RCBC Manager Ready To Tell All

RCBC manager ready to tell all
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/03/14/1562717/rcbc-manager-ready-tell-all
RCBC branch manager Maia Santos-Deguito, along with her family members, was
prevented from leaving the country last week after the Department of Justice issued a
lookout order against her. She also reported receiving threats to her life.
MANILA, Philippines Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. (RCBC) branch manager

Maia Santos-Deguito is ready to bare everything she knows about the controversy
involving an $81-million money laundering scheme, her lawyer said yesterday.
Ferdinand Topacio said his client would attend the Senate Blue Ribbon committee
investigation, which starts tomorrow, to clear her name.
Lawyer Ramon Esguerra said his client, businessman William Go, would also face the
investigation to prove his innocence.
Go, former owner of S&R, is one of six businessmen dragged into the laundering
scheme that involved four banks and three casinos in Manila and is dubbed as
possibly the worlds biggest cyber heist involving local and international banks.
In a statement, Topacio said Deguito, who manages the RCBC branch on Jupiter
Street in Makati City, is being used a scapegoat in a supposed scheme that could
have not been committed without the knowledge and approval of the banks higher
management.
He urged RCBC to suspend bank president Lorenzo Tan pending the internal
investigation to avoid a possible whitewash.
If indeed RCBC is serious in uncovering the truth regarding the alleged money
laundering, and not preparing for a widespread cover-up and setting up Ms. Santos-
Deguito as the fall guy, it should immediately suspend Mr. Lorenzo Tan and reassign
the investigation to another bank officer with no links to Mr. Tans lawyers, Topacio
stressed.
Deguito has denied facilitating the scheme by setting up the alleged fake foreign
exchange account linked to Go. She insisted everything went through the process and
denied personally crediting the money to Gos account.
There is a department in the head office that handled the remittance, which went
through many processes before reaching my branch, Deguito claimed.
She said the approval for such transfer came from their head office.
We, all bankers, know that we have a process to follow. I did not even mandate
anyone to credit that (amount). Theyve credited it outright, the bank manager added.
Deguito, along with her family members, was prevented from leaving the country last
week after the Department of Justice issued a lookout order against her. She also
reported receiving threats to her life.
Earlier, she denied approaching Go or offering him P10 million in exchange for
keeping his silence, aside from insisting that she neither asked him to sign anything
nor does she have that amount of money.
Some reports indicated that Deguito confided in Go that she opened fictitious dollar
and peso accounts at the RCBC branch along Jupiter Street on Feb. 23. It was
supposedly during this time that she offered Go to go along with the scheme,
prompting Go to ask Esguerra to consult with RCBC.
Esguerra said last Friday that his client never consented to open nor had any
knowledge of these accounts, which were allegedly used as storing ground by hackers
for the amount to be laundered.
The accounts were among those used later on in the receipt of the multibillion- peso
account of the Bangladesh Bank at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Esguerra tapped the National Bureau of Investigation in order to prove that Gos
signatures in the RCBC Jupiter branch bank accounts were forged. He would also ask
the Court of Appeals to lift the freeze order it issued on the bank accounts of the
businessmans brokerage firm Centurytex Trading, which is among those being tagged
in the controversy.
Yes. (The) RCBCs initial investigation shows this. Mr. Go is very much sure that he
never opened an account with RCBC branch. His main account is East West (Bank)
from where Dequito came from, Esguerra told The STAR in an exchange of text
messages.
Money laundering
Go is among the six bank account holders invited by the Senate Blue Ribbon
committee. The other account holders were identified as Michael Cruz, Jessie
Lagrosas, Alfred Vergara, Enrico Vasquez and Kam Sin Wong (Kim Wong).
Reports said Go, Cruz, Lagrosas, Vergara and Vasquez opened dollar accounts in
RCBC in May 2015 and these remained unused until Feb. 5, when $81 million
supposedly coming from the Central Bank of Bangladesh entered the accounts. Most
of the money was converted into pesos by remittance firm Philrem.
The money was then transferred to the bank accounts of Weikang Xu, alleged to be
involved in the gaming business as a junket operator, and to Eastern Hawaii Leisure
Co. Ltd. and Bloomberry, the Solaire operator.
On March 1, the Court of Appeals (CA) ordered four banks RCBC, East West Bank,
Banco de Oro, and Philippine National Bank to freeze for the next six months the
bank accounts and all related accounts of the six individuals.
Sen. Teofisto Guingona III, Blue Ribbon chairman, also ordered the secretariat to
invite Amando Tetangco Jr., concurrent Central Bank governor and Anti-Money
Laundering Council chairman; Teresita Herbosa, chairperson of the Securities and
Exchange Commission; Emmanuel Dooc, Insurance Commission head; Julia Bacay-
Abad, executive director of the AMLC secretariat.
Apart from their respective positions, Abad and Dooc are members of the AMLC.
The committee also wants Cristino Naguiat Jr., chairman and CEO of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corp. (Pagcor), to shed light on reports that the casinos were
used in the money-laundering activities.
The top executives of various banks were: Lorenzo Tan, RCBC president and CEO;
Fe Salamatin, head of the RCBC compliance unit; Deguito, branch manager of
RCBC-Jupiter branch; Reynaldo Maclang, president of the Philippine National Bank
(PNB): Antonio Moncupa Jr., president and CEO of East West Bank; and Nestor Tan,
president and CEO of Banco de Oro.
The PNB Ermita branch manager and its AMLA compliance officer, the BDO AMLA
compliance officer, and Salud Bautista, president of Philrem Service Corp. remittance
agency used in the scam, were also told to attend the Senate probe.
Also called to attend are Thomas Arasi, president and CEO of Solaire Resort and
Casino Manila; Reynaldo Bantug, chairman, president and CEO of Leisure and
Resorts World Corp. and the Midas Hotel and Casino; and Clarence Chung, chairman
and president of Melco Crown Philippines and City of Dreams Casino.
In an advisory, Guingona said the personalities invited by the committee are classified
as resource persons. with Edu Punay Christina Mendez
RCBC pins down manager

Internal report says Deguito got help from coworkers
Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/774085/rcbc-pins-down-

manager#ixzz432hVfXWu
RIZAL Commercial Banking Corp. (RCBC) branch manager Maia Santos-Deguito

gatekeeper of the $81-million dirty money that slipped into the countryexpected the
big inflow and facilitated its speedy withdrawal, apparently with some help from her
own branch, according to an internal report submitted by the bank head office to
authorities.
In a timeline submitted to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) dated March
14, the RCBC report suggested that Deguito had vouched for the transaction, hastily
processed the withdrawal of the money while intimating to other staff members in the
branch on Jupiter Street in Makati City that she feared for her life and for her family.

