Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
:
Amrica Latina y el Caribe,
los cambios regionales y
los desafos globales
Anuario de la Integracin Regional de
Amrica Latina y el Caribe, No. 10, 2014
Coordinadores
Andrs Serbin (CRIES, Buenos Aires)
Laneydi Martnez (CEHSEU, La Habana)
Haroldo Ramanzini Jnior (UFU e INCT-INEU, So Paulo)
Atlntico vs. Pacco?:
Amrica Latina y el Caribe,
los cambios regionales y
los desafos globales
Anuario de la Integracin Regional de
Amrica Latina y el Caribe, No. 10, 2014
Coordinadores
Andrs Serbin (CRIES, Buenos Aires)
Laneydi Martnez (CEHSEU, La Habana)
Haroldo Ramanzini Jnior (UFU e INCT-INEU, So Paulo)
Coordinadora Regional de
Investigaciones Econmias y Sociales
1
Indice
ISBN 980-317-196-8
ISSN - 1317-0953
Dedicado a la memoria de
Daniel van Eeuwen y de
Norman Girvan
7
Andrs Serbin, Lanyedi Martnez
8
y Haroldo Ramanzini Jnior
Notas
1. Ver al respecto de las transformaciones hemisfricas Hershberg, Eric;
Andrs Serbin y Tullo Vigevani (eds.) El hemisferio en transformacin:
Regionalismo, multilateralismo y polticas exteriores en un entorno
cambiante, edicin especial de Pensamiento Propio, No. 39, enero-
julio 2014, ao 19, accesible en www.cries.org
Tendencias globales
y transformaciones
regionales
Andrs Serbin
Laneydi Martnez
13
14 Anuario de Integracin 9 | Ao 2012
Atlntico vs. Pacfico?:
Mega-acuerdos e
implicaciones
geo-estratgicas para
Amrica Latina
y el Caribe1
Andrs Serbin
Presidente de la Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones
Econmicas y Sociales (CRIES). Doctor en Ciencias Polticas y Profesor
Titular jubilado de la Universidad Central de Venezuela; Investigador
Emrito del CONICYT del mismo pas; Presidente Emrito y fundador
del Instituto Venezolano de Estudios Sociales y Polticos (INVESP),
y actualmente Consejero del Consejo Argentino de Relaciones
Internacionales (CARI). Ha sido Director de Asuntos del Caribe del
Sistema Econmico Latinoamericano (SELA) y asesor, en varias
ocasiones, del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Venezuela y de
diversos organismos internacionales. Asimismo, ha sido profesor e
investigador invitado en diversas universidades de los EEUU (Harvard,
Pennsylvania y FIU), Gran Bretaa (Warwick) y Francia (Sorbonne III y
Marseille/Aix en Provence); y en diversas
universidades de Amrica Latina y el Caribe.
e-mail: aserbin@cries.org
15
Andrs Serbin
Tanto los EEUU como la UE, aunque puedan ser reas en declive
coyuntural en relacin al ascenso de Asia, continan siendo los
mercados de mayor renta pr cpita ms importantes para las
exportaciones regionales, y la principal fuente de IED, en particular
en sectores manufactureros y de servicios, y persisten como
socios de gran relevancia para promover inversiones y empleo
de calidad a travs de la transferencia de tecnologa. Por otra
parte, en lo que se refiere a los mercados emergentes de Asia y a
los Estados Unidos, a travs de la propuesta de mega-acuerdos
como el Acuerdo Transpacfico (TTP), y el Acuerdo de Comercio
e Inversiones del Atlntico Norte (TTIP), existe un importante
potencial de triangulacin econmica que vindica la estrategia,
planteada desde ambas regiones, de promover una red de acuerdos
de asociacin. De hecho, la estrategia de acuerdos comerciales que
han perseguido distintos actores de la regin ha creado una base
adecuada para la triangulacin productiva, en particular entre los
pases latinoamericanos que han firmado acuerdos con la UE y con
los Estados Unidos, a la par de seguir formando parte de esquemas
de integracin regional (Sanahuja 2014:185).
Por otra parte, los ltimos aos han marcado una serie de tendencias
claras, tanto en el mbito de Asia-Pacfico, como en el espacio
latinoamericano y su relacin con este mbito. Consecuentemente,
en el nuevo mapa del poder global, la regin del Pacfico detenta
una posicin privilegiada. Para Amrica Latina, abre una gran
oportunidad: el foro de los Acuerdos de Cooperacin Econmica Asia-
Pacfico (APEC), en el que participan pases de la regin y la creacin
de la Alianza del Pacfico, son pasos importantes en este sentido.
Asimismo, la Alianza debera servir al conjunto de Amrica Latina
para facilitar la relacin con Asia, con la TPP, con el ASEAN, y con la
Asociacin Econmica Comprensiva Regional (RCEP), promovida por
China, la cual los pases de la regin deberan considerar en forma
conjunta y estratgica (Bitar 2013: 37-39). No obstante, como seala
Ardila (2012:20), hasta la actualidad, la estrategia latinoamericana de
insercin en Asia-Pacfico carece de claridad, abriendo interrogantes
acerca de si existe una estrategia conjunta o si son ms bien una serie
de acciones que requeriran del fortalecimiento entre los mismos
pases de la regin y dentro de cada uno de ellos.
Sin embargo, por su parte, China est presionando para crear un vasto
tratado de libre comercio en la regin Asia-Pacfico, como alternativa
al TPP. Al respecto, China ha propuesto crear un grupo de trabajo
para estudiar la factibilidad de un Acuerdo de Libre Comercio Asia
Pacfico (FTAAP), anunciado en su momento por Wang Shouwen,
viceministro de Comercio chino16.
Por otra parte, es evidente que la negociacin entre los dos mayores
bloques econmicos de la economa mundial no dejar de afectar
la economa global. Si el TTIP logra avanzar en una integracin
profunda seguramente reactivar la economa del Atlntico como
el foco persistente de la dinmica econmica global y generar
innovaciones que reactivarn su relevancia (Hbner 2014:47). Un
estudio reciente de dos think-tanks alemanes el Bertelsmann
Stiftung y el IFO Institute sealan que en trminos econmicos,
tanto los EEUU como la UE se beneficiarn significativamente del
TIIP y de la profundizacin de la liberalizacin comercial, con un
incremente del PIB per cpita y un aumento del empleo en ambos
bloques (George et al. 2014)22.
Otros investigadores sealan, por otra parte, que la Alianza del Pacfico
ha sido postulada por polticos y analistas como una fuerza contraria
al MERCOSUR, en tanto la AP se presenta como pragmtica en lo
poltico, abierta en lo comercial, liberal en lo financiero y ms funcional
a los intereses de Estados Unidos en lo geopoltico, mientras que
MERCOSUR, por el contrario, constituira un anacronismo estancado
por su populismo ideolgico, su defensa del proteccionismo
mercantilista y el recelo a los actores financieros internacionales, a la
vez de ser el sostn de un proyecto ms autnomo de Washington.
Dentro de esta lnea podran distinguirse dos vertientes en la
regin: una de oposicin selectiva y limitada a EEUU (de inspiracin
brasilea) y otra de desafo y confrontacin (emanada desde Caracas
y consolidada en el eje de los pases denominados bolivarianos)
(Turzi 2014:79). No obstante, ambos esquemas el MERCOSUR y
la Alianza del Pacfico no seran inherentemente incompatibles
o antinmicos, aunque refieren a dos modelos de integracin
diferentes: regionalismo abierto y bilateralismo competitivo,
asociados a diferencias de naturaleza social y poltica, que hacen a la
diversidad de esta fase del regionalismo (Turzi 2014:81-82).
Notas
1. El autor agradece los valiosos comentarios y observaciones
hechas a este captulo por parte de Wolf Grabendorff , de Haroldo
Ramanzini Jnior y de Laneydi Martnez.
Bibliografa
Albertoni, Nicols (2013) Desafos de Amrica Latina para
2013, recuperado de: http:/opinin.infobae.com/nicolas-
albertoni/2012/12/31/desafiosdeAmericaLatina-para-2013
Altmann-Borbn, Josette (2013) ALBA en su ciclo ms bajo desde su
conformacin, en Cuadernos sobre Relaciones Internacionales,
regionalismo y Desarrollo, vol. 8, No. 18, julio-dic. 2013, pp. 71-80.
A New Atlantic Community: Generating Growth, Human Development
and Security in the Atlantic Hemisphere, Washington D.C.: Center for
Transatlantic Relations, 2014.
Anguiano Roch, Eugenio (2013) El Acuerdo Transpacfico: una visin
geopoltica, en Oropeza Garca, Arturo (coord.) El Acuerdo de
Asociacin Transpacfico: bisagra o confrontacin entre el Pacfico y
el Atlntico?, Mxico D.F.: UNAM, pp. 21-35.
Aquino, Carlos (2014) El TPP, el futuro del foro APEC y la inclusin
de nuevos miembros, 26 de febrero de 2014. Revisado el 7 de
septiembre en http://asiapacifico-carlos.blogspot.com.ar/2014/02/
el-tpp-el-futuro-del-foro-apec-y-la_26.html
Ardila, Martha (2012) Introduccin, en Ardila, Martha (ed.) El pacfico
latinoamericano y su insercin internacional, Bogot: Pontificia
Universidad Javeriana, pp. 17-25.
Ayerbe, Luis Fernando (org.) (2011). Cuba, Estados Unidos y Amrica
Latina ante los desafos hemisfricos. Buenos Aires - Barcelona: Icaria
Editorial - Ediciones CRIES.
accessed on 30.10.2013).
Kolsky Lewis, Meredith (2011) The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New
Paradigm or Wolf in Sheeps Clothing, en Boston College International
and Comparative Law Review, vol. 34, Issue 1, 1-1-2011, pp. 27-52.
Recuperado de http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol34/iss1/3
Kupchan, Charles (2014) The Geopolitical Implications of Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership, en Transatlantic Academy paper
Series, June 2014, pags. 1-7, en www.transatlanticacademy.org/
publications
Lechini, Gladys (2009) La cooperacin Sur-Sur y la bsqueda de
autonoma en Amrica Latina: Mito o realidad?, en Relaciones
Internacionales, no. 12, octubre 2009, pp. 55-81.
Lechini, Gladys (2010) El lugar de frica en la presidencia de los Kirchner
(2006-2009), en Bologna, Bruno et al. La poltica exterior de Cristina
Fernndez, Rosario: Editorial de la Universidad Nacional de Rosario,
pp. 217-241.
Llenderozas, Elsa (2014) Poltica exterior latinoamericana y las
Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeos, en Bonilla,
Adrin e Isabel lvarez (eds.) Desafos estratgicos del regionalismo
contemporneo: CELAC e Iberoamrica, San Jos: FLACSO-AECID,
pp. 129-149.
Maihold, Gnther (2014) BRICS, MIST, MIKTA: Mxico entre poderes
emergentes, potencias medias y responsabilidad global, en Revista
Mexicana de Poltica Exterior, No. 100, enero-abril 2014, pp. 63-79.
Malamud, Andrs (2009) Leadership without Followers: The Contested
Case for Brazilian Power Status, en Martins, E.C. de R..e M.G. Saraiva
(orgs) Brazil, Uniao Europea, Amrica do Sul: Anos 2010-2020, Brasilia:
Fundaao Konrad Adenauer, pp. 126-148.
Malamud, Andrs (2012) La Unin Europea, del interregionalismo con
Amrica Latina a la asociacin estratgica con Brasil, en Revista
CIDOB dAfairsInternationals, No. 97-98, abril 2012, pp. 219-230.
Malamud, Andrs and Isabella Alcaiz (2014) Managing Security in a
Zone of Peace: Brazils Soft Approach to Regional Governance, EUI
WorkingPaper RICAS 2014/50, EuropeanUniversityInstitute.
Malamud, Carlos (2012): La Alianza del Pacfico: un revulsivo para la
integracin regional en Amrica Latina, ARI 46/2012, Real Instituto
El Cano, 27 de junio del 2012, 5 pgs.
Malamud, Carlos (2014a) Chile y su apuesta por la difcil convergencia
entre la Alianza del Pacfico y MERCOSUR, 7/0/2014, Real Instituto
Elcano, Elcano blog.
Malamud, Carlos (2014b) The TTIP and MERCOSUR, in in Roy, Joaqun and
Roberto Domnguez (eds.) The Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership between the European Union and the United States,
Miami-Florida European Union Center Jean Monnet Chair-Argentine
Council of Foreign Relations (CARI), Buenos Aires, pp. 173-183.
Laneydi Martnez
Economista, investigadora y profesora del Centro de Estudios
Hemisfricos y sobre Estados Unidos (CEHSEU) de la Universidad de
La Habana. Mster en Ciencias Econmicas (2007) por la Facultad
de Economa y en Estudios Caribeos (2011) por la Ctedra de
Estudios del Caribe, ambas en la Universidad de La Habana. Es
co-coordinadora del Programa de Integracin Regional de la
Coordinadora de Investigaciones Econmicas y Sociales (CRIES).
e-mail: laneydi@rect.uh.cu
73
Laneydi Martnez
Amrica
Latina y 5.4 5.2 3.6 -2.1 5.4 3.9 3.0
el Caribe
Grficos 1.
Correlaciones del PIB de Amrica Latina y el Caribe en relacin
Estados Unidos, Unin Europea y China, 1961-2013.
.03 .15 .15
Fuente: Elaborado por la autora a partir de las bases de datos estadsticas del
Banco Mundial (2013)17
Tabla 2.
Amrica Latina y el Caribe: participacin de Estados Unidos, Unin
Europea y China en el comercio total de la regin, 2000-2020 (%).
2000 2009 2020
Importaciones
Estados Unidos 51% 33.1% 26.1%
Unin Europea 14% 14.7% 14%
China Alrededor del 1% 9.5% 16.2%
Exportaciones
Estados Unidos 60% 38.6% 28.4%
Unin Europea 12% 13.8% 13.6%
China Cercano a cero 7.6% 19.3%
Rasgo 1a): Desde los inicios del siglo XXI, la presencia comercial de
China en la regin (tanto por el lado de las importaciones como de
las exportaciones) ha crecido aceleradamente, en un contexto en
el cual Estados Unidos y la Unin Europea, dos socios tradicionales
principales Estados Unidos y la Unin Europea han disminuido y
mantenido su participacin como socios comerciales de la regin.
