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International relations are based on patriarchal norms states
are constructed and legitimized through masculinity making
violence inevitable
True 15
Jacqui True (Professor of Politics & International Relations and an Australian Research Council Future Fellow at
Monash University, Australia. She received her PhD from York University, Toronto, Canada and has held academic
positions at Michigan State University, the University of Southern California, and the University of Auckland. She is a
specialist in Gender and International Relations.), June 2015, A Tale of Two Feminisms in International Relations?
Feminist Political Economy and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, Critical Perspectives, Politics & Gender, 11
(2) (2015), pg. 419-421, Accessed: 7/10/16
A photo depicting Russian President Vladimir Putin in chivalrous fashion, placing his
coat around the shoulders of Chinas first lady at an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) dinner made headline news around the world in November 2014 (Allen-Ebrahimian 2014).
Surely this is not the serious stuff of international politics, IR colleagues commented in social media forums? But
from a feminist perspective that pays attention to the pervasive gendering of IR, the
image was not at all surprising or trivial. Indeed, the gender symbolism of the image
reveals the patriarchal foundations of international politics. Putin, for his part,
personifies the linkages between the figure of the male provider at the heart of
global economic governance and meetings like APEC and the figure of the male
protector of womenandchildren (Enloe 1993) at the heart of the security state
system. Feminist political economy (FPE) analysis reveals the analogy between male heads
of households and the masculine state. Both equally control the lives of dependents
under the guise that it is in their best interests. Their unequal power is violent, but
the violence is masked by virtue and love (Young 2003, 6). Such analysis helps to explain the
prevalence of mens violence against women in the private household as well as the
male dominance of state-sanctioned war and conflict. Modern forms of patriarchal
households themselves were formed through the force of industrialization and
regime of accumulation in and for the formation of warring sovereign states (Mies
1986; Peterson 1992). However, the gendered division of labor between economic production
in the market and social reproduction in the household has obscured mens violence
vis a` vis dependents inside households compared with mens violence outside vis
a` vis other enemy groups. Through a feminist political economy perspective we can see how the
security state is constructed and legitimated through the masculine role of the
provider in the patriarchal family-household and how the state appears a legitimate
protector writ large to citizens when it uses force abroad, often in the name of
women and children. This essay advances the case for an integrated feminist analysis
of international relations inspired by the multidimensional account of womens security in
IR feminist scholarship. Crucially, FPE makes the link between the male provider and the male protector in
explaining the prevalence of mens violence from the private household to the public realm and in state-sanctioned
war and conflict. The importance of an FPE approach to international security is illustrated with respect to the UN
Such an approach opens up new areas of research
Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.
and ways of addressing IR challenges. GENESIS OF FEMINIST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The FPE
approach is no news to many IR feminist scholars and indeed harks back to the earliest articulation of a feminist
perspective on IR. Cynthia Enloe, for instance, makes feminist sense of global politics,
integrating the study of political economy and security politics with ethnographic methods and her trademark
curiosity-driven inquiry. Enloe (2010) analyzes the fallout of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the political regime
changes ensuing from the Arab Spring from the perspective of womens lives. She does not separate these distinct
her
events as matters of international political economy or international security respectively. Instead
gendered lens explores the similarities across them, highlighting their masculinist
logics and disproportionate gendered effects. Ann Tickner (1992, 55 56, 66) mounts a powerful
argument contra IR realism, pointing out that international security must encompass ecological,
economic, and physical security at all levels individual, state, and global. She
(1992, 23) states that because of the sexual division of labour, mens association with
violence has been legitimated through war and the instrument of the state. Thus, she
argues that IR feminist perspectives must introduce the issue of domestic violence
and analyze how the boundaries of public and private, domestic and international,
political and economic are permeable and interrelated. Crucially, the linkage of war to
violence against women should be part of any comprehensive account of security
(Tickner 1992, 55). Following the lead of these trailblazing scholars, IR feminists are examining so-called
private or domestic forms of violence against women and not just that violence through the prism of security
studies, war, and conflict. Theyare confronting regimes of unequal entitlements, masculine
hegemonies that hold hierarchical political economic orders together at every level.
One of the things the state should be is a protector but today this means that all states are
expected to pass laws prohibiting domestic and sexual violence, for instance. States, even authoritarian ones,
must be seen to doing something to address gendered violence to respond to the now
globalized social movements that are making this violence visible.
Fear and Domestic ViolenceThe connection between highly militarized societies and domestic
violence has been well established. Besides rape, there are other types of violence perpetuated against
womens bodies. During shelling, when tension increases and women show fear, men
assault them physically. In Drass, the wife of a policeman related that she is regularly beaten up by her husband as
she screams whenever the shells fall. When there are problems in accessing basic
necessities, it also leads to domestic violence. The women and girls of
Kargil feel that their inferior status in society, dependence on men and the
discrimination that they face are causes for violence. We cannot work nor
sit quietly at home. We cannot do anything. Whatever we do is not right,
there is always tension at home. It is brought in by our husbands,
frustrated with the awam (nation) can we do anything to stop this violence? Unemployed
husbands losing dominant positions at home, discussions of war in public
spaces frequented by men and humiliation by outsiders have resulted in
aggressive masculinity. Zorica Mrscevic analyses a similar situation in former Yugoslavia, where domestic
violence is caught in a vicious circle of mutual consequences and
causation along with patriarchy and war (2000: 42). The community shrinks during war as travel is
limited and in nuclear families there is no one to act as a barrier to the domestic violence faced by women. In a situation where the
military plays decisive roles, violence is a way of life, and women and children live in fear of violence from within and outside the
Violence against women in the private has been kept outside the legal
home.
framework of most countries, thus providing legitimacy to the acts. States such
as India have now started to recognize it as a crime. During confl ict no conceptual distinction emerges between public and private
and violence becomes a continuing threat against women in both spheres. This normalization of violence against women as
observed in the cases of Okinawa and the women of Jordan (see the articles by Kozue Akibayashi and Suzuyo Takazato, and Norma
Violence
Nemeh) must be avoided as in long term-military presence it remains a constant threat to womens human security.
cannot be considered only as a crime but a human rights abuse, as the
women of Okinawa demonstrated. Violence and Masculinity in Conflict Situations In any conflict
situation, national chauvinism exalts both militarism and masculinity. In this
situation, violence becomes the normal expression of masculine identity.
Heroes, patriots and martyrs are projected in terms of power and honour .
Each nation state at war adds on to these two structures on which masculinity is endorsed. In this environment, patriarchy emerges
This culture of
as a significant marker of militarist nationalism, where men hold power and control over women.
power is part of the masculine discourse and mainstreamed into the
natural, not viewed as an aberration of human nature. All countries at war produce their
own version of the masculinist approach. In the South Asian subcontinent, on the borders of India and Pakistan, local versions of
masculinity emerge during conflict to be used by leaders and supporters of war. In October 2001, for instance, after the loss of the
Kargil War, President Musharraf of Pakistan was still sending messages to the Indian counterparts through the media of continuing
the war, declaring that: We in Pakistan have not worn bangles (The Tribune 2001). Bangles are worn by women and denote
femininity and weakness. Prime Minister Vajpayee replied in a public address: In Punjab men also wear kada [steel bracelet] worn
Masculinity is not an
by the Sikhs a martial race (The Tribune 2001). The kada is the religious epitome of Sikh valour.
overarching homogeneous attribute. It has its own complexities which the war
system makes use of to sustain it. As methods of war change, the masculine
determinants modify. The new wars enclose within themselves new methods such as increased use of intelligence
agencies, or terrorism war then becomes good and can be used for protecting civilians
from both external and internal elements which are intermingled . The internal security
becomes closely linked to the external as it did in the USA after 11 September. It happened in many countries such as in Sri Lanka
and India (both in Jammu & Kashmir and the North-East), where security forces play an important role in protecting national security.
This removal of lines between war and peace affect womens in daily lives.
The 2001 example shows us that, on the one hand, extraterrestrialism is simply another
variation of the frontier myth, the legitimization of expansion into space and
domination over the whole world. On the other hand, it is particular to a post-1960s
myth of escaping the Earth to control it- the kind of logic that Nancy Hartsock (1983)
identifies as peculiar to late-twentieth-century white hegemonic masculinity,
especially in the context of normative ideals of the suburban family. Hartsock argues that
under conditions in which men, as commuting breadwinners, are absent from the family, do
not participate in childbearing intimate, daily ways, and still have economic and personal dominance
within the home, gender roles for boys and girls are differentiated by the
requirement that the boy identify with an abstract masculinity, while the girl identifies
with a real person involved in her everyday care. The boy must strenuously reject the set of
characteristics (nurturance, daily housework, intimacy) that are identified with femininity, even though
those may be more real to him than the characteristic associated with the
masculine role (competition, willingness to use violence, control). The underlying logic of
extraterrestrialism is separating from the mother, claiming independence from her,
putatively admiring her from a distance but in reality violently rejecting any
possibility of identification with femininity and its connection to the body, the earth,
and the messy, unpredictable qualities of the basics of reproductive work. Extraterrestrialism
is thus deeply connected to the desire for control of nature (and women),
particularly the promotion of violence (as LeGuin points out) as an adventurous, heroic, and
necessary aspect of human evolution and achievement (Garb 1990; Litfin 1997; Sofia 1984).
State
State centered approaches to human securitization fails to
include womens voices, only alternative is using a gendered
lens on securitization logic absent state action
Hans in 2010 (Asha Hans is the former Director, School of Womens Studies, and
Professor of Political Science, Utkal University, India. She is the author and editor of many
publications related to womens rights, the latest being The Gender Imperative, coedited
with Prof. Betty Reardon (2010). Her book Gender, Disability and Identity (2003) is a globally
recognized seminal work coedited with Annie Patri. An advocate of womens rights, she has
participated in the formulation of many conventions in the United Nations. A leading
campaigner of womens rights in India, she has initiated many campaigns on the inclusion of
women with disabilities in the mainstream womens movement. She is also the founder of
Women with Disabilities India Network. 14 Human Security the Militarized Perception and
Space for Gender The Gender Imperative pages: 384 409)
Conclusion The security system globally is highly militarized and national security, as we
have seen, is placed at the core where the state and not the people come
first. Boundaries have been more important than the humans living on
them. It is therefore not surprising that in Kargil, from a military perspective, the protection of
borders was of foremost importance and people were marginalized. The
animosity of the people became central in the states relationships to its
borders. When the system attempted change, the peoples militarist response that they were willing to die/fight
for Ray was not surprising. The aim of the article is not to be critical of the work done by
the person who created the change but to analyse its importance and its
relationship to the concept of human security, especially from a gendered
perspective. Does Goodwill fit into the feminist paradigm? If we take into account the four
components most well-known feminist constituents of human security agree upon,
i.e. physical security, environment security, daily needs and dignity, it will provide
us with the guidelines to analyse Goodwill . To begin with, the importance of Goodwill to
the nation state is that it controls militancy so the security of its borders is
achieved. Goodwill, Ray said, created trust between the armed forces and
civilians on the border and brought the two civilians on both sides of the
border closer. In the context of this book, the human security paradigm as used by
General Arjun Ray in Kargil is the use of the vocabulary of human security but when
it stipulates that human security is a core element of national security, it goes
against the core element of human security as projected by feminist writers . So though
Goodwill provides more developmental space to the citizens on the border, more equality to women, educational
Though it
and health opportunities, the question that arises is that does it fulfil womens human security needs?
can be considered as a commendable attempt in the context of understanding the
other religion, its sustainability is questionable without which it becomes a half-
hearted attempt by those who continue to use it. Though termed a socio-politico
strategy for conflict prevention, it stops short of even attempting to do this. Using the
terminology of culture of peace and human security is not enough, especially as the approach is narrow and the aim
is basically only to stop opposition. One of the advantages of this has been projected as the number of people from
this region joining the armed forces. This is militarization, an opposing force in womens search for security.
Militarization is not easily tackled as states deliberately use it not only
through the armed forces but as an ideology of power which influences
the society and civilian life as a whole. In its process of implementation patriarchy plays an
ideological manifestation of power relations between state and
important role. This
citizen internalizes militarist values, including the use of force and reinforcement of
patriarchal norms. A human security system would, unlike national security, endure
confrontation rather than suppress it with armaments and do further harm. It would
create space for non-violent protest and not wipe out its own populations together
with that of the opposition across the border. Goodwill speaks of a non-violent
rights-based approach, of disarmament, of sustainable, endogenous, equitable
human development and in the same breath of military security . Though Goodwill is based
on the reasoning that guns and tanks do not provide security and is a brand name for trust and restoring hope and
effective border management, Ray also speaks of security as being a human defence line that can serve as its
eyes and ears on the border. In this concept the villager turns out to be the central point of focus to manage the
border areas and build a functional communityarmy relationship. The visibility of the projects would create
Goodwill and provide a positive image of the army, an important objective but in reality much has not been done to
achieve it. Unless the warlike situation stops on the border, security cannot be achieved. Ray does not mention a
Can the states hegemonic control shift
time frame when the army would leave the borders, if at all.
from the military to the people? We recognize that as the conceptualization of
human security challenges the large expenditures on the armed forces, in a market-
oriented economy it will be difficult to get states to agree to it . Armaments are where the
money lies. At this point we need to remind the state that soon after independence in the 1950s, it sponsored
policies of non-aggression and promoted policies of collective security and displayed faith in the UN. As the power
of the country increased, the more radical its national security determinant became. Above all justice is important,
as the military expenditure is at the cost of other sectors, especially social sectors such as education, health and
gender inequality, the factors which influence the notion of justice. Any order which is not just has to be challenged
the hegemonization of the state which has patriarchal
and changed. Among this is
tendencies and so marginalizes the weak and especially women. The other
vulnerable sections are the minorities, especially religious and ethnic
communities. A human security paradigm to work must facilitate the
creation of these changes. Can this alternative suggested by Ray create the space for change? It is
obvious from womens concerns even after human security was
implemented by the army that womens security was excluded. They still go
without fulfilment of health and other needs and their bodies are violated. In this framework provided by Ray,
human security is achieved through provisions of education, health,
gender equality and community development programmes. The
programmatic approach is not enough; if these are to be provided it must
be to all citizens in conflict zones, but it stops short of universalization in
implementation. Further, the culture of peace and space for shared values of tolerance, solidarity,
democracy and economic development that Goodwill wanted to achieve fits into the feminist human security
paradigm. At the same time, in keeping with its links to national security, it falls short of visioning what it means to
women. A human security paradigm would aim for the wellbeing of the people and avoid the harmful effects of
national security, as seen earlier What kind of a world of peace can we visualize? Can human security as a
paradigm be adopted by states? What is needed to add to this emerging paradigm is a pragmatic non-violent
approach to replace national security through our understanding of human security. About adoption of non-violence
by states, Mahatma Gandhi said that it is a blasphemy to say that non-violence can only be practiced by individuals
and never by nations which are composed of individuals. Thus, he suggests the role of non-cooperation which he
argues is an attempt to awaken the masses to a sense of their dignity and power. Women need to adopt these
What we require is disseminating the
practices when state power threatens their rights.
information on what a feminist perception of human security is. This
should be at all levels, in general education and civil society teachings. We
need to include in our research the linkages that emerge between
violence, masculinity, gender and human security, to create a culture of
peace that will replace the violence in our lives.
Attempts to include feminist ideology in state climate
practices fail- WWC and the UN proves
Gaard, G. (2015, April). Ecofeminism and climate change. In Women's Studies
International Forum (Vol. 49, pp. 20-33). Pergamon. Gaard was a UWRF
Sustainability Faculty Fellow in spring 2011, Dr. Gaard is the current Coordinator for
the Sustainability Faculty Fellows. Before coming to River Falls, Gaard was an
Associate Professor of Humanities at Western Washington University in Bellingham,
Washington (1997-2002) and an Associate Professor of Composition and Women's
Studies at the University of Minnesota-Duluth (1989-1997)
Although the first stirrings of women's environmental defense were introduced at
the United Nations 1985 conference in Nairobi, through news of India's Chipko
movement involving peasant women's defense of trees (their livelihood), women's
role in planetary protection became clearly articulated in November 1991, when the
Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) organized the World
Women's Congress for a Healthy Planet in Miami, Florida (Resurreccin, 2013; WEDO, 2012). Seen as
an opportunity to build on the gains of the United Nations Decade forWomen and to prepare a Women's Action
the World
Agenda for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro,
Women's Congress drew more than 1500 women from 83 countries. But while its
leaders alleged that the resulting Women's Agenda 21 had been built through a
consensus process, for many of those sitting in attendance, listening to one elite
speaker after another, it was not clear how our views shaped or even contributed to
this process of agenda-formation. Participatory democracylong a valued strategy
in grassroots ecofeminist tacticswas reduced to two dubious threads: a series of
break-out discussion groups held throughout the conference, and a Report Card
for participants to take home and use to evaluate specific issues within their
communities and mobilize a local response (shaping the issues themselves had no
place on the report card). Along with other ecofeminists, I felt a mix of energy,
dismay, and frustration at this gathering.1 While the women leaders from many
countries were valuable participants and decision-makers in the upcoming
conversations at the UN Conference on Environment and Development, that
weekend in Miami, too many speakers discussed women's feminine gender roles,
our influence on decision-makers, and the need for reforms to the present
systemall introduced and capped with the essentializing motto, It's Time For
Women to Mother Earth. Despite these flaws in rhetoric and democratic
participation, WEDO's 1991 World Women's Congress has been hailed as the entry-
point for feminism into the UN conferences on the global environment, opening the
way for later developments bridging feminist interventions and activisms
addressing climate change. The following year, UNCED's Agenda 21 did not in fact
include the most transformative recommendations from the Women's Agenda 21
the analysis of environmental degradation as rooted in military/industrial/capitalist
economics, for exampleor even the more reformist proposals such as
implementing gender equity on all UN panels, an issue which has been taken up again at the 2013
Council of the Parties (COP) for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Warsaw,
Perhaps WEDO's Women's Agenda 21 had already been undermined
Poland (See Fig. 2).
