Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
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DEMOCRACY &
ELECTIONS
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Ambassador Albert del Rosario
was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines from 2011 to 2016. He also served as
Philippine Ambassador to the United States of America from 2001 to 2006.
Manuel V. Pangilinan
is CEO and managing director of First Pacific Company Limited. He is also the chairman of
MPIC, PLDT, Meralco, and Smart Communications, among others.
Edgardo G. Lacson
is an honorary chairman of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI). He
was the former president of the Employers Confederation of the Philippines.
Ernest Z. Bower
is senior adviser for Southeast Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS). He is CEO of BowerGroupAsia (BGA), and a leading expert on Southeast Asia.
Introduction 1
Acknowledgements
voting systems in use that automate the recording or counting of votes cast. Other
systems verify voter eligibility and voter authentication. Some countries also
experiment with internet voting as a way to facilitate remote voting and to increase
voter participation and turnout. All of these efforts aim to ensure the credibility of
the democratic process and the reliability of election results.
While these technologies open up new frontiers and offer new possibilities for the
electoral process, there may be unforeseen risks, such as an increase in vote selling or
difficulty in auditing election results if the technology is not well designed. Careful
consideration must therefore be given to the risks of inappropriate or untimely
introduction of technology, especially if it has the potential to compromise voter
turnout as well as the credibility, transparency, and sustainability of the electoral
process.5
The long history of manual elections in the Philippines has always been subject to
electoral fraud. In manual elections, voters wrote the names of their candidates on
the ballot, which they drop in a box. These are read aloud and recorded on a tally
board.12 Such procedure allowed a lot of room for human intervention, which made
the process susceptible to fraud. In particular, electoral fraud can be in the form of
ballot snatching or substitutions, the infamous dagdag-bawas or vote padding and
shaving, voter disenfranchisement, as well as fabrication of election returns and
canvassed results. These problems had resulted to public outcry that impelled the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the constitutional body tasked to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations concerning the conduct of elections, to
adopt an automated election system in the Philippines.13
In 1992, the COMELEC initiated Operation Modex, or Modernization and
Excellence, to modernize the electoral process. The program involved several
components, such as the modernization of the voting process, conducting election
education campaigns, decentralization of COMELEC for better and more efficient
service delivery, and the professionalization of the body and its personnel. In the
following years, COMELEC began to commission foreign consultants to conduct
studies on election modernization in the Philippines and COMELEC officials also
traveled to the United States to inspect the American voting system. An American
company was then chosen to supply the canvassing equipment, with COMELEC
conducting public demonstrations using two loaned units from the supplier. No
contract between COMELEC and the supplier could be signed, however, pending
the passage of a law that will allow COMELEC to conduct the relevant electoral
reform.
Republic Act No. 8046 was the first electoral reform law in the Philippines.
Signed in 1995, it allowed the COMELEC to conduct a nationwide demonstration
of a computerized election system as well as a pilot test in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) for the 1996 elections. The change in administration
during that period also led to the repetition of the bidding process and another
supplier was chosen to provide the equipment for the pilot test. The new equipment
consisted of machines with optical mark recognition capacities in scanning and
tallying computerized ballots. COMELEC personnel and ARMM field officials were
then trained to handle the whole electoral process and the results were determined
TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 7
just 48 to 72 hours after the closing of the polls. Demonstrations of the new system
to the public followed.
In 1997, Republic Act No. 8436 was passed into law, which authorized COMELEC
to implement an automated election system in the May 1998 elections as well as in
subsequent national and local elections. But the automated system was only used
in a number of provinces Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi in
the 1998 elections because of the lack of preparation and budget on the part of
the COMELEC. Moreover, the machines used in some parts of the ARMM were
proven to have caused problems in the counting while irregularities in subsequent
elections discouraged the public from trusting the automated system.
It was not until after the 2004 elections that the use of the automated system
again received attention due to a vote padding and shaving controversy. Republic
Act No. 8436 was then amended by Republic Act No. 9369 in 2007 or the Election
Automation Law. In addition to the use of appropriate technology for the national
and local elections, the amendment calls for transparent, credible, fair and accurate
elections.14 During the 2008 elections in the ARMM, the paper-based system and
the direct recording electronic (DRE) election system were tested. Both of the
systems made the process of voting, counting, and canvassing faster while winning
candidates were announced within 48 hours after the closing of polls. Subsequently,
Republic Act No. 9525 which appropriated the sum of Php11.3 billion for an
automated election system was passed in the Senate.
An automated election system was conducted nationwide during the 2010
elections. The COMELEC primarily selected the paper-based election system
over other technologies such as the DRE because of its paper audit feature, while
Smartmatic Corp., Inc. (Smartmatic) and its local partner Total Information
Management Corp. (TIM) were chosen as the election technology providers.15
The 2010 automated elections altered the conduct of elections in the Philippines.