Este ltimo rasgo constituye, esencialmente, un hecho irrefutable en
los ltimos 10 aos.
Exportaciones
Importaciones
Fuente: Elaborado por la autora a partir de datos del
Departamento de Comercio de Estados Unidos.
Grfico 4.
Fuente: Elaborado por la autora a partir de datos del Banco Mundial.
Conclusiones
El contexto geopoltico y geoeconmico de la economa internacional
ha marcado nuevas dinmicas en la interrelacin econmica de
Amrica Latina y el Caribe con socios tradicionales y emergentes
desde los inicios del siglo XXI y, en especial, a raz de la reciente crisis
econmica internacional (2007-2009). Estos cambios responden
a tendencias ms amplias en el marco de los pases en desarrollo
y emergentes, del Sur global o semiperifricos, relacionadas
con la mayor influencia de actores emergentes como China y otros
en la economa mundial, la emergencia y evolucin de los BRICS
Notas
1. El presente trabajo es un fragmento de una investigacin ms amplia
que no hubiera sido posible sin el apoyo y los valiosos comentarios
sobre fragmentos, secciones e ideas de la investigacin aportadas
por Carlos Quenan y Jorge Mario Snchez y la excelente asistencia
tcnica de Juan Carlos Daz.
2. Esta semiperiferia empleada por Wallerstein (1976) es recogida
en el discurso convencional, mayoritariamente, como economas
emergentes. Desde la perspectiva de Wallerstein (1976:462-463),
los pases semi-perifricos, juegan un rol bien particular dentro del
sistema mundial y diferente de los pases perifricos tradicionales.
En este sentido, como expresa Cari et al (2012), el nuevo estado
del capitalismo global, redisea los espacios territoriales de aplicacin
de la conceptualizacin de periferia- haciendo abstraccin de las
fronteras (...) en ese rediseo ocupa un papel estratgico la categora
de Semiperiferia.
3. Sobre estas categoras, vase la interesante discusin de Sidaway
(2012) sobre la nueva geografa y mapas y visiones del desarrollo,
en una evaluacin crtica al uso de los conceptos Tercer Mundo,
Subdesarrollo, Emergentes y del Sur, a partir de las nuevas
condiciones de la economa internacional y especialmente, discute
sobre las implicaciones epistemolgicas y geopolticas de endosar
cada una de ellas.
Bibliografa
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Ayerbe, Luis Fernando (2001). Los Estados Unidos y la Amrica Latina. La
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Canova, Fabio (2005). The Transmission of US Shocks to Latin America,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jae.837/pdf
Canova, Fabio y Marriman, Jane (1998). Sources and Propagation of
International Output Cycles: Common Shocks or Transmission?
Journal of International Economics, 46, Pginas 133-166, http://
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Caputo, Orlando (2004). Estados Unidos y China: locomotoras en
la recuperacin y en las crisis cclicas de la economa mundial?
en Estay, Jaime (Comp.) La economa mundial y Amrica Latina.
Tendencias, problemas y desafos, Buenos Aires, CLACSO.
Cari I. Cspedes, Gemma y Martnez Peinado, Javier (2012). El
desarrollo de una Semiperiferia como necesidad de la transicin
hacia el Sistema Capitalista Global: Una aproximacin emprica
a travs del anlisis factorial, XIII Jornada Economa Crtica.
Los costes de la crisis y alternativas en construccin, Sevilla,
febrero,http://pendientedemigracion.ucm.es/info/ec/jec13/
Ponencias/economia%20mundial/El%20desarrollo%20de%20
una%20Semiperiferia%20como%20necesidad.pdf
CEA (Council of Economic Advisers), (2013). Economic Report of the
President 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/erp2013/full_2013_economic_report_of_the_president.pdf
CEPAL (2014). La Inversin Extranjera Directa en Amrica Latina y el Caribe,
2013, (LC/G.2613-P), Santiago de Chile, 2014.
Dinmicas del
regionalismo:
abierto, post-liberal,
post-hegemnico?
107
108 Anuario de Integracin 9 | Ao 2012
New paradigm, greater
collaboration?
The Caribbean and Latin
America in a
globalizing world
109
Annita Deloris Montoute
Since 1949, after the establishment of the New China, LAC relations
were principally based on people-to-people exchanges (Chinas
Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, 2009). During
the Cold War, Chinas relations with Latin America revolved around
issues of non alignment. Chinas relationship with Latin America in
the early 1960s was a response to anti-Americanism and opposition
to Washingtons high handedness (Xu 1994: 151 cited in Dosch
and Goodman, 2012:6). China was particularly interested in Cubas
model of government infiltrating through the wider region. The
Cuban model did not have much traction for most of the Cold War
period because Latin American dictatorships were widely opposed
to communism as a system of government. By the 1970s and 1980s,
Countries from Latin America and the Caribbean have not been
passive in this relationship with BRICS countries. They have actively
community (ibid).
When the Goldman Sachs report was released in 2001, calling the
worlds attention to the BRICs group, the relative weight of the BRIC
countries according to GDP criteria was as follows in descending
order: China, India, Brazil and Russia (ONiel, 2001). Recent projections
for 2050 continue along the same vein, with China and India being
way ahead (Hawksworth and Chan, 2013). In addition to economic
differences, there are asymmetries politically. In global governance,
BRICS members have different levels of political clout. For instance,
Russia and China are established global powers with permanent
seats on the UN Security Council. India, Brazil and South Africa
aspire to global influence, but are for now relegated to the position
of regional powers (Toloraya, 2013). This should be a cause for
concern for Chinese and Indian dominance according to hypothesis
3, as Brazil seems to be in a weaker position than China and India.
What makes a difference in this case is that there are other strong
players (Venezuela and Mexico) in CELAC which can play a role at
keeping the balance. Therefore, it is not likely that a Chinese agenda
for example will dominate or interfere in the affairs of CELAC. In
any event, it is important to ensure that the contributions of RIC
countries are monitored to preserve the integrity and independence
of the group. It is also essential to ensure that intra CELAC countries
are strongly and genuinely integrated, in particular, the Caribbean
and Latin America to protect members from pursing links with RIC
countries which may weaken the CELAC group. On a final note,
shared philosophies among CELAC and RIC members could also lead
to convergence of interests rather than domination or interference.
Conclusion
In conclusion, in engaging with the RIC countries, the objectives
of the CELAC must always be at the forefront, i.e. to pursue deeper
integration between Latin America and the Caribbean. Of course,
cooperation with emerging economies is important in this regard
as these emerging powerful actors could foster various wider
South-South cooperation arrangements which could serve to
albeit, organically; bring the Caribbean and Latin America closer.
Emerging economies could help build the necessary physical and
social infrastructure to facilitate deeper integration. This can only
be realized if CELAC is clear on the direction it wants the integration
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129
Walter Antonio Desider Neto
Neste frum, a cada pas cabe um voto com mesmo peso. Dessa
maneira, em toda sesso anual da AGNU so aprovadas algumas
centenas de resolues em mdia, dois teros delas sem votao,
as demais por maioria absoluta sobre os mais variados temas
da poltica internacional. Em funo dessa amplitude temtica,
geogrfica e temporal, a anlise do padro de votao dos pases em
resolues da AGNU se caracteriza como um bom indicador do perfil
de insero poltica internacional dos pases. Para o objetivo deste
artigo, serve ainda como indicador da convergncia ou da afinidade
de posies e preferncias polticas entre naes pertencentes a
coalizes no sistema internacional.
Tabela 1
Comportamento dos votos dos pases do Mercosul na agnu
2003-2010
Pas Casos %
Argentina 38 34%
Brasil 29 26%
Uruguai 19 17%
Paraguai 7 6%
Pares de pases 18 17%
Total 111 100%
Tabela 4
Nmero de casos em que cada pas dos brics responsvel pela
divergncia no bloco em votaes na agnu
2003-2010
Pas Casos %
Rssia 70 31%
ndia 52 23%
Brasil 27 12%
Grfico 3
Nmero de casos por tema em que cada pas dos brics piv da
divergncia no bloco em votaes na agnu
2003-2010
Tabela 5
Nmero de casos por tema em que h divergncia entre os pases
do Mercosul em votaes na agnu
2003-2010
Tabela 6
Nmero de casos por tema em que h
divergncia entre os brics em votaes na agnu
2003-2010
Tema Casos Importncia no perodo
Questo nuclear 93 41%
Direitos humanos 53 23%
Controle de armamentos 32 14%
No caso das reunies de cpula dos fruns IBAS, ASA e ASPA, h uma
semelhana entre as declaraes conjuntas no que diz respeito ao
seu formato: quantidade equilibrada de posicionamentos polticos
e de declaraes sobre reas para avano da cooperao para o
desenvolvimento entre as partes. J as declaraes das cpulas BRIC
se concentram no estabelecimento de posies polticas para um
conjunto menor de temas. Como o impacto poltico para a ordem
internacional das declaraes emitidas por esse frum maior, isso
se deve provavelmente a um maior cuidado das partes envolvidas.
Alm disso, reflete maiores divergncias, conforme demonstrado na
seo anterior.
Tema Abordagem
Trfico de drogas Enfoque integral e dentro do princpio da
responsabilidade comum e compartilhada
(regional e global), com respeito ao direito
internacional
Nas cpulas ASA, ASPA e IBAS, por seu turno, o tema dos direitos
humanos abordado com maior detalhamento conceitual,
Por fim, o nico caso em que houve maior afinidade do Brasil com os
parceiros do IBAS do que com os do bloco regional se refere reforma
da ONU. De um lado, nos comunicados conjuntos do Mercosul, nas
cpulas BRIC e nas cpulas ASA e ASPA se estabelece apenas que,
para cumprir seu papel, a ONU precisa de uma reforma ampla,
integral e urgente, especialmente na Assembleia Geral, no Conselho
de Segurana e no Conselho Econmico e Social, que os tornem mais
eficientes, democrticos, representativos e transparentes. De outro
lado, apenas no caso das cpulas IBAS, h um detalhamento com
relao ao CSNU, como se segue:
Uma ltima ressalva deve ser feita com relao a esta anlise dos
comunicados conjuntos e das declaraes conjuntas das reunies
de cpula dessas coalizes Sul-Sul. Cabe salientar que existem temas
que somente foram abordados em um ou outro encontro, uma vez
que cabiam ao escopo geogrfico daquele frum. So exemplos rea
de Livre Comrcio das Amricas (Alca) no Mercosul, Nova Parceria
para o Desenvolvimento Africano (Nepad) na ASA, a operao de paz
da ONU no Lbano na ASPA, entre outros. Certamente, estas matrias,
por no apresentarem comparabilidade, no foram o foco desta
anlise.
4. Consideraes finais
A combinao da anlise da convergncia de votos na AGNU com a do
contedo dos comunicados conjuntos do Mercosul e das declaraes
conjuntas dos fruns Sul-Sul globais dos quais participou o Brasil no
governo Lula (2003-2010) leva a trs principais concluses. Em primeiro
lugar, conforme apontado anteriormente, h uma consistncia
de posies para uma srie de temas tanto no contexto regional
como no contexto global Sul-Sul, de acordo com a lista da tabela 7.
Nestes temas, h uma viso vinculada ao desenvolvimento e um
perfil demandante perante os pases desenvolvidos caracterstica
histrica de coalizes terceiro-mundistas, a exemplo do Movimento
dos No-Alinhados e do G-77.
Feitas essas consideraes, cabe por fim uma breve reflexo sobre
o comportamento brasileiro vis--vis esses agrupamentos nos
primeiros anos da dcada seguinte ao perodo analisado. Como se
sabe, terminados os dois mandatos do governo Lula, com a chegada
de Dilma Rousseff presidncia em 2011, a transio no foi
acompanhada da expectativa de que grandes mudanas ocorressem
na poltica externa do pas. Como Dilma era pertencente ao mesmo
partido do presidente antecessor e fora ministra-chefe da Casa Civil
no seu governo de 2005 a 2010, sua eleio apontava para um quadro
de continuidade das investidas brasileiras em poltica externa.
Notas
1. Existem casos em que, por alguma razo, os diplomatas que
representam o pas se ausentam no momento da votao e o
pas no vota para a resoluo (voto ausente). Estas ausncias no
foram consideradas como divergncias.
2. O tema Sistema ONU se refere a questes ou assuntos que se
relacionam com a criao ou modificaodos poderes e funes
de qualquer um dos rgos da ONU. A AGNU tem prerrogativa
Referncias
Amorim, C. (2009). O Brasil e os direitos humanos: em busca de uma
agenda positiva. Poltica externa, v. 18, n. 2, p. 67-75, set./nov. 2009.
Malamud, A. (2010). La diplomacia presidencial y los pilares tradicionales
de Mercosur: un examen emprico. Relaciones internacionales,
Madrid, n. 15, out. 2010.
Mello E Souza, A.; Moraes, R. F. (2013). A relevncia do terrorismo
na poltica internacional contempornea. In: Mello E Souza, A.;
Moraes, R. F. (Orgs.). Do 11 de setembro de 2001 Guerra Contra o
Terror: reflexes sobre o terrorismo no sculo XXI. Braslia: IPEA, 2013.
No prelo.
Strezhnev, A.; Voeten, A. (2013). United Nations General Assembly voting
data. 2013. Disponvel em: <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/
Voeten/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?studyId=38311&versionNu
mber=7>. Aceso em: 15 out. 2013.
151
Jos Briceo Ruiz
Notas
1. Entre ellos se puede mencionar la crisis poltica en Bolivia en
2008, debido a las iniciativas separatistas de las provincias de la
medialuna; la crisis entre Ecuador y Colombia provocada por el
ataque del gobierno de lvaro Uribe a un campo de la Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) ubicado en territorio
ecuatoriano en 2009 o el conflicto entre Colombia y Venezuela
debido a las denuncias del gobierno de Uribe que la administracin
de Hugo Chvez permita el establecimiento de campos de la FARC
en su territorio.
