DASMARIAS GARMENTS VS. REYES/AMERICAN PRES.
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the
LINES
GRN 108229 August 24, 1993 Narvasa, J.;
FACTS:
APL sued Dasmarias Garments for sum of money at the
hearing. Instead of presenting its witness, APL filed a motion
praying that it intended to take the depositions of
some Taiwan nationals. The lower court granted the deposition
which was in compliance with the rules on taking of testimony by
deposition upon written interrogatories under ROC. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a party could present its evidence by taking the
deposition of its witness in a foreign jurisdiction before a private
entity.
RULING:
Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended
as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the
knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some
suit or proceeding in court. Depositions are principally made by
law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the
relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a
substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party
witness. Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is
to be taken before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul
gen. etc., and the defendants answer has already been served.
Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any
action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that
limits deposition. Taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it;
no prohibition against the taking of deposition after pre-trial the
law authorizes the taking of depositions before or after an appeal
is taken from the judgment of RTC to perpetuate their testimony
for use in event of further proceedings in court or during the
process of execution of a final and executor judgment.
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO,
Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioners were charged with Other Deceits under Art 318 of
RPC before MTC Manila. They pleaded not guilty, trial dates
were postponed due to the unavailability of private complainant Li
Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia.
The Prosecution filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen
Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the
Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon
doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the
Philippines by reason of ill health.
Petitioners opposed. MTC granted said Motion; denied ensuing
MR. Petitioners, filed a Rule 65 before RTC Manila
RTC granted the petition; declared the MTC Order null and void;
denied ensuing Motion for Reconsideration
Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of
witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the
case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with
respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution
witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to
witness against him face to face.
Prosecution, elevated to CA. CA reversed RTC
no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon the
MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining
witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly
disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that,
in any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity
to cross-examine the complaining witness and make timely
objections during the taking of the oral deposition either
through counsel or through the consular officer who would
be taking the deposition of the witness.
ISSUES:
1. Is allowing the deposition of private complainant
tantamount to a violation of petitioners rights to public
trial and to confront the witnesses face to face? YES.
HELD:
The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases
recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial
evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its
witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial
indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness'
absence from trial. To rule otherwise would
effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.
The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable
Prosecution Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge
in open court.13 This is true especially in criminal cases where
the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial
and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The
requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of
investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness'
credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying.14
It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court
recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use
of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court
testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the
availability of conditional examination of witnesses both for the
benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The Court's
ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos15 explicitly
states that
o "x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of
Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may
be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are
adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal
proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1,
2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense
and prosecution witnesses." (Underscoring supplied)
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows
the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral
examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary
public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or
place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular
official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer
oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement
except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.
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But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more
particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be
unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent
provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution.
When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed
by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite
date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined
before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his
absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has
been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner
as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must
take place at no other place than the court where the case is
pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting
the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the
Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with
approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:
The condition of the private complainant being sick and
of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule
119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially
provides that he should be conditionally examined
before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court
concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be
interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at
the hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and
credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the
hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in the said
rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines
whether the deponent is sick or not.18 (Underscoring
supplied)
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness
elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is
pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to
attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable
when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case
against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in
Vda. de Manguerra19 where we further declared that
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve
the testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we
cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the
protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The
giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of
the rules.
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made
explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as
special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine
consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also
under the circumstances.
However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the
testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness
has been categorically ruled out by the Court in the same case of
Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that
the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal,
and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil
procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases.
However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily
governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely
covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent
reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise."
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot
Defeat the Rights of the Accused to Public Trial and
Confrontation of Witnesses
The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in
criminal cases and overlooked fundamental considerations no
less than the Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right to
a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses. Section
14(2), Article III of the Constitution provides as follows:
VDA. De MANGUERRA vs. RISOS August 28, 2008 | Nachura
| Rule 45 Petition
Facts: RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati
City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly
committed grave abuse of discretion. Respondents were
charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document
before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19. The case arose from
the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly
committed by respondents where they made it appear that
Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the
Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document.
Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation
in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical
Center due to upper gastrointestinal bleeding; and was advised
to stay in Manila for further treatment. Respondents then filed a
Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case No.
CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued
that Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action for
declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved. On
May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion.
Concepcions motion for reconsideration was denied on June 5,
2000. This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action
for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the May 11
and June 5 RTC orders. The counsel of Concepcion filed a
motion to take the latters deposition. He explained the need to
perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical
condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility. RTC
granted the motion and ordered the taking of the deposition
before the Clerk of the Makati RTC. Respondents appealed to
the CA. CA rendered a judgment favorable to the respondents.
