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Management Inquiry

The Logic of Institutional Logics: Insights From French Pragmatist Sociology

Charlotte Cloutier and Ann Langley
Journal of Management Inquiry 2013 22: 360 originally published online 24 January 2013
DOI: 10.1177/1056492612469057

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of Management Inquiry XX(X)Cloutier and Langley
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The Logic of Institutional Logics: 22(4) 360380

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Charlotte Cloutier1 and Ann Langley1

Abstract
Research on institutional logics has exploded in the last decade. Much of this work has taken its inspiration from Friedland
and Alfords call to bring society back in to organizational analysis. Interestingly, when Friedland and Alford published their
seminal piece, another body of work with similar focus emerged in France under the banner of French Pragmatist Sociology.
In this article, we discuss how French Pragmatist Sociology complements institutional logics by helping it address its main
limitations or blind spots. These include (a) microfoundations and recursiveness (how institutions are formed, maintained,
or changed at a micro level), (b) legitimacy struggles (how struggles are resolved on a day-to-day basis), (c) morality (as an
important element underscoring institutional logics), and (d) materiality (as physical and tangible instantiations of logics). We
conclude by suggesting that a rapprochement between both approaches provides an elegant means of bridging the lingering
divide between old and new institutionalism.

Keywords
institutional logics, orders of worth, French pragmatist theory, institutional theory

Introduction
The institutional logics perspective has proven to be a useful
and practical lens through which to account for the plurality
of norms and beliefs in institutional theory and for explain-
ing the processes underscoring institutional formation and
change. Institutional theory has indeed gained considerably
in sophistication over the last three decades, evolving from a
predominant focus on isomorphism and the routine, taken-
for-granted aspects of human behavior (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Thornton & Ocasio,
2008) to now formally recognizing the inherent fluidity of
institutions and their recursive aspects (Thornton, Ocasio, &
Lounsbury, 2012). Consequently, early visions of institutions
as monoliths acting as invisible and powerful constraints on
human behavior have progressively been replaced by a much
more recursive view, premised on the fact that although insti-
tutions certainly constrain action, they are nevertheless the
product of human actions. As such, their reproduction is
negotiated by social actors on an ongoing basis in a process
that, given the stakes involved, is inevitably rife with con-
flict, contradiction and ambiguity (DiMaggio & Powell,
1991, p. 28). In light of this shift, institutional logics have
provided a plausible explanation for what might be at the
source of institutional conflict and by association numerous
insights as to how institutional arrangements are formed and
how they come to change over time.
Despite the many insights that work under the banner of
institutional logics have helped unveil (and perhaps even
because of it), it remains important to consider what is miss-
ing from current conceptualizations and explore how bridg-
ing institutional logics with other related areas of scholarship
might help address gaps or blind spots in extant theory
(Thornton et al., 2012, p. 129). Our goal in this article is thus
to outline the blind spots or less developed areas within cur-
rent conceptualizations of institutional logics and undertake
one such bridging explorationnamely to examine how a
branch of French Pragmatist Sociology, as summarized in
the work of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thvenot (1991,
2006), might help enhance our overall understanding of
institutional logics and their role in shaping institutionaliza-
tion processes.
Specifically, we identify four blind spots that we think are
not addressed as well as they might be within the institutional
logics perspective. First, our understanding of how institu-
tional processes play out at a micro level, on a day-to-day
basis, remains limited (Barley, 2008; Hallett & Ventresca,
2006; Powell & Colyvas, 2008). Second, recent empirical
studies do not focus as well as they might on the specific
dynamics related to struggles over legitimacy that are
a natural side-effect of pluralism and are thus central to
1
HEC Montreal, Quebec, Canada
Corresponding Author:
Charlotte Cloutier, HEC Montreal, 3000, chemin de la Cte-Ste-Catherine,
Montral, Quebec, Canada H3T 2A7.
Email: charlotte.cloutier@hec.ca