2. Obviamente, la UNASUR tiene otras competencias ms all de
cooperacin poltica y en materia de seguridad. En concreto, se
destaca la cooperacin funcional en materia de infraestructura a
travs de la Consejo de Infraestructura y Planeamiento (COSIPLAN),
que ha absorbido los proyectos desarrollados en la Iniciativa para
la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (IIRSA). Tambin en la
Bibliografa
Acuerdo de Alcance Parcial de Complementacin Econmica no. 70
suscrito entre el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, la Repblica de
Cuba, la Repblica de Nicaragua y la Repblica Bolivariana de
Venezuela.
Davide Villani
Licenciado en Cooperacin Internacional y Desarrollo por la
Universidad de Pava (Italia) y magster en Economa Internacional y
Desarrollo de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Actualmente
est cursando la Maestra en Desarrollo Econmico de la UNSAM.
Tiene experiencia docente en la Universidad de Buenos Aires,
UNSAM y CLACSO. Es investigador del Centro de Investigacin sobre
Cooperacin Internacional y Desarrollo (CICI + D) de la UNSAM.
e-mail: davide-villani@hotmail.com
179
180
Ma. Florencia Lpez Canellas y Davide Villani
15 5
20 10
2% de Inters
22 15
24 20 Pago en 15 aos + 2 aos
de gracia
30 25
40 30
50 40
1% de inters
80 50
100 60 Pago en 23 aos + 2 aos
de gracia
150 70
Fuente: Petrocaribe
Rep.
50 27,9 50 22,9 30 27,2 30 27,6 30 29,2 30,0 26,5 30,0 26,9
Dominicana
San Vicente
1 1 1 0,2 1 0,2 1 0,2 1 0,3 1,0 0,3 1,0 0,5
y LG
Cuba 92 92,5 92 91,5 92 93,2 92 93,3 92 97,8 98,0 96,3 98,0 91,1
Total (Sin
107,8 52,3 141,8 56,3 161,8 85,5 165,4 109,9 165,9 99,2 169,3 94,6 169,3 121,0
Cuba)
Total (Con
199,8 144,8 233,8 147,8 253,8 178,7 257,4 203,2 257,9 197 267,3 190,9 267,3 212,1
Cuba)
Fuente PDVSA (varios aos)
193
Con la sucesiva incorporacin de nuevos miembros y la ampliacin
Ma. Florencia Lpez Canellas y Davide Villani
Entre los pases miembros del acuerdo Cuba tiene una cuota de
suministro muy superior a la de los dems pases, siendo de 92 MBD
en 2006 y 98 MDB en 2011.11 En cuando a los dems pases, a pesar
del aumento del suministro, el volumen de barriles importados se
encuentra por debajo del mximo previsto por el acuerdo aunque
la situacin es bastante heterognea. Despus de Cuba, Jamaica,
Nicaragua, Repblica Dominicana, Hait y, ms recientemente, El
Salvador, son los pases que ms hidrocarburos han importado en
trminos concesionales. Estos pases importan en la casi totalidad de
los aos ms del 50% de la cuota mxima prevista por el acuerdo,
con valores que en algunos casos superan esta cantidad. En cuatro
casos (Granada, Guyana, Hait y San Cristbal y Nives) el suministro
de hidrocarburos se implement a distancia de uno o dos aos de
la firma del acuerdo con Venezuela y, una vez puesto en marcha,
el suministro de hidrocarburos se mantuvo en por encima del 50%
de la cuota mxima prevista. Por otra parte, otros pases (Antigua y
Barbuda, Belice, Dominica, y San Vicente y las Granadinas) importaron
una cantidad de hidrocarburos inferior al 50 % de su cuota a lo largo
de todo perodo a pesar de haber empezado las operaciones de
suministro desde 2006. En el caso de Honduras, los datos oficiales
muestran que el acuerdo no tuvo efectividad desde 2010 como
respuesta al golpe de estado contra el presidente hondureo Manuel
Zelaya.12 Finalmente, en Guatemala Petrocaribe qued inoperante a
pesar de la firma del acuerdo, mientras que en Surinam el suministro
se hizo efectivo solo en 2012.
Cuadro 3.
Precio Cesta De exportacin (US$/Barril)
Grfico 1.
AOD canalizada a travs pases e institucin del CAD y
financiacin de Petrocaribe 2006 2011 (millones de US$)
Cuadro 5.
Productos recibidos por Venezuela como compensacin de a Factura Petrolera
Cantidad
Pas Producto Unidades Pas Producto Unidades Cantidad Recibida
Recibida
2011 2012 2011 2012
Arroz Blanco TM 46.700 66.143 Nicaragua Aceite de Palma TM 15.630 5.427
Guyana
Arroz Paddy TM 121.209 146.141 Stabilak TM - 1
Nicaragua Aceite TM 15.280 27.128 Arroz Paddy TM - 103.415
Semillas
Azcar TM 42.440 187.014 TM 25 1.322
Caraotas
Caf TM 28.822 90.090 Novillos UND 13.778 21.362
Caraotas TM 9.760 14.480 Pantalones UND 19.397 -
Carne TM 33.677 39.400 Vaquillas UND 2.631 750
Leche UHT TM 15.024 25.774 Azcar Lquida TM 5.275 5.142
Leche
TM - 1.137 Repblica Caraotas TM 1.795 -
Saborizada
Dominicana
Leche Pastas
TM - 1.066 8.728 10.854
Descremada Alimenticias
Lomo de
TM - 135
Atn
Grfico 2.
Financiamiento concesional de Petrocaribe (2006 2011)
con respecto a las reservas internacionales en 2011
Grfico 3.
Financiamiento concesional de Petrocaribe (2006 2011)
con respecto a la deuda externa pblica en 2011*
(a) Para estos pases los datos se refieren al total de la deuda externa (pblica y
privada)
Bibliografa
Alonso, J.A. (1999). Posibilidades y limitaciones de la ayuda ligada, en
Jaime Atienza Azcona, La deuda externa y los pueblos del sur. El perfil
acreedor de Espaa, Manos Unidas, Madrid.
Benzi, D. y Zapata M, X. (2013). Geopoltica, Economa y Solidaridad
Internacional en la nueva Cooperacin SurSur: En caso de la
Venezuela Bolivariana y Petrocaribe, Amrica Latina Hoy, n. 63.
Detlef Nolte
Is acting president of the GIGA, director of the GIGA Institute of Latin
American Studies (on leave), and a professor of political science at the
University of Hamburg.
e-mail: detlef.nolte@giga-hamburg.de
Leslie Wehner
Is a senior research fellow at the GIGA. He specializes in international
relations theory, foreign policy analysis and regional cooperation
with a special focus on Latin America. His work has been published in
Revista de Ciencia Poltica, Foreign Policy Analysis
and International Studies Review.
e-mail: leslie.wehner@giga-hamburg.de
207
Detlef Nolte and Leslie Wehner
Analysis
The PA will remove 92 percent of all trade tariffs by the end of 2013
and progressively lift the remaining 8 percent. Whereas financial
markets and some of its protagonists depict the PA as the new star in
Latin America, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas
(ALBA) and most of the countries of the Southern Common Market
(Mercado Comn del Sur Mercosur) see the PA as a new attempt
by the United States to undermine alternative patterns of regional
integration in the Americas.
The idea to create the PA initially branded as the Pacific Arch was
first promoted by the then president of Peru, Alan Garcia, in 2006. At
that time, Peru found itself isolated as Venezuela had left the Andean
Community (CAN) and both Bolivia and Ecuador (two CAN members)
were showing more of a vocation for ALBA than for the former group.
Moreover, Peru oriented its economic eff orts to the Asia-Pacific region
as a key market, as did Chile, Colombia and Mexico. Five years later,
in April 2011, these four states came together and formally agreed
to launch the PA. The constitutive treaty was signed in Antofagasta,
Chile, on 6 June 2012.
From this perspective, each Latin American country can choose the
mix of regional organizations or cooperation structures that best fits
its interests. Like-minded states join forces to foster their common
interests. Taking the issue of free trade and open markets as an
example, it is possible to differentiate between the interests of the
countries of the PA, Mercosur and ALBA. The countries that form
part of these groupings have different average most-favored-nation
(MFN) tariffs and different numbers of FTA partners (see Figures 1 and
2). The Chilean president, Sebastin Piera, has indicated that states
and their views have to learn to live together in diversity (El Tiempo
2012), thereby acknowledging the existence of different views and
interests regarding the purpose of regional integration.
Source: IDB 2012.
Figure 2:
Number of Free Trade Agreements Partners
Source: IDB 2012.
important economy in the world though this was still smaller than
Brazils GDP in 2012. The PA received 41 percent of the investments
in the region and accounted for 50 percent of Latin American and
Caribbean exports and imports in 2012 a much higher share than
the Mercosur (Table 1). Moreover, recent average GDP growth rates
for some PA countries have been higher than those for Mercosur and
ALBA countries (ECLAC 2013a).
Table 1:
Share in Latin American and Caribbean
Trade of PA and Mercosur (in %)
Exports Imports
2012 2012
PA/LAC 50 50
EPA/LAC 52 54
Mercosur/LAC 39 35
Table 2:
Index of Economic Freedom 2013
Source: <www.heritage.org/index/ranking>.
Table 3:
Poverty (National Poverty Lines) and
Income Inequality, 20022011
(a) 2000; (b) 2001; (c) 2004; (d) 2009; (e) 2010; (f) 2003; (g) 2005
Source: ECLAC (2013b: 18, 80, 102103)
Hence, the PA is primarily an FTA that has both political and economic
consequences. In the economic realm, the PA is about promoting
member states markets and products in the Asia-Pacific region and
thus also acts as a coordination forum for common positions and
policies in that regard. Putting aside the tensions between the inter
ests of each of the PA members to potentiate its export capacity and
foreign direct investment (FDI) attractiveness, they all share the key
ambition to position the PA within the Chinese market as part of the
groups Asia-Pacific aspirations.
The PA therefore provides the European Union with both a new and
alternative partner in Latin America that shares its economic position
and more options in the occasionally complicated relationship with
ALBA and Mercosur especially when relaunched FTA negotiations
with the latter have not brought results. The PA might put pressure
on countries without FTAs with the European Union (such as Brazil),
especially if EUUS negotiations over a future transatlantic trade and
investment partnership (TTIP) advance. Such an agreement might
benefit the PA countries as they already have FTAs with both the
European Union and the United States.
Although the PA has stressed that it is more than just another FTA,
it has received most of its international attention and support for its
economic achievements and trade focus on the Asia-Pacific region.
However, the PA has also advanced in other niches of cooperation,
such as academic exchange, technology and the integration of stock
markets. It still needs to be seen whether the existing cooperation
will spill over into other issue areas and whether the PA countries will
cooperate and define common positions in international forums.
As salient the trade agenda of the PA may be, one cannot ignore the
political and strategic side effects of the project. The PA has provoked
reactions from regional actors such as Venezuela and the other ALBA
countries, as well as from Brazil and some of its Mercosur partners.
The former consider the PA to be an alternative, antipodal project to
its socialist regional model in Latin America and a US tool with which
Washington can reassert its hegemony. For Brazil, its concerns lie with
losing control of its own sphere of influence as Mexico tries to get
a foothold in the region. Moreover, the PA increases the centrifugal
forces in Mercosur. The PA can also be seen as part of the political
and economic dynamics that are evolving in the Asia-Pacific region
and the great powercompetition between China and the United
States. Likewise, the European Union may obtain more leverage in its
relations with Latin America through its potential close cooperation
and FTAs with the PA countries.
Notes
1. Published in GIGA Focus, no. 8, 2013, pp. 1-7.
Bibliography
Born, Atilio (2013a). Estados Unidos y la Alianza del Pacfico sabotearon la
reunin de Cochabamba, 8 July, online: <www.aporrea.org/tiburon/
n232279.html> (25 Oct. 2013).
Born, Atilio (2013b). Santos, la conjura contra Venezuela y la Alianza de
Pacfico, 2 July, online: <www.avn.info.ve/print/175543> (22 Oct. 2013).
Deutsche Bank Research (2013). Talking Point. The Pacific Alliance Latin
Americas New Stars, 27 August.
Sandra Borda
Directora del Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI) y profesora
asociada del Departamento de Ciencia Poltica de la Universidad de
Los Andes. Tiene un doctorado en Ciencia Poltica de la Universidad
de Minnesota, Maestra en Ciencia Poltica de la Universidad de
Wisconsin y Maestra en Relaciones Internacionales
de la Universidad de Chicago.
e-mail: sandrabordag@gmail.com
223
Sandra Borda
Argentina 16.00%
Bolivia 0.80%
Brasil 39.00%
Colombia 8.0%
Chile 7.00%
Ecuador 4.00%
Guyana 0.10%
Paraguay 1.60%
Per 10.00%
Surinam 0.10%
Uruguay 1.00%
Venezuela 12.40%
Total 100.00%
Breve historia
El 1 de Septiembre de 2000 tiene lugar la I Reunin de Presidentes
de Amrica del Sur en Brasilia. En la Declaracin de Brasilia se
propuso que gracias a la continuidad geogrfica y a la comunidad
de valores existente en el rea suramericana, era preciso formular
una agenda comn. El proceso de creacin de la organizacin, desde
sus inicios, fue liderado y guiado por Brasil. En el 2004, durante la
Tercera Reunin de Presidentes de Amrica del Sur en Cuzco, se creo
la Comunidad Suramericana de Naciones, con el objetivo de unir al
Mercado Comn del SurMercosur con la Comunidad Andina
CAN. En el 2007, durante la Primera Cumbre Energtica Suramericana
en Isla Margarita, se fijaron prioridades y la organizacin adopto su
nombre actual: Unasur.
A pesar del consenso logrado por los jefes de Estado en cuanto a este
tema, en un principio el presidente colombiano Juan Manuel Santos
manifest su intencin de solicitar un recuento de votos, mientras
que los mandatarios de Argentina y Bolivia Cristina Fernndez
y Evo Morales expresaron su rechazo abierto a esta propuesta20.
