DUE PROCESS OF
v Torres
LAW
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS: Driven by aspirations for economic
independence and national security, the Congress
enacted Act No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate
the Retail Business." The main provisions of the
Act, among others, are: (1) a prohibition against
persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
and (2) a prohibition against the establishment or
opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail
business. Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on
behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the said Act,
brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration,
and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime
Hernandez, and all other persons acting under
him, particularly city and municipal treasurers,
from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked
the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law; (2) the
subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; and (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUES: Does the law deny the equal protection
of the laws and the due process of law?
HELD: The Court held that the disputed law was
enacted to remedy a real actual threat and
danger to national economy posed by alien
dominance and control of the retail business and
free citizens and country from dominance and
control. The enactment clearly falls within the
scope of the police power of the State, thru which
and by which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future. The law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to
carry out its objectives appear to be plainly
evident as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary and that in
any case such matter falls within the prerogative
of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere. The provisions of
the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this
suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the
legislators or the segment of the population
affected. Lastly, it cannot be said to be void for
supposed conflict with treaty obligations because
no treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any
other conventional agreement. Hence, the
petition was denied, with costs against petitioner.
1|CONSTI2_DueProcess_Equal protection
Philippine Phospate Fertilizer Co.
Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc.
(PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment a petition for certification
election among the supervisory employees of
petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union
duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment it was seeking to represent the
supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate
Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S.
Milado issued an order directing the holding of a
certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the
superintendents and the professional and
technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an
amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter
wherein it sought to represent not only the
supervisory employees of petitioner but also its
professional/technical and confidential
employees. The parties therein agreed to submit
their respective position papers and to consider
the amended petition submitted for decision on
the basis thereof and related documents.
Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting
the petition and directing the holding of a
certification election among the "supervisory,
professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics,
accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical,
and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed
the order to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment who rendered a decision through
Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing
the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration
but the same was denied; hence, the instant
petition alleging denial of due process on the part
of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was
under.
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due
process.
Held: There was no denial of due process. The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity
to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of petitioner
PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with
the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the position
papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient
compliance with the requirement of due process,
as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity
to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could
have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to
confront and examine the witnesses of the other
party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its
position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides,
petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its
arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor.
Restituto Ynot Vs IAC
Facts
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported
six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by
the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of
executive order and the recovery of the carabaos.
After considering the merits of the case, the
confiscation was sustained and the court declined
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld
the ruling of RTC.
Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling:
The Respondent contends that it is a valid
exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A
amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the
slaughter of carabaos except under certain
conditions. The supreme court said that The
reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved
by the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of
the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter there,
any more than moving them to another province
will make it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A
unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was
carried out forthright. Due process was not
properly observed. In the instant case, the
carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying due process.
Alonte vs. Savellano
Facts: Due Process in Criminal Proceedings
Waiver of Right to Due Process
Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn
Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura
Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alonetes house who was then the mayor of
Bian, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC
Bian. The counsel and the prosecutor later
moved for a change of venue due to alleged
intimidation. While the change of venue was
pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of
desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the
case and the change of venue was done
notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case
was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano.
Savellano later found probable cause and had
ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and
had attested the voluntariness of her desistance
the same being due to media pressure and that
they would rather establish new life elsewhere.
Case was then submitted for decision and
Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion
perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte
waived his right to due process when he did not
cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions
were raised about the details of the rape and on
the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied
criminal due process.
2|CONSTI2_DueProcess_Equal protection
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit
himself from further deciding on the case due to
animosity between him and the parties. There is
no showing that Alonte waived his right. The
standard of waiver requires that it not only must
be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent,
and done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.
Mere silence of the holder of the right should not
be so construed as a waiver of right, and the
courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver. Savellano has not
shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on
numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is
remanded to the lower court for retrial and the
decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
Aniag Jr. v Comelec
Driver underwent illegal search and seizure on
check pt. petitioner charged in violation of
Omnibus Election Code (gun ban) invokes
deprivation of Constitutional right on due process
of law.
Facts: Upon the issuance of declaration of gun
ban by the Comelec in connection to the national
& local election, the Sgt-at-Arms of the House of
Representatives requested petitioner to return
the 2 firearms issued by the House to him. In
compliance, petitioner ordered his driver Arellano
to pick up the firearms in his house to return
them to Congress. On his way back to the
Batasan Complex, Arellano was flagged down in a
check point and police search the car. Upon
finding the guns, he was apprehended and
detained and his case was referred for inquest to
the City prosecutor office. Petitioner was not
made a party to the charge but was invited to
shed light on the incident. Petitioner explained
the purpose how Arellano came to have the
firearms boarded on the car and wrote the
prosecutor to exonerate Arellano from the
charges. The prosecutor recommended
dismissing the case. The Comelec however issued
a resolution filing information in violation of the
gun ban against petitioner. Petitioner moves for
reconsideration to the Comelec which was denied
hence this petition contending that the search on
his car was illegal and that he was not impleaded
as respondent in the preliminary investigation
and his constitutional rights for due process was
violated.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied of
due process of law.
Held: The court held that as a rule, a valid search
must be authorized by a search warrant duly
issued by an appropriate authority. However, this
is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a
lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been
upheld in cases of (1) moving vehicles (2) the
seizure of evidence in plain view and (3) search
conducted at police or military checkpoints which
are not illegal for as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
merely limited to a visual search, and (4) Stop-
and-search without warrant conducted by police
officers on the basis of prior confidential
information which were reasonably corroborated
by other attendant matters is also recognized by
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
the court to be legal. An extensive search without
warrant could only be resorted to if the officers
conducting the search had reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that
either the motorist was a law offender or that
they would find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to the commission of a crime in the
vehicle to be searched. Because there was no
sufficient evidence that would impel the
policemen to suspect Arellano to justify the
search they have conducted, such action
constitutes an unreasonable intrusion of the
petitioners privacy and security of his property in
violation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained
in violation of petitioner's right against
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. The manner by which
COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs
counter to the due process clause of the
Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was
not among those charged by the PNP with
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was
he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a
preliminary investigation for such offense. Thus
the court declared the warrantless search and
seizure of the firearms as illegal hence
inadmissible to court as evidence in any
proceeding against the petitioner.
Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation Vs Jose Luis Alcuaz
Facts: 180 SCRA 218 Political Law Delegation
of Power Administrative Bodies
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to
construct and operate such ground facilities as
needed to deliver telecommunications services
from the communications satellite system and
ground terminal or terminals in the Philippines.
PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to
companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and
PLDT.
Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT
was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of the Public Service Commission later
known as the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No.
196 was later promulgated and the same has
placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the
NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire
permit to operate from the NTC in order to
continue operating its existing satellites. NTC
gave the necessary permit but it however
directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates
by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on
EO 546.
PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner
(Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and
holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC,
empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications, does not provide the necessary
standards which were constitutionally required,
hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative
power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of
NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the
provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of
NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO
196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction
of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by
any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and
adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently
3|CONSTI2_DueProcess_Equal protection
clarified its said submission to mean that the
order mandating a reduction of certain rates is
undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-
judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which
allegedly requires an express conferment by the
legislative body.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue
delegation of power.
HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The
power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the
requirements of public safety, public interest,
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which
conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a
valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental
is the rule that delegation of legislative power
may be sustained only upon the ground that
some standard for its exercise is provided and
that the legislature in making the delegation has
prescribed the manner of the exercise of the
delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency
concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate,
its act must both be non-confiscatory and must
have been established in the manner prescribed
by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a
fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-
fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the
guidance of the administrative authority is that
the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has
been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard
may be implied.
However, in this case, it appears that the manner
of fixing the rates was done without due process
since no hearing was made in ascertaining the
rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.
Ateneo de Manila University v Capulong
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student
of Petitioner University, died of serious physical
injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the
initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido
Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol
Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned
by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him
on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia
del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-
Student Investigating Committee which was
tasked to investigate and submit a report within
72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the
death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required
respondent students to submit their written
statements within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt. Although respondent students received a
copy of the written notice, they failed to file a
reply. In the meantime, they were placed on
preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after
receiving the written statements and hearing the
testimonies of several witness, found a prima
facie case against respondent students for
violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue
entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were
then required to file their written answers to the
formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a
Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against
respondent students. The Board found
respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline
which prohibits participation in hazing activities.
However, in view of the lack of unanimity among
the members of the Board on the penalty of
dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the
penalty to the University Administration.
Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of
dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent
students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they
are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO
was also issued enjoining petitioners from
dismissing the respondents. A day after the
expiration of the temporary restraining order,
Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to
investigate the charges of hazing against
respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was
requested to be stricken out by the respondents
and argued that the creation of the Special Board
was totally unrelated to the original petition
which alleged lack of due process. This was
granted and reinstatement of the students was
ordered.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against
the respondent students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more
particularly procedural due process. Dean of the
Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students to submit their written
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a
reply, respondent students requested through
their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature
and cause of the accusation were adequately
spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the
twin elements of notice and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are
not in a position to file the instant petition under
Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a
motion for reconsideration first before the trial
court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court
of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
remedies is when the case involves a question of
law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or
not respondent students have been afforded
procedural due process prior to their dismissal
from Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein,
thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of
the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence
in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.
4|CONSTI2_DueProcess_Equal protection
EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
People Of The Philippines & Hsbc Vs Judge
Jose Vera & Mariano Cu Unjieng
FACTS:
Political Law Equal Protection Probation Law
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in
Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was
elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the
appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation
alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he
was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI
directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office. The IPO denied the application. However,
Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng
allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The
City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has
no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation
because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221
which provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to provide a
system of probation to convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only
indicated therein that only provinces are covered.
And even if Manila is covered by the law it is
unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the
Constitution provides equal protection of laws.
The said law provides absolute discretion to
provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation
law may be an encroachment of the power of the
executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in
pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is
violated when the Probation Law provides that
only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of
a probation officer may the probation system be
applied.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the
same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a
way an imposition of penalty. There is undue
delegation of power because there is no set
standard provided by Congress on how provincial
boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given
absolute discretion which is violative of the
constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of
equity so protected by the constitution. The
challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11
which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only
in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of
a probation officer at rates not lower than those
now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation
officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office. This only means that only
provinces that can provide appropriation for a
probation officer may have a system of probation
within their locality. This would mean to say that
convicts in provinces where no probation officer is
instituted may not avail of their right to
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
probation. The SC declared the old probation law
as unconstitutional.
In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in
Vera v. People:
a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded
against, and what charge he must answer.
b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence
that is not tainted by falsity, and after the
defendant was heard.
If the prosecution produces the conviction
based on untrue evidence, then it is guilty of
depriving the accused of due process. Thus false
testimony can be questioned by the accused
regardless of the time that lapsed.
c. Judgment according to law
d. Tribunal with jurisdiction
Ichong vs Hernandez
Facts: Chinese businessman, Lao Ichong, entered
the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound. His type of business
particularly is a retail business. He and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in
the local market in Pasay. But in June 1954,
Congress passed the Republic Act No. 1180 or the
Retail Trade Nationalization Act. This act is to
reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the
retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the
nullification of the said Act on the ground that it
contravened several treaties concluded by the
Philippines. He said it violates the equal
protection clause (pacta sund servanda) and, as a
Chinese businessman engaged in the business
here in the country who helps in the income
generation of the country, he should be given
equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Republic Act No. 1180
violates equal protection clause.
HELD: No. The mere fact of alienage is the root
and cause of the distinction between the alien
and the national as a trader. The alien resident
owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his
adopted country; his stay here is for personal
convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain
and profit. He is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he
temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that
spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for
his Filipino customers as would prevent him from
taking advantage of their weakness and
exploiting them. Another objection to the alien
retailer in this country is that he never really
makes a genuine contribution to national income
and wealth. The alien's interest in this country
being merely transient and temporary, it would
indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the
very important function of retail distribution to his
hands. The practices resorted to by aliens in the
control of distribution show the existence of real
and actual, positive and fundamental differences
between an alien and a national which fully justify
the legislative classification adopted in the retail
trade measure Difference in alien aims and
purposes sufficient basis for distinction. The
above objectionable characteristics of the
exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which
are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for
legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the
wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this
5|CONSTI2_DueProcess_Equal protection
we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-
making power. Since the Court finds that the
classification is actual, real and reasonable, and
all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it
cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound
to declare that the legislature acted within its
legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that
the act transcends the limit of equal protection
established by the Constitution. Broadly
speaking, the power of the legislature to make
distinctions and classifications among persons is
not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of
the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a
wide scope of discretion, and a law can be
violative of the constitutional limitation only when
the classification is without reasonable basis.
Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao
Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was
passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on
February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas.
It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any
person not a citizen of the Philippines to be
employed in any place of employment or to be
engaged in any kind of trade business or
occupation within the city of Manila without
securing an employment permit from the Mayor
of Manila and for other purposes.
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in
Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of
preliminary injunction and restraining order to
stop the enforcement of said ordinance.
Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537
violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance
which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable
aliens generally to be employed in the city of
Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.
While it is true that the first part which requires
the alien to secure an employment permit from
the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and
judgment in processing and approval or
disapproval of application is regulatory in
character, the second part which requires the
payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a
regulatory but a revenue measure. Ordinance no.
6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is
tantamount to denial of the basic human right of
the people in the Philippines to engaged in a
means of livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit
aliens within it's territory, once an alien is
admitted he cannot be deprived of life without
due process of law. This guarantee includes the
means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any
standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance
or denial of an alien employment permit fee.
Dumlao v Comelec
Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality
of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution.
Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or
provincial city official that already received
retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall
not be qualified to run for the same local elective
office from which he has retired.
clause_ Search and seizures Digest

Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is
unconstitutional being contrary to the equal
protection and due process rights.
Held: No. The guarantee of equal protection is
subject to rational classification based on
reasonable and real differentiations. In the
present case, employees 65 years of age have
been classifieddifferently from younger
employees. The former are subject to compulsory
retirement while the latter are not.
Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for
elective local officials because there can be
retirees who are even younger and a 65year old
retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official
who is not a retiree. But there is reason to
disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is
trying to run for office because there is the need
for new blood to assume relevance. When an
official has retired he has already declared
himself tired and unavailable for the same
government work.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of
Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared
valid.
Philippine Asso. of Service Exporters v
Drilon
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service
Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female
of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998)
of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the
Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that
such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females
with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the
right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of
the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec
3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for
worker participation in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter
the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE
submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State
and informed the court that the respondent have
lifted the deployment ban in some states where
there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for
sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid
classification in the challenged Department Order
No. 1.
Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that
there has been valid classification, the Filipino
female domestics working abroad were in a class
by themselves, because of the special risk to
which their class was exposed. There is no
question that Order No.1 applies only to female
contract workers but it does not thereby make an
undue discrimination between sexes. It is well
settled hat equality before the law under the
constitution does not import a perfect identity of
6|CONSTI2_DueProcess_Equal protection
rights among all men and women. It admits of
classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial
distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the
law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same
class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest
on substantial distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to
travel. The consequence of the deployment ban
has on the right to travel does not impair the
right, as the right to travel is subjects among
other things, to the requirements of public
safety as may be provided by law. Deployment
ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise
of police power. Police power as been defined as
the state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit
in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative
power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule
making powers.
International School Alliance of Educators v.
Quisumbing and International School
FACTS: International School (IS) pays its teachers
who are hired from abroad, or foreign-hires, a
higher salary than its local-hires, whether the
latter are Filipino or not (most are Filipino, but
some are American). It justifies this under the
'dislocation factor' that foreigners must be
given a higher salary both to attract them to
teach here, and to compensate them for the
"significant economic disadvantages" involved in
coming here. The Teacher's Union cries
discrimination.
Held: Discrimination exists. Equal pay for equal
work is a principal long honored in this
jurisdiction, as it rests on fundamental norms of
justice
1. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution (Social
Justice and Human Rights) exhorts Congress to
give the highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and ennhance the right od
all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalitites." The
Constitution also provides that labor is entitled to
"humane conditions of work.". These conditions
are not restricted to the physical workplace, but
include as well the manner by which employers
treat their employees. Lastly, the Constitution
directs the State to promote "equality of
employment opportunities for all," "regardless
of sex, race, or creed." It would be an affront to
both the spirit and the letter of these provisions if
the State closes its eyes to unequal and
discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment.
2. International law, which springs from general
principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include
principles of equity, i.e., fairness and justice,
based on the test of what is reasonable. The
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
numerous other international Conventions all
embody the general principle against
discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and
justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution,
has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition
before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus,
pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence,
being threatened of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support and also a victim
of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. The
TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to
faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by
the said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.
The trial court issued a modified TPO and
extended the same when petitioner failed to
comment on why the TPO should not be modified.
After the given time allowance to answer, the
petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262
for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for
being an unwanted product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the
TPO but however, denied the petition for failure
to raise the issue of constitutionality in his
pleadings before the trial court and the petition
for prohibition to annul protection orders issued
by the trial court constituted collateral attack on
said law. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
petition is filed.
Issues:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on
the theory that the issue of constitutionality was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the
petition constitutes a collateral attack on the
validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to
conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust
and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not
finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does
violence to the policy of the state to protect the
family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262
as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows
an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy.
Officials.
Held:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited
authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle
the complex issue of constitutionality. Family
Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
7|CONSTI2_DueProcess_Equal protection
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible time so that if not raised in the
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if
not raised in the trial court, it may not be
considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. In
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the
Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each
member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based
on a valid classification and did not violate the
equal protection clause by favouring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO
exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator
is justified. Petitioners contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of
the State to protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution cannot be
sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it
ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any
issue therof to a mediator. This is so because
violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power
to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power
to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance
of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other
law enforcement agencies is consistent with their
duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for
lack of merit.
Himagan v People
Facts: Petitioner, a policeman assigned w/ the
medical co. of the PNP HQ at Camp Catitigan,
Davao City was implicated in the killing of
Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder
of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for
murder and attempted murder were filed w/ the
RTC, the trial court issued an order suspending
petitioner until termination of the case on the
basis of Sec. 47 of RA 6975, w/c provides:
Sec. 47.Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal
Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance
against a member of the PNP for grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
and one (1) day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from office
until the case is terminated. Such case shall be
subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his
suspension relying on Sec. 42 of PD 807, that his
suspension should be limited to 90 days and also,
on our ruling in Deloso v. SB, and Layno v. SB.
The motion and the subsequent MFR were
denied. Hence, this petition forcertiorar i andma
nda mus.
HELD: We find the petition to be devoid of merit.
