DRUGS, GUNS and CASH and Manage A Crisis en CAmerica

Drugs, Guns and Cash
Analysis and Proposals on How to Manage

the Crisis in Central America
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CONTENTS
I. Purpose
II. Cooperating Organizations
III. Executive Summary
IV. Important Points of Mention: Action Plan Guide
V. Findings and Recommendations
i. National Responsibilities
i. Alternatively Governed Spaces
ii. Corruption and Politics
iii. Potential State Failure
iv. Systematic and Structural Problems
v. Citizen Security
ii. Regional Initiatives
i. Unbalanced Resource Allocation
ii. Neutralizing Criminal Organizations
iii. Flourishing Informal and Shadow Economics
iv. Raise the Sense of Urgency
v. Quick Wins
vi. Multilateral Alliances
vii. Territorial and Political Penetration
viii. Gang Violence
iii. International Support
i. Additional Resources
ii. Guatemala A Pivotal Axis
iii. Land Trafficking Routes
iv. Human Trafficking
v. High-level Political Attention
iv. Action Plan
i. Shared Responsibility
ii. Criminal Justice Reform
iii. The Caribbean Connection
iv. Intelligence Sharing
v. Media Responsibility
vi. Systems of Systems Analysis
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vii. Research Based Solutions

v. United States and Canada
i. Responsibilities and Solutions to Organized Crime, both Foreign and
Domestic
VI. Introduction
VII. Situational Analysis
i. Mechanics of Central American Drug Trafficking
ii. Actors Involved
iii. Organized Crime
iv. Modus Operandi, Structure, Network and Activity of Gangs in Central America
v. Structure
i. Drug Trafficking Organizations, Criminal Groups, and Gangs Operating in
Central America
ii. Central American Risk Factors for Youth and Gang Violence
vi. Gangs Network and Activity
i. Maras: Origin, Structure and Network of Activity
ii. A Research Assessment of the Maras
vii. Guatemalas Geostrategic Nightmare
viii. Challenges to Democracy and Demographic Institutions
i. Violence and the Impact on Citizen Security
ii. The Problem of Alternatively Governed Spaces (AGSs)
iii. The Link to Terrorism
VIII. Case Studies
i. Chicago
i. Drug Cartels Operating in Chicago
ii. Street Gangs in Chicago
ii. Panama
i. FARC and Smuggling
ii. Human Trafficking
iii. Conclusion
iii. Guatemala
i. Brief History
ii. Statistical Graphs and Charts
IX. Discussion and Conclusion
i. The Link between Organized Crime and Politics
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ii. A Reality Check

iii. A Way Forward
i. Struggle Against the Large Mafias
ii. Combating the Municipal Chain that Feeds the Large Mafias
iii. Peaceful Co-Existence and Security for the Population
X. Conclusion
XI. Advisors, Background Papers and References, and Additional Resources
CHARTS, TABLES AND GRAPHS
1. Global Potential Cocaine Production, 1990 2008 (Graph)

2. Tunnels Discovered by Law Enforcement in the U.S. (Table)
3. 3 x 3 Matrix of Action (Table)
4. Homicide Rates in Central America (Map)
5. Intensity of Drug Smuggling (Map)
6. Potential Boost of Annual Economic Growth Rate from Reducing Homicide Rate
by 10% (Graph)
7. Illicit Drug Use at the Global Level, 2006 (Graph)
8. Drug Routes Mexico (Map)
9. Share of Cocaine Flowing to the U.S. through Transport Corridors (Graph)
10. Size of Shadow Economies of a Share of Official GDP, 2002/2003 (Graph)
11. Organized Crime: The Mafia, La Cosa Nostra, The Yakuza, Mexican Cartels
The Underworld is Ruled by a Complex Network of Criminal Groups (Map)
12. Key Risk Factors for Homicide in Central America (Graph)
13. Firearms Owned by Civilians in Central America, 2007 (Table)
14. Central American Gangs (Table)
15. The Broker Comparing Anti-Gang Approaches and Policies: Gang Violence in
Central America (News Article)
16. Relative Sizes of Police Forces and Private Security in Central America (Map)
17. Share of the Population Living on less than U.S. $2 Per Day Household Per
Capita Income (Map)
18. Crime rates against Unemployment rates in Central America (Map)
19. Alternatively Governed Spaces in Colombia: Areas where FARC Operate (Map)
20. Merida Aviation Breakdown and Delivery Estimate (Table)
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21. Annual Causes of Death in the United States

22. Chicago (Map)
23. Sinaloa Cartel (Hierarchy Graph)
24. Street Gangs in Chicago (Picture)
25. Street Value of Cocaine, 1 (Graph)
26. Street Value of Cocaine, 2 (Graph)
27. Annual Percentage of Individuals Deported on Criminal Grounds from the U.S.,
2008 - 2010 (Table)
28. Number of Central American Nationals Arrested for Drug Trafficking in the U.S.
in 2004 by Country (Graph)
29. Panama (Map)
30. Guatemala (Map)
31. Deprived of Liberty for every 100,000 Inhabitants, and Capability and
Population in the Penitentiary System, 2010 (Graph)
32. Number of Homicides in Guatemala per 100,000 Inhabitants (Graph)
33. World Rank of Guatemala for Criminal and Violence Cost (Picture Statistic)
34. Economic Growth Per Capita and Annual Population Growth in Latin America,
2000-2010 (Graph)
35. Military Expense in Guatemala as % of GDP (Graph)
36. Composition of Military Budget (Graph)
37. Homicides and Police for every 100,000 Inhabitants (Graph)
38. Development Rate in Guatemala (Picture Statistic)
39. Economic Growth Per Capita in Latin America, 2000-2010 (Graph)
40. Midyear Population for Guatemala, 2010 (Graph)
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PURPOSE
The most important message extracted from this study is that without
intergovernmental and international cooperation and support, primarily between the
countries most involved, Guatemala and Central America will soon collapse into failed
states dominated by shadow economies and run by Criminal Organizations that buy
political power. Without decisive action, these countries will be handed to these
criminal organizations and groups of people that wish to form their own type of
government system and inadvertently create greater regional instability.
This scenario must not be permitted. These same groups of people will eventually take
control of the agricultural and industrial markets in the region, to which the United
States and many other countries depend and, will determine where and at what price
they would want to sell their products. Simultaneously, the United States would lose its
position and influence in Central America. As a result, the region would begin to foster
a unique environment where Narco-Terrorism and quasi-states can flourish. Efforts to
stem the momentum of these events from evolving must be instantaneous and holistic
to produce the desired effect. The carnage and destruction experienced in Colombia and
Mexico is on the doorstep of Central American countries and the criminals have
resources that are far greater today.
Therefore, this report was developed with the hope of achieving three purposes. First, it
is a learning process and a means to bring better understanding about the deteriorating
situation in Central America. Secondly, it is to engender a general awareness on the
various issues that impact the national security, wellbeing and safety of the citizens of
countries in Central America. Thirdly, it is to initiate a deeper and more thoughtful
discussion about these topics, recognizing that old debates, paradigms, and historical
assumptions must be revisited to better analyze the gravity of the situation as critically
and objectively as possible.
The forces of organized crime are clashing against the forces of development. This clash
impedes the regions ability to develop concrete solutions. Traditional strategies have
led to limited results. The type of alternative solutions that should be favored are not
based on conventional wisdom but instead of a result-oriented approach.
The supporting structural ideas applied throughout this report will attempt to stimulate
strategic thinking, debunk myths, understand displacement and its consequences,
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suggest concrete and cost-effective solutions, and develop an analytical framework,

