****************************

*
# *
* CH IP TBS II *
* *

$
* THE OBJECT (KJBMilO *
* *
# *

* *
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 Mo
(d

THE OBJECT (K ARM 1 W.1

DEFINITION OFKABMJK : K arm an as a most derived item:

In Sanskrit grammar the word K arm an has been used in two
1
senses - technical and non-technical. In its non-technical sense
2
it denotes an action while as a technical term it is defined by
3
Panini by the rule 'Karturlp sitatamafo Karma', i.e., What is sought
to be reached as the most desirable thing by the agent through his
action, that, being a Karaka, receives the designation Karman. Fbr
Instance, 'Oda na' in the expression 'Devadattah psyasa odanam
bhunkte' (Devadatta eats rice-gruel along with milk). Here, the
'odana' is the most desired item to Devadatta through his action of
eating.
To understand the Panini's definition of Karman properly
it is inevitable to consider the implications of every word used in
the definition. Patdnjali, Vamana and Jayaditya, Bhattoji Dlksita,
etc. while commenting on the rule have done so with the view to
make the definition clear.
' Mi*|fcout Kartuh the sutra designating Karman would remain

'Ipsitatamam karma, i.e., the most desired object sought to be

reached is Karman. The action is understood here, because the rule
prescribing the designation Karman is read in the jurisdiction of
5
Kgraka which is invariably connected with action. !ttius the most

1. Mbha., 1.1.22, P.258.

2. P.1.3.14.
3. P.1.4.49.
4. KV, 1.4.49, P.46Si 5
i \ 4 >.

T *

SK, 535, P.586! 3 40*

T'iI
wi :i Cl' i C-
<c'v
r:TT^rV.:f
v ; fi
S I i
$

5. BM, 632, P.686.

desired object sought to be reached by the action is K arm an. Being
so, in the absence of the specification of 'Kartuh' the gram-field
would incorrectly be designated as Karman in the expression 'mases-
/
vasvam badhnati' (He ties his horse in the gram-field), because it
is desired to be reached by the action of horse and, consequently,
/
such undesirable usage as ' mas an asvam badhnati' would take place.
To avoid such wrong usages the specification of the action to the
desired effect is necessary and Pinlni has done it by placing the
word Kartuh as a qualifying factor of the action. Now the designa
tion Karman is only possible in connection with that object which
is the most desired to be reached by agent through his action. As
the graim-field in the above expression is not desired by the agent
through his action, but by the Karman, there is no scope to desig-
nate gram-field as agent.6
Here one may contend that even now there is no scope for
designating gram-field as Karman, because it is desired by the
agent of the action of eating, i.e., horse. But this contention
is not justified. Only that object *hich is sought to be reached
by the agent of expressed action is to be known as Karman. Because
the action known here due to the jurisdiction of Karaka is to be
understood only that tfiich is expressed by the root in the sentence.
And by its qualifying word Kartuh the agent must he that of this
expressed verb. As the horse in the said sentence is not agent
of the expressed action of tying there is no question of designat-
7
ing the gram-field as Karman.

/1
6. Cf. Nyasa, 1.4.49,565, p PM, 1.4.49, P.564; LSS,I*rttrya, P.638,
BM, 535, P.590.etc.
7. Cf.lis, VI jay a, Dvitryl, P.639.
 The word Ipsita is known to be of two kinds* one is con
ventional (rudha) which means intended (abhipreta) while the other
is Kriya sabda (Yaugika), that is, derived from the root. In the
latter sense it is derived from the root *aplr' (to attain or to
pervade) in desiderative form with the suffix 'Kt*' in the present
v 8
(3.2.188) and thus it means 'sought to be reached'. The word Ipsita
in the rule designating Karman is used in its derivational sense.
The conventional meaning would have no relevance with the genitive
case-ending in 'Kartuh'. In the sutra the genitive case-ending in
the word 'Kartuh' is construed with this word 'Ipsita'. This geni
tive case-ending is suggestive of being derivational of the word
Ipsita because the genitive case here is in accordance with the
9
sutra 2.3.67 which requires the 'Kta' in present tense. The suffix
'kta' in present in the word Ypsita is available on the strength of
9a ID
P.3.2.188 inhere the word 'mati' is used in the sense of desire.
10a 11 _ 12,
The fact is expressively said by Jinendrabuddhi, Haradatta, Nagesa,
etc. However, in the derivational sense the suffix 'Kjrfta' in Tpsita
does not carry the sense of present with it. In other words, the
sense of present is not intended here. If it were intended the
designation Karman would not have been applicable in connection with
................................................................-.......
8. PM, 1.4.49,P.564$ Prau.M. DvTtlya, P.621; LSS, DvLtlya, P.632.
9. P.2.3.67: fi C.<j> lwj

9a. P.3.2.188: H* ii c\W\

* t , I t ^ I 3 i i v I

//
30. KV.3.2.188, =tfci; = I Cf.PraU.M, Dvitlya, P.621,LSS, Dvitlya,
P.631, SK, 3.2.388, P.476,etc.
30a. Nyasa, 1.4.49, P.664.
11. PM, 1.4.49, P.564.
n
12. LSS, Dvi try a, P.629.
 p*"*

tt)

past and future tense and, consequently, such desired usages as

'Katam Krtavan', 'Katam Karisyati', etc. which do not have sense
of present would have been ungrammatical. As these usages are
considered accurate according to P.1.4.49, we are forced to con
clude that the suffix 'Kta' in 'Tpsita is not used by Pihini as
_ #

33
carrying the sense of tense with it.
The designation Karman has scope for its application in
such cases as ' gram an gacchati' even though the suffix tamap would
not have been added to 'Ipsita', because what is most desired is
14
also desired one* Therefore, one may feel justify to contend
that there is no need to add the suffix tamap to 'Ipsita' in
P.1.4.49. But Patanjali has pointed out the drawback which inevita
bly to creep in if the suffix 'tamap' is not used. In that case,
says Patanjali, there would be a good scope to designate boy as
apadaha in the expression ' agnermanavakam VSrayati* according to
P.1.4.27, because the designation apidana fcy P. 1.4.27 has been
prescribed specially with reference to the use of the roots having
meaning 'to keep away'. As such a root is used in the sentence
(agn erman avakam Varayati) the boy would be justifiably placed in
the apadana Karaka. Accordingly we would have a wrong expression
' agnermshavakat varayati' to convey the sense 'he keeps the boy
IS
away from the fire'. To restrict this inaccuracy one cannot
resort to the principle of 'paratva', because in that case the

tt o
13. Prau.M., Dvltlya, P.622, LSS, Dvitfya, P.634, BSS,Dvitiya,
P.801, etc.
14. Pradlpa, 1.4.49, P.260.
*
% ;* * V*> * -Ht** ,,, r T

15. Mbha7 1*4.49, P.260*.'' rc iict 'PT V V i

v-'- > I I j I

mci ? i c T j
desigi&tion Karman being para' and fire being 'Tpsita' the fir
too would be designated as Karman. Aid thus we shall have again
a wrong expression ' agnimmanavakam varayati' to say that he keeps
away the boy from fire. Therefore, for the accurate demarcation
of the designations Karman and apadaha the use of the suffix 'tamap'
from the word 'Tpsita' is inevitably required. In case of the use
of suffix 'tamap' there is no scope to designate boy in the above
instance as apadana, because he is the most desired and not merely
desired item. Thus the expressive use of 'tamap' from the word
17
'Tpsita' in P. 1.4.49 is necessarily required.
KasikSkara, Bhattoji Biksita, etc. have explained the
#

importance of tamap with the help of 'payasa odanam bhunkte' (He

18
eats rice along with milk). They contend that in case the suffix
'tamap' is not added to 'Tpsita' in P.1.4.49, the designation Karman
would incorrectly be applicable to milk also in the abovesaid ex
pression because the milk is also desired to eat. Now when the
suffix tamap is used there is no scope for the application of the
designation Karm^i to milk, because it is not the most desired item
to be reached by the agent through his action of eating. Milk hot in
the above expression, of course, is not the most desired item as
is evident from the Patanajall's explanation which is as follows:
Suppose somebocfy invites another to have rice but the invited person
replies that he has taken plenty of it. Then the inviting person

36. Mtha, 1.4.49, P.260: Hf^TfcT | cTff

I
17. Ibid. 1.4.49, P.260, Cf.PradTpa, 1.4.49, P.
18. KV, 1.4.49, P.565, SK,535, P.590, etc.
again says that he will get milk also. The invited person says
that with milk he will take certainly. Rcom this one may have
impression that milk is the most desired item because it is milk
that prompts him to take rice. But Patanjali contends that here
too rice having the extra-quality of milk is the most desired thing
and not the milk itself. To confirm the fact Patanjali asserts
that vhen somebody says that he wants to have rice if it is soft
and non-sticky, it cannot be said that here the qualities softness
aid non-stickiness are the most desired. It is rice having these
qualities Tfhich is desired. Similarly in the above instance only
rice having extra quality of milk is the most desired and not the
19
milk itself. Milk is only desired. Thus to preclude the designa
tion K arm an in connection with the milk in the said expression the
suffix tsmap is invariably required.
If the suffix tamap is used one may doubt about the vali
dity of the designation Karman in such expression as 'odanam pacati',
because the rice has no homogeneous competitives in relation to
which it is considered the most desired. To Justify the designation
Karmsn here, Haradatta asserts that here, too, rice is the most
desired item. He argues that an agent performs an action in order
to obtain his desired fruit and thus the action itself also turns
to be desired thing. Thus in comparison to the action which itself
is a desired item the fruit becomes the most desired. To satisfy
the condition of homogeneous competitive he asserts that action is
t _ 20
also K arm an in reference to its own parts like sandarsana, prarthana,
19. MbhI. 1.4.49, P.261, PradTpa, 1.4.49, P.261.
20. PM, 1.4.49, PP.565-66.
etc. Now, as the word 'Ipsita' is derived from the desiderative

root Tpsa' from >v/ap4r, it involves the sense of desire which is

possible only in case of animate ones. Being so, the designation

Karman would not be applicable to the objects which are sought to

be reached by inanimate agents. Pbr instance, the bank in the ex

pression 'nadT kulaA karsati' would not have the designation Karman

as it is sought to be reached by Nadi* which being inanimate has

no desire. To overcome the difficulty Jinendrabuddhi asserts that

the idea of inanimate comes into mind after the connection of 'nadl'

idth Kulam Karsati'. Before this the designation Karman of bank

takes place and it is not averted by the later connection. To con

firm the validity of his solution, he asserts that it is this solu

tion by dint of which the Karma saihjna is also possible where there

is no question of performing an action but only the desire exists to

perform an action such as in the expression

.
' grSmam gantumicchSni.'
21

The word karman in P.1.4.49 could he had from P.1.4.46 by

way of anuvrtti and, consequently, there is no need of using the

word Karma in the sutra. But P3hini has used the word Karman here.

Uiis is done because the word KarmaP sought to he had by way of

anuvrtti is associated with adhlra. If that is sought to he had

its associates adhara would also creep in. In that case the desig

nation Karman would be applicable only in such cases as 'Geham

pravisati' wherein the item 'gSha' being designated as Karman ful

fils the condition of being adhikarana as well. It would not be

applicable to such desired usages as o dan am pacati', 'Saktun pivati',

etc. ffctere the things sought to be designated do not serve as

adhikarana. To avoid such an undesirable situation Plnini has

*

expressively used the word Karman in P. 1.4.49. Now, with the

21. Nyasa, 1.4.49, PP.S66-67.

reading of the word Karman, the anuvrttl of udhara in P.1.4.49 is
22
prevented. The result is that all objects whether serving as
adhikarana or not but which are sought to be reached by the agent
through his action CLKffcapable to have the designation Karman. In
other schools of grammar the Karman is defined in the sane manner.
Chandragomin in his Cajidravyakarana asserts that second case-ending
takes place from the item which is sought to be attained by the
action. This evidently shows that according to Chandragomin what
22a
is desired to be attained by the action is Karman. Similarly,
22b
JSbhyansndl in his Mahavrtti, a commentary on Jainendra Vy&karana
22c
so d Hemehandra
Karman is the same way as Panini has done in his 1.4.49.