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Cloutier and Langley 361
understanding institutional dynamics. Third, neo-institutional
thoughts, and by association current conceptualizations of
institutional logics, have lost their original moral element
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), which shrouds one of the pri-
mary motivators for why organizational actors endorse a par-
ticular logic over another, and thus, withholds an important
explanatory mechanism for deepening our understanding of
institutional processes. Finally, the way in which logics man-
ifest themselves in material objects has been largely over-
looked. It is our contention that these limitations may have
arisen primarily because of the specific epistemological and
ontological assumptions underscoring institutional logics,
limitations that we argue might be addressed, thanks to the
contributions of French Pragmatist Sociology.
Our article is structured as follows. We begin by elaborat-
ing on the notion of institutional logics, tracing the fields
theoretical evolution over recent years and highlighting the
theorys blind spots as discussed above. We then introduce
Boltanski and Thvenots economies of worth framework
(henceforward called the EW framework), outline its points
of convergence and divergence with institutional logics, and
discuss, using examples, how the EW framework, and nota-
bly its conceptualization of logics as a toolkit of resources
that actors can call upon at will to rhetorically promote par-
ticular definitions of legitimacy, can be used to enrich our
overall understanding of institutional logics, and institutional
theory more broadly. We then explore how a rapprochement
between approaches might help extend even further our
understanding of institutional processes and discuss remain-
ing areas of ambiguity. Finally, we conclude by arguing that a
closer friendship between institutional logics and French
Pragmatist Sociology provides an elegant means of bridging
the lingering divide between old and new institutional-
ism, or in other words, helps reconcile ongoing tensions
between agency and structure in institutional debates.
Institutional LogicsAn Overview
The concept of institutional logics was first introduced by
Roger Friedland and Robert Alford in their seminal piece
Bringing Society Back In published in the New
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Friedland &
Alford, 1991). In this article, Friedland and Alford defined
central logics as the set of material practices and symbolic
constructions that constitute each institutional orders orga-
nizing principles and that is available to organizations and
individuals to elaborate (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 232).
Thornton and Ocasio (2008) further elaborated on this defi-
nition by emphasizing that logics are socially constructed,
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values,
beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and repro-
duce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and
provide meaning to their social reality (p. 101). In essence,
logics can be viewed as bundled sets or ensembles of higher
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order meanings, values, norms, and/or rules that frame how
individuals make sense of the world around them and conse-
quently know how to act. They reflect organizing principles
that help frame collective action. More recently, Thornton
et al. (2012) further developed this conceptualization, build-
ing on Friedland and Alfords (1991) initial typology of log-
ics to propose a set of seven ideal type institutional orders
constructed according to a set of nine descriptive categories
that enable classification. The authors argue that these insti-
tutional orders can be combined and instantiated into more
specific field-level logics depending on a fields resource
flows, opportunities, and constraints (Thornton et al., 2012).
In earlier years, institutional logics studies focused primar-
ily on documenting field-level institutional change, usually
over fairly long periods of time. The intent was to study how
shifts in dominant institutional logics influenced organiza-
tional structures and practices. Notable examples of studies in
this vein include those by Thornton and colleagues on how
shifts in institutional logics impacted the academic publishing
industry. The shift from an editorial to a market logic was seen
to manifest itself in changes in organizational structure (from
unitary [U] to multidivisional [M] form; Thornton, 2002), in
organizational power relationships and determinants of execu-
tive succession (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), and in organiza-
tional strategy more generally. Other examples include
DiMaggios (1991) study of how prevailing institutional log-
ics shaped the institutional field of art museums, Haveman
and Raos (1997) study of how organizational structures
shifted along with prevailing logics in the early thrift industry,
Scott, Ruef, Mendel, and Caronnas (2000) study of institu-
tional change in the U.S. health care industry, Greenwood and
Suddabys (2006) study of change in professional service log-
ics and organizational design, Goodricks (2000) study of the
rise of science-based concepts in the academic management
field, and Lounsburys (2002) study of how shifts in institu-
tional logics opened up possibilities for various actors to make
new status claims in the field of finance.
Further evidence of the link between logics and practice
can be found in Lounsburys (2007) study of how different
institutional logics (each of which prevailed in different cities)
led to variation in the way mutual fund companies established
contracts with independent professional money management
firms. Interestingly, in this study, geography rather than time
was the principle factor explaining the differences in prevail-
ing logics and practices. Glynn and Lounsburys (2005) study
on shifting logics in an orchestra showed that shifts in logics
can occur swiftly, as a result of exogenous shock, with reper-
cussions for organizational practices and evaluative criteria (in
this case, external stakeholdersnotably criticsshifting
criteria for judging quality and appropriateness of orchestral
performances). Both these studies helped further solidify the
general argument that institutional logics manifest them-
selves materially in organizational structures and practices,
or in other words, that institutions matter.
362 Journal of Management Inquiry 22(4)
Once this was established, scholars started to become
interested in studying fields where a single logic had yet to
dominate and consequently more than one logic could simul-
taneously be affecting field-level cognitive beliefs, norms,
and practices. Coexisting logics inevitably arise during the
transitional phase between shifting logics in a mature field or
in the early stages of an emerging field (where a dominant
logic has yet to become institutionalized). It is usually during
such moments that institutional conflict and contestation are
made particularly salient as varying groups of actors try to
impose their preferred, and not always compatible, logic on
the field. From this perspective, it then became interesting to
study not only the processes whereby a particular logic
comes to dominate in a field but also the processes that allow
for multiple logics to coexist over extended periods of time
(and thus to explain why in some fields, dominance of a sin-
gle logic remains persistently elusive). A number of interest-
ing studies have been conducted in this vein. Marquis and
Lounsbury (2007) and Lok (2010), for example, demon-
strated empirically how competing logics facilitated resis-
tance to a dominant logic, thus counterbalancing isomorphic
pressures and enabling the coexistence of multiple logics in
the fields they studied. These studies also helped explain
why there is institutional residue or why behaviors associ-
ated with formerly dominant logics tend to persist, even
when a fields dominant logic has shifted (Maguire & Hardy,
2006; Zilber, 2011). Purdy and Gray (2009), Reay and
Hinings (2009), and Battilana and Dorado (2010) for their
part looked at mechanisms that enabled the maintenance of
multiple (and often contradictory) logics within a field,
thereby formally refuting prior assumptions that only one
logic can dominate in a stabilized field.
Recognizing that multiple logics can coexist within a
field refocused scholars attention on the notion of multiple.
With few exceptions however (Heimer, 1999), studies that
looked at multiple logics tended to oppose only two logics
against each other (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta,
& Lounsbury, 2011). Scholars began to question whether this
was an accurate reflection of the empirical reality in which
most organizational actors found themselves (Stryker, 2000;
Zilber, 2008). As a consequence of social movement pres-
sures (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003), or simply on
the basis of organizational actors being exposed to multiple
worldviews (Binder, 2007; Delmestri, 2006; Greenwood,
Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002), reducing field-level reality to
one or two logics seemed reductive, even if convenient from
an analytical standpoint. These authors argued that pluralism
is more likely to be the norm rather than the exception in any
given field. More recent discussions within the ongoing insti-
tutional logics conversation have consequently called for an
explicit and more systematic consideration of institutional
pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 2008) or institutional multiplicity
(Greenwood, Diaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; Zilber, 2011) in
institutional studies. Recognizing this need, Greenwood et al.
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(2011) elaborated the idea of institutional pluralism further
by suggesting that pluralism is at the source of institutional
complexity in organizational environments and by arguing
that some fields are more complex than others on the basis of
how fragmented and/or centralized they are. Recent exam-
ples of studies that have begun to explicitly consider institu-
tional multiplicity or pluralism in their framing include
Greenwood et al.s (2010) study on the interplay between
market, state, and family logics in Spain and Zilbers (2011)
study on the routine, ongoing practices that sustain institu-
tional multiplicity in the Israeli high-tech industry.
Institutional theory in general and our understanding of
institutional logics in particular have thus considerably
evolved since Friedland and Alfords (1991) seminal work
first introduced the concept some 20 years ago. Despite the
substantial milestones achieved however, our understanding
of interplay between logics and how such interplay influ-
ences institutional processes and outcomes continues to
present a number of shortcomings which we turn to now.
Institutional LogicsShortcomings
and Future Outlook
Despite the insightfulness of the work accomplished to date,
a number of blind spots in current theorizations of institu-
tional logics remain. Here we discuss four such blind spots.
Most of these have already been identified by various schol-
ars in one form or another. They are grouped together here
as a means of synthesis.
Micro-Level Processes and Recursiveness
Although institutional scholars now acknowledge that orga-
nizations are exposed to competing demands from multiple
and often incompatible logics, we still know relatively little
about how they proactively deal with such conflict at the
micro level (Greenwood et al., 2011; Pache & Santos, 2010).
Although interest in this area is increasing (Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009; Reay &
Hinings, 2009), few studies have dug deep into the inner
workings of institutional conflict and struggle to open the
black box of institutional processes under conditions of
multiplicity (Zilber, 2011). This may be the case in part
because the institutional logics perspective has not so far
provided the necessary conceptual tools to help effectively
untangle how conflicts are resolved at this level.
Focusing on the inner workings of institutional struggle
makes it necessary to highlight the recursiveness of institu-
tional relations, something that has been alluded to by differ-
ent authors but that has not been thoroughly investigated
empirically. As Hallett and Ventresca (2006) have argued,
institutions are inhabited by people and their interactions
(p. 213) and that although institutional logics carry meaning,
it is also true that meaning arises through social interaction
Cloutier and Langley 363
(p. 215). Hallett and Ventrescas arguments make the link
between institutions and agency clear and hint at how actors
can shape and change institutional logics by manipulating
the cognitive resources made available to them by means of
multiple institutional logics, in the same way that actors will
draw on Swidlers (1986) toolkit of cultural resources in
their enactment of culture. Although institutional logics can
be viewed as providing the raw materials and guidelines
(Hallett & Ventresca, 2006, p. 215), the cultural building
blocks (Zilber, 2008, p. 156), or the symbolic grammar
(Thornton et al., 2012) that organizational actors use in their
social interactions to produce and reproduce the very institu-
tions they are embedded in, conceptually they fall short of
providing an actual repertoire of tools and specific resources
that actors can draw on, both discursively and materially, in
their deliberate struggles to ensure that a particular logic pre-
vails in a given context or situation. We thus need to have a
clearer idea of the content of these institutional and cognitive
toolkits to better understand how people use them in their
attempts to instigate or resist external and internal institu-
tional pressures to change.
Legitimacy Struggles
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) have argued that institu-
tional change results from shifts in the logics whereby legiti-
macy is assessed or, in other words, the standards whereby
alternatives (in terms of practices, identities, cognitive
beliefs, etc.) are deemed to be appropriate (p. 35) or not by
field-level actors. Stryker (2000) has made a similar argu-
ment, pointing out that legitimacy processes not only
explain institutionalization and stability, but also help explain
deinstitutionalization and change in organizations and in
organizational fields (p. 180). Taking the position that the
criteria whereby legitimacy is assessed are encoded within
institutional logics (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), one can
argue that struggles over conflicting logics are in fact legiti-
macy struggles, where organizational actors symbolically
battle out what each thinks is (or should be) legitimate (p.
36) in a given field. Thus, institutional logics can be said to
shape the boundaries of what is considered to be desirable,
proper and appropriate (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) in any
given field or context. However, despite these observations
and some notable exceptions at trying to make sense of them
(Jones & Livne-Tarandach, 2008; Suddaby & Greenwood,
2005), relatively little effort has gone into exploring more
fully and deeply the processual aspects of legitimacy (i.e.,
the rhetorical, discursive, and technical struggles over what
is legitimate or not; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008), particu-
larly as they play out in institutionally complex fields.
Again, this may be because of the limitations imposed by
some of the assumptions underscoring institutional logics
and, in particular, the tendency within this view to conceptu-
alize legitimacy in binary terms (something is legitimate or
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not), which precludes considering specific mechanisms
whereby legitimacy might be assessed in degrees. This is an
important limitation, given that legitimacy, and in particular,
how it is assessed and granted (or not), is central to neo-
institutionalist thought.
Moral Dimension of Logics
Current conceptualizations of institutional logics have for
the most part discarded the moral undercurrents that were
part and parcel of their origins (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).
Indeed, it is difficult to consider the concept of legitimacy
without considering that what social actors generally think is
appropriate is not so for taken-for-granted reasons only. It
is considered so because it is the right thing to think or do
for these actors in a truly moral sense (Vaisey, 2009). Even
the notion of logic of appropriateness (Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006; March, 1994; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008),
which is frequently cited to describe institutional logics, has
moral underpinnings that tend to be bypassed or ignored in
existing theorizations. Indeed, much of the literature in insti-
tutional theory tends to equate legitimacy with conformity to
normative, regulative, and sociocognitive elements of a given
institutional field (Scott, 2008). Things are judged to be
legitimate or not on the basis of their conformity to these ele-
ments, and not on the basis of their being right or wrong
in a moral sense. Yet, if social actors begin to question the
institutional status quo, it will usually be because they con-
sider that some aspect of the status quo is wrong or
unfair. Downplaying the moral dimensions of logics
shrouds from view one of the most powerful motivators for
why organizational actors endorse a particular logic over
another, or why they would so vehemently defend a different
logic from the prevailing one. Such moral myopia effec-
tively withholds an important explanatory mechanism for
deepening our understanding of institutional dynamics.
Materiality
Many definitions of institutional logics have explicitly sug-
gested that they encompass both symbolic systems of
meaning and related material practices (Friedland &
Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Indeed, institu-
tional logics have frequently been examined for their
contributions to emerging structural forms and practices.
Others have noted how shifts in institutional logics may
be related to the emergence of new categories with material
qualities. For example, Rao, Monin, and Durand (2003)
explored the emergence of the nouvelle cuisine move-
ment that is inherently related to new ways of cooking. Yet,
the various typologies of institutional logics proposed by
Thornton and Ocasio (2008) and Thornton et al. (2012) do
not include specific references to tangible objects but tend
to focus, as does much of the research in this area, more
364 Journal of Management Inquiry 22(4)
strongly on the symbolic aspects of logics. When they refer
to material aspects, they do so only in terms of structures
and practices (Thornton et al., 2012) and not more specifi-
cally in terms of objects and technologies through which
logics might become instantiated. The importance of objects
and technologies is underscored by Czarniawska (2008)
who suggested that one of the blind spots of institutional
theory turns around the degree to which various institu-
tional responsibilities have been partially transferred to
machine technologies and therefore partially removed from
everyday awareness (p. 774). Whiteman and Cooper
(2000) argued even further that concern for materiality
needs to extend beyond separable objects to the interrelated
ecological embeddedness of human activity in the natural
world, which affords a considerably richer view of materi-
ality and its influence on institutional processes than current
conceptualizations from an institutional logics perspective.
In general, greater awareness of the imbrications of materi-
ality within institutional forms (the sociomaterial entan-
glement of Orlikowski, 2007, and Latour, 2005) could
contribute to a richer understanding of the constitution,
constraints, and affordances of institutional logics.
In sum, there is still considerable room to further advance
the institutional logics research agenda. Different scholars
have raised several of the issues discussed above, and although
various studies have been developed to address them, there is
still much that can be accomplished. In particular, a synthesis
of the above issues remains elusive. What might we stand to
gain by considering all of these aspects collectively? Focusing
on micro-level processes using a toolkit approach to help
explain how organizational actors produce justificatory
accounts and negotiate what locally is considered to be legiti-
mate or not (Barley, 2008) offers an interesting and underex-
plored way forward for institutional research. Pursuing such
an objective requires a useful analytical framework that speci-
fies the mechanisms and the resources that actors can use to
make the case for legitimacy in a given situation or context.
Such a framework, which needs to take the form of a toolkit,
already exists (Silber, 2003) but stems from a body of litera-
ture that has yet to gain traction among English-speaking man-
agement scholars. In the next section, we explore how French
Pragmatist Sociology, represented here by Luc Boltanski and
Laurent Thvenots (1991, 2006) typology of various econo-
mies of worth, might help enhance our overall understanding
of institutional logics and their role in shaping institutionaliza-
tion processes.1
French Pragmatist
SociologyAn Overview
Considered by some to be the most important sociological
treatise in post-Bourdieu French sociology (Baert & Carreira
da Silva, 2010), Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thvenots
(1991, 2006) On Justification arose out of a direct critique of
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Bourdieus critical sociology. Boltanski and Thvenots main
contention was that critical sociology gave too much weight
to the dispositional properties of actors, consequently under-
estimating their critical competencies or in other words,
their capacity to regard the situations they found themselves
in critically, and to act accordingly (Jagd, 2011). This dichot-
omy partially explains why Bourdieus critical sociology is
often regarded as a sociology of culture, whereas Boltanski
and Thvenots pragmatist sociology is regarded as a sociol-
ogy of action (Bnatoul, 1999; Silber, 2003). In this regard,
they are surprisingly close in their methods and theorizations
to Garfinkels ethnomethodology and Strausss symbolic
interactionism, both of which have been called upon as pos-
sible theoretical frames and methodological approaches for
enriching institutional theory (Barley, 2008). Indeed, both
interactionists and pragmatist sociologists treat institutions
as constraints while emphasizing the role that human agency
and vested interests play in creating, maintaining and chang-
ing institutions (Barley, 2008, p. 495). For both, institutions
were both a product of and resources for interaction and
negotiation in everyday life (Barley, 2008, p. 498). Likewise
for both, struggles for legitimacy are at the heart of institu-
tional processes (Barley, 2008). Where French pragmatist
sociologists distinguish themselves from the interactionists is
in their making the actual structure of institutions (or logics)
explicit. This makes it arguably easier to empirically tease
out in social contexts the relative influence of structure over
agency (and vice versa) and thus arrive at a more fine-grained
understanding of the microdynamics underscoring institu-
tional formation and change.
As with institutional logics, in seeking to provide better
explanation for social action, French Pragmatist Sociology
starts with an assumption of pluralism. The basis for this
assumption was the authors and others (Silber, 2003) observa-
tion that social actors justificatory and legitimating accounts
for their beliefs and actions tended to almost always be made in
reference to a limited number of broad-based sets of values and
conceptions of the common good. This the authors confirmed
over the course of several studies undertaken in the early 1980s
in which they systematically analyzed the reasons social actors
gave for harboring a given opinion or taking a particular course
of action, notably in cases when such opinions or actions were
being challenged by others.
Based on these premises, Boltanski and Thvenot (2006)
then set themselves the task of identifying and describing, in
a pragmatic way, the structure and content of each set of
beliefs about the common good they observed. They did so
by taking inspiration from canonical philosophical texts
thought to constitute the foundation of various forms of the
common good and anchoring them in practical rules of good
practice as reflected in modern day manuals designed to pro-
vide people with practical advice on normal modes of
behaviour (Boltanski & Thvenot, 2006, p. 150) in specific
situations.
Cloutier and Langley 365