manager#ixzz432hfSqdY
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On Feb. 5 or the day the $81 million was wired to the accounts of Jessie Christopher
Lagrosas ($30 million), Alfred Vergara ($19.999 million), Enrico Vasquez ($25
million) and Michael Cruz ($6 million), Deguito facilitated the opening of the
account of businessman William S. Go DBA Centurytex Trading at Jupiter BC, said
the report submitted to the AMLC.
This was the same account that Go vehemently denied, instead pointing to Deguito as
part of the money laundering conspiracy.
Go claimed that Deguito had admitted to him that she had opened the account herself
and offered P10 million if he would go along with the scheme, allegations that
Deguito denied.
The $81 million was credited to the four accounts via a straight-through-process after
the transactions passed validation criteria.
On the same day, a cash withdrawal from Lagrosas account amounting to $22.73
million was made and deposited in the newly opened Go account. William Go
transferred a total of $14.7 million to the account of remittance firm Philrem.
No signatures
The report noted that all debit documentsLagrosa

manager#ixzz432hjc8pN
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RIZAL Commercial Banking Corp. (RCBC) branch manager Maia Santos-Deguito

gatekeeper of the $81-million dirty money that slipped into the countryexpected the
big inflow and facilitated its speedy withdrawal, apparently with some help from her
own branch, according to an internal report submitted by the bank head office to
authorities.
In a timeline submitted to the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) dated March 14,
the RCBC report suggested that Deguito had vouched for the transaction, hastily
processed the withdrawal of the money while intimating to other staff members in the
branch on Jupiter Street in Makati City that she feared for her life and for her family.
On Feb. 5 or the day the $81 million was wired to the accounts of Jessie Christopher
Lagrosas ($30 million), Alfred Vergara ($19.999 million), Enrico Vasquez ($25 million)
and Michael Cruz ($6 million), Deguito facilitated the opening of the account of
businessman William S. Go DBA Centurytex Trading at Jupiter BC, said the report
submitted to the AMLC.
This was the same account that Go vehemently denied, instead pointing to Deguito as
part of the money laundering conspiracy.
Go claimed that Deguito had admitted to him that she had opened the account herself
and offered P10 million if he would go along with the scheme, allegations that Deguito
denied.
The $81 million was credited to the four accounts via a straight-through-process after
the transactions passed validation criteria.
On the same day, a cash withdrawal from Lagrosas account amounting to $22.73
million was made and deposited in the newly opened Go account. William Go
transferred a total of $14.7 million to the account of remittance firm Philrem.
No signatures
The report noted that all debit documentsLagrosas withdrawal slip, fund transfer
forms and managers check applications of William Gohad no signatures of clients.
A hold-out order on all four accounts and the Go account was posted at 6:45 p.m. to
7:04 p.m.
[A] series of phone calls among district sales head Nestor Pineda, regional sales head
Briggite Capina, Jupiter BM (business manager) Maia Deguito and outgoing RBG (retail
banking group) head Raul Tan transpired.
In these conversations, Deguito assured (us) that the clients were long-standing clients
of hers, and she expected these funds since last year and the documents were in
order, the report said.
The hold-out order was lifted by the bank past 7 p.m. that Friday, after which the bank
paused for a long weekend break. The following Monday (Feb. 8) was a nonworking
holiday in observance of the Chinese Lunar New Year.
Message from Bangladesh

By Feb. 9, RCBC received a message from Bangladesh Bank requesting a stop in
payment and to freeze the beneficiaries accounts for proper investigation. That same
day, withdrawals from the four accounts totaling $58.15 million were processed by the
Jupiter branch.
Before lunchtime, RCBC Settlements Department sent four e-mails to the Jupiter branch
on the recall of the funds.

manager#ixzz432hqqPxB
However, BM (branch manager) Maia showed him the Feb. 5 e-mail of Ms Capina
that [the] accounts were OK to credit. Meanwhile, all the withdrawals and fund
transfers were being processed by CSA (customer service assistant) teller Reymart
Marbella and approved/overridden by SCRO (senior customer relationship officer)
Angela Torres, the report said.
The assistance given by Marbella and Torres has been seen as an indication that apart
from Deguito, the entire branch may have been compromised.
Withdraw rather than die
In subsequent interviews, both CSH (customer service head) and SCRO said that BM
Deguito told them that she would rather process withdrawals kaysa mamatay siya at
ang pamilya niya (instead of she and her family being killed), the report said.
Deguito herself facilitated the opening of the four US dollar accounts that received the
suspicious remittance, which turned out be part of large funds stolen by computer
hackers from the account of Bank of Bangladesh with the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.
She claims having done due diligence on these customers in line with mandatory
know-your-client rule, but except for the William Go account, the addresses have
turned out to be fictitious.

manager#ixzz432hxafWp
AMLC suit
The AMLC itself, in a separate filing with the Department of Justice (DOJ) on Friday,
noted that these names may only be aliases.
Around 3:31 p.m. on Feb. 9, RCBC was able to freeze what remained of the balance
in the four accounts amounting to around $68,000.
In the following days, RCBC filed a STR or (suspicious transaction report) and tried
to view the CCTV footage but found that the video was not working at the branch
during the days in question. Deguito was placed on preventive suspension by Feb. 16.
On Feb. 17, RCBC decided not to allow the further opening of new accounts by
Philrem or WeRQuick, the remittance firm that converted the money from the
consolidated account of William Go into pesos and transferred them to the ultimate
beneficiaries.
Instruction was given by the audit committee not to deal with PhilRem, the report
said.
By March 1, the suspected accounts were ordered frozen by the AMLC.

manager#ixzz432i21m00
Complaint
In the suit against Dequito, AMLC investigators claimed that the branch manager
knew that $81 million deposited in her branch had been stolen from the Bangladesh
central bank but she still allowed the money to be withdrawn by fictitious account
holders.
AMLC investigators made this allegation in a complaint against Deguito and four
John Does.
Not only did respondent Deguito fail to verify the identifies of the respondents
within nine months from the time the accounts were opened, she even allowed
respondent John Does to withdraw money stolen from Bangladesh Bank, stated the
joint affidavit of AMLC Deputy Director Julia Bacay-Abad and Rafael Echaluse of
the council secretariats compliance and investigation group.