CA ratiocinated that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as
in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court, only
applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of
Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions deposition should have been
taken before the judge or the court where the case is pending,
which is the
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Issue/Held: WoN Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
applies to the deposition of Concepcion. NO.
Ratio: It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at
the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is
especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant
to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It
also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound
such questions as they deem material and necessary to support
their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly,
this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses' demeanor.
This rule however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28
of the Rules of Court provide for different MODES OF
DISCOVERY that may be resorted to by a party to an action.
These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings,
Sections 12, 13, and 15 of Rule 119, which took effect 1
December 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the
defense and prosecution witnesses. In the case at bench, in
issue is the examination of a prosecution witness who according
to the petitioners was too sick to travel and appear before the trial
court. Section 15 of Rule 119 comes into play and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for prosecution When it
satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too
sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has
to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the
accused, or in his absence, after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the
same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused. argue that the adverse, party has the burden of proving the facts
Petitioners contend that Concepcion's advanced age and health
condition exempt her from this application of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and thus, calls for the
application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
contention does not persuade. The very reason offered by the
petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119
is at once the ground which places her squarely within the
coverage of the same provision. Undoubtedly, the procedure set
forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. In granting
Concepcion's motion and in actually taking her deposition, were
the rules complied with? The CA answered in the negative. The
appellate court considered the taking of deposition before the
Clerk of Court of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the clear
mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court
where the case is pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC
order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. To reiterate, the
conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose
of taking his deposition should be made before the court, or at
least before the judge where the case is pending. Such is the
clear mandate of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. While we
recognize the prosecution's right to preserve its witness;
testimony to prove its case, we cannot disregard rules which are
designed mainly for the protection of the accused's constitutional
rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CO., INC vs.CA
G.R. No. 118438, December 4, 1998
TOPIC: Admission of Facts
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by respondent Cherry Valley for
collection of sum of money against the petitioner Allied Agri-
Business for its failure to pay for the value of orders made
and received by the latter. Cherry Valley served a Request for
Admission of Facts to Agri-Business. The latter failed to submit a
sworn answer to the request for admission within the allowed
period. Thus, summary judgment ensued. Agri-Business alleged
that Cherry Valley had the burden to prove through its own
witness during the trial the matters for which admissions were
requested, and subsequently questioned the summary judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents failure to answer the
Request for Admission shall mean admission of the mailers
stated in the request which can be the basis for summary
judgment?
HELD:
The purpose of the rule governing requests for
admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite
trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will
not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained
by reasonable inquiry. The burden of affirmative action is on
the party upon whom notice is served to avoid the admission
rather than upon the party seeking the admission. Hence, when
Agri-Business failed to reply to a request to admit, it may not
sought to be admitted. Agri-Business silence is an admission of
the facts stated in the request. This now becomes the basis of a
summary judgment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs WEBB
312 SCRA 573
FACTS:
Webb, an accused in the crime of Rape with Homicide,
filed a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral Deposition, to take the
testimonies of some vital witnesses residing in the U.S., before
the proper Philippine consular authorities since the Philippine
court had no jurisdiction over them and may not therefore be
compelled by subpoena to testify. Respondent further alleged
that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned
individuals whose testimonies are allegedly material and
indispensable to establish his innocence of the crime charged is
sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion
averring that Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court has no
application in criminal cases. The trial court denied the motion
but was thereafter reversed by the COA on appeal.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not COA committed reversible error in reversing
the trial courts ruling.
RULING:
YES. It need not be overemphasized that the factual
circumstances only serves to underscore the immutable fact that
the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based
witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature
and in denying respondents motion to take them, the trial court
was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a
superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof
will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence
already on record.
It is pointed out that the defense has already presented at least
fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixty-four (464)
documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as those
to be produced or testified to by the proposed foreign deponents.
Under the circumstances, We sustain the proposition that the trial
judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she decides that
the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in the United
States could not possibly add anything substantial to the defense
evidence involved.
SPOUSES AFULUGENCIA vs METROBANK
715 SCRA 399
TOPIC:
Section 6,1 Rule 25 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides that "a
party not served with written interrogatories may not be
compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court,
or to give a deposition pending appeal." The provision seeks to
prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays. Its goal is to
maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial.
FACTS:
Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a
Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale,
certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against
respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) and
Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) before the RTC of Malolos City.