Table 1. Summary Description of Each EW World (after Boltanski & Thvenot, 1991).
The inspired world
The realm of creativity and art. In this world, what is most valued is that which is passionate, emergent, spontaneous, and inspired.
The creative journey, with its ups and downs, its moments of elation, and its subsequent feelings of doubt and suffering, is what life is
all about: an adventure, an endless horizon of mystery, and a discovery. The journey is the end, not the means. Moments of genius
are unpredictable and unexpected: They appear in flashes and sparks. Actors in this world are repulsed by habit and shun routines. They
dream, imagine, take risks, and live.
The domestic world
The realm of the family in its symbolic sense. In this world, what is valued is that which is firm, loyal, selfless, and trustworthy.
Hierarchy and tradition play central roles. Superiors are informed and wise, and must care and nurture those who are lower in the
hierarchy. Great importance is attached to ones upbringing, as upbringing and good manners reflect where one comes from. The
priority of actors in this world is on preserving, protecting, and nurturing the unit (family, guild, group, etc.) to which one belongs, as
without this unit, one is nothing.
The world of fame
The realm of fame and popularity. In this world, what is valued is that which is visible, famous, influential, fashionable, and recognized.
The worth of actors is determined by the opinion of others. To be banal, unknown, or forgotten is shameful. An undiscovered genius
is a contradiction, as a genius cannot be genial if not known. Any and all means for achieving fame and recognition are sought after and
legitimate.
The civic world
The realm of duty and solidarity. In this world, what is valued is that which is united, representative, legal, official, and free. Individuals
in this world accede to worth by freely joining and being part of a collective, their individual will subordinated to the general will, that
which seeks the common good, the good of all. Leaders are elected and valued because they represent the aspirations of the masses.
To place individual interests ahead of collective interests is panacea in this world. One for all, and all for one.
The market world
The realm of money and the market. In this world, what is valued is rare, expensive, valuable, and profitable. The law of the market
prevails, and actors deemed worthy are those who know how to take advantage of it and reap its rewards (e.g., wealth). Wealth is an
end, and individuals with dignity in this world are detached from the chains of belonging and liberated from the weight of hierarchies.
This gives them the ability to judge market opportunities objectively, unemotionally, and thus win.
The industrial world
The realm of measures and efficiency. In this world, what is valued is precise, functional, professional, productive, efficient, and
useful. A world where technological objects and scientific methods take center stage. Optimization and progress are noble
pursuits. All forms of waste are frowned upon. Actors in this world are professional, hardworking, focused, and thorough.
Perfection is to be found in the optimally functioning system (whether mechanical, technological, or human).
Note: EW = economies of worth.

In this manner, Boltanski and Thvenot developed six
sets of equivalent definitions of what is the most proper or
legitimate action or standard of action (Silber, 2003, p. 429)
to pursue in a given situation or context. Because each set
provided the means whereby individuals and situations could
be judged to be worthy (or not), the authors named them
orders of worth, later calling them worlds.2 A narrative
description of Boltanski and Thvenots six worlds (labeled the
inspired world, the domestic world, the world of fame, the civic
world, the market world, and the industrial world) appears in
Table 1. The authors work also led to the development of a
detailed grammar of key components (see Table 2 for a
detailed explanation and examples), around which each
world is constructed.3 In this grammar, one finds the differ-
ent roles that worthy participants in a given world play, lists
of characteristics of individuals and things that are deemed
particularly worthy as compared with others, symbolic
objects, and even evaluative methods for assessing worthi-
ness of people and things in various contexts. Below we
explain how the different elements of the framework can be
used by actors to help resolve disputes over what each
believes are the proper criteria whereby a particular situa-
tion should be judged for worthiness, and thus appropriate-
ness and legitimacy.
The EW Frameworks Worlds
The EW frameworks worlds are thus in many ways similar
to the logics in institutional logics. Both refer to higher
common principles that reflect the degree of legitimacy of
certain rules and values in society and define appropriate
forms of conduct (Patriotta, Gond, & Schultz, 2011, p. 2)
that serve as core organizing principles underscoring collec-
tive action. Where the EW framework differs from institu-
tional logics is in its assumption that social actors do not
tend to interpret and make sense of the world in a predeter-
mined way, as dictated by a particular, dominant institu-
tional logic. Rather, the EW framework assumes that actors
can draw on elements from any world and use them strate-
gically to suit their rhetorical needs in situations where

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366 Journal of Management Inquiry 22(4)

Table 2. Elements of a Grammar for Boltanski and Thvenots Orders of Worth.

Description (using orders of Description (using institutional Example: Inspired Example: Industrial
Feature worth terminology) logics terminology) world world
Higher common Core organizing principle that Fundamental goal that Inspiration Efficiency performance
principle characterizes a given world, for underpins the organizing
example, what matters most principles of a particular logic
in any given situation
Characteristics
State of worthiness Characteristics that help define Features of objects and What is worthy is What is worthy is
what is most worthy and persons that establish their bizarre, spontaneous, functional, reliable, or
therefore valued in a given legitimacy exciting, disturbing, operational
world or emotional
State of deficiency Characteristics that help Features of objects and What is unworthy is What is unworthy is
define what is least worthy and persons that confirm their lack reality, habits, and amateurism
therefore shunned in a given of legitimacy routines
world
Relation of worth Concept that differentiates The principal criterion Uniqueness Controllability
what is worthy from what is whereby objects and persons
less worthy in a given world are deemed to be more or less
legitimate
Actions and behaviors
Human dignity A physical faculty (e.g., an Appropriate behaviors that Love, passion, Shared work ethic
emotion, a memory, a habit, a actors are expected to engage creativity
desire) that forms the basis of in to be considered legitimate
agreement between persons
Investment formula The price to pay to rise A tangible manifestation of Breaking away from Making progress
to the status of worthy (In commitment to the beliefs routines
principle, the state of being underscoring a particular logic.
worthy is accessible to all, but Implies sacrifice that confers/
not all will make the necessary solidifies legitimacy
investments for becoming so.)
Material manifestations
List of participants People (in terms of their roles Examples of particularly Visionaries, artists Professionals, experts,
and objects or identities) and objects that legitimate actors and/or Dreams, visions, the specialists
are representative of a given objects unconscious Tools, methods, lists,
world graphs, goals
Harmonious figures A symbol that captures the A symbol that captures the The imaginary A system
of the natural essence of a given world essence of what is legitimate
order
Model test A test is an objective means for The material means or method The completion of a The conduct of an
assessing worthiness. Serves as whereby legitimacy is assessed quest experimental trial
a tool for resolving disputes or
conflict within a given world
Source: Adapted from Amblard, Bernoux, Herreros, and Livian (1996), and Boltanski and Thvenot (2006).