Adicionalmente, una delegacin de la Unasur compuesta por
brasileos evidenci irregularidades en las maquinas capta-huellas
que evidenciaron que se poda votar sin que hubiera consistencia
entre el nmero de cdula del votante y su huella. No obstante y a
pesar de estos reparos, la Unasur continu instando a todas las partes
a reconocer los resultados21.
Notas
1. Documento preparado para el International Peace Institute. Quiero
agradecer la ayuda del asistente de investigacin para este proyec-
to, Andrs Aponte.
2. Malamud Rikles, Carlos (2010). El Consejo Suramericano de
Defensa: Entre grandes expectativas y una realidad compleja y
-camino-guerra_0_202779923.html
23. http://www.unasursg.org/inicio/centro-de-noticias/archivo-de-
-noticias/comunicado-de-la-secretara-general-de-unasur
24. http://www.unasursg.org/inicio/centro-de-noticias/archivo-de-
-noticias/declaracin-de-la-unasur-frente-al-agravio-sufrido-por-
-el-presidente-evo-morales
25. http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12912804
26. Es preciso decir, sin embargo, que la tendencia de los pases latino-
americanos a frenar la influencia de Estados Unidos a travs de la
creacin de entidades multilaterales regionales y subregionales, y
de esquemas de integracin que han excluido deliberadamente a
Estados Unidos no es nueva: ese fue el espritu del Sistema Econ-
mico Latinoamericano y del CaribeSELA, el Tratado de 1967 para
la Prohibicin de Armas Nucleares and Amrica Latina y el Caribe
Tratado de Tlatelolco, Contadora y el Grupo de Ro (Legler, p. 29).
27. Parte de las exigencias tambin implicaban una detencin del re-
ferndum para aprobar una nueva Constitucin socialista.
28. http://www.eluniversal.com/2010/02/08/int_ava_oea-y-bid-esta-
ran-re_08A3409531.shtml
29. Tlam. 2011. Unasur, CDS, OEA: relaciones y cambios. Tlam, 13 de
mayo
30. http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-7878299
31. Sanahuja Perales, Jos Antonio (2010). Regionalismo e integracin
en clave suramericana: Los orgenes y evolucin de Unasur.
En La creacin de Unasur en el marco de la seguridad y la defensa,
Documentos de Seguridad y Defensa 29, comp. Ministerio de Defensa
de Espaa, 46-57. Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa de Espaa. P.53.
32. Op. Cit. Pp. 53-54.
33. Op. Cit. p. 48.
34. Op. Cit. p. 50.
35. Radio Mundial (2011). Prevn articular Unasur con la Celac para
fortalecer unin latinoamericana. http://www.radiomundial.com.
ve/yvke/noticia.php?494196 [Fecha de consulta: 17/08/2011]
36. Como sugiere Costa, las dificultades para revitalizar la OEA,
la denuncia del TIAR (Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia
Recproca) por parte de Mxico y el fracaso de las negociaciones
del ALCA, pusieron de relieve los muchos lmites y resistencias
que enfrent el intento de consolidar el hemisferio como referente
principal para el multilateralismo regional facilitando as la
emergencia de un bloque latinoamericano. Costa Vaz, Alcides.
2011. La Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeos:
Es una opcin viable para consolidar el multilateralismo y la
integracin latinoamericana? En Amrica Latina y el Caribe:
Multilateralismo vs soberana: La construccin de la Comunidad de
249
Bruno Theodoro Luciano, Karina Lilia
250
Pasquariello Mariano y Regiane Nitsch Bressan
Notas
1. Esta pesquisa foi realizada em parceria pelos autores com o apoio
financeiro do CNPq e da CAPES, no mbito da Chamada CNPq/
CAPES n 07/2011.
2. Inicialmente este processo era conhecido como Pacto Andino,
com a participao de Bolvia, Chile, Colmbia, Equador, Peru e
Venezuela.
3. Embora no tenhamos o intuito de realizar uma comparao
entre as experincias andina e europeia, preciso ressaltar que
a discusso sobre o dficit democrtico na Europa estava mais
vinculada ao papel do Parlamento na integrao, porque existia
desde o incio da CECA uma representao parlamentar por meio
da Assembleia Comum. No caso andino, o problema era a ausncia
de uma instncia de representao parlamentar no processo.
Referncias
Bustamante, Ana Marleny (2006). Desarrollo institucional de la
Comunidad Andina. Aldea Del Mundo, San Cristobal, Venezuela,
v. 16, n. 8, p.16-28, 09 fev. 2006. Disponvel em: <http://www.
saber.ula.ve/bitstream/123456789 /18164/1/articulo16-2.pdf>.
Acessoem: 24 abr. 2012.
Crdenas, Miguel Eduardo (2004). El futuro de la integracin andina.
Bogot: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung en Colombia Frescol; Centro de
Estudios de La Realidad Colombiana CEREC, 2004.
Comunidade Andina (2011). Sociedad Civil propone crear Consejo de
ParticipacinCiudadana y gestionar reincorporacin de Venezuela
a la CAN. 18 de setembro de 2011. Disponvel em: <http://www.
comunidadandina.org/prensa/notas/np18-9-11.htm>. Acessado
em 08 de maio de 2012.
276
Pasquariello Mariano y Regiane Nitsch Bressan
Actores regionales
y actores externos
en la nueva etapa
del regionalismo
latinoamericano y
caribeo
277
278 Anuario de Integracin 9 | Ao 2012
Seguridad e
interregionalismo
entre la UE-ALC: Ms
problemas que poltica1
279
Francisco J. Verdes-Montenegro Escnez
En ninguna de las seis cumbres que han tenido lugar desde la puesta
en marcha de la asociacin estratgica se ha abordado la dimensin
de paz y seguridad de las relaciones UE-ALC con profundidad. La
primera Cumbre de Ro de Janeiro (1999) tuvo en consideracin esta
dimensin en el mbito poltico de la declaracin final y enumer
en nueve artculos distintas cuestiones que deberan ser abordadas
en el dilogo interregional. Entre ellas, encontramos problemticas
clsicas como el desarme o la no proliferacin de armas
nucleares, junto con la necesidad una respuesta colectiva a nuevas
amenazas como el terrorismo, el crimen organizado transnacional,
el narcotrfico, la corrupcin o la prevencin frente a desastres
naturales. Como veremos a continuacin, en los ms de diez aos
que han transcurrido desde entonces, los avances al respecto por
Cuadro n 1
La cooperacin en materia de seguridad por parte de la CE en
Latinoamrica durante el ciclo de programacin 2007-2013
Regional Strategy Papers (RSP) y Country Strategy Papers (CSP)
(por niveles de renta)
Prioridades
Presupuesto
estratgicas
Pas o grupo (en millones Porcentaje*
en materia de
de )
seguridad
Amrica Latina - -
Fortalecimiento de la
Amrica Central gobernabilidad y la 16 21%
seguridad
RSP
Mercosur - -
Chile - -
Mxico - -
Panam - -
Uruguay - -
Venezuela - -
Lucha contra las
Bolivia 85 34,13%
drogas ilegales
Paz y estabilidad,
incluido el desarrollo 110
Colombia alternativo 89%
Estado de Derecho,
justicia y derechos 32
humanos
Ecuador - -
CSP - PRMB
Cohesin social y
El Salvador 85,4 70%
seguridad humana
Cohesin social y
Guatemala 47,3 35%
seguridad ciudadana
Poltica global de
Honduras justicia y seguridad 44 20%
ciudadana
Nicaragua - -
Paraguay - -
Per - -
Total 429,7 15,30%
Reflexiones finales
Habiendo revisado la trayectoria de las cuestiones de seguridad en
las relaciones interregionales UE-ALC desde la puesta en marcha
de la asociacin estratgica, y tras analizar la configuracin de
circunstancias en base al modelo planteado por Leonard y Kaunert,
podemos afirmar que mientras los cambios estructurales que se han
registrado en las ltimas dcadas ponen sobre la mesa la necesidad
de profundizar las relaciones UE-ALC y se identifican toda una serie
de problemas (o amenazas) en materia de seguridad, el contexto en
el que se insertan estas relaciones parten de unos imaginarios y una
coyuntura de crisis que invitan a un cierto escepticismo.
De todas las amenazas que se han sealado en estos aos por distintos
actores securitizadores, el problema de las drogas es aquel que
Tabla Recapitulativa:
La convergencia y divergencia de agendas de las relaciones
interregionales UE-CELAC
Actor
Problema Policy Politics
Securitizador
Proliferacin - Cooperar para el xito (-) Fracturas ad - Eurolat
de ADM de la Conferencia de intra en las dos - Mandatarios
Examen del TNP (2015) regiones. UE-LAC
(armas (Santiago 2013)
nucleares, - Promover, (-) Brasil apuesta
qumicas o firmar y ratificar por la eliminacin
biolgicas) los instrumentos total de las armas
existentes, incluidas nucleares lo que
las Convenciones provoca el rechazo
sobre Armas Qumicas de los cinco pases
y Biolgicas, el TNP nuclearmente
y el Tratado para la armados y
Prohibicin Completa reconocidos por
de los Ensayos el TNP, entre ellos,
Nucleares dos miembros de
la UE: Francia y
Reino Unido.
- Llevar acciones
conjuntas y poner
en marcha un Centro
Birregional a tal fin
Terrorismo - Prevenir, combatir y Eurolat
eliminar el terrorismo
en todas sus formas
teniendo siempre
presente el respeto
de los derechos
humanos y el
derecho internacional
humanitario
- Cumplimiento de
todos los instrumentos
internacionales al
respecto acordados en
NNUU
Fortalecimiento del
dilogo poltico a nivel
birregional
- Abrir un debate
global, profundo
y sereno sobre la
oportunidad de
legalizar el consumo de
drogas
- Incluir de forma
permanente los
temas de seguridad
en las agendas de
cooperacin bilaterales,
birregionales y
multilaterales
- Tratado Internacional
sobre Seguridad
(-) Complejidad y
heterogeneidad
para concertar
posturas
(-) Crisis
del modelo
cosmopolita
(transnacionalista)
y apuesta por
marcos bilaterales
Bibliografa
ALERTA 2011 (2012). Informe sobre conictos, derechos humanos y construccin
de paz, Ed. Icaria-Escola Cultura de Pau, Barcelona.
Agnew J. (2005). Geopoltica: una re-visin de la poltica mundial. Ed. Trama,
Madrid.
Arenal C. (2010). Balance de la asociacin estratgica entre la UE y los pases
de Amrica Latina y el Caribe, en Dilogo UE-ALC: debate y conclusiones.
Foro Eurolatinoamericano de centros de anlisis, Madrid, 13 de abril de
2010.
Arenal C. y J.A. Sanahuja (2010). La Cumbre ALC-UE de Madrid: un nuevo
impulso a las relaciones birregionales. Fundacin Carolina, Madrid.
Balzacq T. (2005). The three faces of Securitization: political agency, audience
and context, en European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11 (2),
pp. 171-201.
Balzacq T. (2011). Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and
Dissolve, Ed. Routledge-PRIO, Copenhague.
Blickman T. y M. Jelsma (2009). La reforma de las polticas de drogas, en
Nueva Sociedad, n 222, julio-agosto.
317
Luis Ren Fernndez Tabo
2012).
Antecedentes
El nfasis del libre comercio la firma de acuerdos de integracin
econmicos basados en esta orientacin de poltica en la estrategia
de Estados Unidos en su proyeccin internacional y en particular
hacia Amrica Latina y el Caribe no es nueva. Se remonta a la dcada
de 1990, e incluso desde los aos ochenta del siglo pasado en sus
expresiones contemporneas, porque en un sentido ms amplio,
en tanto mecanismos imperialista de subordinacin neocolonial,
puede identificarse como un principio de su poltica asociado al
Destino Manifiesto, los distintos esfuerzos del Panamericanismo y
la necesaria extensin del sistema econmico, poltico e ideolgico
estadounidense por todo el mundo, como base de sus relaciones de
subordinacin.
DR) y a Panam.
Estos acuerdos regionales de libre comercio del siglo XXI han sido
objeto de crticas, que en esencia son las mismas que se realizaron a
raz de los primeros acuerdos de este tipo entre Estados Unidos con
pases de Amrica Latina y el Caribe y en todo el debate realizado por
los movimientos sociales progresistas contra la implantacin del rea
de Libre Comercio de las Amricas (ALCA). La experiencia ms antigua
en Amrica es Mxico, luego de su incorporacin al Tratado de Libre
Comercio de Amrica del Norte (TLCAN) confirman las preocupaciones
que se plantearon respecto al aumento de las diferencias
socioeconmicas al interior del pas y con respecto a los socios ms
desarrollados del Norte. Se destruyeron sobre todo productores
agrcolas con consecuencias negativas para el medio ambiente, la
cultura, la identidad de pueblos originarios y las condiciones de vida
de importantes grupos sociales, al tiempo que se generaban junto a la
pobreza y la falta de empleo, la concentracin de la riqueza en el otro
polo, el transnacionalismo y el ascenso de la violencia y el narcotrfico,
que ha alcanzado niveles dramticos y de difcil reversin.
343
344
Marcos Cordeiro Pires y Gustavo Enrique Santilln
Grfico 1.
Grfico 4.
americanas.
Tabela 1.
Brasil. Exportaes para a China
por tipo de produto, 2002-2012 (mil. US$)
Grfico 7.
Fonte: Tabela 1.
Tabela 2.
Argentina. Exportaes para a China
por tipo de produto, 2002-2012 (mil. US$)
UNCTAD, 2014
Grfico 8.
Fonte: Tabela 2.
Grfico 9.
Fonte: Tabela 2.
UNCTAD, 2014
Grfico 10.
Fonte: Tabela 3.
Fonte: Tabela 3.
Tabela 4.