With the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require
Metrobanks officers to appear and testify as the petitioners initial
witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the
documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those
covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners 200-
square meter land in Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that for lack of a proper
notice of hearing, the Motion must be denied; that being a
litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set a date and
time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro
forma; that pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the
Rules, Metrobanks officers who are considered adverse
parties may not be compelled to appear and testify in court
for the petitioners since they were not initially served with
written interrogatories; that petitioners have not shown the
materiality and relevance of the documents sought to be
produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for
evidence.
On October 19, 2006, the RTC denied petitioners motion for lack
of merit.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the
defective notice was cured by the filing of Metrobanks
Opposition, which they claim is tantamount to notice. They further
argued that Metrobanks officers who are the subject of the
subpoena are not party-defendants, and thus do not comprise
the adverse party; they are individuals separate and distinct from
Metrobank.
In an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, Metrobank
insisted that since a corporation may act only through its officers
and employees, they are to be considered as adverse parties in a
case against the corporation itself.
The RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
prompting them to file a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
asserting this time that their Motion for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum is not a litigated motion; it does
not seek relief, but aims for the issuance of a mere process. They
added that Rule 21 of the Rules requires prior notice and hearing
only with respect to the taking of depositions. Finally, petitioners
claimed that the Rules particularly Section 10,22 Rule 132 do
not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own
witness.
The CA affirmed the assailed decision.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON an adverse party can be required to take the
witness stand (Sec. 6 of Rule 25) without complying with
the notice and hearing requirement under Sec. 4 and 5
of Rule 15
RULING:
NO. On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was
notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition thereto. The
technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured by the
filing of the Opposition.
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse
party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written
interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied
in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.
Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and
to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to
give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending
appeal.
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One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing
expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and
facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who
does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party
beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its
case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand
as its witness.
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobanks officers
to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to
present documents in Metrobanks possession as part of their
principal documentary evidence. This is tantamount to building
their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The burden
of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if
petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence,
then the adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang
itself from its own defense.
Disini vs Sandiganbayan
Jurisdiction over person
On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines and Disini
entered into an Immunity Agreement under which Disini
undertook to testify for the Republic and provide its lawyers with
the information, affidavits, and documents they needed in its
case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the
United States District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration
case that Westinghouse International Projects Company and
others filed against the Republic before the International
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his
second cousin, Herminio, as an executive in the latter's
companies from 1971 to 1984. The Republic believed that the
Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear
Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminios companies, had been
attended by anomalies. In the Immunity Agreement, the Republic
guaranteed that, apart from the two Westinghouse cases, it
would not compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign
proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio. Disini
complied with his undertaking but 18 years later, upon the
Republic's application, the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena
against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce
documents before that court in an action that the Republic filed
against Herminio. Disini moved to quash the subpoena, invoking
the Immunity Agreement. The Sandiganbayan ignored the motion
and issued a new subpoena directing him to testify before it.
Subsequently, the PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity
Agreement insofar as it prohibited the Republic from requiring
Disini to testify against Herminio. Later on, the Sandiganbayan
denied Disinis motion to quash the subpoena. Disini, thus,
brought the matter to the Supreme Court. The Republic
maintained that the PCGGs power to grant immunity under
Section 5 of Executive Order 14 covered only immunity from civil
or criminal prosecution and did not cover immunity from providing
evidence in court. The Republic argued that Disini's immunity
from testifying against Herminio contravened the states policy to
recover ill-gotten wealth acquired under the regime of former
President Marcos. The Republic further argued that under the
last sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement which
reads: Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini's obligation to
provide truthful information or testimony, Disini, despite the
immunity given him against being compelled to testify in other
cases, was to provide truthful information or testimony in such
other cases. For his part, Disini argued that the Republic, through
the PCGG, was estopped from revoking the questioned immunity
as it had made him believe that it had the authority to provide
such guarantee. The Republic countered by invoking Section 15,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that (t)he right
of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees from them or from their nominees, or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel.
Issue: Whether or not the PCGG acted within its authority when it
revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement, hence having
jurisdiction over the person of Disini.
Held: No. PCGG needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini
did. More than anyone, the government should be fair.
It has been a settled rule that by seeking affirmative relief,
voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan constitute waiver on the objection regarding lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. Jurisprudence
holds that an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the
person is waived when the defendant files a motion or pleading
which seeks affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the
case.
The Court should not allow respondent Republic, to put it bluntly,
to double cross petitioner Disini. The Immunity Agreement was
the result of a long drawn out process of negotiations with each
party trying to get the best concessions out of it. The Republic did
not have to enter that agreement. It was free not to. But when it
did, it needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More
than any one, the government should be fair.