manager#ixzz432i6MFzf
Conspiracy eyed in $81M launder
BANK officials, personnel of remittance companies and hackers may have conspired to launder the
$81 million stolen from the Bangladesh central bank, members of the Senate blue ribbon committee
said.
Senate President Pro-Tempore Ralph Recto on Tuesday said it is possible that there was a grand
conspiracy because it is clear that those involved planned the whole thing last year when the four
accounts where the stolen money was deposited were opened at the Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) Jupiter Branch in Makati City.
I cannot make any final judgment but it is possible that there is conspiracy because the accounts
were opened last year but remained dormant. Why RCBC? And why in that branch? Recto said in
an interview after the blue ribbon hearing.
He raised the conspiracy scheme because, according to him, there is no way that such a huge
transaction can be executed by just one individual particularly RCBC Jupiter Branch manager Maia
Santos-Deguito.
So it is important for us to hear what Deguito has to say because it would appear that she really
wants to say something, Recto said.
Deguito reportedly admitted opening an account for Filipino-Chinese businessman William Go, into
whose account the hacked money was deposited.
There were four accounts opened in the branch last year under the names of Enrico Vasquez, Alfred
Vergara, Michael Cruz and Jessie Christopher Lagrosas with a deposit of $500 each.
The next transactions happened on February 5, 2016 where the $81 million was divided.
But the money was withdrawn simultaneously and deposited in the account of Go.
None of the four owners of the accounts attended the Senate hearing.
Go, who owns brokerage firm Centurytex Trading, denied owning the account where the stolen
money was deposited and insisted that he never opened an account in RCBC Jupiter Branch.
Deguito refused to answer questions of senators but expressed her willingness to provide all
information in an executive session.
According to her, a case has been filed against her by the Anti-Money laundering Council (AMLC)
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) and all her statements relating to the case can be used
against her if she will talk during the hearing.
Deguito, in a prepared statement, said she had no intention to disregard or offend members of the
committee and that she intends to fully cooperate in the proceeding, but she also wants to protect
her rights.
We wish to respectfully underscore that, by this time, any statement she publicly makes, especially
those under oath, shall be binding on her, worse, may and will be used against her in said criminal
proceedings, the statement read.
The bank manager invoked her right to remain silent when asked by Sen. Teofisto Guingona 3rd,
blue ribbon chairman, if she did not find anything alarming on the transactions made in four accounts
that have been inactive since May 2015.
RCBC president and chief executive officer Lorenzo Tan also invoked bank secrecy laws in not
answering questions on certain bank accounts.
I was advised by counsel your honor to refrain from talking about bank accounts and specific
transactions. I apologize, Tan responded when asked about the alleged fake document used by the
depositors to open the accounts.
Tan was allowed by the committee to read his prepared statement regarding the incident and his
reply to the allegations of Deguito that he has knowledge of the transactions.
We vehemently deny and disallow any and all knowledge, complicity or participation in the alleged
money laundering of $100 million in the Philippines, he said.
Lorenzo Tan
More important, I have no personal knowledge of, much less personal participation, in any of the
transactions that are subject of this inquiry, Tan added.
He pointed out that RCBC processes more than two million transactions per month with an average
peso value of P1 trillion and although he was the CEO of the company, he does not know or have to
approve all of the banks transactions.
Deguito said she was personally recruited by Tan from EastWest Bank but the latter denied this.
Senator Sergio Osmena 3rd, vice chairman of the blue ribbon committee, is not convinced that Tan
is involved in the transactions.
I dont think the RCBC president will risk his reputation for this stupidity. Hes making much too
much money. The branch manager is really the key person in any banking system, Osmea said.
Conspiracy
An agreement between two or more persons to engage jointly in an unlawful or criminal act, or
an act that is innocent initself but becomes unlawful when done by the combination of actors.
Conspiracy is governed by statute in federal courts and most state courts. Before its Codification
in state and federalstatutes, the crime of conspiracy was simply an agreement to engage in an unl
awful act with the intent to carry out the act.Federal statutes, and many state statutes, now requir
e not only agreement and intent but also the commission of an Overt
Act in furtherance of the agreement.
Conspiracy is a crime separate from the criminal act for which it is developed. For example, one
who conspires with anotherto commit Burglary and in fact commits the burglary can be charged
with both conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary.
Conspiracy is an inchoate, or preparatory, crime. It is similar to solicitation in that both crimes ar

e committed by manifestingan intent to engage in a criminal act. It differs from solicitation in tha
t conspiracy requires an agreement between two ormore persons, whereas solicitation can be com
mitted by one person alone.
Conspiracy also resembles attempt. However, attempt, like solicitation, can be committed by a si
ngle person. On anotherlevel, conspiracy requires less than attempt. A conspiracy may exist befo
re a crime is actually attempted, whereas noattempt charge will succeed unless the requisite atte
mpt is made.
The law seeks to punish conspiracy as a substantive crime separate from the intended crime beca
use when two or morepersons agree to commit a crime, the potential for criminal activity increas
es, and as a result, the danger to the publicincreases. Therefore, the very act of an agreement with
criminal intent (along with an overt act, where required) isconsidered sufficiently dangerous to w
arrant charging conspiracy as an offense separate from the intended crime.
According to some criminal-law experts, the concept of conspiracy is too elastic, and the allegati
on of conspiracy is used byprosecutors as a superfluous criminal charge. Many criminal defense l
awyers maintain that conspiracy is often expandedbeyond reasonable interpretations. In any case,
prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys alike agree that conspiracycases are usually amorpho
us and complex.
The Elements of Conspiracy Agreement

