Section 14. Rights of an accused disposition of the cases filed against him.
es filed against him. It was evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias
Rights of a person charged with a
criminal offense
1. Right to due process of law
2. Right to be presumed innocent
3. Right to be heard by himself and
counsel
4. Right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the
accusation against him
5. Right to have a speedy, impartial
and public trial
6. Right to meet the witnesses face
to face
7. Right to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf
Criminal Due Process
DUE PROCESS
This means that the accused can only be
convicted by a tribunal which is required to
comply with the stringent requirements of
the rules of criminal procedure.
(1) Tatad v Sandiganbayan
*Unreasonable delay resulting to a
violation of due process
Facts:
October 1974- The complainant, Antonio de los
Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report"
with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security
Command (PSC) containing charges of alleged
violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then
Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad.
The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of
the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became
widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad
had a falling out with President Marcos and had
resigned from the Cabinet.
December 12, 1979- the 1974 complaint was
resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed
with the Tanodbayan.
April 1, 1980- The Tanodbayan acted on the
complaint which was around two months after
petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by
Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS,
Presidential Security Command, for investigation
and report.
June 16, 1980- the CIS report was submitted to
the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of
charges for graft and corrupt practices against
former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero.
October 25, 1982- all affidavits and counter-
affidavits were in the case was already for
disposition by the Tanodbayan.
However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a
resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five
criminal informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against
petitioner Tatad alone.
A motion to quash the information was made
alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of
due process of law and of the right to a speedy
voluntariness of her desistance the same being
denied hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his
rights as an accused.
Held: YES.
The long delay in resolving the case under
preliminary investigation can not be justified on
the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No.
911) prescribes a ten-day period for the
prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary
investigation by him from its termination. While
we agree with the respondent court that this
period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on
the other hand, it can not be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It
certainly can not be assumed that the law has
included a provision that is deliberately intended
to become meaningless and to be treated as a
dead letter.
The long delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in
the instant case is violative of the constitutional
right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance
with the time limitation prescribed by the law for
the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is
part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process
clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in
Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973
and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay
is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights.
A delay of close to three (3) years can not be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar
(2) Galman v Sandiganbayan
Facts:
An investigating committee was created to
determine the facts on the case involving the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that
majority and minority reports showed that they
are unconvinced on the participation of Galman as
the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him
instead as the fall guy as opposed to the military
reports. Majority reports recommended the 26
military respondents as indictable for the
premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which
the Sandiganbayan did not give due
consideration.
The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally
preparing a resolution charging the 26 military
accused as principal to the crime against Aquino
but was recalled upon the intervention of
President Marcos who insist on the innocence of
the accused.
Marcos however recommended the filing of
murder charge and to implement the acquittal as
planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked
later on.
The petitioners filed an action for miscarriage of
justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross
violation of constitutional rights of the petitioners
for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the
prosecution to present vital documentary
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and
ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.
Issue:
Whether or not there was due process in the
acquittal of the accused from the charges against
them.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was
deprived of due process and fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove their case which grossly
violates the due process clause.
There could be no double jeopardy since
legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having
been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused (People
vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court that
rendered the judgment of acquittal was not
competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when
it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process. In effect the first jeopardy was never
terminated, and the remand of the criminal case
for further hearing and/or trial before the lower
courts amounts merely to a continuation of the
first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to
a second jeopardy.
The court further contends that the previous trial
was a mock trial where the authoritarian President
ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to
rig and closely monitor the trial which was
undertaken with due pressure to the judiciary. The
courts decision of acquittal is one void of
jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due
process during the trial therefore the judgment
was also deemed void and double jeopardy
cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one
vitiated with lack of due process on the account of
collusion between the lower court and
Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-
determined verdict of the accused.
The denial on the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioners by the court was set aside and
rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused
null and void. An order for a re-trial was granted.
(3) Alonte v Savellano
Facts:
Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn
Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura
Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alonetes house who was then the mayor of Bian,
Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Bian.
The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a
change of venue due to alleged intimidation.