there is disagreement over what is the right or appropriate
course of action to follow. What is right in a given context is
not circumscribed by a particular institutional field, as all
worlds are available to all actors in any field. Each of the
EW frameworks worlds is carefully constructed to reflect
the full range of arguments, principles, and methods of
evaluation, competencies, practices, and so on that actors
might deploy when seeking to justify and legitimate a par-
ticular course of action. For example, the higher common
principle of the industrial world focuses on efficiency and
performance. Work and energy are valued, and profession-
als, experts, and specialists are honored. Worthiness is rec-
ognized in effectiveness, functionality, and dependability,
and unworthiness is associated with amateurism and lack of
productivity. Key objects used to support justifications are
tools, resources, methods, and plans. The set of elements
associated with each of the six worlds is fully described in
the appendix.
Taken together, Boltanski and Thvenots suite of worlds
effectively represents a repertoire or a toolkit of cognitive,

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Cloutier and Langley 367
symbolic, and material elements that actors can actively draw
upon to justify their actions and beliefs or to convince others as
to what beliefs or actions are appropriate in a given situation.
Each world provides the means whereby a competent social
actor can assess and even to some degree prove what things,
actions, or beliefs are deemed worthy or not in any given situ-
ation, worthiness in EW terms being equivalent to legitimacy
in institutional logic terms. Unlike Thornton et al.s (Thornton,
Jones, & Kury, 2005; Thornton et al., 2012) more descriptive
typologies, Boltanski and Thvenots typology of worlds is
constructed in such a way as to make it possible to unpack the
mechanisms whereby worthiness (or legitimacy) is granted in
one world and show the very specific cultural, symbolic, and
material resources, stemming from different worlds, that
actors might mobilize to overcome their disagreements and
thus engage in collective action (or not). We now elaborate on
these key elements of the framework before describing with
empirical examples how it may assist in addressing some of
the blind spots of the institutional logics perspective.
Worthiness (or Legitimacy)
Within One World
Part of Boltanski and Thvenots conceptualization serves to
determine who (actors) and what (things) are deemed worthy
in a given world. This is an important idea because only wor-
thy subjects and objects are deemed to be legitimate and can
thus represent the views of a given world and legitimately
engage in debates on its behalf when there are disputes as to
what world should predominate in a given situation.
Furthermore, unlike legitimacy in institutional theory
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008), worthiness in the EW frame-
work is not viewed as a binary concept (one can be more or
less worthy, as opposed to only worthy or not worthy). How
worthiness is assessed depends on a number of factors that
are fully outlined in Table 2. So, for example, to attain some
degree of worthiness, social actors need to believe in certain
ideas and engage in certain practices (higher common prin-
ciple and human dignity). One must reflect certain character-
istics and avoid others (states of worthiness and states of
deficiency). Higher levels of worthiness can be achieved if
one makes a significant, preferably irreversible, commitment
to those beliefs, in the form of an investment, which is differ-
ent from one world to the next. Those who make such an
investment will be deemed to be particularly worthy (e.g.,
legitimate) in a given world and will be able to act as legiti-
mate spokespersons on behalf of that world.
Modes of Interaction
Within and Between Worlds
As already mentioned, the principles underlying each world
within the EW framework can apply to any situation. Which
principles will predominate in any given situation will
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depend on any number of factors, including circumstance,
habit, routine, culture, norms, and so on. In many situations
(if not most), what principles should apply are taken for
granted. This corresponds to taken-for-granted beliefs, norms,
and practices that prevail and underscore collective action in
a given field from an institutional logics perspective as well.
However, where the EW framework differs from institutional
logics is in its core assumption that even well-established norms
and beliefs can be contested at any time and routinely are. This
echoes Zuckers (1988) early suggestion that institutions are
naturally unstable, on account of the natural decay of institu-
tionalized elements, by divergent self-interest, by divergence
of micro- and macrostructure and action, and by other pro-
cesses such as power (p. 45). Thus, unlike the tendency
within institutional logics, contestation is not viewed as an
exceptional case, something that occurs only occasionally.
Within the EW framework, contests over what higher order
beliefs should prevail in a given situation are a frequent and
normal occurrence in institutional life. In the case of pluralis-
tic organizations (Kraatz & Block, 2008), incidences of con-
test or pushback occur on a daily basis. When contestation
occurs, the choice as to which world should predominate is
subject to dispute, with different actors lobbying in favor of
one world over another, which they do primarily by first cri-
tiquing the principles underlying other worlds and then by
drawing on cultural, symbolic, and material resources from
their chosen world to make the case for why that worlds per-
spective should apply to the given situation. Thus, in situa-
tions where there is disagreement (a dispute) over which
principles should underscore collective action, actors will
rhetorically mobilize various critiques and resources in an
effort to impose a particular world on the situation. Because
EW worlds are based on inherently different principles, and
because no two worlds can apply to the same situation with-
out some diminishment of one or both worlds core princi-
ples, the outcome of such debates determines whether
collective action can occur, and if so, on what basis.
Boltanski and Thvenots (2006) concept of test is an
important mechanism whereby disputes within and between
worlds are resolved:
A test of worth cannot be reduced to a theoretical
debate. It engages persons, in their bodily existence, in
a world of things that serve as evidence, and in the
absence of which the dispute does not have the mate-
rial means of resolution by testing. (p. 131)
The purpose of a test is to remove uncertainty: A test clari-
fies hierarchies (who or what is more or less worthy) and legit-
imizes actors and objects within worlds. To be deemed
admissible in a trial, for example, the evidence presented must
meet precise and objective criteria. Assessing whether a piece
of evidence meets these criteria consists of a test of sorts, one
that in principle is deemed to be objective. It is in this same
368 Journal of Management Inquiry 22(4)
Table 3. How Differences Between Logics or Worlds Are Reconciled.
Modalities of
agreement Boltanski and Thvenot (2006)
Type 1 Resolution in one world
The views of one world apply;
dissenting views are rhetorically
silenced
Type 2 Local arrangements
Loose cohabitation
Agreeing to disagree
Temporary arrangements
Type 3 Compromise
Developing new terms on which a
lasting agreement might be forged
May become institutionalized over
time
Type 4 Collective action not possible
sense that tests are used in the EW framework: as an operation
drawing on appropriate kinds of evidence whereby worth can
be assessed within worlds. As illustrated in the appendix, the
form of such tests varies according to the specific world. In
situations of dispute, contests often arise to determine which
test of worth should legitimately apply to the situation. By
empirically seeking evidence of contests over tests, it becomes
possible to highlight the processes and circumstances whereby
the principles of certain worlds come to take precedence over
others (and eventually lose their status, only to regain it) over
time, and by so doing to better understand the microprocesses
whereby institutions are formed, maintained, and disrupted.
In sum then, it can be argued that Boltanski and Thvenots
elaboration of disputes, critiques, and tests effectively pro-
vides a repertoire of rhetorical tools that social actors can use
to actively engage in the legitimacy struggles that drive, as
discussed above, institutionalization processes, particularly
in fields characterized by institutional complexity.
Modalities of Agreement
Between Worlds
As with institutional logics, clashes between worlds can be
resolved in various ways. Boltanski and Thvenot have
developed their own typology of ways that disputes between
worlds might be resolved, which align with the empirical
observations of institutional logics scholars and with theo-
ries advanced by authors who have looked at the different
ways of dealing with institutional conflict (Pache & Santos,
2010) or pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 2008) in organizations.
A comparison between approaches can be found in Table 3.
Although institutional logics scholars have not yet produced
their own typology of how conflicting logics are reconciled,
various empirical studies point in directions similar to those
already outlined by Boltanski and Thvenot in 1991. In the
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Pache and Santos
Kraatz and Block (2008) (2010) Institutional logics (in general)
Eliminate pluralism (e.g., Acquiescence Dominance
imposition by leaders) Manipulation Taken for grantedness
Compartmentalize Avoidance Coexistence (Reay & Hinings,
Loose coupling 2009)
Balancing tensions
Forge durable identities Compromise Hybridization (which can be
of their own, emerge as temporary or long lasting;
institutions in their own Battilana & Dorado, 2010)
right
Not addressed Defiance Not addressed
following paragraphs, we illustrate some of these similari-
ties, which help underscore the affinity of the EW and insti-
tutional logics literatures, with examples stemming from
both approaches.
For example, early studies that mobilized the EW frame-
work focused on the clashing worlds underpinning agricultural
transformation in France. These studies used the framework to
study the resolution of conflict between traditional producers
of agricultural products (artisans) and large industrial con-
cerns. In particular, Boisard and Letablier (1987, 1989) used
an early version of the EW framework to examine how small,
local producers of camembert cheeses, who favored tradi-
tional methods of production, dealt with globalization pres-
sures that required them to mass produce or die. The
outcome of their confrontation with agribusiness was the
application of the world-renowned Appellation dOrigine
Controle (AOC) label to cheeses produced using traditional
methods. This study provided a compelling example of an
institutionalized, hybrid arrangement between competing
worlds that Boltanski and Thvenot called a compromise.
A comparative and similar example stemming from the
institutional logics literature can be found in Battilana and
Dorados (2010) recent study of how the provision of micro-
loans to the poor shifted from nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) to commercial microfinance institutions.
Battilana and Dorados study showed how one of the two
commercial microfinance institutions they studied managed
to enduringly reconcile the differences between what they
called developmental and banking logics by creating a
common organizational identity that struck a balance
between both logics. Battilana and Dorados hybridization of
banking and development logics in the microfinance indus-
try is thus practically identical to Boisard and Letabliers
hybridization of the domestic and industrial worlds in the
camembert cheese industry.
Cloutier and Langley 369
In another example, Moursli and Cobbaut (2006) used the
EW framework to explain the coexistence of nonprofit, for-
profit, and public organizations in the area of long-term and
respite care in Belgium. The authors showed that the coexis-
tence of these organizational forms was based on actors in
each type of establishment defining quality differently on
the basis of criteria stemming from different worlds: nonprofit
establishments valorizing establishments that felt like home
(thus, referring to the domestic world within the EW frame-
work), for-profit establishments defining quality on the basis of
profitability (the market world), and finally, public establish-
ments reflecting a compromise between the domestic, market,
and industrial worlds. Although all three organizational forms
adhered to principles from all worlds, what was interesting was
how each prioritized them differently, thus giving rise to differ-
ent types of establishments in a field where one might have
expected only a single organizational form to survive.
As regards the coexistence of conflicting logics in the institu-
tional logics literature, we find Purdy and Grays (2009) study on
the emergence of different organizational forms in the emerging
field of alternative dispute resolution that looked at how multi-
ple logics can diffuse within a field, leading to the creation of
parallel organizational forms, each governed by a different
combination of logics. Here, as in the Moursli and Cobbaut
study, each organizational form prioritized a different logic as a
result of field-level realities that supported such coexistence.
Summarizing Similarities
and Differences
As the above paragraphs illustrate, there are various aspects
in which institutional logics and the EW framework are
similar, and various ways in which they are different. We
have summarized these in Table 4.
As regards similarities, both approaches seek to explain
collective action and both rely primarily on plurality of cog-
nitive beliefs for doing so. Both approaches conceptualize
dispute or disagreement over divergent beliefs similarly and
conceptualize the possible outcomes of dispute in similar
ways (see Table 3). Where they differ is in how much agency
they confer to social actors for shaping field-level realities,
in how fluid they perceive field-level realities to be (field-
level beliefs are more changeable within the EW framework
as compared with institutional logics), and in the idea that
worthiness (or legitimacy in institutional terms) can be
granted in degrees. Thus, within the EW framework, actors
and objects can be perceived as being more or less worthy on
the basis of various criteria, such as how well they have met
the exigencies of a particular test of worth or how substantial
their commitment to the beliefs and values of a particular
world has been. Finally, the EW framework focuses much of
its attention, much more so than institutional logics, on con-
flict and dispute between worlds and how such conflicts are
resolved, thus allowing for more intimate insights into
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institutionalization and deinstitutionalization processes than
is possible from an institutional logics perspective.
Indeed, Boltanski and Thvenots theorizing on possible
outcomes of conflict between worlds brings a dynamic per-
spective to the study of institutional multiplicity and opens up
many new and interesting avenues for empirical investiga-
tion. Because they conceptualize higher order belief systems
(e.g., worlds) as cultural toolkits that are available to social
actors at all times, their theory provides an alternate frame-
work for capitalizing on the recent growing interest within
institutional theory for a better and more comprehensive
understanding of how institutional logics coevolve (Dunn &
Jones, 2010; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Reay & Hinings, 2009)
and how actors accommodate conflicting logics in their day-
to-day work. Although Boltanski and Thvenot have theo-
rized about how struggles over what is right or appropriate
to do in a given context might unfold, we still do not know,
for example, exactly how agreements or compromises come
about and what makes them durable or not. The framework
provides a particularly suitable lens through which to study
the critiquing, debating, and negotiating dynamics that frame
decision making in organizational contexts where the pres-
ence of clashing worlds or logics is likely to be high, as in
pluralistic organizations (Denis, Langley, & Rouleau, 2007)
such as hospitals, universities, governmental agencies, non-
profits, and so forth (Kraatz & Block, 2008), but it is never-
theless relevant to other contexts where clashes might be
more subtle. Although at its core the EW framework is about
stability (or how stability is achieved and collective action
facilitated), this does not preempt the framework from being
used to explore, as Stark (2009) has done, how the uncer-
tainty produced by conflicting worlds might actually create
opportunities for action. The framework is thus sufficiently
flexible that it can be used for exploring the dynamics under-
scoring both institutional stability and institutional change.
Opportunities for Extension
We thus argue here that there is much the EW framework
can do to help extend current theorizing around institutional
logics, and thus help deepen our understanding of how
higher order belief systems impact modes of interaction
between social actors and consequently multiple aspects of
everyday life, including practices, beliefs, and organiza-
tional forms. In particular, the framework can be helpful for
filling some of the blind spots identified earlier in the insti-
tutional logics perspective, a summary of which can be
found in Table 5. We now return to these blind spots to
articulate how the EW framework adds insight in each case.
In particular, we discuss some recent applications of the EW
framework and place them in parallel with studies of institu-
tional phenomena. Much of the early work that mobilized
the EW framework was published in French and followed a
separate and parallel path to the tradition of Anglo-Saxon
370 Journal of Management Inquiry 22(4)