SuppIementing definitlons: Thus according to P.1.4.49 the thing

which is most desired to be reached by the agent through his action
is called Karman. On account of this definition, the designation
Karman would not be applied to things which are not desired such
as poison, th elves, etc. in the sentences ' vi sam bhunkte', ' cor an
pasyati*, etc. Here the poison, theives etc. are not the desired
things. Td cover cases like these Pajini in his metarule ' tatha-
yuktam c Snip si tarn' enunciates that the item ihich is not desired
by the agent but connects with the action in the same way as the
23
most desired item is also Karman. Thus there is no difficulty to
j JL* ) * t www ^ a

EM,,535, P.591.
22a. CV 2.1.43
22b. JV, Mahavrtti, 1.2.45s m HSTfcT l
22c. HSA, 2.2.3, !
23. P.1.4.50: cPT m 1
KV, 1.4.50, P * ft^rcRw ff&r cm
zRfrft^tcf flcf *P?fcT ci^q |
designate poison, theives, etc. as Karman in the above sentences,
because they too are the substratum of the result of the actions

performed by their respective agents in the sane way as the most

desired Karmans.

Even after having introduced two definitions of Karman

there are several instances that are not covered by them such as

'gam dogdhi p ayah ' (He milks milk from cow), 'manavakam p an than am

prcchati' (he inquires the road from the boy), etc. *50 cover these

cases Piitiini has supplemented these two definitions by another

through his aphorism 'akathitam ca'i.e., that Karaka vhich is not

spoken of as coming under any of the special relations of ablation,

recipient, etc. is also called Karman or a Karaka should be called

Karman when it is not intended to be expressed by means of the

24
special designations like apadana, samp rad an a, etc. Thus in the

example 'gam dogdhi pay ah' when the cow, though apSdan a in reference

to the separation of milk, is not intended to be expressed as apa

dana, it, being a Karaka, is called Karman.

In connection with the reading of P.1.4.51 one may have

impression that now when the sutra 1.4.51 is formulated in such a

way there is no need to prescribe P.1.4.49 and 1.4.50 to justify

the designation Karman in such cases as 'Katan Karoti', 'visam

bhunkte', etc. because these being ' akathita* will get the desigia-
25
tion Karman according to P.1.4.51. But it is only possible when

24. P. 1.4.51s ^ I
KV, 1.4.51, P.569: Wtfm q cpMsPf! | ?
^'qT^THTf^fwCa^TTH: ^
SK, 539, P.596: WcT I
25. Mbha, 1.4.51, P.272s ^cR mf fS3T |
f4 TqTg; ?%*?iTqT: |
 81
P.1.4.51 would not be t confined to the list of verbs duh, yac, etc.
enumerated by Patanjali, Kaslkakara, Bhattoji Diksita, etc. However,
the refutation of the list would not be reasonable because in that
case the designation Karman would incorrectly be applied even to
'naj:a' in the expression 'natasya srnoti' and thus the rule would
result in the overapplication of the designation Karman. To avoid
26
this overapplication the list must not be dispensed with. Thus
when the rule P.1.4.51 is confined only to the verbs enumerated by
the commentators the reading of P.1.4.49 and 50 becomes necessary
along with P.1.4.51. Patanjali has proved the necessity of P. 1.4.49
and 50 in another way. He asserts that these two sutras are not
redundant, because the sutra P. 1.4.4 is necessary to prescribe the
designation Karman to boy in the expression 'agnermihavakam varayati'.
If P.1.4.49 is not formulated the designation apadana would
incorrectly be applied to boy by P.1.4.27, because it is also an
27
Ipsita object. Thus to remove this over application P. 1.4.4 is
inevitably required. In case the reading of P.l.4.49, the prescrip
tion of P.1.4.50 is required to specify the designation Karman in
such cases as 1 visam bhunkte which do not come within the range
of P.l.4.49, In this way it is evident that to specify the domain
of the designation Karman accurately the reading of P.1.4.49,50 and
51 is invariably required.

26. Pradlpa,
* 1.4. 51, P * 570
27. Mbha, 1.4.51, P.272: qg <5 tflpzr I

Cf.Pradfpaj 1.4.51, P.272. PradTpoddyota, 1.4.51, P.272,

BM, 539, P.598.
 Even now there are several Instances which are not covered
by the definition of K arm an introduced in three ways above, fbr
instance, 1 gamayati manavakam grama, bodhayati manavakam dharmam',
etc. lb cover these cases Paninl has supplemented these three
definitions by another through his aphorism 1.4.52. In this rule
he asserts that of the verbs having the sense of motion, knowledge
or information, eating* and of the verbs that have some literary
work for their object and of intransitive verbs that which was the
agent of the verb in its previous (non-causal), is called the object
28
in its causative stage. Similarly, Panini defines the designation
29 30 31
Karman in the sphere of SampradSna adhikarana and Karana
K arm an as a substratum of result of action: Haradatta's view: Wiile
summing up these all definitions of Karman, Haradatta has pointed
out a definition of Karman which might have been prevailing before
him among some school of learning. Iccording to this definition
32
what is connected with the fruit of the action is Karman. But this
definition is not up to the mark. Haradatta himself refutes this
definition by saying that in this sense agent would incorrectly be
33
designated as Karman, because he is aLso connected with the fruit.
To make the point of Haradatta clear we may take the example ' grin am
gacchati Devadattah'. Here the fruit of the action is the conjunc
tion with village. The village is Karman because it is substratum

28. P.1.4.52: Sf nit |

29. P.1.4.38: ^ |
30. P.1.4.46-48: 3*4 | | |
31. P.1.4.43: ^ .
32. PM, 1.4.50, P.569: f^nTcfiTRTf*T 3*4 I
33. Ibid: crff 3*4^
cT3Tfq HT^TcT |
N
 83

of iSiis fruit. Here the fallacy of this definition is apparent.

Like the village the agent, Devadatta, is also the substratum of
this conjunction and thus he should be designated as K arm an. This
is, of course? not desired. To avert this shortcoming someone
suggests to include the word parasamaveta (inhering in another)
as the adjective of action in the above stated definition. Uius
Karman is that accessory which is connected with the fruit of an
34
action residing in another. Th(*s definition of Karman, according
to Haradatta, cannot be claimed as quite correct. In this sense
the designation Karman -would not be appropriate in such desired
usages as 1 atm a jfiatavya', etc., because here the action of knowing
35
inheres in the same atma who is itself object.

View of Bhattoji DTksita: Bhattoji HLksita while presenting this

definition has pointed out that this definition is made with the
36
view to make the P. 1.4.49-50 redundant. Disagreeing with this view
Bhattoji DTksita has established the necessity of P.1.4.49 and
consequently of P. 1.4.50-51 and has thus rejected the said defini
tion of Karman. To prove the necessity of these sutras, he asserts
that in case the P.1.4.49 is not read the designation apadana would
have scope to apply incorrectly to boy in the expression * agner-
manavakafo varayati' on account of the special prescription of
P.1.4.27. To avoid this anomaly P.1.4.49 is invariably required.
In case of the reading of P.1.4.49, one has to accept the reading
of P.1.4.50 in order to comprehend the object hood of odious and
4N ^ ** 0 0 0 0 0 0 ** 0 *** 0 0 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0: ** 0 0 0 **** 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 *** 0 0 0 **** 0 **Br 0

34. PM, 1.4.50, P.569*. (*FH) |

35. Ibid: ITcfsq H WcT, TRR 5^TSlTfHHclT^T:
fzfTcT |
36. Prau.M. Dvitfya, P.644: '
 37
^different K arm an. Anyhow, Ehattoji
it QTksita
t farther asserts that
the reading of 'anlpsita' in P.1.4.50 is meant only for clear pres-
38
cription of the designation Karman and not invariably required.

Kauqdabhatta* s view: Elaborating this concept further Kaundabhatta

in his Vaiyakaranabhusana
* * Sara has understood P.1.4.4 in the sense
39
of substratum of the result generated by the action! He further
claims that through this very rule designation of Karman is compe
tent to cover all the sphere of Karman, the prescription of P.1.4.50
51, etc. is meant for the sake of vividness. He holds that the
term 'Ipsita' and 'anlpsita' have their value so far as definitions
/ 40
are concerned and have no affect on the verbal cognition .(HfljjiuU^dha^.

Naiy%ikas on Karman? ohe old logicians regarding the Karman have

41
held the same view as Kaundabhatta
00 has put forth. But this defini-
6*.
tion cannot^considered a correct one. According to this definition
Caitra would have chance to be designated as Karman in the sentence
'Cai train gran am gacchati', because the Caitra, the subject, is the

37. PraM.M, Dvitya,P.645:

| ^ ^ dqt *. cPTTf^cH Jf&mT

| TB,538, P.589, EM, 538, P.589.

38. Ibid. P.646: ^1*^ H cTOW |

39. TBS, Subartlia, P.170: ^ 1 I
ff#3TT I
40. Ibid: mV gsRT fldH |
$Nrprr*ta , h % ^rr^tet
cT^RI |
41. UK, P.209: ^ WfWT*. I
substratum of the result 'conjunction' along with the village to
which he goes. The reason is that conjunction is a property which
42
resides in both the related. To avoid these undesirable consequences
Gafrgesa in his Tattvaeintamani has inserted the 'Parasamaveta' (in
hering in another) as the adjunct of action in the old logicians'
definition of Karman. Thus according to him, the substratum of the
result of the action inhering in another, i.e.*, different from the
43
thing to be designated as Karmen, is Karman. In this sense there
is no question to designate Caitra as Karmah in the said case,
because Caitra himself is the substratum of the result of the action
which inheres in him. But even now the definition is not free from
defects. According to this definition the desired usage like ' AtmsT
jnatavya' would not be deemed to be correct# ones, because the sub-
44
stratum of the action is not different from Karman. *

Nagesa has rejected this definition of Karman by contend

ing that following the definition 'Prayaga' and Yrksawould in-
0 0

correctly be designated as Karman respectively in the sentences

'Prayagat Caitra gacchati' and ' Vrksat patram patati', because they
are also the substratum of separation which is the result of their
45
respective actions inhering in another.
To avoid these drawbacks, new logicians define Karman as
'the substratum of the result which is the determinant of the mean-
46
ing of the verbal root. Pbllowing this definition, there is no
42I *PLM*,~K5raka* P. 176: *| *
43. Tattvacintamaqi, Vide NK, Karman, P.207: qxwCcI |
44. See footnote No. 35.
45. PLM, Karaka, P. l76sTTfq cTcT |
TTc[ i
46. Vyu.Va, Dvitfya, P. 215: |
question of designating 'Prayaga' and 'Vrksa'
4
in the abovesaid
cases as K arm an, because they are not the substratum of the result
of the meaning of their respective actions. The meaning of the
root 'gam1 is the conjunction of that place which is not yet
covered and not the separation from the place which is already
reached. Though this definition is free from the abovesaid defect,
it cannot claim to be a correct one. According to this definition,
'KasI', Prayaga aid 'grama' respectively in the sentences
ft / * w
'Kasim gacchn path! mrtah', 'Kasfm gacchati na prayagam' and
' gran am na gacchati' would not be designated as Karmen, because
they are not the substratum of the result of their respective
n
ac tion s.
Nagesa* s view? Trying to set aside all these shortcomings Nagesa
has defined the designation Karman as 'the item produced - directly
or indirectly, by the activity of XEX the expressed action and
48
intended as the substratum of the result as well. According to
this definition of Karman the designation Karman of the milk in
the sentence 'gaft dogdhi pay ah' is also reasonable. Here due to
the insertion of the term 'Prayojya' not only the directly connec
ted objects but the indirectly connected objects are also covered
by the designation. This is not possible according to the defi
nition of Karman put forth by Kaundathatta *hich had the word
'janya' instead of 'prayojya'. Due to the word 'janya', it could
cover only the directly connected object and not the indirectly
49
related ones.