Elections pushed through as scheduled because all technical problems were
deemed to have been addressed, including the faulty memory chips of the counting
machines that were discovered a few weeks before election day. 75,882 machines
still worked smoothly, with only 465 machines or 0.6% reportedly malfunctioning.
Compared to past elections where the winners were known after weeks or months,
local winners were determined in a few hours while half of the national winners
were known after a day. More importantly, election-related violence and public
8 TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
anxiety were significantly reduced as the time for counting and canvassing of votes
was cut short.16
Observers of the 2013 elections made similar assessments. However, it was also
described as generally peaceful and organized especially due to the smaller volume
of election-related violence as compared to previous election years.17
Both the 2010 and 2013 elections made use of the paper-based election system
and Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines. For the 2016 elections, the
PCOS machines were replaced by Vote Counting Machines (VCMs) with enhanced
security and technology. The same technology provider of the PCOS machines,
Smartmatic, supplied the VCMs for the 2016 automated elections.
(RAM) that is 32 times bigger than used in the old PCOS, can charge external
battery while machine is plugged in, is capable of detecting stain and dirt so that
Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs) may be alerted.
Security was also enhanced with stronger encryption keys for digital signatures
and requiring three digital signatures to operate the VCM and transmit results.
Other improvements include the use of a more reliable SD cards as external storage
media, ultra-violet detectors for ballot authentication, a ballot segregation system
which prevents reading of ballots from other precinct. A source code review was
also conducted earlier for scrutiny of concerned parties. Printing of receipts or
Voter Verification Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) in order to verify if the machine has
correctly interpreted the ballot is also a feature of the VCM.
At the end of the election day, the votes are digitally counted. The votes counted
or election returns are printed and are then transmitted by the machines from the
voting precincts to the different canvassing servers and centers. Consolidation and
canvassing of election returns are transmitted on a ladderized manner from the
municipal board of canvassers (MBOC)/
city board of canvassers (CBOC), to
the provincial board of canvassers
(PBOC) and lastly the national board
of canvassers (NBOC). Both the MBOC
and PBOC transmit separate election
returns to the central servers. Moreover,
the viewing of transmitted election
results online was made possible
during the 2016 National Elections
through a public website set up by the
COMELEC.18
of election results and other electoral processes. There are three elements under this
system people, data or information, and procedure or system. The people include
all election stakeholders, from the election management bodies to the civil society
organizations and voters, while the data or information covers all election-related
information from election laws to campaign materials.
Section 7 of R.A. 8436, as amended by Sec. 7 of R.A. 9369, states that the
AES should have the following minimum system capabilities: adequate security
against unauthorized access; accuracy in recording and reading votes as well as in
the tabulation, consolidation or canvassing, electronic transmission, and storage
of results; error recovery in case of non-catastrophic failure of device; system
integrity which ensures physical stability and functioning of the vote recording and
counting process; provision for voter verified paper audit trail; system auditability
which provides supporting documentation for verifying the correctness of
reported election results; an election management system for preparing ballots and
programs for use in the casting and counting of votes and to consolidate, report
and display election results in the shortest time possible; accessibility to illiterates
and disabled voters; vote tabulating program for election, referendum or plebiscite;
accurate ballot counters; data retention provision; provide for the safekeeping,
storing and archiving of physical or paper resource used in the election process; it
must utilize or generate official ballots;
provide the voter a system of verification
to find out whether or not the machine
has registered his choice; and configure
access control for sensitive system data
and functions.
In addition, the COMELEC is also
mandated to develop and adopt an
evaluation system to ascertain that the
above minimum system capabilities are
met in the procurement of an appropriate
technology for the automated
elections. This evaluation system shall
be developed with the assistance of
an Advisory Council composed of
TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 11
Upon realizing that the process of computerized counting of vote marks on paper
ballots will be done internally and in secret by the computer, the framers of
12 TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
The Random Manual Audit is performed in order to check the results produced
by the poll counting machines against the manually counted ballots as prescribed
under Resolution 8837. After the electronic transmission of the results is over, the
Random Manual Audit (RMA) teams, under the supervision of the COMELEC
Technical Working Group (TWG), will conduct manual audits of ballot boxes
from five clustered precincts, which are randomly selected using a tambiolo with
numbered balls as in the case in 2010, and a randomizer software in 2016. This is
done in each of the 299 legislative districts in the country. In 2010, a total of 1,145
out of 76,340 precincts nationwide were subjected to random manual audit. In
the last elections, 715 precincts out of 92,509 clustered precincts were randomly
selected for the audit.
The positions that will be manually counted for the audit include the president,
vice president, district representative, governor and mayor.