Table 4. A Comparison of Epistemological and Ontological Assumptions Between Approaches.

Friedland and Alford Boltanski and Thvenot

Label Logics
Definition Organizing principles of the central
institutions of the capitalist West that shape
individual preferences and organizational
interests, and that help frame collective
action
Assumptions about Shifts between logics may occur when a
change field evolves; stability is the result of actors
seeking to conform to or realign with
dominant logics
Domain specificity Assumes that in certain domains, certain
logics tend to prevail (e.g., each logic parses
to a specific domain)
Mutual exclusivity Logics are mutually exclusive. Can
sometimes be interdependent, and multiple
logics can coexist although it is expected
that one or at most two logics will dominate
in a given field
Level of analysis Primary focus is at the field level (higher
order logics are instantiated at the level of
the field)
Term used for defining Legitimacy or appropriatenessDefined as
what is acceptable yes or no; beliefs, practices, and so on are
either legitimate or not legitimate
Agency of actors Limited. Logics are usually taken for granted
Worlds or orders of worth (terms are used
alternately)
Ordering principles based on shared definitions of the
common good that people establish for the purpose
of assessing themselves and one another and that enable
collective action
Stability is negotiated locally on an ongoing basis
by competent actors in public debates over what is
legitimate or not
Worlds refer to accepted definitions of the common good
that can apply to any domain
Worlds not seen as interdependent but multiple worlds
can coexist in the form of arrangements or compromises
Primary focus is at the level of wider society
WorthinessCan be assessed by degrees; beliefs,
practices, actors, and objects can be more or less
legitimate depending on certain criteria
Considerable. Social actors can draw on worlds
strategically to suit their purpose

organizational institutionalism. However, since the transla-
tion of Boltanski and Thvenots (2006) foundational text,
there have been an increasing number of contributions that
have not only drawn on the EW framework but that have
done so with an awareness of and explicit attention to its
potential relevance to institutional thinking. An examination
of these studies in parallel helps highlight how the two
approaches might gain from each other.
Micro-Level Processes and Recursiveness
As discussed earlier, with some exceptions (Battilana &
Dorado, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Zilber, 2002), most
studies of multiple institutional logics in action have taken
a more macro-level approach. Consequently, the micro-
level processes whereby institutional logics emerge and
interact, and where compromises are produced are largely
invisible. As described above, the EW framework, in con-
trast, emphasizes precisely these micro-level processes, and
in particular the way in which actors draw on the resources
associated with the different worlds in everyday interac-
tions to produce ongoing arrangements and compromises
that enable collective action.
For example, taking an institutional logics perspective,
Dunn and Jones (2010) examined the prevalence and persis-
tence of competing logics in medical education: a science
logic (that one could associate with the industrial order of
worth) and the care logic (that might be associated with the
domestic order of worth). They show how the prevalence of
these logics in medical education discourse has been affected
by a variety of factors over long periods of time, including
the creation of new medical schools, the development of
schools of public health, and the rise of managed care mod-
els. The macro-level forces driving shifting logics are clearly
of interest, but understanding how the two come to be inte-
grated and woven together on the ground may require differ-
ent analytic tools.
From this perspective, Moreiras (2005) EW-based ethno-
graphic study of the development of medical practice guide-
lines shows some complementary dynamics to those
described by Dunn and Jones (2010) but at a more micro
level. In this study, we see committees dedicated to develop-
ing guidelines for medical practitioners engaged directly in
building compromise between worlds in interaction. The
worlds that Moreira identifies echo in many ways the logics
identified by Dunn and Jones in their study. The tenets of