47. PLM, Karakarthavicara, P.177-78.

48. Ibid, P. 171: sptcef

49. Ibid. P. 178.

 /
How, in this definition of Hagesa, there is no chance
of over application of the designation Karmen to 'Prayaga' in such
expression as 'Prayagat Kasfmgacehati'. Doe to the word Prakrta-
dhatu (expressed verb) in the definition only that object which
is the substratum of the result denoted by 'gam' is capable Of
being designated as Karman. The verb 'gam* denotes the sense of
connection with that place \hich is not yet reached and not the
separation from the place which is already reached. Thus it is
/
KasI and not Prayaga in the above example which is capable of
being designated as Karman, as it is only Kasf that is the substrat-
tum of the activity denoted by 'gam' aid not Prayaga. Had the
'prakrtadhatu' been not mentioned in the definition Prayaga would
also have been designated as Karman, because it is also the sub-
50
stratum of the separation.
Nagesa has put forth the word 'Uddesya' in the defini
tion of Karman in order to Justify such usages as Kasim gacchah
Pathi mrtah'. Had the word uddesya not been used in the defini-
_ f
tion Kasr could not have been designated as Karman, as it does not
fora the substratum of the result conveyed by the expressed root
(
'gam'. But due to the prescription of 'Uddesya' this difficulty
cannot come into the way of designating Ka^f as Karmah, because
it is intended as the substratum of the result denoted by the
51
expressed verb
Panini's way of defining Karman Justified: However, due to the
word Uddesya the designation Karman of 'Visa' (poison) and

50. PLM, Karakarthavicira, P.173.

51. Ibid.
'trna' (straw) respectively in the sentences 1 Jtansfc bhaksayan
visam bhurikte* and 'granafc gacchan trnaid sprsati* is not possible,
because they are, of course, not intended by their agents through
their actions. Therefore to justify the designation Karman in the$B
cases, Nagesa following P. 1.4.50 (tatha yuktam cSnipsitam) defines
Karman further as 'the item produced by the activity of the ex
pressed action and the substratum of the result as well, th/ough
52
not wished by the agent, is designated as Karman. He further
asserts that this definition is invariably required for the com-
53
prehension of odious and indifferent kinds of Karman.
Nggesa further proves the necessity of the reading of
P.1.4.51. He holds that regarding the meaning of the roots like
' duh', 'yac', etc. enumerated under P. 1.4.51 by the commentators
there are two views. One maintains that these roots denote two
53a
meanings while the other view is that they express only one meaning.
In the former case the designation Karman of cow in such expression
as ' gaifi dogdhi pay ah' is possible according to P. 1.4.49. But in
the latter case it is only milk that deserves the designation Karman
according to P.1.4.49 while cow being the starting-point in referen
ce to milk is liable to be designated as apldSha. But if speaker
does not want to express cow as apadana, it being sesa can claim
only sixth case-ending according to P.2.3.50. Thus to restrict
52. PLM, KarakarthavicJra, P.175:

53. Ibid s *

53a. Both the views are discussed in detail on thejpages U* ^

It is seen that to look upon the roots duh, yac, etc. as imp
lied the sense of causative, i.e., the view of two meanings,
is not tenable. But these roots denote one action having two
objects. Therefore, to justify two Karmans in connection with
these verbs P.1.4.51 is invariably required.
sixth ease-ending and to express cow as Kalman P. 1.4.51 is invariably
54
required. Thus Nages'a directly counters the assertion of Kaunda-
bhatta in which he asserts that the designation Karman is possible
everywhere in its desired sphere on the authority of F. 1.4.49 and
the other sutras designating Karmen are meant for the sake of vivid
ness.
In this way, we see that the endeavour of grammarians like
Kaundabhatta and Naiysyikas to define the designation Karman through
one definition has not succeeded. Keeping in view the vast domain
of the designation Karman the only way to cover all the sphere of
Karman is to define it variously as Panini has already wisely done
gnd shotfi by N ages a.

REFLEXIVE AGENT (K jBMA-KiRTJO : It has been pointed out that the

substance is the conglomeration of powers which are the real per
formers of action. The substance becomes sSdhana through these
powers and gets the name according to the nature of power that is
called upon to help in the accomplishment of an action at a time
55
and in a particular situation. It has been also said that each
accessory is agent as !fer as its own action is concerned. But as
soon as the activity of the agent of the expressed action is being
emphasized they, the agents of their respective actions, become
Karman, Karana, etc. according to the nature of their services
rendered by them towards the accompli shment of action expressed

54. PLM, Karakarthavicara, P.176.: SzTTqTTS^c^- ^ '

fci | ^^rrqTTqtq^cqq^r ^ -sgrzmHim i

55. Supra, fP. 7 2

<& "
 56
by the verb in the sentence. Explaining this fact Bhartrhari says
that after having enjoyed independence at first in regards to
actions like coming into being they become the object is in regard
Si
to the actions of other agents. Helaraja confirms the subordina
tion of the accessories other than Karta in the presence of agent
by saying that just as servant in the presence of his master is
subordinate in the same way the accessories like K arm an, Kanna, etc
. 58
are subordinate in the presence of the agent. Being subordinate
they get the name K arm an, Karana, etc. according to the nature of
their services rendered towards the performance of action. Ibr
instance, when an agent wishes to reach something through his action
the thing being reached becomes Karman for that time, though it is
independent in regard to its own action. >SL1 this follows the in
tention of speaker, because speaker is free to emphasize a parti
cular aspect of a given Karaka.
Thus what was agent before becomes Karman, Karana etc.
according to speaker's intention. But sometimes what is normally
an object is intended by speaker as Karta. Pointing out the situa
tion Bhartrhari says that when the activity of the main agent is
It

not meant to be expressed, then the object attains the status of

/_
agent in regard to its own activity and the sastra prescribes that
the word expressive of it (that is, the verb) should possess the

56. Supra, P.ClUtesT

57. VP, 3.7.54, P.272: FTcP^cTR |
a^dRTtrTT W^TTI SWcT cTcff | |

58. Hel. PP, 3.7.54, P.272: TcSTT

the marks which it would have if it expressed the object. To make
it clear, Helaraja says that when the activity of the main agent
is not desired to be expressed such as in the sentence 'bhidyate
kusCELafa svayameva', 'luyate kedarah*, 'pacyate odanah', etc. in
order to emphasise the rickety nature of granary, to show the
extreme driness of field, to explain the extreme facility of rice
in cooking the granary, the field, the rice, etc. which would have
been object? first become agents. Thus in order to ignore the
activity of real agent when object gets the status of agent it is
called by the name Karma-Karta. Even now all the operations which
60
are applicable to Kara an are applied to it. Helaraja further
asserts that though the Karan a and adhikarana get the Kartr suffix
% *

when the activity of the main agent is not intended to be expressed

yet they are not regarded as Karma-kartl, The position of Karma-
Karta is possible only when the activity of agent is ignored in
61
order to emphasize the activity of the object denoting Karmen. The
fact gains strength with the expressive use of Karmana' by Pagini
62
in his 3.1.87 which points out the environments of a Karma-kart a.
PataEjali while explaining the purpose of the use of the word
Karmana'
# in P.3.1.87 has first shown that there is no need of the
reading of it in the sutra, because it is understood here without
its expressive use. The reason for this is that the action denoted

59. VP, 3.7.55, P.272: cl^qT^TTf^iifq

W r ^
|
*

60. Hel.PP, 3.7.55, P.272.

61. Ibid, 3.7.56, 274.
62. P.3.1.87: fTOWFT |
by root inheres only either in Kart a or Karmen. As the Karma-Karts'
is not possible in connection with the actions inhering in the
agent, it is only those verbs which expressive of actions residing
63
in Karmen would be understood here. Nevertheless, Pagini has used
the word'Karmana^in P.3.1.87, to teach us that Karma-vad-bhava is
possible when the activity of agent is ignored in order to empha
size the activity of K arm an only. This is why the agent sword in
the expression 1 Sadhvasichinatti' (the sword cuts well) does not
64
receive the operations of Karma-Kart a on account of P.3.1.87, Ihe
sane purpose of the word Karman a', in P.3.1.87 has been put forth
/ 65 66*
by Kasikakara, Bhattoji QTksita, etc.
Thougjb the Karman in these Situations becomes a Karta,
yet it receives the suffixes that are meant for a Karman. These
are yak, Stmanep ada, cin aid cinvadbhava. It is so because Pan ini
says that the la' denoting the agent, when the action effects the
agent is similar to the action which effects the object, is treat-
. , 67
ed as if it wrere la denoting the object.
68
The word 'Kvacit^L' in the Ksriki of Bhartrhari expli
citly expresses that Karma-Kart a is not possible in connection
with every kinds of action. To specify its domain, Helaraja says
that it is possible only in reference to the verbs which are either

63. PradTpa, 3.1.87, P.116: ff*TT fcjWTt^ SF&cfT m

W'femT =r sr^cfrfcr TfVTss i
64. Mtha, 3.1.87, P.116*. ^tTf W W. %
65. I^V, 3.1.87, 473. ^ 1
66. SK; 3.1.87, P.393.
67. P.3.1.87s \
68. VP, 3.7.55, P.272.
 69 ^ 70
Karmasthabhavaka or Karinastha^Kriya. !Uius its application is not
reasonable in connection with the verbs which are Kartrsthakriya or
_ 71
Kartr^sthabhavaka. Katyliyana has already asserted that an addition

69. Pahini does not differentiate between 'bhava' and 'Kriya'. He

has used the term bhava' in the sense of Kriya' in his 2.3.37
(Yasya ca tfcavena bhavalaksanam) as is evident from Kasika
(bhava=&riya). But the later Grammarians like Helaraja, Kaiyata,
etc. have distinguished these two terms. They contend that when
the action denoted by verbal stem requires for its accomplishment
the means having physical movement, it is known by 'Kriya'
(Sapari spandasadhanasadhya Kriya, Hel.PP.3.7.66,Pradrpa, 3.1.87,
P.388), but then it requires for its accomplishment the means
having not the physical movement, it is called by the name
'bhava' (sparispandasadhanasadhyo dhatvartho bhavah, Hel.PP,
3.7.66, PradTpa, 3.1.87, P.188). The effect of the action is
seen either on agent or object. Bbr instance, the effect of
the action of cooking is seen on the object such as in the exam
ple 'odanam pacati'; while the effect of the action of seeing
is not seen an the object but it affects only agent. Therefore
when the effect of the action denoted by verbal root is seen
on the object and it requires jni for its accomplishment the
means having not physical movement it is 'Karmasthabhavaka'.
70. When the action expressed by verbal form affects the object and
requires for its accompli shment the means having physical move
ment it is known as 'Karmasthakriya'.
71. Hel.PP, 3.7.55*. rfcT j cpjft-qHTTHT ^ ^T^TT*
fqprzr: i
 0,
1
should be made to ascertain the domain of Karma-Ka#rta. He says
that it is possible with the verbs which are either Karmasthabha-
j72 ^
vaka or Karmasthakriya. Patanjali has refuted this addition by
observing that this point is already implied in P.3.1.87. He con
tends that P an ini has used the word 'Kami an a" in 3.1.87 in the
sense of Karmasthakriya. The reason is that Panini has used the
third case-ending in Karmana -which shows the similarity with the
action of Kart a. As the Kaman has no relevance here it meta-
73
phorically denotes the action residing in K arm an. Thus according
to Panini Karma-Kart a is possible only in connection with the roots
having the nature of Karmasthakriya or Karmasthabhavaka. The Tact
t 74

is expressively accepted by the later grammarians like Kasikakara,

75 76 77
Jinendrabuddhi, Haradatta, Bhattoji BEksita, etc.
In the above discussion it is said that K arm an becomes
Karta when the activity of the real agent is being ignored or is
not intended to be expressed. In connection with this sense one
may doubt about the position of Karma Karta. An item is designated
as Karmen when the activity of the main agent is being emphasized.
When the activity of main agent is ignored the object playing the
role of Karman, Ka^ha, etc. remain no longer Karmen, Karan a, etc.