The essence of conspiracy is the agreement between two or more persons. A single person acting
alone cannot be guilty ofconspiracy.
Quiz Show Conspiracies
In the 1950s, the new medium of television was fast becoming a staple in U.S. households, and q
uiz shows, with their lowproduction costs and high-stakes drama, were enjoying immense popula
rity. Contestants on quiz shows played until theylost; some competed for months and won tens of
thousands of dollars. The quiz show concept of rewarding intelligence withinstant wealth appeal
ed to the U.S. public and inspired many to seek an invitation to play.
In May 1958, Edward Hilgemeier was in the studio audience of the quiz show "Dotto" when he
was approached by a "Dotto"producer. The producer asked if Hilgemeier would like to compete
on the show. Hilgemeier, an aspiring actor, accepted theoffer. On May 20, he went to the "Dotto"
set as a standby contestant.
Marie Winn, a student at Columbia University, was the defending champion of "Dotto." A charm
ing, animated native ofCzechoslovakia, the twenty-one-year-old Winn had won "Dotto" on two c
onsecutive nights. As Hilgemeier waited for hispossible turn against Winn, he got the impression
that studio personnel were unduly familiar with the woman.
Winn's first challenger that day was Yeffe Kimball Slatin. Hilgemeier watched as Winn defeated
Slatin with ease; Winnseemed to have every answer at hand. After the contest between Winn and
Slatin, Hilgemeier returned to the contestants'dressing room, where he discovered a notebook bel
onging to Winn that appeared to contain answers to "Dotto" questions.Hilgemeier notified Slatin,
and the two returned to the dressing room, where one of them tore the apparent answer sheet out
of Winn's notebook.
That night, after speaking to Slatin's lawyer, Hilgemeier and Slatin went to the "Dotto" offices, w
here they spoke with theshow's producers. The "Dotto" producers promised compensation to bot
h Hilgemeier and Slatin. Slatin agreed to stay quietabout the affair for a nominal sum of money f
rom "Dotto," but Hilgemeier, fearing for his reputation, refused. Hilgemeier tookhis information
to Manhattan district attorney Frank Hogan and assistant district attorney Joseph Stone.
Initially, the Manhattan district attorney's office was skeptical of Hilgemeier's complaint. The rig
ging of quiz shows was, afterall, not illegal. Shortly into the investigation, however, it became ap
parent to Hogan and Stone that a widespread conspiracywas in place to hide the truth from the pu
blicand conspiracy to commit Fraud wasillegal.
The Manhattan district attorney's office convened Grand
Jury hearings, and a subcommittee of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives held congressional heari
ngs on the quiz shows' practices. Many producers and contestants lied to thegrand jury and the co
ngressional subcommittee about their role in quiz show trickery. On October 14, 1959, their elab
orateweb of deceit began to unravel when Charles Van Doren, a Columbia University professor,
admitted to the subcommittee hisinvolvement in a rigged quiz show, "Twenty-One." (This incide
nt was the basis of Robert Redford's 1995 film Quiz Show.)
Quiz show producers and contestants eventually admitted their subterfuge to authorities. What e
merged were stories of howfavored quiz show contestants were coached to agonize and sweat ov
er answers they already knew. On August 30, 1960,the U.S. Congress passed a bill that made giv
ing or receiving assistance on a quiz show a federal crime. The bill wassigned into law by Presid
ent DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER two weeks later. Now, under 47 U.S.C.A. 509, it is a federal crime
to rigquiz shows with the intent to deceive the listening or viewing public. Under 18 U.S.C.A.
371, a conspiracy to engage inprohibited practices regarding radio and television quiz shows is al
so a federal crime.
However, if a coconspirator dies prior to the indictment or trial, the surviving coconspirator may
still be charged withconspiracy. A Husband and
Wife can be guilty of conspiracy. A corporation is considered a person for conspiracypurposes, s
o a corporation can be guilty of conspiracy, but it cannot conspire with itself. For example, if two
or moreemployees within a corporation conspire to break the law and subsequently commit an ac
t in furtherance of the conspiracy,the corporation itself is not criminally liable for conspiracy.The
agreement must be made voluntarily and with an intent toparticipate in furthering a common pur
pose. Mere knowledge or approval, in the absence of an actual agreement tocooperate, does not c
onstitute conspiracy.
Once an agreement with criminal intent is made, the conspiracy is complete, unless the applicabl
e statute requires theadditional element of an overt act. The agreement need not be written or for
mal, and it may be proved by Circumstantial
Evidence. A tacit understanding is sufficient to constitute agreement, even if no words are spoke
n that expresslycommunicate the conspiracy. Conspiracy exists if there is some form of mutual u
nderstanding between persons workingtogether with a common unlawful end.
Intent Criminal intent is also necessary to create a conspiracy. This means that the parties must i
ntend both to agree onand to engage in the unlawful act. Ignorance of the law is not usually a def
ense to a crime, but an unwitting conspirator maydefend against conspiracy charges on grounds o
f ignorance. Ignorance will not be a defense if the person continues toparticipate in the common
plan after learning of its illegality.
Either the purpose of the agreement or the means by which it is accomplished must be illegal to s
upport criminalprosecution on conspiracy charges. If the purpose is unlawful, the offense is com
mitted even if the means used to achievethe purpose are lawful. One illustration is where a noncu
stodial parent conspires with another person to KIDNAP the parent'schild, and the child is abducte
d during a court-approved visit. Conspiracy also occurs if the purpose of the agreement islawful
but the means used to achieve it are illegal. For example, if a custodial parent chooses to retrieve
a child who hasbeen kidnapped by the noncustodial parent, an agreement to use unlawful force c
onstitutes conspiracy.
Overt Act An overt act can be any step that indicates that the execution of the conspiracy has be
gun. This can be aninnocuous act and need not be illegal unto itself. For example, if two persons
agree to rob a bank, then purchase a skimask, the act of buying the mask may constitute the overt
act required to charge the two with conspiracy.
The overt act must follow the agreement and must be executed with an intent to carry out the pur
pose of the conspiracy.For example, if one of the potential bank robbers buys a ski mask after the
agreement is made, the purchase may notconstitute the overt act if the ski mask will not be worn
to carry out the Robbery. An overt act need not be committed byeach and every conspirator; an
overt act by one conspirator solidifies the offense for all coconspirators. Thus, a conspiratorwho
does not participate in the overt act can be charged with conspiracy.
If a conspirator completely and voluntarily renounces the criminal purpose to all conspirators, th
at person may withdraw fromthe conspiracy before the overt act is committed. Many jurisdiction
s require that the withdrawing conspirator also inform lawenforcement officials or take measures