What if problems and technical glitches surface on the election day? Are there
backup strategies prepared by COMELEC to address them? The legislature
14 TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
through Section 9 of R.A. 8436, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. 9369, has also
authorized COMELEC to put up a continuity plan, which is a set of instructions
and contingency plan involving machine replacements and other troubleshooting
procedures that are executed under the National Support Center command in case
of system failure or any other analogous situations.19
In July 2016, Pulse Asia Research Inc. conducted a nationwide survey on the May
2016 Elections. The fieldwork for this Ulat ng Bayan survey was conducted from
July 2 to 8, 2016 by means of face-to-face interviews based on a sample of 1,200
representative adults aged 18 years old and above. It has a 3% error margin at the
95% confidence level, while subnational estimates for each of the geographic areas
covered (i.e., Metro Manila, the rest of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao) have a 6%
error margin at 95% confidence level.
Table 1A. Standards of the May 2013/2016 Elections, June 2013 and July 2016/ Philippines
(In Percent)
June 2013 92 87 93 94 90 92 92 92
June 2013 7 10 6 4 9 6 7 7
June 2013 1 3 0 1 1 2 1 1
June 2013 34 28 26 59 31 35 39 21
June 2013 59 60 66 33 64 57 54 70
TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 15
Table 1B. Standards of the May 2013/2016 Elections, June 2013 and July 2016/ Philippines
(In Percent)
Base: Total Interviews, 100%
June 2013 13 13 12 14 15 17 15 7
June 2013 82 76 85 79 81 77 79 91
June 2013 5 10 3 7 4 6 6 2
PRESENCE OF VIOLENCE IN YOUR
PLACE
June 2013 10 10 10 13 6 16 10 7
June 2013 89 86 90 86 93 83 88 93
June 2013 1 4 0 2 1 1 2 0
June 2013 86 85 90 89 78 91 86 85
BELIEVABILITY OF RESULTS IN
YOUR PLACE
Results are believable July 2016 89 86 87 90 94 85 90 89
June 2013 88 82 91 90 83 88 87 89
June 2013 8 12 8 4 11 7 9 8
June 2013 4 6 1 6 5 6 4 3
16 TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
In addition, sizeable to big majorities consider the results of the 2016 polls to be
more credible (63%) and the pace of the release of electoral results to be faster (78%)
as compared to the 2010 elections. These are also the majority opinions in every
geographic area (55% to 71% and 74% to 81%, respectively) and socio-economic
groupings (59% to 65% and 75% to 81%, respectively).20 (Please refer to Table 2.)
Table 2. Comparing the 2016 Elections with the 2010 Elections Based on Standards
July 2-8, 2016/ Philippines
(In Percent)
PRESENCE OF CHEATING
More cheating now 5 5 3 9 4 5 5 5
Cant say 23 17 27 24 16 15 22 27
Faster now 78 81 77 80 74 81 78 75
Slower now 7 7 7 6 7 5 7 7
As fast as before 12 9 13 11 15 11 13 13
As slow as before 2 2 1 1 3 2 1 3
Cant say 2 1 2 2 1 0 2 2
CREDIBILITY OF RESULTS
As credible as before 20 16 23 17 20 16 20 22
In a media briefing past nine o clock in the evening on May 9, 2016, COMELEC
claimed that the transmission of votes for the 2016 National Elections is the fastest
in the countrys history of automated polls. Chairman Andres Bautista particularly
pointed out that the vote transmission rate as of eight o clock in the evening was
already at 60%. In the same hour, the transmission was at 17% in 2010 and at 23% in
TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 17
2013.21 The Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) also reported
that 96.14% of election results were transmitted to the transparency server within 3
days after elections, as compared to 90% in 2010 and 76% in 2013. They even noted
the 2016 voter turn-out, which, at 81%, is higher compared to the 77% in 2013 and
74% in 2010.22
In general, the fast public availability of vote tallies through unofficial figures
provided by PPCRV significantly shortened the period of uncertainty that used to
exist between the closing of polls and the public knowledge of results. The historic
81% voter turnout also was an important indicator of the credibility of the 2016
elections, with various election stakeholders and citizen groups assessing this years
polls as having been managed far better than the past automated elections in spite of
some problem areas. Although the electorates confidence in the results of the 2016
election system mainly stems from Rodrigo Dutertes wide victory margin, which
was supplemented by the formal concession announcements of his three leading
challengers,23 it is clear that the rapid transmission of results that dramatically
shortened the period of indeterminacy also did a lot in shoring up credibility and
believability of the elections.