Brasil. Principais rubricas de
exportao para a China (mil. US$)
2002 % 2012 %
Exportaes Totais 2.520.979 100,00 41.227.540 100,00
Frutas e sementes oleaginosas 825.538 32,75 11.880.180 28,82
Minrios e resduos de metais 610.602 24,23 15.362.133 37,26
Ferro e ao 142.155 5,64 683.717 1,66
leos e gorduras vegetais, refinado
125.767 4,99 951.226 2,31
ou fracionado
Celulose e resduos de papel 114.154 4,53 1.236.672 3,00
Os veculos a motor 94.054 3,74 43.578 0,11
Mquinas e equipamentos eltricos 81.312 3,23 64.362 0,16
Couro, artigos de couro e peles 75.681 3,00 485.439 1,18
Cortia e madeira 75.269 2,99 43.778 0,11
Plsticos no processados 23.275 0,92 262.240 0,64
Compostos Orgnicos 13.862 0,55 204.807 0,50
Fibras txteis e seus resduos 9.592 0,38 737.716 1,79
Carnes e preparaes 7.003 0,28 575.706 1,40
Metais no-ferrosos 6.985 0,28 144.847 0,36
Petrleo e seus derivados 39 0,00 4.834.790 11,73
10 principais produtos 86,02 87,29
2002 % 2012
%
Total de Exportaes 1.092.354 100 5.021.348 100
Frutas e sementes oleaginosas 506.447 46,36 2.725.863 54,29
leos e gorduras vegetais,
233.172 21,35 943.670 18,8
refinado ou fracionado
Couro, artigos de couro e peles 115.944 10,62 102.822 2,05
Ferro e ao 108.679 9,95 6.109 0,12
Txteis, l, fibras e Vesturio 31.218 2,86 57.575 1,15
Tabela 6.
Chile. Principais rubricas de
exportao para a China (mil. US$)
2002 % 2012 %
3.2 Investimentos
O aumento do investimento direto da China no Cone Sul da Amrica
Latina, e sua importncia, um fenmeno recente, refletindo um
processo deliberado de expanso para fora do capital chins e de
suas empresas multinacionais (a maioria delas do Estado)6. Por ser
recente (a partir de 2007), uma anlise mais aprofundada de sua
estrutura encontra algumas dificuldades, particularmente no que
tange abrangncia e formatao dos dados estatsticos disponveis.
Um exemplo disso, j que os governos registram os capitais por
origem geogrfica, o fato de que os registros associados a empresas
chinesas esto vinculados a parasos fiscais, como as Ilhas Cayman
ou Bahamas. Isto resulta numa escassez de dados comparveis
internacionalmente por meio de sries certificadas durante 2009-
2012, que o perodo mais significativo.
Grfico 12
Grfico 13.
Notas
1. Vale destacar que o Mercosul, como bloco, encontra no Paraguai
um elo fraco na sua estratgia de relacionamento com a China: este
pas no reconhece o princpio de uma nica China, baseada em
Pequim, e mantm relaes diplomticas com Taiwan.
2. China interrompeu por seis meses suas compras de leo de soja da
Argentina alegando questes fitossanitrias, por conta da deciso
do pais sul-americano de impor medidas antidumping sobre as
importaes chinesas.
3. Isto no equivale dizer que a produo dos trs pases tenha se
primarizado na ltima dcada.
4. Embora a UNCTAD agrupe como exportaes intensivas em
tecnologia e recursos humanos de alta complexidade para as
vendas de alimentos processados e distribudos em diferentes
reas, no so identificados graus significativos at 2012, para os
casos da Argentina e do Brasil.
5. Para este ponto, e em geral para os tens apartados b) e c), ver:
Puyana, Alicia, y Constantino, Agustina, Sojizacin y enfermedad
holandesa en Argentina: la maldicin verde?, Problemas del
Desarrollo, 44, 175, octubre/diciembre de 2013
6. interessante notar que a crise de 2008-2009 no afetou a taxa de
entrada de capital chins. A partir de nveis muito baixos, verificou-
se um aumento linear na regio a partir de 2008. Isso refora
nossas observaes sobre o carter poltico do investimento da
China destinado extrao de recursos naturais e de energia e seu
suporte.
7. Banco Central do Brasil, 2014.
8. Banco Central de Chile, 2014.
9. Banco Central de la Repblica Argentina, 2014. Se considera, neste
caso, as estatsticas oficiais registrados na categoria de aes
(corrigido segundo nvel de investimento) de IDE de origem chinesa
acumulado no final de 2007, que chegou a US$ 127 milhes.
10. Banco Central de Chile, 2014.
la compra del Standard Bank por parte del banco ICBC de China,
Tlam, 10 de noviembre de 2012.
12. Lopes de Arajo, Carlos Antnio, O Investimento Direto
Estrangeiro Chins no Brasil e os Determinantes para a Escolha
de Setores Pelas Empresas Investidoras, Dissertao de Mestrado
em Desenvolvimento e Comrcio Internacional, Universidade de
Braslia, 2012, p. 43.
13. China-Latin America cross-council taskforce, Chinese foreign
direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean Summit
on the Global Agenda . World Economic Forum . Santiago de Chile,
ONU-CEPAL, pp. 13-14.
14. Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China , Uma anlise dos investimentos
chineses no Brasil: 2007-2012, Junio de 2013, pp. 53-58.
15. Ibd., p. 58.
Referncias
Agncia Brasil (2013). Brasileiro vence mexicano na disputa pela
direo-geral da OMC. Disponvel em: http://www.ebc.com.br/
noticias/internacional/2013/05/brasileiro-vence-mexicano-na-
disputa-pela-direcao-geral-da-omc. Acessado em: 21/04/2014.
Banco Central de Chile (2014), Base de Datos Estadsticos, http://
si3.bcentral.cl/Siete/secure/cuadros/home.aspx, Acessado em
15/04/14
Banco Central de la Repblica Argentina (2014), Estadsticas e
Indicadores Inversiones Directas - Anuario Estadstico, http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/ , Acessado em 15/04/14
Banco Central do Brasil (2014), Investimento estrangeiro direto, http://
www.bcb.gov.br/?INVED , Acessado em 15/04/14
Banco Central do Brasil (2014), Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil -
Relatrio 2012, http://www.bcb.gov.br/?BOLETIM2012 , Acessado
em 15/04/14
Banco Central do Brasil (2014), Investimento estrangeiro direto - matriz
pas x setor, http://www.bcb.gov.br/?INVEDMATRIZ , Acessado em
15/04/14
Carta Capital (2012). Brasil perde espao para China na Amrica Latina.
13/jan/2012. Disponvel em: http://www.cartacapital.com.br/
economia/brasil-perde-espaco-para-china-na-america-latina.
Acessado em 15/fev/2014.
CASS (2008).China Modernization Report. A study on the International
modernization. Disponvel em: http://www.modernization.com.
cn/cmr2008%20overview.htm. Acessado em 20/03/2014.
381
Marcelo Passini Mariano-Haroldo Ramanzini Jnior
382
Rafael Augusto Ribeiro de Almeida
O Brasil e a UNASUL
Segundo os termos de seu Tratado Constitutivo, a UNASUL uma
iniciativa de integrao regional que associa os pases sul- americanos
a partir do fortalecimento da soberania e da autonomia nacional
dos pases membros2. Em seus objetivos est o fortalecimento
de mecanismos de cooperao regional, buscando articular um
espao econmico e poltico sul-americano, preservando os
espaos nacionais de formulao de poltica. A constituio e a
posterior institucionalizao da UNASUL, nos anos 2000, aponta
para a necessidade de pesquisar em que medida esta instituio
representaria uma nova dimenso da integrao e, ao mesmo tempo,
da poltica brasileira em relao Amrica do Sul. Em outros termos,
trata-se de entender se nos encontramos frente a uma lgica que
consegue compatibilizar o conceito de autonomia com o objetivo da
cooperao e de aspectos setoriais de integrao.
Notas
1. Esse artigo foi inicialmente publicado na Revista Relaes
Internacionais, no. 41, 2014.
2. O artigo 2 do Tratado Constitutivo da UNASUL afirma: a
UNASUL tem como objetivo construir, de maneira participativa e
consensual, um espao de integrao e unio no mbito cultural,
social, econmico e poltico entre seus povos, priorizando o
dilogo poltico, as polticas sociais, a educao, a energia, a
infraestrutura, o financiamento e o meio ambiente, entre outros,
com vistas a eliminar a desigualdade socioeconmica, alcanar a
incluso social e a participao cidad, fortalecer a democracia e
reduzir as assimetrias no contexto do fortalecimento da soberania
e independncia dos Estados (Tratado Constitutivo Da Unasul,
2008).
3. O bloco sul-americano constitudo pelo Conselho de Chefes
de Estado e Governo (principal rgo decisrio da UNASUL); o
Conselho dos Ministros das Relaes Exteriores; o Conselho de
Delegados; e a Secretaria Geral.
4. Os quatro eixos so: cooperao militar; aes humanitrias e
operaes de paz; indstria e tecnologias de defesa; e formao e
capacitao de pessoal (Vaz, 2013).
5. Para compreender o conceito de de-securitizao, preciso
esclarecer o significado de securitizao. Termo que parte da
premissa de que a noo de segurana no objetiva, mas
socialmente construda: trata-de de uma prtica auto-referencial
(...) no necessariamente porque uma ameaa existencial
realmente existe, mas porque o assunto apresentado como tal
(Buzan; Waever; Wilde, 1998, p. 24). Securitizao, nesse sentido,
o uso da retrica da ameaa existencial com o objetivo de levar
um assunto para fora das condies da poltica normal, de modo
a justificar a adoo de procedimentos de emergncia. Cabe
destacar que no necessrio que uma medida emergencial seja
tomada para que se identifique um processo de securitizao:
398
Rafael Augusto Ribeiro de Almeida
399
Miriam Gomes Saraiva
Concluso
As iniciativas diplomticas iniciadas no governo de Lula seguiram
estratgias visando a autonomia das aes brasileiras; o fortalecimento
do universalismo atravs da cooperao sul-sul e em fruns
multilaterais; a consolidao de um papel proativo do Brasil na poltica
global; e a construo da liderana brasileira na Amrica do Sul.
Notas
1. Esta pesquisa contou inicialmente com o apoio da CAPES/Brasil,
atravs da Ctedra Rio Branco e, mais recentemente, vem recendo
apoio do CNPq/Brasil.
2. A Unio Europeia como ator internacional entendida tanto nas
posies do SEAE quanto, nos foros multilaterais, por posies
421
Natalia Saltalamacchia Ziccardi
Even if there are many things going on with regard to Latin America,
at present the most important piece of the Mexican foreign policy
towards the region the one that consumes more time and energy
is the Pacific Alliance. Note that I say towards the region because one
should not see the Alliance simply as a way of relating to Colombia,
Peru and Chile but as a vehicle for influencing Latin American politics
more generally. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to explain
its goals and results but, above all, its rationale: why was the Pacific
Alliance created?
But is all this enthusiasm well deserved? What has really happened
with the Pacific Alliance up to now? The Pacific Alliance is a young
enterprise: it was launched in April 2011, so it has only 3 years of
existence. The initiative has indeed progressed at a surprisingly fast
pace but there are so many things still pending that one should be
cautious.
Despite all this, the economic rationale still looks somewhat weak.
The truth is that before the Pacific Alliance existed, Mexico already
had free trade agreements with Chile and Colombia and an Economic
Agreement with Peru. Notwithstanding, the share of Mexicos trade
with these three countries remained always very small: together
they represent only about 1% of Mexican imports and about 2.2%
of exports (see graphs below). It is difficult to think that the Pacific
Alliance will be able to fundamentally alter this pattern. And it is also
unclear how exactly the Pacific Alliance will boost trade and FDI flows
with Asian countries.
Since economic reasons do not seem to explain the whole story one
should turn to additional and complementary accounts.
Of course, we all know this alliance does not include military elements.
Nonetheless, today in Latin America military power does not play
a central role as a resource of influence in regional international
In contrast to UNASUR and ALBA, the Pacific Alliance does not have
a clear leader. According to its size and relative power Mexico would
be, of course, the natural candidate to play such a role; however, there
are many limits to this, among which the lack of political will among
the Mexican elite to exert regional leadership or to play middle power
politics is paramount. So, within this neo-realist framework, this fact
takes us to observe the Pacific Alliance more as a defensive response
which, in turn, poses the question: a response to whom or to which
threat? Well, precisely in this is line of inquiry one should identify
the third state or states that require balancing and the perceived
risks they represent. Calculations in this respect, of course, may vary
among Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile.
To sum up, the Pacific Alliances members share the identity of liberal,
Latin-American states, both in the economic and the political domain.
According to constructivist theory, this generates incentives to create
a community or club of equals or, in other words, an international
space that is prone to the affirmation and reproduction such liberal
identity.
The Pacific Alliance and ALBA are indeed on opposite sides when
discussing the role of the state in the economy and this should
be understood as the expression of a fact: today in Latin America
there is a diversity of development models. However, following the
constructivist premises, such plurality can be represented politically
and socially as a rivalry or, on the contrary, as a disagreement among
friends. There is nothing inevitable in one option or the other; they
are the result of the intentional decisions made by leaders. What have
we seen so far?
Conclusions
This paper outlined three complementary lines of explanation for
the creation of the Pacific Alliance. From the Mexican point of view,
the economic and functional motives seem to be less important,
at least at first sight. There are relatively low gains from trade to
be expected: on the one hand, there is not much space to expand
imports of natural resources such as cupper and other minerals
which constitute the main products coming from Peru and Chile; on
the other hand, Mexico is already the partner that exports the most
manufactured products (with medium and high value added) within
the bloc. Moreover, the creation of productive chains among these
states appears complicated due to the large distances and the lack of
the necessary infrastructure or connectivity.
All these factors might strengthen the idea that the geopolitical
and ideational hypotheses carry more weight. In this sense, more
empirical research and interviews with decision makers are in order.
In particular, it is essential to determine what has been the role of the
bureaucratic agencies in charge of negotiating the Pacific Alliance
in Mexico, that is, the Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Ministry
of Economy (especially, the Undersecretary for Foreign Trade).
Identifying which of them has exercised more leadership would say
much about the rationality behind Mexicos participation.