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Cloutier and Langley 371
Table 5. Blind Spots of the Institutional Logics Approach and How They Might Be Addressed by the EW Framework.
Institutional logics
Microfoundations and Recognizes embeddedness and recursiveness
recursiveness theoretically but downplays agency (logics
are parsed to domains, and therefore are not
thought to be equally available to actors at all
times and in all situations)
Underspecifies how actors both influence
and are influenced by surrounding logics
and consequently cannot fully explain how
recursiveness is enacted in practice
Legitimacy struggles Logics are viewed as providing vocabularies
of motive and identity, and only secondarily as
sources of legitimacy
By neglecting the idea of struggle over what
is right and appropriate (from a legitimacy
standpoint) to do in different contexts, the logics
approach loses sight of important mechanisms
whereby conflict and contradictions are
overcome, and/or agreements are sustained over
time
Morality Current perspectives have largely eclipsed moral
aspects underscoring beliefs
Logics are viewed as essentially amoral; primary
focus is on cognitive elements
Materiality Recognizes that logics have material effects
(effects on power, structure, and/or practices)
but underplays the materiality of logics
themselvesFor example, their representation
in objects
Conceptualization is primarily cognitive
Note: EW = economies of worth.
evidence-based medicine (associated with the industrial
world, similar to Dunn and Joness science logic) are juxta-
posed dynamically in debates with the need for doctors to
consider specificities and the inability to impose technical
standards on the highly individualized interpersonal relation-
ship they feel they need to maintain with patients (the domes-
tic world, similar to Dunn and Joness care logic). The use of
the EW framework in this study helped show how guideline
development in medical practice is achieved by attending to
a diversity of forms of knowledge, and not just scientific
knowledge, as is frequently believed. At the same time, the
study reveals how a medical practice guidelinean insti-
tutionalized object that might subsequently influence practi-
tioners for some timeis fabricated in interaction by
drawing on the tenets of different worlds. Reay and Hiningss
(2009) study of the interaction between the institutional log-
ics of medical professionalism and businesslike health care
in Alberta is often cited as an exemplary study of how mul-
tiple logics may coexist at the micro level. Yet, although the
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EW
Takes a toolkit approach and provides a detailed
repertoire of cultural-cognitive and normative
resources that, when mobilized by actors to address
legitimacy struggles (see next box), makes the processes
underscoring recursiveness explicit
Assumes that actors can call on all available resources
at all times and in all situations (thus, Boltanski and
Thvenots worlds do not parse to specific domains)
Legitimacy (defined as worthiness) is at the core of
the EW framework; each world represents a different
conceptualization of what is considered to be worthy
from a specific point of view
Struggles are viewed as the result of deep-seated
disagreement over the criteria whereby situations, beliefs,
practices, and so on are deemed appropriate or not
Uses the concept of test to explain how legitimacy
struggles are resolved or overcome
Approach draws specific attention to institutionalized
mechanisms of resolution, which during struggles over
legitimacy can themselves be brought into question
Each world is based on a different shared conception
of the common good, and thus has an explicit moral
grounding
Even market mechanisms are viewed in moral terms
The material manifestations of worlds are recognized
in the form of tangible and intangible objects, which are
part of the repertoire of resources that actors can call
on when engaging in legitimacy debates
authors identify four generic ways by which the bridging of
logics occurs, they do not elaborate on the micro-level inter-
actions and justifications that underlie coordination in spe-
cific situations. Using the EW framework to undertake a
detailed ethnographic study of such interactions in situ could
help reveal how the full range of cultural-cognitive and
material resources available from different worlds might be
mobilized to enable collective action.
In summary, the EW framework addresses the issue of
micro-level processes and recursiveness by conceptualizing
individuals as competent social actors capable of rhetorically
mobilizing repertoires of cultural-cognitive and material
resources in an effort to impose a particular worldview on
a given situation. From this point of view, social actors
influence their institutional environment as much as they are
influenced by it. Such a view helps highlight the micropro-
cesses whereby understandings of appropriateness evolve,
notably as they are repeatedly subject to tests and proofs of
commitment (in the form of investments) that themselves are
372 Journal of Management Inquiry 22(4)
institutionally defined. Rather than seeing cognitive under-
standings (e.g., logics) as leading necessarily to structuring
behaviors (Purdy & Gray, 2009), from the EW frameworks
perspective, the capacity for agency is seen to be embedded
in the ever-present set of tools for justification that compe-
tent actors have at their disposal, and is thus mutually consti-
tutive with structure.
Legitimacy Struggles
Legitimacy struggles are central to the EW framework, and
this offers another way in which it may be used to extend
institutional thinking. In this light, it is interesting to compare
Suddaby and Greenwoods (2005) institutional logics-based
study of legitimacy struggles in the accounting and law pro-
fessions with a recent EW study also dealing with the disrup-
tion of legitimacy and the struggles involved in restoring it.
Patriotta et al. (2011) recently used the EW framework to
examine processes of legitimacy maintenance in the wake of
a nuclear accident in Germany. Their analysis shows how the
company deemed responsible for the accident sought to
maintain legitimacy in its aftermath by strategically using
various justifications inspired by different worlds to appease
or counter legitimacy challenges addressed to it by key
stakeholders. The article shows how the firms initial reflex
to mobilize almost exclusively industrial world justifications
and forms of evidence (technical data about effectiveness
and safety of nuclear power plants) soon gives way to a more
diverse range of arguments based on the market order of
worth (nuclear power as a cheap source of energy), an
increasing use of civic and domestic rationales (the firms
capacity to solve local energy problems in a trustworthy
manner), and even an increasing use of a green rationale
(nuclear power as clean energy). The authors argue that it is
the capacity to draw on a variety of worlds rather than to
become trapped in bipolar conflict that in the end contributes
to legitimacy repair and reproduction, and consequently
institutional maintenance.
A similar approach might have been applied to Suddaby
and Greenwoods (2005) study of rhetoric surrounding the
legitimacy of multidisciplinary practices as a new organiza-
tional form. In this study, the authors inductively analyze the
rhetoric used by proponents and opponents of multidisci-
plinary practice (lawyers and accountants as part of a com-
bined practice). Had they applied the EW framework to guide
their analysis, they might have been able to better character-
ize the cultural resources that actors called upon in making
their respective case for the legitimacy of one organizational
form over another. Suddaby and Greenwood frame this debate
as conflict between two institutional logics they call trustee
and expertise models of professionalism. Their emerging
categories of rhetoric do however often show resemblance to
Boltanski and Thvenots worlds that hint at but go beyond the
obvious dimensions of the professional logics themselves,
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suggesting that people do have the reflexive competence to
draw on a wider range of cultural resources than simply the
specific logics under review. For example, what Suddaby
and Greenwood label value-based arguments seem related to
the civic order of worth, historical arguments that refer to the
authority of tradition can be associated with the domestic
worth, and teleological arguments referring to notions of
progress and effectiveness can be associated with the indus-
trial worth (see the appendix). This suggests that an analysis
drawing on EWs full repertoire of cultural resources might
have been able to capture in a revealing way a wider range of
justifications, including those that reached beyond the repro-
duction of the conflicting logics themselves. Indeed, one
might argue (following the study by Patriotta et al., 2011)
that it was precisely the invocation of justifications that were
not profoundly tied to the specific logics that were being
defended that might enable participants to bridge the divide
that separated them and persuade adversaries and observers.
Another aspect of the situation described by Suddaby and
Greenwood (2005) where the EW framework might have
some purchase in better understanding legitimacy struggles
is in the notion of tests of worth. Clearly, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and Bar Association hearings
within which the rhetorics described by the authors were
produced are examples of tests in which the legitimacy of
different institutional forms is being critiqued and called into
question, and where compromises are being fabricated. The
tests constituted by the SEC and Bar Association hearings
could themselves be considered for their own grounding in
different worlds or orders of worth. To understand the nature
of these tests, it would be important to consider for each
what could be accepted as legitimate material evidence, who
are considered to be worthy judges, and what forms of justi-
fication are likely to be considered acceptable. A more fine-
grained analysis of the particular forums in question and the
forms of justification legitimated by them would be neces-
sary to fully understand the processes and outcomes of the
struggles in question.
In summary, legitimacy struggles are central to the EW
approach, with each world representing a different conceptu-
alization of what is legitimate from a specific point of view.
This view allows for a potentially more robust and precise
explanation for how and why institutional conflict is resolved,
and why such resolutions are more or less durable over time.
Moral Dimension of Logics
The worlds identified by Boltanski and Thvenot (2006)
were elaborated based on texts grounded in moral philoso-
phy, and it is this moral dimension that renders their reper-
toire of cultural toolkits viable in a wide variety of different
situations as a basis for justification and legitimacy struggle.
It is also this moral dimension that underlies the insistence
on and capacity for critique, in which individuals confront
Cloutier and Langley 373
others whose positions are perceived as unworthy in rela-
tion to the world considered to be appropriate or right in that
particular situation.
It is interesting to reconsider yet again Suddaby and
Greenwoods (2005) study from this perspective. These
authors argue that the proponents of the multidisciplinary
practice model were accessing what Suchman (1995) labeled
pragmatic legitimacy, associated with self-interest, whereas
the opponents were accessing moral legitimacy based on
values. These do indeed correspond well to the definitions
that Suchman developed. Yet, an EW perspective might have
led to a slightly different viewnotably by suggesting that
both sides were seeking moral legitimacy, each grounded in
a different world. Thus, for instance, the examples of market
world justification provided in Suddaby and Greenwoods
article would not be seen as grounded in the self-interest of
its proponents but rather in a different interpretation of the
collective good: one in which competitiveness and the satis-
faction of customer needs take precedence. It seems to us
that emphasizing moral legitimacy for one side in the legiti-
macy struggle but not the other may not do full justice to the
nature of the debate.
In this study, the moral dimension on both sides can simi-
larly be seen in how protagonists engage in mutual critique.
Market-based justifications are drawn on by proponents of
the multidisciplinary model to condemn the unworthy anti-
competitive behavior of those who favor prohibiting such
practices, whereas opponents critique the multidisciplinary
model as undermining auditors objectivity and as therefore
conducive to reciprocally unworthy betrayal of civic
imperatives to protect the public. The EW framework thus
strongly sensitizes researchers to the moral foundations
underlying legitimacy struggles as well as to the capacity of
individuals to sense the appropriateness of justifications in
context. As divergences over what, in moral terms, is per-
ceived to be right and wrong in various contexts frequently
underscores actor motivations to change the institutional sta-
tus quo, paying closer attention to how actors mobilize moral
arguments in social interaction should help us better under-
stand both the triggers and processes that underscore institu-
tional change.
Materiality
As mentioned, the institutional logics perspective has also
tended to underplay the role played by material objects in
the resolution of institutional struggles. In contrast, as shown
in the appendix and as discussed earlier, in the EW frame-
work, materiality is embraced explicitly, with tangible and
intangible objects as well as embodied actors included as
part of the repertoire of resources that actors can call upon
when engaging in legitimacy debates. For example, in the
study of the fabrication of medical practice guidelines men-
tioned above, Moreira (2005) showed how different worlds
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were brought to bear through the objects and people that
legitimated them. He noted that in the scientific repertoire
based on the industrial world, The worth of a statement is
associated with the quantity of reliable studies and/or num-
ber of patients involved that can be gathered to support an
argument, and that these are brought to the table inscribed
in graphical representation such as meta-analysis forest
plots or flow charts (Moreira, 2005, p. 1979). In the reper-
toire of practice (associated with care and the domestic
world), however, it is not the weight of scientific proof but
specific personal stories and accounts of care situations that
have value, and the more so if they are brought forward by
patient representatives who materially embody this world
and whose opinions are actively solicited by general practi-
tioners attempting to bring forward the tenets of this world
to the discussion of practice guidelines.
Thus, material beings (a word used by Boltanski and
Thvenot to group objects and people) become particularly
salient in the context of tests of worth, with different tests
bringing to bear different kinds of evidence in relation to the
different evaluative principles in play. Another interesting
example of how institutional logics and material arrange-
ments may be intimately related concerns precisely the
recent transformation of tests of value in the travel industry
(Scott & Orlikowski, 2012) where the traditional methods of
star rating using expert inspections (i.e., grounded in the
industrial world) have been to a large extent superseded by
popularity contests drawing on consumer reviews (i.e., tests
grounded in the world of fame) wired into web-based tech-
nologies. The different interweavings of people, material
objects, technologies, and practices produce quite different
conceptions of value, with potential to transform relations of
accountability in this industry. Overall, this reaffirms the
potential relevance of the notion of test as well as the mate-
rial forms that accompany it, in better understanding the
manifestation, reproduction, and recursive performance of
institutional logics in situated contexts.
Opportunities for Rapprochement
and Development
Although the EW framework has much to offer given its theo-
retical affinities with institutional theory and in particular
institutional logics, it is not without its limitations. These limi-
tations might be addressed, interestingly enough, by a more
systematic rapprochement between both theories. We discuss
here two areas where both theories have limitations and where
rapprochement or joint development might be valuable.
Relationships Between
Nested Levels of Analysis
Both institutional logics and the EW framework recognize the
interplay of logics or worlds at different levels of analysis
374 Journal of Management Inquiry 22(4)
Society Society
Field Field
Individual or group Individual or group
Institutional Logics EW Framework
Loose or not fully defined relationship