On the other hand, election-related violence and vote buying remain the major
election irregularities that beset the elections. In the case of the former, records from
the Philippine National Police (PNP) and election watchdogs show a significant
decrease in election-related incidence (ERIs) since COMELEC introduced the
automated election system in the Philippines. PNP reported that from January 10
to June 8 of 2016, there had been 90 validated ERIs (out of 310 reported cases) as
compared to 178 in 2007, 166 in 2010, and 109 in 2013. This was also supported
by the tallies from other groups which counted 60 confirmed ERIs out of the 230
reported cases during the 2016 elections.24
The Carter Center, a US-based Non-Government Oranization (NGO) that
monitors elections, pointed out that violence around Philippine polls may or may
not be related to elections themselves and often has multiple causes, thus requiring
validation of all reported cases. In fact, a significant volume of violence is actually
linked to local-level rivalries such as clan feuds (also known as rido among the
Moro and pangayaw among the indigenous peoples in Mindanao), business-related
arguments, or kidnapping for ransom which is done to raise funds. However, they
maintained that the base level of general criminality and violence, much of which
18 TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
manual elections. Any attempt, assuming that electronic cheating is even possible,
should be massive and sporadically distributed to lessen the possibility of detection
especially given the vigilance of election watchdogs and the general public. Election-
related irregularities such as malfunctioning vote counting machines, inconsistent
vote receipts, power interruptions, etc. do not really amount to anything especially
if there are only a few isolated cases. But this is not to discount the possibility of
election cheating. In fact, cheating was observed in several precincts in the form
of election paraphernalia posting, illegal campaigning, and the presence of flying
voters, among others. However, such efforts have been inconsequential in terms of
national-level election results.29
On the other hand, much of the allegations of fraud in the 2016 elections
were primarily concentrated on the vice-presidential race. The camp of Senator
Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. claimed that cheating took place when a small change in one
of the output files hash due to corrections applied in some words, which COMELEC
described as cosmetic, coincided with an allegedly dubious rise in Representative
Leni Robredos votes. The change involved the letter () which Smartmatic had
tweaked, upon the request of a member of the media, so that the letter will appear as
it is and not as a question mark (?) in the data package containing election results.30
It should be noted that the City Prosecutor of Manila dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.
honest and credible, as measured by third party assessors like Pulse Asia, National
Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), among others.
Secondly, and another thing that the COMELEC did differently this 2016,
the commission intended to be more focused on the main constituents of the
COMELEC the voters. The poll body claimed that it looked for ways and means
by which it could enhance the voting experience especially by looking out for the
comfort and convenience of the voter.31
The COMELEC has theorized that a better voter experience would result
in a higher turnout, which would lead to a more solid mandate for the winning
candidates, thereby making the whole electoral exercise more credible. The net
effect is a much stronger democracy.
To achieve these twin objectives, the COMELEC also formulated the general
strategy of ICE TEA, or Inspire, Consult and Engage Transparent, Efficient, and
Accountable. Chairman Bautista explained the need to inspire the COMELEC
workforce who serves as the actual implementer of the elections. He likewise
posited the imperative for further consultation and deeper engagement with their
stakeholders, friends, and critics alike.
Chairman Bautista cited the role of ICE TEA in guiding the Commission as it
performed its tasks and functions32 in the last elections.
Aside from this general strategy to achieve its twin objectives, Chairman Bautista
said that the COMELEC still adopted a specific strategy for the 2016 automated
elections. The Commission aimed to improve upon its performance in the 2010
and 2013 polls, learn from the lessons of these elections, as well as demonstrate how
processes could be improved. (Please refer to Figure 1.) This led to the identification
of certain key resolved areas/performance indicators (KRAs/KPIs) against which
the COMELEC would be measured, and which eventually led to the development
of the COMELEC performance scorecard.33
The first KRA/KPI in the COMELEC performance scorecard is voter turnout.
As mentioned, the voter turnout for 2016 was almost 82% as compared to the 74%
in 2010 and 77% in 2013. This means that out of the 54.4 million registered voters,
about 40 million actually exercised their right of suffrage in this years polls.34
COMELEC Chairman Bautista particularly attributed this to the quality of the
candidates which include presidential front runner, and the current President,
Rodrigo Duterte.35 He also argued that since we had good candidates for the
presidency and vice-presidency, there had been a lot of interest in the elections.
With respect to our overseas Filipino voters, the voter turnout for this election
is also higher compared to the previous polls. According to Commissioner Arthur
Lim who is in charge of overseas absentee voting (OAV), they recorded a total of
432,706 (31.25% turnout) overseas absentee voters who participated in the elections
out of the 1,376,067 overseas Filipinos who registered.
The COMELEC actually aimed for 80% OAV turnout, but Atty. Jane Valeza,
Director of the COMELEC Office for Overseas Voting noted several factors that
prevented the achievement of such a score. These include the high mobility of
overseas Filipinos, the distance of residence from the Philippine embassy or
consulate where voting was carried out, postal inefficiencies in countries where
the OAV was manual. Despite these points, Lim said that OAV for this round of
elections was a success with the 2016 polls attracting the highest number of
registered overseas voters, which for the first time breached the 1 million mark,
and the highest number of registered overseas voters who actually voted.36
Moreover, even the turnout in the Local Absentee Voting (LAV) was higher
compared to that of the 2010 and 2013 elections. Chairman Bautista stated that
LAV in 2016 was 77.76% or a total of 19,225 out of the total 24,725 registered voters
for this elections compared to the 74.33% in 2010 and 65.59% in 2013.37 (Please
refer to Table 3.)
