Special Proceedings Cases For consideration are (1) petitioner's Omnibus Motion in G.R. No.
112991 seeking reconsideration of the Court's resolution dated October 9,
Rule 72
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109373. March 27, 1998]
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and
members, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAAGAS II, as Liquidator of
Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents.
[G.R. No. 112991. March 27, 1998]
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, as Liquidator of the Pacific Banking
Corporation, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF
RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG KEONG
LAN and E.J ANG INTL. LTD., represented by their
Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
1995, which denied the reconsideration of the decision in this case
promulgated on March 20, 1995, and the resolution of October 13, 1995
which absolved the branch clerk of court of the RTC of Manila, Branch 31,
of charges of wrongdoing; and (2) the manifestation and motions for
clarification filed by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) concerning
the request of petitioner in G.R. No. 112991 for the transfer of the funds of
the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) to its other account in another
branch of LBP and the alleged garnishment of the funds of PaBC
deposited in LBP in favor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On March 20, 1995, the Court rendered a decision holding that a petition
for liquidation under Sec. 29 of the Central Bank Act, R.A.No. 265[1] is a
special proceeding and , therefore, the rules prescribing a period of 30
days for appealing and requiring a record on appeal apply. Accordingly,
the appeal in G.R. No. 109373 was held to have been duly perfected but
the appeal in G.R. No. 112991 had not been perfected because of
petitioner's failure to file a record on appeal.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 112991 moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision but the Court denied his motion in its resolution of October 9,
1995 on the following grounds (1) the clerks of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals certified that no record on appeal had been filed; (2) the branch
clerk denied that the signature on the alleged copy of the record on appeal
was his; (3) counsel for private respondents and his clerk denied in their
respective affidavits that they had been served a copy of the record on
appeal; (4) the identity of the person who allegedly received the record on
appeal filed in the trial court and whose initials appear on the first page of
the alleged copy of the said record had never been established; and (5) the
copy of the record on appeal allegedly filed did not bear the stamp of the
RTC showing due receipt thereof.
In the resolution of October 13, 1995, the Court held Judge Regino
Veridiano II, Deputy Sheriff Carmelo Cachero and private respondent's
counsel, Atty. Marino Eslao, guilty of indirect contempt for executing the
decision of the trial court despite the temporary restraining order issued by
this Court. The Court, however, found no basis of holding branch clerk
Antonio Valencia Jr. guilty of any wrongdoing in certifying that petitioner
failed to file a record on appeal.
On November 6, 1995, petitioner then filed the Omnibus Motion in
question seeking to (1) reopen the case and/or consider the resolution of
October 9, 1995 which denied his motion for reconsideration, and (2)
reconsider the October 13, 1995 resolution absolving the branch clerk of
the trial court from contempt charges.
In his omnibus motion, petitioner insists that he filed a record on
appeal. As proof, he presents a photocopy of the record on appeal
allegedly received by the branch clerk of the trial court bearing the
handwritten notation "Received, 10-15-92, 3:45 PM" and the alleged
initials of the said clerk. Petitioner explains that the record on appeal does
not have the RTC stamp "Received" because the trial court does not use a
stamp but receipt of pleadings is acknowledged simply by nothing this fact
by hand. Petitioner submitted certain pleadings filed in the trial court
which were acknowledged by the branch clerk in the same way he
allegedly acknowledged by the branch clerk in the same way he allegedly
acknowledged receipt of petitioner's record on appeal. These are the notice
of appeal filed by petitioner on October 14, 1992 (Annex E, Omnibus
Motion), Motion to Strike Out the Notice of Appeal with Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution filed by the private respondents (Annex G)
and Comment filed by another claimant (Solid Bank) dated May 26, 1995
(Annex H).
In addition, petitioner claims that the certifications by the clerks of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals that no record on appeal was filed are
unreliable, that his record on appeal was suppressed from the records of
the case, and that the certification of the Court of Appeals that no record
on appeal was filed therein was to be expected because the record on
appeal was filed with the RTC and not with the Court of Appeals.
Commenting, private respondents contend that the Omnibus Motion is
actually a second motion for reconsideration which is not allowed by the
rules since the issues raised therein had been fully considered and passed
upon by the Court and that there is no compelling reason to grant the
motion. They maintain that petitioner's appeal was not perfected because
of the non-filing of a record on appeal. Branch Clerk of court Antonio
Valencia, on the other hand, maintains that "no record on appeal was filed
and therefore none could be found in the expediente (records of the
case)." He claims that the record on appeal allegedly filed in the trial court
could not have been unlawfully removed from the records because all
pleadings received by the court are immediately attached to the
records. He denies that the signature appearing on the alleged record on
appeal was his.
Because of the serious ness of the petitioner's allegation that its record on
appeal had been suppressed, the Court on December 11, 1996, referred the
question to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
 On June 18, 1997, the OCA submitted its report and recommendation,
the pertinent portions of which state:[2]
In the formal investigation conducted (please see attached
transcript) it was disclosed that Atty. Antonio Valencia Jr. was
appointed as the Clerk of Court V on June 18, 1992 and officially
assumed office on July 1, 1992.
As the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 31, it is his duty to
exercise control and supervision over the personnel of the said
court; examines records of all cases filed and calendared; issues
court processes, prepares drafts of orders and other matters which
are assigned by the Judge Regino Verediano.
In their sala each personnel have their respective duties , from
receipt of pleadings that are being filed to their safekeeping. In
no case is anyone allowed to interfere with the duties of each
personnel except under extreme urgency. Thus, receiving of
pleadings is normally entrusted to the receiving clerk and no one
else. It is, as claimed by Atty. Valencia, only in the absence of the
said receiving clerk that other employees are authorized to
receive pleadings.
For his part, Atty. Valencia claims that he rarely receives
pleadings since before it reaches his table, the same are already
duly received. Besides, it is not one of his duties to receive
pleadings.
With respect to the alleged receipt of the record on appeal by
their office, specifically to him, Atty. Valencia vehemently denied
having received the same. First, because the stroke of the
alphabet indicating his initials is very different and so with the
dates, secondly, if it was actually received it could have been
brought to attention of the late Judge Verediano who thereafter
would have made a notation of the same, like all other pleadings
received in their office or simply instruct the preparation of an
order if necessary and lastly, it would have been included in their
court calendar as there was a notice of hearing attached thereto.
In the court's calendar dated October 23, 1992, Sp. Proc. No.
35313 was never scheduled for hearing. Under normal
circumstances, if there was notice of hearing it would be
outrightly included in the court's calendar for October 23, 1992
as requested.
To substantiate the aforesaid allegations Atty. Valencia submitted
copies of pleadings filed relative to the subject case bearing the
notation of then Judge Verediano and the Court's calendar for
October 22 and 23, 1992.
In addition, he pointed out that if the Notice of Appeal (Record
on Appeal) was actually filed in their sala, why was it raised for
the first time only in PDIC's Motion for Reconsideration. This
according to him is suspicious. He even insinuated that nobody
could have done this (meaning inserted the notice of appeal
[record on appeal] in their pleadings) except the interested
lawyer/s.
Moreover, Atty. Valencia vouches for the honesty and integrity of
his staff, and if there be a need for the examination of their
signatures they would be very willing to go for a specimen
signature examination only to clear his/their names.
 The office of the undersigned believes the claim of Atty. Valencia
that no Notice of Appeal [Record on Appeal] was filed at RTC
Branch 31, Manila. As a CPA/lawyer, he was very well aware of
his duties and responsibilities as a Branch Clerk of Court. This is
evidenced by the fact that in his more than five (5) years stay as a
Branch Clerk of Court, no single administrative complaint has
ever been lodged against him, be it a harassment suit or
otherwise.
Moreover, if it has been actually filed it would not have passed
unnoticed by then Judge Verediano who had to approve the same.
The undersigned is in accord with the claim of Atty. Valencia as
presented by him to Atty. Cunanan of this Office that indeed no
record on appeal was filed by the counsels of PDIC in the subject
case, thus no administrative action should be taken against
him. (Memorandum dated June 5, 1997, pp. 1-2; Rollo, p. 538-
539)
On July 23, 1997, after considering the report and it appearing that
the investigation conducted by the OCA was limited to hearing the
evidence of the branch clerk of court and his witnesses, the required the
OCA to hear the evidence of petitioner that he had filed a record on appeal
but it was suppressed and, after considering that totality of the evidence
presented, to determine liability for any wrongful act committed, and to
submit its findings and recommendations.
On January 27, 1998, the OCA submitted its report and
recommendation on the additional investigation it conducted from which it
appears that hearings were held on three dates; the parties, through their
counsel, were duly notified of the same; and that at the first scheduled
hearing on October 7, 1997, only Atty. Marino E. Eslao, counsel for
private respondent, appeared. In order to expidite the proceedings, he was
allowed to present documentary evidence without prejudice to the right of
the petitioner to comment thereon. During the hearing on November 5,
1997, the parties agreed to file position papers after the testimony of
branch clerk Atty. Valencia. On November 6, 1997, the respective
testimonies of Atty. Valencia and Atty. Pablo Romero, the sole witness for
petitioner, were taken. In his report dated December 1, 1997, [3] Senior
Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez summarized the evidence
presented by the parties and his findings on the same, to wit:
Atty. Pablo Romero, Manager of R&L Litigation Center, PDIC
testifies that he was the one who prepared the subject Record on
Appeal. He likewise confirmed the fact that the President of the
PDIC, Mr. Ernest Leung, Atty. Rosalinda Casiguran and he then
went to see Judge Veridiano and was informed by Atty. Valencia
that he cannot find a copy of the Record on Appeal which was
allegedly filed. He cannot recall if Atty. Valencia ever demanded
from him a copy of said record (pp. 28-29, TSN dated November
6, 1997). No other relevant information were given by Atty.
Romero.
Atty. Antonio Valencia, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 31,
Manila, was invited to testify as to whether a Record on Appeal
was actually filed before their court and the same was duly
received by him. He was examined by the parties, principally the
counsel for PDIC.
In his testimony, Atty. Valencia, reiterated his previous stand that
he never saw a copy of the Record on Appeal and he was
positive that indeed there was no Record on Appeal having been
filed in his court.Counsel of PDIC however insinuated that
record on appeal might have been filed but the same was
misplaced. Atty. Valencia assured that "this is very remote".
(TSN, p. 8, November 6, 1997).
He even stressed that when he was made earlier to comment on
whether or not a record on appeal was actually filed, he checked
and double checked the original records, inquired from the
employees of RTC, Manila including the Judge whether they
have knowledge of any record on appeal which was filed in their
sala but all answered in the negative. (pp. 21 & 22, TSN, Nov. 6,
1997).
Moreover, he also firmly denied having received the alleged
copy of the record on appeal which was presented to him for
identification during his direct testimony since the signatures
appearing therein are totally different from his actual signature
(pp. 23, TSN, November 6, 1997).
It is to be noted that the alleged duplicate original copy of the
Notice of Appeal [Record on Appeal] which is supposed to be
with the counsels of PDIC was not presented as evidence. In fact
when the counsel of PDIC Atty. Romero was asked if the PDIC
employee who allegedly filed the Record on Appeal could testify
he answered in the negative and claimed that the said employee
is already in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. No evidence was likewise
presented to prove the same. No effort was exerted by PDIC to
prove the authenticity of the signature of Clerk of Court Valencia
appearing in PDIC's copy of the Record on Appeal.
It is also worthy to note that other than the bare testimony of
Atty. Romero, no other evidence were presented by petitioner
PDIC to substantiate their claim that a Record on Appeal was
filed at the RTC of Manila and the same was duly received by
Atty. Valencia. The testimony was not even corroborated.
Be that as it may this Office still has to determine as to whether a
Record on Appeal was actually filed at the court a quo.
A review of the record impels a rejection of the petitioner's claim
that a Record on Appeal was filed.
The private respondent was able to present proof which are
affirmative, unequivocal convincing, and consistent. In fact the
testimony alone of Atty. Valencia which was a reiteration of his
previous testimonies were very clear, concise, and moreover
consistent. For the record Atty. Valencia is viewed by the
undersigned who personally conducted the investigation as a
plain, sincere and honest man who, not having been shown of
any reason to be bias or to favor any party, had no reason to
deliberately tell a falsehood relative to his official functions. The
fact therefore that he submitted himself to an investigatin twice
and in different occassions shows his determination to vindicate
his honor by proving the integrity of the records of his office.
From all indications and as the records of the case will show NO
RECORD ON APPEAL was actually filed in the court a quo.
Apparently, RTC, Branch 31, Manila has an effective records
management (system) and it is improbable to have missed one
important document (RECORD ON APPEAL). In the absence of
 any convincing proof to the contrary, the regularity of official
function must be upheld.
Far from the assertions of the petitioner we conclude that there
was no Record on Appeal actually filed. (Memorandum dated
December 11, 1997, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 557-559)
The findings of the OCA are well taken.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence is given on the either side. Plaintiff must therefore
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, i.e. evidence as a whole
which is superior to that of the defendant.[4] In other words, the party who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. [5] In this case, petitioner, as the
party claiming affirmative relief from this Court by contending that he had
filed a record on appeal in the trial court, must discharge the burden of
convincingly proving his claim.[6] As found by the OCA, however, the
evidence of the respondents even outweighs that of petitioner. Private
respondents presented proof which are affirmative, unequivocal,
convincing, and consistent that no record on appel had been filed. As the
OCA noted, petitioner not only failed to present the PDIC employee who
allegedly filed on the record appeal in the trial court but more importantly,
he failed to prove the authenticity of the alleged signature of Branch Clerk
Antonio Valencia appearing in his copy of the record on appeal.
The firm and consistent denial of the branch clerk that he was the one
who received the record on appeal and acknowledged its filing was
disputed by petitioner. But petitioner's witness, Atty. Romero, who
allegedly prepared the said record did not file it in the trial court. Nor did
he have any personal knowledge of the actual filing of the record on
appeal in the trial court. According to Atty. Romero, the PDIC employee
who allegedly filed the record on appeal in the trial court could not testify
because the said employee was already in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This
allegation is not persuasive since no evidence was presented to prove the
same.[7]
Even the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner to prove the
authenticity of the signature of the branch clerk on the alleged duplicate
original copy of the record on appeal [8] is not convincing. The signature
and notation on the alleged duplicate original copy of the record on appeal
do not match the actual signature and handwriting of the branch clerk as
shown in the pleadings submitted by petitioner himself, namely, the notice
of appeal filed by petitioner (Annex E, Omnibus Motion), motion to strike
out notice of appeal filed by private respondents (Annex G) and comment
filed by another claimant (Annex H). The branch clerk's alleged signature
and notation are markedly different from his signature and handwriting
appearing in the submitted documentary evidence. [9] For one, the branch
clerk's initial "AV" appear "HV" in the alleged duplicate original copy of
the record.In addition, numeral "5" was written with a rounded stroke
instead of a sharp one. Clearly, petitioner failed to discharge the required
burden of proof. Hence, petitioner's assertion that he had filed a record on
appeal is not worthy of belief.
As regards petitioner's prayer that the Court reconsider its resolution
of October 13, 1995 absolving the branch clerk of court of charges of
wrongdoing, suffice it to state here that no ground exists to impute bad
faith on the part of the branch clerk. Good faith is presumed and the
complainant has the burden of proving any wrongdoing. [10] Petitioner
simply failed to prove that the branch clerk either suppressed the record on
appeal allegedly filed by petitioner did not file the said record. The Court
cannot find the branch clerk guilty of any wrongdoing in certifying that
petitioner failed to file a record on appeal in the trial court in the face of
petitioner's failure to adduce convincing proof that such a record was in
fact filed therein.
Also for consideration are two (2) manifestations and motions for
clarification filed by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). In its
Manifestation/Motion dated May 20, 1996, LBP alleges that on or about
March 24, 1995, petitioner's deposit accounts in LBP were garnished by
Sheriff Carmelo Cachero in favor of private respondents pursuant to the
writ of execution issued by RTC Branch 31, Manila acting as the
liquidation court; that on April 10, 1995, it received from petitioner a copy
of the April 7, 1995 order of this Court directing the parties to maintain the
status quo in the case; that on November 20, 1995, the Court issued
another resolutiondirecting the parties to maintain the status quo until
further orders; and that on April 1, 1996, it received as request from the
petitioner to transfer the garnished funds to a different account maintained
by petitioner in another branch of LBP. LBP seeks clarification whether or
not the garnishment of petitioner's deposit accounts on March 24, 1995 is
null and void considering the status quo orders issued by the Court. It
further inquires whether or not it may acquiesce to petitioner's request to
transfer the garnished funds to petitioner's other account in another branch
of LBP.[11] In its Manifestation dated October 7, 1996, on the other hand,
LBP alleges that on September 9, 1996, it received from Sheriff Adolfo
Garcia a notice of garnishment over the same deposit accounts of
petitioner implementing the writ of execution issued also by the RTC,
Branch 31, Manila, but for another claimant, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR); that on September 25, 1996, it wrote Sheriff Garcia
informing him that the accounts sought to be garnished were already
garnished pursuant to the processes of the same court for another claimant
(herein private respondents); that on September 27, 1996, it received a
letter from petitioner urging it to effect the immediate release of the
garnished funds to the BIR and that on October 2, 1996, it received from
Sheriff Garcia the order to deliver to him the garnished amount
of P179,971,860.13. LBP manifests that it is holding in abeyance action on
the order to Sheriff Garcia and the letter of petitioner until the incidents in
this case are finally resolved by this Court.[12]
These are matters largely relating to the execution of the decision of
the trial court. As far as this Court is concerned, its decision is now final
and it no longer has any jurisdiction to pass upon these incidents, not to
mention the fact that the manifestation filed by LBP are in the nature of
consultation by one not a party to this case.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DENY petitioner's
Omnibus Motion for lack of merit. The manifestations and motions dated
May 20, 1996 and October 7, 1996 by the Land Bank of the Philippines
are NOTED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, G.R. No. 157912
 Petitioner, against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7,
Present:
2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
YNARES-SANTIAGO, approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, land belonging to the estate, and the amount ofP275,000.00, as
CHICO-NAZARIO, reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in
NACHURA, and
the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, REYES, JJ.
VICTORIA S. MEDINA-
Administratrix, Promulgated: The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the
Respondent. December 13, 2007
x------------------------------------------------x dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the
requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification
DECISION against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written
explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of
the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC)
dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing
without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by
respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per
Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising
the following questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and contain a certification against non-forum shopping, failing
which such claim should be dismissed?
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims
 (b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a
probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the
docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?
(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding
be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written
explanation on the service and filing by registered mail? [2]
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a
probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment
of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72
of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable
to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
The Court gave due course to the petition for review
on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section
2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. [3]
The petition is imbued with merit.
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in
ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is
not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In
the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for
in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of
Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil
actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or
perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.[4] This
means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions
may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where
doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the
Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are
inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the
Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for
complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-
personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money
claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate
proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err
in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent
estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against
non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that
a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory
pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was
initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's
will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting
letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money
claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the
estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they
[5]
would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a
motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration
in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. InArquiza v. Court
[6]
of Appeals, the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new
litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter
arising in the progress of the case in which the motion
is filed. A motion is not an independent right or
remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the
progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is
collateral to the main object of the action and is
connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the
settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since
the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent
claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an
initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum
shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,
[8]
that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's
fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to
theadministratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even
without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall
constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees
within a reasonable time.[9] After all, the trial court had already assumed
jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate.Clearly, therefore,
non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one
of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De
Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is squarely in point. Therein, the Court
held thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court,
passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court,
held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading
or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious
reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution
on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely,
minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if
service or filing is done by mail, considering the
inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal
service will do away with the practice of some lawyers
who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less
than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by
mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the
latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance,
responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon
receiving notice from the post office that the registered
mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the
adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating
before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all,
thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such
pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this
innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal
service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13
then gives the court the discretion to consider a
pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of
service or filing were not resorted to and no written
explanation was made as to why personal service was
not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion
must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal
service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause
whenever practicable.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section
11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to
other modes of service and filing, the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or
filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of
time, place and person, personal service or filing
is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not
practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must
then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why
personal service or filing was not practicable to begin
with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a
court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and
the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality
of personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally
applied Section 11 of Rule 13:
As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court] requires, service and filing of
pleadings must be done personally
whenever practicable. The court notes
that in the present case, personal
service would not be
practicable.Considering the distance
between the Court of Appeals
 and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition
was posted, clearly, service by registered
mail [sic] would have entailed
considerable time, effort and expense. A
written explanation why service was not
done personally might have been
superfluous. In any case, as the rule is
so worded with the use of may,
signifying permissiveness, a violation
thereof gives the court discretion
whether or not to consider the paper as
not filed. While it is true that
procedural rules are necessary to secure
an orderly and speedy administration
of justice, rigid application of Section
11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case
in the interest of substantial justice.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is
Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83
kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes
personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a
written explanation why service was not done personally
might have been superfluous.
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal
construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed
where, among other cases, the injustice to the adverse
party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City,
while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed
orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial
notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed
not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus,
following Medina v. Court of Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to submit
a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be
considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its
discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of
petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of
estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to
residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid. [13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on
money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil.
v. Santibaez,[14] thus:
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in
the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage
case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting
the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him
to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the
 affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law
strictly requires the prompt presentation and
disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate
in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
[15]
(Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule
on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again
in the interest of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional

Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9,
2003, respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. TheRegional Trial Court of Iligan City
, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate
action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules Rule 73

of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SO ORDERED. Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A.
MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna,
Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B.
GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word
"resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court,
referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special
administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A.
Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G.
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the
City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate.
On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May
8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice
of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon all
persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for
delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular
administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should
be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and,
Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa
B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special
administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular
administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the
Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the
jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May
8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous,
misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G.
Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown
herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31,
1973, in theBayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in
Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental
Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by
Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original
petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional
Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence
was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B.
Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the
allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the
original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that
she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the
administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that
Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The
admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B.
Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer
jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the
court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition
was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original
and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the
issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973,
praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent
allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash
advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling
attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the
special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal
and real properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order,
received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the
motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973,
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting
the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition,
because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest
has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid;
and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled
to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental
motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the
court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an
illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G.
Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973,
one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of
properties in the hands of third persons which have not been
determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the
special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the
interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor
Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action,
jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus
motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa
B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that
the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in
Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous
qualification made by the court that the administration of the
properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain
with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been
authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and
possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of
the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to
deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name
without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does
not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that
the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July
2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the
appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental
petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition
for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at
the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that
Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and
had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as
special and regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27,
1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in
view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special
administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack
of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia.
Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the
first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove
the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power
allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit
an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of
the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973,
insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her:
(a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c)
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special
administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks
and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7,
1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three
questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish
Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of
accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her
the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa
B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles
presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon
Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession
in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word
"single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-
C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time
of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing
that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City.
Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in
Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia
commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge
Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that
court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the
criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the
delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G.
Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc.
27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of
jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975,
Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by
certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the
Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1,
1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-
19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On
February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G.
Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special
administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia
qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed
Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge
Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment
of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30,
1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc.
Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the
proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court
of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals.
This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975,
an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance
to Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in
the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling
attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this
Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and
that the case is still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded
Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments
were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt
on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on
January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-
42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to
annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge
Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in the case. A restraining order
was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for
certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations
hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With
particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should
affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the
appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as
death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and
situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the
right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor,
or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his
last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and
that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his
death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the
court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of
venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely
with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the
subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the
subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given
cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by
procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or
authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though
that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of
the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court
may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment
may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to
sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at
once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is
just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place
of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous
Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however,
purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be
brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement
of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration
does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the
Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the
estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides"
mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent
at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term
"resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the
terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa
B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the
time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration
before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G.
Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of
Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba,
Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her,
the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba,
Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to
her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as
appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself
before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision,
Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G.
Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision,
Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was
presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa
B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the
deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before
his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated
November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels
of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973,
transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering
parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that
Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal,
the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C.
Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-
settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver.
Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When
improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed
waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to
hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her
objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while
insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as
special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B.
Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse.
Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may
appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the
estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided
and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the
appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules,
however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment
is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special
administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15That, however, is no
authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal
likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment.
Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and
legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and
legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should
not be taken into account in the appointment of a special
administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order
of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in
appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that
overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the
appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow
would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more,
interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other
next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect
rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as
the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B.
Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever
with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the
latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule
that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of
special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of
such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a
regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not
determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but
who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be
determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court
on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the
basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with
sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased
Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia,
he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his
certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1,
1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his
spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G.
Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs.
Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all
inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was
properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in
the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon
City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special
administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and
the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from
continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the
records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the
continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17,

1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738,
subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang
Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of
P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby
upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia

Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby
denied, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance
of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM
II and LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1 Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to
annul a partition, approved in anintestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the
Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a
probate in the Utah district court).
Antecedents. Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died
at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was
survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children,
named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita
Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by
a first marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47,
Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California.
One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal
property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his
estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two
children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will
disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his
property outside this country, the testator said: t.hqw
I purposely have made no provision in this will for my
daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa
Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have
provided for each of them in a separate will disposing of
my Philippine property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate
Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm
Morris of Cupertino, California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street,
Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate proceeding
(Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in
Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its order dated April 10,
1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills
and the codicil It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated
April 4, 1978 "by and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm,
Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley
Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts"
(Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda
and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their
mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the
intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in
Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald
B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-
in-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm
Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be
designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's
Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half
conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not
be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila
(par. 4). The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable
estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the
Angara law firm (par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall
share equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita
Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net
distributable estate and marital share. A supplemental memorandum also
dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61,
Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that
forty- three days after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughter of
the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and.
Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First
Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024for the settlement of his estate.
She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office,
filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the
ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of
Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special administratrix,
She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his
Philippine estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine,
through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B.
Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to
dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint
administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned
Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in
the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and
approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the so-
called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and
Juanita allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned
out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by
Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L,
p. 90, testate case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they
sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267 shares of RFM
Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed
by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two
children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979
adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and
one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142,
Record). No mention at all was made of the will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced
Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who on August 9,
moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered
the motion moot considering that it had already approved the declaration
of heirs and project of partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that
he was no longer connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when
the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who
negotiated the sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to
sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner
of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that
Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he
interposed no objection to the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p.
153, Record). The court noted the certification as in conformity with its
order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was
no movement or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita
Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so
that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the
present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was
notified of that motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law
firm filed again its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as counsel
for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that
the firm had previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March
11, 1978, when it filed a motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding and
furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm
was then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. On
September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of
Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition
praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah),
that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the
letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and
that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties
received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due
to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah
compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void
because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to the
decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for
lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate
proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be
consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment
of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for
probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).
Ruling. We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion
to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two
wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of
Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479
and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86).
It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be
settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the
testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this
judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her
motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G.
Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of
orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order

is dissolved. No costs.

SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
 G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
(12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and
HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner.

Taada, Teehankee & Carreon for respondents.

DIZON, J.:

On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition

for certiorari docketed as G.R. L-21938 against the respondents
Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance
of Negros Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to
hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively
praying:

Republic of the Philippines

... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered
SUPREME COURT
annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11
Manila
July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court
dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No.
EN BANC
6344, supra, and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of
respondent Manila court denying
petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene and to dismiss
 the later-instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra,
both special proceedings pertaining to the settlement of
the same estate of the same deceased, and consequently
annulling all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No.
51396; supra, of the respondent Manila court as all taken
without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending
these proceedings, petitioner prays for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents
Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte
from proceeding with Special Proceeding No.
51396, supra, until further orders of this Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to declare itself
'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as
prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss its
Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding
proof of prior filing of Special Proceeding No.
6344, supra, in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by
this Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading
entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS docketed
in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 praying, for the reasons therein
stated, that judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued by the
Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first
disapproving his record on appeal and the second denying his motion for
reconsideration, and further commanding said court to approve his record
on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We
issued a resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the
original action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer
traversing petitioner's contention that the respondent courts had committed
grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition
forcertiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court
a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y
Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a
natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime
of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same
Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon
petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed the Philippine National
Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it
set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite
notices be published in accordance with law. The record discloses,
however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National Bank
never actually qualified as special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private
respondents herein, filed an opposition to the above-mentioned petition
alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who
had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated
copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this
Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioner's
capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent,
commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the
probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No.
6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following
grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will,
there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2)
that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to
initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural
son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged
Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the
Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction
over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's
motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending
before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied
on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal
bond and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing from said orders to
this court on questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed
appointed by the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected
to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December 7,
1963 the Negros Court issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the
petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for having been
filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the
meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved
by this Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente Uriarte,
Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this case
squarely before the Supreme Court on questions of law
which is tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his appeal
from this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the
record on appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby
disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental
petition for mandamus mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to
intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the
proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by
said court in its order of July 1 of the same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the
same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No.
6142 to obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgment as his
natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the
action, as well as when he commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he
had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up
to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros
Court has not gone farther than the appointment of a special administrator
in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore,
failed to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were
had in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to
probate the document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y
Goite, the petition for probate appearing not to have been contested. It
appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the Manila
Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion
for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of said proceedings.
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special
proceeding pending before the Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were
attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the
petition filed with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore,
that almost from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros
Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid
last will and of the proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a)
whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding
No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court
similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396
notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in
the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of
First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of
probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of deceased persons whether they died testate or intestate. While their
jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the matter
of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special
proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section
1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be
in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of
first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when
the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien like the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the
deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case
before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila
Courts province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left
considerable properties. From this premise petitioner argues that, as the
Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344),
the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special
Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in
accordance with his alleged will, and that consequently, the first court
erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court
similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with
the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,
testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it
has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had
left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn
over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the
alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall
continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication
that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte
Zamacona should have filed the petition for the probate of the last will of
Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court particularly in Special
Proceeding No. 6344 or was entitled to commence the corresponding
separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to
support the view that he should have submitted said will for probate to the
Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate
motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding
No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the
orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply
litigation, especially if several courts would be involved. This, in effect,
was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court.
In the second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition
to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he
had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for
submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he
had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the
decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he
knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there
was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the
settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio
Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his opposition to
petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly
promised to submit said will for probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate
to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the
purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention
in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said
petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely
a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from
doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that
petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite
since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the
initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner
likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged
last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate
with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona
filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these
notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the
Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking
for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the
proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not
only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit
said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on
October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction
over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on
his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not
inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have
the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction;
more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344,
Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court said that he was "not inclined to
sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein
petitioner has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory
acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution by
him of this proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with the
authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the proper thing for
him to do would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled
Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila
instead of maintaining an independent action, for indeed his supposed
interest in the estate of the decedent is of his doubtful character pending
the final decision of the action for compulsory acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to
prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in
Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to
ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to
submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural
child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate
court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and
whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his
acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476;
Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez
vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-
21939), We are of the opinion, and so hold, that in view of the conclusions
heretofore stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said
supplemental petition is successful, it will only result in compelling the
Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking
from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26,
1964, the first being the order of said court dismissing Special Proceeding
No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner's motion for
the reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result
of what has been said heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the
conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal would serve no
useful purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our
ruling that he can no longer question the validity of said orders.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is
hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a result, the petition
for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental
petition formandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby
dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set
aside. With costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.

Castro, J., is on leave.

Fernando and Teehankee, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
SUPREME COURT
Manila On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila
Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein
EN BANC petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus
Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta.
Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage,
respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco,
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973 Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes
and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs. On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, Senator) 1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of
MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No.
CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO 2433-R), alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in
CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of
GONZALEZ, respondents. his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon
City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition
Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner. for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the
heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof
Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents. at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and
Province of Cebu.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and
its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a
new and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that
the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said
Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that
respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special
administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration
of the said court, giving as reasons the following:
 It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not
having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of
hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover,
copies of the petition have not been served on all of the
heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of
letters of administration. 2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing
of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a
petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for
the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance
of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix
in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner
Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion
to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April
1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on
petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document
purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano
Jesus Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to
the probateproceedings in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to
nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu
court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition
proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and
Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964,opposing probate of the will and
assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain
petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by
her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent
prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to
dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate
proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in
said order that theresidence of the late senator at the time of his death was
at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent
portion of said order follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5
of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows:
"that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a
resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the
aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12
March 1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong
venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73
of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted
allegation, the Court is made to understand that the
oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a
resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate
proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate
proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the
probate of the will should take precedence, but that the
probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City
 Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire
of the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could
not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of
the petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don
Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a
resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last
Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the
petition for probate of the will shows that the decedent at
the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that
he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the
former as his first choice and the latter as his second
choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one
will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he
himself selects or considers to be his home or which
appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in
thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows
the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this
court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is
to the exclusion of all others. 5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon
City court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction
over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court
was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration
dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing
for probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-
hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors
appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the
hearing in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon
City court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under
their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required
by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or
some other persons for his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud
and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend
that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time
he affixed his signature thereto. 6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the
notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs
had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of
the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty.
Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of
the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last
will, and the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence
certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all
indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon
City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its
said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will
and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the
testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-
widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the
testator" in his will as probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the
will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof,
respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case
CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case
No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor
of respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner,
holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc.
2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that
court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first
attached. It is that court which can properly and
exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the
decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether
or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of
his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was
instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it
follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for
probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent
should assert her rights within the framework of the
proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the
jurisdiction of another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on
March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI,
acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for
appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready
for the consideration of the Court today. It would be
premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet
regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . "
It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said
judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction
over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired
from the moment a petition is filed, but only to
theexercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the
proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and
determined by law and does not depend on the
pronouncements of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue,
commanding and directing the respondent Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the
respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually
from proceeding and taking any action in Special
Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent
court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore
 taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge,
therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The
writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition
for review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the
appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with
the testateproceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and
testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without
bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This
issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit,
whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive
jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the
Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to
the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon
City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document
purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano
Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents never
questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and
thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any impediment or
obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss
the probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue,
toproceed with the hearing of the petition and to admit the will to
probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred
in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court
from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting
aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express
wish, for the following considerations:
1. The Judiciary Act 7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all
Courts of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and
intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court
lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and
in order to prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise
may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that
"the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
The cited Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of the province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
 proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. (Rule 73) 8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of
his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but
merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran
inSy Oa vs. Co Ho 9 as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that
in probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is
regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its
mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case
has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First
Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided.
All the parties, however, including all the creditors, have
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and
the case is therein completely finished except for a claim
of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court
but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first
time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial
court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province.
If we consider such question of residence as one affecting
the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter,
the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all
decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in
court will have to be annulled and the same case will have
to be commenced anew before another court of the same
rank in another province. That this is ofmischievous
effect in the prompt administration of justice is too
obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy
Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942)
Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that
the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the
province where he had last resided, could not have been
intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court
over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again,
procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad
Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction Act
No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of
First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased.
Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in
the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190,
section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case
shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of
the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this
ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where
the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly
called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with
whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive
jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estateof a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between
courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with
whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of
the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the
decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his
surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of
the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may
be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold
the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court
which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last
will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing
with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order
holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the
Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before
that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly
admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely
decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would
thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of
jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts.
Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City
court to resolve the question between the parties whether the
decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where he
had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by
respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take
cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the
Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to
the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory
and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take
cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate
petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take
cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise
jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to
do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule
of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition
before it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and
deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by
the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the
Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to
appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court
cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without
jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the
testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority
against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate
proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to
effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate
succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It
is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the
course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of
first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last
will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should
replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in
his possession to the executor subsequently
appointed. This however, is understood to be without
prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication
that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority
over intestate proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in
this case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain
considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein
respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros
Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding
or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending
Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate
to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the
purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention
in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said
petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is
merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of
the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of
the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the
right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so
by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that
petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan
Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio
Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in
Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was
served with notice of the existence (presence) of the
alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the
petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August
 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for
the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these
notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he
filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No.
51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene
and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings
had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court
not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed
but also to admit said will to probate more than five
months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962.
To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction
over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the
validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence.
Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not
inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower
court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor,
if the net result would be to have the same proceedings
repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more
so in a case like the present where the objection against
said proceedings is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of
the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that
Quezon City was the firstchoice of residence of the decedent, who had his
conjugal home and domicile therein with the deference in comity duly
given by the Cebu court could not be contested except by appeal from
said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly
provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in
comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the
record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken
cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the
late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a
legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of
whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise
jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of
Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that
the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious
one, requiring both factual and legal resolution on the
basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary
course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in
view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the
Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also
gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We
reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper court,
as so indicated in the leading and controlling case
 of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792,
July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of
the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to
the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect
asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent
and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would
depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City.
The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts
at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court
thatQuezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate
and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to have no
applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require
the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated
in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of
the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined
Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and
respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding based on
documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine
Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on
appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and
inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when
it is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the
petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts."
Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court
in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence
at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting,
or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in
such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication
as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the
whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court
is binding upon everybody, even against the State.The probate of a will by
a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution
and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its
jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the
proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to
it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action
should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of
jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should
instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in
dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action
admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in
accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be
remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly
had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if
the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran
in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of
considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the
trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again
the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another
province "is too obvious to require comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of
the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the
decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule
73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different
courts which may properly assumejurisdiction from doing so and creating
conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice,
and that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives
who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race
as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice
regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in
disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last
will and testament and the right of his surviving widow named as
executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not intended by
the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the
orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who
under all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu
court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in
the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the
Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12,
1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the
decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is
admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's
estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all
the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate
either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings
be converted into a testate proceeding when under the Rules, the
proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as
already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the
decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and
entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in
accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue
and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money
and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she
has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under
Rule 73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with
the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate
have to beadministered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the
deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that
petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of
the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court
properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the
deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of
jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually
leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate
even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court
did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
instead deferring to thetestate proceedings filed just a week later by
petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's
last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion
to dismiss) showed the falsityof the allegation in the intestate petition that
the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents
never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's
order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the
Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu
court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's
will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have
acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting
the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in
accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled
doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule
of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City
court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing
petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction
to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final
and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine,
as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by
and transferredto the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice
and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference
and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will
and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix
without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders
and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and
authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to
repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to
revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that
indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the
strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City
was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed
by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is
ordered dismissed. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.
I only want to stress that in my view, the failure of respondents to question
within a reasonable time the laying of the venue in the Quezon City Court
of First Instance and the assumption of jurisdiction by that court, after the
Court of First Instance of Cebu deferred in its favor, in order to prevent the
holding therein of any proceeding and trial, and their having filed therein a
formal opposition to the probate of the will, makes them guilty of laches,
for which reason they are not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for in
the present petition.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.
I only want to stress that in my view, the failure of respondents to question
within a reasonable time the laying of the venue in the Quezon City Court
of First Instance and the assumption of jurisdiction by that court, after the
Court of First Instance of Cebu deferred in its favor, in order to prevent the
holding therein of any proceeding and trial, and their having filed therein a
formal opposition to the probate of the will, makes them guilty of laches,
for which reason they are not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for in
the present petition.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 107207 November 23, 1995
VIRGILIO R. ROMERO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ENRIQUETA CHUA VDA. DE
ONGSIONG, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The parties pose this question: May the vendor demand the rescission of a
contract for the sale of a parcel of land for a cause traceable to his own
failure to have the squatters on the subject property evicted within the
contractually-stipulated period?
Petitioner Virgilio R. Romero, a civil engineer, was engaged in the
business of production, manufacture and exportation of perlite filter aids,
permalite insulation and processed perlite ore. In 1988, petitioner and his
foreign partners decided to put up a central warehouse in Metro Manila on
a land area of approximately 2,000 square meters. The project was made
known to several freelance real estate brokers.
A day or so after the announcement, Alfonso Flores and his wife,
accompanied by a broker, offered a parcel of land measuring 1,952 square
meters. Located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila, the
lot was covered by TCT No. 361402 in the name of private respondent
Enriqueta Chua vda. de Ongsiong. Petitioner visited the property and,
except for the presence of squatters in the area, he found the place suitable
for a central warehouse.
Later, the Flores spouses called on petitioner with a proposal that should
he advance the amount of P50,000.00 which could be used in taking up an
ejectment case against the squatters, private respondent would agree to sell
the property for only P800.00 per square meter. Petitioner expressed his
concurrence. On 09 June 1988, a contract, denominated "Deed of
Conditional Sale," was executed between petitioner and private
respondent. The simply-drawn contract read:
DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Contract, made and executed in the Municipality of
Makati, Philippines this 9th day of June, 1988 by and
between:
ENRIQUETA CHUA VDA. DE
ONGSIONG, of legal age, widow,
Filipino and residing at 105 Simoun St.,
Quezon City, Metro Manila, hereinafter
referred to as the VENDOR;
-and-
VIRGILIO R. ROMERO, married to
Severina L. Lat, of Legal age, Filipino,
and residing at 110 San Miguel St.,
Plainview Subd., Mandaluyong Metro
Manila, hereinafter referred to as the
VENDEE:
W I T N E S S E T H : That
WHEREAS, the VENDOR is the owner of One (1) parcel
of land with a total area of ONE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FIFTY TWO (1,952) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, located in Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality
of Paraaque, Province of Rizal, covered by TCT No.
361402 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasig and more
particularly described as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the VENDEE, for (sic) has offered to buy a
parcel of land and the VENDOR has accepted the offer,
subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter stipulated:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum
of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P1,561,600.00)
ONLY, Philippine Currency, payable by VENDEE to in to
(sic) manner set forth, the VENDOR agrees to sell to the
VENDEE, their heirs, successors, administrators,
executors, assign, all her rights, titles and interest in and to
the property mentioned in the FIRST WHEREAS
CLAUSE, subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. That the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) ONLY Philippine
Currency, is to be paid upon signing and
execution of this instrument.
2. The balance of the purchase price in the
amount of ONE MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED PESOS (P1,511,600.00)
 ONLY shall be paid 45 days after the
removal of all squatters from the above
described property.
3. Upon full payment of the overall
purchase price as aforesaid, VENDOR
without necessity of demand shall
immediately sign, execute, acknowledged
(sic) and deliver the corresponding deed
of absolute sale in favor of the VENDEE
free from all liens and encumbrances and
all Real Estate taxes are all paid and
updated.
It is hereby agreed, covenanted and stipulated by and
between the parties hereto that if after 60 days from the
date of the signing of this contract the VENDOR shall not
be able to remove the squatters from the property being
purchased, the downpayment made by the buyer shall be
returned/reimbursed by the VENDOR to the VENDEE.
That in the event that the VENDEE shall not be able to
pay the VENDOR the balance of the purchase price of
ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED ELEVEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P1,511,600.00)
ONLY after 45 days from written notification to the
VENDEE of the removal of the squatters from the
property being purchased, the FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) previously paid as downpayment
shall be forfeited in favor of the VENDOR.
Expenses for the registration such as registration fees,
documentary stamp, transfer fee, assurances and such
other fees and expenses as may be necessary to transfer
the title to the name of the VENDEE shall be for the
account of the VENDEE while capital gains tax shall be
paid by the VENDOR.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereunto signed
those (sic) presents in the City of Makati MM, Philippines
on this 9th day of June, 1988.
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
VIRGILIO R. ROMERO ENRIQUETA
CHUA VDA.
DE ONGSIONG
Vendee Vendor
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
Rowena C. Ongsiong Jack M. Cruz 1
Alfonso Flores, in behalf of private respondent, forthwith received
and acknowledged a check for P50,000.00 2 from petitioner. 3
Pursuant to the agreement, private respondent filed a complaint for
ejectment (Civil Case No. 7579) against Melchor Musa and 29 other
squatter families with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque. A few
months later, or on 21 February 1989, judgment was rendered ordering the
defendants to vacate the premises. The decision was handed down beyond
the 60-day period (expiring 09 August 1988) stipulated in the contract. The
writ of execution of the judgment was issued, still later, on 30 March 1989.
In a letter, dated 07 April 1989, private respondent sought to return the
P50,000.00 she received from petitioner since, she said, she could not "get
rid of the squatters" on the lot. Atty. Sergio A.F. Apostol, counsel for
petitioner, in his reply of 17 April 1989, refused the tender and stated:.
Our client believes that with the exercise of reasonable
diligence considering the favorable decision rendered by
the Court and the writ of execution issued pursuant
thereto, it is now possible to eject the squatters from the
premises of the subject property, for which reason, he
proposes that he shall take it upon himself to eject the
squatters, provided, that expenses which shall be incurred
by reason thereof shall be chargeable to the purchase price
of the land. 4
Meanwhile, the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor ("PCUD"),
through its Regional Director for Luzon, Farley O. Viloria, asked the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque for a grace period of 45 days from
21 April 1989 within which to relocate and transfer the squatter families.
Acting favorably on the request, the court suspended the enforcement of
the writ of execution accordingly.
On 08 June 1989, Atty. Apostol reminded private respondent on the expiry
of the 45-day grace period and his client's willingness to "underwrite the
expenses for the execution of the judgment and ejectment of the
occupants." 5
In his letter of 19 June 1989, Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, Jr., counsel for private
respondent, advised Atty. Apostol that the Deed of Conditional Sale had
been rendered null and void by virtue of his client's failure to evict the
squatters from the premises within the agreed 60-day period. He added
that private respondent had "decided to retain the property." 6
On 23 June 1989, Atty. Apostol wrote back to explain:
The contract of sale between the parties was perfected
from the very moment that there was a meeting of the
minds of the parties upon the subject lot and the price in
the amount of P1,561,600.00. Moreover, the contract had
already been partially fulfilled and executed upon receipt
of the downpayment of your client. Ms. Ongsiong is
precluded from rejecting its binding effects relying upon
her inability to eject the squatters from the premises of
subject property during the agreed period. Suffice it to
state that, the provision of the Deed of Conditional Sale do
not grant her the option or prerogative to rescind the
contract and to retain the property should she fail to
comply with the obligation she has assumed under the
contract. In fact, a perusal of the terms and conditions of
the contract clearly shows that the right to rescind the
contract and to demand the return/reimbursement of the
downpayment is granted to our client for his protection.
Instead, however, of availing himself of the power to
rescind the contract and demand the return,
 reimbursement of the downpayment, our client had opted
to take it upon himself to eject the squatters from the
premises. Precisely, we refer you to our letters addressed
to your client dated April 17, 1989 and June 8, 1989.
Moreover, it is basic under the law on contracts that the
power to rescind is given to the injured party.
Undoubtedly, under the circumstances, our client is the
injured party.
Furthermore, your client has not complied with her
obligation under their contract in good faith. It is
undeniable that Ms. Ongsiong deliberately refused to exert
efforts to eject the squatters from the premises of the
subject property and her decision to retain the property
was brought about by the sudden increase in the value of
realties in the surrounding areas.
Please consider this letter as a tender of payment to your
client and a demand to execute the absolute Deed of Sale. 7
A few days later (or on 27 June 1989), private respondent, prompted by
petitioner's continued refusal to accept the return of the P50,000.00
advance payment, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
133, Civil Case No. 89-4394 for rescission of the deed of "conditional"
sale, plus damages, and for the consignation of P50,000.00 cash.
Meanwhile, on 25 August 1989, the Metropolitan Trial Court issued
an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 7579 on motion of private
respondent but the squatters apparently still stayed on.
Back to Civil Case No. 89-4394, on 26 June 1990, the Regional Trial
Court of Makati 8 rendered decision holding that private respondent had no
right to rescind the contract since it was she who "violated her obligation
to eject the squatters from the subject property" and that petitioner, being
the injured party, was the party who could, under Article 1191 of the Civil
Code, rescind the agreement. The court ruled that the provisions in the
contract relating to (a) the return/reimbursement of the P50,000.00 if the
vendor were to fail in her obligation to free the property from squatters
within the stipulated period or (b), upon the other hand, the sum's
forfeiture by the vendor if the vendee were to fail in paying the agreed
purchase price, amounted to "penalty clauses". The court added:
This Court is not convinced of the ground relied upon by
the plaintiff in seeking the rescission, namely: (1) he (sic)
is afraid of the squatters; and (2) she has spent so much to
eject them from the premises (p. 6, tsn, ses. Jan. 3, 1990).
Militating against her profession of good faith is plaintiffs
conduct which is not in accord with the rules of fair play
and justice. Notably, she caused the issuance of
an alias writ of execution on August 25, 1989 (Exh. 6) in
the ejectment suit which was almost two months after she
filed the complaint before this Court on June 27, 1989. If
she were really afraid of the squatters, then she should not
have pursued the issuance of an alias writ of execution.
Besides, she did not even report to the police the alleged
phone threats from the squatters. To the mind of the Court,
the so-called squatter factor is simply factuitous (sic). 9
The lower court, accordingly, dismissed the complaint and
ordered, instead, private respondent to eject or cause the ejectment
of the squatters from the property and to execute the absolute deed
 of conveyance upon payment of the full purchase price by
petitioner.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 29 May 1992, the
appellate court rendered its decision.10 It opined that the contract entered
into by the parties was subject to a resolutory condition, i.e., the ejectment
of the squatters from the land, the non-occurrence of which resulted in the
failure of the object of the contract; that private respondent substantially
complied with her obligation to evict the squatters; that it was petitioner
who was not ready to pay the purchase price and fulfill his part of the
contract, and that the provision requiring a mandatory
return/reimbursement of the P50,000.00 in case private respondent would
fail to eject the squatters within the 60-day period was not a penal clause.
Thus, it concluded.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered
declaring the contract of conditional sale dated June 9,
1988 cancelled and ordering the defendant-appellee to
accept the return of the downpayment in the amount of
P50,000.00 which was deposited in the court below. No
pronouncement as to costs. 11
Failing to obtain a reconsideration, petitioner filed this petition for review
on certiorari raising issues that, in fine, center on the nature of the contract
adverted to and the P50,000.00 remittance made by petitioner.
A perfected contract of sale may either be absolute or
conditional 12 depending on whether the agreement is devoid of, or subject
to, any condition imposed on the passing of title of the thing to be
conveyed or on the obligation of a party thereto. When ownership is
retained until the fulfillment of a positive condition the breach of the
condition will simply prevent the duty to convey title from acquiring
an obligatory force. If the condition is imposed on an obligation of a party
which is not complied with, the other party may either refuse to proceed or
waive said condition (Art. 1545, Civil Code). Where, of course, the
condition is imposed upon the perfection of the contract itself, the failure
of such condition would prevent the juridical relation itself from coming
into existence. 13
In determining the real character of the contract, the title given to it by the
parties is not as much significant as its substance. For example, a deed of
sale, although denominated as a deed of conditional sale, may be treated as
absolute in nature, if title to the property sold is not reserved in the vendor
or if the vendor is not granted the right to unilaterally rescind the contract
predicated
on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of the prescribed
condition. 14
The term "condition" in the context of a perfected contract of sale pertains,
in reality, to the compliance by one party of an undertaking the fulfillment
of which would beckon, in turn, the demandability of the reciprocal
prestation of the other party. The reciprocal obligations referred to would
normally be, in the case of vendee, the payment of the agreed purchase
price and, in the case of the vendor, the fulfillment of certain express
warranties (which, in the case at bench is the timely eviction of the
squatters on the property).
It would be futile to challenge the agreement here in question as not being
a duly perfected contract. A sale is at once perfected when a person (the
seller) obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer
ownership of a specified thing or right to another (the buyer) over which
the latter agrees. 15
The object of the sale, in the case before us, was specifically identified to
be a 1,952-square meter lot in San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 361402 of the Registry of Deeds for Pasig
and therein technically described. The purchase price was fixed at
P1,561,600.00, of which P50,000.00 was to be paid upon the execution of
the document of sale and the balance of P1,511,600.00 payable "45 days
after the removal of all squatters from the above described property."
From the moment the contract is perfected, the parties are bound not only
to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law. Under the agreement, private respondent is
obligated to evict the squatters on the property. The ejectment of the
squatters is a condition the operative act of which sets into motion the
period of compliance by petitioner of his own obligation, i.e., to pay the
balance of the purchase price. Private respondent's failure "to remove the
squatters from the property" within the stipulated period gives petitioner
the right to either refuse to proceed with the agreement or waive that
condition in consonance with Article 1545 of the Civil Code. 16This option
clearly belongs to petitioner and not to private respondent.
We share the opinion of the appellate court that the undertaking required of
private respondent does not constitute a "potestative condition dependent
solely on his will" that might, otherwise, be void in accordance with
Article 1182 of the Civil Code 17 but a "mixed" condition "dependent not
on the will of the vendor alone but also of third persons like the squatters
and government agencies and personnel concerned." 18 We must hasten to
add, however, that where the so-called "potestative condition" is imposed
not on the birth of the obligation but on its fulfillment, only the obligation
is avoided, leaving unaffected the obligation itself. 19
In contracts of sale particularly, Article 1545 of the Civil Code,
aforementioned, allows the obligee to choose between proceeding with the
agreement or waiving the performance of the condition. It is this provision
which is the pertinent rule in the case at bench. Here, evidently, petitioner
has waived the performance of the condition imposed on private
respondent to free the property from squatters. 20
In any case, private respondent's action for rescission is not warranted. She
is not the injured party. 21 The right of resolution of a party to an obligation
under Article 1191 of the Civil Code is predicated on a breach of faith by
the other party that violates the reciprocity between them. 22 It is private
respondent who has failed in her obligation under the contract. Petitioner
did not breach the agreement. He has agreed, in fact, to shoulder the
expenses of the execution of the judgment in the ejectment case and to
make arrangements with the sheriff to effect such execution. In his letter of
23 June 1989, counsel for petitioner has tendered payment and demanded
forthwith the execution of the deed of absolute sale. Parenthetically, this
offer to pay, having been made prior to the demand for rescission,
assuming for the sake of argument that such a demand is proper under
Article 1592 23 of the Civil Code, would likewise suffice to defeat private
respondent's prerogative to rescind thereunder.
There is no need to still belabor the question of whether the P50,000.00
advance payment is reimbursable to petitioner or forfeitable by private
respondent, since, on the basis of our foregoing conclusions, the matter has
ceased to be an issue. Suffice it to say that petitioner having opted to
proceed with the sale, neither may petitioner demand its reimbursement
from private respondent nor may private respondent subject it to forfeiture.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and another is entered ordering petitioner
to pay private respondent the balance of the purchase price and the latter to
execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a.
SUPREME COURT "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246. 5 In
Manila their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died
intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-
SECOND DIVISION C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno,
G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013 Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to
ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives and
YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA, PETITIONERS, successors-in-interest.8
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as
YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from
CITY, RESPONDENTS. Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. 9 Further,
by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no
RESOLUTION cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of
action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as
Magdalenos lawful heirs.10
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of
Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on The RTC Ruling
certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of
law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011
20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action
cause of action. against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had
established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special
The Facts proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, 12 this did not mean
that they could already be considered as the decedents compulsory heirs.
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, 4 filed a Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages Magdalenos son and hence, his compulsory heir through the
documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage
contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of
Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport. 13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was,
however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsels failure to state
the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate
of Compliance was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-
2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether
or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates
a right of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action
is determined by the allegations in the complaint. 17 In this relation, a
complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to
the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient
basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the
plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and
based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed
by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of
title issued in the latters favor be cancelled. While the foregoing
allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs
sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a
decedents lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of
title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of
Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held
that the determination of who are the decedents lawful heirs must be made
in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of
the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and
not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property.1wphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery
of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action
is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the
declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of
Appeals x x x:
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and
heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special
proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an
illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not
be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the
recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)
it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination
of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership
and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether
proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on
Gaudiosos heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing
pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No.
T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent
proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and
the rights concomitant therewith.
SO ORDERED.

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Mendoza,* JJ., concur.
the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted
the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding
the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened. 24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature,

appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special
proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved,
ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining

whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard
decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before
 the legal spouse. The filiation of the paramours children must be settled in
a probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose, not in an action
for recovery of property.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to nullify the February 4, 2002 Decision [2] and the
August 14, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV
No. 45883. The CA disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby partially

DENIED and the Decision dated May 30, 1994, of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 111 in Civil Case No. 9722-P
is MODIFIED to read, as follows:

FIRST DIVISION WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and

against the defendant as follows:
[G.R. No. 154645. July 13, 2004]
a. Declaring the house and lot registered under Transfer Certificate of Title
MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J.
No. 90293 (26627-A) of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila, District
REYES, petitioner, vs. LOURDES REYES,
IV as conjugal partnership property of the late Spouses Rodolfo and
MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR. -- all
Lourdes Reyes;
surnamed REYES, respondents.
b. Ordering the [petitioner] to surrender possession of said subject
DECISION
property, pursuant to the applicable law on succession, to the respective
estates of the late Rodolfo Reyes and Lourdes Reyes and to pay a
PANGANIBAN, J.:
reasonable rental of P10,000.00 a month, to the same juridical entities,
upon their failure to do so until possession of the property is delivered; and
Though registered in the paramours name, property acquired with the
salaries and earnings of a husband belongs to his conjugal partnership with
c. To pay [respondents] attorneys fees in the sum of P20,000.00 and to pay
the costs.[4]
The questioned Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
[Respondents] filed a Complaint for reconveyance and damages, dated
January 23, 1982, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, containing
the following allegations:
x x x The complaint alleges that [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes is the
widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on September 12, 1981; that
[respondents] Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. are the
legitimate children of [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the deceased
Rodolfo A. Reyes; that for years before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes had
illicit relations with [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino; that before his
death, x x x Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and Comptroller of
Warner Barnes and Company with an income of P15,000.00 a month and,
after retirement on September 30, 1980, received from said company
benefits and emoluments in the amount of P315,0[1]1.79; that
[respondent] wife was not the recipient of any portion of the said amount.
The complaint further alleges that on July 12, 1979, a [D]eed of [S]ale of a
property consisting of a house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro
Manila was executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez in
favor of [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino for which Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 90293 of the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV
was issued in the name of [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino; that the funds
used to purchase this property were conjugal funds and earnings of the
deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes as executive of Warner Barnes and Company
as [petitioner] Joaquino was without the means to pay for the same; that
[petitioner] executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A.
Reyes to mortgage the property to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation
in order to pay the balance of the purchase price; that said Rodolfo A.
Reyes executed a mortgage in favor of Commonwealth Insurance
Corporation forP140,000.00 and to guaranty payment thereof, he secured a
life insurance [policy] with Philam Life Insurance Corporation for the said
amount, assigning the proceeds thereof to Commonwealth Insurance
Corporation; that the monthly amortizations of the mortgage were paid by
said Rodolfo A. Reyes before his death and at the time of his death, the
outstanding balance of P110,000.00 was to be paid out of his Philam Life
Insurance [p]olicy.
The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in
[petitioners] possession and that the real and personal properties in
[petitioners] possession are conjugal partnership propert[ies] of the
spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs
exclusively to [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the
estate of Rodolfo A. Reyes to be apportioned among the [other
respondents] as his forced heirs. [Respondents] therefore, pray that the
property covered by T.C.T. No. 90293 be declared conjugal property of the
spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and Rodolfo A. Reyes and that [petitioner] be
ordered to reconvey the property in [respondents] favor; that the two cars
in [petitioners] possession be delivered to [respondents] and that
[petitioner] be made to pay actual, compensatory and moral damages to
[respondents] as well as attorneys fees.
xxxxxxxxx
[Petitioner] eventually filed her Answer, dated August 1, 1982, the
allegations of which have been summarized by the trial court in the
following manner:
In her Answer, [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino alleges that she
purchased the real property in question with her own exclusive funds and
it was only for convenience that the late Rodolfo Reyes facilitated the
mortgage over the same; that although the late Rodolfo Reyes paid the
monthly amortization of the mortgage as attorney-in-fact of [petitioner],
the money came exclusively from [her].
[Petitioner] further alleges in her answer, by way of special and affirmative
defenses, that during all the nineteen (19) years that [she] lived with
Rodolfo Reyes from 1962 continuously up to September 12, 1981 when
the latter died, [petitioner] never had knowledge whatsoever that he was
married to someone else, much less to [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes; that
[petitioner] was never the beneficiary of the emoluments or other
pecuniary benefits of the late Rodolfo Reyes during his lifetime or after his
death because [she] had the financial capacity to support herself and her
children begotten with the late Rodolfo Reyes. [Petitioner] prays for a
judgment dismissing [respondents] complaint and for the latter to pay unto
[petitioner] moral and exemplary damages in such amounts as may be
determined during the trial, including atto[r]neys fees and the costs of the
suit. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
On February 2, 1993, [respondent] Lourdes Reyes died.
Subsequently, the trial court granted the complaint based on the following
factual findings:
Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3,
1947 in Manila. They have four children, namely: Mercedes, Manuel,
Miriam and Rodolfo Jr., all surnamed Reyes and co-[respondents] in this
case. Rodolfo Reyes died onSeptember 12, 1981. At the time of his death,
Rodolfo Reyes was living with his common-law wife, Milagros Joaquino,
x x x with whom she begot three (3) children namely: Jose Romillo,
Imelda May and Charina, all surnamed Reyes.
During his lifetime, Rodolfo Reyes worked with Marsman and Company
and later transferred to Warner Barnes & Co., where he assumed the
position of Vice-President [Comptroller] until he retired on September 30,
1980. His monthly salary at Warner Barnes & Co. was P15,000.00 x x x
and upon his separation or retirement from said company, Rodolfo Reyes
received a lump sum of P315,011.79 in full payment and settlement of his
separation and retirement benefits.
During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo Reyes and [petitioner]
Milagros Joaquino and while living together, they decided to buy the
house and lot situated at No. 12 Baghdad Street, Phase 3, BF Homes,
Paraaque, Metro Manila. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 12, 1979 was
executed in favor of [petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-90293 covering the said property was issued in
the name of [petitioner only] on July 20, 1979.
To secure the finances with which to pay the purchase price of the property
in the amount of P140,000.00, [petitioner] executed on July 20, 1979, a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes for the latter, as
attorney-in-fact, to secure a loan from the Commonwealth Insurance
Company. An application for mortgage loan was filed by Rodolfo Reyes
with the Commonwealth Insurance Company and a Real Estate Mortgage
Contract was executed as collateral to the mortgage loan. The loan was
payable in ten (10) years with a monthly amortization of P1,166.67. The
monthly amortizations were paid by Rodolfo Reyes and after his death, the
balance of P109,797.64 was paid in full to the Commonwealth Insurance
by the Philam Life Insurance Co. as insurer of the deceased Rodolfo A.
Reyes.[5]
On appeal to the CA, petitioner questioned the following findings of
the trial court: 1) that the house and lot had been paid in full from the
proceeds of the loan that Rodolfo Reyes obtained from the Commonwealth
Insurance Company; 2) that his salaries and earnings, which were his and
Lourdes conjugal funds, paid for the loan and, hence, the disputed property
was conjugal; and 3) that petitioners illegitimate children, not having been
recognized or acknowledged by him in any of the ways provided by law,
acquired no successional rights to his estate.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the RTC, the CA held that the property had been paid out
of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes because the monthly
amortizations for the loan, as well as the premiums for the life insurance
policy that paid for the balance thereof, came from his salaries and
earnings. Like the trial court, it found no sufficient proof that petitioner
was financially capable of buying the disputed property, or that she had
actually contributed her own exclusive funds to pay for it. Hence, it
ordered her to surrender possession of the property to the respective estates
of the spouses.
The appellate court, however, held that the trial court should not have
resolved the issue of the filiation and the successional rights of petitioners
children. Such issues, it said, were not properly cognizable in an ordinary
civil action for reconveyance and damages and were better ventilated in a
probate or special proceeding instituted for the purpose.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for the Courts consideration:
I.
Whether or not it has been indubitably established in a court of law and
trier of facts, the Regional Trial Court, that petitioners three [3] illegitimate
children are x x x indeed the children of the late Rodolfo Reyes.
II.
Whether or not it is legally permissible for [respondents] to make a
mockery of the law by denying [the] filiations of their [two] 2 illegitimate
sisters and one [1] illegitimate brother when in fact the very complaint
filed by their mother, the lawful wife, Lourdes[,] shows that her husband
Rodolfo had illicit relations with the petitioner Milagros and had lived
with her in a house and lot at Baghdad Street.
III.
Whether or not the fact that the Court of Appeals made a finding that the
house and lot at Baghdad Street are conjugal property of lawfully wedded
Rodolfo and Lourdes including the insurance proceeds which was used to
pay the final bill for the house and lot, this will prevail over Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code.
 IV.
Whether or not the Supreme Court should enforce the rule that the parties
to a lawsuit should only tell the truth at the trial and in [their] pleadings x x
x.
V.
Whether or not the legitimate children of the late Rodolfo Reyes should
respect their fathers desire that his illegitimate children should have a
home or a roof over their heads in consonance with his duty to love, care
and provide for his children even after his death. [7]
The issues boil down to the following: 1) the nature of the house and
lot on Baghdad Street (BF Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila); and 2) the
propriety of ruling on the filiation and the successional rights of petitioners
children.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
The Conjugal Nature of the Disputed Property
Before tackling the merits, we must first point out some undisputed
facts and guiding principles.
As to the facts, it is undisputed that the deceased Rodolfo Reyes was
legally married to Respondent Lourdes Reyes on January 3, 1947.[8] It is
also admitted that for 19 years or so, and while their marriage was
subsisting, he was actually living with petitioner. It was during this time,
in 1979, that the disputed house and lot was purchased and registered in
petitioners name.
Plainly, therefore, the applicable law is the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of gains
(CPG) is created upon marriage[9] and lasts until the legal union is
dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of
property.[10] Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the
husband and wife.[11] As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in
Article 153 of the Code, which we quote:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the
spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage,
coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of each
spouse.
Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the
marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively,
are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable presumption to
arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired
during the existence of the marriage.[12]
 The law places the burden of proof [13] on the plaintiffs (respondents
herein) to establish their claim by a preponderance of evidence [14] --
evidence that has greater weight or is more convincing than that which is
offered to oppose it.[15]
On the other hand, Article 144[16] of the Civil Code mandates a co-
ownership between a man and a woman who are living together but are not
legally married. Prevailing jurisprudence holds, though, that for Article
144 to apply, the couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage.
[17]
It has been held that the Article is inapplicable to common-law relations
amounting to adultery or concubinage, as in this case. The reason therefor
is the absurdity of creating a co-ownership in cases in which there exists a
prior conjugal partnership between the man and his lawful wife. [18]
In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family
Code has been applied.[19] The latter Article provides:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article,
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidence of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party which acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties
are in bad faith.
Thus, when a common-law couple have a legal impediment to
marriage, only the property acquired by them -- through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry -- shall be owned by them in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
With these facts and principles firmly settled, we now proceed to the
merits of the first issue.
The present controversy hinges on the source of the funds paid for the
house and lot in question. Upon the resolution of this issue depends the
determination of whether the property is conjugal (owned by Rodolfo
andLourdes) or exclusive (owned by Milagros) or co-owned by Rodolfo
and Milagros.
The above issue, which is clearly factual, has been passed upon by
both the trial and the appellate courts, with similar results in favor of
respondents. Such finding is generally conclusive; it is not the function of
this Court to review questions of fact. [20]
Moreover, it is well-settled that only errors of law and not of facts are
reviewable by this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals
or under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. [21] This principle applies with
greater force herein, because the CA came up with the same factual
findings as those of the RTC.
Even then, heeding petitioners plea, we have gone through the
pleadings and the evidence presented by the parties to find out if there is
any circumstance that might warrant a reversal of the factual
findings.Unfortunately for petitioner, we have found none.
Indeed, a preponderance of evidence has duly established that the
disputed house and lot was paid by Rodolfo Reyes, using his salaries and
earnings. By substantial evidence, respondents showed the following facts:
1) that Rodolfo was gainfully employed as comptroller at Warner, Barnes
and Co., Inc. until his retirement on September 30, 1980, upon which he
received a sizeable retirement package; [22] 2) that at exactly the same time
the property was allegedly purchased,[23] he applied for a mortgage
loan[24] -- intended for housing[25] -- from the Commonwealth Insurance
Company; 3) that he secured the loan with a real estate mortgage [26] over
the same property; 4) that he paid the monthly amortizations for the
loan[27] as well as the semi-annual premiums [28] for a Philam Life insurance
policy, which he was required to take as additional security; and 5) that
with the proceeds of his life insurance policy, the balance of the loan was
paid to Commonwealth by Philam Life Insurance Company.[29]
All told, respondents have shown that the property was bought during
the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the
presumption that it is conjugal. More important, they have established that
the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the
property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and
earnings, which were conjugal funds under the Civil Code.
In contrast, petitioner has failed to substantiate either of her claims --
that she was financially capable of buying the house and lot, or that she
actually contributed to the payments therefor.
Indeed, it does not appear that she was gainfully employed at any
time after 1961[30] when the property was purchased. Hearsay are the
Affidavits[31] and the undated Certification[32] she had presented to prove
that she borrowed money from her siblings and had earnings from a
jewelry business. Respondents had not been given any opportunity to
cross-examine the affiants, who had not testified on these matters. Based
on the rules of evidence, the Affidavits and the Certification have to be
rejected. In fact, they have no probative value. [33] The CA was also correct
in disregarding petitioners allegation that part of the purchase money had
come from the sale of a drugstore[34] four years earlier.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the subsequent
registration of the realty in petitioners name was tantamount to a donation
by Rodolfo to Milagros. By express provision of Article 739(1) of the
Civil Code, such donation was void, because it was made between persons
who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.
The prohibition against donations between spouses [35] must likewise
apply to donations between persons living together in illicit relations;
otherwise, the latter would be better situated than the former. [36] Article 87
of the Family Code now expressly provides thus:
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect,
between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate
gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage. (Italics supplied)
Regarding the registration of the property in petitioners name, it is
enough to stress that a certificate of title under the Torrens system aims to
protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument for the deprivation of
ownership.[37] It has been held that property is conjugal if acquired in a
common-law relationship during the subsistence of a preexisting legal
marriage, even if it is titled in the name of the common-law wife. [38] In this
case, a constructive trust is deemed created under Article 1456 of the Civil
Code, which we quote:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
The registration of the property in petitioners name was clearly
designed to deprive Rodolfos legal spouse and compulsory heirs of
ownership. By operation of law, petitioner is deemed to hold the property
in trust for them. Therefore, she cannot rely on the registration in
repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-known exception to the
principle of conclusiveness of a certificate of title. [39]
Second Issue:
Ruling on Illegitimate Filiation
Not Proper
It is petitioners alternative submission that her children are entitled to
a share in the disputed property, because they were voluntarily
acknowledged by Rodolfo as his children. Claiming that the issue of her
childrens illegitimate filiation was duly established in the trial court, she
faults the CA for ruling that the issue was improper in the instant case.
Her position is untenable.
Indeed, it has been ruled that matters relating to the rights of filiation
and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special
proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
[40]
Sustaining the appellate court in Agapay v. Palang,[41] this Court held
that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a
decedents estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which,
as in this case, was for the recovery of property.
Considerations of due process should have likewise deterred the RTC
from ruling on the status of petitioners children. It is evident from the
pleadings of the parties that this issue was not presented in either the
original[42] or the Supplemental Complaint[43] for reconveyance of property
and damages; that it was not pleaded and specifically prayed for by
petitioner in her Answers[44] thereto; and that it was not traversed by
respondents Reply to the Supplemental Complaint.[45] Neither did
petitioners Memorandum,[46] which was submitted to the trial court, raise
and discuss this issue. In view thereof, the illegitimate filiation of her
children could not have been duly established by the proceedings as
required by Article 887 of the Civil Code.[47]
In view of the foregoing reasons, the CA cannot be faulted for
tackling the propriety of the RTCs ruling on the status of the children of
petitioner, though she did not assign this matter as an error. The general
rule -- that only errors assigned may be passed upon by an appellate court
admits of exceptions. Even unassigned errors may be taken up by such
court if the consideration of those errors would be necessary for arriving at
a just decision or for serving the interest of justice. [48]
The invocation by petitioner of Articles 19[49] and 21[50] of the Civil
Code is also unmeritorious. Clearly, the illegitimate filiation of her
children was not the subject of inquiry and was in fact not duly established
in this case. Thus, she could not have shown that respondents had acted in
bad faith or with intent to prejudice her children. These are conditions
necessary to show that an act constitutes an abuse of rights under Article
19.[51]She also failed to show that respondents -- in violation of the
provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code -- had acted in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

Moreover, we note that the issue concerning the applicability of

Articles 19 and 21 was not raised by petitioner in the trial court or even in
the CA. Hence, she should not be permitted to raise it now. Basic is the
rule that parties may not bring up on appeal issues that have not been
raised on trial.[52]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna,

JJ., concur.
 Promulgated:

FIRST DIVISION

March 13, 2009

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN,namely: G.R. No. 150206 -x
LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN,
PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO
DECISION
GABATAN, NILA GABATAN and JESUS Present:
JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN
TUMALAand FREIRA GABATAN,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioners, PUNO, C.J.,*

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for
-versus- CARPIO,***
review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated April 28, 2000, and
CORONA, Resolution[2] dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
HON. COURT OF APPEALS andLOURDES CA G.R.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the
EVERO PACANA, decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City,
****
BRION, JJ.
Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No. 89-092, an action for
Respondents.
Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced
by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo In their answer, petitioners denied that respondents mother
Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado. Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and
that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan
Gabatan.Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two
land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and
Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in the name of Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from
Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse,
she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners
deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena).Respondent for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements
further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including
Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado
death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo have no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the husband of
Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilos wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It Teofilos daughter while the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that
was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the a similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilos wife,
return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death, respondent also Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No.
did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of
surrender the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no
his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or
possession of the disputed land despite respondents demands for them to has been barred by laches.
vacate the same.

On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs
of Teofilo were individually named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo
Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus
Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52273.

On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer,

additionally alleging that the disputed land was already covered by OCT
On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged
No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan represented by
Decision affirming that of the RTC. Dispositively, the Decision reads:
petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilos daughter).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of questioned decision of the lower court dated October 20,
respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads: 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against
appellants.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring SO ORDERED.
the plaintiff the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at
Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City; and ordering
the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan Tumala
to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 Discounting petitioners argument that respondent is not related to
in favor of plaintiff Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any Juan Gabatan, the CA declared that respondents claim of filiation with
encumbrance; ordering the defendants to pay P10,000.00
Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial. Thus, the CA
by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as Attorneys fees;
and P2,000.00 for litigation expenses. echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court
are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons,
SO ORDERED.[4] such as when the findings of fact are not supported by evidence.

The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute
Sale[5] executed by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and
heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of
Juan Gabatan:
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age,
married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the
deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing
such declaration which was signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest
relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they acknowledged
Hermogenas status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38,
Rule 130[6] of the Rules of Court on the declaration against interest, the CA
ruled that petitioners could not deny that even their very own father,
Teofilo formally recognized Hermogenas right to heirship from Juan
Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent.
As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners
possession of the disputed property could not ripen into acquisitive
prescription because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never held the
property in the concept of an owner.
Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present
recourse principally contending that the CA committed the following
reversible errors:
FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring
that Juan Gabatan died single and without issue;
SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring
the plaintiff-appellee (respondent) as the sole and
surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain
Hermogena Clareto GABATAN;
THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that
a certain Hermogena Clareto GABATAN is the child and
sole heir of Juan Gabatan;
FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to
appreciate by preponderance of evidence in favor of the
defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and the
heirs of Justa and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the
 sole and surviving heirs of Juan Gabatan and, therefore,
entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof;
FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring
that the cause of action of plaintiff-appellee (respondent)
if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription. [7]
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon
certain preliminary matters.
In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact
cannot be the subject of this particular mode of appeal, for this Court is not
a trier of facts.[8] It is not our function to examine and evaluate the
probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned tribunal
upon which its impugned decision or resolution is based.[9]
However, there are established exceptions to the rule on
conclusiveness of the findings of fact by the lower courts, such as (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.[10]
Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an
appellate court to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to
consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court is clothed with ample
authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the
appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of
law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of
which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of
the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised
in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the
issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court
ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to
an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon
which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. [11]
 In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed
to resolve the merits of the case.
The respondents main cause of action in the court a quo is the
recovery of ownership and possession of property. It is undisputed that the
subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan,
during his lifetime.[12] Before us are two contending parties, both insisting
to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal
heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in
court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession
of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a
civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear
that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status
or right.[13]
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,[14] this Court ruled that
the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not
in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated inSolivio v.
Court of Appeals[15] where the Court held:
xxx where despite the pendency of the special
proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a
civil action in which they claimed that they were the
children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a
Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half
share of the conjugal properties acquired during his
marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil
case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not
children of the deceased, that the properties in question
were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera,
and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this
Court, we ruled that such declarations (that Marcosa
Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in
Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive
competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537,
in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be,
ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of
partition.
 In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,
[16]
the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of
filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a
special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such
rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,[17] this Court held that the
status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedents
estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this
case, was for the recovery of property.
However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v.
Portugal-Beltran,[18] where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial
court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the
party therein as heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the
only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the
Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the
circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding
which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs
and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the
civil case subject of the present case, could and had
already in fact presented evidence before the trial
court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon
the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present
case, there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a
determination of petitioners status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners
(Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154
[1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil.
383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties during the trial and
render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during
pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel
of land being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from
Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate
special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the
sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties
to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC
and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in
these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and
consequently rendered judgment thereon.
 We GRANT the petition.
After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find
insufficient and questionable the basis of the RTC in conferring upon
respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and
ownership of the property, pinned her claim entirely on her alleged status
as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to present
preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by
the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an
authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the
preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic
document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, two conflicting birth certificates [19] of respondent were
presented at the RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony, presented
and identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth
certificate which indicated that her mothers maiden name was Hermogena
Clarito Gabatan. Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true
copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate which differed from the
copy presented by respondent. Among the differences was respondents
mothers full maiden name which was indicated as Hermogena Calarito in
the handwritten birth certificate.
In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:
The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each
other by presenting two conflicting Certificate (sic) of
Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana,
which are Exhibit A for the plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for the
defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine, and which is
falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires serious
 scrutiny. The Court is of the observation that Exhibit A for
the plaintiff which is a certified true copy is in due form
and bears the as is and where is rule. It has the impression
of the original certificate. The forms (sic) is an old one
used in the 1950s. Her mothers maiden name appearing
thereof is Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit
1, the entries found thereof (sic) is handwritten which is
very unusual and of dubious source. The form used is of
latest vintage. The entry on the space for mothers maiden
name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an
apparent attempt to thwart plaintiffs mother filiation with
the omission of the surname Gabatan. Considering these
circumstances alone the Court is inclined to believe that
Exhibit A for the plaintiff is far more genuine and
authentic certificate of live birth.[20]
Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we
simply cannot agree with the above-quoted findings of the trial court. To
begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an original typewritten
document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950s
vintage[21] but this Court is unable to concur in the trial courts finding that
Exhibit 1[22] was of a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the
trial courts bases for doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the
contrary, the printed notation on the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1
states Municipal Form No. 102 (Revised, January 1945) which makes it an
older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial courts finding regarding which
form was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the
evidence on record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that
of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly
certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondents
birth certificate. The names of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and
the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with the
notation (Sgd.) also merely typewritten beside their names. The words A
certified true copy: July 6, 1977 above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga
on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the same typewriter as the very
entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the information
stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly,
Maximo P. Noriga was never presented as a witness to identify Exhibit A.
Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were
identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be
deemed sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.
We cannot subscribe to the trial courts view that since the entries
in Exhibit 1 were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious
credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten birth
certificate of respondent (petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly
authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms.
Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil
Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho),
Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both
witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody
of birth records in their respective offices, [23] and (b) the certified true copy
of respondents handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the
original birth certificate registered in their respective offices. [24] Ms. Vidal,
during her testimony, even brought the original of the handwritten birth
certificate before the trial court and respondents counsel confirmed that the
certified true copy (which was eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a
faithful reproduction of the original. [25] Ms. Vidal likewise categorically
testified that no other copy of respondents birth certificate exists in their
records except the handwritten birth certificate. [26] Ms. Cacho, in turn,
testified that the original of respondents handwritten birth certificate found
in the records of the NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied)
was the one officially transmitted to their office by the Local Civil
[27]
Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro. Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho
testified and brought their respective offices copies of respondents birth
certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and there
is no showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their
testimonies. Thus, between respondents Exhibit A and petitioners Exhibits
1 and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth
certificate presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the
same on its face is insufficient to prove respondents filiation to her alleged
grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and
authentic, would have proven was that respondents mother was a certain
Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. It does not prove that same Hermogena
Clarito Gabatan is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the
conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by the parties
only proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena. [28]
It was absolutely crucial to respondents cause of action that she
convincingly proves the filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To
reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan,
our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record
of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final
judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof
that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is
the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules
of Court of her mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate,
which would have been the best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to
Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did
respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically
evidencing Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco
Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified
that they personally knew Hermogena (respondents mother) and/or Juan
Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito
and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none
of these witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan
to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They
were not yet born or were very young when Juan supposedly married
Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of
them were present at Juan and Laureanas wedding or Hermogenas
birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been told
by, or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a
word, hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to
respondents witnesses testimonies. The records would show that they
cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan
testified that he was the son of Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan
and was admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan. [29] His testimony
regarding the relationships within the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As
for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children
of Justa Gabatan Nagac,[30] this Court is wary of according probative
weight to their testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-
examination that her (respondents) husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac
Pacana.[31] In other words, although these witnesses are indeed blood
relatives of petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of
respondents husband. They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in
the outcome of the case.
Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the
RTC and the CA relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute
Sale[32] (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which appeared to be
signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this
document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5,
Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan was indicated as
one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an
affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners predecessor in
interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. [33] The CA
considered the same statement as a declaration against interest on the part
of Teofilo Gabatan.[34]
 However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including
its contents and the signatures therein, as competent evidence was
vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners counsel for being a
mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated. [35] After a close
scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court
cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself.[36] Although the best evidence rule admits of
exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary
evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the
original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of secondary
evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department of Education
Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,[37] we held that a party must first
satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can
resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof
of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original
instrument.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of
Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who identified the photocopy of the Deed of
Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony regarding the
whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded
in any public office.
There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an
admissible public document. For this, respondent relied on the stamped
notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a certified true xerox copy
and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr.,
Assessment Officer, who seems to be an officer in the local assessors
office. Regarding the authentication of public documents, the Rules of
Court[38] provide that the record of public documents, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy.[39] The attestation of the certifying officer must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be.[40]
To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent
that an original of Exhibit H was registered or exists in the records of the
local assessors office. Furthermore, the stamped certification of Honesto P.
Velez is insufficient authentication of Exhibit H since Velezs certification
did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Even worse,
Velez was not presented as a witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true
copy from the original. Indeed, it is highly doubtful that Velez could have
made such an attestation since the assessors office is not the official
repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the
legal custodian contemplated in the rules.
It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original
of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his notarial register and to forward the
same to the proper court. It is the notary public or the proper court that has
custody of his notarial register that could have produced the original or a
certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was
identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite appearing to be a
signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness and as can be gleaned from
her testimony, she had no personal knowledge of the preparation of the
alleged certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even
know who secured a copy of Exhibit H from the assessors office. [41] To be
sure, the roundabout and defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H
renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that
Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of Hermogena
Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.
Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of
Exhibit H and consider the same admissible, it still nonetheless would
have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan was the heir
of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation of respondent to
either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only
document that respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation to
Hermogena Gabatan (respondents Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt
by contrary evidence presented by petitioners.
As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against
respondent. According to respondents own testimony,[42] Juan Gabatan
died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of the heirs of Juan
Gabatan to recover the decedents property from third parties or to quiet
title to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her
mother Hermogena, if they were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did
not assert their rights as such. It is only in 1978 that respondent filed her
first complaint to recover the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No.
5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan. [43] However,
that case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.
[44]
Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause of
action, i.e. the present case.[45] She claimed that she waited until the death
of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita was then
already old.[46]
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 52273, affirming the decision of the
We cannot accept respondents flimsy reason. It is precisely
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is
because Rita Gabatan and her contemporaries (who might have personal
herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint and amended
knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) were advancing in age and
complaint in Civil Case No. 89-092 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
might soon expire that respondent should have exerted every effort to
preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As we held
in Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy: Vigilantibus, sed non
SO ORDERED.
dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those who
sleep on their rights[O]ne may not sleep on a right while expecting to
preserve it in its pristine purity.[47]

All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to

substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof,
her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to
the property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence
were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands
for she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her
certificate of live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of
her own cause of action. If the Court cannot now affirm her claim,
respondent has her own self to blame.
 EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, petitioner,
vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to
the people he leaves behind. For in death, a persons estate remains,
providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds.
Before us is another case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a
mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the
estate of their loved one.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles,

Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent,
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision [1] dated September 25, 1996 and
Resolution[2] dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571. [3] The
Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioners
motion for partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita
Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are undisputed.

On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties

THIRD DIVISION
with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments
worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and
[G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005]
interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner
herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a
verified petition[4] for the settlement of Miguelitas estate. He prayed
that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net
residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed
an opposition, specifically to petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters
of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and
unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of
Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal properties. Respondent
prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her instead.
[5]
Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special
administratrix.[6]
Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that
the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a
compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the
preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law.[7]
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the
estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on
condition that both of them would undertake whatever business
endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.[8]
In her omnibus motion[9] dated April 23, 1993,
respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special
administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing
petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate.
[10]
Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and
posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the
Manila Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims
were filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of
Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of
Miguelitas estate.[11] Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two
minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita. [12]
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus
motion[13] praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing
the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the
estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorneys fees.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the
partition and distribution of the estate is premature and precipitate,
considering that there is yet no determination whether the properties
specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint
venture.[14] Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelitas
estate as an heir and co-owner. Thus, she prayed that a hearing be
scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the
estate taxes and attorneys fees but denied petitioners prayer for partition
and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed premature. The
intestate court ratiocinated as follows:
On the partition and distribution of the deceaseds properties, among the
declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be
premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositors claim as indicated in her
opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine whether the
properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are
entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a
co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their
partnership venture.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the
Resolution dated May 7, 1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate courts Order
dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied
petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being
premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondents
claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that
in issuing the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:
Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondents unsupported claim
of ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the
probate court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is
inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of collation or of
advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed upon
in the course of the proceedings. The probate court in exercising its
prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private
respondents claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the
composition of the estate. This act is not tainted with an iota of grave
abuse of discretion.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following
assignments of error:
I
RESPONDENT COURTS DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE
INTESTATE COURTS ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING
CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF
THE LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED
EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER TO CONDUCT
HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE
ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE
JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
INTESTATE COURTS ORDER AND RESOLUTION
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT CHINGS OWNERSHIP
CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting
as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving
properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an
intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does
not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings.[15] The patent rationale for this rule is that such
court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. [16]
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an
intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership
when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be
included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely
incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,[17] we
held:
x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which
the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in
sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on
respondents claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle,
the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in
hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine
whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The
facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation
and Opposition[18] dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly
adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:
6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his
Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on
November 4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12
of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low
valuation placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right to
submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each.
Respondent could have opposed petitioners inventory and sought the
exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to
be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory,
taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate
properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the
settlement of Miguelitas estate, did not submit his own inventory. His
mandate, as co-administrator, is to submit within three (3) months after his
appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge.
[19]
He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those
properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he
did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with
petitioners inventory.
Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the
intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included
in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the
intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over
properties comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate. The intestate court
went along with respondent on this point as evident in its
Resolution[20]dated May 7, 1996, thus:
On petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late
Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed
a claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the
heirs could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for
appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositors claim. It
must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the
properties, which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the
deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct
interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court.
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the
hearing set by the intestate court was actually to determine the propriety
of oppositors (respondents) claim. According to the intestate court, if it
is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas)
properties, then it means that she has a material and direct interest in
the estate and, hence, she should be given her day in court. The
intended day in court or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety
of respondents contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of
Miguelitas estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondents ingenious attempt to
secure a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against
Miguelitas estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to
determine the accuracy of petitioners inventory, however, a close review of
the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its
jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off
stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and
reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to
ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue
of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the
course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate
court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must
be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a
regional trial court.[21] Jurisprudence teaches us that:
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so.[22]
 Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of
general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the
resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly
belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make
a provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still
respondents claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of
Miguelitas estate, as stated in petitioners inventory, comprises real estates
covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of
Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the
owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action. We find this Courts pronouncement
in Bolisay vs. Alcid[23] relevant, thus:
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting
to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have
a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in
the law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter
as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons. x x x
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a
property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence
of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should
be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his
title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action,
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property
itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, The Property
Registration Decree, proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title,
hence:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot
be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to
present convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We
quote her testimony, thus:
Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on
page 1 of this sworn statement of yours which I quote: In
accordance with the Chinese tradition and culture in the
distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to
give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the
rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that
being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of
the family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you
recall having stated that in your sworn statement?
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a
token, is that right?
A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was
given to Lita and the other half was given to Emmanuel.
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also , is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot
remember any more the amount.
xxxxxx
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot
itemize the one half share of the estate of Miguelita, is
that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the
estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with
respect to the estate of your late husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po.[24]
She further testified as follows:
Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of
land, stocks, investments, bank accounts and deposits
both here and abroad, interests and participation in IFS
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and various
motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how
should these properties be partitioned or what should be
done with these properties? According to you earlier,
you are agreeable for the partition of the said properties
with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin,
sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels
of land located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro,
in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and shares of
stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na
partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?
A: Kung ano ang sa akin
xxxxxx
Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong
iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong
paghahatian or hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir.[25]
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the
properties listed in petitioners inventory belong to her. Neither could she
present any document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently
changing basis of her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially,
she insisted that the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal
properties.[26] Sensing that such assertion could not strengthen her claim of
ownership, she opted to change her submission and declare that she and
Miguelita were business partners and that she gave to the latter most of her
properties to be used in a joint business venture. [27] Respondent must have
realized early on that if the properties listed in petitioners inventory are
paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over them
and upon her death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory
heirs, petitioner herein and their two minor children. [28]
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot
diminish or deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she
believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of
ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted
to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. [29]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
41571 are hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V. MERCADO,
FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND,
RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND
FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of
properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in
the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991,
survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five
children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M.
Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his
two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L.
Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He
owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and
Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and
sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.

On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu
City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of
Emigdios estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094CEB).1 The RTC granted
the petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of
administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of
Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the
RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio
had left no real properties but only personal properties worth
P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and
fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806
shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of
stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.2
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded
from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend
the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelmas
motion through the order of January 8, 1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January
8, 1993,3 supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of
stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock; 4 the deed of
assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real
properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407
Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; 5 and
the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock
of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be
examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed
30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the
inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the
parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the
court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.7cralawred
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and
asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court on the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded
from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that
issue.8cralawlawlibrary
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued
on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory
submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included, and
accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations,
the Court hereby denies the administratrixs motion for approval of
inventory. The Court hereby orders the said administratrix to redo the
inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of
the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the properties mentioned
in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit
the revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had
come to her possession. She must render such accounting within sixty (60)
days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely
sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground
that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian,
Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land
covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession of
and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.10 Thelma opposed the motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, 11 stating
that there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the
movants agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what
properties should be included or excluded from the inventory already
estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to
include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita,
joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse
orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by
petition for certiorari, stating:
I WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL
PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S.
MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION
(MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S.
MERCADO.
II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT REAL PROPERTIES
WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY
REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION
(MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S.
MERCADO.
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE
NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN
PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari,
disposing as follows:13
is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and
May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of
parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an
area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of
the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in
the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned
and affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition
for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of
properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of theCivil
Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold shall be
transferred to the vendee upon its actual and constructive delivery, and of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed
to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made through a
public instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object of the sale,
the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No.
3353 to Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale executed on
November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had thereby ceased to
have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels
of land to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 for the purpose of
saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed of
Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land
were included; that as to the January 10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir
Realty had been even at the losing end considering that such parcels of
land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated February 12,
1989, were again given monetary consideration through shares of stock;
that even if the assignment had been based on the deed of assignment
dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the
inventory considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable about
the estate planning scheme; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had
no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
registered in the name of third persons or corporation; that a property
covered by the Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive
conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had
transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence
on the matter; and that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in
holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its jurisdiction
because of their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which
properties should be included in the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that
petitioners are estopped from questioning its jurisdiction considering that
they have already agreed to submit themselves to its jurisdiction of
determining what properties are to be included in or excluded from the
inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a reading
before public respondent court clearly shows that petitioners are not
questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for
which they are not estopped, since that is their right, considering that there
is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of limited
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001
denying the administratrixs motion for approval of the inventory of
properties which were already titled and in possession of a third person
that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the
law possessed a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders, and
in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the
presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty
Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority
to determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of
corporate fiction and even if public respondent court was not merely acting
in a limited capacity as a probate court, private respondent nonetheless
failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have justified the court to
impale the veil of corporate fiction because to disregard the separate
jurisdictional personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly
and convincingly established since it cannot be presumed. 14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of
Teresita, et al.15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the
inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such
properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate
shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
 Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
I for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort
to the special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC by
Teresita and her corespondents was not proper.
Thelmas contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy
depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or
interlocutory in nature. In PahilaGarrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court
distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well
known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates
a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except
to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does
not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided
upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial
on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to
ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final
is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial
court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or
judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the
writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and
should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an
appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the
merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting
multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case
incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many
appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An
interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a
judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being
included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorariunder Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresitas motion for the
approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her
motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the
inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final
determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory
and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion
or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming
the decision of the CA to the effect that the order of the intestate court
excluding certain real properties from the inventory was interlocutory and
could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a final
but an interlocutory order in the sense that it did not settle once and for all
the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots. The Court observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate
court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3
Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 4489 and
473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262,
266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court
declared that a probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding,
can only pass upon questions of title provisionally, and reminded,
citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that the patent reason is the probate
courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, can only be settled in a separate action. Indeed, in the cited case
of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as
to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do
so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for
Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment
rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of
Court,21 which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that
only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable may be the subject of an appeal
in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution
(interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on
the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made
nonappealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical
recognition of the possibility that material issues may be finally
determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule
109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in which
multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. An
interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or
judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the
distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of
a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset
to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except
that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the
substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or
denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.

Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come
under any of the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion for including properties in the inventory
notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio
during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the properties
in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in
reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully
warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of
administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the
surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person
dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving
spouse, the RTC becomes dutybound to direct the preparation and
submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to
submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of
administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months.
Within three (3) months after his appointment every executor or
administrator shall return to the court atrue inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his
possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court
may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their
assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all
the real and personal properties of the decedent in the
inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has
come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties
must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her
possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the
phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the
decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in
the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and
appraisal of the estate of the decedent is to aid the court in revising the
accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the
administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition)
of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
estate.23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate
is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be
included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot
impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of
which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the
absence of positive abuse of discretion, for in the administration of the
estates of deceased persons, the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers
and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the
action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive
abuse of discretion.25 As long as the RTC commits no patently grave
abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate
court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to
third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court
can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should
be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised.
As the Court said inAgtarap v. Agtarap:26
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate
court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the
probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court
merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases,
a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to
that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort
to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or
a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final
determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its
directive for the inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order
of March 14, 2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio
Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death,
left several properties as listed in the inventory of properties submitted in
Court in Special Proceedings No. 306R which are supposed to be divided
among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being examined in
Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the
inventory submitted by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in
the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting
Emigdio Mercados share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be
included in the inventory of properties required to be submitted to the
Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado
also admitted in Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of
stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were
paid by her from money derived from the taxicab business which she and
her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares of
stock partake of being conjugal in character, onehalf thereof or of the
value thereof should be included in the inventory of the estate of her
husband.

In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado
admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account in her name at Union
Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive. Again, the
money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and
so, onehalf thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties
constituting as estate of her husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case
that Lot No. 3353 of Pls657D located in Badian, Cebu containing an
area of 53,301 square meters as described in and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now.
When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB12690 which was decided
on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which
claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never
intervened in the said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was
admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So
the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the
inventory in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land
by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January
10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said
day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was
a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died
on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one
prompted by the thought that the transferor has not long to live and made
in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909).
Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that
the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value
at the time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest therein
of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of
death. So, the inventory to be approved in this case should still include the
said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in
contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties actually appeared to
be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10)
months after his death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu
City Assessors Office on October 31, 1991 (Exhibit O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and
the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by
the administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive
to include the properties in question in the inventory rested on good and
valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina
Mercado should be included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did
not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime
was the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of
Emigdios estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in
the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property
acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the conjugal
partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party must prove
the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and
convincing evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the presentation of
such proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be
provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected
properties were,31and which of the properties should form part of the estate
of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be
included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the
name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in
dispute. Civil Case No. CEB12692, a dispute that had involved the
ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in
Emigdios name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or
ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the
name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No.
CEB12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB12692 was
susceptible of various interpretations, including one to the effect that the
heirs of Emigdio could have already threshed out their differences with the
assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable considering
that Mervir Realty, whose business was managed by respondent Richard,
was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In other words, Mervir
Realty appeared to be a family corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor
of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the
exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed
of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its
execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of
the transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The
presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of
Appeals:33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its
favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function
of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in
the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties
thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary
consideration in determining the true nature of a contract.(Bold
emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of
Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio would still have
to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two
days prior to his death was a circumstance that should put any interested
party on his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a
finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the
time.34 In this regard, whether the CA correctly characterized the exchange
as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the
facts to be established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the
name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately
excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances
admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This is
because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a
system of registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity
demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable
effect of the mistake or negligence of the States agents, in the absence of
proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a
stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that
were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that may arise
subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall
forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration
officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their
duties.35
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of
assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in the
inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of
the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the validity of the
assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might
have constricted the determination of the rights to the properties arising
from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court from
ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that
deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with
special and limited jurisdiction, was still deemed to have all the necessary
powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective. 37 quasijudicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.39
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and
submitted for the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of In light of the foregoing, the CAs conclusion of grave abuse of discretion
collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of theCivil on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein
Teresita herself, to bring into the mass of the estate any property or right WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDEthe decision promulgated on
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the
heir, and in the account of the partition. Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special
Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime Proceedings No. 3094CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio
of an heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case;
of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. Rule 90 suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of SO ORDERED.
the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated
or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent. 38 Sereno, C.J., LeonardoDe Castro, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes,
JJ. concur.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or
included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority
and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under
the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to
belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in
the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no
patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means
either that the judicial or quasijudicial power was exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL
JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-
BELTRAN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr.,
assail the September 24, 2002[1] Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch
124[2]which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of
title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following
material allegations claims of the parties which they sought to prove
by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz
Lazo.[3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta. [4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom
she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, [6] later baptized as
Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent. [7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights[8] over the estate of their
father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964. [9] In the
deed, Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation
over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.[10]
 On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan
parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person [12] adjudicating to
herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172 [13] in Portugals
name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813 [14] was
issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the
name of respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M.
Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of
the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her
name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a
complaint[15] against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of
Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in
her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related
whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the
Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false
representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of
Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in
respondents name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners)
name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees
and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a
Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.
Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still
be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the
complaint.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, [17] after
giving an account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and
of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during
pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that
petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been established
before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case,
citingHeirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court
held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at
bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate
of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their
right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status
and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein.
However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is
remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of
Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a
wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is to establish, while in
the latter, it is to enforce, a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of
the decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to
state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule
on plaintiffs cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do
not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1
and 2, Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning
the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically
opposed to this Courts following ruling in Cario v. Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226
SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto,
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such
cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001)
subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the
appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this
wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was
the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4
Santiago Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between
the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan
Yee Cario) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that
SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with said two women during his
lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages was
validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario
was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages
was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different
milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property. The
only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during
his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, herein
plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be the
legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties
herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x.
Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be
properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary
civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The
institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is
thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or
forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a
declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in
an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to
impinge upon this axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring
supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002, [22] thus
affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the
appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it
failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel]
Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cario,
and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render
judgment based on the evidence presented relative to
the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .[24] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court
that the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in
accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the
above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that
the pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be entered remanding to the
court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages
is valid, and the determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and
Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in
the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise
prayed for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court
misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged
multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading
of Cario shows; thatCario allows courts to pass on the determination of
heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is
necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the
appellate courts ruling, they had established their status as compulsory
heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners
have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs
before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of
Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
[26]
the therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered
on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled
in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and
Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the
therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a
complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved to
dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a
cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of
itexcept the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned
Yaptinchaysthat they have been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court,
and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance . . . [27] (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the
petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et
al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29] this Court held that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch
as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a
special proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the
son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is
survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children
of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911;
that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage
with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy
Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa
Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. The CFI granted the petition
and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas request, her nephew
Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported
siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael
Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly
appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his
purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his
petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties
allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
 Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some
unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by
the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil
case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are
not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised
for determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael
Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam
and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father
of appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct the trial courts
findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth
certificates of Dy Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the deceased
Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not
appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner
intervened in the preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other
documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and
highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased
Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said
decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court
should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is
the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil
case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the]
[s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special
proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia
Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister of his father,
moved to reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole
heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court
denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the
denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before
the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which
rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the
appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who
posed, among other issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had
jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the deceased] while the
[estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same
court, this Court held that [i]n the interest of orderly procedure and
to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a
court should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-
equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate
proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-
Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-
heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her
claim in the interest of justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted
daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her
adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the
testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate
court directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to
annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud,
and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots
allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion
in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her,
among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the
parties agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanitas motion in the
testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to
her until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said
case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order
setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the
meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the
project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of
which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the
April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no
longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings
for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial
court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive
that the records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this
Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been legally
terminated as Juanitas share under the project of partition had not been
delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated
(Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and
conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain
his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs.
Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has
not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion
in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-
opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been
closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried
by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order
of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and executed and re-
shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar,
89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107,
April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710,
March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).[34] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court
setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to
continue because it involves no longer the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which
the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties
to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but
there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled
in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted
but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir
has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-
heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil
action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the
annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or
properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she
was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988 [35] the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule
74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. [36] Said rule is an exception to
the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.[37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A
probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the
heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, [38] to still subject
it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which
could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of
the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before
the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, [39] the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial
and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial,
which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose
Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.
Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can
still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the
complaint.[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET
ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch
124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-
enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
 No costs. DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA

SO ORDERED. CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE

DE LA
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS
JJ., concur. DELGADO, namely,
HEIRS OFCONCHA
VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF L
UISA
DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, AN
GELA
DELGADOARESPACOCHAGA,
TERESA DELGADO PERLAS,
CAROLINA DELGADO-
ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO
DELGADO, BENJAMIN
DELGADO, GLICERIA
DELGADO and CLEOFAS
DELGADO; and HEIRS OF
GORGONIO DELGADO, namely,
RAMON DELGADO CAMPO,
CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO,
CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-
REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO
ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO
SECOND DIVISION CAMPO-ENCINAS and
MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-
MADARANG,
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE G.R. No. 155733 Petitioners, Present :
ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA
 PUNO, January 27, 2006
irman,
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SANDOVAL
-GUTIERREZ,

- v e r s u s - CORONA,

AZCUNA DECISION
and

G CORONA, J.:
ARCIA,
JJ.

HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, NAMELY,

GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN AND JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF
HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, NAMELY, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON,
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate
HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-
ENRIQUEZ AND FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
RUSTIA, SR., NAMELY, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA
RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, Branch 55,[4] in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by
FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; AND
the Court of Appeals in its decision[5] dated October 24, 2002.
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, AS OPPOSITORS;[1] AND GUILLERMA
RUSTIA, AS INTERVENOR,[2]

Respo
ndents.
[3]
Prom
FACTS OF THE CASE
ulgated
:
 This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.[6] The main issue in this case is of Felisa[11] Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other

relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful children were born to the couple, namely,Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,

heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married

that complicate its resolution. to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural

children of Felisa Delgado.

The claimants to the estates of However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio[12] with

the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship

siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of

the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,[7] his marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is

nephews and nieces,[8] his illegitimate child,[9] and the de facto adopted in dispute.

child[10] (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever

THE ALLEGED HEIRS got married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine
OF JOSEFA DELGADO
whether their successionalrights fall within the ambit of the rule against

reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate

relatives.[13] If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage

then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother ever took place.

of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latters intestate

estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if
survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners
the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be
herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973,
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all
Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
be within the illegitimate line.

Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were

never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or THE MARRIAGE OF
GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADO
place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is

that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon

Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married,

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage
his Partida de Casamiento[14] stated that he was hijo natural
to Josefa Delgado[17] but whether a marriage in fact took place is
de Felisa Delgado (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),[15]significantly
disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as
omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his father.
husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion,
[16]
Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a
petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the
 2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued
civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
one of the sponsors referred to her as Seorita or unmarried woman.

3. Veterans Application for Pension or

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that
the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no
marriage transpired. They maintain
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and
from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death
Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of
the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA
Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration
of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo
that
J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself
[swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in
Manila on 3 June 1919;[18]

of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than

4. Titles to real properties in the name of
half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married
in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the to Josefa Delgado.

following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated

[December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA
J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident
Commissioner to the United States of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines;
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any

children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the
youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia andNanie Rustia. These children, Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate

never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement

dialect as ampun-ampunan. prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim

voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not

the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code. [21]

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did

manage to father an illegitimate child, [19] the intervenor-

respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one AmparoSagarbarria. According On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death

to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption [22] of

and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status their ampun-ampunan GuillerminaRustia. He stated under oath [t]hat he

from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural

obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor- children by legal fiction.[23] The petition was overtaken by his death on

respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the February 28, 1974.

University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her

parent/guardian.[20]
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He

was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother

that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano,
Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia,

Francisco Rustia andLeticia Rustia Miranda.[24] In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to

intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving

descendant in the direct line of GuillermoRustia. Despite the objections of

the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration

was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of
Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as
Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the
husband and wife.
intestate estates of the spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia with

the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.[25] This petition was opposed by the On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a

following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of

namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz; Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground
[26]
(2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in

(3) the ampun-ampunanGuillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.

grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa
claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate
substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on
half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
May 18, 1987.

On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda.
de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.[27] The dispositive portion
of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the
late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated
elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only
legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in
the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to
partition the same among themselves in accordance with
the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is
hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the
late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire
estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of
the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate
of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo
J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet
been settled, and their settlement [is] considered
consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a
single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary,
and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa
has established her right to the appointment
as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby
APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the
intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in
relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of
the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA
RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist
from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and
is likewise ordered to turn over to the
appointedadministratix all her collections of the rentals
and income due on the assets of the estates in question,
including all documents, papers, records and titles
pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and
appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA.
DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this
Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render
 an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.[28]
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on
the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time. [29] They then
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus [30] which was dismissed by the
Court of Appeals.[31] However, on motion for reconsideration and after
hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and
gave due course to oppositors appeal in the interest of substantial justice.
[32]
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the
resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors failure to
file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a
jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this
Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our
decision[33] read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts
must be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be
excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial
courts pronouncements as to certain matters of substance,
relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents
and the party entitled to the administration of their estate,
which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred
absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too
technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to
raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not
have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the
administration proceedings.
 xxx xxx xxx
Appeals amended its earlier decision.[36] The dispositive portion of the

amended decision read:

A review of the trial courts decision is needed.

With the further modification, our assailed

xxx xxx xxx decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the
decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDEREDdeclaring:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to
considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr.
Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of
Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for
children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to
the APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on
partition among themselves the intestate estate
Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the
of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion
Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990
referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as
decision.
the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby
entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the
proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-
appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from
SO ORDERED.
the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her
appointment as administratrix of his estate.

The letters of administration of the intestate estate

of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate
of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals [34] partially set aside the
the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and
trial courts decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, [35] the Court of
 filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00). The issues for our resolution are:

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is 1. whether there was a valid marriage between
hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the
appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals
and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question,
including all documents, papers, records and titles 2. who the legal heirs of the decedents
pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting
of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her
(Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the
estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days
from notice of the administrators qualification and posting 3. who should be issued letters of administration.
of the bond.

The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-

adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA
1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further AND JOSEFA DELGADO
proceedings to determine the extent of the shares
of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children
of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said
adjudication.
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of

a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts.

Hence, this recourse. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of

fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable. [37]

 Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and

friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following
husband and wife was such that even the original petition
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda.

de Danao in 1975 referred to them as spouses.

xxx xxx xxx

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as
Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife without
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage; the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the

contested marriage, the testimony of a witness [38] attesting that they were

xxx xxx xxx not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred toJosefa Delgado

as Seorita or unmarried woman.[39]

We are not persuaded.

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the

presumption that a valid marriage existed between

 First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that

evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in eventually, the two had lived together as husband and wife. This again

fact took place.[40] Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or

directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen

Third, the baptismal certificate[45] was conclusive proof only of the
the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued
baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof
to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,[41] the passport issued to her
of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, [46] such
asJosefa D. Rustia,[42] the declaration under oath of no less than
as the alleged single or unmarried (Seorita) civil status of Josefa Delgado
Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado[43] and the titles to
who had no hand in its preparation.
the properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado,

more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are

public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of

therein.[44] No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every

presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons

petitioners. dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact

married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are

not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose
violation of the common rules of law and
testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed
propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage. Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage
[47]
of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents)

chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the

THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and
JOSEFA DELGADO
Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis

Delgados

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the and Caridad Concepcions Partida de Casamiento[49] identifying Luis

questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with as hijo natural de Felisa Delgado (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).[50]

Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.

All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and

disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born

so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio

them.[48] On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood

presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,Jacoba, Gorgonio and the

evidence to the contrary. decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,[51] were her natural children.[52]

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y
with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural
brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can
they succeed each other reciprocally?
stand on the same footing before the law, just like
legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit,
therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate
brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full
blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive
double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and
if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they
shall share equally.[53]

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between

illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same
parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to
between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child
her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless,
to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child
begotten with a parent different from that of the former, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other.
would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than
a Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
legitimate child.Notwithstanding this, however, we submit
that

succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the
brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason
impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under
between legitimate and illegitimate families does not
Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the
apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has
for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and
and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when
all the children are illegitimate children of the same sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by
parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all
grandnephews and grandnieces.[54] Therefore, the only collateral relatives
of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are
herbrothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of
her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in
the inheritance.[55] The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for
the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or
their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with
Guillermo Rustia,[56] they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code: [57]
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia,
Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to
himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by
an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is
allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement
between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts
and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented
by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized
for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among themselves as
they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there
is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate
by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF
GUILLERMO RUSTIA
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate
child[58] of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled
to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of
 (2) when the child is in continuous possession of
paternity.[59] She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged status of a child of the alleged father (or mother)
[61]
by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on
(3) when the child was conceived during the time
February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that
when the mother cohabited with the supposed
was in effect. father;

(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence

or proof that the defendant is his father. [62]
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29,

1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This

draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of

granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic

condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent. writing.[63]

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first,
[60]
Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases: compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of the

status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when authentic writing.
the period of the offense coincides more or less
with that of the conception;
 There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia.

illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father The fact that his name appears there as intervenorsparent/guardian holds

Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while

a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the

through the courts.[64] Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the SUNDAY

acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the TIMES on September 10, 1972, that published obituary

lifetime of the putative parent.[65] On the death of either, the action for was not the authentic writing contemplatedby the law.

compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. [66] In this What could have been admitted as an authentic writing

case, intervenor Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of

prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974. Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping

of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground)
fatal to intervenors claim.
must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary

recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent

(in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a The same misfortune befalls the ampun-

private writing admitted by the father to be his. [67] Didintervenors report ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in

card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by

prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the

Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card latters death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the

not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote: deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the

remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,[69] nieces and nephews.[70]

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem,

which [created] between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or
in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 ENTITLEMENT TO LETTERS OF
of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not ADMINISTRATION
of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely
artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer
adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is
never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of
person claiming its existence.[68]
Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an

administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the
estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and
the ampun-ampunan GuillerminaRustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the
decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no
granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the

 (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
court, or to such person as such surviving husband
administrators, specially in cases where
or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed,
if competent and willing to serve;
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented

in the management of the estates,[72] a situation which obtains here.

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in
husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the
apply for administration or to request that the
administration be granted to some other person, it nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the
may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve; deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing

to serve, it may be granted to such other person as WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990
the court may select. decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed

October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with

the following modifications:

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration

is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. [71] The order of 1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-

adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian

half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their

remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled
of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may
intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her
shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a
death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are
nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as
excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court
joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of
is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the
the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her
by the trial court.
estate.

3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share

No pronouncement as to costs.
of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited

by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian

and Hortencia RustiaCruz (whose respective shares shall

SO ORDERED.
be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia,

Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective

shares shall be per stirpes). Considering

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991

MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-

TIMBOL, ERLINDA REYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES,
ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II, EMELINA and EVELYN,
all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother, MARIA VDA. DE
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO
GARDIOLA and ROSARIO MARTILLANOrespondents.

De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.

Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Assailed before Us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 11934, promulgated on 20 October 1989, 1 reversing the decision
of 1 October 1986 of Branch 21 (Imus, Cavite) of the Regional Trial Court
of the Fourth Judicial Region in Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17
entitled Maria vda. de Reyes, et al. vs. Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and
Rosario Martillano, and Spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emelita
Gardiola, 2 and the resolution of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the
following facts have been preponderantly established:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of
approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-
Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation
of the Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in
1921 without the title having been issued to him. The application was
prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his
property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs
(Exh. "6"). In the subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked,
indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two
lots, one of which is Lot No. I A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael
Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the
children thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original
certificate of title for the whole property OCT No. 255 was issued. It
was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who
was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this
fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area
of 23,431 square meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio
Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to
Lot No. 1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of sale,
however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee
immediately took possession of the property and started paying the land
taxes therein.
In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate
of Title. As reconstituted, the new title isOCT (0-4358) RO-255 (Exhs. "4"
to "4-A").
On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. "D") based on the aforestated
subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr.,
who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only son and
heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners
herein). Private respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in
representation of her mother, Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino
Reyes.
As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled
and in lieu thereof, several transfer certificates of title covering the
subdivided lots were issued in the names of the respective adjudicatees.
One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr. covering
Lot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title were, however, kept by
one Candido Hebron. On 10 January 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino
Reyes filed a case of Annulment of Partition and Recovery of Possession
before the Court of First Instance of Cavite City, which was docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 1267. One of the defendants in said case is
herein private respondent Rosario Martillano. The case was dismissed on
18 September 1969, but Candido Hebron was ordered by the trial court to
deliver to the heirs concerned all the transfer certificates of title in his
possession. 3
After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from
Hebron, pursuant to the aforesaid order in Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners
herein, as successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March
1983 with the Regional Trial Court the above-mentioned Civil Case No.
RTC-BCV-83-17 against private respondents (defendants therein) for
recovery of possession or, in the alternative, for indemnification,
accounting and damages. They allege therein that after "having definitely
discovered that they are the lawful owners of the property," (Lot No. 1-A-
14), they, "including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated
demands to (sic) defendants to surrender the possession of and vacate the
parcel of land belonging to the former, but defendants refused to vacate
and surrender the possession of the said land to herein plaintiffs;" the last
of the demands was allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They further
allege that they have been deprived by said defendants of the rightful
possession and enjoyment of the property since September 1969 which
coincides with the date of the order in Civil Case No. 1267. 4
In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the
complaint and assert that they are the owners of the lot in question, having
bought the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the issuance of TCT No.
27257 is null and void, for such sale was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that
they have been in possession of the property and have been paying the
land taxes thereon; and that petitioners are barred by prescription and/or
laches. 5
Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as
additional defendants the spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emerita
Gardiola, on the basis of the following claims:
xxx xxx xxx
9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants
spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano's
evidence the former testified that they mortgaged the
subject land to the Rural Bank of Carmona Inc. For their
failure to redeem the mortgage the same was foreclosed
by the bank.
10. However, within the period of one(1) year from such
foreclosure the questioned land was redeemed by the
original defendants' son in the person of Ricardo M.
Gardiola, who was knowledgeable/aware of the pendency
of the above captioned case. The corresponding
redemption was effected through a deed of conveyance, . .
..6
The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief
for indemnification for the reasonable value of the property "in the event
restitution of the property is no longer possible." 7
In its decision of 1 October 1986, 8 the trial court concluded that
petitioners' "title over the subject property is valid and regular and thus
they are entitled to its possession and enjoyment," and accordingly decided
thus:
 WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in
their behalf are hereby ordered to relinguish possession or
vacate the property in question which is covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 in favor of the
plaintiffs.
All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties
relative to this case are dismissed for lack of proper
substantiation.
The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no
evidence that the heirs of Gavino Reyes entered into any written
agreement of partition in 1936 based on the subdivision plan; (b) there is
no identity between Lot No. 1-14-A and the land sold to private
respondents by Rafael Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, the description of
the latter as indicated in the deed of sale (Exh. "5") does not tally with the
description of the former; and (c) moreover:
Granting, arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Reyes,
Sr. to the defendants covered the land in question Lot
No. 1-A-14 and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
27257 was obtained by means of fraud, the claim of the
defendants over the said property is already barred. Action
for reconveyance prescribes in four (4) years from the
discovery thereof. If there was fraud, the defendant could
have discovered the same in 1967 when the partition was
made in as much as defendant Rosario Martillano was a
party to that partition. Let us grant further that the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 to
Rafael Reyes, Jr. created a constructive or implied trust in
favor of the defendants, again, the claim of the defendants
is also barred. From 1967 to the filing of their answer (let
us consider this as an action for reconveyance) to this case
sometime in July, 1983, a period of about sixteen (16)
years had already elapsed. Prescriptibility of an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is ten
(10) years.
The trial court further held that the continued possession by private
respondents, which it found to have started in 1943, did not ripen into
ownership because at that time, the property was already registered, hence
it cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 9
Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals
which docketed the appeal as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934. In its decision of
20 October 1989, the respondent Court of Appeals formulated the issues
before it as follows:
I
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the
property of the late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70
hectares was partitioned only in 1967 by his grandchildren
after discovery of the existence of OCT No. 255 and that
no actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedent's
children.
II
Whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that
the parcel of land sold by the appellees' predecessor-in-
interest, the late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio
 Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under
litigation. 10
and resolved such issues, thus:
On the first issue, We believe that the lower court
committed a reversible error when it declared that the
landed estate of the late Gavino Reyes was partitioned
only in 1967 by the latter's grandchildren; and that no
actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedents' (sic)
children. The evidence on record bears out the existence
of a subdivision plan (Exh. 6) which was not controverted
nor denied by the appellees. In like manner, the lower
court itself recognized the fact that the property of the late
Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed and
subdivided in 1936 as evidenced by the said subdivision
plan (Exh. 6). With the existence of a subdivision plan,
and from the uncontroverted testimony of appellants'
witness, We can only infer that at least an oral partition,
which under the law is valid and binding, was entered into
by the heirs of Gavino Reyes regarding his properties in
1936. As held in a long line of decisions, extrajudicial
partition can be done orally, and the same would be valid
if freely entered into (Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997, March
1953). The reason for this is because a partition is not
exactly a conveyance for the reason that it does not
involve transfer of property from one to the other but
rather a confirmation by them of their ownership of the
property. It must also be remembered that when Gavino
Reyes died on March 7, 1921, his property was admittedly
not yet covered by a torrens title, as it was only in 1941
when said properties were brought into the application of
the torrens system. With this factual milieu, it can also be
concluded that his heirs have indeed settled, subdivided
and partitioned Gavino Reyes' landed estate without
formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
when a parcel of land is covered by a torrens title. As told
earlier, the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) undisputedly
showed on its face that the 70 hectares of land belonging
to the late Gavino Reyes was subdivided and partitioned
by his children in 1936. On this score, the partition of the
said property even without the formal requirements under
the rule is valid as held in the case of Hernandez
vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 176, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943
(Exh. 5) executed by Rafael Reyes, Sr. in favor of
appellant Dalmacio Gardiola, the land sold therein was
described as "na aking minana sa aking ama." This alone
would confirm the contention of the appellants that there
was already an actual partition (at least an oral partition)
of the property of Gavino Reyes in 1936. As aforestated,
the presence of the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) is an (sic)
evidence of such partition which appellees failed to
controvert not to mention the fact that the lower court
itself recognized the existence of said plan, in the same
manner that it concluded that the property was already
surveyed and actually subdivided in 1936 (page 3, pars. 3
and 4, Decision).
From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. D)
executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in
1967 is of no moment considering that the property
subject of the partition in the deed was already partitioned
in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes. It is for this
reason that the lots supposedly inherited by the
grandchildren named in the deed of 1967 were the same
lots inherited and given to their respective fathers or
mothers in 1936 while the land was not yet covered by the
torrens system. Hence, in the case of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the
land inherited by him was two (2) parcels of land known
as Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14 described in the
Subdivision plan of 1936 (Exh. 6), which were the same
parcels of land allegedly inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr.
from Gavino Reyes in representation of his father,
pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
for which TCT No. 27257 was issued.
Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred
when it concluded that the parcel of land sold by
appellee's predecessor-in-interest to appellant Dalmacio
Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation.
It must be pointed out that the identity of the parcel of
land which the appellees sought to recover from the
appellants was never an issue in the lower court, because
the litigants had already conceded that the parcel
identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was the
same parcel of land identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228
and 1235 described in Tax Declaration No. 4766. Despite
this admission, however, the lower court declared that "as
described in the deed of sale (Exh. 5), the land's
description does not tally with the description of Lot No.
1-A-14, the land in litigation." As correctly pointed out by
the appellants however, the discrepancy in the description
was due to the fact that the description of the land sold in
the Deed of Sale was expressed in layman's language
whereas the description of Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No.
27257 was done in technical terms. This was so because,
when Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold the property in dispute to
appellant Dalmacio Gardiola on December 3, 1943, the
only evidence of title to the land then available in so far as
Rafael Reyes, Sr. was concerned was Tax Declaration No.
4766, because at that time, neither he nor appellant
Dalmacio Gardiola was aware of the existence of OCT
No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257 was issued only in
1967. Consequently, the land subject of the Deed of Sale
was described by the vendor in the manner as described in
Tax Declaration No. 4766. However, the description of the
land appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was exactly
the same land identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the
Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) of 1936. Accordingly, the
assumption of the lower court that "if the land sold by
Rafael Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation, he could
have easily indicated Lot No. 1-A-14" is bereft of merit
under the foregoing circumstances. Interestingly enough,
the appellees never denied the identity of the subject lot
during the hearing at the lower court. What they were
denying only was the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to
appellant Dalmacio Gardiola which does not hold true
because of the document denominated as Deed of Sale
(Exh. 5). 11
It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private
respondents or anyone acting in their behalf to relinquish the possession or
vacate the property in question. It thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered
declaring appellants to be the lawful owners of the lot
identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. No
costs. 12
Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1 March 1990, 13 petitioners filed the
instant petition on 6 April 1990 after having obtained an extension of time
within which to file it.
The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola
and Emelita Gardiola.
As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, petitioners allege that said court has decided questions of
substance in a way not in accord with law or applicable jurisprudence
when it held that "the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate (Exh. "D")
executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no
moment considering that the property subject of the partition was already
partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes." In support thereof,
they claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of land; the lot
described in paragraph 1 thereof is owned by petitioners and that
ownership was confirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 79882, hence, the
Court of Appeals should have affirmed the decision of the trial court; (b)
private respondent Rosario Martillano was a party to the extrajudicial
settlement of estate which was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds in
1967; said registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer
or creates a lien upon the land and also constituted constructive notice to
the whole world. The court cannot disregard the binding effect thereof
Finally, the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that private
respondents are the lawful owners of the lot in question "militates against
the indefeasible and incontrovertible character of the torrens title," 14 and
allows reconveyance which is not tenable since the action therefor had
already prescribed, as stated in the decision of the trial court.
In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on
the petition. But even before it could do so, petitioner, without obtaining
prior leave of the Court, filed on 29 May 1990 a so-called Supplemental
Arguments in Support of The Petition For Review On certiorari 15 wherein
they assert, among others, that: (a) the findings of facts of respondent
Court are contrary to those of the trial court and appear to be contradicted
by the evidence on record thus calling for the review by this Court; 16 (b) it
also committed misapprehension of the facts in this case and its findings
are based on speculation, conjecture and surmises; (c) private respondents'
attack on petitioners' title is a collateral attack which is not allowed; even
if it is allowed, the same had already prescribed and is now barred.
It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their
Comment. 17 We required petitioners to reply thereto, which they complied
with on 8 August 1990. 18 A rejoinder was filed by private respondents on
29 August 1990.
We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the
parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda which they
complied with.
Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was
filed on 10 December 1990, is the Resolution of this Court (Third
Division) of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811 entitled Spouses Artemio
Durumpili and Angustia Reyes vs. The Court of Appeals and Spouses
Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, which also involves the
property of Gavino Reyes, the partition thereof among his children in
1936, and the extrajudicial settlement in 1967.
In said resolution, this Court held:
. . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid.
The requirement in Article 1358 of the Civil Code that
acts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property must appear in a public instrument is
only for convenience and not for validity or enforceability
as between the parties themselves. [Thunga Hui vs. Que
Bentec, 2 Phil. 561 (1903)] The subsequent execution by
the heirs of the Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did not alter
the oral partition as in fact the share pertaining to Angustia
Reyes corresponded to that previously assigned to her
father. Considering that Angel Reyes sold this property to
Basilio de Ocampo who, in turn, sold the same to
respondents, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
latter lawfully acquired the property and are entitled to
ownership and possession thereof.
In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately
failed to cite this resolution, the latter, in their reply-memorandum dated
15 March 1991 and filed three days thereafter, allege:
Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution
before this Honorable Court is not deliberate nor with
malice aforethought. The reason is that to date, we have
not yet received any resolution to our Motion For Leave
of Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme
Court En Banc. Moreover, we honestly feel that the
resolution that will be issued therein will not be applicable
to the case before this Honorable Court's Second Division.
It should be mentioned that in the Durumpili case before
the Third Division, the Court of Appeals relied on the
alleged confirmation of the sale executed by Angustia
Reyes, while in the Reyes case before this Second
Division, there was no sale that was executed by the
petitioners Reyes' predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes,
Jr.
The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R. No. 92811,
which reveals the following: (a) On 18 September 1990, petitioners
therein, represented by De Lara, De Lunas and Rosales, who are the
lawyers of petitioners in the instant case, filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the resolution of 20 August 1990. 19 b) This motion was
denied in the resolution of 1 October 1990. 20 c) On 17 November 1990,
petitioners therein, through the same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave Of
Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc And/Or
Motion For Reconsideration 21 wherein they specifically admit that said
case and the instant petition have "identity and/or similarity of the parties,
the facts, the issues raised," even going to the extent of "graphically"
illustrating where such similarities lie. 22d) This motion was denied in the
resolution of 28 November 1990. Copy thereof was furnished the attorneys
for petitioners.23 e) Entry of judgment had already been made therein and a
copy thereof was sent to petitioner's counsel per Letter of Transmittal of
the Deputy Court and Chief of the Judicial Records Office dated 20
December 1990.
What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this
simple issue: whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court.
We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and
unavoidable because the legal and factual conclusions made by the trial
court are unfounded and clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals was not
bound to agree to such conclusions. The trial court erred in holding that:
(a) there was no partition among the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936
since there is no written evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that
there was a survey and subdivision of the property and the adjudication of
specific subdivision lots to each of the children of Gavino; (b) the land
sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondents is not identical to Lot No.
1-A-14, the lot specified for and adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the
partition agreement; and (c) if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private
respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot No. 1-A-14 and that TCT No.
T-27257 was obtained through fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was
an action for reconveyance, which should have been brought within four
(4) years from the discovery thereof in 1967 when the Extrajudicial
Settlement was executed since private respondent Rosario Martillano, wife
of Dalmacio, was a party thereto.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children
of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is
no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be
valid. 24 InHernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be
put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection
of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when
there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no
such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different
from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it
can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to
the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral
partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds:
partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is
not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not
involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a
confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir
renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the
inheritance.
Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly
sustained by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No.
92811. 25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in
1936 was not valid for some reason or another, We would still arrive at the
same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs
automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent. 26 The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership
by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or
interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of
is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-
ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
In Ramirez vs. Bautista, 27 this Court held that every co-heir has the
absolute ownership of his share in the community property and may
alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights,
but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be
awarded to him upon the partition of the property.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent
Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino
Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son
and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners
herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr.
is identical to Lot No. 1-14-A, the trial court based its conclusion that it is
not, on his observation that the description of the former does not tally
with that of the latter, moreover, if Rafael did intend to sell Lot No. 1-14-
A, he should have specifically stated it in the deed since at that time, the
property had already been partitioned and said lot was adjudicated to him.
In addition to the contrary findings and conclusion of the respondent Court
on this issue to which We fully agree, it is to be stressed that Rafael had
this property declared for taxation purposes and the tax declaration issued
was made the basis for the description of the property in the deed of sale.
Upon the execution of the deed of sale, vendee herein private
respondent Dalmacio Gardiola immediately took possession of the
property. This is the very same property which is the subject matter of this
case and which petitioners seek to recover from the private respondents.
The main evidence adduced for their claim of ownership and possession
over it is TCT No. T-27257, the certificate of title covering Lot No. 1-14-
A. They therefore admit and concede that the property claimed by private
respondent, which was acquired by sale from Rafael Reyes, Sr., is none
other than Lot No. 1-14-A.
The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the
Extrajudicial Settlement did not place private respondents in estoppel to
question the issuance of TCT No. T-27257. As correctly maintained by
private respondents, she signed it in representation of her deceased mother,
Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for
and in behalf of her husband, Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee of the share of
Rafael Reyes, Sr.
The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael
Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino. Petitioners, as mere successors-in-
interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that
which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never
became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in
1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.,
in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he
never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a light
in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case, 28 it is but a
confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the
settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration
of the deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in
favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot give
them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.

There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners'

immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action
against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the
latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private
respondents the ownership and possession of the lot from the time Rafael
Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint
Republic of the Philippines
and amended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when, SUPREME COURT
after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they Manila
definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question.
And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual EN BANC
physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and one-half
(13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of G.R. No. L-273 March 29, 1947
possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial
court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
court to place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for
ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant-appellant.
reconveyance within four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance of QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA
the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr. HERNANDEZ, intervenors-appellants.

The instant petition then is without merit. Pedro Paganiban y Tolentino for appellants.
Vicente Reyes Villavicencio for appellee.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with
costs against petitioners. TUASON, J.:

SO ORDERED.
The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina
Hernandez, and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are
brother and sisters. They acquired in common by descent from their father
a parcel of land of which he died seized and known as lot No. 120073 of
the Batangas cadastral survey.
On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this
parcel, a portion which is particularly described in the deed of conveyance
Exhibit A, to Zacarias Andal, the defendant, and Andal's wife in
consideration of P860. This portion purports to be the combined shares of
the intervenors in the larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal partition
alleged to have been made (time not stated) among the five brother and
sisters.
After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but
which is not now important, the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land
sold to Andal. According to her original complaint, dated February 3,
1944, she offered the purchasers P150 as price of repurchase, this being,
according to that complaint, the amount Andal had paid for Maria
Hernandez's and Aquilina Hernandez's shares, but Andal, it is alleged,
refused to part with the property.
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. She alleged that
when the cause was called for trial on March 8, she announced in open
court that she was willing to repurchase her sister's share from Andal for
P860 and reimburse Andal for his expense; that Andal asked for
continuance until the 29th stating that he had made other expenses; that on
29th she brought P860 to repurchase the land in question but the case was
again postponed because the plaintiff's sisters had intervened; and that
meanwhile, on the 26th, Andal resold the land fictitiously to the vendors
for P970.
It results that on the date last mentioned Andal executed a deed of sale for
P970 in favor of the intervenors, an amount which included Andal's
expenses as well as the normal sale price. The document of repurchase
gave as reason for the transaction the fact that it had been agreed that in
the event trouble should arise the sellers should return to the buyer what
they had received and pay the latter his expenses.
On February 14, 1944, the defendant filed his answer alleging that Maria
and Aquilina Hernandez had sold him their respective portions of the
inherited land for P860 and that he had no objection to disposing of those
portions in favor of the plaintiff for P860 plus the expenses he had
incurred in the execution of the deed of sale amounting to P50, but that he
was unwilling to accept P150, which was all the plaintiff offered him
besides his expenses.
On April 4, 1944, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez's answer in intervention
was filed. The intervenors alleged that there had been a partition among
them and their brother and sisters "with the share of each delineated and
marked, and after partition and delineation everyone took exclusive,
separate and independent possession of his portion in the partition." They
charged the plaintiff with bad faith in that "it was upon her request for
chance that the sale to the defendant, about to take place last November,
was delayed till January of this year when she finally informed the
intervenors that they could sell to the defendant, or she could pay only
P150 and could not raise the amount of P860 offered by the defendant."
Cresencia Hernandez, the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her
own behalf. Substantially she reiterated the allegations in her two
complaints. Zacarias Andal, the defendant, also testified. He said that he
was in possession of the land in question until he returned it to the
intervenors. He declared that the plaintiff offered to repurchase the land
from him long after he had bought it, that is, when she was about to file
her action. He stated that after he came from Candelaria, Tayabas, with the
document of sale he showed it to the plaintiff: that was on the 23rd of
January. He was able to do this because he lived near Cresencia and passed
by her house on his way home from Candelaria. He said that Cresencia
Hernandez upon being shown the document merely exclaimed, "Oh, so
you already have a document." When asked whether the land "described in
the complaint of the herein plaintiff has been the object of partition among
the co-owners Pedro, Basilia, Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina surnamed
Hernandez," counsel for the plaintiff objected on the ground that the best
evidence was the document of partition, and the objection was sustained.
The same objection and the same ruling were made on the same ground
when the witness was queried how it was that the land he had bought from
Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had been specified in the deed of sale,
Exhibit A.
In consequence of this ruling, counsel for the defendant and intervenors
did not call any more witnesses but only announced that he had witnesses
ready to prove that a parol partition among the five brother and sisters had
been made, mentioning the names of six such witnesses. Counsel for the
plaintiff again objected asserting that "under the Rules of Court agreement
affecting real estate may not be proved except by means of writing
subscribed by the person against whom the proof is offered. "Upon this
objection, the court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of
Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil Code,
parol evidence of partition was inadmissible, adding that to decide the case
it had enough with the testimony and evidence offered by the parties.
Thereafter the court handed down its decision declaring that the resale of
the land by Zacarias Andal in favor of Maria and Aquilina Hernandez was
illegal and in bad faith. It, however, did not seem to have found as a fact
the allegation that the resale was simulated. The court then made this
judgment:
Registrador de Titulos de Batangas que hayaanotado dicha reventa
por el demandado Zacarias Andal a favorde las terceristas Maria y
Aquilina Hernandez en el citado dia 26 de marzo de 1944; y
(b) se ordena al aqui demandado Zacarias Andal, que otorgue
unaescritura de reventa a favor de la aqui demandante Cresencia
Hernandez, de las participaciones de las terceristas en el
terrenodescrito en la demanda suplementaria previo pago de P860
mas lacantidad de P50 como gastos de documentacion. Se
absuelve al demandado de los daos y perjuicios que reclama la
demandante. Se absuelve tambien a la demandante de la contra-
demanda de lasterceristas.
Sin especial pronunciamento en cuanto a las costas.
The defendant and the intervenors are appealing from the foregoing
decision and in their joint brief made one assignment of error:
The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for
proving a contract of partition among the heirs on the ground that
it was not admissible.

(a) declarando y sin valor alguno el documento de reventaotorgado

por el demandado Zacarias Andal en 26 de marzo de 1944, a favor
de Maria y Aquilina Hernandez sobre el terrenocuestionado que se
presento como Exhibito 2 de dichodemandado, y
consiguientemente se anulan tambien todas lastransacciones
posteriores que las mencionadas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez
hayan hecho sobre el terreno cuestionado despuesdel 26 de marzo
de 1944, asi como tambien cualquiera anotacionen la Oficiana del
Before proceeding with a discussion of the questions raised we are
tempted to point up some seeming incongruities in the above-quoted
judgment. Although Zacarias Andal is no longer interested in the case, as
far as the land is concerned, and even though the intervenors have become
again the absolute owners and are now in full possession of the property,
while Andal has already gotten his money back, the judgment would have
Andal execute a deed of resale in favor of the plaintiff and received from
her the price of repurchase. The judgment is silent as to the intervenors
with reference to the execution of the deed of sale or the receipt of the sale
price. And the lower court made no finding and expressed no opinion as to
whether the offer of P150 instead of P860, not to mention Andal's
expenses, by the plaintiff as price of repurchase was sufficient compliance
with article 1067 of the Civil Code on which the court rested the plaintiff's
cause of action.
However, in this decision we are concerned mainly with the application of
section 21 of Rule 123 and section 1 of Rule 74 both of the Rules of Court.
Article 1248 of the Civil Code has no bearing on the case.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is
such a contract as is required to be in writing under the statute of frauds.
One line of authorities holds the affirmative view; other authorities say no.
The reason for the rule that excludes partition from the operation of the
statute of frauds is that partition is not a conveyance but simply a
separation and designation of that part of the land which belongs to each
tenant in common. (27 C.J., 206.) The differences in the conclusions
reached are "due perhaps to varied phraseology of the statutes" in the
several states. (40 Amer. Jur., 15.) However the case may be, as enacted in
the Philippines, first in section 335 of the former Code of Civil Procedure,
and now in Rule 123, section 21, of the Rules of Court, the law has been
uniformly interpreted in a long line of cases to be applicable to executory
and not to completed or executed contracts. (27 C.J., 206.) In this
jurisdiction performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of the
statute. (Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil., 485; Almirol and
Cario vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil., 67.) The statute of frauds does not declare
the contracts therein enumerated void and of no legal effect, but only
makes ineffective the action for specific performance. (Almirol and
Cario vs. Monserrat, supra.) In the United States, even in those states
where the affirmative view of the question has been followed, "the weight
of authority upholds the rule that an oral partition is effective when several
possession is taken under it by the respective parties to the agreement." (27
C.J., 206.)
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds,
courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely
or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is
valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the
parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of
possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the
parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and
enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties
thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases
involving an oral partition under which the parties went into
possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly
performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such
partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the
possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions
may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert
the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of the land divided by
parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and
acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity
will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and
effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as
between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
 A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the
parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by
taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with
respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part
performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary,
to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of
frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact
between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of
equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to
by the parties. (40 Amer. Jur., 15-18.)
It is on the effects of Rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol
partition that there are sharp divergences of opinion among the members
of this Court. This section reads:
If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of
age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the
parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument file in the office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If
there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself
the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no
debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration
within two years after the death of the decedent.
It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is entirely void and
cannot be validated by any acts of the parties short of the execution of a
public document and its registration.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are
required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or
as a means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form
exacted by the statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes
only." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The decisions of this Court
which we have noticed were predicated on this assumption. The Civil
Code, too, requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public
instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its
efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or contracts has been
admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the document.
(Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs .Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.)
Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential of partition?
In other words, is writing the act that confers legal validity upon the
agreement? There are no indications in the phraseology of this rule which
justify an affirmative answer to these questions. It must be noted that
where the law intends a writing or other formality to be the essential
requisite to the validity of the transactions it says so in clear and
unequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as originally enacted in
England and as enacted in some of the states, uses the words "utterly void"
with statute transactions required to be in writing are absolutely void and
not merely voidable if not made in the manner indicated. Again article 633
of the Civil Code says that donation may be valid only when made in a
public document. Article 146 of the Mortgage Law makes known its
intention to have the execution of a public instrument and its registration
in the registry indispensable to the validity of the contract by using this
phrase: "in order that voluntary mortgages may be legally created in a
valid manner." Article 1765 of the Civil Code also employs for the same
purpose similar expression with reference to the execution of a public
document: "in order that mortgage may be validly constituted." And with
respect to the formalities of last wills and testaments, section 618 of Act
No. 190 makes this emphatic statement: "No will shall be valid to pass
upon any estate real or personal nor change or affect the same, unless it be
written etc." Other examples might be mentioned.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the
required public instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition
or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And this
Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of
a partition as between the parties dependent on the execution of a public
instrument and its registration. On the other hand, the opposite theory is
not without reasonable support. We can think of possible factors against
the proposition that a public document and its registration were
contemplated as necessary ingredients to give life to a contract of partition
so that without them no oral partition can bind the parties.
1. In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under
consideration forms a part were promulgated by the Judicial Department
under authority to deal with matters of procedure exclusively. For this
court to prescribe what is to be a binding agreement between co-heirs in
the settlement of their private affairs which in no way affect the rights of
third parties would be to transcends its rule-making power. We bring out
this limitation upon the authority of this court to make rules, as an aid to
interpretation, as a method of arriving at the conclusion that section 1 of
Rule 74 was meant to be remedial and not a rule of substantive law of far-
reaching importance and serious juridical and practical implications. It is
to be presumed that the framers of the Rules of Court realized the bounds
of this court's functions and did not intend to trespass on purely
substantive rights of the parties to the partition. To the extent the execution
and registration of a notarized instrument are made essential elements to
validity to protect innocent third parties, the rule is legitimate and
necessary; legitimate because decedent's estate are placed under the
jurisdiction of the courts to administer and distribute. The interests of third
parties eliminated, the rule loses its character as one of procedure and
practice and invades the realm of substantive law.
Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 Rule 74, is
enlightening and instructive. The former after stating that heirs may
apportion and divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit by
agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, adds the words "and
not otherwise." These words, in our opinion, were expressive of an
intention to make the written formality inherent element of the validity of
a parol partition. But what is far more to the point is that by logical process
of deduction the elimination from the new rule of the words "and not
otherwise" imports the casting away from the prescribed public document
of its jural character which the document enjoyed in the former code. At
the same time, the inclusion of the aforesaid words in the old provision
serves to emphasize the necessity of a positive and clear language if a
given contractual formality is to be the exclusive basis of the contract's
binding effect on the parties. It is of course unnecessary to say that the
attaching of jural character to the prescribed public instrument in section
596 of Act No. 190 is no argument for contending that such document
must be clothed with the same raiment in the new Rules. Act No. 190 was
a mixture of procedural and substantive provisions, having been enacted
by the legislative body itself which, unlike this court, was unhampered and
untrammelled, except by the fundamental law, in the choice of its subjects
of legislation.
2. The civil law looks upon the role of public instruments in acts and
contracts with greater liberality with a view to better adaptation to human
frailties and idiosyncracies. In their blind faith in friends and relatives, in
their lack of experience and foresight, and their ignorance, men, in spite of
laws, will make and continue to make verbal contracts. The advantages of
an air-tight policy concerning such contracts fall far short of compensating
for the resulting damage, injustice, inconveniences and confusion. So even
though articles 1278, 1279 and 1280 of the Civil Code have made
provisions for public instrument for all transactions and contracts whose
object is the creation, modification or extinction of real rights in
immovables, it has been recognized and held that verbal contracts may be
effective between the parties. A leading case on this subject is Thunga
Chui vs. Que Bentec (2 Phil., 561), Mr. Justice Williard writing the
decision. It was said in that case that when the essential requisites for the
existence of a contract are present, the contract is binding upon the parties,
and, although required to be in writing by article 1280 of the Civil Code,
the plaintiff can maintain an action under article 1279 to compel the
execution of a written instrument. It says that "article 1279 does not
impose an obligation, but confers a privilege upon both contracting parties,
and the fact that the plaintiff has not made use of same does not bar his
action." It further says that article 1279, far from making the enforceability
of the contract dependent upon any special intrinsic form, recognizes its
enforceability by the mere act of granting the contracting parties an
adequate remedy whereby to compel the execution of public writing or any
other special form whenever such form is necessary in order that contract
may produce the effect which is desired according to whatever its object.
This doctrine was iterated and reiterated in a series of decisions perhaps
longer than that on any other legal topic. And it has been extended even to
verbal contracts involving land registered under the Torrens Act. Do the
Rules of Court adhere to this salutary principle? We can perceive no
sufficient ground for the new Rules to depart from it. No considerations of
public policy enter into a partition of hereditary estate among co-heirs
greater than those involved in a contract between strangers which operates
to create, transmit, modify or extinguish property rights in land. If as
between strangers the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of
real rights may be lawfully effected by parol agreement notwithstanding
the requirement that it be put in writing, the new rule could not be more
intransigent when the transaction is between co-heirs and there is no
change of ownership but simply designation and segregation of that part
which belongs to each heir.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered
has, in our opinion, for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the
same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note
that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means
notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when, as
in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected.
No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a
plan different from those provided by law.
It is said that the findings, conclusions and judgment in the appealed
decision are not assigned as errors and that for this reason the appeal
should be dismissed. We do not think that the premise of this objection is
exactly correct. The evidence on parol partition tendered by the defendant
and intervenors was ruled out and they specifically complain of this
exclusion as error. In this manner the assignment of error squarely meets
and attacks the opinion and judgment of the trial court. A superficial
analysis of the case will show that on the validity of the alleged partition
hangs the result of the entire litigation, and on that validity depends in turn
the competence of the excluded evidence. These two interrelated points are
the core of the whole case. All other points are incidental to and revolve
around them. If a completed oral partition may be enforced, as the
defendant and the intervenors contend and as we opine, their evidence
should be allowed, and if allowed and it establishes their allegation, the
plaintiff's cause of action vanishes.
If the appellant's assignment of error be not considered a direct challenge
to the decision of the court below, we still believe that the objection takes a
narrow view of practice and procedure contrary to the liberal spirit which
pervades the Rules of Court. The first injunction of the new Rules (Rule 1,
section 2) is that they "shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." In line with
the modern trends of procedure, we are told that, "while an assignment of
error which is required by law or rule of court has been held essential to
appellate review, and only those assigned will be considered, there are a
number of cases which appear to accord to the appellate court a broad
discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and
consider errors not assigned. And an unassigned error closely related to an
error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question
raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by
the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error." (4
C.J.S., 1734; 3 C.J., 1341, footnote 77.) At the least, the assignment of
error, viewed in this light, authorizes us to examine and pass upon the
decision of the court below.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin
for further proceeding and a new decision not incompatible with this
decision, with costs of this appeal against the appellee.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla,
JJ., concur.
FERIA, J.:
I reserve the right to express my view and write a dissenting opinion later.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., with whom concurs PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Is oral evidence admissible to prove partition of land? The answer of the
appellants is in the affirmative. Thus their only assignment of error is as
follows: "The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for
proving a contract of partition of the land among the heirs on the ground
that it was not admissible." Since no other question, either of fact or of
law, is raised by the appellants, I deem it unnecessary, under the
circumstances of this case, to pass upon said assignment.
A small parcel of land containing some 5,568 square meters was inherited
by four sisters and a brother. It was surveyed and is still assessed as a
single lot, not in the name of the co-owners, but in that of an uncle. It
appears that on January 23, 1944, two of the sisters sold a portion of the
lot to defendant Andal who was neither a relative nor an adjoining owner.
The vendors stated:
Este terreno es parte del terreno referido en la declaracion Tax No.
53379 en nombre de nuestro tio Juan Dimasacat y estaamillarado
todo el terreno en P290. El referido terreno yase vio en el Juzgado
de Primera Instancia de Batangas en 29 de Septiembre de 1941, at
nagcaro-on ng decreto noong ika-6 ng Noviembre, 1941, na doon
ay ipinasiya ang pagbibigay ng Titulo sa aming magcacapatid.
(Exhibit A.)
Upon learning of the sale one week thereafter, a third sister expressed her
desire to repurchase said portion of land and, upon refusal of the buyer,
she filed a complaint for the purpose of being subrogated to the rights
acquired by Andal. The latter, in his answer, is agreeable to the prayer
provided that he be reimbursed in the total sum of P910 which he had
actually paid. In the meantime, the other two sisters (vendors) intervened
in the case, alleging that, before the sale was made to Andal, the plaintiff
had been given the option to acquire the lot in question. By way of
counterclaim, it was alleged that they had repurchased the lot from Andal
at a higher price.
After hearing, the lower court held that inasmuch as the plaintiff is willing
to buy, and Andal to sell, the lot at the price fixed by the latter, there is no
reason why the former's complaint should not prosper, and Andal was
accordingly ordered to convey the property to the plaintiff upon payment
by the latter of the total sum of P910. As regards the contention of the
intervenors, the court held that their alleged repurchase was fraudulent
and, therefore, null and void.
As these pronouncements, necessarily based on findings of fact, have not
been assailed, they should be considered final. Hence, it is absolutely futile
to decide the question of law raised in appellant's assignment of error, the
same having become academic.
Even so, the point whether the sale to Andal took place after a partition is
immaterial, in view of his willingness to resell to the plaintiff, not to
mention the fact that the latter's right to redeem, as an adjoining owner,
maybe based on article 1523 of the Civil Code which provides: "The
owners of the adjacent lands shall also have the right of redemption in case
of the sale of a rural estate whose area does not exceed one hectare."
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
July 30, 1947
TUASON, J.:
Plaintiff and appellee has filed a motion for reconsideration. She maintains
that she is entitled to judgment because the defendant has no objection to
reselling her the land and she is, on the other hand, ready to reimburse him
the purchase price. She argues that the buyer having led her to believe that
he would make the resale in her favor is estopped from going against his
own acts.
Superficially, the decision is obscure as to the relation which Andal's
signification in his answer, that he was willing to sell the land to the
plaintiff, bears to the dispositive part or judgment. But read in its entirety,
analyzed closely, the decision reveals in no uncertain manner that it is
anchored on articles 1067 and 1522 of the Civil Code and that all other
matters discussed therein revolve around this basic conclusion. With
particular reference to Andal's signification abovementioned, the court
does not appear to have made or intended to make it an affirmative,
separate basis of the judgment. Roughly, the judgment was evolved along
this process of reasoning: the plaintiff's right to repurchase the land under
the above-cited provisions of the Civil Code was evident, in the court's
opinion. But, the court said in the same breath, a complication emerged.
The confusion was brought about by the resale of the property by Andal to
the original owners. The court seemed puzzled. Then it saw a way out of
the perplexity; the resale was illegal and mala fide and hence ineffective. It
was illegal, mala fide and ineffective because the defendant had stated in
his answer that he had no objection in allowing the plaintiff to buy the
land, and because the resale to the intervenors had been consummated
during the pendency of the action. Andal's signification in his answer
estopped him from alienating the land in favor of others.
It was estoppel that the court invoked Andal's expression of his willingness
to sell the land, citing section 68 (a), Rule 123, Rules of Court. The court
looked upon this expression not as a cause of action standing on its own
feet but merely as an equitable aid to keep the defendant and intervenors
from making a mockery of the plaintiff's right under the aforecited articles
of the Civil Code. The Court found that the transaction between the
defendant and the intervenors had been entered into "con el proposito de
desorientar al Juzgado y frustrar en cierto modo la administracion de
justicia." The appellee both in her brief and motion for reconsideration
treats Andal's willingness to sell in the same light.
To put it differently, the central principle of the case, as the court saw it,
was that the evidence on the oral partition was inadmissible and so the
plaintiff's right to repurchase the land under articles 1067 and 1522 of the
Civil Code was in order. Andal's expression of willingness to sell the land
to the plaintiff came into play not as a generator of a new obligation in
favor of the plaintiff, separate and distinct from the right of co-heirs to
repurchase shares in property inherited in common and sold to strangers by
other heirs, but simply as a factor to prevent the defendant's and
intervenor's attempt to nullify that right.
Estoppel, in the sense in which the court regarded Andal's manifestation
that he was willing to sell the land to the plaintiff, partakes of the nature of
the rule of evidence. Certainly, it belongs to the adjective branch of the
law, and the court regarded it under this criterion. The court's reference in
its decision to Andal's signification cannot have a meaning other than that
the court assigned thereto a subordinate role, subordinate to the asserted
right of the plaintiff under the provisions of the Civil Code referred to.
The sole assignment of error in appellant's brief thus inevitably clarification. It would be extremely improper, for obvious reasons, to go
comprehends that part of the appealed decision and judgment which into these defects and deficiencies in detail in this resolution in
relates to the defendant's expression of willingness to sell land to the anticipation of the new trial.
plaintiff. A review of the error specifically assigned necessarily carries
with it the consideration of all matters related to and dependent upon that The motion is denied.
error. Specifically, if there was a lawful partition and the partition bars the
plaintiff's right to repurchase the land under the articles relied upon, the Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla,
proposition formulated in the assignment of error then Andal's previous JJ., concur.
willingness to sell loses its raison d'etre as estoppel; it disappears with the Feria, J., reserves his vote.
right which it was intended to uphold and with which it was inextricably
bound up.

It should be made clear that we are only construing the decision of the
lower court. We have explained the ratio decidendi as it appeared to the PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
court, not the theory of the parties in their pleadings. If the supplemental
complaint was intended to present Andal's offer to sell the land to the We are of opinion that, as suggested by plaintiff-appellee in her motion for
plaintiff as constituting a new and separate cause of action a point
reconsideration, dated April 5, 1947, there is no need for ordering a new
which cannot be determined with a fair degree of certainty from a reading trial of the case, and that rather the appealed decision should be affirmed.
of that complaint the court did not see or consider it in that light. And, it
should be remembered, it is what the court decided or how the court
This litigation is about a parcel of land very much less than two hectares in
decided a case that we have to look as a test for judging whether the
area located in a barrio, and assessed for taxation purposes at P290 only,
questions for review have been formulated in the right manner.
and the amount for redemption of said land is much less than P1,000 of
worthless Japanese paper money. The litigation started on February 3,
If Andal's statement in his answer was alleged by the plaintiff to serve as
1944, more than three years ago. It is high time that we put an end to such
an independent cause of action, that is all the more reason, for his own a litigation, to fight which the parties might have spent more money than
benefit, why the cases should be remanded for further proceeding. The
the value of the thing in litigation.
new trial as ordered in our decision leaves the door open for the admission
of evidence on the allegations in the supplementary complaint as well as
Plaintiff and appellee Cresencia Hernandez filed the complaint to compel
on the alleged parol partition. As matters now stand, the plaintiff could ask
defendant Zacarias Andal to sell the property to her. In his answer of
for judgment on the supplementary complaint only on the untenable
February 14, 1944, Zacarias Andal stated that he was willing to sell the
hypothesis that no assignment of error has been made relative to this
property to plaintiff, provided the latter would pay him P800 plus expenses
feature of the case. Without the benefit of this technicality, the plaintiff has
amounting to P50. The appealed decision ordered Zacarias Andal to sell
not made out a case on the supplementary complaint. The evidence is very
the property to plaintiff who was ordered to pay P860, plus P50 for
meager to the point of nullity; many of the allegations have been left
expenses, which is P60 more than the amount demanded by Andal in his
untouched, and there are essential points that badly need amplication or
answer of February 14, 1944. Plaintiff did not appeal, thus showing her
willingness to pay the amount.

Under the circumstances, we do not see any reason why ununderstandable

legal technicalities should block the ending of a litigation which, in
substance ceased to exist since plaintiff and appellee manifested her
willingness to pay to defendant Andal even more than the amount he
demanded.

The legal discussion entered into the majority opinion to support the
further delay in finishing the suit might be highly interesting in a law
academy, but it will never satisfy the simple sense of justice of the
common man.

We vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

PARAS, J.:

I concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19060 May 29, 1964
IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA,
FRANCISCO GERONA and DELFIN GERONA,petitioners,
vs.
CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE
GUZMAN,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE
GUZMAN and VICTORIA DE GUZMANrespondents.
Manuel J. Serapio for petitioners.
D. F. Castro and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming
that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
In the complaint, filed with the latter court on September 4, 1958,
petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and
Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate children
of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on
August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his
first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo
de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children,
namely, respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita
and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died on
September 11, 1945; that subsequently, or on May 6, 1948, respondents
executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased
Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were
the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although
they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that
respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer
certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said
deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of title to be issued
in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each;
that such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the
institution of the case; that petitioners forthwith demanded from
respondents their (petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of
1/8th interest thereon; and that the respondents refused to heed said
demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners. Accordingly, the
latter prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra-
judicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their participation of
1/18th of the properties in litigation; ordering the respondents to reconvey
to petitioners their aforementioned share in said properties; ordering the
register of deeds to cancel the transfer certificates of title secured by
respondents as above stated and to issue new certificates of title in the
name of both the petitioners and the respondents in the proportion of 1/8th
for the former and 7/8th for the latter; ordering the respondents to render
accounts of the income of said properties and to deliver to petitioners their
lawful share therein; and sentencing respondents to pay damages and
attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the
deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of
Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and
that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding
that petitioners' mother was a legitimate child, by first marriage, of
Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his
second wife, Camila Ramos; and that petitioners' action has already
prescribed, and, accordingly, dismissing the complaint without costs. On
appeal taken by the petitioners, this decision as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, with costs against them.
Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the
deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's
estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected
by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin
to run until actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by respondents,
which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly, said
period had not expired when the present action was commenced on
November 4, 1958.
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action
for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as
the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title
(Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1948). The statute of
limitations operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title
is asserted by the possessor of the property (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil.
362; Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).
When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial
settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de
Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name,
they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and,
consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners
have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground
that the same is tainted with fraud. 1wph1.t
Although, there are some decisions to the contrary (Jacinto v. Mendoza, L-
12540, February 28, 1959; Cuison v. Fernandez, L-11764, January 31,
1959; Maribiles v. Quinto, L-10408, October 18, 1956; and Sevilla v. De
los Angeles, L-7745, November 18, 1955), it is already settled in this
jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a
constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the
statute of limitations (Candelaria v. Romero, L-12149, September 30,
1960; Alzona v. Capunita, L-10220, February 28, 1962).
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-
judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the
action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the
fraud (Mauricio v. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959). Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25,
1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for
the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute
constructive notice to the whole world (Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229, March
29, 1958; Avecilla v. Yatco, L-11578, May 14, 1958; J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962; Lopez v. Gonzaga, L-
18788, January 31, 1964).
As correctly stated in the decision of the trial court:
In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that
plaintiffs learned at least constructively, of the alleged fraud
committed against them by defendants on 25 June 1948 when the
deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased
Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the registry of deeds of
Bulacan, Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not filed until 4
November 1958, or more than 10 years thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio
 Gerona became of age on 3 March 1948. He is deemed to have
discovered defendants' fraud on 25 June 1948 and had, therefore,
only 4 years from the said date within which to file this action.
Plaintiff Maria Concepcion Gerona became of age on 8 December
1949 or after the registration of the deed of extra-judicial
settlement. She also had only the remainder of the period of 4
years from December 1949 within which to commence her action.
Plaintiff Francisco Gerona became of age only on 9 January 1952
so that he was still a minor when he gained knowledge (even if
only constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25
June 1948. Likewise, plaintiff Delfin Gerona became of legal age
on 5 August 1954, so that he was also still a minor at the time he
gained knowledge (although constructive) of the deed of extra-
judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Francisco Gerona and Delfin
Gerona had, therefore, two years after the removal of their
disability within which to commence their action (Section 45,
paragraph 3, in relation to Section 43, Act 190), that is, January
29, 1952, with respect to Francisco, and 5 August 1954, with
respect to Delfin.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed,

with costs against petitioners herein. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barredo, Paredes, Regala

and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Labrador and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
 DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, petitioners Napoleon D. Neri (Napoleon), Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar
(Alicia), Visminda D. Neri-Chambers (Visminda), Rosa D. Neri-Millan
(Rosa), Douglas D. Neri (Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos (Eutropia),
and Victoria D. Illut-Piala (Victoria) seek to reverse and set aside the April
27, 2010 Decision2 and October 18, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01031-MIN which annulled the
October 25, 2004 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo
City, Davao del Norte and instead, entered a new one dismissing
petitioners complaint for annulment of sale, damages and attorneys
feesagainst herein respondents heirs of spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Rule 74 Ibrahim Uy (heirs of Uy).

The Facts

Republic of the Philippines During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children,
SUPREME COURT two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely:
Manila Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique
Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.
SECOND DIVISION Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they
acquired several homestead properties with a total area of 296,555 square
meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte, embraced by Original
G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012
Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. (P-7998) P-21285, (P-14608) P-51536 and
P-20551 (P-8348)7issued on February 15, 1957, August 27, 1962 and July
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA 7, 1967, respectively.
D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D.
NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband,
ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners,
Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor
vs.
children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM
Vismindaexecuted an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
UY, Respondents.
Deed of Sale8 on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said
homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying themto the late spouses
Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration
of P 80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment
of saleof the said homestead properties against spouses Uy (later
substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-
28, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the
prohibited period. Thecomplaint was later amended to include Eutropia
and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived
of their legitimes as childrenof Anunciacion from her first marriage.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that
the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance
of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and
Victorias exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the
subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and
laches.
The RTC Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering, among
others, the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-
year prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria
were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial
authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised by
spouses Uy, who claimed possession of the subject properties for 17 years,
holding that co-ownership rights are imprescriptible.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April
27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. It held
that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial
settlement and sale of the subject properties and as such, were not bound
by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the annulment of the sale
considering spouses Uys possession thereof for 17 years, and thatEutropia
and Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997, ormore than two years
fromknowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather
died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their
legitimes from their co-heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent
saleas valid and binding with respect to Enrique and hischildren, holding
that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares
as they consider necessary or fit.While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to
be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale
whenthey failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority.Italso
found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a long period of
time.
The Issues
In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the following errors:
I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE"
AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE
CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR
INHERITANCE;
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED
OF SALE" WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF ROSA AND
DOUGLAS, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR
INHERITANCE; and
III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET Visminda 1/16
IN.
Rosa 1/16
The Ruling of the Court
Douglas 1/16
The petitionis meritorious.
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia and
and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas
her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and
which read: binding uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.

ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they
should come from different marriages. SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. x x x

xxx The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published

ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her
children and Enrique acquired their respective inheritances, 9 entitling them
to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate, as follows:
in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
(Underscoring added)
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further
elucidated in Segura v. Segura,10 thus:

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in

Enrique 9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets + 1/16) question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
Eutropia 1/16 The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was
invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
Victoria 1/16 shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial
Napoleon 1/16 settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and
Alicia 1/16 did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to
hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two
years from its execution
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the
subsequent sale of the subject propertiesmade by Enrique and his children,
Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents isvalid but
only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied
that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the properties of
Anunciacion from the moment of her death11and that, as owners thereof,
they can very well sell their undivided share in the estate. 12
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father,
Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the
laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in
the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father
or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of the childs
property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules
of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the property of the child under
parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the childs
property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules,
and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons,
the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and
the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act
of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the
patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. 13 Thus, a father or
mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does
not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such
power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the wards property
and even then only with courts prior approval secured in accordance with
the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his
minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by
them upon reaching the age of majority,15 is unenforceable in accordance
with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being
authorized by the latter or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority
or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be
unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on
whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been
given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers;
xxx
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and
gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which
without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary
choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was
theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so
making the ratification.16 Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as
when the person knowingly received benefits from it, the contract is
cleansed from all its defects from the moment it was constituted, 17 as it has
a retroactive effect.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement
of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosas
Manifestation18 before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique
Neri concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two sisters and
brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse
Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was
voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale was
absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this case are
concerned;" (Underscoring supplied)
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19 Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:
"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do
not have any intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge the validity
of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of the settlement
of the estate and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the defects existing
at the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosas 1/16
share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is
not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and
therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares
ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead
properties have effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person
can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer can as a
consequence acquire no more than what the sellercan legally
transfer."20 On this score, Article 493 of the Civil Codeis relevant, which
provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso
co-owners of the homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas, who retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They were
deemed to be holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas
under an implied constructive trust for the latters benefit, conformably
with Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:"if property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes." As such, it is only fair, just and equitable that
the amount paid for their shares equivalent to P 5,000.0021 each or a total
of P 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with legal interest.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the
present action has not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the
prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules
of
Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no
application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were
deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides, an
"action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does
not prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10
years from the time the cause of action accrues, 22 which is from the time of
actual notice in case of unregistered deed. 23 In this case, Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement
with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy
failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the
prescriptive period of 10 years.
of the subject homestead properties, covered by Original
Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and
P-20551 (P-8348); and
4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as
Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-
Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the respondents
jointly and solidarily the amount paid corresponding to the 3/16
shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the total amount
of P 15,000.00, with legal interest at 6% per annum computed
from the time of payment until finality of this decision and 12%
per annum thereafter until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010

Decision and October 18, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered:

1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of

Anunciacion Neri NULL and VOID;

2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses

Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards the 13/16 total
shares of the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-
Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-
Millan VALID;

3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and

Douglas D. Neri as the LAWFUL OWNERSof the 3/16 portions
 G.R. No. 166393
CRISTINA F. REILLO, LEONOR F.
PUSO, ADELIA F. ROCAMORA,
SOFRONIO S.J. FERNANDO, EFREN
S.J. FERNANDO, ZOSIMO S.J.
FERNANDO, JR., and MA. TERESA F.
PION,

Petitioners, Present:

Republic of the Philippines

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -
Supreme Court
Chairperson,
Manila
CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,
THIRD DIVISION
GALICANO E.S. SAN JOSE, NACHURA, and
represented by his Attorneys-in-
PERALTA, JJ.
Fact, ANNALISA S.J. RUIZ and
RODELIO S. SAN JOSE, VICTORIA S.J.
REDONGO, CATALINA S.J. DEL
ROSARIO and MARIBETH S.J.
CORTEZ, collectively known as the
HEIRS OF QUITERIO SAN JOSE and
ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO,
 Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Morong, Rizal, Branch 78, granting the
motion for judgment on the pleadings and the motion to dismiss counter
petition for partition filed by respondents in Civil Case No. 99-1148-
M. Also questioned is the CA Resolution [2] dated December 14, 2004
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Promulgated:
Spouses Quiterio San Jose (Quiterio) and Antonina Espiritu Santo
June 18, 2009 (Antonina) were the original registered owners of a parcel of land located
in E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue, Teresa, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 458396 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. The said
Respondents. parcel of land is now registered in the name of Ma. Teresa F. Pion (Teresa)
under TCT No. M-94400.

x---------------------------------------------------x
Quiterio and Antonina had five children, namely, Virginia,
Virgilio, Galicano, Victoria and Catalina. Antonina died on July 1, 1970,
while Quiterio died on October 19, 1976. Virginia and Virgilio are also

DECISION now deceased. Virginia was survived by her husband Zosimo Fernando,
Sr. (Zosimo Sr.) and their seven children, while Virgilio was survived by
his wife Julita Gonzales and children, among whom is Maribeth S.J.
Cortez (Maribeth).
PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the

Decision[1] dated August 31, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- On October 26, 1999, Galicano, represented by his children and attorneys-
G.R. CV No. 69261 which affirmed the Order dated May 9, 2000 of the in-fact, Annalisa S.J. Ruiz and Rodegelio San Jose, Victoria, Catalina, and
Maribeth (respondents) filed with the RTC a Complaint [3]for annulment of
title, annulment of deed of extra-judicial settlement, partition and damages
against Zosimo Sr. and his children Cristina F. Reillo, Leonor F. Puso,
Adelia F. Rocamora, Sofronio S.J. Fernando, Efren S.J. Fernando, Zosimo
S.J. Fernando, Jr. and Ma. Teresa (petitioners) and the Register of Deeds
of Morong, Rizal. The complaint alleged among other things:
6. Under date of January 23, 1998, defendants
FERNANDO et al, without the knowledge and consent of
all the other surviving heirs of the deceased spouses
QUITERIO SAN JOSE and ANTONINA ESPIRITU
SANTO, including herein plaintiffs, executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with
Waiver of Rights making it appear therein that they are the
legitimate descendants and sole heirs of QUITERIO SAN
JOSE and ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO; and
adjudicating among themselves, the subject parcel of land.
6.1 In the same document, defendants ZOSIMO SR.,
CRISTINA, LEONOR, ADELIA, SOFRONIO, EFREN
and ZOSIMO JR., waived all their rights, participation
and interests over the subject parcel of land in favor of
their co-defendant MA. TERESA F. PION (a.k.a MA.
TERESA S.J. FERNANDO).
xxxx
7. On the strength of the said falsified Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, defendant MA.
TERESA PION (a.k.a MA. TERESA S.J. FERNANDO)
succeeded in causing the cancellation of TCT No. 458396
in the name of SPS. QUITERIO SAN JOSE and
ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO and the issuance of a
new Transfer Certificate of Title in her name only, to the
extreme prejudice of all the other heirs of the deceased
SPS. QUITERIO SAN JOSE and ANTONINA ESPIRITU
SANTO, specifically, the herein plaintiffs who were
deprived of their lawful participation over the subject
parcel of land.
7.1 Thus, on July 6, 1999, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
M-94400 was issued in the name of defendant MA.
TERESA S.J. FERNANDO.
xxxx
8. As a result, the herein plaintiffs and the other surviving
heirs of the deceased spouses QUITERIO SAN JOSE and
ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO, who are legally entitled
to inherit from the latters respective estates, in accordance
with the laws of intestate succession, have been duly
deprived of their respective rights, interests and
participation over the subject parcel of land.
 8.1 Thus, there is sufficient ground to annul the subject
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs
with Waiver of Rights dated January 23, 1998, and all
other documents issued on the strength thereof,
particularly Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-94400. [4]
It was also alleged that respondents filed a complaint before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of their Barangay which issued the required certification
to file action for failure of the parties to settle the matter amicably.
Petitioners filed their Answer with Counter-Petition and with
Compulsory Counterclaim[5] denying that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights which was the
basis of the issuance of TCT No. M-94400, was falsified and that the
settlement was made and implemented in accordance with law. They
admitted that the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina had five
children; that the subject property was not the only property of spouses
Quiterio and Antonina and submitted in their counter-petition for partition
the list of the other 12 parcels of land of the deceased spouses Quiterio and
Antonina that petitioners alleged are in respondents possession and
control.
On January 18, 2000, respondents filed a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings[6] alleging that: (1) the denials made by petitioners in their
answer were in the form of negative pregnant; (2) petitioners failed to state
the basis that the questioned document was not falsified; (3) they failed to
specifically deny the allegations in the complaint that petitioners
committed misrepresentations by stating that they are the sole heirs and
legitimate descendants of Quiterio and Antonina; and (4) by making
reference to their allegations in their counter-petition for partition to
support their denials, petitioners impliedly admitted that they are not the
sole heirs of Quiterio and Antonina.
Respondents filed a Reply to Answer with Compulsory
[7]
Counterclaim with a motion to dismiss the counter-petition for partition
on the ground that petitioners failed to pay the required docket fees for
their counter-petition for partition. Petitioners filed their
Rejoinder[8] without tackling the issue of non-payment of docket fees.
On February 4, 2000, petitioners filed their Comment [9] to
respondents motion for judgment on the pleading and prayed that the
instant action be decided on the basis of the pleadings with the exception
of respondents unverified Reply. Petitioners also filed an Opposition to the
motion to dismiss the counter-petition for partition.
 The RTC found that, based on the allegations contained in the
pleadings filed by the parties, petitioners misrepresented themselves when
On May 9, 2000, the RTC rendered its Order, [10] the dispositive portion of
they alleged in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among
which reads:
Heirs with Waiver of Rights that they are the sole heirs of the deceased
spouses Quiterio and Antonina; that petitioners prayed for a counter-
1. The Extrajudicial Settlement of petition for partition involving several parcels of land left by the deceased
Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights, dated January spouses Quiterio and Antonina which bolstered respondents claim that
23, 1998 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-94400 in petitioners falsified the Extrajudicial Settlement which became the basis
the name of Ma. Teresa S.J. Fernando are declared null
for the issuance of TCT No. M-94400 in Ma. Teresas name; thus, a ground
and void;
to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and the title. The RTC did
not consider as filed petitioners Counter-Petition for Partition since they
2. The Register of Deeds of Rizal, did not pay the corresponding docket fees.
Morong Branch, is directed to cancel TCT No. 94400; and
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied
in an Order[12] dated August 29, 2000.

3. The Heirs of Quiterio San Jose and

Antonina Espiritu Santo is (sic) directed to partition the
subject parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-458396 in Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. After the parties filed
accordance with the law of intestate succession. [11] their respective briefs, the case was submitted for decision.

SO ORDERED.
On August 31, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming the
May 9, 2000 Order of the RTC.
 The CA found that, while the subject matter of respondents
complaint was the nullity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
Petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising
among Heirs with Waiver of Rights that resulted in the issuance of TCT
the following assignment of errors, to wit:
No. M-94400 in Ma. Teresas name, petitioners included in their Answer
a Counter-Petition for Partition involving 12 other parcels of land of
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
spouses Quiterio and Antonina which was in the nature of a permissive
GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE
counterclaim; that petitioners, being the plaintiffs in the counter-petition DEFENDANTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) AND IN
for partition, must pay the docket fees otherwise the court will not acquire EVENTUALLY UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE
jurisdiction over the case. The CA ruled that petitioners cannot pass the COURT OF ORIGIN, CONSIDERING THAT SUCH
RULING WILL RESULT TO MULTIPLICITY OF
blame to the RTC for their omission to pay the docket fees.
SUITS BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES AND IN
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW &
The CA affirmed the RTCs judgment on the pleadings since PROPERTY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS.

petitioners admitted that the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina had
five children which included herein plaintiffs; thus, petitioners
misrepresented themselves when they stated in the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement that they are the legitimate descendants and sole heirs of the
deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina; that the deed is null and void on
such ground since respondents were deprived of their rightful share in the
subject property and petitioners cannot transfer the property in favor of
Ma. Teresa without respondents consent; that TCT No. M-94400 must be
cancelled for lack of basis. The CA affirmed the RTCs Order of partition
of the subject property in accordance with the rules on intestate succession
in the absence of a will.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
VACATING THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
PARTITIONING THE ESTATE WITHOUT
PUBLICATION AS REQUIRED BY RULE 74 AND 76
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. [13]
Petitioners contend that in their Comment to respondents motion for
judgment on the pleadings, they stated that they will not oppose the same
provided that their Answer with Counter-Petition for Partition and
Rejoinder will be taken into consideration in deciding the case; however,
the RTC decided the case on the basis alone of respondents complaint; that
the Answer stated that the deed was not a falsified document and was
made and implemented in accordance with law, thus, it was sufficient
enough to tender an issue and was very far from admitting the material
allegations of respondents complaint.
Petitioners also fault the RTC for disregarding their claim for partition of
the other parcels of land owned by the deceased spouses Quiterio and
Antonina for their failure to pay the court docket fees when the RTC could
have simply directed petitioners to pay the same; and that this error if not
corrected will result to multiplicity of suits.
Petitioners argue that the RTC erred in ordering the partition of the subject
property as it violates the basic law on intestate succession that the heirs
should be named and qualified through a formal petition for intestate
succession whereby blood relationship should be established first by the
claiming heirs before they shall be entitled to receive from the estate of the
deceased; that the order of partition was rendered without jurisdiction for
lack of publication as required under Rules 74 and 76 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure for testate or intestate succession.
We find no merit in the petition.
The CA committed no reversible error in affirming the judgment
on the pleadings rendered by the RTC.
Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, states:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where
an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. x x x.
Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the
essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings.
In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue
at all because of the failure of the defending partys answer to raise an
issue.[14] The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not
deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material
allegations of the adverse partys pleadings by confessing the truthfulness
thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all.[15]
 In this case, respondents principal action was for the annulment of
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver
of Rights executed by petitioners and annulment of title on the ground that
petitioners stated in the said Deed that they are the legitimate descendants
and sole heirs of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina. Although petitioners
denied in their Answer that the Deed was falsified, they, however, admitted
respondents allegation that spouses Quiterio and Antonina had 5 children,
thus, supporting respondents claim that petitioners are not the sole heirs of
the deceased spouses. Petitioners denial/admission in his Answer to the
complaint should be considered in its entirety and not truncated parts.
Considering that petitioners already admitted that respondents Galicano,
Victoria, Catalina and Maribeth are the children and grandchild,
respectively, of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina, who were the original
registered owners of the subject property, and thus excluding respondents
from the deed of settlement of the subject property, there is no more
genuine issue between the parties generated by the pleadings, thus, the
RTC committed no reversible error in rendering the judgment on the
pleadings.
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some
of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is
[16]
fraudulent and vicious. The deed of settlement made by petitioners was
invalid because it excluded respondents who were entitled to equal shares
in the subject property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.[17] Thus, the RTC correctly annulled the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights dated January 23,
1998 and TCT No. M-94400 in the name of Ma. Teresa S.J. Fernando
issued pursuant to such deed.
Petitioners claim that had there been a trial, they could have
presented testamentary and documentary evidence that the subject land is
the inheritance of their deceased mother from her deceased parents,
deserves scant consideration. A perusal of petitioners Answer, as well as
their Rejoinder, never raised such a defense. In fact, nowhere in the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights executed
by petitioners was there a statement that the subject property was inherited
by petitioners mother Virginia from her deceased parents Quiterio and
Antonina. Notably, petitioners never opposed respondents motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
We also find no merit in petitioners contention that the Counter-
Petition for Partition in their Answer was in the nature of a compulsory
counterclaim which does not require the payment of docket fees.
 A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have
against an opposing party.[18] It may either be permissive or compulsory. It
is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with
the subject matter of the opposing partys claim. [19] A permissive
counterclaim is essentially an independent claim that may be filed
separately in another case.
A counterclaim is compulsory when its object arises out of or is
necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing partys claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.[20] Unlike permissive counterclaims, compulsory
counterclaims should be set up in the same action; otherwise, they would
be barred forever.
Respondents action was for the annulment of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement, title and partition of the property subject of the
Deed. On the other hand, in the Counter-Petition filed by petitioners in
their Answer to respondents complaint, they were asking for the partition
and accounting of the other 12 parcels of land of the deceased spouses
Quiterio and Antonina, which are entirely different from the subject matter
of the respondents action. Petitioners claim does not arise out of or is
necessarily connected with the action for the Annulment of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the property covered by TCT No.
458396. Thus, payment of docket fees is necessary before the RTC could
acquire jurisdiction over petitioners petition for partition.
Petitioners, however, argue that the RTC could have simply issued
a directive ordering them to pay the docket fees, for its non-payment
should not result in the automatic dismissal of the case.
We find apropos the disquisition of the CA on this matter, thus:
The rule regarding the payment of docket fees
upon the filing of the initiatory pleading is not without
exception. It has been held that if the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
docket fees, the court may allow payment of the fee within
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
It is apparent from the arguments of the
defendants-appellants that they are blaming the trial court
for their omission to pay the docket fees. It is, however,
our opinion that the defendants-appellants cannot pass on
to the trial court the performance of a positive duty
imposed upon them by the law. It should be noted that
their omission to file the docket fees was raised as one of
the grounds to dismiss the counter petition for partition.
The defendants-appellants opposed the said motion
without, however, offering an answer to the said ground
raised by the plaintiffs-appellees. In fact, during the period
the motion was being heard by the trial court, the
defendantsappellants never paid the docket fees for their
petition so that it could have at least brought to the
attention of the trial court their payment of the docket fees
although belatedly done. They did not even ask the trial
court for time within which to pay the docket fees for their
petition. When the trial court ruled to dismiss the petition
of the defendants-appellants, the latter did not, in their
motion for reconsideration, ask the trial court to
reconsider the dismissal of their petition by paying the
required docket fees, neither did they ask for time within
which to pay their docket fees. In other words, the trial
court could have issued an order allowing the defendants-
appellants a period to pay the docket fees for their petition
if the defendants-appellants made such manifestation.
What is apparent from the factual circumstances of the
case is that the defendants-appellants have been neglectful
in complyingwith this positive duty imposed upon them
by law as plaintiffs of the counter petition for partition.
Because of their omission to comply with their duty, no
grave error was committed by the trial court in dismissing
the defendants-appellants counter petition for partition. [21]
Petitioners argue that with the dismissal of their Counter-Petition
for Partition, the partition of the other parcels of land owned by the
deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina will result to multiplicity of suits.
We are not persuaded.
Significantly, in petitioners Answer with Counter-Petition for
Partition, they enumerated 12 other parcels of land owned by the deceased
spouses Quiterio and Antonina. They alleged that some of these properties
had already been disposed of by respondents and some are still generating
income under the control and administration of respondents, and these
properties should be collated back by respondents to be partitioned by all
the heirs of the deceased spouses. It bears stressing that the action filed by
respondents in the RTC was an ordinary civil action for annulment of title,
annulment of the deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition of a parcel
of land now covered by TCT No. M-94400; hence, the authority of the
court is limited to the property described in the pleading. The RTC cannot
order the collation and partition of the other properties which were not
included in the partition that was the subject matter of the respondents
action for annulment. Thus, a separate proceeding is indeed proper for the
partition of the estate of the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina.
 Finally, petitioners contend that the RTC erred when it ordered the
heirs of Quiterio and Antonina to partition the subject parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 458396 in accordance with the laws of intestate
succession; that the RTC violated the requirement of publication under
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74 and Section 3 of Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court.
We do not agree.
We find the ruling of the CA on the matter of the RTCs order of
partition of land subject of the annulled deed of extrajudicial settlement
worth quoting, thus:
Considering that the subject document and the
corresponding title were canceled, the logical consequence
is that the property in dispute, which was the subject of
the extrajudicial settlement, reverted back to the estate of
its original owners, the deceased spouses Quiterio and
Antonina San Jose. Since, it was admitted that all the
parties to the instant suit are legal heirs of the deceased
spouses, they owned the subject property in common. It is
a basic rule that any act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs or co-owners is deemed to be a
partition. Therefore, there was no reversible error
committed by the trial court in ordering the partition of the
subject property. We find nothing wrong with such ruling
considering that the trial court ordered the partition of the
subject property in accordance with the rules on intestate
succession. The trial court found the property to be
originally owned by the deceased spouses Quiterio and
Antonina San Jose and, in the absence of a will left by the
deceased spouses, it must be partitioned in accordance
with the rules on intestate succession.[22]
As the RTC nullified the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights executed by petitioners and the
title issued in accordance therewith, the order of partition of the land
subject of the settlement in accordance with the laws on intestate
succession is proper as respondents action filed in the RTC and
respondents prayer in their complaint asked for the partition of the subject
property in accordance with intestate succession. The applicable law is
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which deals with action for
partition, to wit:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of
real estate. A person having the right to compel
the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this
Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent
of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all
other persons interested in the property.
And, under this law, there is no requirement for publication.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Decision dated August 31, 2004 and the Resolution dated December 14,
Manila
2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69261,
areAFFIRMED. SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 160556 August 3, 2007

SO ORDERED. TEOFILO BAUTISTA, represented by FRANCISCO MUOZ,

Attorney-in-Fact, Petitioner,
vs.
ALEGRIA BAUTISTA, ANGELICA BAUTISTA, PRISCILLA
BAUTISTA, GILBERT BAUTISTA, JIM BAUTISTA, GLENDA
BAUTISTA, GUEN BAUTISTA, GELACIO BAUTISTA, GRACIA
BAUTISTA, PEDRO S. TANDOC and CESAR
TAMONDONG, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

During her lifetime, Teodora Rosario was the owner of a 211.80-square

meter parcel of land (the property) in Poblacion, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12951. She
died intestate on January 19, 1970, leaving behind her spouse Isidro
Bautista (Isidro) and five children, namely: Teofilo Bautista (Teofilo),
Alegria Bautista (Alegria), Angelica Bautista (Angelica), Pacita Bautista
(Pacita) and Gil Bautista (Gil).
On April 21, 1981, Isidro and four of his five children Pacita, Gil,
Alegria, and Angelica executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition 1 of the
property in which Isidro waived his share in favor of his said four children.
Teofilo was excluded from the partition.
Alegria and Angelica, who, under the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,
acquired of the property, sold the same, by Deed of Absolute Sale dated
May 14, 1981, to their sibling Pacita and her common-law husband Pedro
Tandoc (Pedro).2
Pacita and Pedro soon obtained tax declarations3 and TCT No. 187774 in
their names over 209.85 square meters of the property including the shares
they purchased from Angelica and Alegria.
Pacita, with Pedros conformity, later conveyed via Deed of Absolute
Sale5 dated April 13, 1993 of the property in favor of Cesar Tamondong,
Pedros nephew.
On January 24, 1994, herein petitioner Teofilo, represented by his
attorney-in-fact Francisco Muoz, filed a Complaint 6 against his siblings
Alegria and Angelica, along with Pedro (the common-law husband of his
already deceased sister Pacita), Priscilla Bautista (wife of his already
deceased brother Gil), Pricillas children Gilbert, Jim, Glenda, Guen, and
Gelacio and Cesar Tamondong before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Carlos City, for annulment of documents, partition, recovery of
ownership, possession and damages.
In his complaint, petitioner claimed that his co-heirs defrauded him of his
rightful share of the property and that the deed of sale executed by Pacita
in favor of Cesar Tamondong was fictitious as it was impossible for her to
have executed the same in Manila, she being already seriously ill at the
time.7
In their Answer,8 the defendants-herein respondents sisters Alegria and
Angelica, who were joined therein by their co-defendants-respondents
Priscilla, Gilbert, Jim, Glenda, Guen, Gelacio, and Gracia, claimed that it
was Pacita who caused the execution of the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition and because they trusted Pacita, they signed the document
without scrutinizing it; and that they learned about the contents of the
partition only upon Teofilos filing of the Complaint.
By way of cross-claim9 against Pedro and Cesar Tamondong, the
answering defendants-respondents claimed that a few weeks after the
partition, Pacita approached Angelica and Alegria to borrow their share in
the property on her representation that it would be used as security for a
business loan; and that agreeing to accommodate Pacita, Angelica and
Alegria signed a document which Pacita prepared which turned out to be
the deed of absolute sale in Pacitas favor.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,10 Pedro and Cesar Tamondong claimed
that they were buyers in good faith.11In any event, they contended that
prescription had set in, and that the complaint was a mere rehash of a
previous complaint for falsification of public document which had been
dismissed by the prosecutors office.12
By Decision13 of June 24, 1999, Branch 57 of the RTC of San Carlos City
rendered judgment in favor of Teofilo, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring as null and void and of no force and effect the
following documents:
a) Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated April 21, 1981;
b) Deed of Absolute Sale [d]ated May 14, 1981;
c) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18777;
d) Tax Declaration Nos. 59941, 45999, and 46006;
e) Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 13, 1993;
2) Ordering the partition of the land in question among the
compulsory heirs of the late Spouses Isidro Bautista and Teodora
Rosario
3) Ordering defendants Cesar Tamondong and Pedro Tandoc to
vacate the premises.
No pronouncement[s] as to cost.14 (Underscoring supplied)
On appeal by Pedro and Cesar Tamondong, the Court of Appeals, by
Decision15 of February 21, 2003, reversed and set aside the trial courts
decision and dismissed Teofilos complaint on the ground of
prescription.16 His Motion for Reconsideration17 having been
denied,18 Teofilo filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. 19
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court of Appeals, in holding that prescription had set in, reasoned:
Unquestionably, the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition is invalid insofar as it
affects the legitimate share pertaining to the defendant-appellee in the
property in question.1avvphi1 There can be no question that the Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition was fraudulently obtained. Hence, an action to set
it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted. Such action for the
annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought within four
years from the discovery of the fraud. Significantly, it cannot be denied,
either, that by its registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction
may be known actually or constructively.
In the present case, defendant-appellee is deemed to have been
constructively notified of the extra-judicial settlement by reason of its
registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot on
December 21, 1981. From the time of its registration, defendant-appellee
had four (4) years or until 21 December 1985, within which to file his
objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate.
Unfortunately, defendant-appellee failed to institute the present civil action
within said period, having filed the same only on 17 January 1994 or more
than twelve (12) years from the registration of the deed of extra-judicial
partition. Hence, defendant-appellees right to question the deed of extra-
judicial partition has prescribed.
Even on the extreme assumption that defendant-appellees complaint in
Civil Case No. SC-1797 is an action for reconveyance of a portion of the
property which rightfully belongs to him based upon an implied trust
resulting from fraud, said remedy is already barred by prescription.
An action of reconveyance of land based upon an implied or constructive
trust prescribes after ten years from the registration of the deed or from the
issuance of the title.
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The complaint of defendant-appellee was filed only on 17 January 1994,
while the deed of extra-judicial partition was registered and inscribed on
Transfer Certificate of Title 12951, on 21 December 1981. Clearly, the
complaint was filed twelve (12) years and twenty-seven (27) days after the
inscription of the deed of extra-judicial partition on TCT 12951. Hence,
even if We consider defendant-appellees complaint as an action for
reconveyance against plaintiff-appellants on the basis of implied trust, we
find and so hold that his remedy for reconveyance has also
prescribed.20 (Underscoring supplied)
As gathered from the above-quoted portion of its decision, the Court of
Appeals applied the prescriptive periods for annulment on the ground of
fraud and for reconveyance of property under a constructive trust.
The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilos co-heirs was invalid,
however. So Segura v. Segura21 instructs:
x x x The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six
of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned
property. Under the rule, "no extra-judicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to
challenge the partition had prescribed after two years x x
x22 (Underscoring supplied)
The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the
action to have it annulled does not prescribe. 23
Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights
to Teofilos co-heirs.24 Consequently, the subsequent transfer by Angelica
and Alegria of of the property to Pacita and her husband Pedro, as well
as the transfer of of the property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid, hence,
conferring no rights upon the transferees under the principle of nemo dat
quod non habet.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the court a
quo is SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.