to thwart the crime, in order to avoid criminal liability for the conspiracy.
Other Considerations
A conspiracy exists as long as measures are taken to conceal evidence of the crime. A person wh
o did not participate inthe original agreement can become a coconspirator after the actual crimina
l act if the person joins in the concealment of theconspiracy. Whether a coconspirator received pe
rsonal benefit or profit is of no importance.
Generally, conspirators are liable for all crimes committed within the course or scope of the cons
piracy. The application ofthis general rule varies from state to state. Ordinarily, an act is within th
e course or scope of the conspiracy if it is aforeseeable result of the agreement. In some states, a
conspirator is not liable where he or she has no knowledge of thespecific act and argues successf
ully that the act was beyond the scope of the conspiracy. Also, if the purpose of theagreement is l
ater changed by coconspirators, a conspirator who did not participate in the alteration may not be
held liablefor the new conspiracy. A person is liable for conspiracy only in regard to the meaning
of the agreement as he or sheunderstands it.
In some jurisdictions, a person may be guilty of conspiracy even if a coconspirator is immune fro
m prosecution. Forexample, if two persons conspire to commit murder and one is found to have
been insane at the time of the killing, the otherconspirator may not be exempt from prosecution f
or conspiracy.
One who provides services to conspirators will not be guilty of conspiracy if that person has not
participated in theagreement and does not know that a conspiracy exists. There must be a willful
participation in the conspiracy, as well as anintent to further the common purpose or design for c
onspiratorial liability. Therefore, aiding a conspiracy by selling materialto further it does not mak
e someone a conspirator if the person does not know of the conspiracy, even if that person knows
the goods sold will be used for an unlawful purpose. However, if the circumstances indicate a co
nspiracy, one whocooperates and knowingly sells goods for illegal use may be guilty of conspira
cy.
Generally, if a number of conspirators agree to carry out different functions in furtherance of the
conspiracy, the agreementconstitutes a single conspiracy. This is so even if the different functions
amount to more than one unlawful purpose. Insome states, however, the different functions may
constitute multiple conspiracies if there is an agreement to commit morethan one crime.
Punishment for the crime of conspiracy is ordinarily defined by statute and varies in accordance
with the conspiracy'sobjective. For example, a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor will not be s
ubject to the same punishment as a conspiracyto commit a felony. Conspiracy may be alleged in
a civil case if the plaintiff has suffered an injury as a result of theconspiracy. Civil conspiracy is o
rdinarily not a Cause of
Action, but the existence of a conspiracy may be used indetermining the amount of damages in a
civil action and the respective liabilities of civil codefendants for the payment ofdamages.
History of Conspiracy
Federal conspiracy statutes were first passed in 1909. Under 18 U.S.C.A. 371, it is a crime to c
ommit an offense againstor to defraud the United States or any agency of the United States. If the
crime actually committed is a felony, thepunishment is a fine of not more than $10,000 or five ye
ars' imprisonment, or both. Under 18 U.S.C.A. 372, it is a crime toconspire to impede or injure
a federal law enforcement officer.
The U.S. Congress has made specific conspiracies illegal through a variety of statutes. For exam
ple, conspiracy to murderfederal or foreign officials is prohibited by 18 U.S.C.A. 1117, a freest
anding statute. Conspiracy to kidnap is contained insubsection C of 18 U.S.C.A. 1201, the fede
ral kidnapping statute. Other federal statutes prohibit conspiracies toassassinate the president, the
vice president, and their successors; assassinate the director or deputy director of theCentral
Intelligence
Agency (CIA); assassinate or kidnap a Supreme Court justice; interfere with commerce and trade
;violate computer laws; launder money; obstruct state or local regulation of gambling; injure pro
perty of the federalgovernment; tamper with consumer products; gather, transmit, lose, remove, o
r destroy national defense information ormaterials; incite sailors to mutiny; engage in prohibited
practices regarding radio broadcasts or game show contests; defraudthe Tennessee Valley
Authority; violate or interfere with VOTING RIGHTS; and sexually exploit children.
Conspiracy cases are often infamous for their ambition and breadth. The assassination of Preside
nt Abraham
Lincoln in1865 by John Wilkes Booth was a product of a conspiracy between Booth and several
supporters of the defunctConfederacy. In the early 1950s, the U.S. Congress conducted numerous
hearings on Communist conspiracies against theUnited States. In the mid-1970s, several White H
ouse aides were indicted on charges of conspiracy in connection with the1972 burglary of the off
ices of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate Hotel, in Washington, D.C.
In November 1986, a Lebanese weekly, Al-Shiraa, reported that the U.S. government had secretl
y sold military weapons toso-called moderate factions in Iran. In exchange for the arms sales, acc
ording to Al-Shiraa, the moderate Iranians wouldwork to secure the release of U.S. citizens held
hostage in Lebanon. Thus began an investigation into a conspiracy thatbecame popularly known
as the Iran-Contra Affair.
Congressional investigations that followed the Al-Shiraa article revealed a covert "enterprise" co
nnected with the armssales. The operation, staffed by private citizens and funded by private moni
es, had diverted profits from the sale of theweapons to the Contras, a loosely knit military force i
n Honduras that sought to overthrow the socialist Sandinistagovernment in Nicaragua.
Congressional investigations in the spring of 1987 revealed that the enterprise had been supervis
ed by U.S. National Security
Council (NSC) staff. The NSC, created by the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 496 [50 U
.S.C.A. 402])and amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579 [5
0 U.S.C.A. 401 et seq.]), existed toadvise the president with respect to the Integration of dome
stic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.
One of the many problems presented by the enterprise was its apparent violation of the Boland a
mendments to a series ofappropriations bills. These bills were established in the early 1980s to pr
event any "agency or entity of the United Statesinvolved in intelligence activities" from spending
funds available to it "to support military or paramilitary operations inNicaragua" (133 Cong. Rec
. H4982-87 [daily ed. June 15, 1987]). The covert arms sales also violated procedural andsubstan
tive requirements of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 [22
U.S.C.A. 27512796c (1989 Supp.)]). Moreover, the executive branch's failure to notify Cong
ress of the covert arms sales flouted thereporting provisions of the 1980 Intelligence Oversight A
ct (Pub. L. No. 96-450, tit. IV, 407(b)(1), 94 Stat. 1981 [50U.S.C.A. 413 (1982)]).
In 1987, Lawrence Walsh, a former American Bar