22 TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
Total Overseas
Filipino Voters 589,830 737,759 1,376,067
Turnout 25.99% 16.11% 31.25%
The second KRA/KPI in the scorecard is ballot printing. Although printing had
been delayed at least three times, eventually starting on February 18, 2016 from the
supposed January 25, 2016 date, Chairman Bautista argued that this years printing
of the 56,772,230 ballots in 49 days was by far the fastest in automated election
history. He also noted that the said printing process was done within a shorter
period, even if the number of ballots was greater than the past elections, compared
to the ballot printing that ran for 81 days in 2010 and 57 days in 2013.
The delay was caused by, among other things, a case filed by presidential bet
Senator Grace Poe against the COMELEC before the Supreme Court (SC), which
prevented the Commission from finalizing its list of candidates until the verdict
was out. As a result, the COMELEC had targeted to finish ballot printing at the
National Printing Office (NPO) in Quezon City by April 25. Yet exactly a month
before the May 9 polls, COMELEC announced on April 9 that it has printed all of
the needed ballots more than two weeks ahead of schedule.
The Chairman also explained that despite the uncertainties brought about
by the delays in printing, they were able to make the printing process faster by
reformatting the ballot. By just repositioning the names of the candidates, they
were able to shrink this years ballot to 20 inches which is around 5 to 7 inches
shorter than the ballots used in 2010 and 2013.38 (Please refer to Table 4.)
TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 23
Total No. of
Days to Complete 81 57 49
Printing
The third KRA/KPI is voter education campaign. After 24 years, the COMELEC
was able to reintroduce the debates for the presidential and vice-presidential
candidates. However, Chairman Bautista also acknowledged the Commissions
lack of time, expertise, and resources needed in organizing the debates. To offset
these weaknesses, the COMELEC partnered with media outfits and tapped the
support of the private sector. As a result, the COMELEC successfully mounted a
total of four debates held at Capitol University in Cagayan de Oro, University of
the Philippines in Cebu, University of Pangasinan in Dagupan, and University of
Santo Tomas in Manila.
COMELEC went to great lengths to ensure that all registered voters are informed
on how to properly cast their votes using the VCM. One measure it implemented
was the installation of signage and posters detailing the step-by-step voting
procedures. These signage and posters have been set up by election officers in high-
pedestrian traffic areas, rail transit stations, and bus and airport terminals, among
others. And on election day, signage and posters were also set up in the polling
places to effectively direct voters to special lanes and/or assistance desks as well as
guide them throughout the voting process.39
Aside from the instructional component of voter education, the COMELEC
also aimed to inspire voters to fulfill their patriotic duty to vote. To this end, they
used the branding PILI-PINAS 2016. Tamang Pagboto. Tamang Pagbilang (Choose,
Philippines 2016. Right way to vote. Right way to count.)
In addition, the COMELEC organized a nationwide roadshow to conduct
demonstrations of the VCM before live audiences. The goal of the roadshow was
to demonstrate the features of the VCM and let voters try and experience how
24 TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
to cast their ballot on election day. The COMELEC also produced TV and radio
commercials for nationwide airing to extend the reach of such campaign.
And as part of its voter education efforts, the Commission launched www.Pili-
Pinas2016.com, which was separate from the regular COMELEC website. The site
was envisioned to be an online portal to all matters relevant to voter education,
featured the latest election news, step-by-step tutorials on the proper use of the
VCM, blogposts from the COMELEC Chairman, online application for media
accreditation and VCM demo requests, social media feeds, and a host of other
important information.40 (Please refer to Table 5.)
The fourth KRA/KPI is accuracy. With the assistance of NAMFREL and the
Philippine Statistics Authority, COMELEC carried out the Random Manual
Audit (RMA) of votes to validate the 2016 automated election results. Under R.A.
9369, there should be an RMA in at least one precinct in each legislative district.
COMELEC Commissioner Luie Guia, who headed the RMA efforts for the 2016
polls, explained that the process ensures that votes are being properly counted
under the automated system. In the light of this, the number of precincts for audit
was increased and the pace speeded up.
The COMELEC ended up conducting a manual audit of results from 715
TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 25
clustered precincts nationwide as compared to the 235 precincts in the 2010 and
2013 elections.41 The poll body randomly selected precincts from each legislative
district in proportion to the voter population of that area. According to a report
by Smartmatic, there were 1,145 randomly-chosen precincts for manual audit
nationwide during the 2010 polls, while results from 418 precincts were recalled
by the COMELEC in 2013 to double-check disparities with the electronic count.
Last June 10, 2016, the RMA team announced that the count done by the
VCMs matched the manual count with 99.884%, or almost perfect, accuracy.42 In
2010, the accuracy rate as computed via the RMA was 99.6% and this increased to
99.975% in 2013.43 The team noted that the slight disparity between the manual
and electronic counts this year was mainly because of interpretations of auditors on
ambiguous ballot marks. In particular, the VCMs only recognized ovals that were
shaded at least 25% so marks smaller than that were not read. Auditors also noted
a number of ballots that had wrong marks and the COMELEC recalled for further
scrutiny ballots from precincts that reported more than 10 cases of disparity.44
As earlier mentioned, the transmission rate in 2016 topped the figures in 2013
and in 2010. Chairman Bautista explained that the COMELEC focused in ensuring
the fast transmission of results this year to preclude any suspicion caused by delay.