Strong relationship
Occasional relationship (usually thought of as exceptional)
Figure 1. Relationships between levels of analysis.
Note: EW = economies of worth. Arrows indicate primary direction of
relationship.
(organization, field, and society most often but not exclu-
sively; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Both approaches differ
however on which levels they take to be most relevant for
analytical purposes and on which direction the relationship
between levels tends to take. Thus, although Thornton et al.
(2012) have recently reemphasized the embeddedness of
field-level institutional logics in societal-level institutional
orders, the primary focus of the empirical institutional logics
literature so far has been on the field level, and the primary
direction of influence of field-level logics is usually seen as
downward toward the group or individual level of analysis.
Occasionally, individual social actors or groups (often in the
form of institutional entrepreneurs) will intervene and poten-
tially impact the configuration of field-level logics. The
primary focus of the EW framework, however, is squarely
on the societal level, where worlds shape the thinking and
beliefs of individual- and group-level actors who in turn
wield influence upward toward the field (see Figure 1 for a
visual representation of these relationships). What becomes
apparent through this visualization is that both approaches
are not only incomplete but also complementary when it
comes to fully explaining the relationships between worlds
or logics at different levels of analysis. We explain these
relationships more fully in the following paragraphs.
Institutional logics. In their original conceptualization,
Friedland and Alford (1991) discussed the specific case of
logics operating at the level of wider society. These are insti-
tutions that permeate society at its highest level and in which
institutions at lower levels are either partially or wholly
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nested. Logics operating at other levels (field, industry, orga-
nization, for example) are thought to be local instantiations
of these higher order logics. Thornton et al.s (2012) recent
theoretical analysis of the emergence and evolution of field-
level logics goes some way toward elucidating the mecha-
nisms by which this might occur. However, in most empirical
studies undertaken to date, the relationship between societal-
level and field-level logics has so far been largely assumed
or taken for granted.
Indeed, with very few exceptions (Thornton et al., 2005),
scholars conducting studies using an institutional logics per-
spective claim that the field-level logics they have identified
inductively represent field-level instantiations of higher
order societal logics, but these societal-level logics are not
clearly defined and the exact relationship between both is
ambiguous at best. In all fairness, establishing such links is
no easy task, as doing so requires elaborating on the specific
contents of higher order institutional logics (their substantive
and material elements) that would allow for points of diver-
gence and convergence with field-level or organizational-
level observations to be drawn. At the level of individual
studies, drawing such links may not even be inherently use-
ful, as long as the way in which field-level logics are
described and substantiated in the data is sound. However, if
scholars wish to move beyond field-level studies so as to be
able to make comparisons between fields (Greenwood et al.,
2011), then such links must be drawn more systematically
and comprehensively. Doing so may prove fruitful in various
ways, in particular as it would be one way of helping to
bridge the micromacro divide in institutional theory more
systematically than has been done to date.
The EW framework. Although most studies drawing on
institutional logics have so far remained silent about how
nestedness occurs, the EW tends to leap directly from the
societal level to the individual level of analysis. In theorizing
about the different higher orders of worth that all organiza-
tional actors can draw on in all situations, Boltanski and
Thvenot (2006) tended to minimize the extent to which
institutional dynamics at the level of the field might be affect-
ing how actors interpret each world (if indeed they can per-
ceive them) and how ultimately they use any of the
world-related institutional resources at their disposal. Thus,
in moving away from critical sociology and taking a toolkit
(Silber, 2003; Swidler, 1986) approach to explain what guides
and motivates human behavior and action, Boltanski and
Thvenot have partially eclipsed important institutional ideas
such as institutional constraint and isomorphism. Conse-
quently, their theorizing around the EW framework cannot
convincingly account for the more routine, taken-for-granted
aspects of human behavior.
This has left a gap in the EW frameworknotably, how to
explain that in some sectors or fields, certain worlds almost
always tend to prevail? How to explain that even though
actors can theoretically draw on the cultural-cognitive
Cloutier and Langley 375
resources of any world to discursively and materially chal-
lenge (or defend) the status quo, they do not do so? So for
instance, scholars of pragmatist sociology, at least in their
original writings, eschew the question of dominancefor
them, there are only situations of accord (where coordination
runs smoothly) or discord (which requires that actors draw
on symbolic and material resources to collectively reassess
the legitimacy of the situation and resolve the dispute so that
coordination can resume). French pragmatists, for example,
do not question why or in what ways accord might be prob-
lematic. On one hand, applying the concept of a generic
resource toolkit (what the EW framework effectively is) to
institutional thinking is a powerful idea, giving institutional
researchers the means for explaining, at a micro level, how
institutional logics interact, coexist, and/or come to shift
over time and making it possible to compare observations
across fields. On the other hand, field-level influences must
also be taken into consideration as their effects are all too
real. It is here where both institutional theory and pragmatist
sociology can build on each other, effectively overcoming
key shortcomings of both approaches and helping demarcate
more clearly the relationships between levels of analysis
(individual, organization, field, society).
For example, empirical studies that have used the EW
framework to study organizations (Boisard & Letablier,
1989; Moursli & Cobbaut, 2006) have had to grapple with
how to generalize their observations to the level of the
organization or the field. Indeed, to draw conclusions
about their observations, these scholars have had to extrap-
olate organizational- and field-level effects from observa-
tions of individual actors making claims and justifying
their actions in specific situations. Although those who
draw on world resources to make legitimacy claims in a
specific context are necessarily individuals, it is the collec-
tive effect of many individual actors making similar or dif-
ferent claims, both within and without the organization,
that are of particular interest to organizational and institu-
tional scholars.
Over time, it is these collective effects that institutional-
ize what is ultimately deemed to be legitimate or not in a
given field, which helps explain why in certain fields, the
legitimacy of any given actor, object, or practice, regardless
of the situation, will tend to always be based on criteria
stemming from the same world, something that Boltanski
and Thvenot do not explore fully given their tendency to
ignore organizational- and field-level effects. Combining
approaches thus makes it possible to consider both individ-
ual and collective effects, without necessarily downplaying
or overplaying one or the other.
For example, an interesting application of the EW
framework can be found in a recent ethnographic study by
Reinecke (2010) of price setting in a fair-trade labeling
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organization in the coffee industry. Through a detailed
description of the price-setting mechanism in this organiza-
tion, we see how a field-level logic of fair trade is consti-
tuted in opposition to the traditional logic of the market. In
this organization, price is established by a committee rather
than by a market test of value. It is the justifications among
members of this committee, drawing on both the civic
worlds notion of collective consensus and the industrial
worlds notion of objective value based on calculation of
the true costs of production, that agreement and compro-
mise about an appropriate price for fair-trade goods was
established. So even though in this case, individual actors
were calling upon societal-level worldviews to make the
case for how fair-trade price should be calculated at a
local level, as more organizations joined the group and
adopted the same mechanism for setting fair-trade prices
(e.g., the newly created mechanism diffuses), we begin to
witness the institutionalization of a field-level practice.
What is interesting is that Boltanski and Thvenots theo-
rizing stops at the level of the local compromise (the agree-
ment reached between actors for how to establish fair
market prices for a particular organization, for example). It
is only when we begin to integrate a view closer to that
espoused by institutional theorists that we get to see the
bigger picturehow small, localized debates over what is
right and appropriate eventually become institutionalized
more widely, or (because they fail to diffuse) do not. We
believe that there is an important opportunity to draw on
the EW framework (and in particular, its notion of test) to
more systematically examine research questions around the
emergence and proliferation of field-level logics, to enable
better and more empirically grounded understandings of
how nested levels of logics become interconnected.
The Treatment of Power
The EW framework, at least in the form put forward in
On Justification (Boltanski & Thvenot, 2006), does not
consider power in its theorization, something its origina-
tors themselves recognize: Power relations do not play
an important role in the frame of analysis chosen for the
economies of worth. They are not a subject matter of On
Justification, but not because we thought power relations
were non-existent (Basaure, 2011, interview with Luc
Boltanski, p. 369). In other writings, Boltanski and
Thvenot qualified the EW framework by noting the
boundary conditions surrounding its application to situa-
tions where public face-to-face justification is the main
form of coordination, situations that they refer to as
rgimes of justice. This excludes for example rgimes
of violence (or force) where choices are constrained and
critique is suppressed, and rgimes of love (or agap)
376 Journal of Management Inquiry 22(4)
where people interact peacefully without questioning the
principles underlying their activity (Basaure, 2011;
Boltanski, 1990; Boltanski & Thvenot, 1999).
Essentially then, the EW framework assumes situa-
tions in which individual actors are able to freely draw
from a pool of regimes of criticism and justification that
have been made available to them (Silber, 2003) and that
their success in imposing their particular legitimacy
claims in a particular situation depends on the skill with
which they make them (Fligstein, 1997; Hallett &
Ventresca, 2006). Empirically however, it is unlikely that
social actors are ever entirely free in this regard, regard-
less of their level of skill or competency, and that field-
level institutional realities most likely constrain their true
range of options. If they do not fully constrain them, they
will minimally interfere with how much traction a non-
mainstream legitimacy claim is likely to gain in a given
situation. The trichotomous division of situations into
rgimes of justification, violence, and love (Boltanski &
Thvenot, 1999) does not do justice to the subtle ways in
which cultural and political influences coexist.
Interestingly, although the institutional perspective
has recently become more attuned to the issue of power
relations and institutions, and although institutional log-
ics have been described as contributive to structuring
those power relations (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), institu-
tional theory has itself also been criticized for its limited
treatment of power (Cooper, Ezzamel, & Willmott, 2008;
Lawrence, 2008). This is an area where both perspectives
deserve further development. There remains much to be
done to fully understand how, why, and with what conse-
quences institutional logics come to dominate a field, dis-
ciplining organizations and individuals activities, and
yet individuals and organizations may still retain suffi-
cient agency to mobilize critique and thus influence the
institutional mechanisms that regulate their behavior. It
seems as though whereas historically, institutional theory
has tended to overemphasize the constraining power
effects of institutions (control), the EW framework has
tended to overemphasize individuals capacity for reflex-
ivity (agency and resistance). Lawrence (2008) has
argued for an approach that better integrates the power
dynamics of control, agency, and resistance within insti-
tutional thinking. Similarly, Boltanskis (2011) recent
writings involve an attempt to reconcile his version of
pragmatic sociology represented in On Justification with
Bourdieusian critical sociology that emphasizes the
potency of mechanisms of oppression. Although the ana-
lytical tools are different, there is promising convergence
on the need for further development on this important
topic. Again, a rapprochement between both approaches
might be helpful in this regard.
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Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that Boltanski and Thvenots
(1991, 2006) repertoire of worlds offers an interesting perspec-
tive through which to further our understanding of institutional
logics and how logics influence institutionalization and deinsti-
tutionalization processes. It is our view that bringing institutional
logics and the EW framework closer together provides an inter-
esting means for addressing some key theoretical concerns (or
blind spots, as we have referred to them) raised by institutional
scholars in recent years, blind spots that cannot, we think, be
adequately addressed using current conceptualizations of logics.
We suggest that bridging these two theories, by adopting some
of the EW frameworks epistemological and ontological assump-
tions, can help us better explain how recursiveness between
agency and structure in institutional contexts unfolds or how
legitimacy struggles are resolved in practice. Such an approach
helps focus our attention on the microprocesses underscoring
how legitimacy is manufactured and sustained (Barley, 2008;
Patriotta et al., 2011; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). The EW
framework helps us do this notably by making salient, thanks to
its toolkit conceptualization of worlds, the range of discursive
and material resources that actors draw on when engaged in
legitimacy struggles (Hardy, Palmer, & Phillips, 2000). Such a
focus helps reveal, among other things, the social skills
(Fligstein, 1997) and competencies that social actors need to
deploy in social interaction when they are seeking to induce
cooperation, a process that still remains a black box in institu-
tional studies (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006).
There has been, within organizational institutionalism, a
continuing chasm between what have been rhetorically
termed the old and new institutionalisms, where the old
focused on action embedded in social interaction in specific
and localized communities and the new gives priority to a
more macro view, focusing its attention on the field and soci-
etal levels of analysis (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). In the
view of Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997, p. 406), institutional
theory has consequently shifted away from the contextual
richness of action perspectives toward more structuralist
paradigms and in so doing has lost something important
along the way. Their call is for a more balanced approach to
the action-structure duality (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997, p.
406), in particular because, as we have argued consistently
throughout this article, the details of micro-level action are
needed to explain how macro-level institutions change (p.
412). They underscore the importance of recognizing that
legitimacy can be obtained by means other than just imitat-
ing the success of others. If institutional theory wishes to
hold onto its already wide appeal, it will need to give itself
the means for exploring these important questions. Bridging
with other theories and areas of scholarship, as we have sug-
gested here, is one means of doing so.
Cloutier and Langley 377

