence of his guilt fully applies.12
Fourth. The claim of the defense that members of the New People's Army (NPA) could have
committed the crime lacks basis. The supposed "notice" from the NPA, written on a brown
cardboard which was found in the premises of the Senados house claiming responsibility for what
happened and warning the Senadoses to leave the place, cannot prevail over the positive
identification of accused-appellant.
On the other hand, we think the trial court correctly rejected the admissibility of the alleged
confession of accused-appellant to Sgt. Minerva and PO3 Pedrogosa. This extrajudicial confession
was taken without observing the proper procedure under Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution. It is,
therefore inadmissible.
Fifth. The trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstances of treachery and rejected
the allegation of evident premeditation. For as held:
[U]nder the facts of this case based on the evidence the prosecution presented, the Senados
couple was not in a position to defend themselves as the assailant struck at a time when the
occupants of the house have already retired, leaving in the wake of his attack a 6-year old boy
dead and his mother wounded on the left foot. Undoubtedly, there is treachery when the
assailant crept up to his victims who were unaware of the impending damage to their life and
limb. The crime committed is murder.1wphi1.nt
xxx xxx xxx
To authorize a finding of premeditation, it must affirmatively appear from the overt acts of the
accused that he has definitely resolved to commit the offense; that he has from then cooly and
dispassionately reflected both on the means of carrying his resolution into execution and on the
consequences of his designs; and that an appreciable length of time has elapsed as to expect an
aroused conscience to otherwise relent and desist from the accomplishment of the proposed
crime. Definitely, the prosecution has not adduced proof to satisfy the requirements establishing
this qualifying circumstance of premeditation. Mere presumptions and inferences are
insufficient.13
Finally, it is noteworthy that the information filed in this case is only for the murder of Jerry
Senados. Though the prosecution established in the testimony of its witnesses that Millianita
Senados and Junior Senados were injured, the court hold accused-appellant liable for said injuries
since he was not properly charged therefor. The Constitution is clear that an accused has the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.14 Hence, a person
cannot be convicted of a crime for which he has not been charged, otherwise, he would be
denied the due process of law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Butuan City, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.