For Chairman Bautista, the credibility of the elections was predicated largely on
speedy transmission of results. He also attributed the higher rate of electronic
transmission to a well-executed plan that saw the COMELEC, Smartmatic, and
the TELCOS working together to identify areas with poor cellular signal and
implement remedies such as the deployment of satellites in such areas.45
The voter receipt was still another interesting aspect of the 2016 elections. On
March 17, 2016, the Supreme Court (SC) ordered a final and executory decision
ordering the COMELEC to issue printed receipts, denying the poll bodys motion
for reconsideration. In a unanimous vote, the SC had previously asked COMELEC
to enable the voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) feature of the VCMs as
being one of the security features mandated by R.A. 9369. A voter verified paper
audit trail consists of physical paper records of voter ballots as voters cast them
electronically, and the COMELEC had not yet enabled such feature until this years
automated elections.
The COMELEC had questioned the said ruling, saying that reconfiguring the
VCMs to issue the paper receipt will derail the election timetable. The poll body
26 TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
also presented two options in its appeal to the SC holding the May 9 polls as
scheduled without a new trusted build or postponing the elections to May 23 with a
new trusted build. The SC chose the first option which the COMELEC must comply
with. However, Chairman Bautista subsequently warned that without a new trusted
build for the source code, about 20% of the VCMs that will be used during the
elections may malfunction.
The COMELEC also raised other concerns that activating the feature could
prolong the voting procedure, encourage vote buying, or cause confusion which
can lead to cheating allegations. It argued that the receipts would not have served
any legal purpose as the absence of security features like the hash code, precinct
number, and location rendered it without any evidentiary value. It claimed that
the receipts would have merely given psychological comfort to the voters that their
votes were counted by the VCMs. Yet in the end, the COMELEC complied with the
ruling as well as studied the possible risks and corresponding measures to ensure
clean elections in 2016.46
In hindsight, Chairman Bautista said that the ruling probably was a blessing
in disguise for COMELEC as it enhanced the voting experience. Filipinos were
generally happy to see that the receipt was able to correctly show the candidates
that they were voting for. He also added that for the succeeding elections, the
Commission will therefore improve upon the voter receipts that are going to be
produced so that they will also have
security features such as the hash code,
precinct number, and location.47
The COMELEC also claimed that
voting had been much easier for the
illiterate and people with disabilities
(PWDs) as they activated the audio
feature of the VCMs in this years
elections. In case they had someone
shade the ballots in their behalf, they
will be able to know who their assistants
really voted for using the headphones
which will be provided to them.48
(Please refer to Table 6.)
TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 27
KRA/KPI: ACCURACY
2010 2013 2016
The fifth KRA/KPI is security. In addition to the VVPAT, the COMELEC had
enabled the three other security features of the VCM for the 2016 polls the digital
signatures, ultraviolet (UV) lamps, and the source code. While the SC had stated
that the signature of the machine was sufficient for the purposes of R.A. 9369,
COMELEC said that there was an added security if the BEIs digital signatures
were also used.49 The BEIs, on the other hand, were supposed to digitally sign the
election returns and certificates of canvass in 2010 but the feature was disabled
by COMELEC For 2016, the Commission had the machine signature as well as
the three signatures from the BEIs which were used to authenticate all transmitted
election results.
Technology-wise, the COMELEC pointed out that the VCM is a step-up from
the PCOS machines, boasting of a more robust system owing to an upgraded 256-
bit security encryption and 1gHz processor.
While the PCOS machines used Compact Flash(CF) cards, the VCMs used the
more robust SD (secure digital) cards. The VCMs are also capable of simultaneous
saving and data corruption recovery by using replacement memories making data
corruption less likely.50 Such upgrade was intended to improve the reliability of the
external media and avoid problems with CF cards in the past elections.
The UV detection feature for the ballots was also enabled to detect fake ballots for
this years elections. In the 2010 elections, COMELEC had disabled the said feature
and instead used portable or hand-held UV lamps.51 (Please refer to Table 7.)
28 TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
KRA/KPI: SECURITY
The sixth KRA/KPI is transparency. Chairman Bautista said that the COMELEC
had a vastly-improved implementation of mock elections for the 2016 polls, with
the poll body conducting the exercise in 40 locations nationwide. The mock
polls, open to the public and to the media for transparency, essentially served as
a technical rehearsal to test and ensure adequate security, accuracy, and credibility
of the VCMs, the transmission devices, and consolidation and canvassing system.