by the 1987 report from the World Commission on Environment and Development,
Our Common Future, led by Brundtland, 1987. This report established sustainable
development as a desirable strategy, defined as development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needswhich sounds reasonable enough, until one reads the document's
renewed call for continued economic growth on a finite planet, a fundamentally
unsustainable endeavor. The report completely omits discussion of the First
World/North's2 over-development and its high levels of production, consumption,
and disregard for the environment (Agostino & Lizarde, 2012). Nonetheless, the
Brundtland Report's sustainable development concept has shaped climate change
discourse for the subsequent decades, producing techno-solutions such as the
green economy that have perpetuated capitalist and colonialist strategies of
privatization, and fail to address root causes of the climate crisis (Pskowski, 2013). In the
two decades since WEDO's Women's Agenda 21, feminist involvement in global environmentalism has developed
from a 19801990's focus on women, environment and development (WED), women in development (WID) or
gender, environment and development (GED) to an emphasis on feminist political ecology in the 1990s2000s
Initially, discussion of women and
(Goebel, 2004; MacGregor, 2010; Resurreccin, 2013).
environment focused on women in the global South, whose real material needs for
food security and productive agricultural land, forest resources, clean water and
sanitation trumped more structural discussions about gendered environmental
discourses (i.e. Leonard, 1989; Sontheimer, 1991), although these structurally
transformative elements were equally present in other texts (i.e. Sen & Grown,
1987). The focus on women rather than gender tended to construct women as
victims of environmental degradation in need of rescue; their essential closeness to
nature, cultivated through family caregiving and through Fig. 1.subsistence labor, was
argued as providing women with special knowledge, and their agency as laborers
and leaders in environmental sustainability projects was advocated (Mies & Shiva,
1993; Shiva, 1989). Clearly, this rhetoric instrumentalized women and ignored the
cultural limitations of the woman-nature linkage (cf. Dodd, 1997; Leach, 2007; Li,
1993); it was also significantly silent on the roles of men, and the ways that gender
as a system constructed economic and material resources that produce victims
(MacGregor, 2010; Resurreccin, 2013). The shift to a feminist political ecology (Goebel,
2004) involved a macro-level exploration of the problems of globalization and
colonization, a micro-level examination of local institutions for their environmental
management, a critique of marriage institutions for the ways these affect women's
access to natural resources, and an interrogation of the gendered aspects of space
in terms of women's mobility, labor, knowledge, and power. The shift from women
as individuals to gender as a system structuring power relations has been an
important development in feminist responses to climate change. Moving forward from this
herstory, I bring an ecofeminist perspective to examine the ways that climate change phenomena have been
analyzed primarily from the standpoint of the environmental sciences and technologies, and how this standpoint
forecloses the kinds of solutions envisioned.3 I examine both liberal and cultural ecofeminist perspectives
highlighting the ways women have been both excluded from climate change policy discussions and
disproportionately affected by climate change phenomena, and summarize Fig. 2. Comparing Women's Agenda 21
(1991) and the UNCED Agenda 21 (1992). (Data source: Br Bistuer & Cabo, 2004). 22 G. Gaard / Women's Studies
International Forum 49 (2015) 2033 proposals drawing on women's special knowledge and agency as decision-
makers and leaders in solving the problems of climate change. Noting the popular utility as well as the limitations of
these perspectives, I examine both climate change phenomena and climate justice analyses. In organizing this
inquiry, I am inspired by feminist activist and scholar Charlotte Bunch, founder of Rutgers University's Center for
Women's Global Leadership, whose landmark essay, Not by degrees: Feminist theory and education (1979)
proposes four tactical steps for using feminist theory to understand situations, place them in a broader context, and
evaluate possible courses of action. Simply stated, Bunch's theory suggests we ask, what is the problem?, how did
it originate?, what do we want?, and, how do we get there? (Bunch, 1987).
Traditional IR
Their conception of politics is too narrowtreating domestic
politics, international relations, and personal experience as
separate arenas denies the ways in which violence in each of
these affects violence in all of them and reproduces that
violence
Enloe 14
Cynthia, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Clark University. Bananas, Beaches
and Bases. University of California Press. 2014. Pp 348-353. MiLibrary.
One of the simplest and most disturbing feminist insights crafted in recent decades
is that the personal is political. It is a profound theoretical statement that can be transferred to a T-shirt
or bumper sticker. Asserting that the personal is political is disturbing, intentionally
disturbing, because it means that relationships we once imagined were (and many
of our friends and colleagues still prefer to think are) private or merely social are in
fact infused with power. Furthermore, those allegedly private, personal relationships are infused with
power that is unequal and backed up by public authority. But the assertion that the personal is
political is like a palindrome, one of those phrases that can be read backward as well as forward. Read
as the political is personal, the assertion suggests that politics is not shaped merely
by what happens in legislative debates, voting booths, political party strategy
sessions, court rooms, or war rooms. While men who dominate public life in so many
countries have told women to stay in the proverbial kitchen (not travel to workshops
in Manila, not organize, not theorize), those same men have used their myriad
forms of public power to construct private relationships in ways that have bolstered
their own masculinized political control . Without these deliberate gendered
maneuvers, men hold over political life might be far less secure. Without these
gendered maneuvers, moreover, most mens seeming expertise in politics would
look less impressive. A 2013 cross-national survey of citizens political knowledge
found that in virtually every one of the ten countries studied, women know less
about politics than men regardless of how advanced a country is in terms of gender
equality. The authors of the study speculated that this gender gap in political information might be due to the
fact that few women play prominent roles in news journalism and elite political life, which discourages many women
viewers and readers from seeing how current news accounts are relevant to themselves. While this possible
a British feminist
explanation for the country-by-country political information gaps appears feasible,
journalist analyzing the same ten-country study offered an additional explanation:
perhaps the researchers definitions and measures of what counts as politics were
too narrow. 3 Perhaps what many women do pay attention to, and do store information
about, is encompassed by a broader, some might say more realistic, map of politics,
for instance, the availability of affordable child care, the condition of public parks,
the accessibility of public transport, the readiness of police to treat a woman with
respect when she brings a rape charge, the governments willingness to use
sexualized pictures of local women to lure foreign tourists, and the impunity with
which employers abuse women on the job. That is, perhaps if the map of what is counted
as political were redrawn by feminist-informed cartographers, the gap between
womens and mens political knowledge would shrink dramatically. Explaining why any country
has the kind of politics it does should motivate us to be curious about how public life is constructed out of struggles
Accepting that the political is personal prompts one to
to define masculinity and femininity.
investigate the politics of marriage, the cheapening of womens labor, ideologies of
masculinity, sexually transmitted diseases, and homophobia not as marginal issues
but as matters central to the state. Doing this kind of research becomes just as
serious as studying military weaponry or taxation policy. In fact, insofar as the political
is personal, the latter categories cannot be fully understood without taking into
account the former. To make sense of international politics, we have to read power
backward and forward. Power relations between countries and their governments
involve more than troop maneuvers and diplomatic emails . Read forward, the personal is
international insofar as ideas about what it means to be a respectable woman or an
honorable man have been shaped by colonizing policies, international trade
strategies, and military doctrines. Today it has almost become a clich to say that the world is
shrinking, that state boundaries are porous: think of KFC opening in Shanghai, sushi eaten in Santiago, Czannes
hanging on walls in Doha, a Korean pop star drawing crowds in New York, and Russian weaponry propping up a
We frequently persist, nonetheless, in discussing personal power
Syrian autocrat.
relationships as if they were contained by sovereign states. We frequently consider
violence against women without investigating how the global trade in Internet
pornography operates, or how companies ordering sex tours and mail-order brides
conduct their business across national borders. Similarly, we try to explain how
women learn to be feminine without unraveling the legacies left by colonial officials
who used Victorian ideals of feminine domesticity to sustain their empires ; or we try to
trace what shapes childrens ideas about femininity and masculinity without looking at governments foreign
investment policies that encourage the global advertising campaigns of such giants as McCann Erickson, BBDO, or
Saatchi and Saatchi. Becoming aware that personal relationships have been internationalized, however, may make
one only feel guilty for not having paid enough attention to international affairs. You should know more about the
IMF, Dont switch channels when experts start talking about climate change, Find out where Guam is. While
new international attentiveness by itself is not sufficient. It leaves
useful, this
untouched our conventional presumptions about just what international politics is
and where it takes place. Coming to realize that the personal is international
expands the politically attentive audience, but it fails to transform our
understandings of what is happening on the multiple stages of international politics. The implications
of a feminist understanding of international politics are thrown into sharper relief
when one reads the personal is international the other way around: the international
is personal. This calls for a radical new imagining of what it takes for governments
to ally with each other, to compete with and wage war against each other. The
international is personal implies that governments depend on certain kinds of
allegedly private relationships in order to conduct their foreign affairs . Governments need
more than tax revenues and spy agencies; they also need wives who are willing to provide their diplomatic
husbands with unpaid services so those men can develop trusting relationships with other diplomatic husbands.
They need not only military hardware but also a steady supply of womens sexual services, as well as military
To operate in the international
wives gratitude, to convince their male soldiers that they are manly.
arena, governments seek other governments recognition of their sovereignty; but
they also depend on ideas about masculinized dignity and feminized sacrifice to
sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood. Thus the international politics of
debt, investment, colonization, decolonization, national security, diplomacy, trade,
and military occupation are far more complicated than most conventional experts
would have us believe. This may appear paradoxical. Many people, and especially women,
are taught that international politics are too complex, too remote, and too tough for
the so-called feminine mind to comprehend . If a Hillary Clinton, Angela Merkel, Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf, Michelle Bachelet, or Christine Lagarde enters, it is presumably because she has learned to think like a man.
Conventional analyses stop short of investigating an entire area of international
relations, an area that feminist-informed researchers in the still-expanding field of
gender and international relations are pioneers in exploring: how states depend on
particular artificial constructions of the domestic and private spheres to achieve
their political goals. If we take seriously the politics of domestic servants, of women living on or near a
military base, or of women who sew Gap and Zara apparel, we discover that international politics are more
explanations of
complicated than non- feminist analysts imagine. This is worth saying again:
international politics that are devoid of feminist questioning are too-simple
explanations. Such non-feminist explanations shy away from complexity. They
underestimate power. A feminist investigatory approach exposes a remarkable
assortment of the kinds of power it takes to make the complex international political
system work the way it currently does. Admittedly, conventional analysts of interstate
relations do talk a lot about power. In fact, they put power at the center of their
commentaries. These are the sorts of commentaries that are presumed to be most
naturally comprehended by manly men; women, especially those women presumed
to be conventionally feminine, allegedly do not have an innate taste for either
wielding or understanding power . However, feminist-informed explorations of
agribusiness plantation prostitution, foreign-service corps sexism, and repeated
attempts to tame outspoken nationalist women all reveal that, in reality, it takes
much more power to construct and perpetuate international political relations than we
have been led to believe. One result of feminists insight is that they do not erect false
barriers between the fields of security studies and international political economy.
Feminists realize that the actual workings of gendered politics routinely blur these
artificial fields of investigation.
In recent years, a veritable industry has emerged in relation to climate change vis-a`-vis research, reports,
conferences, and projects. Despite more recent controversies and politicized debates on credibility of science, data,
and predictions, the general consensus among scholars is that anthropogenic climate change has uneven and
uncertain impacts. The contextual nature of climate change and the specificities of responses have been repeatedly
highlighted in the milieu of generalizations and globalized discourses, and academics have responded with new
research. Hazards geographers and political ecologists are increasingly contributing to climate change research, but
Hulme (2008), Bailey (2008), and Moser (2009) have argued that geographers need to engage more critically and
geographers
forcefully with climate change policies and politics. In responding to such a call, I posit that
need to further engage with the gendered implications of climate change across sites and
scales, given the paucity of emphasis on such issues in the current literatures. Feminist geographers,
especially feminist political ecologists, I believe, have much to contribute to these debates. Few
scholars have focused on the ways that gender is a key factor in impacts,
adaptation, or mitigation in the voluminous literature on climate change . Men and
women experience, understand, and adapt to climate change in different ways, and
it is important to understand changes currently taking place, and likely to happen in the near
future, from a gendered perspective. Climate change is likely to exacerbate gendered
vulnerabilities and differential abilities to cope with changes on multiple fronts .
Although climate change is often framed as a global problem for all of humanity, the
heterogeneity of its manifestations, impacts, and responses has to be carefully
considered. Even though climate change is often portrayed as affecting the poor
uniformly in the Global South, this is further complicated by gendered power
relations that are intersected with other social differentiations (e.g., class, race, ethnicity,
etc.). Implications for livelihood, survival, poverty, and social power relations can have subtle and overt gendered
A focus on the various patterns of changes that
outcomes, which have to be analyzed in context.
exacerbate gender relations in livelihood opportunities, vulnerabilities, hardships,
and survival can provide more comprehensive understanding of the ways that
climate change impacts households and communities. Such analyses also shed further light on
the ways that emerging adaptation programs are influenced by gender dynamics and are complicated by gendered
power relations. Recent scholarship has highlighted the importance of heeding gender in climate change
discourses, programs, and projects (Dankelman 2010). Such scholarship draws from insights gained in the disaster
risk and reduction (DRR) literatures that have predominantly focused on case-specific events and empirical findings
and have contributed to greater understandings of the role of gender in disasters and recovery. More broadly, the
At the
emerging gender and climate change literature draws from insights of gender development literatures.
policy level, the clarion call of No climate justice without gender justice has
become popular since the Bali COP conference in 2007, bringing attention to the fact that
climate change is gendered in impacts, mitigation, adaptation, and policy
processes. Although still nascent, scholarship in gender and climate change has drawn attention to the
gendered differences in perceptions, responses, priorities, abilities, and preferences in the ways that climate
change is understood in mitigation and adaptation discourses (Dankelman 2002, 2010; Denton 2002; Masika 2002;
Nelson et al. 2002; Brody, Demetriades, and Esplen 2008; Terry 2009; Agostine and Lizarde 2012; see also the
GenderCC Network). For instance, a study of women in South Asia found that poor women
were particularly vulnerable to dramatic shifts in environmental change (e.g., erratic
monsoons, extreme floods, etc.) but were knowledgeable about the needs and requirements
of their households and communities to cope with changes as well as about alternative livelihood strategies
(Mitchell, Tanner, and Lussier 2007). The constraints they faced were also articulated along
class, gender, locational, and institutional lines, however. Feminist geographers and feminist
political ecologists can add much to the ongoing debates in the climate change and adaptation literatures,
explicating the textured ways that space, place, identities, and lived experiences are intersected by a range of
gender is often
processes and social relations. Seager (2006) and Mac- Gregor (2009) pointed out that
selectively given attention, or not, in any research or policy context . Demetriades and
Esplen (2008) and Nelson and Stathers (2009) further argued about the crucial importance of context-
specific and complex gender analysis in climate change debates, so as not to
reproduce the women only narratives that portray women simultaneously as
victims and as solution providers, thereby increasing the long list of caregiving roles women are
already assigned to. The collapsing of gender-as-women has been common in the existing
gender and climate change literature, which is often written for and by the development practitioner
and policy community. MacGregor (2009) pointed out that a lack of critical gender analysis or
theorization of gender limits such literature, even while bringing very important
attention to gender by privileging certain framings in the international arena. For
instance, as Dankelman (2010, 1112) indicated, it is important to look at women as a group as
well as gender as a construct but pay greater attention to the experiences of
women and focus on women in climate change debates. This might be strategically
important, but it also has the potential to limit the attention to the complex ways
that masculinities and femininities are constructed, negotiated, altered, and
transformed through climate change processes. There can also be the tendency to
essentialize women as a homogeneous group and overlook the multiple processes
that constitute gendered subjects, identities, and bodies. The dominant focus has been
on the impacts of climate change on women, but greater attention is needed to how
gender is intersected by other axe s (e.g., class, caste, age, etc.) as well as a relational
analysis of both women and men across social categories in a changing climate .
Given the importance of inclusion and equality, however, it is important not to
romanticize women, womens knowledge, or womens participation in climate
change mitigation or adaptation plans but to recognize their roles, responsibilities,
constraints, and opportunities. Balancing inclusion without essentialization is thus
crucial, albeit challenging. Such critiques resonate with those of feminist political ecologists and feminist
scholars who have long argued that genderenvironment relations risk being essentialized and reified without
careful, con- textual, and fluid understandings of gender as a power relation (e.g., Agarwal 1992, 2000; Jackson
1993; Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter, and Wangari 1996; Nightingale 2006; Leach 2007; Sultana 2009b). Few feminist
geographers have forayed into the climate change debates (e.g., Seager 2009; Bee et al. 2012). To this end,
scholars can contribute to the analyses and framing of debates, bringing forth the complex ways that gender
environment relations are produced, performed, contested, and lived. Feminist political ecologists have argued that
gendered dynamics of environmental change must be analyzed in ways that integrate subjectivities, scales, places,
spaces, ecological change, and power relations (Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter, and Wangari 1996; Elmhirst 2011;
Hawkins and Odeja 2011). Broader contexts and constraints that influence gender are crucial to understand and
Given the gaps in the literatures on climate change
address in processes of climate change.
that engage with recent advances in feminist theories, it becomes imperative to
bring such insights to bear on the important work that has been accomplished by
gender advocates in their sustained and tireless efforts in the development and
policy circles. In this regard, feminist analyses of the impacts of climate change remain
important but also must be broadened to examine the ways in which gender
complicates the assumptions made, the analysis proffered, and adaptation solutions pursued in any
climate change program. Such insights can enrich the burgeoning literature on gender and climate change that is
relevant to academia and policy circles. In this article, I highlight some key issues. Although my regional emphasis
is on South Asia, the analyses and geographical insights are relevant elsewhere.