While the change of venue was pending, Juvie
executed an affidavit of desistance. The
prosecutor continued on with the case and the
change of venue was done notwithstanding
opposition from Alonte.
The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J
Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause
and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and
Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution
presented Juvie and had attested the
due to media pressure and that they would rather
establish new life elsewhere.
Case was then submitted for decision and
Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion
perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte
waived his right to due process when he did not
cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions
were raised about the details of the rape and on
the voluntariness of her desistance.
Issue:
Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal
due process.
Held:
The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself
from further deciding on the case due to
animosity between him and the parties.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due
process in criminal proceedings, in
particular, require (a) that the court or
tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is
lawfully acquired by it over the person of
the accused; (c) that the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard; and (d) that
judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly
spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the
Rules of Court; viz:
"Sec. 3. Order of trial. - The trial shall
proceed in the following order:
"(a) The prosecution shall present evidence
to prove the charge and, in the proper case,
the civil liability.
"(b) The accused may present evidence to
prove his defense, and damages, if any,
arising from the issuance of any provisional
remedy in the case.
"(c) The parties may then respectively
present rebutting evidence only, unless the
court, in furtherance of justice, permits
them to present additional evidence bearing
upon the main issue.
"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the
case shall be deemed submitted for decision
unless the court directs the parties to argue
orally or to submit memoranda.
"(e) However, when the accused admits the
act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense,
the order of trial may be modified
accordingly."
In Tabao vs. Espina, the Court has underscored the
need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It
reminds that -
"x x x each step in the trial process serves a
specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor
of an accused requires that an accused be given
sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So,
with the prosecution as to its evidence.
"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of
trial should always take into consideration the
rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the
prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their
discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the
law but also to do what is fair and just.
The standard of waiver requires that it "not only
must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences." Mere silence of the holder of the
right should not be so construed as a waiver of
right, and the courts must indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver.
The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of
the deviations from what otherwise should
have been the regular course of trial:
(1) Petitioners have not been directed to
present evidence to prove their defenses
nor have dates therefor been scheduled for
the purpose; (2) the parties have not been
given the opportunity to present rebutting
evidence nor have dates been set by
respondent Judge for the purpose and (3)
petitioners have not admitted the act
charged in the Information so as to justify
any modification in the order of trial. There
can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there
can be no excuse for not affording an accused his
full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying
the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of
Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that
cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
Presumption of Innocence
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
The Constitution does not prohibit the
legislature from providing that proof of
certain facts leads to a prima facie
presumption of guilt, provided that the
facts proved have a reasonable connection
to the ultimate fact presumed.
Presumption of guilt should not be
conclusive
(4) People v Dramayo
Facts:
The two accused, now appellants, Pableo
Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the company of
the deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of Barrio
Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, Surigao
del Norte, saw its chief of police. Their purpose
was to shed light on a robbery committed in the
house of the deceased five days before by being
available as witnesses. The response was
decidedly in the negative as they themselves
were prime suspects, having been implicated by
at least two individuals who had confessed.
The same day, while they were in the house of
their co-accused Priolo Billona, the accused
Dramayo invited all those present including the
other for a drinking session. It was on that
occasion that Dramayo brought up the idea of
killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify
in the robbery case.
Soon the unfortunate victim was sighted, they
proceeded as planned and killed the victim
thereafter, he went to the house of the deceased
and informed the, latter's widow Corazon that he
had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio
lieutenant and the chief of police were duly
notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on
the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain.
The answer was that a skin ailment of his
daughter was the cause thereof.
The death was due to the wounds inflicted, two in
the epigastric region, one in the right lumbar
region, and another in the left breast.
It was on the basis of the above testimony offered
by the prosecution that the lower court reached
its decision. Its dispositive portion found the
accused, now appellant Pableo Dramayo and
Paterno Ecubin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
of the crime of [murder], defined and penalized
under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the accuseds criminal
liability proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is
the Presumption of innocence. So it must be,
according to the Constitution. That is a right
safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous
with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution
demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were
not even called upon then to offer evidence on
their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the
requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shown
beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is
moral certainty. "By reasonable doubt is
meant that which of possibility may arise,
but it is doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an
inability, after such investigation, to let the
mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.
Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by
the law to convict of any carnal charge but
moral certainty is required, and this
certainty is required as to Whether or not BP 52 sec 4 violates the
every proposition of proof regular to constitutional rights of the accused
constitute the offense."
The judgment of conviction should not have
occasioned any surprise on the part of the two
appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the
fullest credence, their guilt had been more than Held:
amply demonstrated. The presumption of
innocence could not come to their rescue as it was
more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are
was offered by the prosecution. The concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of
principal contention raised is thus clearly Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and
untenable. It must be stated likewise that while which they challenge, may be divided in two
squarely advanced for the first time, there had parts. The first provides:
been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a
majority of the defendants being acquitted, the
a. judgment of conviction jor any
element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly
of the aforementioned crimes
present, did hold the party or parties, responsible
shall be conclusive evidence of
for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a
such fact ...
moral certainty having arisen as to their
capability.
b.
(5) Dumlao v Comelec Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
Facts: and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973
Constitution). An accusation, according to the
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt.
Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and
he has been receiving retirement benefits
therefrom.
The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office.
office on the ground alone that charges have been
Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted.
filed against him before a civil or military tribunal.
This law provides, among others, that retirees
It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate
from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to
effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring
distinction is made between a person convicted of
that it is class legislation hence
acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked
have been filed for such acts, as both of them
equal protection in the eye of the law.
would be ineligible to run for public office. A
person disqualified to run for public office on the
ground that charges have been filed against him
is virtually placed in the same category as a
person already convicted of a crime with the
penalty of arresto, which carries with it the
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and
accessory penalty of suspension of the right to
Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have
hold office during the term of the sentence (Art.
different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan
44, Revised Penal Code).
are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other
provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of
the elected officials, the length of the campaign,
and the provision which bars persons charged for
crimes from running for public office as well as the
provision that provides that the mere filing of
The portion of the second paragraph of section 4
complaints against them after preliminary
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "...
investigation would already disqualify them from
the filing of charges for the commission of such
office.
crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima
facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared
null and void, for being violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused.
Issue:

(6) Marquez v Comelec
Facts:
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the
Province of Quezon filed a petition for the reversal
of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his
petition for quo warranto against Eduardo
Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from
justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent
filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge
against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud
or grand theft of personal property was still
pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles
Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of
California, U.S.A.
A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is
claimed, has yet to be served on private
respondent on account of his alleged flight from
that country.
Petitioners subsequent recourse from the
COMELECs May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed
without prejudice, however, to the filing in due
time of a possible post-election quo warranto
proceeding against private respondent.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner
filed a petition with the COMELEC for cancellation
of respondents CoC on account of the candidates
disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect
of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner
instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28)
against private respondent before the COMELEC.
Issue;
Whether private respondent who, at the time of
the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to
date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before
a foreign court and evading a warrant for his
arrest comes within the term fugitive from
justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC
and is, therefore, disqualified from being a
candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding
on to, an elective local office.
Held:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a
Fugitive from justice in criminal cases here and
abroad are disqualified from running for any
elective local position.
It has been held that construction placed upon law
by the officials in charge of its enforcement
deserves great and considerable weight. However,
when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity
in an enabling law, it must merely be made to
apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or
regulation can neither expand nor constrict the
law but must remain congruent to it.
The confinement of the term fugitive from
justice in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a
person who has been convicted by final
judgment is an inordinate and undue
circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any
definite finding on whether or not private
respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as
such term must be interpreted and applied in the
light of the Courts opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC outrightly
dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the
basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Oversight
Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts, is
thus constrained to remand the case to the
COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved
factual matter.
DAVIDE JR, Separate Opinion, Concurring
I do not share the doubt of Mr. Justice Vitug on the
constitutionality of the disqualification based on
the presumption of innocence clause of the Bill of
Rights.
the disqualification in guestion does not, in reality,
involve the issue of presumption of innocence.