Other issues included paper jams as well as misread ballots caused by ballot
defects or the presence of dirt in the optical scanner. Aside from being one of the
four security features of the VCM, the source code review is also a vital transparency
indicator for the elections. The source code refers to the version of a software as
originally written by a human in plain text. The source code review is therefore
important because it allows participants to review, line by line, the software to be
used in the polls.
There were two phases of the source code review the first involving a review of
the base code, and the second, of the final customized source code. The first phase
was launched by the COMELEC on October 2015 and it allowed participants to
take a look at the base source code submitted by Smartmatic including the code
of three systems EMS, VCM, and CCS. During the first phase, Smartmatic also
provided the on-site support of a developer for each of the systems to explain the
code to the reviewers. Moreover, participants had the chance to issue a report with
recommendations at the conclusion on December 15, 2016 , which were taken into
account in preparing the final customized source code.
TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 29
The second phase was launched three months before the 2016 polls. It allowed
the reviewers to inspect the final customized source code including all the
customizations required by the COMELEC such as the type of information reflected
on the VCM screen as well as the language used in the screen display. The two phases
of the source code review were made available to the public and an independent
certification agency, SLI Global Solutions, was hired by the COMELEC to review
and certify the source code. The certification that was issued by SLI on January 27
indicated that the final customized code was found to be without errors or malicious
codes, and that such code complies with all of COMELECs requirements.52
This was markedly different from the experiences during the previous automated
polls, during which less than a month was given for the review, as in the 2010
elections. In 2013, a legal dispute between Smartmatic and Dominion prevented an
early source code review and left only four days for the whole activity.
Chairman Bautista cited this as part of the COMELECs efforts to promote
transparency for the 2016 elections, which included giving more interested groups,
political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and civil society organizations a
longer period to review the source code.53
Another measure that shored up the credibility of the elections was the public
ballot printing tracking system, which allowed everyone to track how the ballots are
being printed, and ensure that no excess
ballots are being printed or distributed
throughout the country.
On May 8, 2016, the COMELEC
also unveiled a special website for
the publication of election results.
COMELEC Spokesperson James
Jimenez announced that the website
www.pilipinaselectionresults2016.com
would be publishing election results
and certificates of canvass transmitted
to the poll bodys central server. The
public site system did not rank vote
tallies but merely summed these up by
location. The site canvassed the results
30 TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
for the Senate and party-list race but not for the presidential and vice-presidential
contest as canvassing of the latter races is the sole province of Congress sitting as
the NBOC.54 (Please refer to Table 8.)
Source Code Review before the 2010 before the 2013 3 Months
elections elections before the 2016
elections for final
review
The seventh and last KRA/KPI in the scorecard is election services. According
to Chairman Bautista, election services are important in meeting the Commissions
objective to become more voter-centric and to look for ways by which they can
enhance the voting experience.
In terms of accessibility, the COMELEC reported that they were able to increase
the number of PWA-friendly polling centers to 289 in 2016 from four in 2013. They
also partnered with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Philippine Association
of Law Schools and the Public Attorneys Office to set up legal assistance desks in
polling precincts, which ensured that legal assistance was available for any voter or
BEI who needed it.
The availability of medical assistance in the polling centers was another
innovation that the poll body introduced in this election. Together with the
Department of Health (DOH), the COMELEC set up medical assistance desks in
the large polling precincts ready to render first aid to voters who required it. Due
TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 31
to the summer heat, some 17,000 people who experienced fainting, dizziness, or
elevated blood pressure were taken to these desks for medical assistance.
According to Chairman Bautista, election related violence reportedly went
down in 2016, which is consistent with third-party assessments. According to the
PNP, incidents of election-related violence fell from 166 in 2010 to109 in 2013, and
all the way to 90 in 2016.
An accessibility audit of the polling places was also implemented in the last
elections. A continuing program of the Commission with the Department of
Public Works and Highways and the United Architects of the Philippines, the audit
aims in order to improve the facilities of Philippine public schools to make them
more accessible to voters especially to senior citizens and persons with disabilities
(PWDs).
Moreover, the COMELEC was successful in making the 2016 elections more
inclusive to indigenous people (IP). Under the supervision of Commissioner Guia,
the poll body set up special polling centers in the upland areas of Mindoro to service
Mangyans who were uncomfortable in going to the lowlands to vote. The historic
initiative was responsible for getting about 90% of the Mangyans to participate in
the last elections. Finally, the mall registration initiative was successful in getting
500,000 voters to sign up in participating malls nationwide.55 (Please refer to Table 9.)
The Random Manual Audit Committee reported the Automated Election System
99.9% accurate after months of testing over 700 clustered polling precincts
representing legislative districts nationwide.
The Random Manual Audit Committee composed of the COMELEC,
NAMFREL and Philippine Statistics Authority stated that data from 687 precincts
show audit counts matched 99.9023 percent accuracy.
The National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) deemed the 2016
elections to have been better managed than the preceding two automated polls.