(1) The language of the first sentence is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity. xxx The second
sentence xx providing the trial must be
terminated w/in 90 days from arraignment does
not qualify or limit the first sentence. The 2 can
stand independently of each other. The first refers
to the period of suspension. The 2nd deals w/ the
time frame w/in w/c the trial should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated w/in the 90-
day period, should the suspension of accused be
lifted? Certainly no. While the law uses the
mandatory word "shall" bef. the phrase "be
terminated w/in 90 days," there is nothing in the
law that suggests that the preventive suspension
of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not
terminated w/in that period. But this is w/o
prejudice to the administrative sanctions, and, in
appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to
criminal or civil liability of the judge. Should the
trial be unreasonably delayed w/o the fault of the
accused, he may ask for the dismissal of the
case. Should this be refused, he can compel its
dismissal bycer tiorari, prohibition orma nda mus,
or secure his liberty by
(2) Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A
meticulous reading of the section clearly shows
that it refers to the lifting of the preventive
suspension in pending admin. investigation, not
in crim. cases, as here. xxx Sec. 91 of RA 6975
w/c states that the CS law and its implementing
rules shall apply to members of the PNP insofar
as the provisions, rules and regulations are not
inconsistent w/ RA 6975.
(3) The petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso
is misplaced. xxx Sec. 13 of RA 3019 upon w/c
the preventive suspension of the accused in
Layno and Deloso was based was silent w/
respect to the duration of the preventive
suspension, such that the suspension of the
accused therein for a prolonged and
unreasonable length of time raised a due process
question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is
charged w/ murder under the RPC and it is
undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47
RA 6975 w/c categorically states that
hissuspension shall last until the case is
terminated.
(4) The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on National Defense relative to the bill
that became RA 6975 reveal the legislative intent
to place on preventive suspension a member of
the PNP charged w/ grave felonies where the
penalty imposed by law exceeds six yrs. of
imprisonment and w/c suspension continues until
the case against him is terminated.
8|CONSTI2_DueProcess_Equal protection
QUINTO vs. COMELEC
Facts: Congress enacted RA 8436 on December
22, 1997. On January 23, 2007. it enacted RA
9369, amending theprevious act.Pursuant to its
constitutional mandate to enforce and administer
election laws, COMELEC issued ResolutionNo.
8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates
of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of
OfficialCandidates of Registered Political Parties in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections.Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No.
8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.-
a)
Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of theArmed
Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned orcontrolled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filingof his
certificate of candidacy.
b)Any person holding an elective office or position
shall not be considered resigned upon thefiling of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.-
The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on
regulardays, from November 20 to 30, 2009,
during office hours, except on the last day, which
shall be untilmidnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto
resigned from their offices the moment they file
their CoCs,petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and
Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive
positions in the government and who intend to
run in the coming elections,5 filed the instant
petition for prohibition and certiorari,seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
ISSUES:
1. Do petitioners have locus standi?
2. Do the second proviso in paragraph 3, Section
13 of RA 9369, Section 66 of the OmnibusElection
Code, and Section 4(a) of RA 8678 violate the
equal protection clause?
HELD:
The transcendental nature and paramount
importance of the issues raised and the
compelling state interest involved in their early
resolution the period for the filing of CoCs for the
2010elections has already started and hundreds
of civil servants intending to run for elective
offices are to lose their employment, thereby
causing imminent and irreparable damage to
their means of livelihood and, at the same time,
crippling the government's manpower further
dictate that the Court must, for propriety, if only
from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition
so as to expedite the adjudication of all,
especially the constitutional, issues. The Court,
nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not
yet candidates, they have the standing to raise
the constitutional challenge, simply because they
are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy,
such as the challenged measure herein, affects
the rights of voters to choose their public officials.
The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case
or controversy exists between the petitioners and
the COMELEC, the body charged with the
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
enforcement and administration of all election
laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise
manner that they would engage in the very acts
that would trigger the enforcement of the
provision they would file their CoCs and run in the
2010 elections. Given that the assailed provision
provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing
of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only
a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to
petitioners' candidacy.
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO vs. THE
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1
establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the
Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration,
and to submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative body.
But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties.
All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers
but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts
if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of
an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its
operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section
31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated
authority of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new public
office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution
and statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office
of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause
as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the
other administrations, past and present, who may
be indictable.
9|CONSTI2_DueProcess_Equal protection
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal
standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of
Congress because the Presidents executive
power and power of control necessarily include
the inherent power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that,
in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create
or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of
Congress to appropriate funds because there is
no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds
already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or
supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not
a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the
equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file
the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for
public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the
power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that
the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office remain inviolate.
Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of
any official action which, to their mind, infringes
on their prerogatives as legislators.
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court
of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in
interest rule. It provides that every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in
public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
public right in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He has to show that he is entitled
to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public
order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result. The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that
the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction
by the Court. There are constitutional issues in
the petition which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring
that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers
of the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution. One of the
recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is
the power to create ad hoc committees. This
flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an
allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part
of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for
the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing
auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the
DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will
complement those of the two offices. The
function of determining probable cause for the
10 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise
and guide the President in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement
of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view
of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III
(Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions
to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a states
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification.
Equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must
pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights determined and all public
authority administered. Laws that do not conform
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
to the Constitution should be stricken down for
being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Central Bank Employees Association v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Facts: RA 7653 otherwise known as the New
Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993,
effectively replacing the earlier Central Bank of
the Philippines (established 1949) by the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner
Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association
Inc. filed a petition against the Executive
Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain
BSP from implementing the last proviso in Section
15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to
establishment of a Human resource management
system and a compensation structure as part of
the authority of the Monetary Board. Employees
whose positions fall under SG 19 and below shall
be in accordance with the rates in the salary
standardization act. Petitioner contends that the
classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and
violates the equal protection clause. The said
proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank-
and file BSP employees. Respondent on the
other hand contends that the provision does not
violate the equal protection clause, provided that
it is construed together with other provisions of
the same law such as the fiscal and
administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral
and the mandate of its monetary board. The
Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive
Secretary defends the provision, that the
classification of employees is based on real and
actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy
of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and
excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing
laws and policies of the government.
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if
RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws,
hence unconstitutional.
Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it
operate on the salary grade or the officer
employee status, it distinguishes between
economic class and status with the higher salary
grade recipients are of greater benefit above the
law than those of mandated by the Salary
Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive
higher wages that those of rank-and-file
employees because the former are not covered
by the salary standardization act as provided by
the proviso.
Commissioner Jose T. Almonte, petitioner v
Honorable Conrado Vasquez, respondent
Facts: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado
and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all
documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr.
1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of
EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was
issued in connection with the investigation of
funds representing savings from unfilled positions
in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte
and Perez denied the anomalous activities that
11 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to
quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim
privilege of an agency of the Government.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly
Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez
is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal
Management Division. The subpoena duces
tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
connection with his investigation of an
anonymous letter alleging that funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the
EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter,
purporting to have been written by an employee
of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was
addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with
copies furnished several government offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman.
Issue: Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige
the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces
tecum to provide documents relating tWhether or
not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by
virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide
documents relating to personal service and salary
vouchers of EIIB employers.o personal service
and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
Ruling: In the case at bar, there is no claim that
military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records pertaining to the
personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is
the gathering and evaluation of intelligence
reports and information. "illegal activities
affecting the national economy, such as, but not
limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in
cases which involve state secrets it may be
sufficient to determine from the circumstances of
the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters without compelling production, no similar
excuse can be made for a privilege resting on
other considerations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is
directed that the inspection of subpoenaed
documents be made personally in camera by the
Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined
in this decision.
Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. v Treasurer of Ormoc
City
Facts: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board
of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of
1964, imposing "on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax
equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export
sale to the United States of America and other
foreign countries." Payments for said tax were
made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7, 087.50 and on
April 20, 1964 for P5, 000, or a total of P12,
087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General,
a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as
its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging
that the afore-stated ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution)
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]),
Art. VI, Constitution).
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax
ordinance was within defendant city's power to
enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the
same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional
limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the
case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance,
on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and
declared the taxing power of defendant chartered
city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to
include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees
not excluded in its charter.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause under Sec. 1[1], Art. III,
Constitution.
(2) Whether or not it was violative of the rule of
uniformity of taxation under the Bill of Rights,
Sec. 22[1], Art. VI, Constitution.
Held: The Constitution in the bill of rights
provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III)
In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal
protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of
legislation, and a classification is reasonable
where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; (2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present
conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4)
the classification applies only to those who
belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that
the questioned ordinance does not meet them,
for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and
exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and
none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is
true, was the only sugar central in the city of
Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions
as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the
same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the
tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company
is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because
the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City
Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied
upon.
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on
the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily
collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the
ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude
arbitrariness, the same being then presumed
constitutional until declared otherwise.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared
unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees
are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50
12 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs.
So ordered.
SEARCHES AND
SEIZUERS
People Of The Philippines Vs. Andre Marti
Facts: On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila
Packaging and Export Forwarders to send
packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received
by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the
packages. Shirley refused and eventually
convinced Anita to seal the package making it
ready for shipment. Before being sent out for
delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
proprietor of the courier company, conducted an
inspection of the package as part of standard
operating procedures. Upon opening the package,
he noticed a suspicious odor which made him
took sample of the substance he found inside. He
reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his
office to inspect the package. In the presence of
the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious
package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside.
A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation
of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a
quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court
claiming that his constitutional right of privacy
was violated and that the evidence acquired from
his package was inadmissible as evidence against
him.
Issue: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be
enforced against private individuals?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held based on the
speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of
Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts
of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr
Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the
presence of the NBI agents in his place of
business. The mere presence of the NBI agents
did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure
proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe
and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search. The judgement of conviction finding
appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged was AFFIRMED.
Stonehill vs Diokno
Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42
search warrants against petitioners personally,
and/or corporations for which they are officers
directing peace officers to search the persons of
petitioners and premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences to search for
personal properties books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents showing all
business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the
subject of the offense for violations of Central
Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations and on the
respective residences of the petitioners, there
seized documents, papers, money and other
records. Petitioners then were subjected to
deportation proceedings and were constrained to
question the legality of the searches and seizures
as well as the admissibility of those seized as
evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction and partially lifted the
same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some
documents and papers.
Held: Search warrants issued were violative of
the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or
being general warrants. There is no probable
cause and warrant did not particularly specify the
things to be seized. The purpose of the
requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers.
Document seized from an illegal search warrant is
not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous
tee. However, they could not be returned, except
if warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question
the validity and return of those taken from the
corporations for which they acted as officers as
they are treated as personality different from that
of the corporation.
Soliven vs Makasiar
FACTS: On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of
Justice denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City
Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal,
the President, through the Executive Secretary,
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Executive Secretary on May
16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners'
contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the law
has lost factual support. Petitioner Beltran also
said that the issuance of the warrant of arrest is
not valid because the judge did not personally
examined the complainant and witnesses.
.On the other hand, Petitioner Beltran argues
that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability
to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's
filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may
subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an
indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity
from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand,
she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
13 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
So, the petitioners raised 3 questions to contend
if there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondents, respectively:
(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due
process when informations for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima facie case was still under
review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or
not the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if
any, to determine probable cause; and (3)
whether or not the President of the Philippines,
under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the
filing of a complaint-affidavit.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent.
RULING: The first question was rendered moot
and academic. The allegation of denial of due
process of law in the preliminary investigation is
negated by the fact that instead of submitting his
counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare
Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to
refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the
respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is
required is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so
minded.
The second question, court interpreted the
provision under Article III, sec 2, which states
that, no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The court said that, what the Constitution
underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.
The third question, court said that, the rationale
for the grant to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being
the Chief Executive of the Government is a job
that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention.
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
The petitions fail to establish that public
respondents, through their separate acts, gravely
abused their discretion as to amount to lack of
jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the public respondents, the Court
Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos.
82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain
the status quo contained in the Resolution of the
Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated
in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Silva Vs. Presiding Judge
Facts: Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom
Detachment in Dumaguete City filed an
"application for search warrant" and "Deposition
of witness" against petitioner Nicomedes Silva
and Martin Silva. Judge Nickarter Ontal, then the
presiding judge of RTC of Dumaguete issued
Search Warrant No.1 pursuant to the said
applications for violation of RA 6425 Dangerous
Drugs ACT of 1972. Such warrant states that
there is a probable cause to believe that Mr. Tama
Silva has the possession and control of marijuana
dried leaves, cigarette and joint. The warrant
authorizes Sgt. Villamor to make an immediate
search at any time of the room of Mr. Tama Silva
at the residence of his father Comedes Silva and
to open aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartons and
containers to look for said illegal drugs. In the
course of the search, the officers seized money
belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of
P1,231.40. Petitioner filed a motion to quash
Search Warrant No.1 on the ground that 1) it was
issued on the sole basis of mimeographed 2) the
judge failed to personally examine the
complainant and witness by searching questions
and answers.
Issue: Whether or Not Search Warrant No.1 is
invalid. WON the officers abused their authority in
seizing the money of Antonieta Silva.
Held: Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid due to the
failure of the judge to examine the witness in the
form of searching questions and answers. The
questions asked were leading as they are
answerable by mere yes or no. Such questions
are not sufficiently searching to establish
probable cause. The questions were already
mimeographed and all the witness had to do was
fill in their answers on the blanks provided. Judge
Ontal is guilty of grave abuse of discretion when
he rejected the motion of Antonieta Silva seeking
the return of her money. The officers who
implemented the search warrant clearly abused
their authority when they seized the money of
Antonieta Silva. The warrant did not indicate the
seizure of money but only for marijuana leaves,
cigarettes..etc. Search Warrant No. 1 is declared
null and void.
Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court
Examination of the complainant, record -the
judge before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and any witness he may produce the
facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with their
affidavits.
14 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
Morano Vs. Vivo
FACTS: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in
Fukein, China on Jan.6,1932, arrived in the
Philippines on Nov.23, 1961 to visit her cousin,
Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in China two of her
children bt the first marriage. With her was Fu Yan
Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage on
Sept, 11, 1957.She and her son were permitted
only into the Phils. Under a temporary visitors
visa for 2 months and after they posted a cash
bond of Php4,000. On Jan. 24 1962,Chan Sau Wan
married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino
citizen, born to his union on Sept. 16, 1962 was
Esteban Morano, Jr.To prolong their stay in the
Phils., Chan Sau Wan & Fu Yan Fun obtained
several extentions. The last extention was Sept.
10,1962. On Aug. 10 1962, the Commissioner
ordered her and son to leave the countryon or
before Sept. 10, 1962 w/ a warning that upon
failure to do so, he will issue a warrant for their
arrest and will cause the confiscation of the bond.
But instead of leaving the country, on Sept. 10
1962, Chan Sau Wan w/ her husband Esteban
Morano & Fu Yan Fun petitioned the court of First
Instance of Mla. for Mandamus to compel the
Commissioner of Immigration to cancel
petitioners alien certificate of registration,
prohibition to stop him from issuing a warrant for
their arrest & preliminary injunction of
confiscating their cash bond & from issuing
warrants of arrest pending resolution of the case.
The trial court on Nov. 3, 1962, issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a Php.
2,000 bond.
ISSUE: Whether or not Chan Sau Wan and her
son Fu Yan Fun violated sec. 37(a) of the Phil.
Immigration Act and the Naturalization Law
requisite.
COURT RULING: The petition for mandamus and
prohibition w/ respect to petitioner Chan Sau Wah
was denied and the judgement declaring her a
citizen of the Phils. directed respondent to cancel
her alien certificate of registration & other
immigration papers, and declaring the
preliminary injunction w/ respect to her
permanency were all set aside. With respect to
her citizenship, Chan Sau Wah didnt possessed
all the qualifications required by the
Naturalization Law.
Harvey Vs. Santiago
Facts: Andrew Harvey( 52 years old) and John
Sherman (72 years old) are both American
nationals residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna while
Adriaan Van Elshout (58 years old) is a Dutch
citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. The
petitioners were among the twenty-two (22)
suspected alien pedophiles who were
apprehended after the three months of close
surveillance by CID (Commission on Immigration
and Deportation) agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Seized during petitioners arrest were
rolls of photo negatives and photos of the
suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious
poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the
sex act. There were also posters and other
literature advertising the child prostitutes. During
the operation Harvey was found together with
two young boys and Sherman was found with two
naked young boys inside his room and in the case
of Van Den Elshout there were two children ages
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
14-16 which subject readily accepted having
been in his care and live-in for quite some time.
Petitioners availed for this petition a writ of
Habeas Corpus questioning the validity of their
detention.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the respondent has the
authority to arrest and detain the petitioners
pending determination of the existence of
probable cause leading to an administrative
investigation.
2. Whether or not the CID agents were clothed
with valid warrants, search and seizure as
required by the Constitution.
Ruling: The right against unreasonable searches
and seizure which is guaranteed by the
constitution is available to all persons including
ALIENS whether accused of a crime or not. One of
the constitutional requirements of a valid search
warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must have a
probable cause. In this case, the arrest of
petitioners was based on a probable cause
determined after a close surveillance for three (3)
months during which period their activities was
monitored. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo
negatives, photographs and posters and the said
articles were seized as an incident to a lawful
arrest and are therefore, admissible in evidence.
The petitioners were not caught in the
act does not make their arrest illegal. The
Petitioners were found with young boys in their
respective rooms, the ones with Sherman were
naked. The CID agents had a reasonable ground
to believe that the petitioners had committed
pedophilia and it is a behavior which is
offensive to public morals and against State
policies. . Also it is a fundamental rule that a writ
of habeas corpus will not be granted when the
confinement is or has become legal, although
such confinement was illegal at the beginning.
The petition was dismissed and the Habeas
Corpus was denied.
Alvarez vs. CFI
Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department
of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn
affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in
possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by
him as money lender/usurer charging usurious
rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of
the task force, didnt say that the information was
based on his personal knowledge but was only
received by him from a reliable source.
Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant
ordering the search of Alvarez house. On June 4,
1936, the agents raided the subject place and
seized different documents namely, banknotes,
bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading,
credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles
seized was not brought immediately to the
custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez
moved that the agents of the Board be declared
guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in
question be returned to him because the SW
issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-
Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to
retain custody of the articles seized for further
investigation. When the judge sustained the
latters motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to
15 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
the SC and prayed that the search warrant as
well as the order of the judge authorizing the
Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared
null and void.
Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is
illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of
Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared
that he had no personal knowledge of the facts
which were to serve as basis for the issuance of
the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only
through information secured from a person whom
he considered reliable.
Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of
the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders
58 require that there be not only probable cause
before the issuance of a search warrant but that
the search warrant must be based upon an
application supported by oath of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce. In its
broadest sense, an oath includes any form of
attestation by which a party signifies that he is
bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully
and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an
outward pledge given by the person taking it that
his attestation or promise is made under an
immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The
oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or
his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant
is whether it has been drawn in such a manner
that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant
be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit,
which served as the exclusive basis of the search
warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by
reason of the manner in which the oath was
made, and therefore, the search warrant and the
subsequent seizure of the books, documents and
other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice
in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at
least the applicant or complainant to the
application. It is admitted that the judge who
issued the search warrant in this case, relied
exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent
Almeda and that he did not require nor take the
deposition of any other witness. The Constitution
does not provide that it is of an imperative
necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses
to be presented by the applicant or complainant
in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The
purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of
probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge
may dispense with that of other witnesses.
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was
insufficient because his knowledge of the facts
was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the
duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or
more witnesses for the purpose of determining
the existence of probable cause to warrant the
issuance of the search warrant. When the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied
that there exists probable cause; when the
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
applicants knowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses
having a personal knowledge of the facts is
necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise
illegal because it was based only on the affidavit
of the agent who had no personal knowledge of
the facts
Mata vs. Bayona
FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under
Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD
1306, the information against him alleging that
Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on
the Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets known
as Masiao tickets without any authority from the
Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or
from the government authorities concerned.
Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case,
he discovered that nowhere from the records of
the said case could be found the search warrant
and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire
from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which
inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding
Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, it is
with the court. The Judge then handed the
records to the Fiscal who attached them to the
records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash
and annul the search warrant and for the return
of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among
others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on
1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a
thorough investigation and examination under
oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T.
Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of
352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the
court made a certification to that effect; and that
the fact that documents relating to the search
warrant were not attached immediately to the
record of the criminal case is of no moment,
considering that the rule does not specify when
these documents are to be attached to the
records. Matas motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order having been denied, he came to
the Supreme Court, with the petition for
certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court
declare the search warrant to be invalid for its
alleged failure to comply with the requisites of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that
all the articles confiscated under such warrant as
inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any
proceedings on the matter.
ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition
to any affidavits presented to him?
HELD: YES. Under the Constitution no search
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
More emphatic and detailed is the implementing
rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules
provide that the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce and take their depositions in
16 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition
to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary
in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or nonexistence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the
person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that
the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the
failure of the Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the
search warrant invalid.
People v Del Rosario
Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by
the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and
illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly
methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance
of the search warrant, which authorized the
search and seizure of an undetermined quantity
of methamphetamine and its paraphernalias, an
entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of
del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its
paraphernalias and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3
live ammunition.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms
was proper.
Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution
specifically provides that a search warrant must
particularly describe the things to be seized. In
herein case, the only objects to be seized that the
warrant determined was the methamphetamine
and the paraphernalias therein. The seizure of
the firearms was unconstitutional.
Wherefore the decision is reversed and the
accused is acquitted.
Umil v Ramos
As for cases of rebellion, the case of Umil vs.
Ramos (187 SCRA 311), clearly states that since
rebellion is a continuing offense, a rebel may be
arrested at any time, with or without a warrant,
as he is deemed to be in the act of committing
the offense at any time of the day or night.
PER CURIAM
These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus
(HC) filed bef. the Court. The Court finds that the
persons detained have not been illegally arrested
nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional
right to liberty and that the circumstances
attending these cases do not warrant their
release on HC.
An arrest w/o a warrant, under Sec. 5,
pars. (a) and (b) of Rule 113, ROC, as amended is
justified when the person arrested is caught in
flagrante delicto, viz., in the act of committing an
offense; or when an offense has just been
committed and the person making the arrest has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the person arrested has committed it.
The persons in whose behalf these
petitions for HC have been filed had freshly
committed or were actually committing an
offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests,
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
w/o warrant were clearly justified, and that they
are, further detained by virtue of valid
informations filed against them in court.
In Umil v. Ramos, RIOU-CAPCOM received
confidential info. about a member of the NPA-
Sparrow unit being treated for a gunshot wound
at the St. Agnes Hospital in
Roosevelt Ave.
, Q.C. It was found that the wounded person, who
was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie
Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of
the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the
killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before.
Dural was then transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM.
Upon positive identification by an
eyewitness, Dural was referred to the Caloocan
City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and
thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an info.
charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/
Assault upon agents of persons in authority."
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil &
Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and
academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the
writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a crim.
case, who has been released on bail.
As to Dural, he was not arrested while in
the act of shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he
arrested after the commission of said offense for
his arrest came a day after the shooting incident.
However, Dural was arrested for being a member
of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest
of Dural w/o warrant is justified as it can be said
that he was committing an offense when
arrested.
The arrest of persons involved in rebellion
whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of
rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion,
than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting
them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in
the prosecution of offenses w/c requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of
probable cause bef. the issuance of a judicial
warrant and the granting of bail if the offense is
bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or
capturing persons committing overt acts of
violence against govt forces, or any other milder
acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.)
Dural was found guilty of the charge and
is now serving the sentence imposed upon him
by the trial court. Thus, the writ of HC is no
longer available
People v Sucro
Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados
house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison
SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be
selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from
Regalados house. Sucro was monitored to have
talked and exchanged things three times. These
activities are reported through radio to P/Lt.
Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with
appellant and was reported and later identified as
Ronnie Macabante. From that moment,
P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the
police officers were at the Youth Hostel in
Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to
17 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini
and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical
center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea
bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante
admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in
front of the chapel.
The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO
at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans.
Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and
another teabag from Macabante.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is
lawful.
(2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is
admissible.
Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid
warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule
126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything,
which may be used as proff of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant.(People v.
Castiller) The failure of the police officers to
secure a warrant stems from the fact that their
knowledge required from the surveillance was
insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance.
However, warantless search and seizures are
legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The
police officers have personal knowledge of the
actual commission of the crime from the
surveillance of the activities of the accused. As
police officers were the ones conducting the
surveillance, it is presumed that they are
regularly in performance of their duties.
People v Rodrigueza
buy-bust operation and raid without search
warrant
Facts: An informer of the Narcotics Division
reported activity on illegal drug trafficking to the
authorities and a buy-bust operation was
conducted where the informer successfully
bought 100 grams of marijuana for P10.00 from
the accused. The authorities immediately
conducted a raid and apprehended the accused
while confiscating marijuana leaves and syringes.
The raid however was not authorized by a search
warrant. Accused now contends that the court
erred in admitting the evidence seized without
any search warrant and in violation of his
constitutional rights.
Issue: Whether or not evidence obtained without
a valid search warrant may be used to prosecute
the accused.
Held: The court held that a buy bust operation is
a form of entrapment employed by peace officers
to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in
flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug
dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of
selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a
person acting or posing as a buyer. In the instant
case, however, the procedure adopted by the
NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification.
The Narcom agents should have secured a valid
search warrant prior the raid since they have
already been conducting surveillance against the
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
accused for quite sometime already and the
urgency of their cause of action cannot be
justified in court. Hence the accused was
acquitted.
Go v CA
Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong
direction on a one-way street, almost had a
collision with another vehicle. Petitioner
thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the
other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the
incident was able to take down petitioners plate
number and reported the same to the police, who
subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6
days after the shooting, petitioner presented
himself in the police station, accompanied by 2
lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a
criminal charge was brought against him.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the
case to the lower court, setting and commencing
trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor
reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted
and that such situation, that petitioner has been
arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under
Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of
The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to
situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner
in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure
and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary
investigation.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not warrantless arrest of
petitioner was lawful.
(2) Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived
his right to preliminary investigation.
Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on
Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the
warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days
from actual commission of the offenses, which
however constituted continuing crimes, i.e.
subversion, membership in an outlawed
organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless
arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because
the arresting officers were not actually there
during the incident, thus they had no personal
knowledge and their information regarding
petitioner were derived from other sources.
Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he
walked in the police station, he neither expressed
surrender nor any statement that he was or was
not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was
filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation
should have been scheduled to determine
probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive
error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary
investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge,
where the same is required appear thereat.
Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct
preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal
case is suspended pending result from
preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered
released upon posting a bail bond.
Posadas v CA
Facts: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both
members of the INP of the Davao Metrodiscom
assigned w/ the Intelligence Task Force, were
18 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes, St.,
Davao City. While they were w/in the premises of
the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed
him to be acting suspiciously. They approached
the petitioner and identified themselves as
members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee
but was stopped by the 2. They then checked the
"buri" bag of the petitioner where they found 1
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, w/ 2 rounds
of live ammunition for a .38 cal. gun, a smoke
grenade, & 2 live ammunition for a .22 cal. gun.
Petitioner was brought to the police station for
further investigation. He was prosecuted for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in
the RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not
guilty, and trial on the merits, a decision was
rendered finding petitioner guilty. The CA
affirmed the appealed decision in toto.
Hence, the petition for review, the main
thrust of w/c is that there being no lawful arrest
or search and seizure, the items w/c were
confiscated from the possession of the petitioner
are inadmissible in evidence against him.
The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. 12,
R 136 of ROC, a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything (w/c
may be) used as proof of a commission of an
offense, w/o a SW.
HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that
an arrest w/o a warrant may be effected by a
peace officer or private person, among others,
when in his presence the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense, or when an
offense has in fact, just been committed, & he
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the person arrested has committed it.
At the time the peace officers identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee, they did not know that he had
committed, or was actually committing, the
offense. They just suspected that he was hiding
something in the buri bag. They did not know
what its contents were. The said circumstances
did not justify an arrest w/o a warrant.
However, there are many instances where
a warrant & seizure can be effected w/o
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost
of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW at military
or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of w/c
has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. de
Villa.
As bet. a warrantless search and seizure
(S & S) conducted at military or police
checkpoints and the search thereof in the case at
bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is
more reasonable considering that, unlike in the
former, it was effected on the basis of a probable
cause. The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to
flee w/ the buri bag, there was a probable cause
that he was concealing something illegal in the
bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police
officers to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a
SW for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove
to be useless, futile and much too late.
As the Sol-Gen said:
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
 "The assailed S & S may still be
justified as akin to a 'stop and frisk' situation
whose object is either to determine the identity of
suspicious individuals or to maintain the status
quo momentarily while the police officers seeks
to obtain more info. ... The US SC held in Terry v.
Ohio that "a police officer may in appropriate
circumstances & in an appropriate manner
approach a person for the purpose of
investigating possible criminal behaviour even
though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an
officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder
and allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious
individual briefly in order to determine his
identity or maintaing the status quo while
obtaining more info."
PETITION DENIED. RAM.
(not in VV's revised outline)
(e) When there is a valid
express waiver made voluntarily and intelligently.
Waiver cannot be implied from the fact
that the person consented or did not object to the
search, for it many happen that he did so only out
of respect for the authorities. The waiver must
be expressly made.
People v Mengote
Facts: The Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were
three suspicious looking persons at the corner of
Juan Luna and side to side, one of whom holding
his abdomen. They approached the persons and
identified themselves as policemen, whereupon
the two tried to run but unable to escape because
the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects
were then searched. One of them the accused-
appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live
ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan
knife. The weapons were taken from them and
they were turned over to the police headquarters
for investigation. An information was filed before
the RTC convicting the accused of illegal
possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that
the weapon was among the articles stolen at his
shop, which he reported to the police including
the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort
to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he
was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed
that the weapon was planted on him at the time
of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of
P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the
weapon was not admissible as evidence against
him because it had been illegally seized and
therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and
arrest was illegal.
Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an
illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III
sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the
Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant
lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the
offense in fact has just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
19 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
the person arrested has committed it and (c) the
person to be arrested has escaped from a penal
establishment or a place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in
the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused appellant was merely
looking from side to side and holding his
abdomen, according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that
has just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempt by Mengote
in their presence. Moreover a person may not be
stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a
busy street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-
appellant is acquitted.
North Bay Boulevard
in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the
place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from
Malacat v CA
Facts: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m.,
allegedly in response to bomb threats reported
seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western
Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the
Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3,
Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform) along
Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the
Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men,
with each group, comprised of three to four men,
posted at opposite sides of the corner of stop
and frisk, where a warrant and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by
an arrest and whose object is either to maintain
the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information; and
that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus
found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD
1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more
than 30 years of Reclusion Perpetua, as
maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a
notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing
to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the
case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-
GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Manalili filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.
Quezon Boulevard
near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were
acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very
fast. Yu and his companions positioned
themselves at strategic points and observed both
groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers
then approached one group of men, who then
fled in different directions. As the policemen gave
chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended
Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized,
inasmuch as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25
August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw
Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a
fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latters
front waist line. Yus companion, police officer
Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from
whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered.
Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police
Station 3 where Yu placed an X mark at the
bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to
his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for
the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat.
On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with
violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At
arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner,
assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of
not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and
explained that he only recently arrived in Manila.
However, several other police officers mauled
him, hitting him with benches and guns.
Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing
was found on him. He saw the grenade only in
court when it was presented. In its decision dated
10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15
February 1994, the trial court ruled that the
warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was
akin to a
Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is
valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and
frisk.
Held: The general rule as regards arrests,
searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed
in order to validly effect the same. The
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those
effected without a validly issued warrant, subject
to certain exceptions. As regards valid
warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless
arrest under the circumstances contemplated
under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one
in flagrante delicto, while that under Section
5(b) has been described as a hot pursuit arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are
limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence
in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search
incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a stop and
frisk. The concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be
confused. These two types of warrantless
searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum
of proof before they may be validly effected and
in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to
a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search
in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the
part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating
that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed. Plainly,
the search conducted on Malacat could not have
been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the
other hand, while probable cause is not required
to conduct a stop and frisk, it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officers
experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-
20 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of
safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with
a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against the police officer. Here,
there are at least three (3) reasons why the
stop-and-frisk was invalid: First, there is grave
doubts as to Yus claim that Malacat was a
member of the group which attempted to bomb
Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither
supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who
allegedly chased that group. Second, there was
nothing in Malacats behavior or conduct which
could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving
very fast an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were
nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30
p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his
companions were merely standing at the corner
and were not creating any commotion or trouble.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or
otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for
as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
discovered inside the front waistline of
Malacat, and from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale
bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What
is unequivocal then are blatant violations of
Malacats rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections
2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
People v. Aminudin
(Inadmissible Evidence; Invalid Search)
- Aminudin was arrested shortly after
disembarking from a ship. His bag was inspected
which contained marijuana.
- The prosecution had earlier an information that
a marijuana would be transported in Iloilo. Acting
on the tip, they waited till evening when the ship
embarked. They informant pointed on Aminudin
followed by the arrest and search.
- Aminudin disclaimed of the marijuana. He also
invoked that he was arbitrary arrested and was
searched without warrant. He was convicted by
the trial court.
- In this court he pleaded to reverse the ruling on
the ground that the evidence against him was
inadmissible.
SC: Tip they received from the informant was
alleged to be 2 days prior the arrest. The present
case presented no such urgency. From the
conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which
they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the
M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle
was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain.
And from the information they had received, they
could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of
a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights
was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant
who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search
warrant was not necessary.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not,
at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or
that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9
and there was no outward indication that called
for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any
of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana
that he suddenly became suspect and so subject
to apprehension. This is not inflagrante delicto.
ACQUITTED.
People v Malmstedt
Facts: In an information filed against the
accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was
charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet,
for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national,
entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the
country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for
Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the
morning of the following day, he took a bus to
Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the
accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that
same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional
Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay,
Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The
order to establish a checkpoint in the said area
was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana
and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information
was received by the Commanding Officer of
NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven
(7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay
Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the
designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning and inspected all vehicles coming from
the Cordillera Region.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their
inspection from the front going towards the rear
of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner
riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a
bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge
on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked
for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the
officer required him to bring out whatever it was
that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object
turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
21 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer
noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the
officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The
wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a
derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus
for questioning. But before he alighted from the
bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling
bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out
of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened
them. A teddy bear was found in each bag.
Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that
there were bulges inside the same which did not
feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the
officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of
the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the
investigation room, the officers opened the teddy
bears and they were found to also contain
hashish. Representative samples were taken from
the hashish found among the personal effects of
accused and the same were brought to the PC
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that
the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited
drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an
information was filed against accused for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ACCUSEDS DEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea
of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue
of illegal search of his personal effects. He also
claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the
two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him,
but were merely entrusted to him by an
Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He
further claimed that the Australian couple
intended to take the same bus with him but
because there were no more seats available in
said bus, they decided to take the next ride and
asked accused to take charge of the bags, and
that they would meet each other at the Dangwa
Station.
The trial court found the guilt of the accused
Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable
doubt.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial
court finding him guilty of the crime charged,
accused argues that the search of his personal
effects was illegal because it was made without a
search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited
drugs which were discovered during the illegal
search are not admissible as evidence against
him.
Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the
accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be
reversed.
Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
searches and seizures. However, where the
search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there
is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful
arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
officer or a private person under the following
circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Accused was searched and arrested while
transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime
was actually being committed by the accused
and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless
search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true
that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a
search warrant when the search was made over
the personal effects of accused, however, under
the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to
believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts
and circumstances which could lead a opposition, allegingthat the court had no
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless
search of the personal effects of an accused has
been declared by this Court as valid, because of
existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by
the accused, 10 or where the accused was acting
suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee.
The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial
court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the
accused-appellant.
PAPA v. MAGO
Facts: Original action in the SC for prohibition
and certiorari, praying for the annulment of the
order issued by respondent
judgeParties:Petitioners:Ricardo G. Papa (Chief of
Police of Manila), Juan Ponce Enrile
(Commissioner of Customs), Pedro Pacis(Collector
of Customs of the Port of Manila), Martin Alagao
(Patrolman, head of counter-intelligence of
theManila Police
Department)Respondents:Remedios MagoHilarion
Jarencio (Presiding Judge of Br. 23, CFI of Manila)J.
ZaldivarNovember 4, 1966 having received
22 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
information the day before that a certain
shipment of misdeclared andundervalued
personal effects would be released from the
customs zone of the port of Manila, Alagao and
aduly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs
conducted surveillance of two trucks allegedly
carrying thegoods. When the trucks left the
customs zone, elements of the counter-
intelligence unit intercepted them inErmita. The
trucks and the nine bales of goods they carried
were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police.