Elsewise stated, one is not disqualified because he
is presumed guilty by the filing of an information
or criminal complaint against him. He is
disqualified because he is a "fugitive from justice,"
The disqualification then is based on his flight
from justice. In the face of the settled doctrine
that flight is an indication of guilt, it may even be
truly said that it is not the challenged disqualifying
provision which overcomes the presumption of
innocence but rather the disqualified person
himself who has proven his guilt.
(7) Corpuz v People
Facts:
Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower courts
decision finding him guilty for malversation of
public funds. The accused was the acting
supervising cashier at the Provincial Treasurers
office.
He denied having misused the whole amount
of P72,823.08 which was discovered to be a
shortage from the government funds contending
that the P50,000.00 was the unliquidated
withdrawal made by their paymaster Pineda
through the 4 checks he issued while the
petitioner was on leave and that he was forced by
their Provincial Treasurer Aluning to post said
amount in his cash book despite not actually
receiving the amount.
Facts:
Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he
had liquidated all four checks after the amounts
thereof were disbursed. He added that the
petitioner was not really absent on the dates in
question as alleged but was in fact the one who
prepared the said checks in the morning before
attending to the sick wife in the hospital, returning
to the office in the afternoon.
to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by
Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez
corroborated Pineda's testimony that the
petitioner was not on official leave on the dates in
question. Aluning denied he had exerted pressure
on the petitioner to post the shortage in the
petitioner's cash book.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in observing the
presumption of innocence of the accused of the
charge against him
Held: It is held that presumption of innocence of
the accused should yield to the positive findings
that he malversed the government funds
considering all the evidences presented that point
out to his guilt on the charge imputed against
him. Records shows that the checks issued for the
paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused
and there were inconsistent entries on his cash
books and that he was not really on leave on the
day the said checks were disbursed by the
paymaster.
The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a
"sinister design" to hold him responsible for a
crime he has not committed is less than
convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on
others for his failure to account for the missing
money only shows it is he who is looking for a
scapegoat.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is
applicable only where the evidence of the parties
is evenly balanced, in which case the
constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt
the scales in favor of the accused. There is no
such equipoise here. The evidence of the
prosecution is overwhelming and has not been
overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous
claims of persecution and conspiracy. The
presumed innocence of the accused must yield to
the positive finding that he malversed the sum of
P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose
confidence he has breached. His conviction must
be affirmed.
(8) Feeder International line v CA
The M/T ULU WAI a foreign vessel of Honduran
registry, owned and operated by Feeder
International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left
Singapore carrying gas oil and fuel oil consigned
to Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga,
Philippines.
The vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon
Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs
authorities. The presence of the vessel only came
information of the civilian informer in the area.
Acting on said information, the Acting District
Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team to
verify the report.
The Customs team found out that the vessel did
not have on board the required ship and shipping
documents, except for a clearance from the port
authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for
Zamboanga.
The District Collector issued his decision finding
the said vessel and her cargo in violation of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD
1464). The same was affirmed by both Custom
Commissioner and Court of Tax Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of
property without due process of law in that its
right to be presumed innocent was not recognized
.
Ruling:
No, the petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has
no personality to invoke the right to be presumed
innocent which right is available only to an
individual who is an accused in a criminal case.
Right to be Heard by Himself and
Counsel
RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF
AND COUNSEL
The right to be heard includes the
following rights:
1. Right to be present at the trial
2. The right to be present covers
the period from ARRAIGNMENT
to PROMULGATION of sentence.
3. After arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding
absence of accused, provided 2
requisites are met. Note, that
trial in absentia is allowed only if
the accused has been validly
arraigned.
(i) Accused has been duly
notified; and
(ii) His failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
4. The accused may waive the right
to be present at the trial by not
showing up. However, the court
can still compel the attendance
of the accused if necessary for
identification purposes.
Exception: If the accused, after
arraignment, has stipulated that
he is indeed the person charged
with the offense and named in
the information, and that any
time a witness refers to a name
by which he is known, the
witness is to be understood as
referring to him.