They are so only In relation to the activity of main agent. Now

when this activity of the main agent is ignored they become agent
in reference to their own activity which also is the expressed
# # # # r * 0

72. Mbha, 3.1.87, P.118: cFTT qpfcqHTOHT ^ \

73. Ibid, 118- 139IB: z? | H sj ^clFWT^iTHT

74. O, 3.1.87, P.474.

75. Nyasa, 3.1.87, P.474.
76. PM, 3.1.87, P.474,
77. 3K, 3.1.87, P,~'*'
mealing of the root. To justify the n ame Karma-Kart a, Bhartrhari
says that when the object is free from any prompting it is connected
with its own action, l&ien it is no longer the object, it becomes
78
agent in regard to its own action. To make the fact clear HelS-
raja says that in the expression 'pacyate x o dan ah svayameva' the
verbal suffix denotes the activity of the agent of the activity of
softening now expressed by the root and performed by the new agent,
namely, rice, which was Karman before and not the agent of the main
activity, that is, cooking. Thus the item which was Karman in
reference to the activity of the main agent becomes independent in
reference to its own activity. Now the activity of the main agent
is not being emphasized or is ignored in order to show the extreme
facility of the rice in the action of softening. Thus the object
that was Karman in relation to the activity of main agent is now
.79
agent and so it is called Kanna-Rarta. Thus for a Karma-Kart a
there are two obligatory conditions, namely, the activity of the
main agent is ignored or is not intended to be emphasized and the
80
object should be independent in regard to its own action. The
notion that new agent is independent in regard to its own action
becomes pertinent with the observation of KStjrayana who asserts
81
that in case of Karma-kart a the independence of the agent is intended.
The independence of agent is viewed in reference to its own action,
such as $in the expression 'Pacyate odana^ svayameva' rice is

78. VP, 3.7.56, P.272: f

79. Hel.PP ,3.7.56, P.272 C

so. ibid: h ^ ^r^mrrt w-

cpffi f^rrrzrTHfq |
81. Mtha, 3.1.87, P.139: ' f^t^TcTrqT^ |
independent in regard to its own action of becoming soft. Patanjali
has tried to establish that the existing independence is intended
to be expressed. He contends that though all the possible causes
of breaking of a thing like air, water and long life of a thing
do not take place, yet the action of breaking of a thing happens
82
in such cases as ' bhidyate Kusulah*.*
This evidently shows that
granary itself being independent in the action of breaking is agent*
In the above discussion we see that the sane root some
times denotes the activity of main agent such as 'pacati od an am
Devadattah' whereas in some other cases it expresses a different
activity of another object such as in the sentence 'pacyate
odanah svayameva*. In the first we understand the meaning of
cooking while in the second it is known asto beoome soft'. kid
as the word is used to convey the meaning the latter is primary
and the word is subordinate to it. The meaning being different
makes the words conveying the meaning different, .according to this
principle we are to accept these two roots as different from each
83
other. Being so, one may say that as the condition of the same
root for the use of Karma-Karta is not fulfilledj the use of Karma-
Karta is not possible. However, this objection has no root.Because
when the difference of words is accepted on the basis of the
difference of meaning, the sameness of the words on the basis of
the sameness of form is not denied. We are to accept the roots as
same if they have the same form. Thus here the root is one. To

82. Mbha. 3.1.87, P.tiSt 123. ^ ^ fp:

Tmh cfrt ^cif n^fer fgpTcr i
83. Hel. ,PF.3.7.57: | f? ^THT \
^TTTlqT^T ^ ^oT ffcT -ZTTqTcT W. |
confirm this, Ehartrhari says that it has been said that they (the
#

different uses of a root) are as different from one another as the

root pacV and ' sidh'. Though they are different, they are taken to
84
be same on account of the similarity in the sounds. This is why

Paaini has read ' $upacas pike* In his dhatupatha only once.

However, there are some others who opine that the same

word has different meanings, following this view there is no diffi

culty to accept that the same root can denote the different activi

ties, i.e., of main agent as well as of Karma-Karta. Keeping this

fact in view, Bhartrhari says that roots like 'pac' denote a part

or all the activities spontaneously, even vhen their forms remains

85
the same. Commenting on this* Helarlja says that there is no prob

lem in accepting that the same word conveys many meanings on account

of different powers it has. He holds that the power of the Same

word to convey many meanings is seen in the language, for instance,

the word 1 grim a' denotes village, surroundings of village and gather

ing of men in different contexts. In this way it is evident that no

problem stands in the way to accept that the same word expresses
86
the two different senses in two different contexts. following this
fact there is no difficulty in the process of Karma-Karta. Thus

in the usage 'paeyate odanah svayameva' the root pac conveys the

meaning of becoming soft while in the usages 'pacatyodanam Deva-

dattah', the same root conveys the meaning of cooking.
87
Pan ini has prescribed Utmanepada affixes by P.1.3.67 to
explain the usages like 1 Sr oh ay ate hastf svayameva, To justify such
jot
00
00
Oi
00 00


usages jetarx Katyayana has questioned the propriety of the rule on
the ground that the intended usages can be explained as those of
88
KarmaJ^art^. As the root in Karma-Karta takes the atm an ep ad a accord-
89
ing to P.1.3.13. There is no need to formulate the sutra 1.3.67.
Mi at is meant by Katyiyana and Patanjali in this regard is brought
forward by Bhartrhari while discussing Karma-Karta. He observes
that from the pure root 'ruh' both 'causing to bend' and 'bending'
are understood. From the root with the causative affix 'gic' also
both 'causing to bend' and bendingare understood. Mien the object

becomes agent aid the causative affix is also used there is fifth
condition. Mien the root does not express the idea of somebody
causing an action to be done (Presana), the causative affix is used
90
to express the original meaning of the root. Helaraja taking the
main example of P. 1.3.67, i.e., 'arohayate hast! svayameva', asserts
that while analysing the sentence we meet, with different stages. In
the first stage the pure root 'ruh' in the expression 'arohanti
hastlhaa hastipakah' (the elephant-keepers mount the elephant) con
veys the sense of causing to bend as the sentence means that ele
phant-keepers cause to bend the elephant which is bending. In the
next stage Mien speaker does not wish to express the activity of
the elephant-keepers in order to show the docility of elephant in
the action of bending he uses such expression as ' aruhyate hastf
svayameva' (the elephant bends of its own accord). This is the

88. Mbha, 1.3.67, P. 178: | cm

89 P.1.3.13. *rRwrrf: i
90. TP, 3.7.59-60:
^fcmcf 11
to*rr gf i
fHfg^ToTTiTclt: fhTf^tr ||
second stage. Though here elephant bends on its own accord yet
when tiae idea of its continuity comes in the mind of speaker he
again expresses the activity of agent by employing the causative
suffix and said ' arohayanti hastlnam hastipakah' (the elephant-
keepers mount the elephant). In this stage the root ruh 'having'
the suffix njic' conveys the same sense as without the suffix ex
pressed in the first stage. Uiis is the third stage. In the next
stage to show the docility of the elephant in the action of bending
the activity conveyed by the root having the suffix 'nic' is ignored
we find fourth stage. This stage is necessary to get the fifth
stage, i.e., Karma-^arta. In this stage the activity of the ele
phant-keepers, i.e., causing to bend, is dispensed with and the
activity of the elephant, i.e., bending, is being emphasized such
* 91
as conveyed by the sentence ' arohayate hastf svayameva'. These
92 93
five stages have been pointed by Kaiyata, Haradatta, Bhattoji
94 95
Diksita, Nagesa, etc. and to confirm their views they have referred
to Bhartrhari. In this way, here the atmanepada is secured on the
authority of Karma--^arts, there is no need to read P.1.3.67. But
P.1.3.67 is necessary to prevent the use of atamanepada in such
96
cases as 'ganayati' ganah svayameva1.
In the above discussion it is said that the root 'ruh'
having causative suffix conveys the same meaning as it conveys in
its radical form. To confirm this fact Bhartrhari says that the
root XgUMJC ' sidhyati' can not express the meaning of the root 'pac'
without the causative affix. But when it takes the causative affix

91. Hel.PP,3.7.59-60, P.276-77.

92. PradTpa* 1.3.67, P.178.
93. P^M, 1.3.67, P.466.
94. SK, 1.3.67, P.82.
95. Pradipoddyota, 1.3.67, P.179.
96. Hel.PP, 3.7.59-60, P.277: WT^ffcI *ror:
fawferr" un;oTt' i
(IJic) it expresses the original meaning of the root 'pac'. Hela-
raja makes it clear by saying that root 'sidh' conveys the sense
of becoming soft such as in the expression Siddhyatyodantj. The
sense making soft conveyed by root pac' in the sentence 'pacatyo-
danad1 to which the becoming soft is subordinate is expressed by the
root 'sidh* having the suffix 'nic' such as in the sentence sadha-
yatyodanam'. In the sane way the root 'ruh' conveys the same mean
ing as it conveys in its causative sense. Thus the radical root
ruh and the root having causative suffix though different but con
vey the same meaning as the root pac' aid the root sidh having
98
the suffix *jp.ic*

(KINDS OF KA3MM): View of Seven Kinds? Vararuci in his Vara-

99
rucasamgaraha has pointed out the seven kinds of K arm an but he
gives no list of these kinds which he has in his mind. These *
seven kinds of Karman must have been the same as are put forth by
Bhartrhari as is evident from Narayana's Dipaprabha, a commentary
' # 300
on Vararucasamgraha. Bhartrhari speaks of the seven kinds of
Karman, namely, product (Nirvartya) , modification (Vikdrya) ,
destination (pripya), indifferent (udaslna), disliked (anfpsita),
that to which the name of any other Karjka cannot be given
(Saihjnintarairan'&khyatam) and that which had another name before

97. VP, 3.7.61, P.277: JJSTfcT f*RT fVTWl \

S rcpcT*. 9fcT 11

98. Hel.PP.3.7.61, P.277.

99. Vff. Sad. P.5: qtf \
300. Va. Sam. Dipaprabha, PP.5-6.
 301
(angyapurvaka). He has also stated that among these seven kinds
the first three are the result of division of 'that which is most
302
desired to be attained' (Ip si tamtam am). Later on the grammarians
103 ^304 105 , / 306
like Haradatta, Bhattoji DSksita, Kaundabhatta, Visveswara suri,
etc. have followed the same classification of the term Karman as
put forth by Biartrhari and more over they, in support of their
views, have referred to Bhartrhari.
Before Bhartrhari, Katyayana while commenting on P.3.2.1.
asserts that the suffix '&}* is desired only then the product aid
307
modification types of Karman are in composition. This assertion
obviousLy ghows that Katyayana in his mind had some other varieties
of Karman also, otherwise, to restrict the suffix only to product
and modification in the said TSrttika serves no purpose. From the
counter example^given by P atanj ali in the exposition of KStyayana's
assertion it is evident that he had accepted destination as the
308 _
third variety of Karman. But nowhere in his Mah*5bhasya he has
expressively said that Karman is of three kinds. Kaslkakara has
expressively stated that Karman is of three kinds, n^esely, product,
309
modification and destination. Commenting on the statement of

301. VP, 3.7.45-46: ^ ^ f^RT WT |

302. VP, 3.7.45, P.266.

303. PJ4, 1.4.49, P.567.
304. 3K, 1.4.49, P.129.
305. SBS, Subarihanirnaya, P
106. VS^I, 1.4.49, P.&48.
107. Mbha, 3.2.1., P.156 : mffvl |
308. Ibid: HT ^ fiFFPcT fDTtfcf, yTH T^Tfcf I
K9. KV.3.2.1., P.54D! f^f f!W#J ^
Kasikakawy^aradatta says that these three kinds are the division
of Tpsitata^na Karman and quoting Bhartphari he adds that there
are four other kinds also and thus he admits the seven kinds of
HO
Karman as stated above.

View of eight Kinds: Kevalanandasaraswati, a Mfmamsaka, in his

Jaiminisfitravrtti speaks of eight kinds of Karman. it the first
instance he enumerates two kinds of Karman, namely, 'Ip sit a' aid
' anlpsita' and then points out that the first kind has four divi
sions viz. product, modification, destination and purified (Sarfts-
kSrya), -whereas the four kinds, namely, udsslha, anlpsita, anSkh-
yta and anyapurvaka, are grouped by him under the name of anip-
sita. Thus according to Mlmamsakasx the designation Karman is
112
of eight kinds, a fact which is endorsed by Haradatta also.

Seven kinds justified: Haradatta, however, opposing the eighth

kind of Karmen, namely, Samskaraya, accepted by Mfo.amsakas contends
that there is no need to accept saciskraya as a separate kind as it
is the same as the modification Karman. He argues that modifica
tion is that Karman ihich comes into existence with the change of
its material cause. This change may be perceived directly such as
in 'K^stham bhasma Karoti' or indirectly such as in 'brlhin proksati.

110. PM, 3.2.1., P. 540.

111. Jaiminisutravrtti, vide MK, Dvitlya, P.2228:
* W -
fSTftm |
*4 (K.'dyt)
m ^rpdr^rf i - .f^rarr^- stfrftger-

112. PM, 3.2.1., P.540: *5nW ^ ^ ^T^fcT^fcT

On the ground of this difference of perception MImamsakas differen
tiate sa&skarya from the vikarya. Inhere the change is directly
perceived the K arm an is called VikSrya and in case where perception
takes place through the sastra the Karman is called by them Sams-
karya. As the difference is negligible and as all other characteris
tics in both the kinds are the same, there is no need to consider
112a
them as quite different from each other. In other words there
is no harm to conceive both kinds of change by the name of modifi
cation. Thus according to the grammarians Karman is of seven kinds.

Product (Nirvartya): Explaining the product kind of Karman Bhartr-

hari says that product is the object the transforming material of
which, whether existing or not* is not presented as identiCtQ. with
113
it. Elaborating the view of Bhartrhari, Helaraja says that when
the existing material is presented as different from the object
being produced such as 'mrds ghatam karoti' (He makes the pot out
of clay); and when material does not exist such as 'samyogam karoti
114
the object designated as Karman is known by the name product.Kaiyata
has expressed the sane view. According to him product Karman is
that object the material cause of which does not exist, such as
'samyogam karoti. He further asserts that if it does exist it is
not intended to be expressed such as in the expression 'ghatam
karoti'. To confirm his view he refers to Bhartrhari's KrikS x in
115 / 116
which he defines product Karmsn. Later on Gokulan&tha Misra,
U2a. PM, 3.2.1., P.54D.
113. VP, 3.7.47, P.267: StT TT ^ft^TTMT |

jt. vfru ww fMNfcr i

114. 3.7.47, P.267.
116. Pradiba, 3.2.1., P.156.
116. PVR, Dvitfya, P.514.
 i 117 118
Sgesa in his pradlpoddyota aid Gadadhara have followed the
view as pat forth by Bhartrhari.
Regarding the product type of Karman, Bhartrhari has
pointed out the view of other schools who are identified by HelSrlja
/ _ t ~] ~[Q
as Vaisesikas and Samkhyas. He points out that according to some
the non-existent tiling which comes into existence or that existing
120
thing which is manifested by birth, is the K arm an called product.
Commenting on this Helaraja says that according to Vaisesikas a
product comes into being from non-existence, whereas according to
Ssmkhyas the product is only a manifestation of That already exists
in a latent form. According to both the views only manifestation
of anything is expressed by the term 'janma'. R>r instance, son
in the sentence putrafe prasut& (gives birth to a son). Here the
son that is born was existent in ah embryonic stage before its
121 122 123
delivery. The later grammarians like Jinendrabuddhi, Bhoja,
124 125
Haradatta and Bharata MaLlika have expressed the same view.
However, the view of Vaisesikas and SMkhyas regarding
product Karman cannot he considered a correct one. In this view
by the term ' janma' (birth) material cause is intended to be ex
pressed. Thus what is produced may be looked upon as modification

117.Pradfpoddyota, 3.2.1., P.156.

H8. Vyu-Va., DvitTya Karaka, P.337.
119. Hel. PP, 3.7.49, P.268.
120. VP, 3.7.43, P.268; gST opHHT |11
121. Hei.PP, 3.7.49.
122. Nyasa, 3.2.1., P.540: m fHqfrq I
123. c>P, Caturtha Prakfisa, P.148.
124. PM, 3.2.1., P.540.
125. KSrakollSsa, 46, P.5.
 126
in relation to material cause. Pointing out the drawback in this
view, Helaraja contends that according to this view Veda, of course,
prapya K arm an, would be Nirvartya K arm an in the expression ' Vedama-
dhTte' (He studies Veda), because Veda gets itself manifested by
127
study.

Modification (Vikarya): Bhartrhari has said that when the material

128
cause is intended to be expressed the object is called modification.
Bbr instance, 'ghata' 'kata, 'bhasma', etc. in the sentences 'mrdafc
ghatam karoti' 'Kasan Kat^am Karoti', ' an g Sr an bhasma karoti', etc.,
because here material causes are presented as being transformed into
their respective effects. Thus it can be said that where material
cause and its effect are expressed in the form of identity the ob
ject designated as K arm an is known by the name modification. Kaiyata
has expressed the same view by contending that when the material
cause is presented as identical with its effect the object is modi*
129 130
fication. Later on Biat$oji DTksita has expressed the same view.
Jinendrabuddhi has explained the Vikarya K arm an thus: 'when
the action of the agent brings some changes in the form of a existnet
131 ikj^sx^a.
thing, the object is called by modification such as TCggpfea in the
example 'Kasthani bhasma karoti'. Haradatta has given the same

126. Hel. PP.3.7.49: 9ffctf^TqT TOT^cfTHTf |

127. Ibid, 3.7.49 & Mbha, 3.2.1., P.156.
128. VP, 3.7.48: f^TTW f^T% |
129. Hradrpa, 3.2.1., P.166.
130. SK, 1.4.49, P.129.
131. Nyasa, 1.4.49, P.567: |
Cf 3. 2# 1 ^ P 54D #
 132
explanation of the modification type of Kami an, From the perusal
of these views it is evident that these views are not different from
that of Bhartrhari. By the reading of 'Prakrti' Bhartrhari has also
accepted that when the existent thing is intended to be expressed as
changing itself, the object attained by this change is known as
modification.
Pointing out the view of others, Bhartrhari states that
according to them the modification is of two kinds. One kind of modi
fication is resulted from the destruction of the original material as
ashes from brunt wood (Kasthani bhasmo-karo ti). *
Jkiother kind is the
result of the coming of a new property as the tr an so Itar ati on of gold
133
into ornaments (Suvarnam KurjdaLe bhavatah). Commenting on this,
Helaraja says that in the first case the modification type of Karman
is that idiich comes into existence after the complete annihilation
of its material cause. In the second case of VikSrya Karman the
material cause remains the same though^ it changes its shape such
134
as ring in the above said example.
The difference between this view and Bhartrtiari's view
comes out evidently in reference to the object of ashes. According
to Bhartphari ashes can be product and modification according to the
speaker's intention, Ashes are product when it is presented as
different from its material cause such as in the sentence 'Kasthen

bhasma Karoti' or when the material cause is not intended to be

expressed such as in the expression 'bhasma karoti'. Ashes is
*** ^ VM* 0 M ^ W 0 0 0 *** 0 *** 0 **** 0 ***** 0 *** 0 P 0

132. PM, 1.4.49, P.567, 3.2.1., P.540.

133. VP, 3.7.50, P.269:
fafsRT 3iT53Tf^WT |

134. Hel.PP, 3.7.50.

VikSrya when it is presented in the sentence as identical to its
material cause or material cause is intended to be expressed such
as 'Ka^tham bhasma Karoti'. While according to the view of others
ashes is always modification and can never be product, because it
comes into existence after the complete annihilation of its material
c au s6
Patanjali has made the difference between product and modi
fication kinds of K arm an by raising a question about the justifica
tion of such usages as ' tandulahodanam pacati' and ' tandulahamodanafe
pacati'. Giving the answer about their justification he has asserted
that both the usages are appropriate. He holds that here the root
'pac' has jcaar two meanings. Being so, in the first case the sen
tence means ' tandulan pacannodanam nirvartayati (by cooking the
rice grains he produce^ cooked rice). Here in the example tandulan-
odanam pacati' the root 'pac' expresses the sense of producing to
which the activity of becoming soft is subordinate. Thus in this
sentence rice grains are the modification K arm an in reference to the
subordinate action of becoming soft and the cooked rice is product
Karman in reference to the primary action of producing. In the
second case, i.e., ' tandulanamodam pacati' the sentence means 'tandu-
lavikSramodanam nirvartayati (he produces cooked rice which is a
product of rice grains). Here the rice grains are connected with
the cooked rice as a material cause of the object which is being
135
produced by the action of cooking. Thus we see that when speaker

135. Mtha, 1.4.49, P.361: m Sm:

f^cNtrfcT I ^T^f qfEff^nzfT^
C-^r frl^rfcT |
 f \
o

wishes to express rice grains as modification he presents them as

identical with cooked rice. But when he desires to present them
as a material cause of product Karman he expresses them as differ!t
from cooked rice. Thus according to Patanjali also when the mate
rial cause is presented as identical with its effects it is under
stood as modification. In case of differentiation it is to be
understood as product.

Destination (Prapya) : according to Bhartrhari, that object is

called destination or thing to be attained on which the accomplish-
136
ment of the effects of the action cannot be seen or inferred. Ex
posing the observation of Bhartrhari, Helaraja says that the exis
tence of the product is possible only after the activity of agent
such as pot comes into existence Vnen pot maker performs the action
of making a pot and, consequently, the effect of the action on pro
duct is directly perceived. Similarly in modification the action
of the agent brings change in the shape of the object and thus the
effect of the action is visible in this case also. Somewhere, the
effect of the action is conceived through inference such as the
judgement of happiness of someone is inferred from his facial
impression. But in case of destination no effect of the action is
137
seen as in the case of product and modification. Pbr instance, in
the sentence adityam pasyati' the action of seeing neither produces
the sun nor brings any change in the shape of sun. Sun is only the
object of the action of seeing and thus it is destination. In this

136. VP, 3.7.51, P.269: f^Wt^trCToTf fgfssfa d I

Wfcf | |

137. Hel.PP, 3.7.51, P.270.

way it is concluded that according to Bhartphari the object which is
not Effected by the action of the agent but becomes only the object
of the action is called prapya.
Jinendrabuddhi while distinguishing between the three
types of Karmen asserts that in case of the prSpya K arm an the ex
pressed action neither produces any non-existent thing nor brings
any change in the existing thing but only a relation between the
138
object designated as K arm an and action is understood, such as in
case of Veda in the sentence ' Vedamadhlte'. From this it is evi
dent that Jinendrabuddhi, too, accepts that in prapya Karman the
139 140
effect of the action is not seen. Later on Kaiyata, Haradatta,
141 i42 143
Bhattoji DIksita, Kaundathat^a, Bharata Mallika, etc. have put
forth the same view as Bhartphari has observed. Moreover most of
them refer to Bhartrhari for the confirmation of their view.
0

Hiere are others who do not accept the category of prpya

Karman, because they are of the view that action does have its
effect invariably when and There it takes place. Even in case of
1 adityam pasyati' and 1 Vedamadhfte' which are put forth as prapya
category of Karman, the actions seeing and studying have their
effects. Is Bhartphari has shown the advocates of this view say
that the effect of seeing is clearly manifested and proved in the

138. Nyasa, 3.2.1., P.541: ^T^qq-TrSfcT ffqtf, TTfq

t^TTram, wm 5#rqcr i
139. PradTpa, 3.2.1., P.156.
140. PM, 3.2.1. , P.540.
141. i>K, 1.4.49, P. 129.
142. VB3, Subarthanirnaya,fP.
143. KSTakollasa, 44, P.4.
case of the action of seeing by snakes having poison in their
144
vision. Helaraja propounding this view says that actions like
seeing must have their effects on the object. It is another
matter that they are not perceived due to their minuteness. The
fact gains strength in reference to the vision of snake. It is
seen that things are brunt up when they are looked at by snakes
having poison in their vision. On the analogy of this they con
clude that in other cases of seeing etc. also the action of seeing
etc. must have their effect though due to subtleness it is not
145
perceived. This is not Bhartrhari's own view. This verily be
longs to others as is evident from the expressive use of 'Kesiam-
146
citjg} in the Karika. Bhartrhari's own view is that effect of
action is not universal. In reference to the above instance put
forth by others, Bhartrhari is of the view, as is evident from
Helaraja, that the vision of snakes is a kind of fierce fire and
14?
so -when in contact with a thing it burns up the object. Thus it
is clear that according to Bhartrhari burning in the above case
is a result of the contact of fire with the object and not due to
the action of seeing. Thus Bhartrhari is of the view that action
has not its effect always and everywhere. Moreover Helaraja ob
serves that the objects of seeing are the prompter of the action
and not the effect of the action. Thus whenever the effect of the
action is absent we are to take the Karman of a third kind, namely,
_ 148
prapya.

144. VP, 3.7.52: fcffpr^-R: i

145. Hel, PP, 3.7.52, P.270-71.

146. VP. 3.7.52.
147. Hel.PP, 3.7.52, P.271: cR: f^RTTt
148. HeljPP, 3.7.52
 In connection with the vie-w that the effect of the action
is not seen in the prapya Karmen a question does arise, namely, if
there is no effect of action in the Karman in these cases how can
it be considered to be a means to that action? Because only that
item which has some particular role in the accomplishment of an
action is considered sadhana. To answer this question Bhartrhari
asserts that being in the right place (athasopagamah), being illu
minated (vyaktih) and having natural fitness (sodhatva) these are
the properties of a prapya object connecting it with the acconplish
149
ment of an action. Helaraja exposes the view of Bhartrhari in
reference to the action of seeing. He contends that an object
becomes the means in the action of seeing vhen it is situated in
such a way as it can come into contact with sight. 3hus a thing
when situated at a right place it becomes means to the act of see
ing. A thing situated at its proper place cannot be seen if it is
obstructed by such things as darkness, fog, etc. which prevent the
si git from coming into contact with it. Thus by being illuminated
by the light is the second factor helping in the act of seeing,
apart from this, hthe object of seeing must be a visible thing.
The invisible things though situated in light and at their right
places cannot be seen. Thus the quality of manifesting itself by
the object is the third cause of the act of seeing the object.
<stv
These causal factors being present in the prapya Karman pliable to
get the status of sidhana in such cases as 'adityaA pa^ati',

149. VP, 3.7.53, P.271: ITHWfaTHt eqftrcf: |

fairer: \\
 J12
160
* Vedanadhlte*, etc. It is to be noted here that these causes do
not affect the action of seeing. These are only the causal factors
151
(Hetu). In the action like going remembering, etc. In the ex
pressions 1 gram am gacchati'. 'mStram se^arati.* etc. such factors
/ / ?
I

as stated above can be apparently seen and this is why the actions
though not affecting the village, mother, etc. in the above instances
^become sSdhana of these actions. Haradatta has put forth the same
reasons as are pointed out by Ehartrtiari and explained by Hersraja
to confirm the sadhanata of prapya Karman. Thus there is no diffi-
. 152
culty in taking the prap^ya Karman as a means*
Katyayana has also raised the doubt about the Ksrakata
of prapya Karman by saying that the designation Karmen being defined
as the most desired accessory would not be applicable to Nirvrta,
i.e.;pripya karman, because in these cases action itself is the
153
most desired thing. Thus the sugar would not be Karman in the
expression ' gudam bhaksayati1, because here the action of eating,
and not the sugar, is the most desired item. The reason is that
here the action of eating does not effect the sugar or bring any chang
in it, but is used only for the accomplisbment of the action of eat
ing. To avert this doubt Katyayana himself says that both the sugar
154
and the action of eating in the above case are desired. To show
the validity of this observation Patanjali asserts that the person

150. Hel. PP.3.7.53.

151. Hel. PP, 3.7.53: ^ H cT^kTT: |
152. PM, 1.4.49, PP.MGC 567-68.
153. Mbha, 1.4.49, P.262: Z|f

154. K Ibid. =7 |
who makes his mind to eat sugar is not satisfied by eating a piece
of ma^s Kaiyata makes the fact clear by contending that if only

sugar were desired by agent he should be satisfied by seeing or

touching the sugar. But the fact is different. He *ho thinks of
swallowing sugar is satisfied only after eating it. Similarly only
the action of eating cannot be said to be desired by the agent,
otherwise, he would have been satisfied by eating the piece of mud.
But this is not the fact. Both the action of eating aid the sugar
156
are the items that are desired by the agent. Thus it is evident
that both the prapya Karman and the action connected with it are
to be taken as the desired. Thus even according to KStyayana there
is no difficulty to conceive prapya Karman as a means.
Hallowing the KatySyana' s point, ^iartrhari, to defend
the KsrakatS of prapya Karman contends that the object which is
already accomplished and which does not receive any change due to
coming into contact with the action is ipsita (disired to be attain-
157
ed) in as much as it becomes the object of action like easting. Com
menting on this, Helaraja by giving the same argument as has already
been explained in reference to Kaiyata has confirmed the fact that
both the sugar and the action of eating in the above case are the
most desired. He further contends that the sugar is the means in
the above case in reference to the satisfaction which is the result

155. Mtha., 1.4.49,P.262s | |

mrbt H^rfcr nr^fr ftr mfz \

156. Pradfpa* 1.4.49, P.262.

157. VP, 3.7.87, P.301: 1
 114

of the action of eating of sugar. Thus sugar is the means through

the medium of the action of eating. In tills way there is no
158
difficulty to consider sugar as means of the action of eating.J

Indifferent (Udgsina) : The object attained indifferently by agent

159
is called indifferent Karman. In other words, somebody when in-
xadtxs volving himself to do something to attain his desired fruit
happens to do such things as are not desired by him to attain and
360
thus towards which he is indifferent. The object connected with
its action in the same way as a desired one with its action is
called an indifferent Karman. Ibr instance, the roots of the tree
are indifferent Karman in 1he expression ' gremain gacchan vyksamu-
lanyaupasarpati' (going to the village he comes across to the roots
of tree), because here the agent of the action of going wants to
reach village only. In the Panini's system the designation Karman
is prescribed to these cases by P. 1.4.50, which prescribes that
the item which is not desired by the agent but connects with the
action in the same way as the most desired item is also Karman.
Patarijali has explained) that we are to take the negative sense
of 'anlpsita1 in the P.1.4.50 as a 'paryudasa* (exclusion) i.e. ,
other than Tpsita1 and not as Prasajyapratisedha, i.e., the
161
opposite meaning of Tpsita. Later on Jinendrabuddhi has taken the

158. Hel.PP , 3.7.87, P.302.

150. VP, XX 3.7.46: zjcT | Cf.Hel.PP.3.7.46.
160. Mbha, 1.4.50, P.263 tjttfcf |
161. Ibid: ft^cTWcT HTz? ^fcT | f4 cTft?
 ^ 162
same sense of * anlpsita' as has been held by Patanjali, In this
sense, there remains no problem to consider roots of the tree as
Karman according to Panini 1.4.50, because it is an item which is
not desired to attain by the agent.
Being so, there would be chsfice to designate PraySga as
Karman in the expression 'PraySgat Klslm gacchati Devadatt ah1
according to P.1.4.50, because Deva^datta is indifferent to Prayaga
or it is not desired to attain by tile Devadatt a. To avoid this
chance Panini has put an adjective ' tathayuktam' in his definition
to quality -the ' anfpsita. Now there is no scope for the designa
tion Karman in such cases as is stated above on account of the
163
adjunct ' tathtyuktan'. By this Panini prescribes that the item
to be designated as Karman must be^substratum of the result of
expressed action. Since in the above case 'Prayaga1 is not the
substratum of the result of the expressiin: action of going? there
is no chance to designate it as Karman.
Odious (Dyesya): Dvesya Karman is that which is positive
ly disliked by the agent, though it becomes the substratum of the
164
result of the action of agent. Bbr instance, poison in the ex
pression 'visam bhunkte'. Patanjali, however, contends that poison
in the above instance is not an odious Karman. He holds that poi
son may be desired object. A person who is afflicted by miseries
and sees no end to them in future thinks it better to put an end
to his life by inhaling the poison. In this situation the poison
**
162. Nyasa, 1.4.50, P.568.
363. P.1.4.50: cMTffcT ^TfTf^clH |
164. VP, 3.7.46: qssq
 165
is a desired object. But no one can deny that poison is really
an odious Karman in such cases as 'odanam bhunjano visan bhuhkte'.
The best example of odious K arm an is thei-^ in such expression as
'Coran pa^ati', because nobody likes to see a thief. So unfortu
nately when a thief becomes the substratum of the result of the
be
action of seeing the theif is to/regarded as an odious K arm an.

Not intended as a particular Karaka (Sam.1nantarairanakhyata): Anakhya-

ta is that Karm&n which is prescribed in Panini's system by P.1.4.51
by saying that that KSraka which is not intended as coming under any
one of the special relations of ablation, recipient, etc. is also
166
called Karman. Fbr instance, cow in the sentence 'gM dogdhi
paysh'. Here cow is starting-point in reference to the separation
of milk but speaker expresses it as Karman due to his intention. To
specify the domain of anakhyata Karman, Patanjali enumerates the
roots in connection to which an anSfehyata Karman is found in the
language, ^According to him, anaMiyata Karmen has its application in
connection with, the roots 'dhh' (to milk) 'yac' (to ask), 'rudh'(to
obstruct), *Pracch'(to ask), 'bhiksa' (to beg) 'ci' (to collect),
'bru' (to tell), ' ias' (to instruct) 'nl' 'vah' sod 'hr' in the sense
167 /
of 'to carry'. Kgsiklkara is also of the same opinion as suggested
. 168
by Patanjali. Bhattoji DTksita on the ground of Patanjali and
# # # * # **' 0 **0 **..*** **.*" ^ **
is5. Muhs, 1.4.60: ^ f? ^:sTaf
^rrqt | ZRTOT^ffcT |
166. See Pbdit Note No. 24.
167. Mbha. 1.4.51, P.264: i qqr |

TT^qtflcf^Tfq TcqerNf cM ^ |
fp ^tj*T ^-^qf^Tfcr f=T^RT: |
168. K?, 1.4.51, P.570.
Madhavlya dhatuvrtti enhances the scope of an akhy at a K arm an by
adding six roots, namely, 'pac* (to cook), darj^a' (to punish),'ji'
(to win), 'manth' (to churn), mush (to steal) and kps' (to carry)
/ 169
to the list put forth by PataKjali and followed by Kasiklak'&ra.
However, one should not assert that the an&khyata K arm an
is to be formed only Then these sixteen verbs are expressively used
in the sentence. It is found in connection with those verbs also
which are the synonyms of these sixteen verbs, fbr instance,
'Devadattam satam prafrthayate', Devadattam satam mrgayate* 'MSnava-
. _ * 170 # i7i
kam dharmam bhasate', etc. Uiis is >toy Jinendrabuddhi Kaiya^a,
172 * 173
Haradatta, Bha^to^i, etc. have stated that the applica
tion of an akhy at a ^ arm an does not confine itself only to these six
teen verbs. It is used in connection with those verbs which are
synonym to these sixteen roots. Thus the sphere of anakhyata karman
is that which is covered by the meaning of these sixteen verbs. The
/. _
fact becomes pertinent with the Patanjali's usages like ' sakarait
174
asi coditah* in which the anakhyata Karman is found in connection
A,
with the root 'cud* Trial eh is the synonym of 'pnfcch'.
However, one may doubt about the application of anakfcorata
Karman in reference to the verbs synonym to these sixteen verbs on

169. SK, 539, P.597: |

mT Il
Cf. EM, 538, P.597.
170. Nyasa, 1.4.61, P.573.
171. PradTpa, 1.4.51, P.264: ^zrpfr^f ^lfq^uTTqtciT^T:TT?cl2|f^
H^fcT |
172. PM, 1.4.51, P.573.
173. SK, 539, P.601: |
174. Mbha, 3.4.82, P.280.
account of separate enumeration of 'bhiks' and 'yac' in the list
of Dvikarmaka rootsj Had the application of anakhyata Karman would
be possible in the use of synonymioot Patanjall would not have been
read both 'bhiks1 and 'yac' because they have the same meaning.
Kaiyata averts this doubt by contending that 'bhik' means only
to ask or to beg while the meaning of 'yac' consists not only of
175
asking hut persuading also. Thus, having different meanings both
'ylc' and 'bhiks' are enumerated in the list. In this way there is
doubt about the fact that the application of ahkhyata Karman is
found in connection with all those verbs which have the same meaning
as these sixteen roots have.

That which has another name before: (Aiyapurvaka) : The Karman which
176 177
has, otherwise, played a role of either Karana or Sampradana or
178
adhikarana in the accomplishment of action but which for the
grammatical operations is designated as Karman is known as anya-
purvaka. For instance, dice in the expression 'aksanaf dfvyati'.
Though here dice play the role of Ka*ia in the action of gambling
but P. 1.4.43. prescribes the name Karman to the Karana of gambling
optionally. Thus it is an ' any ap urvak a' type of Karmen. Similarly,
the abode in case of the use of verbs 'siH' (to lie), ' sthS' (to
stay) and 'as' (to sit) preceded by adhi, 'vis' (to enter) preceded

175. Pradtfca, 1.4.51, P.aees W I

^zrrterrfq i
Cf. Nyasa 1.4.51, P.573, PM, 1.4.51, P.573, etc.
176. P.1.4.43: f^: ^ ^ |
177. P.1.4.37: |
178. P.1.4.46-48: \ | W. |
'abhini* and 'vas'(to dwell)preceded by upa' 'ana' sod adhi is
designated as Karin an. In this same way, s ampr adan a in case of the
use of Krudh and druh preceded by any prefix is designated as K arm an.
In these instances the item designated as K arm an though
not leaving its previous characteristics of instrument, abode and
recipient in the accomplishment of an action is designated as K arm an
only for the sake of grammatical operations* Now the item designated
as K arm an will be capable of having all those operations which are
applicable to Karman.

Oneness of Karmant Thus we see that K arm an is of seven kinds. Yet

the fact is that it is fundamentally one. Pointing out to this fact
Bhartrhari says that just as the starting-point (apffcll^ana) which is
one, is shown in the science of grammar as many, in the same way,
179
the object (Karman) also, vhich is one, is expounded as many. Though
the designation of apadana prescribed by P.1.4.24, when taken in its
conceptual aspect, is capable to cover the sphere of P.1.4.25-31 anriy
also yet is elaborated in Panini's system by P.1.4.25-31 only for the
sake of ignorant. The elaboration of apadana by P.1.4.25-31 does
180
not affect the oneness of apadana. So is the case with Karman also.
The designation of Karman though possible in the sphere of P.1.4.50
etc. on the ground of P.1.4.49, the prescription of Karman by
P.1.4.SO. 51, etc. is meantfbr the help of those who are less quali-
fied. To prove this Helaraja has asserted that cow in the expression
' gSm dogdhi psyah' is a desired object to be reached by the action of
milking. To show the pertinency of his observation he puts forth a

179. VP, 3.7.78, P. 294: ^ l

wf-fq ^ 11
180. Infra, the starting-point, P.4^3
concrete example, namely, ' tahdulSn odanam pacati*.
*
Here the root
'pac* conveys two sense, namely, becoming soft and the process of
cooking. Thus rice grains (tandula) are the object in relation to
the action of becoming soft which is subordinate to the action of
cooking of rice (odana). The rice is the object in relation to the
action of cooking. Thus both are Karin an in reference to two actions
simultaneously expressed in the form of primary and secondary by
the same root. Similarly, the root 'duh' should be understood con
veying simultaneously two actions milking and causing to milk which
stand in relation of primary and secondary actions. In relation
to these two actions there is no problem to accept Karmata of cow
and milk. One of them is covered by the primary meaning of the verb
'duh' while the other is covered by the secondary meaning of the
verb, both meaning simultaneously expressed by the same root. Thus
the cow can be designated as Karman by P. 1.4.49 and there is no need
181
to prescribe P.1.4.51. In other words anakhyata Karman is not
different from Ipsitatama Karman.
Similarly, odious Karman is not different from Ipsitatama
Karman. To make the point clear Bhartrhari says that just as through
greed one (that is, a sick man) has the dtxi desire to eat -What is not
good for his health, similarly, through fear, etc. one acts in regard
182
to poison, etc. Exposing the Bhartrhari* s point of view, Helaraja
says that just as the man Tho is sick and is in the grip of greed
desires to eat what is not good for his health in the same way when
a man who is fed up of his miseries or tortures given to him by his

181. Hel.PP, 3.7.78, P.294.

182. VP, 3.7.80: WT <3te3Tc[ l
t^psTf^rf 11
master intends to die he takes poison. In such cases poison is not

a disliked thing but a thing desired by him. Thus poison gets the
name K arm an in such expression as ' viam bhurikte according to
183
P, 1.4.49 and not to P.1.4.50.

Similarly the indifferent objects also come under the pur

view of F. 1.4.4. ft>r instance, roots of the tree in the sentence

* grSmsfo gacchan vrksamulahyup asarpati'

are Ip sit a Kar man in reference
184
to the action of coming near (upasarpana). Similarly, the instances

of Karman coming under the category of anyapurvaka are also covered

by the general rule, i.e., P.1.4.49. For instance, in connection

with transitive verbs like the verb 1 sfh' preceded by adhi' and the

root ' stha' preceded by upa the designation 'adhikarana' is pre

vailed over by the designation Karman on account of the principle

of 'p aratva' in such sentences as 1 gramplamadhi sete' and 'N agaram-

, , 185
up ati sth ati . Thus here also the designation Karman is possible

in accordance with P.1.4.49. Thus the kinds of Karman, namely,

indifferent, odious, anSkhyata and anyapurvaka are not different

from the Ipsita Karman. Thus there is no ground to count them as

different from it.

The Ipsita Karman, however, is said to be three kinds,

namely, product, modification and destination. To prove the oneness

183. Hel. PP.3.7.80, P.296.

184. Ibid.P.297: HT^rf'-HcT o
cFTfa

i
185. Hel.PP.3.7.80, P.297: ^THHf^tlcF,
of these three Kinds of Karman Bhartrhari says that Aether the
object be something to be made or something to be modified or some
thing to be reached, it is the substratum of power and is presented
as an accompli died thing because it is only actions which are to be
186
accomplished. Patalijali has observed that it is the action which
4 , 7
is to be accomplished, whereas the dravya is always accomplished.
On the ground of Patahjali observation, Helaraja while exposing the
Bhartrhari5assertion says that by the word noun substratum of power,
i.e. , accomplished object, is expressed whereas the verbal form
denotes the action which is sldhya by nature. As the noun words
are to present their meaning always in the form of accompli died
things whether they are being accomplished externally or are already
accomplished the object Karman is always present in similar form,
i.e., in the form of accomplished. Thus in the cases, such as
'Ka$am Karoti1, 'tarjdul'Sn odanam pacati' and 1 adityah pasyati. The
noun words express*# the accomplished objects which are th sub
stratum of power and thus there is no difference among them. The
difference in them is brought about by the actions, i.e., the
production, modification and destination. In connection with the
action of producing it becomes product, in relation to the action
of modifying it is designated as modification and in reference to
188
the action of reaching it is called as destination. It amounts
to say that the differentiation of one and the same Karman is
imposed on it due to the action which is to be accomplished by it.

186. VP.3.7.79, P.296: qT f^Tqf. qT TT tflWsra: I

ffsrrnTT^ |
187. Mbhg, 1.3.1., P. f^T % fl mvzfa, WTRtlfS 1
188. HeL.PP. 3.7.79, P.296.
 123

Otherwise by nature it i s one and the same. 3hus in fact K arm an

is one but it is divided into seven kinds so that its implications
may be well understood even by those who do not have a keen faculty
to understand it in its full width and length.

Division in form of Primary and Secondary: Katy ay an a has asserted

that time, action, distance to be covered and country should be

enumerated as K arm an with reference to intransitive verbs, such as
'masamaste' (He sits for a month), ' Godohamaste' (he sits through
out the milking of the cows), Krosamaste (He covers a Kros'a) and
189
Kurun svapiti (he sleeps in the country of Kurus). In reference
to this suggestion of Katy ay ana, Bharttfiari has observed that there
is no need to make such an addition. He contends that when words
expressive of time, action, distance to be covered and country come
together with any intransitive verb which implies another action,
390
they become the object of that action. Exposing the point of view
of Bhartihari, Helargja has expressively said that intransitive
#

verbs in the sentences imply another action and it is this action

in reference to \hich time, duration, etc. are used as Karman. Bbr
instance, in the sentence masamaste the action of 'covering* is
implied in the action of sitting. Thus period of one month is
Karman in reference to the action of covering, because it is desired
to be attained by the action of covering. Thus it becomes Karman

189. Mbha, 1.4.51, PP. 270-71: TOHT^T^PcTsqT: |

_,
I
390. VP, 3.7.67, P.282: |
on account of P.1.4.49 and there is no need of making the addition.
However, now as the sense of covering is a part of the mean
ing of the root 'as' etc. the later would be considered as transi
tive verbs because the time etc. are the object of the verbs. Being
so, the desired usages like 'masamSsyate Devadatten' would not be
appropriate, because P.3.4.69 prescribes that the tense affixes
called 'la' are used in denoting the object and the agent, but
after intransitive verbs, they denote the action (bhava) as well as
392
agent. Jccording to this rule the affix denoting action is not
reasonable in connection with transitive verb. To remove this de
fect, Heiaraja asserts that K arm an is of two kinds internal and
external. The Karman in the form of substance is to be regarded
as internal because it is the Karman in form of substance which
directly relates to the action expressed by verb. Jfeile the Karman
in the form of time, action, etc. is to be understood as external,
393
because it is related to the action through the internal object.
The fact that a root transitive or intransitive is decided only
on the basis of the internal object4 So a root having internal

object is considered transitive and other are intransitive, because

in reference to the external Karman, that is, time, action, etc.,
all the verbs are transitives. No verb is intransitive as far as
these objects are concerned. Thus there can be no difference of
transitives and intransitive verbs as the basis of these external

191. HeL.PP, 3.7.67, P.282.

192. P.3.4.69:
193. Hel.PP, 3.7.67, P.282: fgfSpq H ^ | cT^f
i ^fwj^ *r i
394. Ibid: ^ vVl ^THET. I
objects. It is the intern aVobject -which is determinative of this
difference of the verbs. The fact is expressively stated by PataK-
jali by saying that though time, distance to be covered, etc. dec
lared to be objects, yet a root which has only such an object and
355
not an object in the form of substance is deemed to be intransitive.
Being so, there is no difficulty to justify the said cases, because
the root 'Its' being intransitive shall have affix in the sense of
action.
On the basis of this discussion we may take these two
kinds of K arm an as primary and secondary. The internal Karman, i.e.
Karman in the form of substance, is primary while the external
Karman, i.e., Karman in the form of time, action, etc. is secondary.
This division becomes pertinent with the observation of Bhartrhari
when he contends that having be come a kind of substratum for the
substance objects like time etc. later become object having a
356
different status. HeLrgja proves the second aryness of the exter
nal Karman like time, distance to be covered, etc. by contending
that they are like substratum because they have a similarity with
the substratum in the sense that they are related to the verb
either through agent or object, the substratum also is related
to the verb only either through agent or object. Jbr instance,
/ /
in the expressions 'Krosam sete, Kurun svapiti' etc. a distance
of Krosa, the country of Kuru, etc. are evidently substrata,
because they hold their agents. But they become Karman in reference
to the action of covering that is implied in the action expressed
355. MbhS., 1.4.52, P.275-76.
356. VP, 3.7.68, P.284: ^ciT^ |
by the verb in the sentence. They are related to the verb through
rtf's
the medium ^internal Karman, i.e., Karman in the form of substance.
In this way it is the Karman- in the form of substance that is
first connected with the action while the Karmahrin the form of
time, action, etc. relate themselves to the verb only either
through the agent or^fe- As the duration of time varies accord
ing to the nature and quantity of the internal Karman, i.e., Karman
in the form of substance, with the action must be regarded as
taken place before the external object. To make the point clear,
Helaraj a says that a thing that is harder takes more time in its
cooking than a thing v/hich is soft even though it is being cooked
in more quantity. The difference of time in cooking the substance
of two different nature shows that it is the Karman in the form
of substance that first canes into the contact of action and so it
must be the internal and for this very reason the primary object
while the time etc. feeing connected with the action later on
197
should be external and secondary objects.
It is not only time, action, etc. which have secondary
status but the designation Karman in connection with the roots
enumerated under P.1.4.51 is also of the same category. It is
evident from the Bhartrharis statement in which he observes that
all that is not declared to be something else and so becomes object
according to P.1.4.51 is understood to have different status,
because, it is, not what is most desired to be attained by the
agent, coming, as it does, within the scope of the meaning of the
mm mm ^ mm _ mm ^ aw ~ mm aw ^ <w 0 mm 0 0 mm ^ wv ^ aw ^ mm ^ aw ^ ^ aw ^ aw ^ w* ^ gw 0 aw ^ mm ^ aw 0 aw 0 mm ^ 0 mm ^ mm 0 w> 0 mm 0 m 0 mm ^ mm

197. Hel. PP. 3.7.68, P.284.

 198
root in a different way. To look upon the Karman defined by
P.1.4.51 as having different status from the Karman designated
by P.1.4.49 becomes pertinent with the explanation of 'akathita'
put forth by Patanjali. Iftiile commenting on P.1.4.23 he asserts
199
that 'akathita' means non-prominent Karaka. Thus akathita means
to say that the designation Karman is to be applied to a word re
presenting a Karaka which in comparison to another Karaka plays
a non-prominent role. Exposing the fact, HelSraja says that in
the expressions ' gsri dogdhi payah', Pauravam g Sun yacate', etc.
though cow, Paurava, etc. are Karman in the form of substance they
have different status, because milk, cow, etc. are the primary
Karman of the actions of milking, begging? etc. whereas cow, 'Faurava'
etc. are only the mja& to the end* The action of milking which is
the meaning of root is directly connected with the milk, for which
cow is indispensably required. Thus milk is firstly connected wdth
action of milking and it is milk through which the cow is connected
wdth the action of milking. Thus cow though substance is a Karman
u
of the second order in comparison to milk. This/,why to look upon
200
this as having different status is quite appropriate. Kaiyata
has proved the secondary nature of cow in the example 'g&h dogdhi
201
payah' on the ground of ' upayoganimitta' used by Patsnjali stotate
K
while specifying the sphere of akthita Karman. He holds that by

198. VP, 3.7.70, P.286: g<f ^ |

199. Kbha, 1.4.23, P.241: #i |

200. Hel.PP. 3.7.70, PP.286-87.
201. Mbha, 1.4.51, P.264: See footnote 167.
the use of ' upayoganimitta' it is shown that in 1 gaft dogdhi payah'
the milk is the most desired where cow is not the most desired,
202
because it only serves to have milk.
To make it clear Bhartrhari further points Out the crete-
rion which distinguishes between a primary and secondary Karman.
He contends that that *hich causes the action to be done is said
to be main object (pradhanakarman). That which becomes connected
with the action in order that it (the main object) may be attained
is something else and has been called that which has not been dec-
203
lared to be anything else (akathitaK Exposing the Bhartrharis
observation, Helaraja says that the main or primary object is that
thing for which all the accessories perform their activities and
e/eased to be active after attaining it. For instance, milk in
the sentence 'gam dogdhi payah is primary object as cow is meant
for this. The thing which is inseparably associated with the
most desired thing such as cow in the above sentence is secondary
Karman. HelSraja further points out that cow can also be a pri
mary object when the action of milking is done in order to prevent
the cow from drying such as in the sentence 'gSm dogdhi'. Thus
Helaraja accepts that cow is Karman of a nature different from
primary Karman defined by P.1.4.40, because cow and milk are in
the relation of nimitta-nimitti. $ This is why to designate cow

202. Pradlpa, P.1.4.51, P.264i j grjzpqcT

m: c?r^Tfq cflR i tt m w csr Mm

i
203. VP, 3.7.71, P.287: spf^cf ^ 9*#^ |
as Karman in the above example the formulation of P.1.4.51 is
204
necessary.
There are some others who opine that Karman is of only
one kind, i.e., primary. Pointing out this view, Bhartrhari says
that in the case of roots like duh, yac, etc. which involve the mean,
ing of the causative affix, cow, paurava, etc. become object by the
first rule (P. 1.4.49) as in the case of roots ending in the causa
tive affix. Biis is why there is restriction in regard to the roots
205
ending in the causative affix. Exposing this view, Helaraja says
that the designation Karman of cow in the expression 'gam dogdhi
peyah' is reasonable on the account of P. 1.4.49 such as that of
i

Devadatta in the example ' gamayati gram am Devadattafc Yajnadattah',

because the roots enumerated under P.1.4.51 imply the causative
sense. In other words these roots have the sense which is conveyed
by the suffix 'nic'. Jbr instance in the above sentence the root
duh has the sense ' gauh payah Ksarati, Devadattah tam ksarantlm
ksarayati' (cow yields milk and Devadatta makes the cow to yield
milk) in which milk being the most desired to be attained by the
action of 'Ksarati' becomes Karman by P.1.4.49 and cow being most
desired to be reached by the action of 'KsHrayati' is Karman also
by the same sutra. Here though from the point of view of purpose
milk is primary as the action of milking is aimed at attaining it
*hile the cow is secondary as it serves only to have milk. Yet

204. Hel. PP, 3.7.71, P.287.

205. VP. 3.7.73, P.288: 3pcP|<TfoT5WfHT* ftrT^p^ |
f$3 gfoT fbTP5i fHW^TT 11
from the point of view of the verbal use it becomes vice verse, i.e.,
cow is primary while milk gets the status of secondary K arm an, be
cause the finite verb meaning 'causes to yield milk' is directly
connected to cow. This is \hy 'la* etc. also are indirect relation
ship with cow such as in the usages 'duhyate gauh payal}, dogdhavyl",
dugdhS, sudoha. In this way there is no need of P.1.4.51 to desig
nate cow as Karman in the above expression. To confirm this view
HelSraja says that P.1.4.52 is a restrictive rule only in connection
with the roots mentioned in P.1.4.52 and not in relation to those
verbs which are not mentioned in this sutra like 'Pac' etc. though
206
'nic' is added to them.
Propounding this view, HelSraja further points out the
difficulty in case of the application of P.1.4.51 in such desired
usages like 'gain dogdhi' even Then it is not dispensed with. The
point is that without the separation of milk from cow the action
of milking is not possible. Thus cow being expressed by the
designation apSdana cannot have the designation Karman by P.1.4.51.
But in application of P.1.4.4S there is no problem. Though it bwt
comes with the range of the designation aplidana, the designation
Karman being para would prevail upon the designation apadana on
207
account of ' apadlnamuttarani'.
As far as we see from the point of view of actual posi
tion between the two, i.e., milk and cow, it is milk that is more
206. Hel. PP. 3.7.73, P.289.
207. Ibid: f*RT WTT^T ?WTf=t '
fcT q^WTcT | qfq cRTqTstHc^TcT
d I q <c*riT 3RPTH-

^TfcT ' TT J
 131

desirable. The cow being only the means to have it is secondary to

the milk. Being so, only milk deserves the designation Karman by
P.1.4.49. The reason is that in P.1.4.49 the suffix 'tamap' is
expressively used on account of which only the most desired can
be eligible to be designated as Karman. ind in thatcase formula
tion of P.1.4.51 is necessary. However, the view is not tenable.
The difference of degree due to the use of 'tamap* is to be regarded
in comparison with other Karakas than that being defined. Difference
of degree due to the use of 'tamap' in case of instrument is intend
ed in comparison with other KSi^kas and not within the range of
instrument itself. Otherwise in the sentence ' asvena patha cffpi-
kaya yiti' only the horse, being the most effective in the accom
pli stamen t of the action of going, would be eligible to be named as
Karana, not the lamp and the road. 3me is the case with the desig
nation Karman. Here also the difference in degree is to be under-
two
stood in relation to other Karakas and not between thjg/things desig-
208
nated as Karman. Uius as no difference of degree is to be consi
dered within the same Kraka there is no iff difficulty to designate
more than one thing as Karman on account of difference in degree
of their importance.
However, Bhartrhari refutes this argument, lecording to
him, as the difference in degree is accepted in regard to the thing
which is desired to be attained by the agent through his action,
therefore, a great difference is accepted between that which becomes
object by P.1.4.5f aid that which becomes object by the first rule

208. VP. 3.7.74, P.291: ifqtmfzf Wft |

 209
(P.1.4.49). Exposing the observation of Bhartphari, HelSraja says
that though all the Karakas are means in reference to the accomplish
ment of an action but due to its activity Karaa is the most effective
among them. Thus Karan a has difference in degree in reference to
other Karakas and not to its oui domain. In case of Karman^, how
ever, the situation is different. L1 the KIrakas are not desired
to be reached by the agent through his action. No doubt, instrument
etc. are sought to be reached by the agent but for the sake of
action aid not through his action. This is the reason why Karman
*

has difference in degree in reference to its own domain and not in

regards to other Karakas. Thus between milk and cow milk being
more desired item to be reached by the action of milking deserves
the designation
b
K arm an^P. 1.4.49, aid not the cow. Therefore, to
designate cow as Karman the P.1.4.51 is necessary. Hitd the diffe
rence in degree not been, unlike the instrument, in regard to its
own sphere the examples like 'Yavebhyo gM vSrayati', 'KupSdandham
varayati' etc. cited for P.1.4.27 would not be appropriate, because
in thejucasex 'yava', kupa*, etc. being Tp sit a would be designated as
karman. Therefore, for the clear demarcation between P.1.4.49 and
P.1.4.27 the use of 'tamap' is necessary to mark, "the difference
in degree regarding the things desired to be attained by the agent
r 210
though his action.
Bhartrhari has further ruled out the possibility of desig
nating cow as Karman according to P.1.4.49, on the analogy of

209. VP. 3.7.75, P.292: I

Sfc: ^nTT 11
210. Hel. PP.3.7.75, PP. 291-92.
causative roots. He contends that just as, in the case of a verb
ending in the causative affix, it is the active agent who is prompt
ed, in the same way, in the use of roots like ni, the agent, though
211
inactive is prompted. Exposing this, Helaraja says that in case
of causative use of verbs such as 1 gamayati graham Devadattam'
there are two action^ namely, one conveyed by the radical, i.e.,
'gam', and the other expressed by the root having causative suffix.
Thus two Karmans in the above sentence are justified in reference
to these two separate actions. But in the sentences like gam dogdhi
payah there is only one action denoted by radical root 'duh' and
m

hence the use of two Karmans cannot be justified. To say that roots
like duh, etc. are equal to causative ones and thus as there are
two actions they may have two object is not tenable. The causative
verb conveys the sense of prompting which is always possible only

ts)

in reference to an active agent. But in the above case cow/not

212
active. The same fact has been said by Kaiyata. He contends that
the use of causative verb is found in the case where prompted is
active to do something. But in the use of duh, etc. we do not find
such position. We see that sometimes one makes use of cow in the
213
action of milking even when it is non-cooperative (niskriya). Thus

211. VP., 3.7.76, P.292: fuT^ ^ ml IftbfSB |

mT Wtff S ft? 11

212. Hel.PP, 3.7.75, P.2S2.

213: Pradfpa* 1.4.51, P.264: . | Wtt.
sfci ^cfrfcT: i \ f^fdzifTrd' i
though both the cow and the milk are desired by the action of milk
ing, it is milk which is more desired so it is only it, and not
the cow, that deserves the designation Karmen according to P.1.4.49.
Therefore, to designate cow as K arm an P. 1.4.51 is invariably re
quired.
The possibility that roots like duh, yac, etc. imply the
causative sense has been refuted by Bhartrhari by contending that
as for the explanatory sentence in regard to verbs ending in causa
tive affix and to the roots 'nl* and 'duh1, it consists of different
214
words and has no connection with the root in question. Proving this
fact Helaraja says that we analyse the stem and suffix in the sen
tences, like 'gamayati gram am Devadattam' and * aj am nayati gram am,
we find the analysis in the form ' gachantam prayuhkte' (he prompts
to go Devadatta who is going) and ' gram am pripnuvantlmj am prayunkte'
(he prompts the goat which is going to the village). In the first
explained sentence the verb expresses the prompted agent, while
in the form of causative only the activity of prompted is appeared
and he himself expressed by separate words such as in the above
example Devadatta. Thus there is great difference between the verbs
employed in causative sense and explanatory sentence; though the
radical form, i.e., gam' is the same. But in the second case the
roots employed in the explanatory sense has no similarity of any
kind. Ihus to conceive that the roots 'dub*, 'nl', etc. implied
the sense of causative sense is far from fact. But these roots
express only one action having two objects* Out of these two objects

21ft. VP, 3.7.77, P.293: ^ ^ uzpcF ^ I

TOfFPcHR} *TTfTT | |
primary object gets the status of Karman according to P.1.4.49
215
Tidiile secondary Karmen comes under P.1.4.51.
It is evident from the above discussion that the designa
tion Karman is really of two types, namely, primary and secondary.
The primary Karman is that which is designated by P.1.4.49 and it
is almost in the form of substance. The secondary type comprises
the Karman in the form of time, action, distance to be covered
and country in reference to intransitive verbs and the Karmans
designated by P. 1.4.51.
EXPRESSIVE TERMINATIONS OF KABMM: The designation Karman gets it
self manifested in the surface structure of Sanskrit language by
216 .
the second case-ending * Hhen it is not expressed by tin, krt,etc.
such as 'odana* (rice) in the sentence ' Devadattah odanam pacati1
(Devadatta cooks rice). In case it is expressed it claims only
217
nominative case-ending, for instance 'Ka^a' (mat) in the expres
sion 'Katah Kriyate'. In connection with the verbal derivative
218 . ,
noun (Krdanta) it claims sixth case-ending. Such as rJagata

(world) in the sentence ' Jagatah Karts Krsnah'.

4 # #

*****
***
*

215. Hel. PP. 3.7.77, P.293.

236. 2.3.2:
217. 2.3.46.
218. P.2.3.65,66.