Upon investigation those claiming ownership
showed the policemen a Statement of Receipts
of Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-
5501 issued by the Bureau of Customs in the
name of oneBienvenido Naguit.Mago filed with
the CFI of Manila a Petition for Mandamus with
restraining order or preliminary injunction,
alleging that she was the owner of the goods
seized, which were purchased from Sta.
MonicaGrocery in San Fernando, Pampanga. She
hired the trucks owned by Lanopa (who filed with
her) to bringthe goods to her residence in
Sampaloc, Manila. She complained that the goods
were seized without a warrant, and that they
were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of
the Tariff and Customs Code even if they were
misdeclared and undervalued because she had
bought them without knowing they had
beenimported illegally. They asked that the police
not open the bales, the goods be returned, and
for moral andexemplary damages.November 10,
1966 Judge issued an order restraining the
police from opening the nine bales in question,
but by then some had already been opened. Five
days later Mago filed an amended petition
including asparty defendants Pedro Pacis and
Martin Alagao.December 23, 1966 Mago filed a
motion to release the goods, alleging that since
the inventory ordered by the court of the goods
seized did not show any article of prohibited
importation, the same should be releasedupon
her posting of the appropriate bond. The
petitioners in the instant case filed their
jurisdiction over the case and thus no jurisdiction
to order the release (case under jurisdiction of
CTA), and as the goods were not declared they
were subject to forfeiture.
March 7, 1967 assailed Order issued by
Jarencio, authorized release under bond of goods
seized and held by petitioners in connection with
the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code.
The bond of P40,000.00 was filed five days later.
On the same day, Papa filed on his own behalf a
motion for reconsideration on theground that the
Manila Police Department had been directed by
the Collector of Customs to hold the
goodspending termination of the seizure
proceedings. Without waiting for the courts
action on the MR, petitioners filed the present
action. Arguments of Petitioners (that seem
important)(1) CFI had no jurisdiction over the
case(2) Mago had no cause of action in the civil
case filed with the CFI due to her failure to
exhaust alladministrative remedies before
invoking judicial intervention Arguments of
Respondents(1) It was within the jurisdiction of
the lower court presided by respondent Judge to
hear and decide CivilCase No. 67496 and to issue
the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because
said Civil Case No. 67496 wasinstituted long
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
before seizure, and identification proceedings
against the nine bales of goods in question were
instituted by the Collector of Customs(2)
Petitioners could no longer go after the goods in
question after the corresponding duties and taxes
had been paid and said goods had left the
customs premises and were no longer within the
control of the Bureauof Customs
Issue: WON the judge acted with jurisdiction in
issuing the Order releasing the goods in question
HELD: NO. Petition granted, case filed by Mago
dismissed.The Bureau of Customs has the duties,
powers and jurisdiction, among others, to(1)
assess and collect all lawful revenues from
imported articles, and all other dues, fees,
charges, fines andpenalties, accruing under the
tariff and customs laws(2) prevent and suppress
smuggling and other frauds upon the customs;
and(3) to enforce tariff and customs laws.The
goods in question were imported from Hongkong,
as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of
DutiesCollected on Informal Entry". As long as the
importation has not been terminated the
importedgoods remain under the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of customs. Importation is
deemedterminated only upon the payment of the
duties, taxes and other charges upon the
articles,or secured to be paid, at the port of entry
and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have
beengranted. The payment of the duties, taxes,
fees and other charges must be in full.The record
shows, by comparing the articles and duties
stated in the aforesaid "Statementand Receipts of
Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the
manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
General wherein it is stated that the estimated
duties, taxes and other chargeson the goods
subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as
evidenced by the report of theappraiser of the
Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and
other charges had not been paid infull.
Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which
duties had been assessed, as shown in the
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing
the articlesfound in the bales upon examination
and inventory, shows that the quantity of the
goods wasunderdeclared, presumably to avoid
the payment of duties thereon. (e.g. 40 pieces of
ladiessweaters assessed in the Statement when
there actually 42 dozen; 100 watch bands were
assessed but 2,209dozen, etc.) The articles
contained in the nine bales in question, were,
therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section
2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the
Tariff and Customs Code. The Court had held
before (and did again in this case) that
merchandise, the importation of which is effected
contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, and that
goods released contrary to law are subject to
seizureand forfeiture.
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the
goods in question had been brought out of the
customs areathe Bureau of Customs had lost
jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when
said goods were interceptedat the Agrifina Circle
on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila
Police Department, acting underdirections and
orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had
been formally deputized by theCommissioner of
23 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
Customs, the Bureau of Customs had regained
jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section
1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes
upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold
possession of all imported articles upon which
duties, taxes, and other charges havenot been
paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the
same according to law. The goodsin question,
therefore, were under the custody and at the
disposal of the Bureau of Customsat the time the
petition for mandamus was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila onNovember 9, 1966. The
Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could
not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if
the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods
for thepurposes of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings had not yet been issued by the
Collectorof Customs. The Court reiterated its
ruling in De Joya v. Lantin: The owner of seized
goods may set up defenses beforethe
Commissioner of Customs during the proceedings
following seizure. From his decision appeal may
bemade to the Court of Tax Appeals. To permit
recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of
seizure of imported goods would in effect render
ineffective the power of the Customs authorities
under the Tariff andCustoms Code and deprive
the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive
appellate jurisdictions. Republic Acts 1937 and
1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings exclusively uponthe Bureau of
Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law
being special in nature, whilethe Judiciary Act
defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance
is a general legislation,not to mention that the
former are later enactments, the Court of First
Instance should yieldto the jurisdiction of the
Customs authorities.The Bureau of Customs
acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported
goods, for thepurposes of enforcement of the
customs laws, from the moment the goods are
actually in itspossession or control, even if no
warrant of seizure or detention had previously
been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. In thepresent case, the Bureau of
Customs actually seized the goods in question on
November 4,1966, and so from that date the
Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the
goods forthe purposes of the enforcement of the
tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of
theregular courts. Much less then would the Court
of First Instance of Manila have jurisdictionover
the goods in question after the Collector of
Customs had issued the warrant of seizureand
detention on January 12, 1967.
Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods,
itfollows that the Court of First Instance of Manila
had no jurisdiction to issue the questionedorder
of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
People v Musa
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information
that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana
in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was
ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to
conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The
civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and
gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for
P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to
raise his right hand if he successfully buys
marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the
house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves
about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position,
Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came
out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted.
Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave
Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into
the house and came back, giving Ani two
newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana.
Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right
hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents,
and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside
the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room
but did not find the marked money (gave it to his
wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt.
Lego went to the kitchen and found a cellophane
colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of
the kitchen. They asked Musa about its contents
but failed to get a response. So they opened it
and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa
was then placed under arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic
bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable,
hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and
seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include
the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the plain view of
an officer who has the right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may
be presented as evidence. The plain view
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure
of the object where the incriminating nature of
the object is not apparent from the plain view of
the object.
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the
plain view of the police. They arrested the
accused in the living room and moved into the
kitchen in search for other evidences where they
found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana
inside the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the plain view of said object.
Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The
plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be
presented in evidence pursuant to Article III
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
Valmonte v De Villa
Facts: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated w/
the mission of conducting security operations
w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the
social, economic and political dev't of the NCR.
As part of its duty to maitain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela and MM. Petitioners aver that, bec. of
24 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l protection
the institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela
residents are worried of being harassed and of
their sarety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering
that their cars and vehicles are being subjected
to regular searches and check-ups, especially at
night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or court order.
Their alleged fear for their safety increased when
Benjamin Parpon, was gaunned down allegedly in
cold blood by members of the NCRDC for ignoring
and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of warning
shots fired in the air.
HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and
apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient
grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal.
No proof has been presented before the Court to
show that, in the course of their routine checks,
the military, indeed, committed specific violations
of petitioners' rights against unlawful search and
seizure of other rights. The constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invocable only by those whose
rights have been infringed, or threatened to be
infringed. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those w/c are reasonable are not
forbidden. The setting up of the questioned
checkpoints may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its
mission of establishing effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for the
benfit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be
regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the govt, in the interest of public
security. Between the inherent right of the state
to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail. True, the
manning of checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the military in the same
manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted w/in
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.
MICLAT vs PEOPLE
Facts: Police operatives including PDEA
conducted a surveillance of drug trafficking in
Palmera SpringII, Bagumbong, Caloocan City. The
informant of the police directed them to the
residence of a certainABE PO3 Antonio then
positioned himself at the perimeter of the house,
while the rest of the membersof the group
deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small
opening in the curtain-covered window,
PO3Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance
of 1 meters, he saw Abe arranging several
pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed
to be containing shabu. At the same instance
they arrested the petitioner. However, the version
of the petitioner is that, together with her father
and sister whilewatching television the police
operatives barrage themselves into their house
and that the shabu was later planted to the
petitioner while travelling to the police
station.The trial court rendered the decision
finding the petitioner guilty of Violation of Section
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
11, Article II of RA No. 9165. The CA subsequently
affirmed the trial court decision. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A
CURTAIN-COVERED WINDOW IS WITHINTHE
MEANING OF PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE FOR A
WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BELAWFUL.WHETHER
OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY APPRAISED
(SIC) OF HISCONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE
INFORMED OF THE CAUSE AND NATURE OF HIS
ARRESTAND RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY COUNSEL
DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS ARREST
ANDCONTINUED DETENTION.WHETHER OR NOT
ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC
SACHETSCONSTITUTE AS A CRIME WITHIN THE
MEANING OF SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF
THERULES OF COURT.
Heald: Supreme Court ruled that at the time of
petitioners arraignment, there was no objection
raised asto the irregularity of his arrest.
Thereafter, he actively participated in the
proceedings before the trialcourt. In effect, he is
deemed to have waived any perceived defect in
his arrest and effectively submittedhimself to the
jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any
rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is
notsufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after a trial freefrom error. It will not even negate
the validity of the conviction of the accused.While
it is true that Sec. 2 of the bill of rights preserves
the rights of individuals of illegal searchand
seizure. However, a settled exception to the right
guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that
of an arrest made during the commission of a
crime, which does not require a previously issued
warrant.Such warrantless arrest is considered
reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule
113 of the RevisedRules on Criminal Procedure, to
wit: Sec. 5.
Arrest without warrant; when lawful a peace
office of a private person may, without awarrant,
arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or isattempting to commit an
offense;For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule
113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, isactually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited
drug to lie, the following elements must
beestablished: (1) the accused was in possession
of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was
freely andconsciously aware of being in
possession of the drug.Supreme Court ruled there
is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of
fact of the trial court. Noevidence exist that
shows any apparent inconsistencies in the
narration of the prosecution witnesses of
theevents which transpired and led to the arrest
of petitioner. After a careful evaluation of the
records, Wefind no error was committed by the
RTC and the CA to disregard their factual findings
that petitioner committed the crime charged
against him
25 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l protection
RULE 113 - ARREST
Section 1. Definition of arrest. Arrest is the
taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense.
Sec. 2. Arrest; how made. An arrest is made by
an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or
by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in
making an arrest. The person arrested shall not
be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary
for his detention.
Sec. 3. Duty of arresting officer. It shall be the
duty of the officer executing the warrant to arrest
the accused and deliver him to the nearest police
station or jail without unnecessary delay.
Sec. 4. Execution of warrant. The head of the
office to whom the warrant of arrest was
delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to
be executed within ten (10) days from its receipt.
Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the
period, the officer to whom it was assigned for
execution shall make a report to the judge who
issued the warrant. In case of his failure to
execute the warrant, he shall state the reason
therefore.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Sec. 6. Time of making arrest. An arrest may be
made on any day and at any time of the day or
night.
Sec. 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of
warrant. When making an arrest by virtue of a
warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be
arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact
that a warrant has been issued for his arrest,
except when he flees or forcibly resists before the
officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when
the giving of such information will imperil the
arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in
his possession at the time of the arrest but after
the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the
warrant shall be shown to him as soon as
practicable.chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 8. Method of arrest by officer without
warrant. When making an arrest without a
warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be
arrested of his authority and the cause of the
arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the
commission of an offense, is pursued immediately
after its commission, has escaped, flees, or
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity
to so inform him, or when the giving of such
information will imperil the arrest.
Sec. 9. Method of arrest by private person.
When making an arrest, a private person shall
inform the person to be arrested of the intention
to arrest him and the case of the arrest, unless
the latter is either engaged in the commission of
an offense, is pursued immediately after its
commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly
resists before the person making the arrest has
opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving
of such information will imperil the arrest.
Sec. 10. Officer may summon assistance. An
officer making a lawful arrest may orally summon
as many persons as he deems necessary to assist
him in effecting the arrest. Every person so
summoned by an officer shall assist him in
effecting the arrest when he can render such
assistance without detriment to himself.
Sec. 11. Right of officer to break into building or
enclosure. An officer, in order to make an arrest
either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant
as provided in section 5, may break into any
building or enclosure where the person to be
arrested is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is
refused admittance thereto, after announcing his
authority and purpose.
Sec. 12. Right to break out from building or
enclosure. Whenever an officer has entered the
building or enclosure in accordance with the
preceding section, he may break out therefrom
when necessary to liberate himself.
Sec. 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. If a
person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued,
any person may immediately pursue or retake
him without a warrant at any time and in any
place within the Philippines.
Sec. 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit
person arrested. Any member of the Philippine
Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or
of another acting in his behalf, have the right to
visit and confer privately with such person in the
jail or any other place of custody at any hour of
the day or night. Subject to reasonable
regulations, a relative of the person arrested can
also exercise the same right.
RULE 126 - SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Section 1. Search warrant defined. A search
warrant is an order in writing issued in the name
of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him
to search for personal property described therein
and bring it before the courtSec. 2. Court where
application for search warrant shall be filed. An
application for search warrant shall be filed with
the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a
crime was committed.chan robles virtual law
library
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the
application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the warrant
shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been
filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending.
Sec. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure
of personal property:
26 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or
fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A
search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witness he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may
be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record.
The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements,
together with the affidavits submitted.
Sec. 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If
the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts
upon which the application is based or that there
is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
shall issue the warrant, which must be
substantially in the form prescribed by these
Rules.
Sec. 7. Right to break door or window to effect
search. The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer
or inner door or window of a house or any part of
a house or anything therein to execute the
warrant to liberate himself or any person lawfully
aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Sec. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be
made in presence of two witnesses. No search
of a house, room, or any other premises shall be
made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or
in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality.chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 9. Time of making search. The warrant
must direct that it be served in the day time,
unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on
the person or in the place ordered to be
searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day
or night.
Sec. 10. Validity of search warrant. A search
warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its
date. Thereafter, it shall be void.
Sec. 11. Receipt for the property seized. The
officer seizing the property under the warrant
must give a detailed receipt for the same to the
lawful occupant of the premises in whose
presence the search and seizure were made, or in
the absence of such occupant, must, in the
presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality,
leave a receipt in the place in which he found the
seized property.
Sec. 12. Delivery of property and inventory
thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the
property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof
duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search
warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
return has been made, and if none, shall summon
the person to whom the warrant was issued and
require him to explain why no return was made. If
the return has been made, the judge shall
ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has
been complied with and shall require that the
property seized be delivered to him. The judge
shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been
complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed
and kept by the custodian of the log book on
search warrants who shall enter therein the date
of the return, the result, and other actions of the
judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute
contempt of court.
Sec. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant.
Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to
suppress evidence; where to file. A motion to
quash a search warrant and/or to suppress
evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and
acted upon only by the court where the action
has been instituted. If no criminal action has been
instituted, the motion may be filed in and
resolved by the court that issued search warrant.
However, if such court failed to resolve the
motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed
in another court, the motion shall be resolved by
the latter court.
(Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v. DSWD
Secretary, G.R. No. 175356, December 03,
2013)
2013-0028: manila memorial park, inc. And la
funeraria paz-sucat, inc., petitioners, -versus-
secretary of the department of social welfare and
development and the secretary of the
department of finance (g.r. no. 175356, 03
december 2013, del castillo j.)Subject/s: legality
of discounts for senior citizens (brief title: manila
memorial vs. Dswd secretary)
Dispositive:
wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.
so ordered.
Subjects/doctrines/digest:
Petitioners argue that the discount given to senior
citizens (under r.a. 7432 as amended by r.a.
9257) will force establishments to raise their
prices in order to compensate for its impact on
overall profits or income/gross sales. The general
public, or those not belonging to the senior
citizen class, are, thus, made to effectively
shoulder the subsidy for senior citizens. This,
in petitioners view, is unfair. Is petitioners
contention correct?
No.
Congress may be reasonably assumed to
have foreseen this eventuality. But, more
importantly, this goes into the wisdom,
efficacy and expediency of the subject law which
is not proper for judicial review.
27 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
In a way, this law pursues its social equity
objective in a non-traditional manner unlike past
and existing direct subsidy programs of the
government for the poor and marginalized
sectors of our society. Verily, congress must be
given sufficient leeway in formulating welfare
legislations given the enormous challenges that
the government faces relative to, among others,
resource adequacy and administrative capability
in implementing social reform measures which
aim to protect and uphold the interests of those
most vulnerable in our society. In the process,
the individual, who enjoys the rights, benefits and
privileges of living in a democratic polity, must
bear his share in supporting measures intended
for the common good.
Without the requisite showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the constitution, the
validity of the assailed law must be sustained.
(Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v. DSWD
Secretary, G.R. No. 175356, December 03,
2013)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 175356. December 3, 2013.]
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA
FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC., petitioners, vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT and THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE, respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
When a party challenges the constitutionality of a
law, the burden of proof rests upon him. 1
Before us is a Petition for Prohibition 2 under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Manila
Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria Paz-Sucat,
Inc., domestic corporations engaged in the
business of providing funeral and burial services,
against public respondents Secretaries of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) and the Department of Finance (DOF).
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4
of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432, 3 as amended by
RA 9257, 4 and the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar
as these allow business establishments to claim
the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax
deduction. TECcHA
Factual Antecedents
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law,
granting senior citizens the following privileges:
SECTION 4.Privileges for the Senior Citizens.
The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following:
a)the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount
from all establishments relative to utilization of
transportation services, hotels and similar lodging
establishment[s], restaurants and recreation
centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in
the country: Provided, That private
establishments may claim the cost as tax credit;
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
b)a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount
on admission fees charged by theaters, cinema
houses and concert halls, circuses, carnivals and
other similar places of culture, leisure, and
amusement;
c)exemption from the payment of individual
income taxes: Provided, That their annual taxable
income does not exceed the property level as
determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year;
d)exemption from training fees for socioeconomic
programs undertaken by the OSCA as part of its
work;
e)free medical and dental services in government
establishment[s] anywhere in the country,
subject to guidelines to be issued by the
Department of Health, the Government Service
Insurance System and the Social Security
System; EaHATD
f)to the extent practicable and feasible, the
continuance of the same benefits and privileges
given by the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and
PAG-IBIG, as the case may be, as are enjoyed by
those in actual service.
On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR)
No. 02-94 was issued to implement RA 7432.
Sections 2 (i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 provide:
Sec. 2.DEFINITIONS. For purposes of these
regulations:
i.Tax Credit refers to the amount representing
the 20% discount granted to a qualified senior
citizen by all establishments relative to their
utilization of transportation services, hotels and
similar lodging establishments, restaurants,
drugstores, recreation centers, theaters, cinema
houses, concert halls, circuses, carnivals and
other similar places of culture, leisure and
amusement, which discount shall be deducted by
the said establishments from their gross income
for income tax purposes and from their gross
sales for value-added tax or other percentage tax
purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4.RECORDING/BOOKKEEPING
REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS.
Private establishments, i.e., transport services,
hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants, recreation centers, drugstores,
theaters, cinema houses, concert halls, circuses,
carnivals and other similar places of culture[,]
leisure and amusement, giving 20% discounts to
qualified senior citizens are required to keep
separate and accurate record[s] of sales made to
senior citizens, which shall include the name,
identification number, gross sales/receipts,
discounts, dates of transactions and invoice
number for every transaction. cISDHE
The amount of 20% discount shall be deducted
from the gross income for income tax purposes
and from gross sales of the business enterprise
concerned for purposes of the VAT and other
percentage taxes.
28 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central
Luzon Drug Corporation, 5 the Court declared
Sections 2 (i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 as erroneous
because these contravene RA 7432, 6 thus:
RA 7432 specifically allows private
establishments to claim as tax credit the amount
of discounts they grant. In turn, the Implementing
Rules and Regulations, issued pursuant thereto,
provide the procedures for its availment. To deny
such credit, despite the plain mandate of the law
and the regulations carrying out that mandate, is
indefensible.
First, the definition given by petitioner is
erroneous. It refers to tax credit as the amount
representing the 20 percent discount that "shall
be deducted by the said establishments from
their gross income for income tax purposes and
from their gross sales for value-added tax or
other percentage tax purposes." In ordinary
business language, the tax credit represents the
amount of such discount. However, the manner
by which the discount shall be credited against
taxes has not been clarified by the revenue
regulations. aHcACT
By ordinary acceptation, a discount is an
"abatement or reduction made from the gross
amount or value of anything." To be more precise,
it is in business parlance "a deduction or lowering
of an amount of money;" or "a reduction from the
full amount or value of something, especially a
price." In business there are many kinds of
discount, the most common of which is that
affecting the income statement or financial report
upon which the income tax is based.
xxx xxx xxx
Sections 2.i and 4 of Revenue Regulations No.
(RR) 2-94 define tax credit as the 20 percent
discount deductible from gross income for income
tax purposes, or from gross sales for VAT or other
percentage tax purposes. In effect, the tax credit
benefit under RA 7432 is related to a sales
discount. This contrived definition is improper,
considering that the latter has to be deducted
from gross sales in order to compute the gross
income in the income statement and cannot be
deducted again, even for purposes of computing
the income tax.
When the law says that the cost of the discount
may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the
amount when claimed shall be treated as a
reduction from any tax liability, plain and simple.
The option to avail of the tax credit benefit
depends upon the existence of a tax liability, but
to limit the benefit to a sales discount which is
not even identical to the discount privilege that is
granted by law does not define it at all and
serves no useful purpose. The definition must,
therefore, be stricken down. DcSTaC
Laws Not Amended
by Regulations
Second, the law cannot be amended by a mere
regulation. In fact, a regulation that "operates to
create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a
mere nullity;" it cannot prevail.
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest

It is a cardinal rule that courts "will and should
respect the contemporaneous construction
placed upon a statute by the executive officers
whose duty it is to enforce it . . . ." In the scheme
of judicial tax administration, the need for
certainty and predictability in the implementation
of tax laws is crucial. Our tax authorities fill in the
details that "Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide." The
regulations these authorities issue are relied upon
by taxpayers, who are certain that these will be
followed by the courts. Courts, however, will not
uphold these authorities' interpretations when
clearly absurd, erroneous or improper.
In the present case, the tax authorities have
given the term tax credit in Sections 2.i and 4 of
RR 2-94 a meaning utterly in contrast to what RA
7432 provides. Their interpretation has muddled .
. . the intent of Congress in granting a mere
discount privilege, not a sales discount. The
administrative agency issuing these regulations
may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of
the law it administers; it cannot engraft additional
requirements not contemplated by the
legislature.
In case of conflict, the law must prevail. A
"regulation adopted pursuant to law is law."
Conversely, a regulation or any portion thereof
not adopted pursuant to law is no law and has
neither the force nor the effect of law. 7
On February 26, 2004, RA 9257 8 amended
certain provisions of RA 7432, to wit: HSCATc
SECTION 4.Privileges for the Senior Citizens.
The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following:
(a)the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount
from all establishments relative to the utilization
of services in hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants and recreation
centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral
and burial services for the death of senior
citizens;
xxx xxx xxx
The establishment may claim the discounts
granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax
deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold
or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of
the discount shall be allowed as deduction from
gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted. Provided, further, That the
total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of
value added tax if applicable, shall be included in
their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and
shall be subject to proper documentation and to
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended.
To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the
Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4-2006, the
pertinent provision of which provides:
SEC. 8.AVAILMENT BY ESTABLISHMENTS OF SALES
DISCOUNTS AS DEDUCTION FROM GROSS
29 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l protection
INCOME. Establishments enumerated in
subparagraph (6) hereunder granting sales
discounts to senior citizens on the sale of goods
and/or services specified thereunder are entitled
to deduct the said discount from gross income
subject to the following conditions: caIDSH
(1)Only that portion of the gross sales
EXCLUSIVELY USED, CONSUMED OR ENJOYED BY
THE SENIOR CITIZEN shall be eligible for the
deductible sales discount.
(2)The gross selling price and the sales discount
MUST BE SEPARATELY INDICATED IN THE OFFICIAL
RECEIPT OR SALES INVOICE issued by the
establishment for the sale of goods or services to
the senior citizen.
(3)Only the actual amount of the discount
granted or a sales discount not exceeding 20% of
the gross selling price can be deducted from the
gross income, net of value added tax, if
applicable, for income tax purposes, and from
gross sales or gross receipts of the business
enterprise concerned, for VAT or other percentage
tax purposes.
(4)The discount can only be allowed as deduction
from gross income for the same taxable year that
the discount is granted.
(5)The business establishment giving sales
discounts to qualified senior citizens is required to
keep separate and accurate record[s] of sales,
which shall include the name of the senior citizen,
TIN, OSCA ID, gross sales/receipts, sales discount
granted, [date] of [transaction] and invoice
number for every sale transaction to senior
citizen.
(6)Only the following business establishments
which granted sales discount to senior citizens on
their sale of goods and/or services may claim the
said discount granted as deduction from gross
income, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(i)Funeral parlors and similar establishments
The beneficiary or any person who shall shoulder
the funeral and burial expenses of the deceased
senior citizen shall claim the discount, such as
casket, embalmment, cremation cost and other
related services for the senior citizen upon
payment and presentation of [his] death
certificate. TSEHcA
The DSWD likewise issued its own Rules and
Regulations Implementing RA 9257, to wit:
SCEDAI
RULE VI
DISCOUNTS AS TAX DEDUCTION OF
ESTABLISHMENTS
Article 8.Tax Deduction of Establishments. The
establishment may claim the discounts granted
under Rule V, Section 4 Discounts for
Establishments, Section 9, Medical and Dental
Services in Private Facilities and Sections 10 and
11 Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax
deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
or services rendered. Provided, That the cost of
the discount shall be allowed as deduction from
gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted; Provided, further, That the
total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of
value added tax if applicable, shall be included in
their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and
shall be subject to proper documentation and to
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended; Provided, finally, that the
implementation of the tax deduction shall be
subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
approved by the Department of Finance (DOF).
Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme,
petitioners filed the present recourse, praying
that Section 4 of RA 7432, as amended by RA
9257, and the implementing rules and regulations
issued by the DSWD and the DOF be declared
unconstitutional insofar as these allow business
establishments to claim the 20% discount given
to senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the
DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from enforcing
the same; and that the tax credit treatment of the
20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of
RA 7432 be reinstated.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
A.
WHETHER THE PETITION PRESENTS AN ACTUAL
CASE OR CONTROVERSY.
B.
WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257
AND . . . ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY PROVIDE THAT
THE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) DISCOUNT TO
SENIOR CITIZENS MAY BE CLAIMED AS A TAX
DEDUCTION BY THE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS,
ARE INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 9 IaECcH
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners emphasize that they are not
questioning the 20% discount granted to senior
citizens but are only assailing the constitutionality
of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA
9257 and the implementing rules and regulations
issued by the DSWD and the DOF. 10
Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme
contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the
Constitution, which provides that: "[p]rivate
property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation." 11 In support of their
position, petitioners cite Central Luzon Drug
Corporation, 12 where it was ruled that the 20%
discount privilege constitutes taking of private
property for public use which requires the
payment of just compensation, 13 and Carlos
Superdrug Corporation v. Department of Social
Welfare and Development, 14 where it was
acknowledged that the tax deduction scheme
does not meet the definition of just
compensation. 15
Petitioners likewise seek a reversal of the ruling in
Carlos Superdrug Corporation 16 that the tax
deduction scheme adopted by the government is
30 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
justified by police power. 17 They assert that
"[a]lthough both police power and the power of
eminent domain have the general welfare for
their object, there are still traditional distinctions
between the two" 18 and that "eminent domain
cannot be made less supreme than police power."
19 Petitioners further claim that the legislature, in
amending RA 7432, relied on an erroneous
contemporaneous construction that prior
payment of taxes is required for tax credit. 20
Petitioners also contend that the tax deduction
scheme violates Article XV, Section 4 21 and
Article XIII, Section 11 22 of the Constitution
because it shifts the State's constitutional
mandate or duty of improving the welfare of the
elderly to the private sector. 23 Under the tax
deduction scheme, the private sector shoulders
65% of the discount because only 35% 24 of it is
actually returned by the government. 25
Consequently, the implementation of the tax
deduction scheme prescribed under Section 4 of
RA 9257 affects the businesses of petitioners. 26
Thus, there exists an actual case or controversy
of transcendental importance which deserves
judicious disposition on the merits by the highest
court of the land. 27 DEcSaI
Respondents' Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, question the
filing of the instant Petition directly with the
Supreme Court as this disregards the hierarchy of
courts. 28 They likewise assert that there is no
justiciable controversy as petitioners failed to
prove that the tax deduction treatment is not a
"fair and full equivalent of the loss sustained" by
them. 29 As to the constitutionality of RA 9257
and its implementing rules and regulations,
respondents contend that petitioners failed to
overturn its presumption of constitutionality. 30
More important, respondents maintain that the
tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of
the State's police power. 31
Our Ruling
The Petition lacks merit. EICSDT
There exists an actual case or
controversy.
We shall first resolve the procedural issue.
When the constitutionality of a law is put in issue,
judicial review may be availed of only if the
following requisites concur: "(1) the existence of
an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence
of personal and substantial interest on the part of
the party raising the [question of
constitutionality]; (3) recourse to judicial review is
made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
[question of constitutionality] is the lis mota of
the case." 32
In this case, petitioners are challenging the
constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme
provided in RA 9257 and the implementing rules
and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.
Respondents, however, oppose the Petition on
the ground that there is no actual case or
controversy. We do not agree with respondents.
An actual case or controversy exists when there
is "a conflict of legal rights" or "an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
resolution." 33 The Petition must therefore show
that "the governmental act being challenged has
a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it." 34 In this case, the tax deduction
scheme challenged by petitioners has a direct
adverse effect on them. Thus, it cannot be denied
that there exists an actual case or controversy.
cTECHI
The validity of the 20% senior citizen
discount and tax deduction scheme
under RA 9257, as an exercise of police
power of the State, has already been
settled in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation.
Petitioners posit that the resolution of this case
lies in the determination of whether the legally
mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an
exercise of police power or eminent domain. If it
is police power, no just compensation is
warranted. But if it is eminent domain, the tax
deduction scheme is unconstitutional because it
is not a peso for peso reimbursement of the 20%
discount given to senior citizens. Thus, it
constitutes taking of private property without
payment of just compensation.
At the outset, we note that this question has been
settled in Carlos Superdrug Corporation. 35 In
that case, we ruled:
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes
deprivation of private property. Compelling
drugstore owners and establishments to grant the
discount will result in a loss of profit and capital
because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only
5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law
failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores
will be justly compensated for the discount.
HcDATC
Examining petitioners' arguments, it is apparent
that what petitioners are ultimately questioning is
the validity of the tax deduction scheme as a
reimbursement mechanism for the twenty
percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior
citizens.
Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax
deduction scheme does not fully reimburse
petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to
senior citizens. This is because the discount is
treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense
that is subtracted from the gross income and
results in a lower taxable income. Stated
otherwise, it is an amount that is allowed by law
to reduce the income prior to the application of
the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which
is due. Being a tax deduction, the discount does
not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis
but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes
owed.
Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a
deduction reduces the net income of the private
establishments concerned. The discounts given
would have entered the coffers and formed part
of the gross sales of the private establishments,
were it not for R.A. No. 9257.
The permanent reduction in their total revenues
is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of
31 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
private property for public use or benefit. This
constitutes compensable taking for which
petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a
just compensation.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. The measure is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word just is
used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation, and to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
TcHCDI
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement
of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would
not meet the definition of just compensation.
Having said that, this raises the question of
whether the State, in promoting the health and
welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose
upon private establishments the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program.
The Court believes so.
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to
maximize the contribution of senior citizens to
nation-building, and to grant benefits and
privileges to them for their improvement and
well-being as the State considers them an
integral part of our society.
The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis
in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself.
Thus, the Act provides:
SEC. 2.Republic Act No. 7432 is hereby amended
to read as follows: TaDSCA
SECTION 1.Declaration of Policies and Objectives.
Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the
Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take
care of its elderly members while the State may
design programs of social security for them. In
addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies provides: "The State
shall provide social justice in all phases of
national development." Further, Article XIII,
Section 11, provides: "The State shall adopt an
integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to
make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable
cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women
and children." Consonant with these
constitutional principles the following are the
declared policies of this Act: DacASC
xxx xxx xxx
(f)To recognize the important role of the private
sector in the improvement of the welfare of
senior citizens and to actively seek their
partnership.
To implement the above policy, the law grants a
twenty percent discount to senior citizens for
medical and dental services, and diagnostic and
laboratory fees; admission fees charged by
theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
other similar places of culture, leisure and
amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea
travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar
lodging establishments, restaurants and
recreation centers; and purchases of medicines
for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior
citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law
provides that business establishments extending
the twenty percent discount to senior citizens
may claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
has general welfare for its object. Police power is
not capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore
its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has
been described as "the most essential, insistent
and the least limitable of powers, extending as it
does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he
power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of
the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
same." HCaIDS
For this reason, when the conditions so demand
as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the
common good would be diluted considerably if on
the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer
loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence
of evidence demonstrating the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question,
there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its
favor.
Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners to insist
that the grant of the senior citizen discount is
unduly oppressive to their business, because
petitioners have not taken time to calculate
correctly and come up with a financial report, so
that they have not been able to show properly
whether or not the tax deduction scheme really
works greatly to their disadvantage.
In treating the discount as a tax deduction,
petitioners insist that they will incur losses
because, referring to the DOF Opinion, for every
P1.00 senior citizen discount that petitioners
would give, P0.68 will be shouldered by them as
only P0.32 will be refunded by the government by
way of a tax deduction. HIaAED
To illustrate this point, petitioner Carlos Super
Drug cited the anti-hypertensive maintenance
drug Norvasc as an example. According to the
latter, it acquires Norvasc from the distributors at
P37.57 per tablet, and retails it at P39.60 (or at a
margin of 5%). If it grants a 20% discount to
senior citizens or an amount equivalent to P7.92,
32 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
then it would have to sell Norvasc at P31.68
which translates to a loss from capital of P5.89
per tablet. Even if the government will allow a tax
deduction, only P2.53 per tablet will be refunded
and not the full amount of the discount which is
P7.92. In short, only 32% of the 20% discount will
be reimbursed to the drugstores.
Petitioners' computation is flawed. For purposes
of reimbursement, the law states that the cost of
the discount shall be deducted from gross
income, the amount of income derived from all
sources before deducting allowable expenses,
which will result in net income. Here, petitioners
tried to show a loss on a per transaction basis,
which should not be the case. An income
statement, showing an accounting of petitioners'
sales, expenses, and net profit (or loss) for a
given period could have accurately reflected the
effect of the discount on their income. Absent any
financial statement, petitioners cannot
substantiate their claim that they will be
operating at a loss should they give the discount.
In addition, the computation was erroneously
based on the assumption that their customers
consisted wholly of senior citizens. Lastly, the
32% tax rate is to be imposed on income, not on
the amount of the discount.
Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize
the law because they cannot raise the prices of
their medicines given the cutthroat nature of the
players in the industry. It is a business decision on
the part of petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%.
Selling the medicines below acquisition cost, as
alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of this
decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a property right,
petitioners cannot reproach the law for being
oppressive, simply because they cannot afford to
raise their prices for fear of losing their customers
to competition. DIETHS
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the
pharmaceutical industry and the competitive
pricing component of the business. While the
Constitution protects property rights, petitioners
must accept the realities of business and the
State, in the exercise of police power, can
intervene in the operations of a business which
may result in an impairment of property rights in
the process.
Moreover, the right to property has a social
dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution
provides the precept for the protection of
property, various laws and jurisprudence,
particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation
of contracts and public utilities, continuously
serve as . . . reminder[s] that the right to property
can be relinquished upon the command of the
State for the promotion of public good.
Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens
program rests largely on the support imparted by
petitioners and the other private establishments
concerned. This being the case, the means
employed in invoking the active participation of
the private sector, in order to achieve the
purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and
directly related. Without sufficient proof that
Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and
that the continued implementation of the same
would be unconscionably detrimental to
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a
legislative act. 36 (Bold in the original; underline
supplied)
We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as
the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of
the police power of the State. ATcaEH
No compelling reason has been
proffered to overturn, modify or
abandon the ruling in Carlos
Superdrug Corporation.
Petitioners argue that we have previously ruled in
Central Luzon Drug Corporation 37 that the 20%
discount is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain, thus, requiring the payment of just
compensation. They urge us to re-examine our
ruling in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 38 which
allegedly reversed the ruling in Central Luzon
Drug Corporation. 39 They also point out that
Carlos Superdrug Corporation 40 recognized that
the tax deduction scheme under the assailed law
does not provide for sufficient just compensation.
We agree with petitioners' observation that there
are statements in Central Luzon Drug Corporation
41 describing the 20% discount as an exercise of
the power of eminent domain, viz.:
[T]he privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does
not come directly from the State, but rather from
the private establishments concerned.
Accordingly, the tax credit benefit granted to
these establishments can be deemed as their just
compensation for private property taken by the
State for public use.
The concept of public use is no longer confined to
the traditional notion of use by the public, but
held synonymous with public interest, public
benefit, public welfare, and public convenience.
The discount privilege to which our senior citizens
are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the
general public to which these citizens belong. The
discounts given would have entered the coffers
and formed part of the gross sales of the private
establishments concerned, were it not for RA
7432. The permanent reduction in their total
revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the
taking of private property for public use or
benefit. HDTcEI
As a result of the 20 percent discount imposed by
RA 7432, respondent becomes entitled to a just
compensation. This term refers not only to the
issuance of a tax credit certificate indicating the
correct amount of the discounts given, but also to
the promptness in its release. Equivalent to the
payment of property taken by the State, such
issuance when not done within a reasonable
time from the grant of the discounts cannot be
considered as just compensation. In effect,
respondent is made to suffer the consequences of
being immediately deprived of its revenues while
awaiting actual receipt, through the certificate, of
the equivalent amount it needs to cope with the
reduction in its revenues.
Besides, the taxation power can also be used as
an implement for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. Tax measures are but "enforced
contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions"
and "clearly imposed for a public purpose." In
33 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
recent years, the power to tax has indeed
become a most effective tool to realize social
justice, public welfare, and the equitable
distribution of wealth.
While it is a declared commitment under Section
1 of RA 7432, social justice "cannot be invoked to
trample on the rights of property owners who
under our Constitution and laws are also entitled
to protection. The social justice consecrated in
our [C]onstitution [is] not intended to take away
rights from a person and give them to another
who is not entitled thereto." For this reason, a just
compensation for income that is taken away from
respondent becomes necessary. It is in the tax
credit that our legislators find support to realize
social justice, and no administrative body can
alter that fact. DHESca
To put it differently, a private establishment that
merely breaks even without the discounts yet
will surely start to incur losses because of such
discounts. The same effect is expected if its
mark-up is less than 20 percent, and if all its
sales come from retail purchases by senior
citizens. Aside from the observation we have
already raised earlier, it will also be grossly unfair
to an establishment if the discounts will be
treated merely as deductions from either its gross
income or its gross sales. Operating at a loss
through no fault of its own, it will realize that the
tax credit limitation under RR 2-94 is inutile, if not
improper. Worse, profit-generating businesses will
be put in a better position if they avail
themselves of tax credits denied those that are
losing, because no taxes are due from the latter.
42 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
The above was partly incorporated in our ruling in
Carlos Superdrug Corporation 43 when we stated
preliminarily that
Petitioners assert that Section 4(a) of the law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes
deprivation of private property. Compelling
drugstore owners and establishments to grant the
discount will result in a loss of profit and capital
because 1) drugstores impose a mark-up of only
5% to 10% on branded medicines; and 2) the law
failed to provide a scheme whereby drugstores
will be justly compensated for the discount.
STEacI
Examining petitioners' arguments, it is apparent
that what petitioners are ultimately questioning is
the validity of the tax deduction scheme as a
reimbursement mechanism for the twenty
percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior
citizens.
Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax
deduction scheme does not fully reimburse
petitioners for the discount privilege accorded to
senior citizens. This is because the discount is
treated as a deduction, a tax-deductible expense
that is subtracted from the gross income and
results in a lower taxable income. Stated
otherwise, it is an amount that is allowed by law
to reduce the income prior to the application of
the tax rate to compute the amount of tax which
is due. Being a tax deduction, the discount does
not reduce taxes owed on a peso for peso basis
but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes
owed.
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest

Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a
deduction reduces the net income of the private
establishments concerned. The discounts given
would have entered the coffers and formed part
of the gross sales of the private establishments,
were it not for R.A. No. 9257.
The permanent reduction in their total revenues
is a forced subsidy corresponding to the taking of
private property for public use or benefit. This
constitutes compensable taking for which
petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a
just compensation.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. The measure is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word just is
used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation, and to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement
of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would
not meet the definition of just compensation.
Having said that, this raises the question of
whether the State, in promoting the health and
welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose
upon private establishments the burden of partly
subsidizing a government program.
The Court believes so. 44 TaEIAS
This, notwithstanding, we went on to rule in
Carlos Superdrug Corporation 45 that the 20%
discount and tax deduction scheme is a valid
exercise of the police power of the State.
The present case, thus, affords an opportunity for
us to clarify the above-quoted statements in
Central Luzon Drug Corporation 46 and Carlos
Superdrug Corporation. 47
First, we note that the above-quoted disquisition
on eminent domain in Central Luzon Drug
Corporation 48 is obiter dicta and, thus, not
binding precedent. As stated earlier, in Central
Luzon Drug Corporation, 49 we ruled that the BIR
acted ultra vires when it effectively treated the
20% discount as a tax deduction, under Sections
2.i and 4 of RR No. 2-94, despite the clear
wording of the previous law that the same should
be treated as a tax credit. We were, therefore, not
confronted in that case with the issue as to
whether the 20% discount is an exercise of police
power or eminent domain.
Second, although we adverted to Central Luzon
Drug Corporation 50 in our ruling in Carlos
Superdrug Corporation, 51 this referred only to
preliminary matters. A fair reading of Carlos
Superdrug Corporation 52 would show that we
categorically ruled therein that the 20% discount
is a valid exercise of police power. Thus, even if
the current law, through its tax deduction scheme
(which abandoned the tax credit scheme under
the previous law), does not provide for a peso for
peso reimbursement of the 20% discount given
by private establishments, no constitutional
infirmity obtains because, being a valid exercise
34 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
of police power, payment of just compensation is
not warranted.
We have carefully reviewed the basis of our ruling
in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 53 and we find
no cogent reason to overturn, modify or abandon
it. We also note that petitioners' arguments are a
mere reiteration of those raised and resolved in
Carlos Superdrug Corporation. 54 Thus, we
sustain Carlos Superdrug Corporation. 55 EAIcCS
Nonetheless, we deem it proper, in what follows,
to amplify our explanation in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation 56 as to why the 20% discount is a
valid exercise of police power and why it may not,
under the specific circumstances of this case, be
considered as an exercise of the power of
eminent domain contrary to the obiter in Central
Luzon Drug Corporation. 57 IaAScD
Police power versus eminent domain.
Police power is the inherent power of the State to
regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and
property for public welfare. 58 The only limitation
is that the restriction imposed should be
reasonable, not oppressive. 59 In other words, to
be a valid exercise of police power, it must have a
lawful subject or objective and a lawful method of
accomplishing the goal. 60 Under the police
power of the State, "property rights of individuals
may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the government."
61 The State "may interfere with personal liberty,
property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare [as long as] the
interference [is] reasonable and not arbitrary." 62
Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the
inherent power of the State to take or appropriate
private property for public use. 63 The
Constitution, however, requires that private
property shall not be taken without due process
of law and the payment of just compensation. 64
Traditional distinctions exist between police
power and eminent domain.
In the exercise of police power, a property right is
impaired by regulation, 65 or the use of property
is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted 66 to
promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no
compensable taking, hence, payment of just
compensation is not required. Examples of these
regulations are property condemned for being
noxious or intended for noxious purposes (e.g., a
building on the verge of collapse to be
demolished for public safety, or obscene
materials to be destroyed in the interest of public
morals) 67 as well as zoning ordinances
prohibiting the use of property for purposes
injurious to the health, morals or safety of the
community (e.g., dividing a city's territory into
residential and industrial areas). 68 It has, thus,
been observed that, in the exercise of police
power (as distinguished from eminent domain),
although the regulation affects the right of
ownership, none of the bundle of rights which
constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or
for the benefit of the public. 69 HASTCa
On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, property interests are
appropriated and applied to some public purpose
which necessitates the payment of just
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
compensation therefor. Normally, the title to and
possession of the property are transferred to the
expropriating authority. Examples include the
acquisition of lands for the construction of public
highways as well as agricultural lands acquired by
the government under the agrarian reform law for
redistribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries.
However, it is a settled rule that the acquisition of
title or total destruction of the property is not
essential for "taking" under the power of eminent
domain to be present. 70 Examples of these
include establishment of easements such as
where the land owner is perpetually deprived of
his proprietary rights because of the hazards
posed by electric transmission lines constructed
above his property 71 or the compelled
interconnection of the telephone system between
the government and a private company. 72 In
these cases, although the private property owner
is not divested of ownership or possession,
payment of just compensation is warranted
because of the burden placed on the property for
the use or benefit of the public.
The 20% senior citizen discount is an
exercise of police power.
It may not always be easy to determine whether
a challenged governmental act is an exercise of
police power or eminent domain. The very nature
of police power as elastic and responsive to
various social conditions 73 as well as the
evolving meaning and scope of public use 74 and
just compensation 75 in eminent domain evinces
that these are not static concepts. Because of the
exigencies of rapidly changing times, Congress
may be compelled to adopt or experiment with
different measures to promote the general
welfare which may not fall squarely within the
traditionally recognized categories of police
power and eminent domain. The judicious
approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and
effects of the challenged governmental act and
decide, on the basis thereof, whether the act is
the exercise of police power or eminent domain.
Thus, we now look at the nature and effects of
the 20% discount to determine if it constitutes an
exercise of police power or eminent domain.
ASHaDT
The 20% discount is intended to improve the
welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are
less likely to be gainfully employed, more prone
to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in
need of subsidy in purchasing basic commodities.
It may not be amiss to mention also that the
discount serves to honor senior citizens who
presumably spent the productive years of their
lives on contributing to the development and
progress of the nation. This distinct cultural
Filipino practice of honoring the elderly is an
integral part of this law.
As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a
regulation affecting the ability of private
establishments to price their products and
services relative to a special class of individuals,
senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords
preferential concern. 76 In turn, this affects the
amount of profits or income/gross sales that a
private establishment can derive from senior
citizens. In other words, the subject regulation
affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of
a private establishment. However, it does not
35 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
purport to appropriate or burden specific
properties, used in the operation or conduct of
the business of private establishments, for the
use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for
that matter, but merely regulates the pricing of
goods and services relative to, and the amount of
profits or income/gross sales that such private
establishments may derive from, senior citizens.
ITEcAD
The subject regulation may be said to be similar
to, but with substantial distinctions from, price
control or rate of return on investment control
laws which are traditionally regarded as police
power measures. 77 These laws generally
regulate public utilities or industries/enterprises
imbued with public interest in order to protect
consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable
pricing as well as temper corporate greed by
controlling the rate of return on investment of
these corporations considering that they have a
monopoly over the goods or services that they
provide to the general public. The subject
regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the
discount does not prevent the establishments
from adjusting the level of prices of their goods
and services, and (2) the discount does not apply
to all customers of a given establishment but only
to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the
degree material to the resolution of this case, the
20% discount may be properly viewed as
belonging to the category of price regulatory
measures which affect the profitability of
establishments subjected thereto.
On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a
police power measure.
The obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation, 78
however, describes the 20% discount as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain and the
tax credit, under the previous law, equivalent to
the amount of discount given as the just
compensation therefor. The reason is that (1) the
discount would have formed part of the gross
sales of the establishment were it not for the law
prescribing the 20% discount, and (2) the
permanent reduction in total revenues is a forced
subsidy corresponding to the taking of private
property for public use or benefit. DTEScI
The flaw in this reasoning is in its premise. It
presupposes that the subject regulation, which
impacts the pricing and, hence, the profitability of
a private establishment, automatically amounts
to a deprivation of property without due process
of law. If this were so, then all price and rate of
return on investment control laws would have to
be invalidated because they impact, at some
level, the regulated establishment's profits or
income/gross sales, yet there is no provision for
payment of just compensation. It would also
mean that government cannot set price or rate of
return on investment limits, which reduce the
profits or income/gross sales of private
establishments, if no just compensation is paid
even if the measure is not confiscatory. The obiter
is, thus, at odds with the settled doctrine that the
State can employ police power measures to
regulate the pricing of goods and services, and,
hence, the profitability of business
establishments in order to pursue legitimate
State objectives for the common good, provided
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
that the regulation does not go too far as to
amount to "taking." 79
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 80 we recognized
that
. . . a taking also could be found if government
regulation of the use of property went "too far."
When regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not in all cases there must be an exercise
of eminent domain and compensation to support
the act. While property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking. cHSIAC
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the
questions of what is too far and when regulation
becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes
recognized that it was "a question of degree and
therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions." On many other occasions as well,
the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of
when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter
of considering the facts in each case. The Court
asks whether justice and fairness require that the
economic loss caused by public action must be
compensated by the government and thus borne
by the public as a whole, or whether the loss
should remain concentrated on those few persons
subject to the public action. 81
The impact or effect of a regulation, such as the
one under consideration, must, thus, be
determined on a case-to-case basis. Whether that
line between permissible regulation under police
power and "taking" under eminent domain has
been crossed must, under the specific
circumstances of this case, be subject to proof
and the one assailing the constitutionality of the
regulation carries the heavy burden of proving
that the measure is unreasonable, oppressive or
confiscatory. The time-honored rule is that the
burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a law
rests upon the one assailing it and "the burden
becomes heavier when police power is at issue."
82
The 20% senior citizen discount has not
been shown to be unreasonable,
oppressive or confiscatory.
In Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, 83
petitioners, who were franchise holders of electric
plants, challenged the validity of a law limiting
their allowable net profits to no more than 12%
per annum of their investments plus two-month
operating expenses. In rejecting their plea, we
ruled that, in an earlier case, it was found that
12% is a reasonable rate of return and that
petitioners failed to prove that the aforesaid rate
is confiscatory in view of the presumption of
constitutionality. 84 aESHDA
We adopted a similar line of reasoning in Carlos
Superdrug Corporation 85 when we ruled that
petitioners therein failed to prove that the 20%
discount is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory.
We noted that no evidence, such as a financial
report, to establish the impact of the 20%
discount on the overall profitability of petitioners
was presented in order to show that they would
be operating at a loss due to the subject
regulation or that the continued implementation
of the law would be unconscionably detrimental
36 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
to the business operations of petitioners. In the
case at bar, petitioners proceeded with a
hypothetical computation of the alleged loss that
they will suffer similar to what the petitioners in
Carlos Superdrug Corporation 86 did. Petitioners
went directly to this Court without first
establishing the factual bases of their claims.
Hence, the present recourse must, likewise, fail.
Because all laws enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality, courts will uphold a law's
validity if any set of facts may be conceived to
sustain it. 87 On its face, we find that there are at
least two conceivable bases to sustain the subject
regulation's validity absent clear and convincing
proof that it is unreasonable, oppressive or
confiscatory. Congress may have legitimately
concluded that business establishments have the
capacity to absorb a decrease in profits or
income/gross sales due to the 20% discount
without substantially affecting the reasonable
rate of return on their investments considering
(1) not all customers of a business establishment
are senior citizens and (2) the level of its profit
margins on goods and services offered to the
general public. Concurrently, Congress may have,
likewise, legitimately concluded that the
establishments, which will be required to extend
the 20% discount, have the capacity to revise
their pricing strategy so that whatever reduction
in profits or income/gross sales that they may
sustain because of sales to senior citizens, can be
recouped through higher mark-ups or from other
products not subject of discounts. As a result, the
discounts resulting from sales to senior citizens
will not be confiscatory or unduly oppressive.
aESICD
In sum, we sustain our ruling in Carlos Superdrug
Corporation 88 that the 20% senior citizen
discount and tax deduction scheme are valid
exercises of police power of the State absent a
clear showing that it is arbitrary, oppressive or
confiscatory.
Conclusion
In closing, we note that petitioners hypothesize,
consistent with our previous ratiocinations, that
the discount will force establishments to raise
their prices in order to compensate for its impact
on overall profits or income/gross sales. The
general public, or those not belonging to the
senior citizen class, are, thus, made to effectively
shoulder the subsidy for senior citizens. This, in
petitioners' view, is unfair.
As already mentioned, Congress may be
reasonably assumed to have foreseen this
eventuality. But, more importantly, this goes into
the wisdom, efficacy and expediency of the
subject law which is not proper for judicial review.
In a way, this law pursues its social equity
objective in a non-traditional manner unlike past
and existing direct subsidy programs of the
government for the poor and marginalized
sectors of our society. Verily, Congress must be
given sufficient leeway in formulating welfare
legislations given the enormous challenges that
the government faces relative to, among others,
resource adequacy and administrative capability
in implementing social reform measures which
aim to protect and uphold the interests of those
most vulnerable in our society. In the process, the
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
individual, who enjoys the rights, benefits and
privileges of living in a democratic polity, must
bear his share in supporting measures intended
for the common good. This is only fair.
In fine, without the requisite showing of a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, the
validity of the assailed law must be sustained.
cSDHEC
Refutation of the Dissent
The main points of Justice Carpio's Dissent may
be summarized as follows: (1) the discussion on
eminent domain in Central Luzon Drug
Corporation 89 is not obiter dicta; (2) allowable
taking, in police power, is limited to property that
is destroyed or placed outside the commerce of
man for public welfare; (3) the amount of
mandatory discount is private property within the
ambit of Article III, Section 9 90 of the
Constitution; and (4) the permanent reduction in
a private establishment's total revenue, arising
from the mandatory discount, is a taking of
private property for public use or benefit, hence,
an exercise of the power of eminent domain
requiring the payment of just compensation.
I the case in Central Luzon Drug Corporation 96
We maintain that the discussion on eminent
domain in Central Luzon Drug Corporation 91 is
obiter dicta.
As previously discussed, in Central Luzon Drug
Corporation, 92 the BIR, pursuant to Sections 2.i
and 4 of RR No. 2-94, treated the senior citizen
discount in the previous law, RA 7432, as a tax
deduction instead of a tax credit despite the clear
provision in that law which stated
SECTION 4.Privileges for the Senior Citizens.
The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following:
a)The grant of twenty percent (20%) discount
from all establishments relative to utilization of
transportation services, hotels and similar lodging
establishment, restaurants and recreation centers
and purchase of medicines anywhere in the
country: Provided, That private establishments
may claim the cost as tax credit; (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the Court ruled that the subject revenue
regulation violated the law, viz.:
The 20 percent discount required by the law to be
given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not merely
a tax deduction from the gross income or gross
sale of the establishment concerned. A tax credit
is used by a private establishment only after the
tax has been computed; a tax deduction, before
the tax is computed. RA 7432 unconditionally
grants a tax credit to all covered entities. Thus,
the provisions of the revenue regulation that
withdraw or modify such grant are void. Basic is
the rule that administrative regulations cannot
amend or revoke the law. 93
As can be readily seen, the discussion on eminent
domain was not necessary in order to arrive at
this conclusion. All that was needed was to point
out that the revenue regulation contravened the
law which it sought to implement. And, precisely,
this was done in Central Luzon Drug Corporation
37 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
94 by comparing the wording of the previous law
vis- -vis the revenue regulation; employing the
rules of statutory construction; and applying the
settled principle that a regulation cannot amend
the law it seeks to implement. IcTEaC
A close reading of Central Luzon Drug Corporation
95 would show that the Court went on to state
that the tax credit "can be deemed" as just
compensation only to explain why the previous
law provides for a tax credit instead of a tax
deduction. The Court surmised that the tax credit
was a form of just compensation given to the
establishments covered by the 20% discount.
However, the reason why the previous law
provided for a tax credit and not a tax deduction
was not necessary to resolve the issue as to
whether the revenue regulation contravenes the
law. Hence, the discussion on eminent domain is
obiter dicta.
A court, in resolving cases before it, may look into
the possible purposes or reasons that impelled
the enactment of a particular statute or legal
provision. However, statements made relative
thereto are not always necessary in resolving the
actual controversies presented before it. This was
resulting in that unfortunate statement that the
tax credit "can be deemed" as just compensation.
This, in turn, led to the erroneous conclusion, by
deductive reasoning, that the 20% discount is an
exercise of the power of eminent domain. The
Dissent essentially adopts this theory and
reasoning which, as will be shown below, is
contrary to settled principles in police power and
eminent domain analysis.
II
The Dissent discusses at length the doctrine on
"taking" in police power which occurs when
private property is destroyed or placed outside
the commerce of man. Indeed, there is a whole
class of police power measures which justify the
destruction of private property in order to
preserve public health, morals, safety or welfare.
As earlier mentioned, these would include a
building on the verge of collapse or confiscated
obscene materials as well as those mentioned by
the Dissent with regard to property used in
violating a criminal statute or one which
constitutes a nuisance. In such cases, no
compensation is required.
However, it is equally true that there is another
class of police power measures which do not
involve the destruction of private property but
merely regulate its use. The minimum wage law,
zoning ordinances, price control laws, laws
regulating the operation of motels and hotels,
laws limiting the working hours to eight, and the
like would fall under this category. The examples
cited by the Dissent, likewise, fall under this
category: Article 157 of the Labor Code, Sections
19 and 18 of the Social Security Law, and Section
7 of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. These laws merely
regulate or, to use the term of the Dissent,
burden the conduct of the affairs of business
establishments. In such cases, payment of just
compensation is not required because they fall
within the sphere of permissible police power
measures. The senior citizen discount law falls
under this latter category. cIECTH
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest

III
The Dissent proceeds from the theory that the
permanent reduction of profits or income/gross
sales, due to the 20% discount, is a "taking" of
private property for public purpose without
payment of just compensation.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that
petitioners never presented any evidence to
establish that they were forced to suffer
enormous losses or operate at a loss due to the
effects of the assailed law. They came directly to
this Court and provided a hypothetical
computation of the loss they would allegedly
suffer due to the operation of the assailed law.
The central premise of the Dissent's argument
that the 20% discount results in a permanent
reduction in profits or income/gross sales, or
forces a business establishment to operate at a
loss is, thus, wholly unsupported by competent
evidence. To be sure, the Court can invalidate a
law which, on its face, is arbitrary, oppressive or
confiscatory. 97 But this is not the case here.
In the case at bar, evidence is indispensable
before a determination of a constitutional
violation can be made because of the following
reasons.
First, the assailed law, by imposing the senior
citizen discount, does not take any of the
properties used by a business establishment like,
say, the land on which a manufacturing plant is
constructed or the equipment being used to
produce goods or services.
Second, rather than taking specific properties of a
business establishment, the senior citizen
discount law merely regulates the prices of the
goods or services being sold to senior citizens by
mandating a 20% discount. Thus, if a product is
sold at P10.00 to the general public, then it shall
be sold at P8.00 (i.e., P10.00 less 20%) to senior
citizens. Note that the law does not impose at
what specific price the product shall be sold, only
that a 20% discount shall be given to senior
citizens based on the price set by the business
establishment. A business establishment is, thus,
free to adjust the prices of the goods or services
it provides to the general public. Accordingly, it
can increase the price of the above product to
P20.00 but is required to sell it at P16.00 (i.e.,
P20.00 less 20%) to senior citizens. DaIAcC
Third, because the law impacts the prices of the
goods or services of a particular establishment
relative to its sales to senior citizens, its profits or
income/gross sales are affected. The extent of the
impact would, however, depend on the profit
margin of the business establishment on a
particular good or service. If a product costs
P5.00 to produce and is sold at P10.00, then the
profit 98 is P5.00 99 or a profit margin 100 of
50%. 101 Under the assailed law, the aforesaid
product would have to be sold at P8.00 to senior
citizens yet the business would still earn P3.00
102 or a 30% 103 profit margin. On the other
hand, if the product costs P9.00 to produce and is
required to be sold at P8.00 to senior citizens,
then the business would experience a loss of
P1.00. 104 But note that since not all customers
of a business establishment are senior citizens,
38 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l protection
the business establishment may continue to earn
P1.00 from non-senior citizens which, in turn, can
offset any loss arising from sales to senior
citizens.
Fourth, when the law imposes the 20% discount
in favor of senior citizens, it does not prevent the
business establishment from revising its pricing
strategy. By revising its pricing strategy, a
business establishment can recoup any reduction
of profits or income/gross sales which would
otherwise arise from the giving of the 20%
discount. To illustrate, suppose A has two
customers: X, a senior citizen, and Y, a non-senior
citizen. Prior to the law, A sells his products at
P10.00 a piece to X and Y resulting in
income/gross sales of P20.00 (P10.00 + P10.00).
With the passage of the law, A must now sell his
product to X at P8.00 (i.e., P10.00 less 20%) so
that his income/gross sales would be P18.00
(P8.00 + P10.00) or lower by P2.00. To prevent
this from happening, A decides to increase the
price of his products to P11.11 per piece. Thus,
he sells his product to X at P8.89 (i.e., P11.11 less
20%) and to Y at P11.11. As a result, his
income/gross sales would still be P20.00 105
(P8.89 + P11.11). The capacity, then, of business
establishments to revise their pricing strategy
makes it possible for them not to suffer any
reduction in profits or income/gross sales, or, in
the alternative, mitigate the reduction of their
profits or income/gross sales even after the
passage of the law. In other words, business
establishments have the capacity to adjust their
prices so that they may remain profitable even
under the operation of the assailed law. acADIT
The Dissent, however, states that
The explanation by the majority that private
establishments can always increase their prices
to recover the mandatory discount will only
encourage private establishments to adjust their
prices upwards to the prejudice of customers who
do not enjoy the 20% discount. It was likewise
suggested that if a company increases its prices,
despite the application of the 20% discount, the
establishment becomes more profitable than it
was before the implementation of R.A. 7432. Such
an economic justification is self-defeating, for
more consumers will suffer from the price
increase than will benefit from the 20% discount.
Even then, such ability to increase prices cannot
legally validate a violation of the eminent domain
clause. 106
But, if it is possible that the business
establishment, by adjusting its prices, will suffer
no reduction in its profits or income/gross sales
(or suffer some reduction but continue to operate
profitably) despite giving the discount, what
would be the basis to strike down the law? If it is
possible that the business establishment, by
adjusting its prices, will not be unduly burdened,
how can there be a finding that the assailed law
is an unconstitutional exercise of police power or
eminent domain?
That there may be a burden placed on business
establishments or the consuming public as a
result of the operation of the assailed law is not,
by itself, a ground to declare it unconstitutional
for this goes into the wisdom and expediency of
the law. The cost of most, if not all, regulatory
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
measures of the government on business
establishments is ultimately passed on to the
consumers but that, by itself, does not justify the
wholesale nullification of these measures. It is a
basic postulate of our democratic system of
government that the Constitution is a social
contract whereby the people have surrendered
their sovereign powers to the State for the
common good. 107 All persons may be burdened
by regulatory measures intended for the common
good or to serve some important governmental
interest, such as protecting or improving the
welfare of a special class of people for which the
Constitution affords preferential concern.
Indubitably, the one assailing the law has the
heavy burden of proving that the regulation is
unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory, or has
gone "too far" as to amount to a "taking." Yet,
here, the Dissent would have this Court nullify the
law without any proof of such nature. DCIEac
Further, this Court is not the proper forum to
debate the economic theories or realities that
impelled Congress to shift from the tax credit to
the tax deduction scheme. It is not within our
power or competence to judge which scheme is
more or less burdensome to business
establishments or the consuming public and,
thereafter, to choose which scheme the State
should use or pursue. The shift from the tax credit
to tax deduction scheme is a policy determination
by Congress and the Court will respect it for as
long as there is no showing, as here, that the
subject regulation has transgressed constitutional
limitations.
Unavoidably, the lack of evidence constrains the
Dissent to rely on speculative and hypothetical
argumentation when it states that the 20%
discount is a significant amount and not a
minimal loss (which erroneously assumes that the
discount automatically results in a loss when it is
possible that the profit margin is greater than
20% and/or the pricing strategy can be revised to
prevent or mitigate any reduction in profits or
income/gross sales as illustrated above), 108 and
not all private establishments make a 20% profit
margin (which conversely implies that there are
those who make more and, thus, would not be
greatly affected by this regulation). 109
In fine, because of the possible scenarios
discussed above, we cannot assume that the 20%
discount results in a permanent reduction in
profits or income/gross sales, much less that
business establishments are forced to operate at
a loss under the assailed law. And, even if we
gratuitously assume that the 20% discount
results in some degree of reduction in profits or
income/gross sales, we cannot assume that such
reduction is arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory.
To repeat, there is no actual proof to back up this
claim, and it could be that the loss suffered by a
business establishment was occasioned through
its fault or negligence in not adapting to the
effects of the assailed law. The law uniformly
applies to all business establishments covered
thereunder. There is, therefore, no unjust
discrimination as the aforesaid business
establishments are faced with the same
constraints.
39 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
The necessity of proof is all the more pertinent in
this case because, as similarly observed by
Justice Velasco in his Concurring Opinion, the law
has been in operation for over nine years now.
However, the grim picture painted by petitioners
on the unconscionable losses to be
indiscriminately suffered by business
establishments, which should have led to the
closure of numerous business establishments,
has not come to pass. ScaEIT
Verily, we cannot invalidate the assailed law
based on assumptions and conjectures. Without
adequate proof, the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail.
IV
At this juncture, we note that the Dissent
modified its original arguments by including a
new paragraph, to wit:
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
speaks of private property without any
distinction. It does not state that there should be
profit before the taking of property is subject to
just compensation. The private property referred
to for purposes of taking could be inherited,
donated, purchased, mortgaged, or as in this
case, part of the gross sales of private
establishments. They are all private property and
any taking should be attended by corresponding
payment of just compensation. The 20% discount
granted to senior citizens belong to private
establishments, whether these establishments
make a profit or suffer a loss. In fact, the 20%
discount applies to non-profit establishments like
country, social, or golf clubs which are open to
the public and not only for exclusive membership.
The issue of profit or loss to the establishments is
immaterial. 110
Two things may be said of this argument. HDcaAI
First, it contradicts the rest of the arguments of
the Dissent. After it states that the issue of profit
or loss is immaterial, the Dissent proceeds to
argue that the 20% discount is not a minimal loss
111 and that the 20% discount forces business
establishments to operate at a loss. 112 Even the
obiter in Central Luzon Drug Corporation, 113
which the Dissent essentially adopts and relies
on, is premised on the permanent reduction of
total revenues and the loss that business
establishments will be forced to suffer in arguing
that the 20% discount constitutes a "taking"
under the power of eminent domain. Thus, when
the Dissent now argues that the issue of profit or
loss is immaterial, it contradicts itself because it
later argues, in order to justify that there is a
"taking" under the power of eminent domain in
this case, that the 20% discount forces business
establishments to suffer a significant loss or to
operate at a loss.
Second, this argument suffers from the same flaw
as the Dissent's original arguments. It is an
erroneous characterization of the 20% discount.
According to the Dissent, the 20% discount is part
of the gross sales and, hence, private property
belonging to business establishments. However,
as previously discussed, the 20% discount is not
private property actually owned and/or used by
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
the business establishment. It should be
distinguished from properties like lands or
buildings actually used in the operation of a
business establishment which, if appropriated for
public use, would amount to a "taking" under the
power of eminent domain.
Instead, the 20% discount is a regulatory
measure which impacts the pricing and, hence,
the profitability of business establishments. At
the time the discount is imposed, no particular
property of the business establishment can be
said to be "taken." That is, the State does not
acquire or take anything from the business
establishment in the way that it takes a piece of
private land to build a public road. While the 20%
discount may form part of the potential profits or
income/gross sales 114 of the business
establishment, as similarly characterized by
Justice Bersamin in his Concurring Opinion,
potential profits or income/gross sales are not
private property, specifically cash or money,
already belonging to the business establishment.
They are a mere expectancy because they are
potential fruits of the successful conduct of the
business.
Prior to the sale of goods or services, a business
establishment may be subject to State
regulations, such as the 20% senior citizen
discount, which may impact the level or amount
of profits or income/gross sales that can be
generated by such establishment. For this reason,
the validity of the discount is to be determined
based on its overall effects on the operations of
the business establishment. DcCEHI
Again, as previously discussed, the 20% discount
does not automatically result in a 20% reduction
in profits, or, to align it with the term used by the
Dissent, the 20% discount does not mean that a
20% reduction in gross sales necessarily results.
Because (1) the profit margin of a product is not
necessarily less than 20%, (2) not all customers
of a business establishment are senior citizens,
and (3) the establishment may revise its pricing
strategy, such reduction in profits or
income/gross sales may be prevented or, in the
alternative, mitigated so that the business
establishment continues to operate profitably.
Thus, even if we gratuitously assume that some
degree of reduction in profits or income/gross
sales occurs because of the 20% discount, it does
not follow that the regulation is unreasonable,
oppressive or confiscatory because the business
establishment may make the necessary
adjustments to continue to operate profitably. No
evidence was presented by petitioners to show
otherwise. In fact, no evidence was presented by
petitioners at all.
Justice Leonen, in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, characterizes "profits" (or income/gross
sales) as an inchoate right. Another way to view
it, as stated by Justice Velasco in his Concurring
Opinion, is that the business establishment
merely has a right to profits. The Constitution
adverts to it as the right of an enterprise to a
reasonable return on investment. 115
Undeniably, this right, like any other right, may
be regulated under the police power of the State
to achieve important governmental objectives
40 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
like protecting the interests and improving the
welfare of senior citizens.
It should be noted though that potential profits or
income/gross sales are relevant in police power
and eminent domain analyses because they may,
in appropriate cases, serve as an indicia when a
regulation has gone "too far" as to amount to a
"taking" under the power of eminent domain.
When the deprivation or reduction of profits or
income/gross sales is shown to be unreasonable,
oppressive or confiscatory, then the challenged
governmental regulation may be nullified for
being a "taking" under the power of eminent
domain. In such a case, it is not profits or
income/gross sales which are actually taken and
appropriated for public use. Rather, when the
regulation causes an establishment to incur
losses in an unreasonable, oppressive or
confiscatory manner, what is actually taken is
capital and the right of the business
establishment to a reasonable return on
investment. If the business losses are not halted
because of the continued operation of the
regulation, this eventually leads to the
destruction of the business and the total loss of
the capital invested therein. But, again,
petitioners in this case failed to prove that the
subject regulation is unreasonable, oppressive or
confiscatory. ECHSDc
V.
The Dissent further argues that we erroneously
used price and rate of return on investment
control laws to justify the senior citizen discount
law. According to the Dissent, only profits from
industries imbued with public interest may be
regulated because this is a condition of their
franchises. Profits of establishments without
franchises cannot be regulated permanently
because there is no law regulating their profits.
The Dissent concludes that the permanent
reduction of total revenues or gross sales of
business establishments without franchises is a
taking of private property under the power of
eminent domain.
In making this argument, it is unfortunate that
the Dissent quotes only a portion of the ponencia
The subject regulation may be said to be similar
to, but with substantial distinctions from, price
control or rate of return on investment control
laws which are traditionally regarded as police
power measures. These laws generally regulate
public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued
with public interest in order to protect consumers
from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as
temper corporate greed by controlling the rate of
return on investment of these corporations
considering that they have a monopoly over the
goods or services that they provide to the general
public. The subject regulation differs therefrom in
that (1) the discount does not prevent the
establishments from adjusting the level of prices
of their goods and services, and (2) the discount
does not apply to all customers of a given
establishment but only to the class of senior
citizens. . . . 116
The above paragraph, in full, states
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
The subject regulation may be said to be similar
to, but with substantial distinctions from, price
control or rate of return on investment control
laws which are traditionally regarded as police
power measures. These laws generally regulate
public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued
with public interest in order to protect consumers
from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as
temper. corporate greed by controlling the rate of
return on investment of these corporations
considering that they have a monopoly over the
goods or services that they provide to the general
public. The subject regulation differs therefrom in
that (1) the discount does not prevent the
establishments from adjusting the level of prices
of their goods and services, and (2) the discount
does not apply to all customers of a given
establishment but only to the class of senior
citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to
the resolution of this case, the 20% discount may
be properly viewed as belonging to the category
of price regulatory measures which affects the
profitability of establishments subjected thereto.
(Emphasis supplied)
The point of this paragraph is to simply show that
the State has, in the past, regulated prices and
profits of business establishments. In other
words, this type of regulatory measures is
traditionally recognized as police power measures
so that the senior citizen discount may be
considered as a police power measure as well.
What is more, the substantial distinctions
between price and rate of return on investment
control laws vis- -vis the senior citizen discount
law provide greater reason to uphold the validity
of the senior citizen discount law. As previously
discussed, the ability to adjust prices allows the
establishment subject to the senior citizen
discount to prevent or mitigate any reduction of
profits or income/gross sales arising from the
giving of the discount. In contrast, establishments
subject to price and rate of return on investment
control laws cannot adjust prices accordingly.
Certainly, there is no intention to say that price
and rate of return on investment control laws are
the justification for the senior citizen discount
law. Not at all. The justification for the senior
citizen discount law is the plenary powers of
Congress. The legislative power to regulate
business establishments is broad and covers a
wide array of areas and subjects. It is well within
Congress' legislative powers to regulate the
profits or income/gross sales of industries and
enterprises, even those without franchises. For
what are franchises but mere legislative
enactments? SaDICE
There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits
Congress from regulating the profits or
income/gross sales of industries and enterprises
without franchises. On the contrary, the social
justice provisions of the Constitution enjoin the
State to regulate the "acquisition, ownership, use,
and disposition" of property and its increments.
117 This may cover the regulation of profits or
income/gross sales of all businesses, without
qualification, to attain the objective of diffusing
wealth in order to protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity. 118 Thus,
under the social justice policy of the Constitution,
business establishments may be compelled to
41 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
contribute to uplifting the plight of vulnerable or
marginalized groups in our society provided that
the regulation is not arbitrary, oppressive or
confiscatory, or is not in breach of some specific
constitutional limitation.
When the Dissent, therefore, states that the
"profits of private establishments which are non-
franchisees cannot be regulated permanently,
and there is no such law regulating their profits
permanently," 119 it is assuming what it ought to
prove. First, there are laws which, in effect,
permanently regulate profits or income/gross
sales of establishments without franchises, and
RA 9257 is one such law. And, second, Congress
can regulate such profits or income/gross sales
because, as previously noted, there is nothing in
the Constitution to prevent it from doing so. Here,
again, it must be emphasized that petitioners
failed to present any proof to show that the
effects of the assailed law on their operations has
been unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory.
SCHATc
The permanent regulation of profits or
income/gross sales of business establishments,
even those without franchises, is not as
uncommon as the Dissent depicts it to be.
For instance, the minimum wage law allows the
State to set the minimum wage of employees in a
given region or geographical area. Because of the
added labor costs arising from the minimum
wage, a permanent reduction of profits or
income/gross sales would result, assuming that
the employer does not increase the prices of his
goods or services. To illustrate, suppose it costs a
company P5.00 to produce a product and it sells
the same at P10.00 with a 50% profit margin.
Later, the State increases the minimum wage. As
a result, the company incurs greater labor costs
so that it now costs P7.00 to produce the same
product. The profit per product of the company
would be reduced to P3.00 with a profit margin of
30%. The net effect would be the same as in the
earlier example of granting a 20% senior citizen
discount. As can be seen, the minimum wage law
could, likewise, lead to a permanent reduction of
profits. Does this mean that the minimum wage
law should, likewise, be declared unconstitutional
on the mere plea that it results in a permanent
reduction of profits? Taking it a step further,
suppose the company decides to increase the
price of its product in order to offset the effects of
the increase in labor cost; does this mean that
the minimum wage law, following the reasoning
of the Dissent, is unconstitutional because the
consuming public is effectively made to subsidize
the wage of a group of laborers, i.e., minimum
wage earners?
The same reasoning can be adopted relative to
the examples cited by the Dissent which,
according to it, are valid police power regulations.
Article 157 of the Labor Code, Sections 19 and 18
of the Social Security Law, and Section 7 of the
Pag-IBIG Fund Law would effectively increase the
labor cost of a business establishment. This
would, in turn, be integrated as part of the cost of
its goods or services. Again, if the establishment
does not increase its prices, the net effect would
be a permanent reduction in its profits or
income/gross sales. Following the reasoning of
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
the Dissent that "any form of permanent taking of
private property (including profits or
income/gross sales) 120 is an exercise of eminent
domain that requires the State to pay just
compensation," 121 then these statutory
provisions would, likewise, have to be declared
unconstitutional. It does not matter that these
benefits are deemed part of the employees'
legislated wages because the net effect is the
same, that is, it leads to higher labor costs and a
permanent reduction in the profits or
income/gross sales of the business
establishments. 122 HcTEaA
The point then is this most, if not all,
regulatory measures imposed by the State on
business establishments impact, at some level,
the latter's prices and/or profits or income/gross
sales. 123 If the Court were to sustain the
Dissent's theory, then a wholesale nullification of
such measures would inevitably result. The police
power of the State and the social justice
provisions of the Constitution would, thus, be
rendered nugatory.
There is nothing sacrosanct about profits or
income/gross sales. This, we made clear in Carlos
Superdrug Corporation: 124
Police power as an attribute to promote the
common good would be diluted considerably if on
the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer
loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence
of evidence demonstrating the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question,
there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its
favor.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the
pharmaceutical industry and the competitive
pricing component of the business. While the
Constitution protects property rights, petitioners
must accept the realities of business and the
State, in the exercise of police power, can
intervene in the operations of a business which
may result in an impairment of property rights in
the process.
Moreover, the right to property has a social
dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution
provides the precept for the protection of
property, various laws and jurisprudence,
particularly on agrarian reform and the regulation
of contracts and public utilities, continuously
serve as a reminder that the right to property can
be relinquished upon the command of the State
for the promotion of public good. ASIDTa
Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens
program rests largely on the support imparted by
petitioners and the other private establishments
concerned. This being the case, the means
employed in invoking the active participation of
the private sector, in order to achieve the
purpose or objective of the law, is reasonably and
directly related. Without sufficient proof that
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that
the continued implementation of the same would
be unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the
42 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.
125
In conclusion, we maintain that the correct rule in
determining whether the subject regulatory
measure has amounted to a "taking" under the
power of eminent domain is the one laid down in
Alalayan v. National Power Corporation 126 and
followed in Carlos Superdrug Corporation 127
consistent with long standing principles in police
power and eminent domain analysis. Thus, the
deprivation or reduction of profits or income/gross
sales must be clearly shown to be unreasonable,
oppressive or confiscatory. Under the specific
circumstances of this case, such determination
can only be made upon the presentation of
competent proof which petitioners failed to do. A
law, which has been in operation for many years
and promotes the welfare of a group accorded
special concern by the Constitution, cannot and
should not be summarily invalidated on a mere
allegation that it reduces the profits or
income/gross sales of business establishments.
cDSaEH
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., pls. see concurring opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., C.J., Sereno certifies that J.
De Castro left her vote concurring w/ ponencia of
J. Del Castillo.
Brion, J., took no part.
Peralta, J., C.J., Sereno certifies that J. Peralta left
his vote concurring w/ ponencia of J. Del Castillo.
Bersamin, J., with concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
(Espano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
120431, April 01, 1998)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998.]
RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for review of the decision of the
court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 13976 dated
January 16, 1995 which affirmed in toto the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 1, convicting petitioner Rodolfo Espano for
violation of Article II Section 8 of REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The records of the
case reveal that herein petitioner was caught in
possession of and under his custody twelve
plastic cellophane bags weighing 5.5 grams
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
containing crushed flowering tops, marijuana
which is a prohibited drug. In his appeal before
the Supreme Court, petitioner contends that the
trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him
because (1) the pieces of evidence seized were
inadmissible; (2) the superiority of his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent over
the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (3) he
was denied the constitutional right of
confrontation and to compulsory process; and (4)
his conviction was based on evidence which was
irrelevant and not properly identified. CIScaA
The Supreme Court finds that there was no
compelling reason to reverse the decisions of the
trial and appellate courts. In this case, the
findings of the trial court that the prosecution
witnesses were more credible than those of the
defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that
Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, in testifying against him,
was motivated by reasons other than his duty to
curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely
impute to him such a serious crime as possession
of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill
motive, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duty must prevail.
Furthermore, the defense of alibi set up by
petitioner deserved scant consideration. He
simply contended that he was in his house
sleeping at the time of the incident. Lastly, the
two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence because he was caught in
flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation
conducted by police officers. However, as for the
other ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at
petitioner's residence, the same are inadmissible
in evidence considering that the said bags were
seized at petitioner's house after his arrest,
hence, do not fall under the exceptions provided
under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. In view thereof, the instant petition
is denied and the challenged decision is affirmed
with modification as to the penalty.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY
OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURTS
ON THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
DESERVE A HIGH DEGREE OF RESPECT; CASE
AT BAR. It is a well-settled doctrine that
findings of trial courts on the credibility of witness
deserve a high degree of respect. Having
observed the deportment of witnesses during the
trial, the trial judge is in a better position to
determine the issue of credibility and, thus, his
findings will not be disturbed during appeal in the
absence of any clear and showing that he had
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which could have altered the conviction of the
appellants. In this case, the findings of the trial
court that the prosecution witnesses were more
credible that those of the defense must stand.
Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in
testifying against him, was motivated by reasons
other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had
any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious
crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the
absence of such ill motive, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official duty
must prevail.
43 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIM OF FRAME-UP, LIKE
ALIBI, IS A DEFENSE THAT HAS BEEN
INVARIABLY VIEWED BY THE COURT WITH
DISFAVOR; CASE AT BAR. The defense set
up by petitioner does not deserve any
consideration. He simply contended that he was
in his house sleeping at the time of the incident.
This court has consistently held that alibi is the
weakest of all defenses; and for it to prosper, the
accused has the burden of proving that he was
not at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission and that it was physically impossible
for him to be there. Moreover, the "claim of
'frame-up,' like alibi, is a defense that has been
invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it
can just as easily be concocted but difficult to
prove, and is a common and standard line of
defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act." No clear
and convincing evidence was presented by
petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
WARRANTLESS ARREST; THE MARIJUANA
SEIZED FROM PETITIONER'S HOUSE AFTER
HIS ARREST IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;
CASE AT BAR. The 1987 Constitution
guarantees freedom against unreasonable
searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2
which provides: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest of dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense. It may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include
the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. In this case, the ten
cellophane bags of marijuana seized at
petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan
and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said
exceptions. . . . The articles seized from petitioner
during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of
search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The
warrantless search made in his house, however,
which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana
became unlawful since the police officers were
not armed with a search warrant at the time.
Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of
petitioner. HTScEI
4. CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425
AS AMENDED BY Republic Act 7659; IF THE
QUANTITY OF MARIJUANA INVOLVED IS LESS
THAN 750 GRAMS, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY
RANGES FROM PRISION CORRECTIONAL TO
RECLUSION TEMPORAL; CASE AT BAR. This
Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II,
Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L)(I) of
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, as amended. Under the
said provision, the penalty imposed is six years
and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging
from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. With
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, which took
effect on December 31, 1993, the imposable
penalty shall now depend on the quantity of
drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic
Act No. 7659, Section 20, and as interpreted in
People v. Simon (234 SCRA 555 [1994]) and
People v. Lara, (236 SCRA 291 [1994]) if the
quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750
grams, the imposable penalty ranges from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking into
consideration that petitioner is not a habitual
delinquent, the amendatory provision is favorable
to him and the quantity of marijuana involved is
less than 750 grams, the penalty imposed under
Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied.
5. ID.; ID.; PROPER PENALTY THEREOF; CASE
AT BAR. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, the imposable
penalty shall be prision correccional in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be
taken from the medium period of prision
correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
(2) months, while the minimum shall be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, which is
one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
of arresto mayor. cSDHEC
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated
January 16, 1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 1, convicting petitioner Rodolfo Espano for
violation of Article II, Section 8 of REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. aisadc
Petitioner was charged under the
information:
"That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of
Manila, Philippines the said accused, not being
authorized by law to possess or use any
prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession
and under his custody and control twelve (12)
plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed
flowering tops, marijuana weighing 5.5 grams
which is prohibited drug.
Contrary to law." 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the
testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on
July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other
police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino,
Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the
Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division
went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to
confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They
saw petitioner selling "something" to another
person. After the alleged buyer left, they
approached petitioner, identified themselves as
policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded
two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana .
When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied
that there was more in his house. The policemen
went to his residence where they found ten more
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was
44 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
brought to the police headquarters where he was
charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On
July 24, 1991, petitioner posted bail 3 and the
trial court issued his order of release on July 29,
1991. 4
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD
Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section,
testified that the articles sent to her by Pat.
Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a
certain Rodolfo Espano for examination tested
positive for marijuana, with total weight of 5.5
grams.
By way of defense, petitioner that on said
evening, he was sleeping in house and was
awakened only when the policemen handcuffed
him. He alleged that the policemen were looking
for his brother-in-law Lauro, and when they could
not find the latter, he was brought to the police
station for investigation and later indicted for
possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna
corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioner's defense as a
"mere afterthought" and found the version of the
prosecution "more credible and trustworthy."
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered
a decision, convicting petitioner of the crime
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE there being proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the court finds the accused
Rodolfo Espano y Valeria guilty of the crime of
violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to
Section 2 (e-L) (I) of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, and
pursuant to law hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years and to pay a fine of P6,000.00
following with subsidiary imprisonment in case of default
plus costs.
The marijuana is declared fortified in favor of
government and shall be turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board without delay.
SO ORDERED." 5
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, however, affirmed
the decision of the trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate
courts erred in convicting him on the basis of the
following: (a) the pieces of evidence seized were
inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent over
the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (c) he
was denied the constitutional right of
confrontation and to compulsory process; and (d)
his conviction was based on evidence which was
irrelevant and not properly identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the
case, this Court finds no compelling reason
sufficient to reverse the decisions of the trial and
appellate courts.
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of
trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve
a high degree of respect. Having observed the
deportment of witnesses during the trial, the trial
judge is in a better position to determine the
issue of credibility and, thus, his findings will not
be disturbed during appeal in the absence of any
clear showing that he had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which
could have altered the conviction of the
appellants. 6
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the
prosecution witnesses were more credible than
those of the defense must stand. Petitioner failed
to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against
him, was motivated by reasons other than his
duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to
falsely impute to him such a serious crime as
possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of
such ill motive, the presumption of regularity of
his official duty must prevail.
In People v. Velasco, 7 this Court reiterated the
doctrine of presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty which provides:
". . . Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy
and the other members of the buy-bust team are
policemen engaged in mulcting or other
unscrupulous activities who where motivated
either by the desire to extort money or exact
personal vengeance, or by sheer whim and
caprice, when they entrapped her. And in the
absence of proof of any intent on the part of the
police authorities to falsely impute such a serious
crime against appellant, as in this case, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty, . . ., must prevail over the self-
serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant
that she had been framed." 8
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner
does not deserve any consideration. He simply
contended that he was in his house sleeping at
the time of the incident. This Court has
consistently held that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has
the burden of proving that he was not at the
scene of the crime of its commission and that it
was physically impossible for him to be there.
Moreover, the "claim of a 'frame-up', like alibi, is
a defense that has been invariably viewed by the
Court with disfavor for it can just as easily be
concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common
and standard line of defense in most prosecutions
arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act." 9 No clear and convincing evidence was
presented by petitioner to prove his defense of
alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the
prosecution's failure to present the alleged
informant in court cast a reasonable doubt which
warrants his acquittal. This is again without merit,
since failure of the prosecution to produce the
informant in court is of no moment especially
when he is not even the best witness to establish
the fact that a buy-bust operation had indeed
been conducted. In this case, Pat. Pagilagan, one
of the policemen who apprehended petitioner,
testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991,
45 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
and identified him as the one they caught in
possession of prohibited drugs. Thus,
"We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily
proved its case against appellants. There is no
compelling reason for us to overturn the finding
of the trial court that the testimony of Sgt.
Gamboa, the lone witness for the prosecution,
was straightforward, spontaneous and
convincing. The testimony of a sole witness, if
credible and positive and satisfies the court
beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict."
10
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagan's testimony,
the prosecution was able to prove that petitioner
indeed committed the crime charged;
consequently, the finding of conviction was
proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the
marijuana seized should likewise be ruled upon.
Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court
provides:
"A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx."
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the
aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a
result of a buy-bust operation conducted by
police officers on the basis of information
received regarding the illegal trade of drugs
within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets,
Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing
over something to an alleged buyer. After the
buyer left, they searched him and discovered two
cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was,
therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of
marijuana seized were admissible in evidence,
being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found
at petitioner's residence, however, the same
inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom
against unreasonable searches and seizures
under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense. 11 It may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest
include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. In this case, the ten
cellophane bags of marijuana seized at
petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan
and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said
exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held:
"As regards the brick of marijuana found inside
the appellant's house, the trial court correctly
ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility.
While initially the arrest as well as the body
search was lawful, the warrantless search made
inside the appellant's house became unlawful
since the police operatives were not armed with a
search warrant. Such search cannot fall under
"search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the
same being limited to body search and to that
point within reach or control of the person
arrested, or that which may furnish him with the
means of committing violence or of escaping. In
the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside
his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can
hardly be said that the inner portion of his house
was within his reach or control."
The articles seized from petitioner during his
arrest were valid under the doctrine of search
made incidental to a lawful arrest. The
warrantless search made in his house, however,
which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana
became unlawful since the police officers were
not armed with a search warrant at the time.
Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of
petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L)
(I) of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, as amended.
Under the said provision, the penalty imposed is
six years and one day to twelve years and a fine
ranging from six thousand to twelve thousands
pesos. With the passage of Republic Act No. 7659,
with took effect on December 31, 1993, the
imposable penalty shall now depend on the
quantity of drugs recovered. Under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, and as
interpreted in People v. Simon 13 and People v.
Lara, 14 if the quantity of marijuana involved is
less than 750 grams, the imposable penalty
ranges from prision correccional to reclusion
temporal. Taking into consideration that
petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the
amendatory provision is favorable to him and the
quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750
grams, the penalty imposed under Republic Act
No. 7659 should be applied. There being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the
imposable penalty shall be prision correccional in
its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be
taken from the medium period of prision
correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two
(2) months, while the minimum shall be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, which is
one (1) month and one (1) day six (6) months of
arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
46 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l protection
C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner
Rodolfo Espano is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and
ONE (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum of
TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ ., concur.
Addendum
Due process
Ang Tibay v CIR
Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay
and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU
alleged that the supposed lack of leather material
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharge all the
members of the NLU, from work. And this
averment is desired to be proved by the
petitioner with the records of the Bureau of
Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers
in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood
Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was
alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR,
decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme
Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by
the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for
opposing the said motion.
Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is
meritorious to be granted.
Held: To begin with the issue before us is to
realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a
special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation which is the
Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to
be a mere receptive organ of the government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function
of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its
organic law is more active, affirmative and
dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and
extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and
settle any question, matter controversy or
disputes arising between, and/ or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and
regulates the relations between them, subject to,
and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC
had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
clause_ Search and seizures Digest
forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be
free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore
or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.
There cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right
to present one's cause and submit evidence in
support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support
itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
47 | C O N S T I 2 _ D u e P r o c e s s _ E q u a l
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing; or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must
act on its own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the
various Issue involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the
motion for a new trial should be, and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction
that it reopen the case receive all such evidence
as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth. So
ordered.
protection clause_ Search and seizures Digest