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Los desafos
globales
437
438 Anuario de Integracin 9 | Ao 2012
As Tenses Emergentes
entre o Brasil e a
China: o G-20 e a
Amrica do Sul1
439
Corival Alves do Carmo
440
Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo
O pas foi capaz de fazer sua voz ser ouvida nos fruns internacionais
e suas posies serem tomadas em considerao nos acordos
estabelecidos. Dentro desta estratgia, o Brasil retomou a proximidade
com a ndia, aliado tradicional nas negociaes comerciais at os
anos 1980, e iniciou um novo ciclo de reaproximao com os pases
africanos, que, dentre outros resultados, originou o agrupamento
IBAS (ndia, Brasil e frica do Sul) e reforou os processos de
integrao sul-americana por duas vias. Em primeiro, o reforo
dos mecanismos existentes como o MERCOSUL (Mercado Comum
do Sul) e, em segundo, a criao de novas estruturas como a IIRSA
(Integrao da Infraestrutura Sul-Americana) e a CASA/UNASUL
(Comunidade das Naes Sul-Americanas, renomeada Unio das
Naes Sul-Americanas).
Concluses
H uma redistribuio do poder mundial em curso, particularmente
na esfera econmica, esta dinmica gera uma janela de oportunidades
para a ascenso de Estados com projetos e estratgias para mudar o
padro tradicional de insero internacional. No necessariamente
os ganhos econmicos do desenvolvimento resultaro em aumento
de poder em escala mundial e maior presena nos fruns, preciso
conquistar isso.
Referncias
Amorim, Celso (2011). Conversas com jovens diplomatas. So Paulo, Ed.
Benvir, 2011.
Avalo, Andrs Giussepe (2010). Petrodiplomacia y economa en Venezuela:
un anlisis retrospectivo y prospectivo de las relaciones comercio-
petroleras venezolanas. Caracas, El Perro y la Rana.
Georgina Chami
is a Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations,
University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad. She
holds a doctoral degree in International Relations from the Institute of
International Relations, St. Augustine Campus. Her areas of expertise
are International Organizations, diplomacy, peace/security, and
conflict resolution. Dr. Chami is a member of the United Nations
Association of Trinidad and Tobago, Sub-committee for Community
Mobilization - Habitat for Humanity, and UN Volunteers program. She
was also a recipient of the Visiting Fulbright
Scholar Research Program in 2010.
e-mail: georgina.chami@sta.uwi.edu
465
Georgina Chami
The Caribbean and the G20: The Search for an Engagement Framework
The G20 has emerged as a significant institutional component of
the global governance architecture since its inception in 1999. This
group consists of 19 countries plus the European Union created to
respond to the Asian financial crisis. For the last decade and a half,
with several gatherings of finance ministers and central bankers,
this forum has evolved into a global economic forum for Presidents
and Prime Ministers to determine solutions on assuaging the US-
triggered global financial crisis. The G20 leaders have met seven
times since its inaugural meeting in Washington in 2008.1 Over time,
four issues have emerged as the litmus tests for G20 effectiveness:
reform of financial markets, reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions,
the conclusion of the WTOs Doha Development Agenda, and the
mitigation of global macroeconomic imbalances.2
Over the years, the countries in the G20 have become the main
decision-makers and rule makers for managing the global economy
instead of the G8 which consisted of the worlds richest nations.
Now, at the pinnacle of global governance structures, the G20 is
influencing the mandates of key global institutions such as the World
Bank, the World Trade Organization, and United Nations Agencies.
Consequently, these Institutions have become accountable to the
G20. But the question remains is the G20 offering a new forum for
States to address serious global economic governance challenges.
In the 1980s, the annual G-7 Summits became more formal, with
an agreed statement, or Communiqu, issued by the leaders at the
end of each meeting. Within these Summits, there was an expansion
of the issues tabled for discussion brought by leaders such as the
then US President Reagan, French President Mitterand and German
Chancellor Kohl. Interestingly, some issues discussed reflected
the Cold War tensions evident during this period. For example, at
the 1983 Summit, hosted by President Reagan, G-7 produced an
agreement which supported the deployment of U.S. Pershing and
Cruise missiles to Europe to confront new Soviet SS20 missiles.6 The
tensions of the global system at that time conditioned or influenced
the discussions within this Summit. As the Cold War grew to an end,
other issues surfaced that posed serious challenges for the G7. These
included rising intrastate conflicts, dissolution of the Soviet Union
and environmental concerns.
With the end of the Cold War, as democratic and economic reform got
underway in Russia, Russian leaders were gradually integrated into
the G-7. Former Presidents of Russia, Gorbachev and Yeltsin attended
Summits in London 1991 and 1992/1993 respectively. Within these
Summits, some issues discussed included financial assistance to the
The Caribbean and the G20: The Search for an Engagement Framework
foreign policy. In 1998, the G-7s name was formally changed to the
G8, and its first meeting was held in Birmingham in June of that year.
At this Summit, there were three main issues discussed - employment,
combating international organized crime and global economic
issues, including the crisis in Southeast Asia. The G8 represented the
main economic powers at that time that were deemed democratic,
and militarily allied to the US. Due to the small size of this Group, the
heads of government were quite informal as they knew each other
reasonably well.
The Caribbean and the G20: The Search for an Engagement Framework
of the process, along with the Deputy Finance Ministers, the Sherpas
prepare the final declaration statement and other supporting
documents for the Leaders. The Sherpa is generally quite influential
and provide both an institutional memory and an aid to ensuring
follow-up to previous commitments.13
Subsequent to this Summit was the London G20 Summit which was
historic because it set the core agenda for future G20 summits. It
focussed on three crucial issues: (i) macroeconomic adjustment
for recovery and rebalancing; (ii) strengthening national and
global institutions for oversight, supervision and regulation of
financial markets and institutions; and (iii) reform of and allocation
of resources for the international financial institutions, especially
the IMF.15 Furthermore, at this Summit, there was also a change
Since its establishment, the G20 Finance Ministers group was seen
as a way of opening up and rationalizing the international dialogue.
Within this group, each country represents its own interests, not
those of its neighbours. This is problematic as it further ostracizes the
countries that are not members of the G20. G-20, itself, categorizes its
member countries as follows:
The Caribbean and the G20: The Search for an Engagement Framework
Emerging deficit countries: Brazil, India, Mexico, South
Africa, Turkey, and other European Union countries; and
Even though, these countries have been included in the G20, there
is still a ranking among these countries according to economic
status. This is demonstrative of the significance of the economic
dimension for the developed North countries. Interestingly, with
this classification, it is still evident that emerging economies are still
subjected to the further categorization based on the Eurocentricism.
The African, Caribbean and Pacific countries view the G20 as not
reflective of a new world economic order but rather a continuance
of the old economic system that has been in existence for many
years. While the G8 countries consulted carefully with the dynamic
emerging market economies about the future growth and stability of
the global economy, not much has changed. While this forum should
allow for more diverse discussion and dialogue on global economic
governance given its composition, another trend is emerging. The
group seems to be emphasizing the power of the big powers. This
is confirmed with its continued association and influence over the
Bretton Woods Institutions. The G20 has effectively undermined
the existing system of multilateral cooperation by ensuring that the
interests of these countries are advanced within these institutions. As
such, the majority of nations lose voice and influence on subjects that
affect them crucially. This has triggered deep levels of resentment
towards the G20.
The Caribbean and the G20: The Search for an Engagement Framework
often conceals this reality. Consequently, the manner in which these
economies participate in the world economy and their internal
economic management and structural adjustment remain critical to
their economic development.
The Caribbean and the G20: The Search for an Engagement Framework
this region during 2009. Given the strong linkages of the region with
the US and Europe, the effects of the crisis through a reduction in
the demand for Caribbean exports, the deceleration of the inflow of
remittances and the slowdown in FDI generated a growth contraction
of approximately 0.2 percent for the entire region25. Countries such
as Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, Grenada, St. Kitts and St. Lucia
have all experienced negative GDP growth rates in 2009. Growth
in these countries was -3.9%, -3.5%, -1.0%, -1.5%, -5.2% and -2.5%,
respectively.26 With respect to inflation, for the first half of the 2008,
most CARICOM countries experienced an increase in their rates. This
was as a result of an increase in commodity prices especially food
and energy prices. These negative effects coupled with several other
factors added to increasing unemployment regionally and possibly
even increasing the incidence of poverty in CARICOM. Therefore,
while globalization presents the prospect of a more dynamic
environment in which CARICOM might prosper, there is also greater
risk of exposure to negative exogenous shocks.27
The Caribbean and the G20: The Search for an Engagement Framework
The G20 has emerged as the foremost economic forum for global
economic cooperation. Originally convened to address the Asian
financial crisis of 2008, the G20 has evolved into a powerful forum
which accomplishes more than simply international economic
cooperation. As the international system attempts to recover and
stabilize, there is a concern that countries will lose the sense of
urgency to agree on key issues and policies in response to them.
But the effectiveness of the G20 is not in question as it has shown
the capability to administer to issues beyond the financial crisis;
coordinate financial policies; and implement decisions agreed
upon at previous summits. In this regard, its sustainability as a
leaders forum is not threatened. What is to be addressed is how
the CARICOM region like many other developing regions can do in
order to position their countries to access and influence forums like
the G20. Many Caribbean scholars especially the New World Group
envision CARICOM countries as eligible to enter into any trading
arrangements and more importantly the G20.
The Caribbean and the G20: The Search for an Engagement Framework
to be taken on the different thematic issues in order to have a
common position. It has been observed that a lack of preparation,
uncoordinated policies, non-representation and improper
representation have affected CARICOMs participation at these
negotiating forums. Experience also shows that great care must be
taken in the selection of the negotiating team, and in the assignment
of responsibilities. Individuals chosen should be versed on the issues
involved, be effective communicators, possess good interpersonal
relations, and be a team player. The aim is to develop a team with a
culture and identity of its own, with collective aims, strategies and
positions that have been worked out by all of the members.
The Caribbean and the G20: The Search for an Engagement Framework
With 173 countries permanently excluded, it is difficult to agree with
the idea that the G20 is in some way representative of the world. As
shown, G20 lacks global representation because Africa, CARICOM and
low low-income countries are not sufficiently represented. Clearly, for
the developing countries especially CARICOM countries, the G20 has
not lived up to expectation about inclusion of the wider international
community and pledging to be more representative. But, it has also
been shown that the G20 addresses issues that are relevant to the
developing world such as development, security and trade. In this
regard, with the growing significance of this forum to the overall
global economic agenda, it is critical that CARICOM becomes more
effective and dynamic towards negotiating its positions in these
forums. Hence, CARICOM must align itself with selective partners in
order to position itself strategically to gain from this forum.
CARICOM has remained committed to implementing policies aimed
at improving regional competitiveness and creating strategic safety
nets to protect the poor and those disadvantaged by the global
economic crisis. The region has also called for further upgrading of the
Communitys financial architecture and greater cooperation in other
regional initiatives. The responses of individual countries and the
region as a whole, for the most part, can be described as necessary,
pragmatic and strategic. More so, the actions taken at the national
level have been consistent with those at the regional level. Although
regional economies have been able to stymie the full onslaught
of the crisis, to some extent, the crisis has definitely presented an
even greater challenge for these economies for achieving deeper
integration. CARICOM member states must also be mindful to not
adopt economic agreements with countries outside of the region
that may compromise the thrust towards deeper integration within
the Single Market and Economy.
Generally, the G20 has been quite effective in advancing strategies
for global economic governance. Discussion of such matters within
a global forum makes these summits more meaningful. Through the
Leaders Summit, Ministerial and Working Groups, issues discussed
are simultaneously of domestic and international concern. Thus,
the G20 Summits are not just routine displays in diplomacy and
international cooperation but shows attempts made to address
complex problems arising within and between States globally such
as combating terror financing, challenges of globalization, BWI
reform and development. It is different to the G8 forums as it is more
connected with domestic economic and political forces at work. In
the present milieu, countries are jostling to reposition themselves in
order to diversify their economic relations. In this regard, CARICOM
Notes
1. London (April 2009), Pittsburg (September 2009), Toronto (July
2010), Seoul (November 2010), Seoul (November 2011), Mexico
(June 2012) and Russia (2013).
2. Stephen D. Krasner and Mo Jongryn (2013). Regime Building
in the Competitive World Order: The Case of the G20 in Middle
Powers and G20 Governance, ed. Mo Jongryn. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 85.
3. Nancy Alexander (2012), Introduction to the Group of 20, G20
Fundamentals, Issue 1, 1.
4. G20 (2008). The Group of Twenty: a history. http://www.g20.
utoronto.ca./
5. Gordon Smith (2011). G7 to the G8 to the G20: Evolution in Global
Governance,CIGI G20 Papers 6, May 6, 2011, 4.
6. Meeting of G8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, Washington
May 11, 2004. http://www.justice.gov/ag/events/g82004/g8_
background.html.
7. G. John Ikenberry, Salvaging the G-7, Foreign Affairs 72, no.2
(1993): 132.
8. Ikenberry, Salvaging the G-7, 132.
9. The emerging countries are Brazil. Argentina and Mexico.
10. Robert Wade (2009), From global imbalances to global
reorganizations, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33: 553.
11. Patrick, Stewart (2010), The G20 and the United States:
Opportunities for More Effective Multilateralism, A Century
Foundation Report, New York, 49.
12. Krasner, and Jongryn (2013), 86.
13. Gordon S. Smith and Peter Heap (2010). Canada, the G8 and the
G20: A Canadian Approach to Shaping Global Governance in a
Shifting International Environment, by, SPP Research Papers, The
School of Public Policy, Volume 3, Issue 8, November 2010, 7.
http://www.policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/
smithfinalfinal.pdf
14. http://www.justice.gov/ag/events/g82004/g8_background.html
15. Colin I. Bradford and Johannes F. Linn (2011). A History of G20
Summits: The Evolving. Dynamic of Global Leadership, Journal of
Globalization andDevelopment 2011, Vol.2, 2: 110.
The Caribbean and the G20: The Search for an Engagement Framework
systematically important financial institution (SIFI) regulations.
17. Nancy Alexander, An Introduction to the G20, 2.
18. Richard Bernal, Small Developing Economies in the World
Trade Organization. Paper Presented at World Bank Conference
Leveraging Trade, Global Market Integration and the New WTO
Negotiations for Development, Washington, DC, July 23-24, 2001,
1.
19. UN-OHRLLS, (2011), Small Island Developing States, Small Islands
Big(ger) Stakes, United Nations, New York, 3.
20. United Nations (1994), Report of the Global Conference on the
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States. A/
CONF.167/9.
21. Peter Clegg (2009),The Caribbean and the global financial crisis:
Implications for domestic politics and foreign policy.
22. Maurice Odle (2009), From Subprime to Sublime Disaster; Implication
for the Caribbean Region of the Current Financial Crisis in the USA,
Caribbean Community Secretariat.
23. Clegg (2009).
24. Ibid pg.
25. Auguste Kouame and Maria Ivanova Reyes (2011), The Caribbean
Region Beyond the 200809 Global Financial Crisis. Paper
presented at the Options for the Caribbean After the Global Financial
Crisis Conference, Bridgetown, Barbados, 11.
26. Caribbean Development Bank (2008) Report of the Seminar on
Global Financial Crisis and the Caribbean: Impact and Response
Economics Department, CDB.
27. Robert Read, The Implications of Increasing Globalization and
Regionalism for the Economic Growth of Small Island States (United
Kingdom: Elsevier Ltd,. University of Lancaster, 2004), 372.
28. Read (2004), 37.
29. Alister McIntyre (1994), The Importance of Negotiation
Preparedness: Reflections on the Caribbean Experience. Caribbean
Dialogue 1, no. 1 (1994): 3.
30. Nancy Alexander, An Introduction to the G20.
Bibliography
Alexander, Nancy (2012). An Introduction to the G20. G20 Fundamentals,
North America: Heinrich Bll Foundation, Issue 1, 1-3.
Bernal, Richard (2001). Small Developing Economies in the World
Trade Organization. Paper Presented at World Bank Conference
487
Jos Antonio Sanahuja y
488
Francisco J. Verdes-Montenegro Escnez
Grfico n 2
Brasil, por su parte, opta por una actuacin unilateral que responde
a sus aspiraciones de potencia global y de ocupar un escao en
el Consejo de Seguridad. Aunque en ocasiones esa actuacin
regional/global se puede conciliar por ejemplo, con el liderazgo y
participacin brasilea en Hait a travs de la Misin de estabilizacin
de Naciones Unidas en Hait (MINUSTAH), en general supone una
clara disociacin de esos dos niveles o esferas de actuacin la
diplomacia brasilea no deja de recordar que su pas acta en solitario
en el plano global, conforme a su propia lectura de los intereses
nacionales, y no supedita su posicin, en principio, a la consulta o la
concertacin con la regin y ello implica necesariamente que las
agendas de UNASUR se limiten a los asuntos propios de la regin,
dejando fuera los de carcter global. Este hecho es visible tambin en
otras agendas globales, como las que se abordan en el seno del G-20,
donde los tres pases latinoamericanos, y los dos suramericanos
presentes Argentina, Brasil y Mxicoactan como tales, y no en
representacin de la regin, y no conciertan posiciones ni entre s, ni
con otros pases, en UNASUR o en CELAC.
Grfico n 3
Por pases, como se aprecia en el anexo, son los pases con mayores
capacidades y experiencia en el mbito de las misiones de paz
y la ayuda humanitaria los que han asumido mayores cotas de
responsabilidad en este eje, como se observa en el Plan de Accin
2013 en el que Argentina, Brasil y Chile asumen ntegramente la
responsabilidad de las actividades. Este ltimo pas, adems, asume
una mayor visibilidad al asumir algn rol proactivo en todas las
actividades programadas. Per tambin es uno de los pases activos,
sobre todo en calidad de corresponsable. Otros, como Paraguay y
Surinam no han asumido an ningn compromiso. Es significativa la
ausencia de Uruguay, pese a su mayor tradicin en la participacin
en misiones de paz de Naciones Unidas.
Del anlisis de los Planes de Accin y los estudios del CEED que se
ha realizado en estas pginas tambin se pueden deducir algunas
tendencias que pueden condicionar los avances en materia de
seguridad y defensa en UNASUR. Por un lado, atendiendo al compromiso
y asuncin de responsabilidades en el desarrollo de las actividades
del CDS, teniendo en cuenta que uno de los principios de la defensa
regional suramericana es la reduccin de las asimetras en defensa,
se aprecian distintos niveles de compromiso y participacin. Adems
del caso ms evidente de Colombia, relacionado con sus vnculos
extrarregionales, cabe mencionar tambin el desigual liderazgo de
Brasil. Salvo en el mbito de las industrias de defensa y en MINUSTAH,
este pas no parece haber asumido la responsabilidad que se espera de
un pas que se erige como potencia regional y global, ni ha dispuesto
los medios que exige el papel de paymaster en materia de seguridad y
defensa. Ello requiere de un inteligente liderazgo colectivo que debe
evitar que se agudicen las asimetras entre los pases suramericanos que
participan en la UNASUR y exista un compromiso equilibrado tanto con
el desarrollo de las actividades del CDS como con el desarrollo de otros
consejos vinculados con cuestiones de seguridad. Lo que en suma se
espera de actuacin brasilea es, como afirma Tokatlian, que genere
liderazgos mltiples, es decir, liderazgos concertados, colaborativos,
compartidos y distributivos (Tokatlian, 2013).
Las agendas, logros y planes futuros tanto del CDS como de UNASUR
parecen indicar que la regin ha optado por un enfoque de la
seguridad y la defensa en el que si bien existe una notable coincidencia,
Notas
1. Entre los factores que explican ese estancamiento se encontrara el
menor crecimiento del comercio intragrupo, frenado por carencias
de infraestructura y barreras no arancelarias, y el mayor atractivo
de las opciones extrarregionales, sean los acuerdos comerciales
Sur-Norte con Estados Unidos y la Unin Europea (UE), y el
espectacular aumento de las exportaciones a Asia, en especial de
materias primas.
2. De la configuracin regional de los noventa en Suramrica, slo
Chile opt por una estrategia radial (hub and spoke) y qued al
margen de vincularse a alguno de los esquemas regionales que
operaban en la regin. Los restantes once Estados se adhirieron
o bien al Mercosur (Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay y Uruguay), a la
CAN (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Per y Venezuela) o al CARICOM
(Surinam y Guayana).
3. Veo a los ejrcitos sudamericanos protegiendo los recursos
naturales. Entrevista a Mara Emma Meja, El Pas, 23 de junio de
20111.
4. En la Declaracin de Lima de 2011,adoptada en la tercera reunin
ordinaria del CDS (12 al 13 de mayo de 2011) se aprob un nuevo
eje de cooperacin sobre la proteccin de la biodiversidad y los
recursos naturales estratgicos de cara al siguiente Plan de Accin,
pero no se implement ni en 2012 ni en 2013 (UNASUR, 2011).
Bibliografa
Alda, S. (2012). La participacin militar en el combate contra la violencia
criminal en VV A A Los desafos de la seguridad en Iberoamrica,
Cuadernos de Estrategia, n 158, Instituto Espaol de Estudios
Estratgicos-IUGM, diciembre 2012, pp. 198-232.
Battaglino, J. (2012). Defence in a Post-Hegemonic Regional Agenda:
The Case of the South American Defence Council en Riggirozzi P. y
D. Tussie, The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism: The Case of Latin
America. pp. 81100.
Battaglino, J.M (2013). Auge, cada y retorno de la defensa en Argentina
en Foreign Affairs Latinoamrica n 13, pp. 3239.
Borda, S. (2012). Desafos y oportunidades de la Unin de naciones
Suramericanas-UNASUR. Buenos Aires. CRIES, Documento CRIES 18.
Briceo, J. (2010). La iniciativa del Arco del Pacfico Latinoamericano.
Nueva Sociedad n 228, julio-agosto, pp. 44-59.
Buzan B., Waever O. y J. De Wilde (1998). Security: a new framework of
analysis, Ed. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London.
Fuente: elaboracin propia a partir de los Planes de Accin del CDS (2009-2013)
530
Francisco J. Verdes-Montenegro Escnez
531
Jos Manuel Ugarte
Notas
1. Aprobada en la XI reunin del Consejo del Mercado Comn en
Fortaleza, Brasil, el 17-12-96.
2. Creada por Acuerdo de los Presidentes de las Repblicas de
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras y Nicaragua suscripto el 12 de
noviembre de 1997.
3. Hoy, Comisin de Jefes/as y Directores/as de Polica de
Centroamrica, Mxico, el Caribe y Colombia, obviamente en una
dimensin que supera el mbito subregional.
Juliana Rodrigues
Bacharel em Direito pela Universidade Estadual de Ponta Grossa -
Paran, advogada, pesquisadora na rea de Direito Internacional e
mestranda em Relaes Internacionais pelo
Programa San Tiago Dantas.
e-mail: julianaa.rrodrigues@gmail.com
547
Andrei Serbin Pont e Juliana Rodrigues
A Responsabilidade de Proteger
Contexto Histrico
Em dezembro de 2001, o governo do Canad desenvolveu um
estudo chamado The Responsability to Protect, elaborado pela
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, no
intuito de construir um entendimento mais amplo sobre o problema
da conciliao entre a interveno para a proteo humana e a
soberania (ICISS, 2001). Apesar de considerar-se tal documento
um marco, o debate no era novo. Durante as ltimas dcadas,
genocdios, crimes contra a humanidade, crimes de guerra e limpezas
tnicas permearam pela sociedade mundial, havendo intensificao
depois dos anos 90, podendo-se citar os massacres em Ruanda (1994)
e na Bsnia (1995) como exemplos.
mais graves 10. Para que esta seja legtima, o Relatrio aponta seis
princpios: namely, right autority, just cause, right intention, last
resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects11.
Argentina
A Argentina tomou uma postura ecltica no debate sobre
a Responsabilidade de Proteger. Com um largo histrico de
intervenes humanitrias, e vrias dcadas ocupando um papel
importante como promotora dos direitos humanos, a Argentina ficou
um pouco distante das discusses num primeiro instante. O governo
considerava que j existiam mecanismos e, sobretudo, um marco
jurdico, que permitia o acionamento do mecanismo de segurana
coletiva j instaurado no marco das Naes Unidas, dando a entender
certa redundncia no desenvolvimento e na implementao
do conceito de Responsabilidade de Proteger. Ela demonstrava
uma postura de balano entre o princpio de no-interveno e o
princpio de no-indiferena ante atrocidades e violaes de direitos
a) nfase na preveno;
b) Esgotamento dos meios pacficos;
c) O Conselho de Segurana ou a Assembleia Geral como
rgos encarregados de autorizar o uso da fora;
d) A utilizao de fora limitada pelo mandato e exercida sob
parmetros do direito internacional;
e) O uso da fora deve produzir o mnimo de violncia e
instabilidade possvel;
f) O uso da fora deve ser prudente, proporcional e limitado
aos objetivos do Conselho de Segurana;
g) As orientaes apresentadas no documento deveriam ser
observadas durante toda a durao do mandato;
h) necessrio, dentro do Conselho de Segurana, desenvolver
procedimentos para monitorar e valorar as interpretaes de
resolues para assegurar a Responsabilidade ao Proteger;
i) O Conselho de Segurana deveria assegurar aaccountability
dos que receberam autoridade para executar o uso da fora
(Rodrigues, 2012)
Consideraes finais
A Responsabilidade de Proteger, apesar de estar alguns anos dentro
do sistema internacional, segue sendo um conceito novo, faltando-
lhe um aprofundamento tanto em aspectos tericos como prticos
e operativos. Os pases da Amrica Latina, em sua diversidade de
Notas
1. Arredondo, Ricardo (2011). La Responsabilidad de Proteger en
Amrica Latina: su aplicabilidad y desafos. Em: Responsabilidad
de proteger y prevencin en Amrica Latina y el Caribe: El rol de
la sociedad civil. Arredondo, Ricardo, Rodrigues, Gilberto M. A.,
Serbin, Andrs. Documentos CRIES 16. Coordinadora Regional de
Investigaciones Econmicas y Sociales: Buenos Aires, 2011.
2. Arredondo, Ricardo (2011). La Responsabilidad de Proteger en
Amrica Latina: su aplicabilidad y desafos. Em: Responsabilidad
de proteger y prevencin en Amrica Latina y el Caribe: El rol de
la sociedad civil. Arredondo, Ricardo, Rodrigues, Gilberto M. A.,
Serbin, Andrs. Documentos CRIES 16. Coordinadora Regional de
Investigaciones Econmicas y Sociales: Buenos Aires, 2011.
3. Arredondo, Ricardo (2011). La Responsabilidad de Proteger en
Amrica Latina: su aplicabilidad y desafos. Em: Responsabilidad
de proteger y prevencin en Amrica Latina y el Caribe: El rol de
la sociedad civil. Arredondo, Ricardo, Rodrigues, Gilberto M. A.,
Serbin, Andrs. Documentos CRIES 16. Coordinadora Regional de
Investigaciones Econmicas y Sociales: Buenos Aires, 2011.
4. Rodrigues, Thiago e Souza, Graziene Carneiro de (2012). Respon-
sabilidade de Proteger e sua responsabilidade de reagir: Ultima
ratio de um novo dispositivo global de segurana? En: La Respon-
sabilidad de Proteger y su aplicabilidad en Amrica Latina. Pensa-
miento Propio n. 35. Editorial CRIES: Buenos Aires, 2012.
2013.
16. Serbin, Andrs (2007). Amrica Latina en el Consejo de Seguridad:
juego de intereses entre Venezuela, Panam y EEUU. Papeles Nro
26. FUHEM. Madrid, Espaa. 2007.
17. Serbin, Andrs (2007). Amrica Latina en el Consejo de Seguridad:
juego de intereses entre Venezuela, Panam y EEUU. Papeles Nro
26. FUHEM. Madrid, Espaa. 2007.
18. Documento Final da Cpula de 2005.
19. Arredondo, Ricardo (2011). La Responsabilidad de Proteger en
Amrica Latina: su aplicabilidad y desafos. Em: Responsabilidad
de proteger y prevencin en Amrica Latina y el Caribe: El rol de
la sociedad civil. Arredondo, Ricardo, Rodrigues, Gilberto M. A.,
Serbin, Andrs. Documentos CRIES 16. Coordinadora Regional de
Investigaciones Econmicas y Sociales: Buenos Aires, 2011.
20. Arredondo, Ricardo (2011). La Responsabilidad de Proteger en
Amrica Latina: su aplicabilidad y desafos. Em: Responsabilidad
de proteger y prevencin en Amrica Latina y el Caribe: El rol de
la sociedad civil. Arredondo, Ricardo, Rodrigues, Gilberto M. A.,
Serbin, Andrs. Documentos CRIES 16. Coordinadora Regional de
Investigaciones Econmicas y Sociales: Buenos Aires, 2011.
21. Arredondo, Ricardo (2011). La Responsabilidad de Proteger en
Amrica Latina: su aplicabilidad y desafos. Em: Responsabilidad
de proteger y prevencin en Amrica Latina y el Caribe: El rol de
la sociedad civil. Arredondo, Ricardo, Rodrigues, Gilberto M. A.,
Serbin, Andrs. Documentos CRIES 16. Coordinadora Regional de
Investigaciones Econmicas y Sociales: Buenos Aires, 2011.
22. Rodrigues, Thiago e Souza, Graziene Carneiro de (2012).
Responsabilidade de Proteger e sua responsabilidade de reagir:
Ultima ratio de um novo dispositivo global de segurana? En: La
Responsabilidad de Proteger y su aplicabilidad en Amrica Latina.
Pensamiento Propio n. 35. Editorial CRIES: Buenos Aires, 2012.
Referncias
Albuquerque Mello, Celso D. de (1997). Direitos Humanos e Conflitos
Armados. Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 1997.
Arredondo, Ricardo (2011). La Responsabilidad de Proteger en
Amrica Latina: su aplicabilidad y desafos. Em: Responsabilidad
de proteger y prevencin en Amrica Latina y el Caribe: El rol de
la sociedad civil. Arredondo, Ricardo, Rodrigues, Gilberto M. A.,
Serbin, Andrs. Documentos CRIES 16. Coordinadora Regional de
Investigaciones Econmicas y Sociales: Buenos Aires, 2011.
567
Gian Carlo Delgado Ramos
Emisiones GEI
Huella hdrica
(Produccin,
Sector / Producto (incluye huella
procesamiento y
azul, verde y gris)
transportacin)
Flujo de residuos
Ciudad Flujos de Alimentos orgnicos/
inorgnicos
1
La zona metropolitana de Buenos Aires, o el Gran Buenos Aires, cubre una su-
perficie de 3,833 km2 con una poblacin de ms de 12 millones de habitantes. La
Ciudad Autnoma de Buenos Aires en cambio comprende poco ms de 3 millones
de habitantes en una superficie de 203 km2. Se produce ah la cuarta parte del PIB
del pas. La densidad de poblacin es de 15 mil hab/km2.
2
Tiene 8.85 millones de habitantes en 1,400km2. La Zona Metropolitana del Valle
de Mxico (ZMVM) concentra 22 millones en una superficie de 4,900 km2 y oficial-
mente con unos 4 millones de personas viviendo en reas de alta marginacin. En
los ltimos 60 aos, la ciudad ha crecido una hectrea por da (SMA- GDF, 2008: 36).
El 59% del suelo es de conservacin.
3
Ro de Janeiro y su zona metropolitana albergan a poco ms de 11 millones de
habitantes en una superficie de 5,645 km2. Slo la ciudad tiene 6,0994,183 habi-
tantes en unos 1,200 km2.
4
Tiene 11 millones de habitantes en 1,522 km2. Considerando su zona metropolita-
na, la poblacin aumenta a 20 millones en una superficie total de 8 mil km2, no obs-
tante, la urbanizacin es prcticamente continua, al incluir la regin metropolitana
de la Bajada Santista y la regin metropolitana de Campias. En conjunto suman
ms de 24 millones de habitantes en alrededor de 14 mil km2.
Fuente: elaboracin propia con base en documentos oficiales diversos y datos de
FAOSTAT.
Reflexiones finales
En general, el conocimiento sobre el funcionamiento del metabolismo
de las ciudades y en particular el de los alimentos, es bastante escaso.
La informacin, si es que la hay, est altamente fragmentada o se
Bibliografa
Altieri, M. & V. M. Toledo (2011). The agroecological revolution of
Latin America: rescuing nature, securing food sovereignity and
empowering peasants. Journal of Peasant Studies. Vol. 38. No. 3.
Julio. Pp. 587 612.
Cochrane, Kever, De Young, Cassandra, Soto, Doris, Bahri, Tarb (2009).
Climate change implications for fisheries and aquaculture. Overview
of current scientific knowledge. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture
Technical Paper No. 530. FAO. Roma, Italia.
Colombo, Sri Lanka. En: www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Publications/IWMI_
Research_Reports/PDF/pub115/RR115.pdf
Delgado, Gian Carlo (2011). El mito de la economa verde. ALAI, Amrica
Latina en Movimiento. 6 de Octubre. En: alainet.org/active/49976
De Zeeuw H., R. Van Veenhuizen, y M. Dubbeling (2011). The Role
of Urban Agriculture in Building Resilient Cities in Developing
Countries. The Journal of Agricultural Science 149, 153-163.
Drechsel P., S. Graefe, y M. Fink, (2007). Rural-Urban Food, Nutrient and
Virtual Water Flows in Selected West African Cities. International
Water Management Institute.
Funes-Monzote, Fernando (2010). El uso de transgnicos para producir
alimentos en Cuba. Caminos. Revista de Pensamiento Socioteolgico.
No. 55 56. Enero- Junio. La Habana, Cuba. Pp. 8 - 13.
Funes-Monzote, Fernando, Altieri, Miguel y Rosset, Peter (2009). The
Avery Diet: the Hudson Institutes misinformation campaign against
cuban agriculture. En: globalalternatives.org/files/AveryCubaDiet.
pdf
Asha Singh
works as an interdisciplinary scientist mainly in the area of marine
management and policy at the Institute of Marine Affairs. She
holds a PhD from The University of Plymouth, U.K., M.Sc. from
University of the West Indies and a B.Sc. from the University of
Guyana. Her professional experience included various positions in
the environmental field with organizations such as Guyana Forestry
Commission (Guyana), University of Plymouth (U.K.), The Cropper
Foundation (Trinidad and Tobago) and the Florida International
University (U.S.A.). She also worked as a
consultant with agencies such as UNEP.
e-mail: ashasing@yahoo.ca / asingh@ima.gov.tt
599
Asha Singh
States
In the growing work on governance, it is evident that there is a
redirection of its use and currently governance has a broader
application. Such has resulted in many different meanings depending
on the context and usage, many of which are somewhat removed
from the original intention or meaning.4 A review of the literature
concludes that the term governance is used in a variety of ways and
disciplines and has a variety of meanings, which include:
Soft Laws are used to further compliment the other legal instruments,
a caveat of international declarations, policy guidance documents
and programmes of actions, which set forth principles, guidelines and
recommendations, were sanctioned in support of these agreements,
for example Agenda 21 and the Barbados Programme of Action and
Mauritius Strategy for Sustainable Development (BPOA/MS).
The core of governance shows the various legal agreements, which provide
the legal basis/right to govern and the Interventions show the various
instruments which support the core OF Governance. The core of governance
and interventions collectively are affected by a large number of implementing
mechanisms facilitated by various institutions and stakeholders. These take
into account society norms and behaviours.
Environmental Governance
No doubt Small States have made considerable policy strides in
the manner in which they regard their resources, recognise the
fragility of important ecosystems and environment/economic inter-
dependence. However, despite this recognition, some persistent
policies continue to be propagated in small states which are viewed
as impediments to sound governance and therefore require urgent
re-evaluation. These are as follows:
Conclusion
Over the years numerous attempts were made by SIDS albeit with
mixed reviews to enhance their governance. Arguably these states
have recognised the importance of sound and holistic governance
and have continue to make strides; but the reality is that the pace
of environmental reform is not occurring at the desired level where
environmental degradation is halted to the level as to allow for
recovery. While this is not solely a SIDS problem, rather a global
one, SIDS as a group of nations and with inherent characteristics of
resources scarcity is likely to be at the greatest disadvantage.
Commission, Mauritius
15. Stakeholder participation and the implementing agencies play a
significant role in governance. However, this paper focuses on the
governance from the legal, diplomatic and political perspective.
Wherever, it is deemed important, reference to institutional
mechanism and stakeholders will be incorporated into the analysis.
16. In this paper, the national laws of the 36 States will not be discussed.
However, their implications and significance for ocean governance
where necessary will be examined.
17. The anti-globalization movement is critical of the globalization of
corporate capitalism. What is shared is that participants oppose
what they see as large, multi-national corporations having
unregulated political power, exercised through trade agreements
and deregulated financial markets which have contributed in part,
to many of the environmental problems experienced presently.
18. Meeting of experts on growth and Development in small States,
Commonwealth Secretariat.
19. Data from the World Bank is showing a low level of FDI, refer to
Appendix 1.
20. SIDS (2010) Issues and Challenges.
21. Phillip Osei, Senior Fellow, Sir Authur Lewis, Institute of Social and
Economic Studies. Meeting of Experts on growth and Development
in Small States
22 . Refer to Singh. A and Caribinvest (W.I) Ltd, 2012 Overview of
climate change in Small States, Commonwealth Secretariat, 25 pgs.
For the financing provided for climate change related projects.
Refer to Caribinvest (W.I) Ltd AND A. Singh, 2012 Fast Start
financing in Small States, commonwealth Secretariat, 25 pgs. For
the financing provided by the international community on related
projects.
Bibliography
Caribinvest (W.I) Ltd and A. Singh (2012). Fast Start financing in Small
States, Commonwealth Secretariat, 25 pgs.
Carly. M. and Christie, I.(2000). The Worlds Commons: The Challenge of
Governance, World humanity Action Trust, 200 pgs
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, (2006) Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment. http://www.maweb.org/en/Reports.aspx#
Singh, A and Caribinvest (W.I) Ltd, (2012). Overview of climate change
in Small States, Commonwealth Secretariat, 25 pgs.
In memoriam.
Homenaje a Daniel van
Eeuwen y Norman Girvan
Jos Briceo
D. Alissa Trotz
Laneydi Martnez
621
622 Anuario de Integracin 9 | Ao 2012
In memoriam
Daniel van Eeuwen
(1944-2013)
623
Jos Briceo Ruiz
D. Alissa Trotz
is an Associate Professor in Women and Gender Studies,
and Director of the undergraduate Caribbean Studies
Program at New College, University of Toronto.
e-mail : da.trotz@utoronto.ca
627
D. Alissa Trotz
precedent the EPA sets for future trade negotiations with Canada and
the US. Norman was at the forefront of a campaign that was carried
in the regional media calling for a full and public review of the EPA.
He supplied memorable terms to describe the three card trick that we
were played: sweetification, the dangling carrot that came in the form
of hollow promises of development funds; treatyfication, binding
legal documents that arguably contravene elements of the Caricom
Single Market and Economy itself; and technification, the dense
language over hundreds of pages of the Agreement that mystified
the entire process. On this last point Norman was deeply reflective of
the way in which the anti-EPA campaign with the exception of Haiti
where there was popular mobilization - remained largely at the level of
an intra-elite disagreement, removing from plain view the devastating
effects the agreement could potentially have on peoples everyday
lives. The lessons to be drawn are many, as we were reminded just two
weeks ago when at a meeting in Guyana, the Caribbean Association
of Industry and Commerce (CAIC) noted that the EPA has not allowed
us full access [to the European market] that we have envisioned.
At the time of signing, provisions were put in place to evaluate
implementation after an initial five years meaning that a full and frank
public accounting was due to the people of the region in 2013. CAICs
comments suggest that little to nothing has been done by Caricom,
or the CRNM, or the Heads of Government, to ensure that we were
collecting systematic information to enable meaningful discussion
of what the EPA has (not) delivered to the region. Addressing this
shameful lapse head on is part of the work to be done, while also
engaging Normans efforts (rooted in his idea of a Caribbean beyond
the narrow insularities of the Anglophone countries) to think about
different kinds of integration possibilities outside of neoliberal free
trade arrangement logics, represented for example by The Bolivarian
Alliance of the Americas (ALBA) and PetroCaribe.
Most recently and at the time of his tragic accident, Norman was
actively involved in a campaign that brought together colleagues
from the Caribbean, North America and Europe, outraged by the
discriminatory and racist Ruling 168-13 of the Constitutional Tribunal of
the Dominican Republic (DR) that effectively stripped citizenship from
potentially hundreds of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent.
The position that Caricom eventually took (condemning the ruling
and suspending consideration of the DRs request for membership of
Caricom) cannot be understood outside of this activism that pressured
the regions governments to take a stand. Normans online blog kept us
abreast of ongoing developments, taking care to feature oppositional
voices from the Dominican Republic to remind us to always take our
cue from those most affected by and mobilizing against the ruling. In
D. Alissa Trotz
633
Laneydi Martnez Alfonso
LMA: As you know, in the last 10 years, new players have emerged
in the regional scenario of Latin America and the Caribbean:
UNASUR, ALBA and CELAC are some of the examples. How would
you characterize, in terms of achievements and challenges, the
emergence of these new stakeholders in the regional context?
At the same time, you have new integration schemes being offered
to these countries. The Economic Partnership Agreement between
the EU and the CARIFORUM countries sets up a virtual single market
among them in trade, services and investments. There were also
institutional arrangements in which interaction with the EU wil be
as strong as or stronger than interaction within CARICOM on trade
matters. Two countries -Guyana and Surinam- are participating in
UNASUR; and three others Antigua, Saint Vincent and Grenadines,
and Dominica are in ALBA, with a fourth, St Lucia, set to join. These
schemes bring interaction with larger and financially more powerful
countries. The effect of these schemes in the Caribbean Community
is that the economic integration aspect is being put to one side.
LMA: In the case of CELAC: How would you assess the participation
and perspectives of CARICOM countries in this scheme, particularly,
given the controversial political positions of CARICOM countries in
the case of the Falkland Island and the Assange case?