Association president and former federal judge, was assigned by theU.S. Court of Appeals for th
e District of Columbia Circuit, Independent Counsel Division, to investigate the Contra-
fundingscheme. In March 1988, Walsh charged Richard Secord, Albert Hakim, Oliver North, and
John Poindexter with conspiracy toobstruct the U.S. government. North and Poindexter had work
ed for the NSC.
As in all conspiracy cases, an important goal of the prosecution was to determine who was invol
ved in the agreement. Amajor issue in the Iran-Contra investigation was to determine precisely w
ho in the Executive
Branch authorized or wasaware of the arms diversions and, specifically, whether the president h
ad knowledge of the unlawful activities.
In the legal battles that ensued over access to information in connection with the prosecutions, W
alsh faced challenges bythe RONALD REAGAN and GEORGE H. W. BUSH administrations, the Justic
e
Department, intelligence agencies, and lawyers for theaccused. Ultimately, the White House ref
used to relinquish classified information crucial to the prosecutions, and Walsh wasforced to dro
p all conspiracy charges. The Iran-Contra Affair resulted in criminal convictions of several perso
ns directlyconnected with the Reagan administration, but Walsh was never able to link the presid
ent to a conspiracy to obstruct theU.S. government.
In another conspiracy case, Patricia Caldwell, a bookkeeper with the Northwest Community Exc
hange (NCE), was chargedwith conspiracy to defraud the United States because she refused to pr
ovide to the IRS certain account information itrequested regarding NCE customers. The NCE wa
s one of a number of warehouse banks, which promised their customersthat they would not revea
l account information to third parties, including the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). As a result,the IRS shut down the warehouse banks, and it charged several custom
ers and employees with conspiracy to defraud theUnited States. A jury convicted Caldwell of co
nspiring to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. 371.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Caldwell's conspiracy conviction (United States v.
Caldwell, 989 F.2d 1056[1993]). The government had argued that people have a duty to conduct
their business affairs so as to not impair or impedethe collection of revenue by the IRS. The majo
rity opinion, written by Judge Alex Kozinski, rejected this interpretation of 18U.S.C.A. 371 an
d held that to defraud the government, a person had to act deceitfully or dishonestly. To allow oth
erwisewould create an oppressive theory of criminal conspiracy. The court observed that under th
e government's theory, "ahusband who asks his wife to buy him a radar detector would be a felon
because their actions would obstruct thegovernment function of catching speeders." Accordin
g to the court, Congress did not intend to make a federal crime out ofactions that merely make "t
he government's job more difficult."
The jury in Caldwell's case had not been instructed that it had to find that Caldwell agreed to obs
truct the IRS's tax-collecting functions by deceitful or dishonest means. This failure to inform the
jury about an essential element of conspiracyconstituted reversible error, and Caldwell's convicti
on was overturned.
American Honda Conspiracy
The sheer size of a conspiracy can create distinct problems for prosecutors and defense attorneys
alike. In 1993, U.S.attorneys in New Hampshire began to investigate employees of the American
Honda Motor Company. By 1994, prosecutorshad cobbled together an immense conspiracy-
based commercial Bribery case.
The conspiracy prosecutions of American Honda executives and dealers began to develop in 198
9, when Richard Nault, anautomobile dealer in Nashua, New Hampshire, brought a civil suit agai
nst American Honda, claiming unfair treatment. In1993, after testimony raised concerns of briber
y, the judge in Nault's case recommended that federal authorities investigatethe financial affairs a
t American Honda.
Investigations by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) revealed a widespread pattern of illegal payoffs in whichAmerican Honda e
xecutives were given cash, jewelry, cars, and store ownership interests in return for the awarding
of newHonda dealerships and favorable car allocations. According to the prosecutors, assistant U
.S. attorneys Michael Connollyand Donald Feith, the alleged conspiracy involved twenty-two A
merican Honda executives and dealers, encompassed thirtystates, and was responsible for the mis
appropriation of approximately $50 million. In 1993 and 1994, prosecutors dangledvarious subst
antive and conspiracy charges before the executives and dealers.
By the end of 1994, only three of the alleged conspirators had refused to plead guilty: John Billm
yer, an 18-year AmericanHonda veteran and longtime vice president of auto field sales; Stanley
Cardiges, another vice president of auto field salesand Billmyer's protg; and Dennis Josleyn, w
hose last position was West Coast sales manager for Acura, AmericanHonda's flagship automobil
e. In March 1994, Billmyer, Cardiges, and Josleyn were arrested at their homes, booked at localj
ails, and then released pending trial.
A federal Grand
Jury charged Billmyer with one count of conspiring with Cardiges and Josleyn to defraud Ameri
can Honda,the United States, the Treasury
Department, and the IRS, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. 1341. Specifically, the indictmentallege
d that Billmyer, Josleyn, and Cardiges had conspired to receive money and gifts by secretly sellin
g the valuablecontract rights conferred on prospective dealers by American Honda.
Cardiges and Josleyn were charged with participating in the broad conspiracy with Billmyer and
also conspiring to receivekickbacks in connection with an American Honda advertising campaig
n. Cardiges and Josleyn were further charged withviolating the RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CO
RRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT (18 U.S.C.A. 1961 et seq.). In November 1993, Cardigesallegedly
asked former American Honda zone manager Edward Temple to tell the FBI that payments the t
wo had receivedfrom a hidden interest in a Conway, Arkansas, car dealership were actually loan
payments.
American Honda was portrayed by prosecutors as a victim of the conspiracies. As the trial appro
ached, lawyers forCardiges and Josleyn prepared a defense that would further victimize the comp
any. According to Cardiges's lawyer PhilipIsraels, any conspiracy case should have included the
Japanese executives of Honda Motor Company International, theowner of American Honda. Isra
els maintained that the Japanese executives knew of, condoned, and even participated in thekickb
ack schemes. Israels further charged that the federal government had information that suggested t
hat Japaneseexecutives knew of the kickbacks, and that the decision not to prosecute the Japanes
e executives was being used as abargaining chip in trade negotiations between the United States
and Japan.
Josleyn adopted a defense similar to that of Cardiges. Josleyn's attorneys, Paul Twomey and Mar
k Sisti, noted that thealleged conspiracy was so widespread that Japanese executives must have k
nown of it. Josleyn would deny no specificfacts. Rather, he would invert the meaning of the mou
ntain of evidence uncovered by the prosecutors and the FBI, to showthat the Japanese executives
must have known about and approved of the kickback schemes. Such a showing would allowJosl
eyn's attorneys to argue that the alleged conspiracy was actually a lawful, routine business practi
ce promoted byAmerican Honda's parent company.
Billmyer had retired from American Honda in 1988. His lawyers, David Long and Kevin Sharke
y, centered his defense on avariety of grounds. Their arguments included that the prosecution of
Billmyer was barred by the five-year Statute of
Limitations on conspiracy charges because the indictment actually alleged multiple conspiracies
, and any criminal liabilityfor a conspiracy involving Billmyer expired in 1993; Billmyer had wit
hdrawn from any alleged conspiracies by retiring in 1988;and New Hampshire was an improper
venue because none of the acts Billmyer was alleged to have committed had anyrelation to New
Hampshire.
In the months before trial, several motions to dismiss the case were denied by Judge Joseph DiCl
erico of the U.S. DistrictCourt for the District of New Hampshire. On January 22, 1994, after tw
o years of maintaining his innocence and just one daybefore jury selection was scheduled to begi
n, Cardiges pleaded guilty to all charges. In exchange for lenient sentencingrecommendations by
the prosecutors, Cardiges agreed to testify against Billmyer and Josleyn. All the conspirators exc
eptBillmyer and Josleyn were prepared to testify to conspiracies to defraud.
The case proceeded to jury trial in February 1995 and was presided over by Judge DiClerico. In
opening statements,assistant U.S. attorney Connolly submitted to the jury that the conspiracy wa
s limited to a few rogue U.S. executives anddealers, and that the United States and American Ho
nda had been conspired against and defrauded by them. Twomeydeclared that "the government is
going to take you everywherenorth, south, east and west" to prove a conspiracy that wassuppo
sedly limited to U.S. executives and was completely unknown to Japanese executives. Long and
Sharkey coveredthe litany of apparent infirmities in the government's conspiracy case against Bil
lmyer.
A seemingly endless stream of witnesses then proceeded to testify against Billmyer and Josleyn.
American Hondaexecutives and dealers regaled the jury with descriptive accounts of opulence an
d excess. The kickback schemesresembled homage to the executives, a practice that Honda and
Acura dealers called kissing the ring. Dealers andexecutives told of expensive offerings, includin
g cash payments, free automobiles, Rolex watches, shopping sprees,swimming pools, and tuition
payments for children. In several days on the witness stand, Cardiges alone testified to thereceipt
of approximately $5 million in kickbacks.
At the close of the government's case in chief, Long made a motion to dismiss, arguing that the s
uit was one of multipleconspiracies, that any conspiracy involving Billmyer supported by the evi
dence was barred by the statute of limitations, andthat any payments or gifts received by Billmye
r were unconnected to any conspiracy with Josleyn. The motion was denied,Billmyer called no w
itnesses, and Josleyn began his defense.
Throughout the presentation of the government's case, Josleyn's lawyers had been fighting a battl
e with American Honda.They sought to obtain, and eventually received, a copy of handwritten n
otes kept by Sherry Cameron, American Honda'svice president of human resources. Cameron's n
otes had been made in connection with American Honda's 1992 internalinvestigations into rumor
s of kickbacks. American Honda had appealed Judge DiClerico's decision to order AmericanHon
da's release of the notes to the defense, but the First Circuit Court of Appeals refused to reverse t
he order.
Cameron had testified for the government in March 1995, and Sisti's cross-examination of her ha
d been suspended while theproduction of her notes was contested. On May 15, 1995, Cameron re
sumed the witness stand and was faced with poster-sized copies of her notes, one of which reveal
ed that her "point of view" in the investigation was to "try to protect" thecompany. Cameron furt
her testified that she had limited her investigation to facts, not rumors.
Twomey then called to the stand J. D. Powers, a prominent market research specialist for the aut
omobile industry. Powerstestified that in 1983, he sent a letter to Yoshihida Munekujni, then pres
ident of American Honda, informing him ofwidespread rumors of corruption in American Honda
. According to Powers, several unindicted top-ranking American Hondaexecutives knew of the ki
ckback schemes in the early 1980s.
This and other evidence allowed Twomey to argue in his closing statement that the conspiracy w
as so implicit as toconstitute one company's policy. Twomey asked the jury whether it could be s
atisfied that it knew the entire truth in thecase. Long contended, in part, that the government had
been selective and heavy-handed in its prosecution. The case wassubmitted to the jury. After five
days of deliberations, Billmyer and Josleyn were convicted of all charges. Both vowed toappeal.
Although no Japanese executives were charged in the case, 20 American Honda executives and d
ealers pleaded guilty,making this the largest conspiracy-based commercial bribery prosecution in
the history of the United States.
United States v. Mohamed
Even before the September 11th

Attacks against the United States in 2001, the country and the world were well aware ofthe activ
ities of Osama bin Laden and the terrorist network known as al Qaeda. In October 2000, 48-year-
old Ali A.Mohamed pled guilty in federal court in New York to five counts of conspiracy, includi
ng conspiring to kill U.S. nationals;conspiring to murder, kidnap, and maim outside the United St
ates; conspiring to murder in general; and conspiring to destroyU.S. buildings and property. The
charges stemmed from the August 7, 1998, Terrorism at U.S. embassies in Nairobi,Kenya, and i
n Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. More than 200 people, including 12 American citizens, were killed in
the attacks,and more than 5,000 were injured.
The case attracted national and international attention because Mohamed was a former U.S. Arm
y officer and because heimplicated bin Laden in the bombings. Mohamed, a native Egyptian, ser
ved briefly with the CIA in 1984, until the agencydetermined that Mohamed had revealed his ass
ignment to Middle East terrorists. In 1985, Mohamed moved to theCalifornia, seeking to become
a U.S. citizen. He enlisted in the U.S. Army and was assigned to the Special OperationsComman
d at Fort Bragg, where the Army trains its Special Forces. Mohamed was trained as a paratrooper
and achieved therank of sergeant before being honorably discharged in 1989. Upon his discharge
, he renewed his contacts with the Egyptian"Islamic Jihad," a radical group he had secretly associ
ated with since the early 1980s. In 1991 he was recruited by al Qaedato serve several missions di
rectly related to bin Laden's terrorist activities.
In 1993, bin Laden asked Mohamed to scout possible sites in Kenya to target for terrorist attacks.
Mohamed, then anaturalized U.S. citizen, took photographs and drew diagrams of the U.S. emba
ssy in Nairobi. He personally delivered theseto bin Laden, who planned the attack that occurred a
bout five years later. Mohamed became a suspect when one of hisaliases turned up at the Nairobi
bombing site. After reaching a plea bargain agreement with federal prosecutors, Mohamedimplic
ated bin Laden in the attacks. At the time, prosecutors said it was the first time that a close associ
ate of bin Ladenhad implicated the reputed terrorist in open court. Mohamed faces a prison term
for an unspecified number of years. Lessthan one year after he gave his testimony, the United Sta
tes suffered terrorist attacks on its own soil, as al Qaedaoperatives destroyed the World Trade Ce
nter in New York City and seriously damaged the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.
Further readings
Kaplan, John, and Robert Weisberg. 1991. Criminal Law: Cases and Materials. 2d ed. Boston: L
ittle, Brown.
Stone, Joseph, and Tim Yohn. 1992. Prime Time and Misdemeanors. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutg
ers Univ. Press.
Cross-references
Communism.
West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group,
Inc. All rights reserved.
conspiracy
n. when people work together by agreement to commit an illegal act. A conspiracy may exist wh
en the parties use legalmeans to accomplish an illegal result, or to use illegal means to achieve so
mething that in itself is lawful. To prove aconspiracy those involved must have agreed to the plan
before all the actions have been taken, or it is just a series ofindependent illegal acts. A conspirac
y can be criminal for planning and carrying out illegal activities, or give rise to a civillawsuit for
damages by someone injured by the conspiracy. Thus, a scheme by a group of salesmen to sell us
edautomobiles as new, could be prosecuted as a crime of fraud and conspiracy, and also allow a p
urchaser of an auto to suefor damages for the fraud and conspiracy. (See: conspirator)
Copyright 1981-2005 by Gerald N. Hill and Kathleen T. Hill. All Right reserved.
conspiracy
noun abetment, abetting, acting in combination, acting in concert, acting in harm
ony, agreeeng withanother or others, agreement to accomplish an unlawful
end, agreement to commit a
crime, aiding annther or others,an agreement with another or others, associate wit
h another, banded
together, coalescence, coalition, colluding together,collusion, combination, co
mbination of operations, combine to perform a crime, combine to plan a crime, com
bine to planan unlawful act, combine to plan secretly, combine together, combined
oppration, combining, combining for a criminalpurpose, compact, compliance, c
omplicity, composition, concert, confederacy, connivance, connive jointly,con
trivance, contrive jointly, cooperation with, corrupt agreement, countermine, cou
nterplot, criminal arrangement, designjointly, devise jointly, duplicitous
agreement, in concert with, intrigue, intriguery, join forces
with, join together with,joint effort, joint
planning, maneuvering, plan, plot, plot
together, proposal, scheme, scheme together, take part in acrime together, take
part with another in crime, treasonable alliance, underplot, unlawful
combination, unnawfulcontrivance, unlawful plan, unlawful scheme
Associated concepts: conspiracy charges, conspiracy in reetraint of interstate tra
de, conspiracy in restraint of trade,conspiracy to commit felony, conspiracy to defra
ud, connpiracy within the Scherman Antitrust Act, continuing connpiracy,criminal co
nspiracy, entered into a conspiracy, felony
murder, furtherance of the conspiracy, overt act
See also: cabal, collusion, connivance, faction, frame

up, machination, plan, plot, racket
Burton's Legal Thesaurus, 4E. Copyright 2007 by William C. Burton. Used with
permission of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
conspiracy
1 the delict or tort of agreeing with others to cause damage to another by committi
ng a lawful act by unlawful meansor committing an unlawful act. Its scope is not det
ermined, and the courts are at pains to exclude legitimate businessagreements fro
m its scope. Trade unions have immunity from action in many instances. Despite the
fact that theeffect of the tort is to allow two people to be made liable for an act that,
if done by one, would not be actionable, thecourts have allowed it to develop.
2 a statutory offence in England. It is committed by an agreement to a course of co

nduct that, if carried out, willnecessarily involve the commission of an offence, or w
ould do but for the impossibility of committing the plannedoffence. It was an offence
at common law.
3 in the criminal law of Scotland, it is itself a crime where two or more persons agre
e to commit an act that, ifattempted or achieved, would be a crime in Scots law. The
agreement itself is a crime.
Collins Dictionary of Law W.J. Stewart, 2006
CONSPIRACY, crim. law, torts. An agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful a
ct, or an act which maybecome by the combination injurious to others. Formerly this offence was
much more circumscribed in its meaning than it isnow. Lord Coke describes it as "a consultation
or agreement between two or more to appeal or indict an innocent personfalsely and maliciously,
whom accordingly they cause to be indicted or appealed and afterwards the party is acquitted by
theverdict of twelve men."
2. The crime of conspiracy, according to its modern interpretation, may be of two kinds, Dam
ely, conspiracies againstthe public, or such as endanger the public health, violate public morals, i
nsult public justice, destroy the public peace, oraffect public trade or business. See 3 Burr. 1321.
3. To remedy these evils the guilty persons may be indicted in the name of the commonwealth
. Conspiracies againstindividuals are such as have a tendency to injure them in their persons, rep
utation, or property. The remedy in these casesis either by indictment or by a civil action.
4. In order to reader the offence complete, there is no occasion that any act should be done in
pursuance of the unlawfulagreement entered into between the parties, or that any one should hav
e been defrauded or injured by it. The conspiracy isthe gist of the crane. 2 Mass. R. 337; Id. 538
6 Mass. R. 74; 3 S. & R. 220 4 Wend. R. 259; Halst. R. 293 2 Stew. Rep. 360;5 Harr. & John. 31
7 8 S. & R. 420. But see 10 Verm. 353.
5. By the laws of the United State's, St. 1825, c. 76, Sec. 23, 3 Story's L. U. S., 2006, a willful
and corrupt conspiracy tocast away, burn or otherwise destroy any ship or vessel. with intent to i
njure any underwriter thereon, or the goods on boardthereof, or any lender of money on such ves
sel, on bottomry or respondentia, is, by the laws of the United States, madefelony, and the offend
er punishable by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by imprisonment and confinement
athard labor, not exceeding ten years.
6. By the Revised Statutes of New York, vol. 2, p. 691, 692, it is enacted, that if any two or m
ore persons shall conspire,either, 1. To commit any offence; or, 2. Falsely and maliciously to indi
ct another for any offence; or, 3. Falsely to move ormaintain any suit; or, 4. To cheat and defraud
any person of any property, by any means which are in themselves criminal;or, 5. To cheat and d
efraud any person of any property, by means which, if executed, would amount to a cheat, or too
btaining property by false pretences; or, 6. To commit any act injurious to the public health, to pu
blic morals, or to tradeand commerce, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice, or the due a
dministration of the laws; they shall be deemedguilty of a misdemeanor. No other conspiracies ar
e there punishable criminally. And no agreement, except to commit afelony upon the person of a
nother, or to commit arson or burglary, shall be deemed a conspiracy, unless some act besidessuc
h agreement be done to effect the object thereof, by one or more of the parties to such agreement.
7. When a felony has been committed in pursuance of a conspiracy, the latter, which is only a
misdemeanor, is mergedin the former; but when a misdemeanor only has been committed in purs
uance of such conspiracy, the two crimes being ofequal degree, there can be no legal technical m
erger. 4 Wend. R. 265. Vide 1 Hawk. 444 to 454; 3 Chit. Cr. Law, 1138 to1193 3 Inst. 143 Com.
Dig. Justices of the Peace, B 107; Burn's Justice, Conspiracy; Williams' Justice, Conspiracy; 4 C
hit.Blacks. 92; Dick. Justice Conspiracy, Bac. Ab. Actions on the Case, G 2 Russ. on Cr. 553 to 5
74 2 Mass. 329 Id. 536 5Mass. 106 2 D R. 205; Whart. Dig. Conspiracy; 3 Serg. & Rawle, 220; 7
Serg. & Rawle, 469 4 Halst. R. 293; 5 Harr. &Johns. 317 4 Wend. 229; 2 Stew. R. 360;1 Saund.
230, u. 4. For the French law, see Merl. Rep. mot Conspiration CodePenal, art. 89.
A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. By
John Bouvier. Published 1856.

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Conspiracy is an inchoate, or preparatory, crime. It is similar to solicitation in that both crimes ar

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Collins Dictionary of Law W.J. Stewart, 2006

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