PCGGs revocation of the questioned immunity and
Sandiganbayan's denial of Disini's motion to quash the subpoena
were both annulled.
Metrobank v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 169677, February 18, 2013)
Facts:
On July 17, 1987, the Republic brought a complaint for
reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito,
Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other
defendants. The action was obviously to recover allegedly ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their nominees, dummies
and agents.
Among the properties subject of the action were two parcels
of commercial land located in Tandang Sora (Old Balara),
Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 266423 and TCT No. 266588 of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City registered in the names of Spouses Andres V.
Genito, Jr. and Ludivina L. Genito.
On February 5, 2001, the Republic moved for the
amendment of the complaint in order to implead Asian Bank
(now Metrobank) as an additional defendant.
Commenting on the motion, Asian Bank sought the
deferment of any action on the motion until it was first given
the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and
documentary evidence the Republic had already presented
against the original defendants, and contended that it would
be deprived of its day in court if a separate trial were to be
held against it without having been sufficiently apprised
about the evidence the Republic had adduced before it was
brought in as an additional defendant.
In its reply to Asian Bank's comment, the Republic
maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was proper
because its cause of action against Asian Bank was entirely
5
 distinct and independent from its cause of action against the
original defendants; and that the issue with respect to Asian
Bank was whether Asian Bank had actual or constructive
knowledge at the time of the issuance of the TCTs for the
properties in its name that such properties were the subject
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0004, while the issue as to
the original defendants was whether they had "committed
the acts complained of as constituting illegal or unlawful
accumulation of wealth which would, as a consequence,
justify forfeiture of the said properties or the satisfaction from
said properties of the judgement that may be rendered in
favor of the Republic.
Sandiganbayan granted motion for separate trial and denied
MR of Metrobank. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
WON Sandiganbayan committed GADALEJ?
WON the Republic is entitled to a separate Trial against Asia
Bank?
Held:
The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the
Republic's motion for separate trial, but was correct in upholding
its jurisdiction over the Republic's claim against Asian Bank.
The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2,
Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 2.Separate trials. The court, in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of
any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or
of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to
determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or
of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party
complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of
such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice to any party.
We conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
its discretion in ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank
(Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was
distinct and separate from that against the original defendants.
Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule
of having all the issues in every case tried at one time,
unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a
"single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and
inconvenience to the parties and the courts."
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are
extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different
issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the
issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues
will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will
promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a
fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.
As we see it, however, the justification of the Sandiganbayan for
allowing the separate trial did not constitute a special or
compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To begin with, the
issue relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated. In that
context, the separate trial would not be in furtherance of
convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian
Bank was necessarily connected with the cause of action against
the original defendants. Should the Sandiganbayan resolve the
issue against Spouses Genito in a separate trial on the basis of
the evidence adduced against the original defendants, the
properties would be thereby adjudged as ill-gotten and liable to
forfeiture in favor of the Republic without Metrobank being given
the opportunity to rebut or explain its side. The outcome would
surely be prejudicial towards Metrobank.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive
jurisdiction over the claim against Asian Bank, for the Court has
ruled in Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Sandiganbayan, that "the Sandiganbayan has original and
exclusive jurisdiction not only over principal causes of action
involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth, but also over all incidents
arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases."
REPUBLIC v. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO, JR.
DOCTRINE: Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court
in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the
business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with
economy while providing justice to the parties.
In the context of legal procedure, the term consolidation is used
in three different senses: (1)Quasi-consolidation; (2)Actual
Consolidation; (3)Consolidation for Trial.
Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance
of one action from the other is not necessary to appeal a
judgment already rendered in one action. There is no rule or law
prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one
case which is consolidated with other cases.
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 233-0-91 (for recovery of possession) -
filed by Oribello against Apog and San Juan, the actual
occupants
Civil Case No. 225-0-92 (for reversion of property) - filed
by the Republic
September 12, 1997 Order: Republic deemed to have
abandoned the case. = interlocutory as ruled by the SC
February 21, 2005 Order: Dismissed the consolidated
cases without prejudice for non-substitution of deceased
plaintiff (Oribello) and his counsel.
June 29, 2005 Order: Trial court allowed the
continuation of Republics presentation of evidence.
July 12, 2006 Order: Dismissed case.