Most approaches within the broad feminist environmental tradition share basic
principles of feminist epistemology, namely that the social situation of the knower
matters, that gender as a social category plays a role in epistemic norms, and that
gendered, material, and political relations lie behind all knowledge-making
practices. Interrogations of these topics by scholars such as Donna Haraway and Lorraine Code have shaped
ecofeminist epistemological approaches in significant ways. What should we make of the dominant
framing of climate change from this perspective? Does it matter that the definition
of climate change as an existential threat, the research being done, and solutions
being devised, rest principally in the hands of an elite group of mainly male , mainly
white European and Anglo-American scientists from the affluent West? What are the
implications of a situation where the choice is between accepting climate science as
uncontested (inconvenient) Truth or being dismissed as a skeptic (or stupid)? Since the 1970s,
the climate change phenomenon has been defined by a relatively small number of natural scientists. As Eugene
Rosa and Thomas Dietz write, [s]cience provides the framing and discourse for the problem and scientific elites
promote the discourse (Rosa and Dietz 1998, 442).For feminists, it matters that the majority of
climate scientists are men from affluent parts of the world. Armed with their UNFCC
and IPCC documents, men also dominate in the global climate policy arena and as
prominent spokespeople whose worldviews and vested interests serve to construct
the issue in stereotypically masculinized ways. For example, not only is the issue
constructed in a way that demands techno-scientific solutions, from which there is
money to be made, it is also presented as a threat to national and international
security, for which a reinforcement of militarism is the answer. In both cases, there
is certainty about the inevitability of climate change and a managerial program that
serves elite male interests. Also relevant from a feminist epistemological perspective
is that climate science operates at a global level, aggregating and calculating facts
in ways that are often detached from local experience. This results in an
impersonal, apolitical, and universal imaginary of climate change that is taking
over from the subjective, situated, and normative imaginations of human actors
engaging directly with nature (Jasanoff 2010, 235). Its definition as global masks alternative voices
that fundamentally challenge Western ways of knowing, being, and doing (Smith 2007, 198). The exclusion
of ways of knowing that challenge mainstream science means that the scope for
meaningful feminist participation in the environmental arena may be reduced.
Feminist epistemology has always aimed to critique Western science, and yet it is
increasingly difficult to ask questions about climate science. This is not an argument
in favor of climate change denial, but it is an expression of concern for what the
presentation of an incontestable set of predictions about the future might do to a
feminist green politics that is at once critical and visionary. Will ecofeminists join the growing
number of movements dedicated to resilience and transition that appear to assume a set of conservative socio-
environmental relations designed to ensure survival? Or can they maintain a principled stance for climate justice
Those invoking apocalyptic and survivalist discourses , such as
and a radically different future?
the Transition Town Network, arguably want to turn back time, accepting a notion that we need to
return society back to a steady-state, before the great ecological disruption to
restore natural order as quickly as possible after disturbance (Catney and Doyle 2011, 190).
Will feminists be able to express deep reservations about the assumptions being
made about humans and nature in the scientized and securitized climate discourse ?
Resistance is difficult when the climate consensus has a tone of unquestionable scientific-moral authority. In the UK,
those who disagree with the Science, or who refuse to change their carbon-emitting ways, have been labeled
eco-sinners. In 2006 the Bishop of London made headlines for declaring it a moral obligation to eschew
environmentally unfriendly practices. He said, making selfish choices such as flying on holiday or buying a large
car are a symptom of sin. Sin is not just a restricted list of moral mistakes. It is living a life turned in on itself where
people ignore the consequences of their actions (Barrow 2006). Mouffe laments the encroachment of this kind of
moral argumentation into the properly political sphere when she writes: What is happening is that nowadays the
political is played out in the moral register. In place of a struggle between right and left we are faced with a
With climate change, there is little room for
struggle between right and wrong (Mouffe 2005, 5).
ecofeminist critiques of scientific knowledge when an inaccessible, authoritative,
and moralistic science sets the parameters of the issue.
However, the political responsibilities just outlined do not yet address the claims
made by indigenous women that I discussed in the previous section, which include
how indigenous womens responsibilities, and hence identities, are implicated in
climate change impacts and the unique forms of collective action that indigenous
women take toward adaptation and mitigation. There are important reasons why
this is the case. The first two political responsibilities are based on the passivity of
indigenous women as members of indigenous peoples. Indigenous women are
described primarily in terms of what they have not brought about. Yet the Mother
Earth Water Walk and the Mandaluyong Declaration emphasize the agency of
indigenous women that arises from the spiritual relations they maintain with
relatives like water. In these cases, climate change impacts are seen as implicating
the responsibilities these indigenous women enact within systems of responsibilities
that matter to their communities. Moreover, these indigenous women have
capacities for unique forms of collective action that can influence adaptation and
mitigation beyond their communities, and serve as vehicles for more formal
inclusion of indigenous women in policy processes from which they were previously
excluded. The third political responsibility emphasizes the involvement of
indigenous women as knowledge keepers and knowers in other senses who should
be included within scientific and political organizations that have already been put
in place by nonindigenous parties, like the IPCC. Yet McGregor understands
indigenous womens knowledge as being more than a body of insights about the
environment; rather, knowledge involves being embedded within systems of
responsibilities that one actively performs. Knowledge, then, refers to knowing what
one ought to do to be a responsible environmental steward or guardian (in
McGregors case, she discusses water). The Mandaluyong Declaration also expands
the notion of knowledge by placing priority on what science can do for indigenous
women if they are allowed to determine the purpose for which scientific research is
employed. Both McGregor and the Declaration stress broader notions of knowledge
that embrace indigenous womens insights for establishing principles and structures
of collective action toward adaptation and mitigation that are appropriate for their
communities. For example, environmental scientists have often told indigenous
peoples not to eat their first foods because of contamination. These scientific
assessments often included indigenous womens knowledge. Yet the impact of not
eating traditional foods, which can sever multiple responsibilities among humans
and certain species, can lead to far worse harms to indigenous identity, community
well-being, and human health (such as having to eat more fast food) (Arquette et al.
2002; Ranco et al. 2011; see also Nadasdy 1999). Here, a major articulation of
indigenous womens knowledge is often understood according to knowledge of what
responsibilities are important for indigenous communities collective continuance
and how science can be redeployed to serve these responsibilities, instead of
serving only the goals established by people of other heritages and nations
Econ
The economy advantage is grounded in gendered epistemology
Maximizes competition and the supremacy of androcentric
values
Nhanenge 7 Jytte: Master of Arts at the development studies at the University of
South Africa Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the concerns of women, poor people
and nature into development. Pg 570-572.
Economics is firmly founded
In order to support this profit-making system science developed the discipline of economics.
on dualised values. It has therefore prioritized hard, masculine characteristics as being
mannerly in economic profit making. It has ensured that all soft, feminine traits are
considered as being subordinate and disgraceful for the economic individual. Hence, superior
reason is selected over inferior emotion, competition over cooperation, self-interest
over community-interest, maximization over optimization, and the needs of the
individual over the needs of society. The first mentioned are superior human qualities that belong to the Ups,
while the second ones are inferior traits that relate to the Downs. This bias focus on masculine characteristics
has produced societies that consist of rational, competing, self-interested, and profit
maximizing individuals. These individuals are often men, but may also include women, as long as they are
willing to identify with the masculine traits and behaviour . The highest goals of these individuals are profit
making for their own benefit. To maximize this objective the Ups are using the Downs as
instruments. Hence, any rational individual with respect for himself would be exploiting nature's
resources together with the free or cheap labour of women and Others. This means that all
Downs are perceived as being instruments for the profit making of the Ups. Modern technology is
the means to generate economic profit. Since the greed of the Ups is pressing, the need to generate more
wealth is urgent. This means that technologies commonly are developed in a rush, without
careful consideration about the effects from its application. The result is that
modern technology often causes pollution of both society and nature. This leads to
serious suffering on the part of women, Others and nature . The rational individuals may notice
these effects but since the priority is maximization of economic profit making and the
Downs anyway are considered of a lower value, the polluting activities are
rationalized away as being necessary for the benefit of all. The rational individual
has consequently no human empathy for the pain and suffering his activities are causing the
dualised other. The reason for this is straightforward and simple: Human emotions of empathy, care and concern are feminine
values, which are seen as being soft, naive, unimportant and disgraceful in the hard, rational, masculine, competitive, individual
world.What commonly makes a society healthy and harmonious is the shared sense of
mutual relationships. These are built on cooperation and reprocity based on the
human emotions of care, concern and sympathy between people in a community .
Such a support system is needed for a human being to develop in a balanced manner. It commonly is founded on
the unpaid activities of women and Others. Thus in order to succeed rational man
needs, expects and takes for granted this feminine support. However, being greedy
for maximum profit rational man overlooks the importance of directing some
resources to the feminine social support system . This causes it to wear out. Hence rather than
being a place of cooperation society increasingly becomes a battlefield where self-
interested individuals 572 compete for scarce resources . Hence, modern society has
become a dominant, exploitative, and violent place to live . Its children cannot grow up in secure
and caring social surroundings to become balanced adults. Such a society breads aggressive people who
re-create a vicious circle of crime, pollution, human misery, poverty, ethnic conflicts,
terrorism, and sometimes civil war. The main sufferers from these crises are women
and Others. Hence, the greed of economic man has lead to an unhealthy social system. However, instead of trying
to restore social health, the maximizing individual sees it as a great opportunity,
because strife is profitable. Thus, violent technology is made available to the
conflicting groups. This will increase the fighting and amplify the crises of war and
violence, human rights abuses, poverty and natural destruction . The victims are mainly women
and Others.
The Line of Control (LOC) between India and Pakistan in the state of
Women on the Line of Control
Jammu & Kashmir has emerged as one of the most rapidly militarized space in
the world. Since 1947 militarization has increased, leaving civilians to bear
its undesirable consequences. The price of militarization, needless to say, is met
at the cost of other basic needs and has subsequently given rise to increased
violence against women. I have tried to listen to womens experiences of the conflict zone on the LOC, an
IndoPakistan border, where the army is implementing its programme of human security. The region selected for
study on the border is 100 kilometres long and covers Kargil, Drass and Batalik sectors in Jammu & Kashmir. The
area which has experienced low intensity conflict since partition underwent border changes in the wars of 1948,
womens voices were documented by the
1965, 1972 and 1999. After the conflict of 1999,
author and the article communicates these womens concerns and desires
for change.2 Among these narrations on the LOC emerged the term of
human security used by the armed forces as a strategy of peace on the
borders. Authored by a commanding officer of the army, General Arjun Ray, it has turned into a full-fledged
programme of the Indian Army. To analyse the emerging perspective of a human security paradigm within a
The high level of
militarized environment, the discourse that has emerged is documented here.
violence against women in this zone is not created alone by killings due to
incessant shelling but goes beyond it, to physical harm such as rape and
domestic and psychological violence. The rape of millions of women in
historical and geographical perspectives has been documented globally in
the gendered narrative of wars. In that narrative, dominant notions of
masculinity merge with the ethnic element. While we cannot rule out rape
as an individual act carried out as a prize of war, it is also committed by
the armed forces as part of a tactic to defeat the ethnic or religious
adversary. Militarized rape is viewed as a distinctive act perpetrated in
the context of an institution, the military that is part of the state
machinery. The documentation of the mass rapes in the South Asian subcontinent
is part of the history of the partition of India and Pakistan. These are narratives of
dishonour and abductions based on religious grounds, by both the Hindus and the Muslims.
The rape of women of our community by their men figured prominently in the debates and discussions that took
place in parliamentary circles (as expected mainly among men). The honour of the community and of the nation
was seen to be the trajectories written across the bodies of women and the violation of their bodies, and was
therefore tantamount to a violation of the body of the nation, of Mother India (Butalia 1998; Menon and Bhasin
1998). During partition, though women should have been central in the writing of
history, they found little space, and it is therefore not surprising that rape as an
instrument finds no reference in the history of the LOC . Post partition, the new
border that is the Line of Control was drawn in 1972, as a result of the IndoPak war.
In that drawing of the temporary border, portions of land changed hands from India to Pakistan and vice versa.3 In
this fluid territorial situation the armed forces perpetuated rape on an
extensive scale, silenced forever due to the shame the community felt
(authors visit to a village in Kargil in 2002).4 The children of the rapes are now grown up.
There is silence over the fate of these wronged children fathered by
soldiers. It was a personal and a community humiliation. The memories
are kept behind a shadow of silence. Their trauma cannot be overlooked,
as two whole generations have suffered. For the women the shame and
dishonour of rape will always remain, even though they are in their 40s and 50s now. For
the village at large it was a community humiliation by a state meant to
protect them. For them, independence as understood by the rest of India did not take place.5 Rape
exacerbates womens vulnerability because of patriarchal definitions of
womens purity (De Alwis 2004).6 A purity mapped on their bodies. This purity is
not confined to conflict but is carried over from their daily lives. Concepts of
virtue and family honour are part of the private, which during conflicts comes into the public through rape. In the
surviving rape and
social milieu, being raped brings stigma to both mother and child. In this context,
bearing a rapists child means loss of family, community and livelihood. Women
thus have strong incentives to mask or hide their experiences of sexual assault.
Sexual abuse continues to occur in the border region of Kargil, but due to the stigma associated with this issue, it is
difficult for the community to discuss it openly. Gendered duties, it is seen, also bring gendered consequences.
Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to attack when collecting and searching for firewood, as this may take
them a long distance from their homes and expose them not only to the danger of anti-personnel mines and
The collectivity of womens bodies in the
unexploded shells but also the risk of sexual attack.
eyes of the perpetuator as representation of the community cannot be
perceived by women in the same manner, for whom loss of self-esteem is a
personal tragedy and loss of self-esteem and dignity comprise an
important component of human security. The protection from violation of human dignity
forms the core principle of human security. Rape has the most long-lasting effect on womens psyche and the most
Any alternative security system that does not address these
difficult to heal.
concerns of women violates their human rights. Unfortunately, the existing
national security system provides no protection to women on this ground.
War
A feminist political economy perspective highlights structural
violence and harmful gendered globalized structuresgender
equality is directly linked to lower levels of domestic and intra-
state conflict
True 15
Jacqui True (Professor of Politics & International Relations and an Australian Research Council Future Fellow at
Monash University, Australia. She received her PhD from York University, Toronto, Canada and has held academic
positions at Michigan State University, the University of Southern California, and the University of Auckland. She is a
specialist in Gender and International Relations.), June 2015, A Tale of Two Feminisms in International Relations?
Feminist Political Economy and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, Critical Perspectives, Politics & Gender, 11
(2) (2015), pg. 421-423, Accessed: 7/10/16
IR feminists are exploring the continuum of gendered violence through engagement with the United Nations Women, Peace and
Security agenda. Addressing the protection and prevention of conflict-related sexual and
gender-based violence (SGBV) specifically requires a feminist political economy
approach, not just the mainstreaming of gender within international security issues. UN
Security Council WPS resolutions since SCR 1325 in 2000 have progressively narrowed their focus
to the issue of the use of sexual violence in conflict and disaggregated this violence from
other forms of gendered violence affecting women and girls disproportionately. The
slew of Security Council resolutions from 1820 to 2122 have focused on coordination mechanisms
for protection within peace operations and legal accountability mechanisms for
prevention, but they have not addressed the root causes of the sexual violence,
such as the social structures of gender inequality, economic impoverishment, and
lack of opportunity. On the demand side, many conflicts involve competition over land and
other natural resources, and several implicate large transnational corporations in
human rights violations. Indeed, SGBV against women and girls, boys and men may be deployed
precisely to dispossess individuals and communities of their land and to remove the
agricultural labor force of a community. Because women often do the majority of
agricultural work, some conflicts have witnessed armed groups attempting to stop
women from being able to work, effectively cutting the food supply of the enemy (Turshen 1998). On the supply
side, womens empowerment is a critical part of violence prevention in and outside of
conflict. It is true that women of all income groups and in all conflicts experience mens
violence, but when women have access to productive resources and enjoy equal social
and economic rights with men, they are less vulnerable to violence across all
societies (True 2012). Not surprisingly, countries that value womens equal participation and
where there are fewer economic, social, or political differences in power between
men and women have lower levels of violence and of intrastate armed conflict
(Caprioli 2005; WHO 2005). To illustrate the importance of an FPE perspective on the WPS agenda, consider womens
in postconflict Sri Lanka. The conflict was officially over
experiences of multiple forms of insecurity and violence
the war is over, the violence has not ended. The situation of
in Sri Lanka in 2009; however, while
structural violence for minority women, in the north and east of Sri Lanka in particular,
exacerbates womens vulnerability to physical violence, including sex trafficking,
harassment, sexual violence, and domestic violence. In the latter stages of the conflict and its
aftermath, military forces were responsible for a variety of human rights abuses against
the civilian population, including extrajudicial killings, disappearance, rape, sexual
harassment, and other violations. In the current climate of impunity, sustained by
insecurity and the lack of military accountability, abuses continue. Thousands of
these
this has
women have lost their husbands and other family members during the armed conflict. For many,
brought new responsibilities: 40,000 households in the north and east are now
femaleheaded. Women are now primary providers for their families: they face
limited livelihood opportunities in the postconflict context and are typically excluded
from official development programs. Moreover, against a backdrop of competing claims
and mass resettlement, they are especially vulnerable to land grabs and other
rights violations. The militarization of these regions since the formal end of the conflict has
compounded the insecurities for minority women. Many, especially widows and the wives of
disappeared or surrenderees, are vulnerable every day to sexual harassment, exploitation, or
assault by army personnel or other militias (see Davies and True 2015). These women are
targeted for violence as embodiments of minority group identity and because
gendered cultures of stigma and shame generalizes their oppression and
punishment across their families and communities. An FPE perspective expands the
WPS agenda by directing our attention toward the long-term prevention of conflict and
violence. More than gendered interpersonal relations, religious and cultural
dynamics, it emphasizes the gendered globalized structures that contribute to
violence and conflict, such as gender-biased macroeconomic policies, supply chains,
labor markets, and political norms. These structures are modifiable, and where they
can be shown to be causal of violence, as in the case of Sri Lanka, WPS policy changes
could be devised to significantly reduce the incidence of widespread sexual and gender-
based violence.
InGender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, J. Ann Tickner
(1992)identified three main dimensions to achieving global security national
security, economic security, and ecological security: conflict, economics,
and the environment. Much of the work in feminist peace studies that inspired early
feminist International Relations (IR) work (e.g., Brock-Utne 1989; Reardon 1985) and many of Tickners
contemporaries (e.g., Enloe 1989; Peterson and Runyan 1991; Pettman 1996) also saw political
economy and a feminist conception of security as intrinsically interlinked.
Yet, as feminist IR research evolved in the early 21st century, more scholars were
thinking either about political economy or about war and political
violence, but not both. This divergence was recognized and reified with the use
of the terms Feminist Security Studies (FSS) and Feminist Political Economy or
Feminist Global Political Economy (FPE). Both FSS and FPE went from being named to developing
into vibrant research communities over the last decade (e.g., Rai and Waylen 2013; Sjoberg 2009a). While
specialization led to a significant amount of intricate field research (e.g., Chin 2013; MacKenzie 2009) and deep
the overlap that early feminists in IR saw
theoretical conversations (Peterson 2003; Wibben 2010),
between political economy and security has often (though not always) been lost in
both FSS and FPE research. This brief essay contends that looking at the space where
security and political economy questions intersect is one of the most
fruitful directions for researchers in the field and provides an added value to the
analysis that either lens would provide individually . The essay uses an example
from my research on prostitution of male members of the U.S. military to
explore the utility of understanding the interlocked nature of security and
political economy in feminist scholarship on global politics politically,
analytically, intellectually, and normatively. It concludes by arguing that a
reunification of FSS and FPE is a productive and intellectually essential
direction of future research. Naming FSS and Identifying its Losses I certainly was not the only one
who started using the term FSS around a decade ago, but I can speak to my purposes for using it (which may differ
from others purposes). In 2006, I proposed a special issue of Security Studies (Sjoberg 2009a) and a 2007
International Studies Association workshop on FSS. My use of the term had an explicitly outward-focused intent:
there existed a subfield of IR called Security Studies, and an employer had asked me to write an essay evaluating
although feminists had been writing important
feminist contributions to it. As I tried, I realized that
works about gender, war, and conflict for decades, they had not made the radar
screen of Security Studies, so I used the term Feminist Security Studies with the
explicit intent of convincing people in Security Studies that feminist work matters to
their research. That mission has had some successes and failures, I think, but they seem to me to be
secondary to the (at least for me) unintended consequences of naming FSS. To me, there seemed to be a
(hopefully-short-term) effect of a trend of research that self-identified as FSS, mine included, marginalizing feminist
work on global political economy within the feminist IR community. The FSS work became, in my view,
overrepresented in the field. I also felt that sense of overrepresentation looking at the proliferation of work on
womens violence within Feminist Security Studies, which was certainly for a while (and may still be) a significantly
larger part of feminist research on security than are gender issues in lived experiences of security. While there are
indicators that both of these trends are at least being tempered, I think it is important to evaluate how those
consequences might have evolved. In hindsight, I think the notion that the label FSS could possibly be purely
outward-looking was short-sighted. Whatever successes it had in gaining traction in Security Studies that made the
never-intended subfield of FSS appealing, the work it inspired was, by definition, going to be impacted by the
assumed intended audience of Security Studies with its narrow definitions of security and assumptions about
methodology. While I think (and hope) a lot of our work has either rejected this direction or walked the line well,
there will always be trade-offs in such a project. While early feminist IR addressed militarism, political economy, and
the environment as interrelated, much more recent work in FSS has either been narrower or wielded a security
lens to analyze those other issues. My work is as susceptible to this critique as anyone elses, if not more so (e.g.,
Sjoberg 2009b). My research has often not done a good job at approximating the relationship between FSS and FPE
that would be ideal, in part because I have always felt more comfortable in the realm of security (as traditionally
understood) than researching and theorizing political economy. Still, writing a book about the different areas of
I found political economy always and
feminist theorizing of wars (Sjoberg 2013),
everywhere relevant to individual experiences of war, to conflict-related
migration, to the funding of war and conflict, to the social dynamics of
joining militaries, to the constitution of military action. In fact, some of
the most interesting and underexplored intersections between war
practice and feminist theorizing are the places where questions of political
economy would dominate the analysis like analyzing the gendered nature of
military logistics practices, understanding the long-term effects of conflicts on
populations in conflict zones, and understanding the gendered health impacts of
war, to name a few examples. A narrowly framed FSS-focused research approach might miss many of these
dimensions which I think is the loss for FSS research involved in its divergence from FPE research. Thinking About
I have just started a research project on male
FSS and FPE in Male Military Prostitution
members of the U.S. military who prostitute themselves to near-based populations. I
initially became interested in the question of where male military prostitutes are while reading Aaron Belkins
(2012) book on homoeroticism underpinning the straight, hegemonic masculinity of the U.S. military next to
Katharine Moons (1997) book on base camp prostitution. I wondered are there base camps for male prostitutes?
I found a positive answer to that, but found myself more interested in having discovered the male members of the
understanding military
military who prostitute themselves. I was interested for Belkins reasons of
masculinities and their relationship to sexualities, but also because I was
interested in what straight soldiers prostituting themselves to men
meant for the social construction of heterosexuality. I started thinking about it
as both securitized (what does this mean for the sex of security?) and as an artifact of queer
history (Berube 2010). That said, my approach largely ignored political economy dynamics, not least that
prostitution is, by definition, a practice where money changes hands . The
more research I do, however, the more I find a politics of the monetization of sex
mapped onto the politics of performed masculinities, where particular
sorts of men performing particular sorts of sex acts command a financial
premium, while others are financially undervalued because of their
assumed desire for the sex act. The exchange of money can also act as a
pass to deny desire. In that way, the constitution of securitized
masculinity (which I am interested in) cannot be separated from the power-laden
political economies of prostitution since straight male prostitutes
provide only certain services, and command a premium, especially if they
are selling themselves as soldiers. This brings up a number of other questions that I
previously had not considered: What are the monetary significations of idealized
militarized masculinities, inside of prostitution and outside of it? A number
of male soldiers who prostitute themselves say they do it for the money,
so what are the political-economic pressures on their lives that make that
(or the perception of it) true? From where is the money that goes into male military
prostitution being diverted? Where is it being spent? Does economic well-being in
the location where soldier prostitution occurs dictate the volume of that prostitution
or the price that it brings? In situations where soldiers do not do it for the money,
what is the signification of money changing hands (particularly for military
masculinities) rather than not? To what degree is male military prostitution
performed involuntarily or with limited agency ? Do the pressures to which that
involuntariness responds lie largely in the financial or social arenas? Is there utility to comparing soldier prostitution
with soldier consumption of prostitute services? If so, what is that utility ?
What roles do economic
inequality and commerce dynamics have in the constitution of idealized
military masculinity through sexuality? These are, of course, a rough cut, both conceptually
and terminologically, but even that very rough cut seems to suggest that research in FSS that takes
political economy seriously is likely to provide a deeper understanding of
the phenomenon being studied, important clues into the empirical
dynamics of the subject matter, and an overall higher quality analysis. Reunifying FSS and FPE To
achieve this higher-quality analysis and start recovering the losses associated with the divergence of FSS and FPE,
ideally, conceptual and empirical feminist research would recognize, like early IR feminist research did, that
there is no separation between security and political economy, as
security is intimately bound up in political economy, and political economy
is bound up in security. That is not to say that they are the same thing, but that they are a
continuum without clear or defined boundaries. Any security question
has political economy implications and needs political economy analysis to
be fully understood. Any political economy question has security
implications and may benefit from security analysis. At the same time, while there is
very little risk of doing economic analysis on issues traditionally
considered part of security studies, there is, as we have witnessed, a fair amount of risk to
securitizing political economy issues (Duffield 2001). In some sense, then, the trend of treating security issues as
primary within feminist IR not only needs to be equalized but politically and intellectually reversed. This would make
both FSS and FPE research richer and serve as a step toward dissolving categories that may have served their
purpose.
Based on the interlinked effects from the multiple, global crises, modern Western
culture is required to make some necessary transitions . These changes are rather
extensive and will probably shake the foundations of the modern way of life and deeply
affect its social, economic and political systems. To approach the situation it is therefore wise to
adopt a broader view. One way is to perceive the situation as a natural cultural evolution. Hence, the modern
perspective needs to make a shift from seeing social and natural systems as being static, to perceiving them as
being dynamic patterns of change. In this way, one may view a crisis as a natural aspect of a transformation. This
perception is equivalent to the ancient Chinese philosophy, which found that times of crises are both times of
danger and opportunities. It can be seen in the Chinese sign for crisis, which is composed of two characters
"danger" and "opportunity". Thus, the old Chinese were well aware that there is a profound connection between
When one examines the interconnected
crisis and change. (Henderson 1978: 381; Capra 1982: 7).
effects of the crises it becomes clear, due to the persistent domination of women,
Others and nature, that there are three fundamental and interconnected challenges,
which requires transformation in the modern culture : (Capra 1982: 10) The first is the
slow but inevitable decline of patriarchy. According to Adrienne Rich, "Patriarchy is the power of the
fathers. It is a familial-social, ideological, political system in which men - by force, direct pressure, or through ritual,
tradition, law, language, customs, etiquette, education, and the division of labour - determine what part women
Patriarchy has had
shall or shall not play, and in which the female is everywhere subsumed under the male".
a time span of approximately 3,000 years in Western civilisation. Its full power is
extremely difficult to grasp because it is all pervasive . It has influenced the basic
ideas about human nature and people's relations to the universe. It is a system which, until
recently, has never been openly challenged and whose doctrines have been universally accepted and presented as
laws of nature. However, a society where men dominate women is an unbalanced society. It is a society, which is
much less than what it otherwise might have been. The complementary contrast, which men and women give to
society creates the necessary social balance. Since extremes always lead to disaster, patriarchy has played an
essential part in promoting the global crises. Today the disintegration of patriarchy is in sight. The feminist
movement is one of the 98 strongest cultural current in present time and it will have a profound effect on the
further cultural evolution. A more in-dept discussion about the patriarchy and its domination will take place in
The second transition is a
chapter 4. (Capra 1982: 10-11; Capra 1989: 240; Rowe 1997: 234).
paradigm shift. The modern vision of reality, including its common concepts,
thoughts, perceptions, values and practices, needs to be changed . The present
paradigm has dominated modern culture for several hundred years. It has shaped Western
societies and has had a strong influence in the rest of the world. It comprises some
entrenched, patriarchal ideas and values related to the Enlightenment, the Scientific
Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. It includes the assumptions that the
scientific method is the only valid approach to knowledge; that the universe is a
mechanical system composed of material elements; that nature is dead; that the
human body is a machine; that life in society is an individual, competitive struggle
for existence; that man can have unlimited material progress through economic
growth and technological development; and that females are subsumed under the
male as a basic law of nature. These assumptions have proven to be inadequate. The
values they promote have contributed fundamentally to the present crises of poverty, environmental destruction,
human repression and a violent world. The modern vision and its values are now challenged; they are in need of
major revision. This relates to the fall of the patriarchy. When modern science is historically examined from a
feministic point of view, it becomes clear that the scientific epistemology is an ideological and aggressive
An analysis of science has
patriarchal way of perceiving the world founded on power and control.
therefore been helpful to understand the current patriarchal domination of women,
Others and nature. A critique of the modern meaning structure and suggestion for an alternative perception
of reality, is the main subject in chapters 4, 5 and 6. (Capra 1982: 12; Norgaard 1994: 62-66; Capra 1997: 5-6; Des
Jardins 2001: 255). The third transition is the human perception of nature. The current
paradigm and its institutions see environmental destruction as an unforeseen and
unintended side effect of development and progress. Thus, the remedies advocated
are based on improving the tools by introducing better science, appropriate
technologies, improved resource management and environmental accounting etc. It is
a kind of enlightened stewardship of nature by human beings. However, reforms alone are not
enough, instead the root causes must be addressed. This has led to development of
other views like those of Deep Ecology, social ecology and ecofeminism. These
alternative perspectives challenge the dominant mode of progress as being
inherently wrong. They point to the cultural roots of the crisis and call for a re-
conceptualization of development based on equitable relationships between
humans and humans, men and women, and humans and nature . These visions
consequently have ethical and 99 epistemological positions that are alternatives to
those of the old scientific experts. The latter have continuously claimed a superior
epistemological position, due to their objectivity, but this is part of the problem
rather than a solution to natural destruction. Sustainable development will hardly be
possible without the contributions of these alternative perspectives . Together they make
up a broad movement towards pro-environmental change, which will require fundamental transformation in the
modern economic and political systems. It will include decentralisation of power and ownership
of natural resources together with establishment of ecologically harmonious life-
styles. It will promote formation of new coalitions and new forms of politics. Part of the change is the decline of
the fossil-fuel age. Fossil fuels include coal, oil and natural gas. These have been humanity's principal sources of
energy. However, since they run out in 2300 the era will come to an end.The effects of the decline are
already felt in scarcity of energy leading to high prices, debts, unstable economies,
tense competition for resources and violence . Since the use of fossil fuels has played a major role
in perpetuating the global crises, healthy alternatives are needed. The cultural transformation would
therefore include a shift from the petroleum age to the solar age, where activities
will be powered by renewable sun energy. This third transition is an integral part of
a paradigm change and the fall of patriarchy . The present paradigm, which was generated and is
maintained by patriarchy is by feminists seen as promoting inequalities, unsustainable progress and violence. Thus,
peace, equality and sustainable development have become interlinked issues in women's movements. Peace is not
only the absence of war but also a compassionate way of life. It is the creation of a certain mind-set of sharing,
reciprocity, love, happiness and care as the central issues in societies, in relationship with nature and in
development. Few people talk about happiness and love as a motivating force, but these are ethical values, which
can change the world and its institutions and they are promoted by women. From this, it follows that the cultural
transformation will be promoted by ecological movements, women's movements and peace movements. An
ecological feminist environmental ethics, which is an alternative to the current perception of nature, will be
discussed in chapter 4, while chapter 7 will present some basic elements in its alternative epistemology. (Capra
The above three interconnected
1982: 11; Capra 1989: 253; Braidotti et al 1994: 126, 131).
challenges are all contributing to the present global crises. They therefore require
major and profound changes. However, in order to promote good results transitions must be done in a
peaceful and harmonious way. A perspective which can do that and which therefore is suggested here is the ideal of
harmonious change portrayed in the Chinese book "I Ching", Book of Changes. The ancient Chinese philosophy of
change is a holistic, systemic perspective, which by its two, equally important dynamic forces of yin (the feminine)
and yang (the masculine) should be able successfully to overcome the imbalanced, and disharmony innate in the
static modern perception of 100 reality. The I Ching philosophy can be contrasted to the Marxist view on social
evolution. The latter emphasizes conflict, struggle and violent revolution where human suffering and sacrifice is
seen as a necessary price that has to be paid for social change. This view is parallel to Darwin's emphasis on
struggle in biological evolution and the Social Darwinists, who vigorously promoted the view that life was an
ongoing struggle. However, such perspectives are one-sided. They overlook the fact that struggle in nature and
society takes place within a wider context of cooperation. Although conflict and struggle have brought about
important social progress in the past and is often an essential part of the dynamics of change, it does not mean that
they are the source of this dynamics. Oppositely, the I Ching minimizes conflicts in times of social transformation, a
view considered necessary in an increasingly violent world with many human casualties. I Ching's ability to
overcome Western, patriarchal dualism, which promotes domination of all that is feminine, is specifically important
domination, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, is a major
in this context. The reason is that
part of the global crises. (Capra 1982: 14-17). Various authors (Hazel Henderson 1978; Marthinus Versfeld
1979; Fritjof Capra 1982; Janis Birkeland 1995; Edith Sizoo 2000) have in different ways incorporated the Chinese
philosophy of yin and yang in their individual critiques of the modern culture and its development. The work of
these have been an inspiration for the comparison, which in this dissertation is done between the yin and yang
perspective of changes and an ecofeminist philosophy as an example of change towards an alternative future.
Politics of Place
We must engage in place-based indigenous feminist dialogues
to combat hegemonic representations- other alternatives
reinforce the system
Brun, C., & Blaikie, P. (2016). Alternative Development: Unravelling
Marginalization, Voicing Change. Farnham, GB: Routledge. Retrieved from
http://www.ebrary.com.proxy.library.umkc.edu Brun was appointed Associate
Professor at the Department of Geography in August 2004, and Professor from
September 2013. I am currently Director of Research in the department. She
teaches and supervises students in human geography, development studies and
globalisation studies. Piers Macleod Blaikie is a geographer and scholar of
international development and natural resources, who worked until 2003 at the
School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia
In the early 1990s, Ragnhild Lund (1993) argued for a place and people centred
perspective in development theory. In doing so, she was one of the first
geographers to recognize the devaluation of place in conventional development
studies. Lund points out that guidelines for development during the latter half of the
twentieth century were heavily focused on economic rather than social, cultural or
ecological issues. Drawing from a range of theories from Marxism to liberalism, she
notes that few of these perspectives focused on place as a dynamic factor in
societal change. Rather, place was characterized as a relatively passive stage for
social and political action and interaction. In a broad-ranging critique of modernist
Rostowian and Marxist perspectives, Lund argues against both the popular
regionalizing systems theories based on Wallerstein and humanist perspectives that
advocated endogenous self-reliance. The former tend towards purely economic
solutions and the latter suggest a focus on local practices that are hugely valuable
and tie in with perspectives that date back to Ernst Schumachers famous Small is
Beautiful (1973) , but are also easily conscripted into the service of neoliberal
policies that foist way too much responsibility for economic advancement on to the
shoulders of people who are least able to bear it. Instead, Lund favours an
alternative development that takes account of gender and is influenced by social
movements focused on ecology, peace and women (see also Nederveen Pieterse
1998). In so doing, she recognizes: that women and men encounter a variety of
external policies and interventions in a given place, and modify and adapt to
external influences in accordance to norms, conventions and practices prevalent in
the local society. Both internal and external factors are historically and
geographically specific. Consequently, it is necessary to understand the relationship
between gender and place to realize change. (Lund 1993: 197) Lunds perspective
highlights the need for indigenous women to renegotiate continuously local values
in the light of broad structural economic and social transformations. Her
poststructural feminism is pragmatically grounded in the realities of shifting
economic and social conditions and how they play out in local landscapes. In a
study of working women in Malaysia, for example, Lie and Lund (1995: 10) argue
that studies must focus on local values and, from a feminist perspective,
womens views on the changes taking place in their own lives as well as in their
families and the local surroundings. Lunds focus on womens perceptions and
values ties in with 1990s literature on feminist, postmodern and populist
approaches to development and postdevelopment (Nederveen Pieterse 1998,
Blaikie 2000, Momsen 2004). It also resonates with Arturo Escobars (2008) interest
in the ability of indigenous peoples to create figured worlds in which local
practices, culture and identities are deployed effectively enough to create a visible
(spontaneous, emotional and corporeal) space for authoring that contest external,
hegemonic representations of that place.
Queer Fem
Discourses of everyone being affected similarly by climate
change fail to solve- only queer fem can change this ideology
Gaard, G. (2015, April). Ecofeminism and climate change. In Women's Studies
International Forum (Vol. 49, pp. 20-33). Pergamon. Gaard was a UWRF
Sustainability Faculty Fellow in spring 2011, Dr. Gaard is the current Coordinator for
the Sustainability Faculty Fellows. Before coming to River Falls, Gaard was an
Associate Professor of Humanities at Western Washington University in Bellingham,
Washington (1997-2002) and an Associate Professor of Composition and Women's
Studies at the University of Minnesota-Duluth (1989-1997)
For example, at the First Worldwide Peoples' Conference on Climate Change and Mother Earth held in Cochabamba,
April 1922, 2010, Bolivian President Evo Morales claimed that the presence of homosexual men around the world
was a consequence of eating genetically-modified chicken: The chicken that we eat is chock-full of feminine
hormones. So, when men eat these chickens, they deviate from themselves as men (ILGA, 2010). This statement
exemplifies a dangerous nexus of ignorance, speciesism, and homophobia that conceals the workings of industrial
in
agribusiness, and simultaneously vilifies gay and transgendered persons as genetic deviants. Yet
statements of climate justice to date, there is no mention of the integral need for
queer climate justicealthough all our climates are both gendered and sexualized,
simultaneously material, cultural, and ecological. Described largely from the
perspective of the environmental (climate) sciences (i.e., astrophysics, atmospheric
chemistry, geography, meteorology, oceanography, paleoclimatology), climate
change has been most widely discussed as a scientific problem requiring
technological and scientific solutions without substantially transforming ideologies
and economies of domination, exploitation and colonialism: this misrepresentation
of climate change root causes is one part of the problem, misdirecting those who
ground climate change solutions on incomplete analyses (cf. Klein, 2014). On an
international level, solutions mitigating climate change include Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+ Initiative), the Kyoto Protocol's
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) that encourages emission trading,
sustainable development funding for Two-Thirds countries, genetically modified
crops, renewable energy technologies, and the more recent strategy, geo-
engineering (Klein, 2012). On an individual level, citizen-consumers of the
North/One-Thirds world are urged toward green consumerism and carbon-footprint
reduction. Certainly renewable energy is a necessary and wholly possible shift;
moreover, it carries within its practice the ideological shift needed to make a wider
transformation in the North/OneThirds consumers' relationship with environments
and ecosystems. From a feminist perspective, however, the problem remains that at
the highest levels of international discussion, climate change is cast as a human
crisis in which gender has no relevance (MacGregor, 2010) and man is supposed
to mean everyone. Such gender-blind analysis leads to excluding data and
perspectives that are crucial in solving climate change problems, while the issues
that women traditionally organize aroundenvironmental health, habitats,
livelihoods are marginalized by techno-science solutions which take center stage
in climate change discussions and funding. GLBTQ issues such as bullying in the
schools, hate crimes legislation, equity in housing and the workplace, same-sex
marriage (not to mention polyamorous marriage) don't appear in climate
discussions either. Given the gender-blind techno-science perspective dominating
climate change discussions, queer feminist entry to these discussions has been
stalled, trapped between Scylla and Charybdis: over the past two decades,
discussions have alternated between the liberal strategy of mainstreaming women
into discussions of risk, vulnerability, and adaptation, as WEDO has done; or,
adopting the cultural feminist strategy of calling on women's unique capacities of
caring for family and for environment, women's special knowledge and agency
based on their location within gender-role restricted occupations, and lauding
women's grassroots leadership. In either strategy, gender is restricted to the
study of women, and feminist analyses of structural gender inequalities that
compare the status of men, women, and GLBTQ others are completely omitted. To
date, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Gender and Climate Change
website addresses these problems by drawing on both reformist liberal ecofeminisms and cultural (essentialist)
ecofeminisms. In its statement on women's vulnerability, inclusion, and agency, the UNFCCC website asserts: It
is
increasingly evident that women are at the centre of the climate change challenge.
Women are disproportionately affected by climate change impacts, such as
droughts, floods and other extreme weather events, but they also have a critical
role in combatting climate change. In order to perform that critical role, however,
gender parity in climate change discussions is a minimum requirement : women
need to be equal members in policy-setting and decisionmaking on climate change.
And to have authentic, inclusive feminism, gender justice and sexual justice must
be partnered with climate justice, for women of all genders and sexualities form the
grassroots force within these three movements
Alt Solvency
Security State
Integrating feminist security, politics, and political economy
into our knowledge production leads to the breakdown of the
masculinized security state and a greater understanding of
humanity
Elias 15 (Juanita Elias is Associate Professor in International Political Economy. She
was educated at the University of Manchester (BA (Hons) Politics and Modern
History first class) and the University of Warwick (MA International Political
Economy; PhD Politics and International Studies), Introduction: Feminist Security
Studies and Feminist Political Economy: Crossing Divides and Rebuilding Bridges,
Politics & Gender, 11 (2015), 406 438, doi:10.1017/S1743923X15000100, accessed
7/10/16//KR)
The essays here reflect on the need to rebuild bridges between two key strands of feminist International Relations
(IR) scholarship: feminist security studies (FSS) and feminist (international) political economy (FPE/FIPE). As many of
feminist IR scholarship has long emphasized how
the contributions to this section point out,
gender relations and identities are constituted globally in relation to processes of
militarization, securitization, globalization, and governance. In more recent years,
however, feminist IR scholarship has come to be dominated by a concern with
security (Pru gl 2011). Of course, FPE scholarship has continued to provide critical
accounts of the gendered nature of global production, work, and financial crises
(among other issues). But it is notable that, in doing so, much FPE scholarship has tended
to avoid questions of security and/or violence . This CP section, then, looks to the growing divide
between FSS and FPE with all of the contributors seeking to analyse how these two traditions of feminist scholarship
might be reintegrated and why this reintegration is important. This section draws together scholars working within
in
and across FSS and FPE from a variety of theoretical, methodological, and empirical perspectives. And yet,
spite of this scholarly diversity, a certain degree of consensus is reached in terms of
the need to return to a more integrated feminist IR . We open with Laura Sjobergs
reflection on the emergence of FSS and how attention to political economy can
serve an important role in developing understandings of militarized gendered lives
and sexualities and, in particular, of male military prostitution . In this sense, Sjoberg
suggests that reintegration is necessary in order to bolster the explanatory value of feminist IR analyses. Heidi
Hudsons commentary argues for a reconnection between FSS and FPE in understanding sexual and gender-based
violence. Hudson makes the point that FPE serves as an important source for FSS
scholars seeking to reincorporate materialist concerns into their work . Indeed, for Hudson,
such a commitment is necessary in order to better understand not just practices of
violence, but in order to maintain a commitment to radical, emancipatory
understandings of human security . Jacqui True further underlines the need for bringing FPE into
discussions of sexual and gender-based violence. For True, FPE provides insights that are easily
overlooked and/or forgotten. This includes recognizing the gendered political
economic relations that underpin the formation of the modern state system. States
may well have started to better acknowledge women , peace, and security agendas as a result
of sustained civil society pressure, but the endurance of the highly masculinized and
militarized authoritarian security state is complemented by neoliberal political
economic state transformations. Elias and Rais contribution moves the conversation away from more
obvious discussions of gender and security (e.g., sexual and gender-based violence, militaries) and instead looks to
how a discussion of everyday gendered forms of violence can also play a role in bridging the gap between FSS and
FPE. Finally, Katherine Allison reflects on this topic with a warning, suggesting that we need to look closely at how
we tell feminist stories, for example, of a schism between FSS and FPE in ways that may well serve to ignore
earlier manifestations of these debates. The question of reintegration entails asking some difficult questions about
the nature of feminist theorizing and feminist practice. In particular, Allison notes the divisions within feminist
peace movements and scholarship in the early twentieth century over the role and position of socialist thinking.
Allison reminds us of the need to recognize the existence of multiple ways of
Moreover,
doing and knowing feminism and that the search for a single best way of doing
feminism should not be the goal of efforts by FPE and FSS scholars to better
understand one another. Thus, the contributors to this CP section look to bridge the current divide
between feminist security studies and feminist IPE by returning to the spirit of early feminist IR. In this sense, it is
not a particular methodological approach or theoretical framework that serves to best integrate a feminist
understanding of security and political economy rather, it is to suggest that a feminist curiosity (Enloe 2004)
should lead us to look beyond the confines of security studies and IPE. It is appropriate then that this Critical
Perspectives section is rounded off with a closing reflection by Cynthia Enloe.
Politics of Place
A focus on place-based local values is necessary to disrupt the
misogynistic system of global development- discourse of
development and modernization in a policy context is used to
reinforce patriarchal norms
Brun, C., & Blaikie, P. (2016). Alternative Development: Unravelling
Marginalization, Voicing Change. Farnham, GB: Routledge. Retrieved from
http://www.ebrary.com.proxy.library.umkc.edu Brun was appointed Associate
Professor at the Department of Geography in August 2004, and Professor from
September 2013. I am currently Director of Research in the department. She
teaches and supervises students in human geography, development studies and
globalisation studies. Piers Macleod Blaikie is a geographer and scholar of
international development and natural resources, who worked until 2003 at the
School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia
With this chapter, 1 we bring Lunds feminism and Escobars poststructuralism to
bear on a participatory mapping project in Fanjingshan National Nature Reserve
(FNNR), China (Figure 11.1). A critical issue in FNNR relates to the resource-use
relations between local farmers and an endangered snub-nosed monkey species,
Rhinopithecus brelichi , known as the grey snub-nosed monkey or the Ghizhou snub-
nose golden monkey. The United Nations International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD) argues that participatory mapping is particularly important
when dealing with indigenous peoples and forest dwellers that find their lives
disproportionately threatened by reduced access to land and natural resources. The
21,000 farmers within FNNR have an intimate knowledge of their local environment,
and participatory mapping is an important tool for accessing this knowledge in the
complex gender and child/adult contexts of human environment dynamics. Based
on first impressions and pilot work, we talk about the efficacy of this technique,
particularly in terms of how it embraces a place-based sensibility that empowers
female, male, child and adult participants. We then discuss local womens
participation in interviews and highlight, as examples of Escobars figured worlds,
their roles in a changing world of short-term work and boarding schools for children.
We then speculate on ways the FNNR example demonstrates Lunds imperative for
renegotiating local values and Escobars (2008) concern for building on identity,
territory and autonomy where they may exist locally. Lunds perspective on
renegotiating local values in the face of economic and social restructuring presages
contemporary poststructural feminism, which is not only critical of patriarchy but
forefronts the far more radical idea that problems actually have their origins in the
(male) reasoning of enlightenment thinkers influenced by Ren Descartes and
Baruch Spinoza amongst others. While recognizing the importance of emotions in
how we think, Spinoza nonetheless believed that emotions were transformed into
intellect through a strong mans detached understanding of grand questions such as
universality and transhistorical necessity (Peet and Hartwick 2009). With an
understanding that emotions play an important part in creating the complexities of
mens and womens lives, Lund (1993: 195) notes that gender roles and gender
relations are not framed on the basis of patriarchy alone. By recognizing the
importance of emotion and place-based contexts of development that are not
inordinately (and apolitically) humanistic, her work joins with a strand of late
twentieth-century feminism that elaborates a poststructural critique of reason and
one of its problematic enlightenment products, modern development. In an
important sense, a poststructural feminism argues that modern development is the
problem for women (and men), not the solution. A focus on local values destabilizes
the grand terms of enlightenment-based, universal development that is planned
from the Global North and implemented in the Global South. Tropes such as
development, modernization, self-reliance and revolution may speak to important
parameters of change and transformation, but poststructuralists and feminists
argue that they also speak to the dominant policies and practices of international
institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and revolutionary governments
whose bases are predicated upon masculinist endeavours and a male-dominated
public sphere (Scott 1995). The ensuing power struggle places rationality, efficiency
and optimism at the forefront of a regime that may also characterize womens work
as inferior, backward or invisible. In discourses of this kind, social struggles focus on
productive activities that exclude gendered power relations and retain notions of a
subordinate reproductive sphere and ideas of nature that are seen as feminine. A
problem arises, however, from switching the valences of the discourse by putting
women and their work at the centre of development discourses. Too often, accounts
of women in development are written in policy language amenable to the ongoing
practices of development agencies. Making women central to development
practices is here often about changing women (e.g. requiring them to speak
bureaucratic policy language) rather than changing institutional practices. Putting
women at the heart of development in this way is about fostering development
practices that continue to ignore difference, indigenous knowledge and local
expertise while legitimating foreign solutions to womens problems in the South
(Parpart and Marchand 1995: 16). This, in turn, shifts development solutions from
local areas to development agency headquarters in Washington, Oslo, Geneva or
Ottawa.
artificiality of the presumed division between the public and the private
spheres. Second, they have demonstrated that there is a lot more power
(and confusion) at work in politics than most nonfeminist analysts have
been willing to admit. Both of these feminist contributions have had significant impacts on all fields of political analysis. Nowhere is this truer than in the
study of international politics. In fact, as the six multinational authors of these provocative essays make clear, the evolution of feminist analysis of international politics has moved so far
along in the last decade that there are now signs worrisome signs that feminist analysts of international politics might be forgetting what they have shared. They might be making
bricks to construct new intellectual barriers. That is not progress. Building, brick by metaphorical brick, new intellectual barriers would deprive all of us, trying to make sense of politics in
could have put U.S. bases in one box and sexualized entertainment businesses in
another box. It would, similarly, have been easier if I could have put the garment
industry in one box and wartime sexual violence in a separate box . But whoever
said that plunging into a feminist investigation was easy? In her essay here, Laura Sjoberg usefully
reminds us that any disciplinary institutionalization has its own history. For example, feminist security studies was named by a particular scholar at a particular historical moment in the
ongoing evolutions of four academic fields: political science, international relations, development studies, and womens/ gender/feminist studies. That reminder serves to make us more
unless we
acutely aware of a conundrum that simultaneously enlivens and plagues current academic life one might even say academic everyday life. That is,
are wide awake and attentive, new questionings, new investigatory and
teaching energies, new collaborations, new excitements each of which
has helped to dismantle existing wasteful barriers can now provide the
mortar and the bricks for constructing new wasteful academic walls . The free-flowing
river of thought and findings can begin to diverge into separate channels. Out of our fresh questionings, collaborations, and discoveries we begin to offer new advanced undergraduate
and graduate seminars that are more specialized. We propose new academic lists to book publishers. Because there is now so much new work getting into print, we craft assigned
readings that are more specialized. We launch new Internet lists to stay in touch with those researchers asking questions closest to our own. We scheme to publish new journals. We do
the hard work of organizing new focused workshops and conferences. We urge academic association officers to provide space for more of our specialized panels. Its all so exciting. The
feminist curiosity divides; its currents grow weaker. What these five valuable
essays amount to is a cautionary tale. It is a cautionary tale not just for scholars/teachers
working in the exiting field of gender and international politics . It is a cautionary
tale for all of us, no matter what our special interests are in the wide-open
area of gendered political analysis. We should delight in our feminist-fueled intellectual excitements. We should cultivate new
interests and nonparochial networks. Let a hundred new panels bloom. But, all the while, we need to be wary of
creating and then slipping into comfortable new isolating silos. Instead, I
think, we need to keep asking ourselves, How do we make sense of womens and
mens gendered political lives without shying away from their wonderful
messiness?
Militarism/ Security
The impacts of militarism and the security state will only
recreate themselves absent a feminist restructuring of power
Hans and Reardon 12 [Asha Hans, Betty A. Reardon The Gender Imperative:
Human Security Vs State Security Routledge, Dec 6, 2012]
Militarism is a logical outgrowth of a patriarchal society through the use of force
as a means of regulating social hierarchies and ensuring that those at the top of the
structure receive a disproportionate share of resources . The construction of gender, as part of a
negotiation with society, is not in itself a problem. The problem occurs when gender roles are
proscribed by society, resulting in oppression, discrimination, fear and violence, with
adverse effects on the health of both men and women . Both gender and militarism
are significant determinants of health and insecurity . Combined, they create structures
which disproportionately affect women through exclusion, violence and
misapplication of resources. A determinants analysis allows the development of alternatives to not simply
focus on women as victims of militarism, but instead to look at the role that gendered behaviours, structures and
So when we define violence as a public health issue , as
institutions play in generating insecurity.
it means we need to challenge the social, political and
has been done earlier in this article,
cultural beliefs that support violence and lead to inequality, discrimination and
exclusion. Based primarily on protectionist models, current human security discourse
perpetuates patriarchy rather than addressing it . A non-patriarchal human security,
based around principles of social justice, the dignity and worth of the person, and environmental and social
sustainabilityoffers much greater possibilities for reducing the causes and effects of
threats. This would need to be built around four mutually supporting strategies : z
Redistribution not just of resources, but also of power. Redistribution for human security
needs to be framed around the goals of undermining hierarchies, reducing the
threats that militarism poses to human security and environmental sustainability
and generating more equitable systems . This means empowering people not just to take
resources from military spending in all its forms, but instead to ensure that peoples basic needs are
met through the equitable distribution of resources in areas such as food,
healthcare, education, housing and employment opportunities. Fundamental to this is the
need for gender equity access for women to all levels of the decision-making process. It involves
recognizing the major role that women already play in healthcare, education and all
other aspects of social development. Human rights, based on fundamental human dignity and a
progressive recognition of values toward the development of positive rights. Rights approaches are one
of the principle means by which individuals and communities can negotiate with the
state about the equitable use of power and resources . Successful application of human rights
enhances the development of new social values and increases empowerment. Empowerment occurs as a
result of the raising of critical consciousness, a process that needs to be nurtured
and reinforced by civil society. Empowerment is an essential precondition for
community use of power, the acquisition and utilization of rights and for redefining
the power of the state. It is also an outcome of claiming human rights, and of the successful use of power. z
Sufficient protection provided by the state through healthcare and other state-based
services to ensure that people have access to protective services where required .
This needs to be mandated by people through use of human rights mechanisms,
and where necessary, civil action to demand the redistribution of resources and
power.
Aff Answers
Links
Climate Change
Climate change is not a gendered issuethe impacts would be
the same on everyone
Salmon 13
Rhian A., senior lecturer in the Science in Context Group and Climate Change
Research Institute at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. She completed
a PhD in Atmospheric Chemistry in 2002 before working for the British Antarctic
Survey as a research scientist. Is climate science gendered? A reflection by a
female 'climate scientist'. Women's Studies Journal27.1 (Dec 2013): 49-55.
Lowe et al. (2013) propose that climate change poses both a scientific and social challenge for mankind that can
only be addressed with multi-disciplinary perspectives. Indeed, the last decade has seen huge growth not only in
climate science, but also in, for example, policy (Aldy, Barrett, & Stavins, 2003), psychology (Corner, 2012), and
If, like me, women find themselves more
communication (Kahan, 2013) related to climate change.
attracted to careers that they feel might 'make a difference', then the existence of
anthropogenic climate change could have engaged more women globally than
would have otherwise been engaged - in a range of roles including scientist,
educator, activist, communicator, and policy-maker. It may therefore have also
provided a mechanism for more women to become more scientifically literate. Taken
further, it could be argued that the emergence of anthropogenic climate change may have
therefore attracted more women into the physical sciences . Clearly, further data would need
to be collected to verify this hypothesis. My lack of training in the social sciences in general, and feminist theory or
women's studies in particular, resulted in my feeling poorly equipped to directly address the question of the impact
this is an on-going tension
that climate change has had on women in particular. However, I argue that
between the social and physical sciences, rather than a gender issue . In order to
tackle the challenges associated with climate change, a greater appreciation of
research approaches in multiple disciplines is required, in all directions. That is to
say - not only must natural scientists learn to appreciate the 'politics of climate
change' (Lowe et al., 2013), but there is also a need for non-scientists working in
the field of climate change to understand the scientific method that is used to
obtain the data (and its strengths and limitations), as well as the assumptions and
probabilities that are inherent in predictions about future climate. A more gender-
relevant question that emerged in considering this paper is why there is such a high
proportion of female polar and climate scientists who are involved in outreach
compared to the ratio of female scientists in this field overall . More research is required to
explore this question. Such a gender disparity, if substantiated, may be related to a greater desire among women to
While climate change is a serious reality
'make a difference through connecting with the community'.
that we all, male and female, have to deal with, it has also, I would argue, provided
an opportunity to break down some walls and challenge stereotypes. My personal
experience suggests that working in this field can be empowering for a woman -
both as a minority amongst scientists, and as a community member trying to
stimulate change through education. In answer to the panel question, therefore, I argue that climate
change could mean greater opportunities for women, in a range of personal and professional roles, in Aotaeoroa
New Zealand.
Deterrence
Deterrence is morally necessary; empirics prove it functions
and is inevitable in the status quo
Sohail and Steven 2004 (Hashmi, Sohail H., and Lee, Steven P., eds. Ethics and
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives. Cambridge, GB:
Cambridge University Press, 2004. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 13 July 2016.)
Antiwar feminists highlight an important consideration often lacking in discussions of the morality of deterrence by
emphasizing the unstated costs of the development, deployment, maintenance, and disposal of WMD, including the
diversion of funds that otherwise might be available for social welfare programs, the costs of disposing of hazardous
wastes, exposure to radiation, and so on. In addition, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence as an inhibitor of
armed aggression is dubious in the post cold war era, dominated by internal armed conflicts that do not directly
involve one (nuclear) nation pitted against another, and the growing threat of terrorist tactics such as those used by
Despite these costs, pragmatist feminist strategy deals
al-Qaida on September 11, 2001.
with existing actualities, not utopian ideals. Deterrence has been
successful, if success can be measured in terms of the lack of the use of nuclear
weapons for nearly fifty years. Looking pragmatically at human history and the scant
possibility that nations that have already developed weapons of mass destruction will voluntarily destroy them (all
of them, that is) or be deterred from ever using them in the absence of a credible threat that such use would be
met by equal or greater force the possession of WMD for purposes of deterrence
may be morally necessary, at least given current geopolitical realities . As
military philosopher Malham Wakin suggests: When we ask whether nuclear deterrence is the only
effective way to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in a total war, we must be
sure to do so in the context of the actual world situation we now find ourselves
in, a situation that includes a very large number of nuclear warheads in the possession of several nations and in at
least one of those nations many of those nuclear weapons are aimed at the United States and its NATO allies. In
that realistic context is it reasonable to suppose that a nuclear balance is better calculated to deter total war than a
nuclear imbalance? 28 Given the goal of pragmatist feminism to end oppression, including the domination and
WMD
control of some nations and peoples by others, and given that the possession and threatened use of
have become one of the most effective means by which nations in the
world today assert their power, deterrence is morally necessary to help
ensure against the oppression of some nations or peoples by others armed
with WMD. However, since the goal of international peace and security can never be fully achieved while
nuclear and other WMD exist, whether for defensive, deterrent, or other purposes, pragmatist feminists
allow for the interim use of deterrence only in the context of active efforts by nuclear
nations to bring about multilateral disarmament, such as that called for by the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Pragmatist feminists thus disagree with the antiwar feminist rejection of
any use of nuclear weapons, even for deterrence purposes, arguing for such use as a temporary, interim strategy
through the process of mutual disarmament. Therefore, while pragmatist feminists might agree with antiwar
feminists that nuclear weapons never should have been invented or, once invented, never should have been tested
Yes,
or deployed or used as the basis for deterrence, that is not the reality we find ourselves in today.
development and deployment must be factored into the ethical status of
deterrence, as antiwar feminists suggest. However, these costs in and of
themselves are not too high if viewed from the vantage point of the present, since
much of the cost has, in effect, already been spent. The antiwar feminist point about the costs of
development and deployment is highly relevant, however, to considering whether to build additional WMD for
deterrence purposes.
Deterrence is an ethical and preferable way to avoid war and
minimize human suffering from a feminist perspective
Lucinda Joy Peach 4, Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at
American University, 2004, A Pragmatist Feminist Approach to the Ethics of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Hashmi, p. 436-441
The pragmatist feminist perspective that I develop in this chapter is deeply indebted to and affirms
in many respects the antiwar feminist approach outlined by Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick
in the preceding chapter, but with some marked differences. These differences, I argue,
reveal more completely both the promise and the limitations of antiwar feminism. At the outset, it is
important to note that there is neither a single "feminism" nor a single "pragmatism" with which it might be aligned.
The "pragmatist feminism"
Instead, there are multiple feminisms, just as there are multiple pragmatisms.
developed in this essay draws on several elements from American Pragmatism , a
philosophical school developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most prominently by Charles
Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead. Despite the many differences among the
pragmatists, they tend to share several features. Perhaps most salient to the subject of this volume
is their presumption "that human agency in all of its higher manifestations has evolved
from ... concrete circumstances in which a vulnerable organism is confronted , often (if
not usually) in concert with other organisms of the same species, with possibilities of both injury and
fulfillment."' It is the continuous reminder of "human fallibility and finitude "' that
constrains pragmatists from positions such as foundationalism and dogmatism and thus against
ideologies that encourage the use of armed force , and especially of WMD, in all but the
most extreme circumstances. It is also a reminder that armed conflicts are
composed of embodied human beings, each of whom has the capacity for suffering
as well as happiness, a point stressed by feminist analyses of armed conflicts. There are several significant points of
commonality or intersection between pragmatism and feminism.3 Perhaps most important for thinking about the
ethics of weapons of mass destruction is that both are actively engaged in attempting to solve social problems. The
early pragmatists viewed the purpose of philosophical reflection to be "the intelligent overcoming of oppressive
conditions." Dewey, for example, recommended the criticism of beliefs underlying society that have led to
"unsatisfactory conditions in order to radically reconstruct our society according to non-oppressive and cooperative
standards."5 Feminist goals of liberating women from oppression thus echo pragmatist
ones. While most often feminist movements have been focused specifically on ending the male domination and
oppression of women, a more inclusive feminist vision has as its object the elimination of
all hierarchical and oppressive relationships, including the oppression of so-called third world or
developing nations (especially of the Global South) by those of the so-called first world or industrialized nations
(especially of the Global North), of ethnic, cultural, racial, or religious minorities by majorities, homosexuals by
pragmatists advocate
heterosexuals, the poor by the wealthy, children by adults, and so on. In addition,
the elimination of sharp divisions between theory and practice, reason and
experience, and knowing and doing.8 Pragmatists focus much more on
consequences rather than on a priori abstract conceptualizing , captured in the phrase that
pragmatists assign value on the basis of "what works" or what provides "emotional satisfaction."9 From a
Pragmatists consider moral
pragmatist perspective, the most important questions are practical ones.
agents to be actors within a concrete particular context that both influences what is
experienced and is influenced by those experiences . The inextricability of the perceiver from
what is perceived means that action, whether in the context of armed conflict and the use of
WMD or otherwise, must be situated within the larger context of which it is a part.
Since every decision to enter or engage in an armed conflict and every decision to deploy
WMD, of whatever type, must be considered within the full context of other relevant
actors, agencies, and term strategies or results ,12 a pragmatist perspective is
unlikely to result in the kind of abstract thinking that antiwar feminism criticizes in
dominant just war and realist approaches.13 Feminism also shares pragmatism's rejection of
traditional rationalist and empiricist approaches and its commitment to the inseparability of theory and practice.14
Both believe that reason must be grounded in experience and requires being supplemented, at least in particular
circumstances, by emotion.15 In this respect, feminists also favor a posteriori rather than a priori forms of
knowledge, those that develop on the basis of experience rather than those that are posited prior to it.16 In sum,
both pragmatism and feminism accord a central place to the particular, the
concrete, and the factual elements of experience, as opposed to the universal, the
generalizable, and the abstract .17 This opposition to abstraction is apparent, for example, in feminist
understandings of women's "different voice" and Dewey's views about the importance of the qualitative background
of situations. In contrast to mainstream philosophy, both feminist and pragmatist perspectives focus on everyday
The pragmatists' sensitivity
life and emphasize respect for others and the constitutiveness of community.
to the social embeddedness of persons led them to understand the "I" "only in
relation to other selves, so that the autonomy of individual agents needed to be
integrated with their status as social beings" existing in community . 18 This common
conception of the "relational self" suggests that both pragmatists and feminists will
resist turning others into "the Other," who can then be demonized and made into
"the enemy," suitable to be killed. The feminist commitment to the well-being of
others, in both the local and the global community, is well illustrated by Carol Cohn's
and Sara Ruddick's contribution to this volume. However, this commitment also provides the
basis for the pragmatist feminist position articulated here that refuses to
categorically rule out the moral legitimacy of any resort to armed force or war ,
since such resort may be morally imperative to protect innocent others . In addition to
these marked similarities, it is also important to acknowledge how a pragmatist feminism differs significantly from
American Pragmatism. Perhaps most important is pragmatist feminism's attention to the gendered character of the
social world and gender's impact on the formation and maintenance of male and female identities. These subjects
largely were ignored by the American Pragmatists19 but influence the analysis of the ethics of WMD outlined here.
In addition, feminists tend to give greater import to the cognitive aspects of affect than pragmatists, even though,
as already discussed, pragmatists recognize the importance of emotions to agency and cognition. Despite its
pragmatist feminism shares the goals of
differences from more mainstream strands of feminism,
many strands of feminism to make gender a central consideration of the analysis
(here of armed force and WMD)20 and to eradicate (patriarchal) oppression and domination .
These goals result in a strong presumption against the use of any weapons , not only
WMD, since they are in their very inception designed as tools for domination and
suppression of others designated as "the enemy ." This opposition to the use of
armed force is related to feminist observations of the patriarchal and hierarchical,
male-dominated and -controlled character of the military and the oppressive effects
of war and militarism around the world, especially on women and children. In addition, the
pragmatist feminist view described here affirms much in the "constitutive positions" of antiwar feminism articulated
by Cohn and Ruddick,21 especially its observation of the gendered character of war and militarism, its suspicion of
masculinist approaches to war and conflict resolution, and its critique of the dominant tradition for its focus on the
physical, military, and strategic effects of these weapons separate from their embeddedness in the rest of social
and political life. With this brief overview in mind, in the following section, I describe how a pragmatist feminist
perspective compares with the antiwar feminist position outlined by Cohn and Ruddick in Chapter 21 with respect to
the specific issues addressed by this volume. SOURCES AND PRINCIPLES Although pragmatist feminism itself does
not directly provide general norms governing the use of weapons in war, it does so indirectly through its affirmation
of elements of justwar theory, as described below. Pragmatist feminism does not categorically
rule out the use of armed force or engagement in war. Its pragmatist perspective
steers in a different direction from the antiwar feminists' "practical" opposition to
war. Whereas the realist tradition has been unduly pessimistic in its assumption that war and armed conflict are
necessary, certain, and inevitable, on a pragmatist feminist view, antiwar feminist thinking tends to
be unduly optimistic about the human capacity to transcend the use of violent
methods of resolving disputes, given the consistent and continual resort to such means throughout most
of human history. From a pragmatist feminist perspective , the historical and contemporary
experience of the repeated resort to violence and the inability of humanity thus far to
develop alternative mechanisms for resolving large-scale disputes suggests the
likelihood of future wars and armed conflicts. In light of this history, overcoming the "war
culture" that antiwar feminists view so unfavorably can be possible only outside the
immediate situation of armed conflict. Once the aggressor has struck or threatens
to do so imminently, it is too late to change our societies and ourselves in order to
avoid war. Rather, it is then necessary to act in order to avoid annihilation in one form or
another. Given its view that some wars and some opposition to war and armed conflicts are morally necessary to
protect ourselves and others from harm, pragmatist feminists seek to impose moral limits on the harm and
suffering to the minimum necessary. Despite an awareness of its limitations,22 a pragmatist feminist perspective
considers just war theory to provide a flexible and modifiable set of criteria for attempting to act morally and in
accordance with principles of justice, both in entering into an armed conflict (jus ad bellum) and in the actual
engagement of that conflict (jus in bello). In particular, pragmatist feminism shares just war's starting premise of a
A
strong presumption against the legitimacy of the use of armed force and violence to resolve conflicts.
pragmatist feminist perspective thus rejects Cohn's and Ruddick's contention that
justwar theorists "implicitly accept war as a practice even when condemning particular
wars."23 Recognizing the historical and global reality of war making and armed force as
means of resolving conflicts and adopting strategies to maximize justice and
minimize immorality when such means are adopted is not the same as "implicitly
accepting the practices of war," at least in the absence of demonstrably effective
means of eliminating such conflicts . To ignore the reality of the continuing resort to
war and armed force is itself to revert to abstraction rather than offering a practical
method for eliminating the human suffering and incalculable damage caused by war and armed
conflict. Here Colin and Ruddick reveal (intentionally or otherwise) their situatedness as citizens
of a war-making state, one that has had the choice in many, if not all, instances since the mid-twentieth
century, at least, of deciding whether or not to go to war. Just as Cohn and Ruddick criticize just war
theory for failing to explore nonviolent alternatives once a just cause is determined or war has begun, their
antiwar feminist approach fails to offer concrete suggestions for avoiding armed
conflict when a nation or people is confronted with armed aggression or assault by
others, the situation where the options boil down to "fight or die." This perspective fails
to look at war from the point of view of the aggressed-against , when armed conflict
becomes a necessity in order to retain national and/or cultural and/or ethnic identity from subjugation by
the aggressor(s). In such circumstances, the moral necessity of armed force looks quite
different. And in such circumstances, the threatened use of WMD can be seen as less evil
than the alternatives, such as doing nothing and being conquered or fighting a
conventional war and faring poorly. Rather than reverting to abstract thinking about war, pragmatist
feminism affirms just war theory's casuistic approach to particular armed conflicts as well as its position that such
means are sometimes morally justifiable or even morally obligator)' in order to protect oneself (individual or nation)
pragmatist feminism affirms just war thinking's attention to
or innocent third parties. Further,
particular conflicts rather than war in the abstract and its stance of moderation and
of imposing the minimal suffering necessary to accomplish the objective of restoring the peace.24
Thus, with respect to the military response of the United States to the September 11 terrorist attacks, a pragmatist
feminist application of just war criteria yields the conclusion that the jus ad bellum principles of "last resort" and
A
"proportionality," as well as the in hello principles of "proportionality" and "discrimination," were not satisfied.
second difference in the two feminist perspectives emerges out of the antiwar feminist
observation that war and militarism are not separate from everyday life but integral
aspects of it.25 While this is an extremely important insight into the underlying conditions of war and
militarism, it needs to be joined with alternative proposals for addressing the "large-
scale military conflict." There has been scant attention to this issue in antiwar
feminist scholarship. Even if one assumes, as antiwar feminists do, that war is a "presence"
in everyday life and not merely a discrete "event" that occasionally "erupts,"26 it is
nonetheless the case that "war" is more damaging and harmful, and creates greater
suffering in a multiplicity of ways , than the absence of war. Pragmatist feminist
thinking about the ethics of WMD is attentive to how such differences in consequences
differentiate war from everyday life. A third significant area of difference between the two types of
feminist theories concerns responses to the causes of war. Whereas pragmatist feminists agree with antiwar
feminists that wars are partially a mutual construction, they also insist that some wars have much more to do with
unjust aggression for which opposing sides do not share equal responsibility. Antiwar feminism fails to accept that
some wars are not only necessary as a matter of prudence, but also morally justifiable on feminist grounds, for
For a pragmatist
example, humanitarian intervention to end the severe oppression of innocent victims.
feminist, the current state of international affairs unfortunately requires consideration of
the circumstances in which the threatened or actual use of such weapons for defensive
or deterrent purposes may be morally allowable or even morally necessary. Given these
circumstances, pragmatist feminism considers the just war tradition to provide a morally useful source of norms
relating to the use of weapons in war.
Perm cards
Globalization + Feminism
Globalization has created opportunities for pathbreaking in
China gives them room to develop more individual identities
and influence the international theatre
Li 1(Li Xiaojiang is the founder and pioneer of women's studies in China and the
Professor and director of the Gender Research Center of Dalian University
"Modernization" to "Globalization": Where Are Chinese Women?, Signs: Journal of
Women in Culture and Society 2001, vol. 26, no. 4,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175370, accessed 7/10/16//KR)
Pathbreaking (jiegui) was a ubiquitous key term in the 1990s and has saturated
virtually all professions and callings. This term in fact harbors wthin itself a certain larger process.
Before and after pathbreaking in China, this process has involved two terms
representing two, not exactly identical, social subjects and development objectives.
One, modernization, was born at the same time as the late era of social reforms in the 1970s; its social basis
lay in nationalism, and it aimed at strengthening China. This agenda involved a race to catch up with
Western industrial civilization, a breaching of Chinese confinement, and what we
Chinese call a "heading for the world" (zouxiang shijie) -that is,globalization, the
second term of what became, in the 1990s, the prime Chinese social development
objec- tive in relation, of course, to the modernization of the 1980s. Without a doubt, globalization transcended
modernization in China, since we also had at our disposal the Chinese term social countermodeling (shehui zhuan-
Women's development and the gender question both stand in rela- tion to
xing).
"pathbreaking" and to "countermodeling," and, although in the end this relation was
transitory, it is still registering influence. Two necessary brief asides will provide explanations of
some essential matters. The first of these relates to globalization itself. Early in 1992, at Boston's Northeastern
University, historian Patrick Manning gave a talk in which he argued there was a trend toward globalization. In those
days, international society was feeling profoundly the dismemberment of the So- viet Union and Eastern Europe and
the sanctions imposed on China by Western countries. Globalization seemed to be hot air then. But, in China, within
not even three years (from late 1994, when the drive to enter the market economy began), globalization not only
became an objective linked to the slogan of pathbreaking, it had already become an accomplished real- ity in many
domains. To an extraordinary degree, China's activist (albeit nationalist) political process fortuitously seized upon
globalization and forcefully promoted it, rather than serving as a powerful obstacle to it in the way so many
(Western) people had imagined. The second aside concerns models. Contemporary scholars (particularly in the
West) are too habituated to systems of thinking that draw on classi- ficatory models and have situated China in the
"Asian development model" or "postsocialist model." Yet China and the other Asian nations have never developed
according to the same model, and thus there really is no com- mon foundational developmental model at all. Those
analyses prematurely claim that China is "postsocialist, because even now China strictly upholds a socialist
(political) system and ideology. Because China undertook glob- alization from within its own particular system
scholars must study China in its singularity if they wish to understand the relationship of contempo- rary China to
globalization. The concept of globalization emerged out of Western society . Initially, it was
both an economic movement and a Western concept or value, albeit popularized on the global scale. In China, the
analogous concept to this Western value was the notion of "heading for the world." A nationalist slogan of self-
strengthening, it enabled China to be pathbreaking through countermodeling, thus giving globalization a Chinese
nationalist content. Consequently, the Western concept of globalization came to be used in- strumentally in China
as a nationalist battle cry. In China, in other words, globalization became the historical turning point for the nation's
the concept
encounter with the world. While all of the above is background knowledge, it serves to clarify how
of globalization was historically produced in China and to explain globalization's
particular regional inflection, all of which will enable us to consider the status,
attitude, and actions of and potential questions facing Chinese women and to
understand and establish a method of explicating those questions. The preparatory
meetings for the 1995 Women's Conference, which began in late 1993, drew Chinese
women into the processes of globaliza- tion, even before they had became involved
in so-called modernization, and they were the first social group to encounter
globalization. How do we look into (Chinese) women's status and the woman
question in the processes of globalization? The made-to-order method (and this includes the
thinking of Sins' spe- cial issue editors) is most often as follows: in societies moving toward eco-
nomic marketization, women are the consumer group, and the sex (the xing) of
women (nuxing) becomes a mass consumer item, the labor power of women is
exploited, and so on. From the perspective of developed West- ern nations and the reflections of postmodernism
on modernization, this is the absolute reality of economic marketization. But why is it
that, in countries where these questions are actually at stake, they are not raised by
the very women in question but are, on the contrary, precisely the objec- tives that
people swarm toward as fast as they can? To take another ex- ample, the most exploitative labor
categories are those with the highest concentrations of workers. Yet as of this time, these jobs have allowed un- told
numbers of rural women to take the road toward casting off poverty, casting off the influence of the clan, and
transforming their own selves.In today's China, the development of women does not fall
within that stereotyped model, because of the very substantial influence of regional
variation, or for personal reasons (or opportunities). In every arena, indi- viduals who
have the material resources or the personal opportunity to "pathbreak" do so, no
matter what sort of new problems or what sort of oppressions or misuses they
encounter as a consequence. Their life condi- tions and their degree of self-
autonomy are so much greater than those allowed in traditional regions and in the traditional social life
of the indi- vidual that it does not matter that women in foreign enterprises are clearly
being paid less: they will still choose the exploitative wages of foreign en- terprises
and turn down the housewifery of state enterprises . The "woman question" raised by the process
of globalization clearly di- verges from recognized models, and whether it can easily be judged by mod- ern or
it is of the greatest importance that we
postmoder standards of value is hard to say. Still,
recognize the existence of continuous, ongoing pro- cesses of displacement of
positions and the consequent displacement of a universal standard of value. This is
a social method for our recognizing the processes of globalization and their
transformation of women's status and the women/gender question . The concepts of
globalization and "indige- nous consciousness," "development" and "sustainable development," are mutually
contradictory, and, moreover, their original standpoints are in- commensurable. From one perspective (the
macroscopic, globalized per- spective, a perspective that has reflected on "modernization" and capital- ism), we
see capitals accelerating exploitation of women in the developing countries. From the
other indigenous perspective, we must squarely face the fact that women's lives and status in modernization and
globalization have improved for the better; even though, compared with the West, their lives appear impoverished,
Again, if the labor market is
individuals may actually have (compared to the past) greater affluence.
slanted toward developing countries, the marriage and sex markets actually offer
women increased opportunities for choice (including the choice of sexual services)
and con- sequently improve the situation of women, although to women of the de-
veloped regions and countries this may constitute a sort of oppression. But, at the
same time, the positive value to women is not only not uniform, it may, on the
contrary, be quite the opposite. Each of these events give rise to women questions whose methods of
resolution may also be poles apart. During the modernization of the 1980s, the basic attitude of Chinese women
(particularly urban, professional women) was passivity; as a result, their development lagged behind social
"en- lightenment" became the prime subject of Chinese social
development generally. Then
agenda. This dis- course aimed to mobilize women to plunge enthusiastically into
the total modernization of society and the improvement of their own circum-
stances. From that perspective, the globalization of the 1990s has offered Chinese women an unexpected
opportunity to overtake Chinese society's entire developmental level while at the same time pathbreaking into the
world and becoming individual persons. They can also cast off the en- tanglements of nationalism, taking
themselves "toward the world." This is absolutely crucial in the history of Chinese women's liberation and devel-
opment.For all of history, Chinese women have always been contained in the family,
the clan, the community; that was why the processes of Chinese women's liberation
were always involved with nation, society, and the state. For this reason, when I see
the process of Chinese women's globaliza- tion, I also see the fortuitous processes
of her individuation. When the Chinese reforms began in the 1980s and it appeared as though modernization
would discard or abandon women, I felt that this would actually be a good thing for Chinese women and would
globalization is,
awaken in Chinese women their female subjective consciousness. Today I feel similarly that
for Chinese women, a difficult historical opportunity, holding out the chance to
every woman to exceed family, society, nation, and state and leading in the end to
more opportunities and more chances to choose to become an individual . No matter
how many new problems it produces, what single thing could be more important than choice? If the catchword of
the Chinese women's movement of the 1980s was (social) enlightenment, today's objective is (individual)
development. These will certainly seem dubious from the postmodernist perspective, and such reservations have
their laudable points. But these are all the self- conscious and self-selected choices of Chinese women themselves,
and it is possible that they are brief and fleeting, a counter to countermodeling and pathbreaking. At this point, no
matter how many definitions we provide at the level of theory, I think that standards for judgment must grow out of
the spe- cifics of life itself. Doing what one ought or ought not to do is relevant not in the abstract but only in the
It is essential now to scrutinize reality very carefully, to evaluate the
context of reality.
price of doing what one says is "necessary," and to try to calibrate and to reduce
these costs.
State Perms
Perm, do both: State involvement is key to place-attached
politics and solidarity among the oppressed through
delocalization
Brun, C., & Blaikie, P. (2016). Alternative Development: Unravelling
Marginalization, Voicing Change. Farnham, GB: Routledge. Retrieved from
http://www.ebrary.com.proxy.library.umkc.edu Brun was appointed Associate
Professor at the Department of Geography in August 2004, and Professor from
September 2013. I am currently Director of Research in the department. She
teaches and supervises students in human geography, development studies and
globalisation studies. Piers Macleod Blaikie is a geographer and scholar of
international development and natural resources, who worked until 2003 at the
School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia
It was not until the 1990s that alternative, antimodernist development theories critiqued development practices for
their concerns with fulfillment of basic needs with a focus on indigenous values, neoliberal self-reliance and so forth.
Lund (1993) was one of the first to argue that identifying ways to empower the poor and marginalized was more
appropriate than focusing solely on fulfilling needs, which were frequently inappropriately identified by experts
from elsewhere. Part of this critique questioned how men and women could sensitize themselves and act against
oppressive structural forces, including patriarchy (Lund 1993). The structures affecting womens lives production,
reproduction, socialization, motherhood, gender and sexuality contain different contradictions and dynamics but
they nonetheless contain a unity in womens experience. Women are contextualized by the shifting social relations
they inhabit and the types of labour they perform. A focus on gender and development argues that the sexual
division of labour in a society is one of the relations in which men and women become dependent upon each other,
and these relations must necessarily change. Gender power relations rather than women in development are the
needed focus of analysis. In addition, a focus on gender and development emphasizes that women are not a
Women are seen as social
homogenous group but rather are divided by class, ethnicity, age and so forth.
actors within wider social contexts, and the state can be an important actor
promoting womens emancipation (Peet and Hartwick 2009). Escobar (2008: 32)
approaches power over the production of locality as being tantamount to two
conflicting yet at times mutually constitutive processes of localization. On the one
hand, there are the dominant forces of the state and capital, which attempt to shift
the production of locality in their favor, thus ultimately creating a delocalizing
effect with respect to places, and, second, what Escobar refers to as subaltern
forms of localization: place-based strategies that rely on the attachment to territory
and culture; and network strategies. In the first instance capital and the state
mobilize the politics of scale that valorize local endeavours (e.g. some ecotourism
programmes are foisted on indigenous peoples and are advertised globally as authentic, traditional experiences
To the extent that these strategies do not originate from
that do not hurt the environment).
local places (they may come from the state or the Global North), they inevitably induce a
delocalizing effect in terms of an unfolding of social and ecological life. In the
second instance are subaltern strategies, which follow the Deleuzian notion that
the oppressed, if given the chance and on their way to solidarity through alliance
politics can speak and know their conditions (Spivak 1988: 25). Escobar
advocates two strategies that focus on (1) attachment to place, and (2) attachment
to redes that empower social networks to enact the politics of scale from below.
These latter strategies, as suggested by some of our work in FNNR, engage local
movements with biodiversity networks, on the one hand, and with other place-
based actors and struggles, on the other (Escobar 2008: 32). In what follows we highlight the FNNR
project in Guizhou Province, China, where complex social and biodiverse relations between the endangered
snubnosed monkey,local hillside farmers and their traditional agricultural practices,
tourist policies, economic development and education interweave in ways that
highlight Escobars delocalizing effects and place-based strategies and suggest the
importance of Lunds renegotiation of local values on a continual basis. Recent
decades have witnessed considerable interdisciplinary research and conservation
efforts, pointing to a fundamental question of how we can better understand the
space time complexities of humans, protected species and the environment (e.g.
Ehrlich and Wilson 1991, Vitousek 1994, Jeffers 1997, Vitousek et al. 1997, Dirzo and Raven 2003, Smith et al. 2003,
Turner et al. 2003, OConnor and Crowe 2005).
Richard Ned Lebow (20002001) has recently invoked what might be called a streetcar interpretation of
systemic war and change. According to him, all our structural theories in world politics both
overdetermine and underdetermine the explanation of the most important
events such as World War I, World War II, or the end of the Cold War. Not only do structural
theories tend to fixate on one cause or stream of causation, they are inherently
incomplete because the influence of structural causes cannot be known
without also identifying the necessary role of catalysts. As long as we ignore
the precipitants that actually encourage actors to act, we cannot make
accurate generalizations about the relationships between more remote
causation and the outcomes that we are trying to explain . Nor can we test the
accuracy of such generalizations without accompanying data on the presence or absence of catalysts. In
the absence of an appropriate catalyst (or a streetcar that failed to arrive), wars
might never have happened. Concrete information on their presence (streetcars that did
arrive) might alter our understanding of the explanatory significance of other variables. But since catalysts
and contingencies are so difficult to handle theoretically and empirically, perhaps we should focus instead on
probing the theoretical role of contingencies via the development of what if scenarios.
Consequences > Epistemology
We begin our critique by subjecting to scrutiny the substantive claims evident in our authors' narratives of retrieval
and reinvention regarding who might be the rightful bearer of progressive politics, what a progressive political
agenda should look like and how that agenda must be pursued. In terms of the favoured agent of change, all three
writers share what could be described as a nostalgic attachment to the socialist feminism of the past, with Fraser
and Eisenstein arguing for its revival and McRobbie lamenting its demise. Now, while we have no issue with
nostalgia per se playing a role in the articulation of a progressive politics (see Bonnett, 2010), or with the notion
that socialist feminism may be a good place to start that endeavour, we underline two interconnected problems
socialist feminism is romanticised,
with how this plays out in all the texts under discussion. First,
presented as an ideal type rather than as a concrete, internally complex, historically
specific political project. McRobbie has been criticised, rightly, for mobilising socialist
feminism as a kind of shortcut label, never describing exactly what it was or why it
might have declined in popularity (Van Zoonen, 2010, pp. 1701). Perhaps she might be excused this,
given that she does not rely on socialist feminism for her progressive politics of the present. But Fraser and
socialist feminism remains elusive, glimpsed only through rose-
Eisenstein do, and here too
tinted spectacles. Fraser's account, for example, contains some historical
inaccuracies, eliding as it does socialist feminism in the 1970s with black and anti-
imperialist feminism and attributing to all three an intersectional analysis that was
actually pioneered by black feminists (Fraser, 2009, p. 103; e.g. Combahee River Collective, 1977). In
Eisenstein's book, the issue is rather one of absence: socialist feminism is explicitly summoned in an earlier article
(Eisenstein, 2005, p. 488) and implicitly invoked in the book in calls to put socialism back on the agenda, but
barely features in the accompanying analysis of the triumph of mainstream liberal feminism over what Eisenstein
calls social feminism and labor feminism (Eisenstein, 2009, pp. 4054). Connectedly, Fraser and Eisenstein
neglect internal debates and conflict among socialist feminists. This can be seen in their discussion of the revaluing
of care work, positioned by both authors as central to a socialist-feminist revival and especially important to
Eisenstein's progressive vision, but which has long been subject to high-profile contestation among socialist
feminists and beyond in ways that surely merit some consideration.2 The second problem, closely connected to the
contemporary strands of feminism are assessed in light of this
first, is that
romanticised ideal and found wanting. So, for example, McRobbie's sweeping dismissal of
third wave feminism as an apologia for capitalism ignores the expansive literature
on the internal contestations and contradictions of this feminist trend (e.g. Dean, 2009;
Henry, 2004; Snyder, 2008). In parallel, Eisenstein's depiction of the rise of post-structuralist feminism in the 1990s
ignores, among other things, the fact that many of the thinkers involved like McRobbie herself come out of a
all three
socialist feminist tradition. To use an argument made by Cynthia Weber (1994) in a different context,
authors in their own ways are disciplining feminism from an assumed position of
authority and in accordance with their own purposes , elevating socialist feminists as
the good girls of the past and thereby denigrating, variously, liberal feminists,
cultural theorists, post-structuralists or the third wave as the bad girls of the
present. In so doing, our authors run the risk of reifying differences among feminists,
failing to appreciate the connections and hard-won alliances that flow through the
feminist body as a whole (Weber, 1994, p. 347). The limitation of their vision of the agent of progressive
politics, however, goes beyond the shared tendency to discipline contemporary feminism in light of an idealised
socialist feminism. In terms of Fraser and Eisenstein, an additional problem arises with their insistence that
feminism and the left be reintegrated. Indeed, in our view, both these authors seriously underestimate the
tensions between these two political forces, historically and today. Although Eisenstein (2009, pp. 2036)
acknowledges the much-documented unhappy marriage between them throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries and Fraser (2009, p. 10) notes the critique by second-wave socialist feminists of the androcentrism of
their left comrades, both analysts assume that such obstacles can be overcome. Fraser simply asserts the necessity
of reunion while Eisenstein's prescriptions for healing (2009, pp. 2069) between the left and feminism, based on
the former taking feminist forms of solidarity and aspirations more seriously, and the latter going beyond anger,
seem to us to be set out more in hope than in realistic expectation .
Even more worrisome is the
implication that the progressive character of socialist feminism is secured by its
adherence to the socialist/Marxist/left side of the equation. Surprisingly, for Fraser and
Eisenstein, socialist feminism appears to acquire its critical bite and realise its emancipatory promise only in so far
as it is socialist or left, not feminist. Thus, feminism qua feminism is positioned not only as non-left, but also as non-
progressive.3 Turning to McRobbie's political imaginary, the agent, as we have seen, is assumed to be the individual
subject (i.e. female student) who is depicted as capable of deep personal transformation. But McRobbie's
articulation of the nature, direction and end product of this process, although evocative, remains rather inchoate
and non-committal. First, she gives us no justification of why she lays all her hopes for a new minoritarian politics
on the role of higher education, in general, and on young, middle-class, cosmopolitan students from the colonial
periphery, in particular. She certainly fails to explain in what sense these relatively privileged students are
minoritarian and why she thinks that their highly mobile, reconstituted subjectivities will be novel in any way or,
the individual as the bearer of
for that matter, progressive. Moreover, McRobbie's turn to
progressive politics seems to leave no room for the key ingredient that any
collective effort at re-articulation would require, that is, intersubjectivity. Instead,
her vision of the politics of becoming seems to take for granted the individualisation
of women and, in so doing, accept the very terms of the Faustian pact between
feminism and neo-liberalism that she decries . On this view, resistance in
contemporary conditions can only be undertaken by individual subjects, alone, with
no possibility of collective political struggle perceived now or in the future. If the
agents of progressive feminist politics proposed by these authors are problematic,
so too are their agendas. With respect to McRobbie's agenda, we have already indicated that her
suggestions on this topic are very schematic. Her call for a relentless critique of capitalism
(McRobbie, 2009, p. 49) offers a starting point, one shared with Fraser and Eisenstein. But it is far less
apparent how her affirmative vision of radical democracy and multiculturalism,
along with their attendant values of pluralism and otherness, fits with this
critique. In other words, even if one could foster such a radical ethos in the classroom,
how would one go about translating this moment into a wider social and political
project that might challenge our total subsumption by capital (McRobbie, 2009, p. 164)? By
comparison, Fraser's and Eisenstein's plea for the return of socialist feminism reactivates a more explicit, extensive
and substantive political agenda revolving around the re-centring of a critique of capitalism, the reintegration of
class, race and gender in this analysis and the revaluation of socio-economic and cultural axes of oppression so that
the former is once again given its due. This call for a recalibration of feminist political priorities sounds reasonable
enough. And yet there is a danger here that in their efforts to rectify an assumed skewing of
feminist analysis whereby gender is privileged over class and race, and recognition
over redistribution, Fraser and Eisenstein actually tip the scales in the other
direction, allowing for the reassertion of class and socio-economic oppression over
other forms of power and suffering. Such a hazard arises in the first place because the existence of the
imbalance to which they are responding is, at the very least, contested. After all, what about the claims
of Latin American feminists that they have long sought to integrate an account of
class and gender oppressions (e.g. Chinchilla, 1991)? Or what about those feminist critics who do not
accept the recognition and redistribution dualism and by implication the categorisation of social movements
(including feminism) on this basis (Alcoff, 2000; Butler, 1998; Young, 1997)? It is beyond the scope of this article to
adjudicate these competing claims. The point we are trying to make is simply that Eisenstein and Fraser are offering
a solution to a problem that many other feminists seem unconvinced actually exists and in this way, may be
A second issue with Fraser's and Eisenstein's call for a
creating a new problem of their own.
re-centring of the critique of capitalism is that neither scholar makes clear how
socio-economic and cultural axes of oppression, or gender, race and class, can be
understood as mutually constitutive within a framework that simultaneously
privileges capitalism. Our anxiety on this point is that feminist contributions to the progressive agenda,
rather than socialist or Marxist ones, get lost. This worry is particularly heightened when Eisenstein asserts that
gender, race and nationality are ultimately grounded in production relations (Aguilar, cited in Eisenstein, 2009, p.
213), implying that these other axes of oppression, and the struggles they generate are, in fact, an effect of the
foundational structure of capitalism. She reinforces this impression when she intimates that the divisions between
white women and women of colour in the US are primarily an issue of class, rather than race (Eisenstein, 2009, p.
214). Fraser is not much more reassuring. Characterising capitalism as a social totality (Fraser, 2009, p. 103) and
entreating feminists to make market-mediated processes the major focus of their analyses (Fraser, 2009, p. 115),
she does little to alleviate fears that she is rebalancing the scales in favour of production relations and the class
These drawbacks with the substantive characterisations of the
politics that this generates.
agent and agenda are accompanied by an almost complete neglect of political
practices. Fraser, for one, tells us nothing about how her preferred political agent should act. We do get glimpses
of what progressive political practice should look like from Eisenstein, who includes popular education,
consciousness raising, mass mobilisation, coalition building, union organising and neighbourhood cooperatives in
her trawl through possible ways forward (Eisenstein, 2009, pp. 20227), and from McRobbie (2009, p. 166) who
suggests critical pedagogy as crucial to the transformation of her students' subjectivities. But in the end, rather
than defend these suggestions in light of what might constitute progressive political practices in a neo-liberal age,
all three authors seem to assume that these practices will automatically flow either from the revival of social
feminism both as an agent and agenda or, in the case of McRobbie, from the transformation of students'
subjectivities. Moreover, all three implicitly limit the array of possible progressive practices by strenuously denying
the potential of either cultural and/or institutionalised practices. In this way, we are left to assume the nature of
progressive feminist practices from what they are not. We have shown in this section that all three of our authors
have an uncritical affection for socialist feminism, whether this is mourned as the progressive agent of the past or
willed back into being to carry the hopes of the present. This attachment carries with it exclusions and blind spots,
socialist feminism remains highly under-specified and indeed romanticised in
for
these texts, as does the relationship between feminism and the left. This not only makes
Fraser's and Eisenstein's case for the retrieval of socialist feminism as the agent of progressive politics less
it also allows them to skew their desired progressive agenda in ways that
compelling,
favour Marxism over feminism and to neglect the role of concrete political practices
in bringing about this agenda. Even McRobbie, who refuses to return to the past for a saviour, is unable
fully to flesh out her vision in ways that offer a convincing alternative to the socialist feminism for which she yearns.
focus on the individual subject and educational encounters in the
Indeed, her
classroom could be said to signal an unsatisfactory retreat from collective action in
the wake of socialist feminism's alleged demise . On both accounts, then, socialist feminism
functions as a benchmark to discipline contemporary strands of activism as insufficiently progressive by
comparison. As we will go on to argue in the next section, this disciplining dynamic is sustained and made more
plausible by the ways in which three interconnected concepts are deployed by these authors to undergird their
proleptic imaginings.
Jane Jaquette sounds the alarm. She exposes the dangers of ignoring the
In this important paper,
state and the dangers of difference feminism. She also shows how these are
linked. Although I will underscore the merits of anti-state activity and difference
feminism, I agree that a feminist strategy that neglected or deplored state action
would be weak indeed. So would a strategy that relied on womens differences from
men. First, the merits of Jaquettes argument. One strand in feminist theory and practice
greatly suspects the state. This suspicion can escalate into outright rejection, with
potentially grave consequences for women. The philosophical case for the state is relatively simple.
Collective action can improve human lives. Efficient collective action requires coercion. Instruments of collective
action involving coercion can, paradoxically, increase human freedom. We are freer to do many things if we can
bind ourselves with legally enforceable contracts. Rather than enforcing these contracts privately, it is more
efficient and potentially more just to give a monopoly of legitimate violence to one entity, so long as that entity can
reasonably claim to be more just than the alternatives. Humans have long struggled to devise relatively legitimate
forms of coercion. The history of democracy is part of that struggle, although that history has nowhere produced
national-level institutions that are highly legitimate. Despite their incapacity ever to be fully legitimate, however,
we still need both states and international institutions to help solve collective action problems and to give scope to
the human capacity for justice. Regarding women, the practical case for the state, must be grounded in
contemporary realities. In some states, such as Sweden, women do better, compared to men, than in the most
although the dangers of state
egalitarian of known pre-state entities, such as the Kung!. Moreover,
power for women are great, it is not practical to contemplate returning to pre-state
entities. Human beings seem to want the goods produced by more extensive forms of cooperation, including
those that require legitimate coercion. Given that states will not disappear in the near future, what stance should
State power will be used against women, just as
we take toward them? My answer is: wary usage.
other forms of power are used against women, unless we intervene. One response is
to establish barriers, such as constitutional or internationally enforceable rights, to
certain kinds of invasions by state power. Another is to make states more likely to
act in the interests of women. In the United States both theory and institutional practice carry suspicion
of the state farther than in most countries, with some malign consequences. Ours has been a liberalism of fear
more than an Enlightenment liberalism that envisions a common good. Americans are wary of state power,
encouraged in that wariness by powerful capitalist interests. Jaquette rightly warns against this. State power can
serve both as a brake on the negative externalities of capitalism and as a positive force for material redistribution.
Particularly when patriarchal power takes violent forms in the private sphere, state
power can help women struggle against that violence as well as other non-state
evils. The question, then, is how far to carry wariness of state power and of theories of state universalism and
impartiality. I believe we must both use state power and place bounds on . Because the state as
a tool is dangerous and flawed, we need to use it with caution. Jaquette faults contemporary feminist anti-state
theorists not for wanting to abolish the state but for spending their energies on wariness rather than on how to use
it for redistribution. How important one thinks this problem is depends on how one judges the current balance
within feminist theory. Many feminist theorists e.g. Susan Okin, Nancy Fraser, Iris Young call for redistributive
reforms requiring state power. Perhaps in Latin America, from 356 International Feminist Journal of Politics
Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 12:19 04 August 2014 which Jaquette takes her
lead, theorists of the North are represented by antistate theory. In that case, one must ask why these are the
theorists Latin American feminists choose to read. Anti-state discourse may have informed radical practice in Latin
America not because anti-state theory is dominant in the North but because activists in Latin America find that anti-
Anti-state discourse may reflect the reality of
state discourse meets their organizing needs.
individuals working on the margins of states that either are relatively corrupt or,
even more obviously than most, enforce the interests of dominant classes. Jaquette
also rightly warns of the dangers of valorizing action in civil society to the neglect of
state action. However, we need evidence that the more women participate in NGOs the less they participate in
the state. Without such evidence it seems equally plausible that the more women participate in NGOs the more
they will acquire the skills and contacts required for involvement in state politics. Some individuals also will not be
able to deal with the hierarchy, coercion and male dominance embedded in all states. They will need to work in
social movements. Political activism usually sustains a division of labor, with the individuals who can best deal with
established institutions doing just that and those who are most repelled by those institutions charting another
Women and feminists trying to
course. The directions they take sometimes conflict with one another.
achieve places in the state, whether as femocrats or politicians, face major barriers
but also major attractions. I do not know how much we should worry that they will not be attracted to
these jobs because of radical anti-state discourse. In the United States this does not seem to be a huge problem. In
some countries, women who could be agents of feminist change turn down jobs in the state because those jobs are
boring and unsatisfying. When these women speak of their frustrations, radical antistate discourse appears to play
Jaquette is right that an established anti-state discourse
a small or non-existent role. In short,
within radical movements makes productive interaction with states less likely , but I am
not sure that such discourse is created by feminist theory. Jaquette also points to distortions produced by difference
It is true that any stress on womens differences reinforces the tendency of
feminism.
dominant groups such as white or middle-class women to interpret womens
experiences primarily in light of their own experiences. In recent years, women of
color have produced the greatest advances in feminist theory, forcing white
feminists to look more closely at their hegemonically defined concepts of
commonality; this work has given all feminists the tools to understand better
differences within their groups and subgroups. In addition, in most areas of presumed personality
difference between men and women, the differences are extremely small. The currently definitive meta-analysis of
studies on Carol Gilligans hypothesis shows that at least in the United States, in the highly educated populations
Most studies do
where she argues that differences should appear only very small differences can be found.
not show women taking a different approach to justice or behaving more
cooperatively than men. Studies designed to elicit behavioral gender differences often generate practically
none. In-groups, we now know, exaggerate similarities within their group and their differences from other groups.
The human brain makes these predictable cognitive and emotional mistakes in in-group/out-group differentiation.
Recognizing this tendency, we should constantly struggle to take into account the fact that our social and first-order
cognitive estimates of such differences are usually exaggerated. In the case of gender, all societies also engage in
gratuitous gendering giving gendered meanings to nouns and patterns of action that do not functionally require
Today we have
that identification. These processes increase even more our perceptions of gender difference.
little idea what differences might or might not emerge between men and women in
a non-oppressive society. It seems mistaken, therefore, to insist on difference rather
than focusing on the effects of dominance. Finally, as Jaquette warns, promising different
political results based on the premise that women are different from men is
dangerous. We are almost certain not to deliver on that promise, at least in the short run. The backlash after the
US suffrage movement was undoubtedly caused in part by disillusion at the lack of change when women won the
And yet, small differences that do appear between men and women can take on
vote.
major symbolic significance, precisely because of our human tendency to
exaggerate group differences. Although using that significance is dangerous, not only because it
exaggerates reality but also because it underlines the very stereotypes that have been used to keep women in their
place, the existence of danger does not mean that we should forswear this tool any more than for swearing the
tool of state action. Just remember: when using a dangerous tool, take active precautions against its potential
harms. Difference arguments for electing women are not just arguments from utility ,
as Jaquette reports Marian Sawers point. For example, the fact that women are perceived as more honest than men
can advance an attack on corruption by associating its female leaders with honesty. Using positive stereotypes of
women in this way need not be degrading. Successful uses may even result in males adopting certain features of
female symbolism to signify their own adherence to better standards. In another example, among professional
populations in the United States, women are somewhat more likely than men to adopt participatory, egalitarian
styles of leadership. The difference probably derives from womens relative powerlessness, which teaches skills of
persuasion rather than command. In the US womens movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, women used the
gender differences they perceived in listening, interpreting body language and participatory style to create
significant departures from the prevailing styles of left politics in organizations dominated by men. The message,
We do things differently is exhilarating. It prompts greater effort in trying to forge a new model, because the effort
is associated not only with a different culture that can replace the old one but also with a different self and
Turning from practical politics to political theory, concepts are also
associated selves.
often gender-coded. Freedom and self-interest, for example, are often coded as
male, community and altruism as female. It is not surprising, then, that when
feminist theorists entered the field of theory, some explicitly supported certain
values previously denigrated as female. Although the arguments made for these
values might not be female, their proponrnts often were . Moreover, having been raised in a
subculture that had been allocated cultural responsibility for these values, women had often thought about them
more thoroughly than men. Women had also usually experienced the denigration of these values first-hand. In
short, Jaquette is right that stressing womens differences from men is fraught with danger.
But values and practices that many cultures associate with women are often good in themselves, denigrated
because of their association with women. Asserting the value of these ideals and practices from a stance as women
Jaquette identifies a link between
often makes emotional, cognitive and political sense. Importantly,
anti-state discourse and difference feminism. A number of anti-state theorists who
are also strongly anti-essentialist would deny this identification. But in social
movements themselves, the identification makes sense. The state is male; hence
difference feminists should be anti-state. The state is instrumental, self-interested and hierarchical;
women are communal, nurturing and participatory. To the degree that these associations are simply accepted as
I agree wholeheartedly
unchangeable truths, they compound the most problematic anti-state mistake.
with Jaquettes fears in seeing no visible trend toward a renewed interest in the
politics of economic justice, at least in the United States. In contrast to the creativity in the struggle
against globalization, there has been an absence of street-level activism against, for example, the revolutionary
shift in tax burdens in the USA. More positively, the antisweatshop movement has had some good effects in raising
consumer consciousness and bringing younger activists in touch with international labor movement organizing. As
for the causes of the shift away from the politics of economic justice, I agree with Jaquette that it is related to the
post-Cold War era and the temporary triumph of capitalism. I am not so sure that it has much to do either with
activists anti-state discourse or with difference feminism. This commentary has concentrated on the caveats to
Jaquettes thesis. I conclude by stressing again my fundamental agreement with her argument. Feminists have a
stake in a capable state. It would be catastrophic to be so carried away by the theoretical virtues of civil society or
by anti-state discourse as to deaden oneself to the practical need to work with the state to improve the lives of
women. Because ideas have influence, it is worth stressing Jaquettes point that norms
adopted
internationally depend on states to implement them; and only states can change
the rules for women and other disadvantaged groups . The welfare state is a huge improvement
over the arbitrary power of men in private families. Womens groups must therefore work closely
with governments or remain on the fringe. Feminists will not only have to learn to
live with the state. They should learn to work with the state . For those who do not already
know this, Jaquettes article is required reading.
Western Feminism
Western feminism is limited in its applicabilityit was
instrumental in exporting global capitalism and imperialism to
places like China
Shih 06
Shu-Mei Shih (an interdisciplinary scholar situated in the intersection
between ethnic studies, area studies, and comparative literature.) , Complicities of
Western Feminism, 2006, The Feminist Press at the City University of New York,
Women's Studies Quarterly Vol. 34, No. 1/2, The Global & the Intimate (Spring -
Summer, 2006), pp. 79-81