It cited the higher rate and faster transmission of results that ultimately reached
TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 33
96%. NAMFREL likewise noted improvements in the VCM which registered less
incidence of ballot-rejection, lower rate of malfunction, and the insignificant
number of reported discrepancy between the voters receipt and the actual votes.
The election watchdog also pointed out the COMELECs initiatives such as the
nationally-televised debates and heavy presence of how-to-vote signage in voting
centers on Election Day as having enhanced the voters experience.
The PPCRV commended Commissioner Christian Robert Lim who headed the
steering committee. It made mention of the highest and fastest transmission rate
of electronic results that the group received from the COMELEC Transparency
Server ever since Philippine elections underwent automation in 2010.
Still, the civil society organizations have identified several issues that have beset
the last elections. NAMFREL reported that the COMELEC ignored the law and
insisted on using the Machine Digital Signature proposed by Smartmatic, while RA
9369 states that the election returns and certificates of canvass should be digitally
signed by the BEI prior to transmission in order for these election reports to be
used in proclaiming the winning candidates. For this years elections, the ICT
Office (ICTO) of Department of Science and Technology (DOST) expressed their
capability in supplying COMELEC with Digital Certificates for signing by the BEIs
and the BOCs, yet COMELEC did not push through with it.58
Corazon Akol, NAMFREL Systems Committee Chair, argued that a lot of
questions on transparency and charges on vote manipulation would have been
avoided if the Digital Signatures employing both a Public Key and a Private
Key were used. With the Public Key, the Public can have access to packets of
information transmitted by the VCMs. In addition, accredited stakeholders, given
the Encryption Code, can do the data conversion into useful information that
they can process. Full transparency can therefore be achieved because access to
transmission data will provide the metadata in the transmission log including the
unique machine IDs of each of the VCMs, the time of transmission, and the BEIs
ID.59
In the matter of the source code review, some of the reviewers have noted the
improvements in the process compared with the past two automated elections. Dr.
Pablo Manalastas was of the opinion that the system was secure and would be quite
difficult to hack in favor of one candidate. There was still the general sentiment
among Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that reviewing the source code was a
34 TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS
challenge. One of the common issues raised by the reviewers is that while the
COMELEC invited all interested stakeholders to participate, the process was only
limited to reading of the codes. Such sentiment needs to be tempered with the
greater imperative to safeguard the source code from unauthorized manipulation.
Lastly, the CSOs had the common observation that the COMELEC website
containing the National and Local Elections of 2016 was no longer available to
display election day results versus electronically transmitted from all VCMs and
CCS nationwide. According to PPCRV IT Director Dr. William Yu, the display
would have been a great transparency measure that could be used by different
stakeholders in their own assessments of the elections, yet it had been unavailable for
quite some time up to the present. Section 33 of RA 9369 states that the COMELEC
shall post its digital files in its website for the public to view or download at any
time of the day and should maintain the files for at least three years from the date
of posting. The unavailability of the said website is therefore a clear violation of the
law.60
Despite the fact that the AES Law does not cover data protection issues, CSOs
additionally pointed out that the Comeleak incident compromised the publics
trust in the COMELEC and in government agencies holding the citizens sensitive
data. This was described as the single biggest problem that the COMELEC has
faced. Vital information that should be treated with utmost confidentiality was lost
by the Commission. Not only were the information leaked, the COMELEC couldnt
bring them back up. A lot of people were dependent on this information, resulting
to disenfranchised voters who couldnt find their polling places.61
TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 35
Conclusion
RMA protocols should carefully distinguish between ballot marks not scanned
in accordance with VCM settings from outright failure of VCM scanning. The term
Digital Signature should be placed in the law, and be defined in an Amendment
to the AES Law. The COMELEC should place relevant information on the VVPAT
to make it a more effective transparency measure. The Source Code Review should
not be limited to only reading the codes but should also allow the use of software
tools to test the system. Finally, the poll body should restore the NLE 2016 Results
on its website or on a separate one linked to its official website for enhanced
transparency and public access.
TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS 37
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ADR Institute gratefully acknowledges all those who have extended their support,
cooperation, and commitment in the development of this project. This publication
would not have materialized without their help.
We would also like to thank Prof. Victor Andres Dindo Manhit, President of
the ADR Institute, for his leadership, vision, and guidance in making this endeavor
possible.
Last but not the least, we would like to thank the following for their hard work
and dedication, and for working tirelessly towards the completion of this project:
Deputy Executive Director for Research, Ms. Angelica Mangahas, and Senior
Research Associate, Ms. Weslene Uy, who both served as the editorial staff;
Our design consultant, Ms. Carol Manhit, for the publication lay-out and cover
design;
And the rest of the ADRi team headed by Executive Director, Atty. Katrina
Clemente-Lua, Deputy Executive Director for Programs, Ms. Ma. Claudette
Guevara, Program Associate, Ms. Vanesa Lee, and External Affairs and Social
Media Associate, Ms. Krystyna Dy.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR