Available online at www.sciencedirect.

com

Physics of Life Reviews 9 (2012) 297298

www.elsevier.com/locate/plrev

Comment

Putting Descartes before the horse: Quantum theories of

consciousness
Comment on Consciousness, biology, and quantum hypotheses
by Baars & Edelman

Anil K. Seth a,b,

a Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, UK
b Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9QJ, UK

Received 5 July 2012; accepted 15 July 2012

Available online 20 July 2012
Communicated by L. Perlovsky

Despite rapidly advancing work across the sciences, the means by which neurochemical brain activity engenders
subjective conscious experience (such as the pain of a stubbed toe, or of a lingering regret) can still seem entirely
mysterious, and perhaps requiring scientific revolution rather than evolution. Quantum theories of consciousness
capitalize on this suspicion but, in the absence of generating testable predictions or unifying insights, they presently
do little to advance our understanding of this fundamental biological property.
In their review, Baars and Edelman [2] (this issue) provide an important service by reminding us of the wealth
of biological evidence that bears on the problem of consciousness, as well as showcasing the rich repertoire of ex-
perimental methodologies supporting further advances. In doing so they call into question the need for a quantum
revolution in consciousness science. Their approach reflects what is historically a successful strategy with respect
to apparently mysterious phenomena: describe what you are trying to explain, and then come up with testable ex-
planations. This may sound trite, but it is not meant to. Just this strategy characterizes how the biology of life has
(successfully) unfolded: What was at one time monolithic and mysterious has become increasingly understood as a
constellation of biological processes each accounting for identifiable and partially separable features: metabolism,
reproduction, homeostasis, development, and the like [10].
Similarly, as well described by Baars and Edelman, subjective conscious experience has many separable phenome-
nal properties (such as unity, a first-person-perspective, and tightly-bound multimodal contents; see also [16]) that may
each depend on distinct but overlapping neural mechanisms. The challenge for consciousness science is to unravel
these mechanisms in ways which explain or account for the corresponding phenomenal features [5,7,14,15]. This
process can be characterized as the search for so-called explanatory correlates of consciousness (ECCs, [14]), which
represents a development of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) approach characterizing early work in

DOI of original article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2012.07.001.

* Correspondence to A.K. Seth: Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, UK. Tel.: +44 1273 678549.
E-mail address: a.k.seth@sussex.ac.uk.
URLs: http://www.anilseth.com, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sackler/.

1571-0645/$ see front matter 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.plrev.2012.07.005
298 A.K. Seth / Physics of Life Reviews 9 (2012) 297298

consciousness science [4,13] and is closely related to foundational theoretical approaches of both Baars [1] and (Ger-
ald) Edelman [6].
A good example of the ECC approach is the attempt to relate the integrated yet informative content of a con-
scious scene to a dynamic balance between integration and differentiation in the activity of the underlying neural
networks [18,17]. These proposals are complex and require the sustained contributions of physicists for their formu-
lation and operationalization, enabling testability. However, so far it is the tools of classical and especially statistical
and nonlinear-dynamical physics which are most fruitful when applied to the complex interacting networks of the
brain. As Baars and Edelman rightly emphasize, although all physical entities must be consistent with the principles
of quantum physics this does not mean that quantum descriptions are the most appropriate for explaining a particular
phenomenon. Indeed it has been repeatedly pointed out that the warm, wet, and large biological brain is an inhospitable
environment in which to expect quantum effects to dominate classical interactions [9,11].
What then underlies the perennial appeal of quantum approaches to consciousness? Roger Penrose based his theory
on the limits of formal computational systems with respect to conscious insight [12]; however we already know that
the brain is not a computer [6] so there seems little need to appeal to quantum principles on these grounds. Similarly
the famous observer effect by which a quantum superposition of states collapses when measured, while admittedly
perplexing, does not seem to require a conscious observer [9]. And the idea that the quantum indeterminism may
provide a haven for conscious free will in the face of the naturalization of volition, intention, and agency, seems
rather to misunderstand the nature of the problem rather than to provide any interesting new solutions [8].
Beyond all this lurks the so-called hard-problem of consciousness which in its common form wonders how it is
that any physical system could give rise to conscious experience at all [3]. Perhaps this is where quantum theories will
eventually dispel our ignorance (to put it unkindly: quantum mechanics is mysterious, consciousness is mysterious,
ergo, they must be deeply related)? But, to repeat an old joke, lets not put Descartes before the horse. Physicists have
laid bare many mysteries of the universe without accounting for the brute fact of its existence, and the same may well
turn out to be true for consciousness. While a useful testable insightful quantum theory of consciousness cannot be
excluded, life is short and as Baars and Edelman make abundantly clear, a classical science of consciousness is already
on the march.

References

[1] Baars BJ. A cognitive theory of consciousness. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; 1988.
[2] Baars BJ, Edelman DB. Consciousness, biology and quantum hypotheses. Phys Life Rev 2012;9(3):28594 [this issue].
[3] Chalmers DJ. The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; 1996.
[4] Crick F, Koch C. Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Semin Neurosci 1990;2:26375.
[5] Dehaene S, Changeux JP. Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing. Neuron 2011;70(2):20027.
[6] Edelman GM. The remembered present. New York, NY: Basic Books; 1989.
[7] Edelman GM. Naturalizing consciousness: a theoretical framework. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2003;100(9):55204.
[8] Haggard P. Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will. Nat Rev Neurosci 2008;9(12):93446.
[9] Koch C, Hepp K. Quantum mechanics in the brain. Nature 2006;440(7084):611.
[10] McKay CP. What is life and how do we search for it in other worlds? PLoS Biol 2004;2(9):E302.
[11] McKemmish LK, Reimers JR, McKenzie RH, Mark AE, Hush NS. Penrose-Hameroff orchestrated objective-reduction proposal for human
consciousness is not biologically feasible. Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 2009;80(2 Pt 1):021912.
[12] Penrose R. Consciousness, the brain, and spacetime geometry: an addendum. Some new developments on the Orch OR model for conscious-
ness. Ann N Y Acad Sci 2001;929:10510.
[13] Rees G, Kreiman G, Koch C. Neural correlates of consciousness in humans. Nat Rev Neurosci 2002;3(4):26170.
[14] Seth AK. Explanatory correlates of consciousness: theoretical and computational challenges. Cogn Comput 2009;1(1):5063.
[15] Seth AK. The grand challenge of consciousness. Front Psychol 2010;1(5):12.
[16] Seth AK, Baars BJ, Edelman DB. Criteria for consciousness in humans and other mammals. Conscious Cogn 2005;14(1):11939.
[17] Seth AK, Barrett AB, Barnett L. Causal density and integrated information as measures of conscious level. Philos Trans R Soc Lond Ser A
Math Phys Eng Sci 2011;369(1952):374867.
[18] Tononi G. Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto. Biol Bull 2008;215(3):21642.