Appendix
Summary of Attributes of Each EW World
World Inspired Domestic Fame Civic Market Industrial
Higher Inspiration Tradition, Public opinion Civic duty Competition Efficiency,
common hierarchy performance
principle

Characteristics
State of Bizarre, different, Benevolent, well Celebrity, Representative, Desirable, Effective,
worthiness original, bred, wise, sensible prestige, public free, official, valuable, functional,
spontaneous recognition statutory wealthy dependable
State of Habit, routine, Impoliteness, Banal, unknown Division, isolation, Loss, poverty Amateurism, lack
deficiency reality inconsiderateness, individualism of productivity
treason, vulgarity
Relation of Independence, Respectability, Recognition, Membership, Possession Mastery
worth uniqueness responsibility, notoriety, delegation
authority, honor visibility
Actions and behaviors
Human Love, passion, Comfort, ease, Well known, Freedom, Self-interest, Work, energy,
dignity creativity judgment reputed, visible, democracy, civil desire, activities
persuasive rights consumption
Investment Risk, detour, Rejection of Abandonment Renunciation of Opportunism Progress, effort,
formula calling into selfishness, duty, of privacy personal interests, investment
question obligation solidarity, struggle
Material manifestations
List of Visionary, child, Father, king, Star, fans, Elected officials, Competitors, Professionals,
subjects artist woman, fairy, superiors, inferiors, spokesperson, the party, client, buyer, experts, specialists
crank boss stranger, chief thought leader members, seller
representatives
List of Spirit, body, dream, Good manners, Media, brand, Elections, law, Wealth, luxury Tools, resources,
objects the unconscious etiquette, titles, campaign, committees, lists, objects methods, plans,
rank, gifts message criteria, decrees, norms, tasks
codes
Harmonious The imaginary, The home, the Public image, The state, The market The system
figures of the the unconscious family, customs, the audience democracy,
natural order conventions, electorates,
principles parliament
Model test Adventure, quest, Family ceremonies, Presentation, Demonstration in Deal, Test, control,
journey celebrations, press favor of a moral transaction, launch
marriage conference, cause, assembly contract
launch
Source: EW = economies of worth. Adapted from Boltanski and Thvenot (1991), pp. 177-262.

Acknowledgments Declaration of Conflicting Interests

We wish to thank Laure Cabantous, Jean-Pascal Gond, and
especially Davide Ravasi for their careful reading of earlier
versions of this article and their thoughtful and detailed sugges-
tions that helped considerably improve and strengthen it. We
are also grateful to Journal of Management Inquiry editor
Nelson Phillips for his support as well as our three anonymous
reviewers for their encouraging and insightful comments
throughout the review process.
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support
for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This
study was supported by funding from the Social Sciences and
Research Council of Canada (Charlotte Cloutier and Ann Langley)

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378 Journal of Management Inquiry 22(4)
and the Fonds qubcois de recherche sur la socit et la culture
(Ann Langley).
Notes
1. Despite obvious affinities, Friedland and Alfords institutional
logics and Boltanski and Thvenots different economies of
worth have essentially developed in parallel, with little or no
overlap, perhaps in part because On Justification did not appear
in English until 2006. Although Thornton and Ocasio (2008) do
mention Boltanski and Thvenot in their handbook chapter on
institutional logics, they list them only as precursors, which is
surprising, given that both streams of thought emerged virtually
simultaneously, and given the language divide, it is quite
unlikely that one influenced the other at the time.
2. Boltanski and Thvenot alternately use orders of worth,
economies of worth, worlds, and occasionally, regimes of
action in reference to the same idea. For clarity and simplicity,
we will henceforward use the term worlds.
3. A tabular presentation of all the grammatical elements for each
world appears in the appendix.
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Author Biographies
Charlotte Cloutier is currently an assistant professor of man-
agement at Hautes tudes commerciales de Montral (HEC
Montreal). Her current research focuses on understanding strat-
egy processes as they unfold in pluralistic organizations (non-
governmental organizations, trade associations, hospitals,
universities, government ministries, or agencies, etc.), notably
from a strategy-as-practice perspective.
Ann Langley is a professor of management at HEC Montral
and Canada research chair in strategic management in pluralis-
tic settings. Her recent research focuses on strategic change,
leadership, identity, and the use of management tools in com-
plex organizations with an emphasis on processual research
approaches. She has published more than 50 articles and two
books. She is an adjunct professor at the Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration and the Department of
Health Administration at the University of Montreal.