5. While the accused is entitled to
be present during promulgation
of judgement, the absence of his
counsel during such
promulgation does not affect its
validity.
2. Right to counsel
(a) Right to counsel means the right to
EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION.
(b) If the accused appears at arraignment
without counsel, the judge must:
(i) Inform the accused that he has a
right to a counsel before arraignment
(ii) Ask the accused if he desires the aid
of counsel
(iii) If the accused desires counsel, but
cannot afford one, a counsel de oficio must
be appointed
(iv) If the accused desires to obtain his own
counsel, the court must give him a
reasonable time to get one.
3. Right to an impartial judge
4. Right of confrontation and cross-
examination
5. Right to compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses
(9) People v Holgado
Facts:
Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in
the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight
illegal detention because according to the
information, being a private person, he did
"feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap
and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of
Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby
depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal
liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and
said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo,
which no evidence was presented to indict the
latter.
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in
the proceedings in the trial court.
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If
the defendant appears without attorney, he
must be informed by the court that it is his
right to have attorney being arraigned., and
must be asked if he desires the aid of
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de
oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must
be allowed for procuring attorney. This was
violated. More so the guarantees of our
Constitution, and that all accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel." In
criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given the opportunity to be heard
by counsel.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the
true import of the qualified plea of accused. The
record does not show whether the supposed
instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether
it had reference to the commission of the offense
or to the making of the plea guilty. No
investigation was opened by the court on this
matter in the presence of the accused and there is
now no way of determining whether the supposed
instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the
voluntariness of the confession. Apparently
the court became satisfied with the fiscal's
information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo
and found that the same had nothing to do with
this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for
the simple reason that a mere statement of
the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a
qualified plea of the accused. But above all,
the court should have seen to it that the accused
be assisted by counsel especially because of the
qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of
the offense found to be capital by the court
. hearing.
(10) People v Agbayani
Facts:
The appellant was charged for raping his 14-year
old daughter and was found guilty of the crime of
rape.. A motion for a new trial was filed before the
court by the new counsel of the accused assailing
the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused invoking the failure of the
court to inform the accused of his right to choose
his own counsel and the violation of the
appellants right for a 2 day preparation for trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose
affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient
ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and
to send the case back for a new trial.
Held:
It is settled that the failure of the record to
disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised
the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient
ground to reverse conviction. The reason being
that the trial court must be presumed to have
complied with the procedure prescribed by law for
the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a
presumption can only be overcome by an
affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has
been held that unless the contrary appears in the
record, or that it is positively proved that the trial
court failed to inform the accused of his right to
counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was
informed by the court of such right.
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
provides that after a plea of not guilty, the
accused is entitled to two (2) days to
prepare for trial unless the court for good
cause grants him further time. It must be
pointed out that the right must be expressly
demanded. Only when so demanded does denial
thereof constitute reversible error and a ground
for new trial. Further, such right may be waived,
expressly or impliedly. In the instant case,
appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial,
hence, he effectively waived such right. It is
untenable to believe that the counsel who
represented the appellant was not prepared
during the trial as records showed he was able to
cross-examine the complainant and there was no
ground to claim he is incompetent to represent
the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed
the decision of the lower court.
(11) Amion v Judge Chiongson
Facts:
This is an administrative matter filed before the
court charging the respondent judge for ignorance
of the law and oppression for vehemently insisting
of appointing the accused-appellant counsel de
officio despite the appellants opposition because
he has his own counsel of choice in the person of
Atty. Depasucat.
However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat did
not appear in court which prompted respondent
judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to
represent the accused stating on record that his
representation is without prejudice to the
appearance of the accused own counsel.
This was done in order to avoid delay of the trial
since the complainant already expressed
frustration on the so many postponement of the
Issue:
Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right
to counsel of his own choice as asserted by the
accused in the case at bar.
Held:
The court finds the administrative complaint
against respondent judge devoid of merit. An
examination of related provisions in the
Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will
show that the "preference in the choice of
counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically
to a person under investigation rather than
one who is the accused in a criminal
prosecution.
Withal, the word preferably under Section 12(1),
Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey
the message that the choice of a lawyer by a
person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling his
defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the
tempo of a custodial investigation, will be solely in
the hands of the accused who can impede, nay,
obstruct the progress of the interrogation by
simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or
another, is not available to protect his
interest. This absurd scenario could not have been
contemplated by the framers of the charter.
Accused-complainant was not, in any way,
deprived of his substantive and constitutional
right to due process as he was duly accorded all
the opportunities to be heard and to present
evidence to substantiate his defense but he
forfeited this right, for not appearing in court
together with his counsel at the scheduled
hearings. It was the strategic machination of
delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave
rise to the need of appointing him counsel de
officio by the court as delaying further the hearing
is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a case and
causes delay in the administration of justice.
The Court cannot help but note the series of legal
maneuvers resorted to and repeated importunings
of the accused or his counsel, which resulted in
the protracted trial of the case, thus making a
mockery of the judicial process, not to mention
the injustice caused by the delay to the victims
family.
Right to e Informed of the Nature and
Cause of the Accusation
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
Purposes of the right:
1) To furnish the accused with a
description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defenses
2) To avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal against a further prosecution for
the same cause
3) To inform the court of the facts
alleged.
If the information fails to allege the
material elements of the offense, the
accused cannot be convicted thereof even
if the prosecution is able to present
evidence during the trial with respect to
such elements.
The real nature of the crime charged is
determined from the recital of facts in the
information. It is not determined based on
the caption or preamble thereof nor from
the specification of the provision of law
allegedly violated
(12) People v Quitlong
(13) Pecho v People
(14) Soriano v Saandiganbayan
(15) Borja v Mendoza
Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public
Trial
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND
PUBLIC TRIAL
Factors used in determining whether against President Joseph or was not due to the fault of the
the right to a speedy trial has been Definition of impartial trial Eestrada prosecution, the testimony of the witness
violated. The accused is entitled to the cold (22) Re: Petition for Radio and TV should be excluded.
1) Time expired from the filing of the neutrality of an impartial judge. Coverage of the Multiple
information It is an element of due process. MurderCases against When the right to cross-examine is
2) Length of delay involved Maguindanao Governor Zaldy demandable
3) Reasons for the delay Definition of public trial Ampatuan It is demandable only during trials. Thus, it
4) Assertion or non-assertion of the The attendance at the trial is open to all (23) People v Mapalao cannot be availed of during preliminary
right by the accused irrespective of their relationship to the (24) People v Valeriano investigations.
5) Prejudice caused to the defendant. accused. However, if the evidence to be Principal exceptions to the right of
adduced is offensive to decency or public Right of Confrontation confrontation
Effect of dismissal based on the morals, the public may be excluded. RIGHT TO MEET WITNESS FACE TO 1. The admissibility of dying
ground of violation of the accuseds The right of the accused to a public trial is FACE declarations
right to speedy trial not violated if the hearings are conducted Purposes of the right: 2. Trial in absentia under Section
If the dismissal is valid, it amounts to an on Saturdays, either with the consent of 1. To afford the accused an 14(2)
acquittal and can be used as basis to claim the accused or if failed to object thereto. opportunity to cross-examine the
double jeopardy. This would be the effect witness (25) Talino v Sandiganyan
even if the dismissal was made with the (16) People v Tee 2. To allow the judge the
consent of the accused (17) Flores v People opportunity to observe the Right to Compulsory Processes
(18) Conde v Rivera deportment of the witness
Remedy of the accused if his right to
speedy trial has been violated
(19)
(20)
Mateo, Jr v Villaluz
Garcia v Domingo Failure of the accused to cross-
(26) Roco v Contreras
He can move for the dismissal of the case. (21) In re: request for Live Radio and examine a witness
If he is detained, he can file a petition for TV Coverage of the Trial in the If the failure of the accused to cross-
the issuance of writ of habeas corpus. Sandiganbayan of Plunder case examine a witness is due to his own fault