The present controversy involves a parcel of land situated in
Olongapo City, which was once classified as forest land by the
Bureau of Forest Development. The property was originally
occupied by a certain Valentin Fernandez (Valentin) in 1968 by
virtue of a Residential Permit issued by the same government
office. Upon Valentins death, his son, Odillon Fernandez
(Odillon), continued to occupy the property, together with
spouses Ruperto and Matilde Apog. Sometime in 1969, Odillon
sold the property to a certain Mrs. Florentina Balcita who, later
on, sold the same property to Oribello.
Oribello filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
which denied the application since the land remained forest land.
On 20 February 1987, the subject property was declared open to
disposition under the Public Land Act. Thus, Oribello filed another
Miscellaneous Sales Application. The Director of Lands issued an
Order for the issuance of a patent in favor of Oribello.
6
Matilde Apog and Aliseo San Juan claiming to be actual
occupants of the property, protested with the DENR the issuance
of the sales patent and OCT in favor of Oribello. They sought the
annulment of the sales patent, arguing that Oribello and Land
Inspector Dominador Laxa committed fraud and
misrepresentation in the approval of the Miscellaneous Sales
Application of Oribello. They alleged that Laxa submitted a false
report to the Director of Lands, by stating that there were no
other claimants to the property and that Oribello was the actual
occupant thereof, when the contrary was true.
The OSG, representing petitioner, instituted a complaint for
reversion and cancellation of title before the RTC. The case was
thereafter consolidated with Civil Case No. 233-0-91, a complaint
for recovery of possession filed by Oribello against Apog and San
Juan.
RTC dismissed the consolidated cases without prejudice for non-
substitution of the deceased plaintiff (Oribello) and his counsel.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, contending that the Order
applied exclusively to Civil Case No. 233-0-91 (for recovery of
possession) and did not affect Civil Case No. 225-0-92 (for
reversion of property). RTC allowed the continuation of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.
Aggrieved, Oribellos heirs filed a Manifestation and Motion,
bringing to the attention of the trial court the previous 12
September 1997 Order declaring petitioner to have abandoned
the reversion case. Oribellos heirs pointed out that from the time
petitioner received the Order in 1997, it did nothing to question
the same, making the Order final. RTC finding merit in
defendants Motion and Manifestation, the Order dated 29 June
2005 granting the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Solicitor
General is recalled and the above-entitled case is DISMISSED.
The CA denied petitioners appeal ruling that the remedy of
appeal is no longer available to petitioner and that petitioner has
lost its right to participate in the proceedings of Civil Case No.
225-0-92 when it failed to question the trial courts 12 September
1997 Order, declaring it to have abandoned the case. As a
consequence of petitioners inaction, such order inevitably
became final.
Petitioner contends that the 12 September 1997 Order of the trial
court, deeming it to have abandoned the case, is interlocutory in
nature; thus, is not appealable. Respondents argue otherwise,
maintaining that such Order is a dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of failure to prosecute which is, under the Rules,
considered an adjudication on the merits, and hence appealable.
ISSUE:
Whether the consolidated cases, without any order of severance,
cannot be subject of multiple appeals.
HELD:
YES.
Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court in
deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the
business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with
economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote this
end, the rule allows the consolidation and a single trial of several
cases in the courts docket, or the consolidation of issues within
those cases. The Court explained, thus:
In the context of legal procedure, the term consolidation is
used in three different senses:
(1)Where all except one of several actions are stayed until
one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one trial is
conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but
is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)
(2)Where several actions are combined into one, lose their
separate identity, and become a single action in which a single
judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where
several actions are pending between the same parties stating
claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint.
(actual consolidation)
(3)Where several actions are ordered to be tried together
but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a
separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge
the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to
be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)
In the present case, the complaint for reversion filed by
petitioner (Civil Case No. 225-0-92) was consolidated with the
complaint for recovery of possession filed by Oribello (Civil Case
No. 223-0-91). While these two cases involve common questions
of law and fact, each action retains its separate and distinct
character. The reversion suit settles whether the subject land will
be reverted to the State, while the recovery of possession case
determines which private party has the better right of possession
over the subject property. These cases, involving different issues
and seeking different remedies, require the rendition and entry of
separate judgments. The consolidation is merely for joint trial of
the cases. Notably, the complaint for recovery of possession
proceeded independently of the reversion case, and was
disposed of accordingly by the trial court.
Since each action does not lose its distinct character,
severance of one action from the other is not necessary to
appeal a judgment already rendered in one action. There is no
rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a
judgment in one case which is consolidated with other cases.
Further, severance is within the sound discretion of the court for
convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under the
Rules of Court that the court sever one case from the other cases
before a party can appeal an adverse ruling on such case.