which allows a balanced fact-based approach.
The most significant ideas that relate to strategic thinking are cohesive intelligence
sharing, combined tactics, operational strategies and a collective initiative without
regional borders and barriers. In the case of debunking myths, it is necessary to end the
denial phase of the current crisis in the region by confronting the reality that this is a
regional problem that requires an Integrated Regional Security Strategy and, unmask
numerous erroneous conceptions and assumptions within Guatemala - and other
regional countries - in their political, social, and economic arenas. Lastly, to understand
the seriousness of displacement and its consequences, especially around the Latin
American and Caribbean region. Prioritized allocation of counter-initiative resources
must be addressed in a comprehensive and coherent manner or the problem will
remain being shuffled around the geographic chessboard that haunts the region.
Much time and effort has been devoted to the escalating problems of the region with
few concrete and cost-effective solutions implemented in a timely manner. In contrast, an
integrated analytical framework will guide the type of actionable strategies that are
necessary to better approach these critical issues in Central America.
In brief, the goal of this study is to promote a new and informed dialogue on these
complex and vastly misunderstood matters. The proposed suggestions and
recommendations are not meant to be final or conclusive, but rather, they are meant to
spark a debate around sustainable solutions and ideas, and their potential results and
benefits to the region. Hopefully, with this Central Americans can find common ground
within which these findings and recommendations can be formulated and executed.
Nonetheless, this report was developed with the intention of finding immediate and
strategic regional solutions, underscoring a sense of urgency more so for Guatemala.
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COOPERATING ORGANIZATIONS
CACIF
The Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial y Financial

Associations (CACIF) is the organization which represents the business sector in
Guatemala since the late 1950s. Organized, inclusive, proactive, modern and in constant
coordination with the different areas of society, it promotes a productive country whose
economic growth and social development is based on: Market economy, democracy and
rule of law. It strongly believes that the free enterprise system is the best way to achieve
progress for this country, supported by the rule of law, and the principle that the
general interest must prevail over individual interests.
CIEN
The National Economic Research Center (CIEN in Spanish) is a 30-year-old private,

non-lucrative, and political but nonpartisan institution, whose mission is to improve the
living conditions of people through research proposals based on technical, analytical
and rigorous challenges related to the promotion of welfare in its proper context. Their
institutional vision is to be the leader and reference point within and outside
Guatemala, in developing creative, critical, and inspiring proposals and that effectively
contribute to the welfare of humans.
FUNDESA
The Foundation for the Development of Guatemala (FUNDESA in Spanish) is a 30-year-

old private, non-profit organization, comprised by business people who act on their
own accord. It works as a Think Tank that strives to contribute to integral, sustainable
and democratic development within a market economy and rule of law. The
Foundation acts as an independent institution that is representative, with a proactive
approach, and a long-term vision regarding key issues that affect the development of
the Guatemalan people. FUNDESA has positioned itself as a source of relevant,
technical information and data about Guatemala, a hub for key projects that aid long-
term economic and social transformations, and an advocate for innovations and the
implementation of new ideas and concepts jointly with national and international
organizations in Guatemala.
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Foundation G
Foundation G (Fundacin G in Spanish) is a recently created (2011) private, non-profit

foundation, whose mission is to generate awareness and propose solutions to the
challenges Security and Justice of Guatemala, National Unity and collaboration,
education and poverty reduction. It has recently supported rule-of-law initiatives such
as Guatemala Visible (www.guatemalavisible.org), Congreso Visible
(www.congresovisible.org), Movimiento Cvico Nacional (www.mcn.org.gt), and
Ciudades Seguras (www.unifemweb.org.mx).
Integrated Security Solutions (ISS)
ISS served a collaborative role in this study by recruiting academics and researchers in
the various fields of interest contained in this report, compiling and refining bulk data
to sanitize the ideas presented and providing expert analysis for the delivery of the final
report. Of specific mention are two prominent contributors (1) Professor Anthony T
Bryan, who has a long and distinguished career as an academic and scholar, researcher
and analyst in many disciplines that were relevant to this study. (2) Mr. Eric Davis is a
former Chicago police Officer, Specialist in gang reform and containment and respected
speaker on the many subjects that proved critical to better understanding the dynamics
that impact the complexity of the problems faced in the Americas today.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The insatiable consumption of illicit drugs has created a very powerful enemy that
thrives on violence, lust for money and power and which has set its sights on Central
America - as one of its vital organs. This enemy is not new to the global arena, as
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) have existed since ancient times and
remains a part of the underground economies that sustain many traditional economies.
Be it the trafficking of drugs, weapons, contraband or humans, TCOs sponsor and
enable Localized Criminal Organizations (LCOs) to facilitate and execute their
operational activities within specific jurisdictions. Shifting sociopolitical dynamics in
the Americas - over the last decade - have empowered and emboldened many TCOs
and LCOs as expanding drug transit routes to the U.S.A. and elsewhere are posing a
serious and escalating threat to the sovereignty of many countries within Central
America. In this struggle, Central America must reestablish the Rule of Law as the
basis of its counter initiatives.
These TCOs (of which many are Mexican and Colombian drug cartels) have the
finances, organizational structures, geostrategic influence and illegally obtained
firepower to destabilize many Central American countries. As a result, they provide
alternative governance to areas within countries that are not under the direct control of
governments. These Alternatively Governed Spaces (AGS)* have become logistics hubs
for road, maritime, and aerial deposit and storage of large amounts of illicit cargo
destined for the U.S. and other markets, and primarily for TCOs active in Mexico that
operate a complex variety of land crossings and tunnels into the lucrative U.S. market.
Central American countries have been drawn into this narcotics and contraband
quagmire largely due to greed, its geostrategic location with Mexico and the fact that
its a maneuverable land, sea and air bridge between North and South America.
While the United States (U.S.) remains the prime destination for South American-
produced cocaine and Florida is no longer the primary trans-shipment route - the
transit routes between Mexico and South America have clearly changed. The myriads of
trafficking routes passing throughout Central America have become the new
superhighway due to many shifting dynamics over the last decade. As part of the U.S.
sponsored Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) several countries in the region have
stepped up their monitoring and interdiction of airborne and maritime shipments
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transiting from South America to the U.S. and elsewhere. However, they have not seen
similar successes in the interdiction of road transit shipments primarily due to the
absence of adequate border control mechanisms; corrupt and inefficient Security Forces,
clandestine transit routes being used by TCOs and LCOs and collusion on many levels.
During the Presidency of both Pastrana and Uribe, Plan Colombia was part of the ACI
program. Colombia has learned many lessons on the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels that could prove beneficial to safety and security concerns Central American
countries face today. More so, it is important to conceptualize the impact and
consequences of the ACI program and Plan Colombia within the broader context of the
many crossroads faced by the U.S. (9/11, economic collapse and two wars in the Middle
East) in the last decade and the resultant effect on its regional focus and involvement.
According to a December 2008 report from the U.S. National Drug Intelligence Center,
less than 1 percent of the estimated 600 to 700 tons of cocaine that departed South
America for the United States - in 2007 - transited through Central America. The rest,
for the most part, passed through the Caribbean Sea or Pacific Ocean.
Recently, former U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Stephen McFarland estimated - in an

interview with a Guatemalan newspaper - that cocaine now passes through Guatemala
at a rate of approximately 300 to 400 tons per year. In reality, Guatemala has become a
geostrategic storage and wholesale distribution hub for South American produced
cocaine. Notwithstanding the difficulty associated with estimating drug trafficking, it is
clear that Central America has evolved into the main trans-shipment route for drugs
and contraband cargo, and that the logistic and transit changes have taken place rapidly
and in response to active interdiction programs supported and funded by the U.S.
These developments warrant a closer look at the mechanics of the drug trade in the
region, the actors involved, and the implications for Central American governments -
for whom TCOs and LCOs represent a much more daunting threat than current
national security resources can manage and that of the Americas as a whole.
In the 1980s and early 1990s Colombias warfare with drug cartels saw unprecedented
bombings, assassinations and kidnappings directed at government and civilian targets
in what was labeled the age of Narco-terrorism. By the U.S. definition of terrorism,
TCOs in Mexico and the Northern Triangle (Guatemala; El Salvador and Honduras)
operate as terrorist groups as evidenced by their recent emboldened actions. Despite the
media spotlight on Mexico, Honduras has the highest per-capita murder rate in Central
America of 77:100,000 inhabitants, followed by El Salvador with 66:100,000, Guatemala
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with 50:100,000 and Mexico with 18:100,000. These numbers tell a story of their own as
corruption, collusion, greed and poverty create a formula that has facilitated cheap
guns for hire, turf wars for control of lucrative drug transit routes and an opportunist
mentality among many, based on desire to improve their economic circumstances.
The Northern Triangle has become - in the last decade - the most dangerous part of the
world outside of active war zones. This is primarily because of the geostrategic location
as a bridge between North and South America. The Merida Initiative in Mexico is
pressuring TCOs and LCOs and the result is that they have broadened their operational
arenas and shifted their activities to countries immediately south of Mexico. Northern
Triangle countries are today feeling the brunt of these expansionist ambitions. Central
American governments must be prepared to dialogue with TCOs and LCOs as was
the case in Colombia to arrive at compromises that facilitate acceptable levels of safety
and security for the region.
The solutions presented in this report are built around the promotion of interdependent
criminal justice programs that will primarily remain internal and situational to every
country but at the same time support a collaborative set of goals that are regional. The
security and public safety concerns of the region should be unified into a collective
effort that simultaneously addresses the holistic needs and desires of Central American
countries to combat organized crime, regain control of their territories and strengthen
their respective national security programs. This interdependence of effort would in
turn reinforce the independence of the respective Intelligence and Policing efforts and
reintroduce the Military into the fold - of participating security forces - after years of
psychological exile following the civil war era. Collective Intelligence (CI) and
Intelligence Led Operations (ILOs) have proven to be the soundest approach in leading
combat, interdiction and reform initiatives required.
The lessons of the past forty years of combating drugs and organized crime primarily
in South America and Mexico - offer a great strategic advantage to Central American
countries. The Central American crisis will not pass without cohesive intelligence
sharing and combined tactical and operational strategies. Joint initiatives should
remove the pitfalls of going alone against this phenomenon, as has been the case, for the
most part, so far. This effort has to be a cohesive initiative without borders and barriers
which hinder a holistic approach and which foster perpetual bureaucratic deliberations
that play into the hands of criminal organizations. Time is of the essence for success to
be real or even achievable. Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan points
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out, we will not enjoy either (security or development) without respect for human
rights. Unless all causes are advanced, none will succeed.
The old paradigm of a heavy-handed approach to crime control has proven fruitless
and destructive. Although operational and tactical intervention is required as a parallel
initiative, the more strategic approach would be the coordinated application of all of the
resources of the national governments, private sectors, NGOs, friendly foreign
governments and regionally aligned agencies. Conducting this orchestra of efforts will
leverage the collective intelligence and creativity of the next generation of leaders, in
what is likely to be the only real way to solve the complex issues at hand. In the words
of former CICIG Commissioner Carlos Castresana The problem is that, in Guatemala,
criminal organizations have never been confronted. Commissioner Castresana also
coined the phrase Looking the monster in the face, which is what Guatemala and all
of Central America is now forced to do should democracy, development and principle-
centered leadership prevail.
So as we look at the monster in the face, we have come to realize that the monster in fact
has many faces that represent different cultures, religions, nationalities and an
operational framework that engenders the ideals of criminal organizations, Islamic
terrorists groups, corrupt politicians, money laundering institutions and States that
sponsor strategies and tactics that promote ideological principles that are meant to
divide and dominate its people. This cocktail of collusion and apathy has brought an
entire region to the brink of implosion because of its inequities and uncertainties that all
form part of a growing formula that may well see the return of civil strife and internal
conflicts that will turn back the hands of time in Central America.
The ultimate reality is that certain cold-war ideologists and strategists have not given
up on the goals and objectives in the Americas. Civil wars continue on social and
political battlefields, where Hidden Powers combine gangs, well-placed bureaucrats,
clandestine groups and historical trading routes to enable and facilitate a tactical,
operational and strategic infrastructure that has survived the forty-year war on drugs.
It is not coincidental that time is telling a story all of its own as declassified information
exposes strategic ties between common enemies of democracy and the freedoms,
transparencies and accountabilities that are derived from democratic systems. So as
battlefields change along with doctrines and instruments of modern warfare, what
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remains consistent is the use of organized crime, shadow economies and political
strategies to seize power and wealth to continue funding these ideological revolutions.
Central America has become a pawn in a much greater chess-game that transcends
regional and ideological borders and promotes the ongoing struggle between
conflicting political extremes with which the region continues to struggle in this
modern era. Even in this great debate, time has proven to be the best storyteller, as
democratic countries are protected and defended by security forces that operate on
quasi-authoritarian principles, where command and control is centralized and
unchallenged.
Perhaps, as we evolve as a humanity we will one day arrive at the conclusion that all
realities have valuable lessons that when fused and edited could offer a collective
approach that is inclusive, respectful and based on the fundamental human rights of all.
When we go to the supermarket we do not take everything on the shelf, but rather the
things we need. Central America must decide on the menu of ideas that must be
executed for its development and take the things it needs from its collective local,
regional and international access to grow and develop progressively.
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IMPORTANT POINTS OF MENTION

ACTION PLAN GUIDE
Has the cold war really ended or, have ideological guerilla organizations simply used
peace accords and political objectives to further their cause in seeking power and
control of territories in the region? Since the negotiated settlement with the FARC in
1998 - that gave them autonomous territory - Colombia surpassed Peru as the largest
producers of cocaine in the world. Criminal organizations are openly accessing and
utilizing indigenous land and waterway travel routes to traffic drugs, humans and
other contraband. Weapons used by guerilla organizations during the civil war era -
are the primary weapons still in use by criminal organizations and clandestine groups
active throughout Latin America. Equally alarming is the fact that most confiscated
weapons in the war on drugs are U.S. made.
Democratic elections throughout Latin America are masking the growing lack of
democratic governance by the political parties that assume office. National election
campaigns in many countries are seen and used as investments to more lucrative
sources of revenue derived from state coffers and institutions. Government contracts
and projects are being farmed out to criminal organizations that use these programs to
launder money and gain social credibility through employment. Throughout this crafty
process of indulgence and patronage, socio-political power structures are being
established and funded by illicit cash.
The breath and depth of the vast empires of TCOs have become so complex over time
that dismantling them have become greater challenges with the successive changes in
governments throughout Latin America. In most of these countries, two-term
Presidencies are not common and actually work in favor of the more established TCOs.
This lack of constituency of political will and divergent loyalties have negatively
affected national efforts and breathe distrust among neighboring countries with
opposing political interests and intents. This mistrust hampers collective intelligence
sharing and interdiction initiatives as Politicians are more concerned with their return
on investment spent on getting into office as opposed to the collective benefit of the
country.
Since the attacks on the U.S. on September 11th 2001 (9/11), U.S. strategic interest has
shifted away from Latin America and over these past ten years there has been a tidal
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wave of criminal activity, socio-political shifts and measurable reduction in the positive
impact in the region by U.S. Policymakers. U.S. Military, Political, Economic and
Intelligence vulnerabilities exposed during and since the 9/11 attacks have left many
developing countries without a realistic true-north in seeking their own socio-political
identities. However, all is not lost, democratic values and principles are still very much
alive but require more determined focus and leadership to recover lost ground
throughout Latin America.
International and regional support must return to Central America to guide necessary
reforms and must take on an all-inclusive appeal to the varied aspirations and
motivations of this dynamic and evolving region. Latin America has the potential to
become a world power if fairly and transparently managed.
1. A Paradigm Shift To Deal With Criminality. The past forty years, since the U.S.
declaration of the war on drugs, has seen tremendous human and material
resources dedicated to the disruption of supply and other operational aspects of
the drug trade, the capture of visible leaders, and sprinkled initiatives at
reducing demand and prosecuting the intellectual authors behind the large
criminal networks. This approach is predominantly why the impact of the war
on drugs has netted meager results. The paradigm shift that must take place now
- to deliver measurably significant results is to focus on understanding how
criminals can penetrate, and simultaneously derive profits and power from, the
current governmental, social, and financial structures. Furthermore, delve into
what psychological, social, economic, and political factors compel criminals to
become malfeasants and to engage in illegal activities and groups. Finally, grasp
the idea that illegal global markets and criminal organizations mainspring from a
rebellion to political/governmental actions and the Western desire to consume.
In simpler terms, we must not focus all energies and resources towards the
producers but focus equal or more attention towards the consumers. After all,
if people really want something they will find a way to get it.
2. Culture of Consequences. Latin American countries have struggled to establish a

law-abiding socio-cultural system. However, the lack of consequences has
allowed a parallel culture of permissiveness. This sort of culture is beneficial to
criminal organizations, mafias, and terrorists. In order to dismantle such groups,
we must start by creating a culture of consequences. The punishment of those
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who are guilty of the criminal activities, that facilitate and enable narco-terrorism
and corruption, should be sufficiently strengthened to reflect that of the
estimated value of the trade or activity in the context of fines and asset
confiscations, along with lifetime imprisonment sentences. Furthermore, penal
disincentives due to illegal affiliations would disrupt the recruitment capability
of criminal organizations throughout the region.
3. Learn to Deal with Smart Evolving Criminals. The tactics utilized by

transnational criminal organizations are outsmarting the conventional
approaches utilized by governments: they adapt to economic recessions, invade
impenetrable government institutions, infect the altruistic efforts of people and
groups, operate in lawless border regions and adjust themselves or their
behavior to survive in whatever host they spread into. For instance, there is clear
evidence of an active collaboration and cooperation between drug and terrorist
organizations, who are great threats to the national security of every country in
the region. As a result of this network strengthening, national security is at risk
because this sinister criminal enterprise is expanding at an accelerated pace. In
contrast, there has not been a concomitant expansion in transnational law
enforcement capabilities.
4. Strengthen Government Institutions. Increase efforts to strengthen democratic

institutions that uphold and support the Rule of Law, judicial expedience,
economic and social development, political awareness, and civic responsibility.
The key pillars of human and social development must be strengthened to
reduce the apathy upon which criminal organizations prey.
5. Technological Intelligence. As human development initiatives are improved to

support solutions, so too must technological intelligence be applied to reinforce
efforts that stem the growth of global shadow economies that feed corruption
and apathy. Citizen security programs that make cities safer, promote crime
prevention programs, and leverage technology to promote greater efficiencies
are key. Monitoring data from air and seaports, land border crossings, and
national archives generated through e-Government initiatives should be
standard practice and represent an immediate action item.
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6. Ideological Divide. Rhetorical ideological differences among countries in the

Americas and lack of trust are the most determining factors that hinder collective
initiatives to combat criminality and corruption. The lack of collective efforts
allows the free flow of criminal organizations and their operations. In reality, the
main instigating factors that led to civil wars throughout Latin America remain
integral to the ideological divide that still besieges the regions ability to derive
holistic solutions to its many challenges.
7. Rethinking Tactics and Policies. Globalization has reduced the barriers to

international criminal networks. Lower barriers have allowed criminogenic
behavior to grow at exponential rates. In addition, this behavior demonstrates
great resilience to the established government and law enforcement institutions.
We need to rethink the methodology and policies being used to combat illegal
activities such as drugs, money laundering, human prostitution, and the sale of
weapons to criminals. The U.S. War on Drugs policy has contained the overall
problem but has failed to dismantle and eliminate Narcos and the illegal
activities they are associated with. It is time to create a new framework that will
permit governments, law enforcement, and social institutions to eradicate
criminal organizations.
8. Shared Responsibility. World governments have struggled immensely to curtail

illegal global markets. Yet, such markets continue to proliferate. The type of
mechanisms and approaches used in this struggle have generated a set of
collateral problems and externalities. It is within this framework that countries
all around the world must take personal responsibility within their respective
borders and collective responsibility in support of trans-national interdiction, in
addressing illicit activities in a comprehensive manner. Because the U.S. and
Canada are regionally the main consumers and beneficiaries of the proceeds
from several of the products traded in illegal markets, a more integral and
responsible role is necessary from both countries - in funding interdiction
efforts that are commensurate with the magnitude of the problem itself.
9. Smarter Government and Private Sector Involvement. As a national and regional

concern, criminal organizations and their illicit activities must be addressed at a
governmental level. Security Forces in the region must be strengthened along the
lines of increased capacity to Naval, Air, Police, and Military Forces that can
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better control the various indigenous and covert trafficking routes used by
criminal organizations to move drugs, guns and bulk cash. As such, government
accountability and responsibility must become primary for tangible results to be
achieved. Private sector involvement must also be a parallel initiative to promote
the formalization of the economies and to act as social auditors to monitor the
use of resources.
10. Accountability and Transparency. The role of each Public Controllers Office
throughout the region must also be strengthened and brought into national
prominence as a Fourth Power within the national architecture of administrative
governance. Public accountability and transparency must serve as guiding
principles that factor in the publics right to know and to hold officials in public
office accountable for their actions or lack thereof.
11. Stronger Anti-Crime Global Networks. Finally, the chain is as strong as the
weakest link. A Systems-of-Systems analysis must become the core driver in
identifying and dismantling the elements of the supply and demand logistics and
operational chain that maintains the activities of criminal organizations. A
similar analysis must be conducted for the financial activities of criminal
organizations to better understand and defeat money-laundering practices and
bring down the organizations that facilitate and enable these activities.
Complementary to all of this should be revised gun laws in the U.S. and Latin
America to also bring much needed order to this fundamental dilemma.
20
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
National Responsibilities
Findings: Alternatively Governed Spaces
The structure and network of active TCOs and LCOs have led to the creation of
Alternatively Governed Spaces (AGS) in which criminal organizations, rather than
formal state authorities, effectively control the residents, act as the arbiter of internal
order, and serve as de facto administrations. These areas provide uninterrupted
operational activity and attract other clandestine groups that swap capabilities, ideas
and resources that reinforce intent and effectiveness. The FARC in Colombia are a
prime example of AGSs having a direct impact of crime and violence in a state. In
Guatemala, 40% of the territory is currently an alternatively controlled.
Notions of ungoverned spaces or lawless areas increasingly have been seen as a

dangerous phenomenon, especially because they provide safe havens for terrorists. In
fact, many of them are not so much ungoverned as alternatively governed by groups,
which act as surrogates for the state. The dons in the slums of Kingston, Jamaica, for
example, are not merely the heads of drug trafficking organizations; they are also the
social and economic patrons of marginalized people who have little or no assistance
from the state 1.
Between 400 and 500 tons of cocaine flow through the Northern Triangle of Central
America (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) per year. This is equivalent to
approximately $12 billion in wholesale value in the U.S. market. This amounts to
approximately $65 billion in estimated street-sale profits in the U.S. with about 50% of
that amount making its way back to Mexico and Latin America countries.
Total 2010 tax collection for the Northern Triangle was at $11.7 billion. This means, that
the drug/cocaine business is over 5 times larger than the combined states 2.
Central American countries are out powered and out gunned in fighting the epidemic
of drug trafficking and organized crime. No amount of tax reform or local resources
21
would ever be enough to address the problem independently and effectively. That is,
without the support of international organizations and/or other countries.
Recommendations
National Security Forces should collaborate to address the threat that TCOs and
LCOs pose to democratic governance and Rule of Law.
Promote economic, educational and social opportunities and activities that generate
alternative livelihoods for these communities.
Develop an Inclusion Indicator by community. The Indicator should gauge the

degree to which the government is reaching each community with key services, i.e.
public schools, police, health, electoral registry, property registry, communications,
infrastructure, etc.
Develop a prioritized plan with specified dates by which services would reach
communities and, set goals and monitor progress for the Inclusion Indicator.
Findings: Corruption and Politics
In addition to violence, corruption plays an integral role in undermining state

institutions. The financing of political parties and/or candidates with money from
criminal organizations is a direct threat to the survival of democracy in the region.
TCOs and LCOs are able to clobber the state from without and weaken it from within.
Governments must put more resources to work against corruption, money laundering
and embezzlement. Congressional appropriations for national projects have become
get-rich-schemes for politicians in an environment where checks and balances are non-
existent and oversight is overlooked.
22
Recommendations
Urgently modify Campaign Financing norms to make contributions transparent and

to hold Political Parties accountable to a higher standard of due-diligence in
accepting funds.
Assist civilian and National Security leaders to develop a cohesive and broad
strategic vision to solve the emerging TCO and LCO security problems, while
dealing with the changing societal values in the 21st Century. Leaders must consider
these problems from multiple angles, multiple levels and varying degrees of
complexity. Key elements must include: weapons, transparency and money launder.
Reinforce local Public Comptroller Offices and functions through legislation, which
(i) criminalizes the new corruption schemes (including the usage of NGOs to execute
government funds), and (ii) creates significant consequences for violations.
Establish E-Government and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) strategies to

promote greater transparency within government which allow Civil Society
oversight, accountability in financial practices and a data warehouse that can feed
national intelligence. E-Government and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
strategies and systems should be considered as medium-to-long term initiatives to
promote transparency and accountability.
Findings: Potential State Failure
The ultimate threat of TCO and LCO activities is not instability or even criminal
violence. Instead, it is either state failure or the forced imposition of a radical
socioeconomic - political restructuring of the state and its governance.
Most political leaders in the region are still thinking about the TCO and LCO
phenomenon in traditional terms of criminal activity, and have not yet caught up with
stark reality. They do not appreciate the extent and nature of the threat to political order
and responsible democratic governance being raised by the rapidly moving clash of two
types of fundamental values. One set of values seeks the general wellbeing of the state
while the other serves criminal greed for money and power. Leaders whose discourse
23
favors the first ideals but whose actions and ideals espouse the second, pose the greatest
threat to progress
Recommendations
Restructuring efforts should provide checks and balances that prevent corrupt
officials or criminal actors themselves from taking up high-level government
positions, which offer immunity as an additional incentive.
Create national and regional policies that facilitate in-depth financial investigations
and asset-seizures to take the profits away from corruption rings, drug traffickers
and organized crime groups.
Remove the immunity associated with congressional and mayoral positions. At the
very least, create expedited processes for lifting immunity in cases of state asset
theft, Narco - trafficking or money laundering.
Create specialized Investigation and Prosecution units for the above-mentioned

crimes.
Create national vetting and Polygraph centers to verify credible and uproot corrupt
officials in public sector institutions.
Findings: Systematic and Structural Problems
Addressing the deteriorating security environment in the region is a complex and

difficult task. Part of the problem is the seeming inability or reluctance of regional
leaders to address the structural and systemic problems of a skewed distribution of
opportunities, insufficient fiscal incomes, rampant corruption, unrelenting violence,
lack of consequences and weak state institutional capacity to make a difference.
24
Recommendations
Harness political will to persist bravely in the defense of fundamental human and
democratic values, by standing together to make a difference and rally grass-roots
movements to support this effort.
Promote micro-financing and other market-based poverty reduction solutions to

enable economic opportunities in rural areas. Also, promote small business
financing programs to strengthen the middle class in the region.
Regulate salaries of professional staff in the public sector to enable pay packages
that are commensurate to their merits and responsibilities.
Consideration of pay-per-performance or pay-per-qualifications should be

introduced to promote results and enhance self-improvement.
Revise criminal laws and punishments to strengthen consequences.
Promote a culture of consequences. All laws must be obeyed starting with seemingly
unrelated things such as traffic laws. Colombia used this as a way to reduce the
subjectivity around which laws are obeyed and which are not.
Promote awareness campaigns to inform citizens of the very real cost-benefits

associated with investing in security and to generate awareness that security and
rule-of-law are everyones responsibility.
Improve public safety initiatives to reduce crime indexes and encourage increased
local and foreign investment.
Findings: Citizen Security
Regional governments should do more to protect its citizens, enhance crime prevention
programs, unify the efforts and initiatives of Security Forces and enhance response
initiatives to create real time consequences for criminal activity and unified approaches.
25
Recommendations
Citizen Security is fundamental and critical to success; therefore Safe City

programs should first be initially implemented in high-crime and high-risk areas,
but should eventually spread to other departments to unify the countrys
development through human and technological intelligence.
Because violence burdens economic development and direct investment, reductions

in violence supports national development, therefore the cost/benefit ratio of action
makes it economically desirable to make the required sacrifices necessary to
confront TCOs and LCOs that challenge state institutions and sovereignty.
Regional Initiatives
Findings: Unbalanced Resource Allocation
Mexican criminal actors are moving south and resources must now be properly
reallocated to address this growing concern. The United States has dedicated a vast
amount of resources over the last 11 years to efforts in Colombia through Plan
Colombia, and a vast number of resources over the past four years to the situation in
Mexico through the Merida Initiative. The situation in Central America must be
addressed in a comprehensive and coherent manner by involving all Central American
and Caribbean countries that bridge the gap between North and South America, which
has become the critical chessboard where transit schemes are played out.
Recommendations
There can be no regional integration without security and no security without

integration, therefore only a collaborative approach and agreement would serve the
security needs of the region. This collaboration must first take place with national
rank and file operations and should then strengthen regional and otherwise
collective approaches.
26
Lobby for a change in the prioritized allocation of resources. Resources given to Plan
Colombia and to the Merida Initiative have generated displacement towards Central
America, thus escalating the insecurity environment. Prioritized allocation must be
addressed in a comprehensive and coherent manner or the problem will continue to
be shuffled around the geographic chessboard.
Findings: Neutralizing Criminal Organizations
Following the civil war era that plagued Central America over the past fifty years, peace
negotiations and signed accords disempowered Military structures, placed them in
psychological exile, diminished their resources, marginalized their deployment in
supporting National Security initiatives and significantly reduced their manpower
strength. National Police Forces were then empowered to protect the state and have
been overwhelmed in facing the challenges presented by better equipped, trained and
financed TCOs and LCO. Strengthened Military involvement in current National
Security concerns in Central America is needed.
Recommendations
Establish nationally dedicated Intervention Force - the equivalent of a Military

Division - of 1000 National Security personnel, to include both internal and external
Intelligence agencies, that act together to reclaim territory controlled by TCOs and
LCOs, marginalize their illicit operations and restore public confidence by achieving
acceptable levels of violence and national security.
Another element that is essential is the creation of functioning institutions in the

most affected states that can both investigate and judicially prosecute transnational
criminal organizations. The most efficient way to do this is through the creation of
vetted police and military units and judicial corps that are specially trained and who
can be protected from reprisals.
Strategies in Central America must go beyond an effort to salvage judicial systems

and Security Forces increasingly overwhelmed by drug cartels, organized crime and
27
violence. TCOs and LCOs must be neutralized and contained in order to achieve real
and sustainable success.
Findings: Flourishing Informal and Shadow Economies
Although Central Americas organized crime problem cannot be reduced to drugs as

numerous other illicit activities flourish in a number of different sectors of the informal
economy - it is a key factor in the overall deteriorating situation and, if constructively
addressed, would help mitigate the worst consequences of crime, corruption and
impunity. Organized crime groups facilitate and enable the laundering of bulk-cash, the
trafficking of weapons, contraband and humans provide a Reverse Logistics to bring
contraband south from where 50% or more of the drugs go up to in the north.
Recommendations
Make asset forfeiture in drug, human trafficking, illegal weapons dealings, state
asset theft and contraband related cases mandatory for all countries that directly
benefit from the financial pledges made in support of mitigating and interdicting
these activities. Countries that fail to pass this law will send a clear message to the
rest of the world that their legislative bodies are not sufficiently sterile to receive
international funding for such efforts.
Tighten fiscal and border controls in order to squeeze the informal economy and
eliminate an important auxiliary system that enables organized crime to thrive.
Target brothels, illegal casinos and other businesses which exist in the parallel
economy and which provide auxiliary services such as money laundering.
Findings: Raise the Sense of Urgency
This is more than a law enforcement problem or a security issue. Democracy is seriously
under siege since organized crime has exposed the inability of Central American states
to control their territory or to protect their citizens. This weakness in governance has a
28
deleterious effect on public psyche, and the wellbeing of the majority of citizens, where
public safety is absent
Recommendations
Raise the collective policy discussion to the level of a threat to national, regional and
international security and enact appropriate legislation to that effect.
Encourage the public to join the government in standing up to criminal

organizations by establishing rewards for information that lead to arrests, whistle-
blower hotlines, prioritize the development of witness protection programs and
confidentiality measures to protect identities of those that come forward.
Work towards strengthening democratic institutions within the security and justice
sectors.
Findings: Quick Wins
National and regional stability is at stake. Quick wins are required to inspire confidence
and strengthen political will.
Recommendations
Draw on the experience and lessons learned by Columbia and Mexico to assist in the
struggle ahead for Central American countries as they seek to recover control of
their countries, economies and violent existence.
Vetted specialized units capable of collecting actionable information and intelligence

with proper oversight are vital and a far more achievable goal than the strategic
level goal of National Security reform.
Leverage the power of information to strengthen border security programs,

redeploy National Security Forces, improve the security of air and seaports and
29
empower communities to recover spaces that are alternatively controlled and

administered by criminal organizations.
End the denial phase of the current crisis in the region by confronting the reality that
this is a regional problem that requires an Integral Regional Security Strategy.
Findings: Multilateral Alliances
There must be a regional approach to deal with local and transnational crime. In the
case of local crime, integrated policies for peaceful co-existence and citizen security
encompassing crime prevention and control are required. In the case of transnational
crime, regional and multilateral alliances are needed to combat TCO activity. In
addition to hunting down leaders, efforts need to focus on mid-level command and
links in the supply and demand chain to take the profit and glory out of drugs, guns,
and other illicit trades. Targeting the prospects and allure of the get rich quick would
break apart these organizations, and enable the design of policies to encourage young
people to leave criminal groups and prevent others from joining.
Recommendations
Simultaneously attack all links in the supply and distribution chain of drug, human
trafficking and contraband to weaken its infrastructure from within.
Create and maintain a regional platform for information sharing in support of a

collective intelligence effort, through links to Interpol, UNODC and Intelligence
Agencies from supporting nations globally.
Findings: Territorial and Political Penetration
The transnational dimension of the security challenge - largely because of the drug
trade behind it - calls for coordinated action. Organized criminal networks pose a major
security challenge to both the Central American and Caribbean regions, using them as a
convenient transport route to move drugs from the south to the north and bulk cash
and weapons north to south. Their networks have infiltrated urban centers and overrun
30
rural ones. In some countries, they have even secured entry points into critical state
institutions and high-level political offices.
Recommendations
TCOs and LCOs are not constrained by borders, so the response to their activities by
states cannot be either. Collective effort is mandatory. Appropriate legislation must
be passed to enable regional intelligence sharing and hot pursuit mechanisms.
Perseverance must refute deterrence.
Investing in education and jobs must run parallel to fighting crime and violence by
establishing a national awareness program that is tied to real-time economic
opportunity derived from incremental steps towards inclusion and empowerment.
Findings: Gang Violence
To address issues of youth and gang violence in the short term, policy makers should
borrow from the evidence-based toolkit of programs from other regions, such as early
childhood development and mentoring programs, interventions to increase retention of
high-risk youth in secondary schools.
Recommendations
Work against the poverty, social exclusion, lack of education, and destruction of
families.
Central America must stop killing its young people, by condemning them to the
curse of gangs.
The stigma and ruthlessness of civil war atrocities have germinated the origins of
the violence into which active and prospective gang members have fallen.
Harsher penalties is not the solution, better opportunities and principle based
national leadership will yield more positive results.
31
Repression should be replaced by dialogue with gang leaders at their headquarters

level in the U.S.
International Support
Findings: Additional Resources
Central America will require significant additional resources to fight this multi-front
war.
Recommendations
Develop an instrument to channel and manage financial contributions, ensuring

adequate transparency and accountability of donor funds. This entity could also
administer the liquidation of seized assets from drug and human trafficking and
other contraband related cases to supplement repayment of loans offered in
combating these scourges. Generated proceeds from the law should be used to
supplement funding that sustains interdiction and mitigation programs throughout
the region.
The region should be encouraged to consider a surtax for improved administration

of justice perhaps by creating a facility along with other Central American nations to
pay into a regional lock box whose closely monitored resources could be used to
promote security on both a country-specific and regional basis.
Establish communications channels with Washington and other members of the

International Community to obtain additional support which is commensurate to
the size of the enemy that Central America is being asked to fight.
Establish well-equipped National Training Centers for all disciplines of the criminal
justice sector with experienced and credible Instructors and Mentors. All Central
American countries, especially Guatemala, needs a training institution for both
police and military forces. In addition, part of the gun control proposition,
32
individual citizens and other private security firms could benefit from such training.
Im thinking about some sort of academic/military/law enforcement academy or
school, composed of certain active and retired military and law enforcement officers,
who could come to Guatemala and offer their expertise and training.
Findings: Guatemala A Pivotal Axis
The May 2011 report of the U.S. Senate caucus on International Narcotics Controls
report on U.S. and Mexican responses to Mexican DTOs, estimates that between $18 and
$39 billion dollars in wholesale illicit drug distribution proceeds, crosses the southwest
US/Mexican border making its way back to Mexico and Latin America. In addition to
these bulk cash figures moving south from the U.S., Guatemala has become a pivotal
axis and the largest regional wholesale storage and distribution locale for - roughly 50%
of overall U.S. consumption of - illicit drugs and locally generates an estimated $5
billion dollars in additional illegal drugs cash flow in the region.
Recommendations
Post - Merida counter - narcotics support to Latin America must cater to the
deteriorating security environment in Guatemala - and other Northern Triangle
countries - brought about by increased drug flow through Central America by land
routes.
The conditions that make Guatemala an ideal safe haven for the storage and
transshipment of drugs must be corrected in the short-term.
Findings: Land Trafficking Routes
The Merida Initiative has focused significant resources on maritime and aerial assets in
support of the war on drugs in Mexico; however, land trafficking routes throughout
Central America remain primary options to TCOs and LCOs and require immediate
strengthening through collective initiative.
33
Recommendations
Post-Merida resources should be directed towards strengthening land border

crossings both formal and informal.
Joint Police and Military operations should be used to establish checkpoints along
main highway arteries and intersections.
Vehicle X-Ray screening technology and Canine sniffers should be employed to

stem the flow of drugs, weapons drugs and human cargo.
Important point of mention: Post Merida support to Central America must produce
a more comprehensive approach to addressing the problems on the ground.
Findings: Human Trafficking
The trafficking of humans across international borders for the purposes of sex slavery
and the sale of human organs is more than just an illegal immigration concern and
remains a timeless and profitable business to criminal organizations. It is estimated that
one sex slave earns these organizations a net profit of approximately one million USD
over a five-year period and the victims are also used as unwilling donors of vital organs
and other body parts that are sold for exorbitant amounts to ailing and desperate
clients.
The ageless network of illicit transit routes, corrupt officials and organized criminal
activity that supports the trafficking and flow of drugs and contraband into countries is
what is also being used to traffic and sell humans, transfer weapons and explosives and
move bulk cash across international borders. In times past these very routes and
clandestine networks were used to traffic bootleg whiskey and other contraband, and
though the content of the illegal merchandize being trafficked has changed with time,
the well-guarded secrets of these criminal networks continue to thrive.
34
Recommendations
International agencies and organizations that deal with the interdiction of human
trafficking should work closer with Counter-Narcotics and Counter-Terrorism
organizations to share valuable intelligence and strategies to collectively address the
common concerns that facilitate and enable the illegal flow of illegal merchandise
and immigrants and persons trafficked specifically or sexual exploitation.
International policies and national legislation should be strengthened to address the

plague of sex slavery and the sale of humans organs from unwilling donors and
victims of exploitation.
Findings: High-Level Political Attention
Given the magnitude of the challenge and the high stakes involved it is not clear
whether past efforts, however worthwhile, have been sufficient to deal effectively with
problems that require sustained, high-level political attention and a more robust and
energized multilateral system.
Recommendations
For Washington, a broader strategy would, for example, focus seriously on

stemming continuing flows of arms and money from the United States to the region;
fostering more genuine cooperation among Central American governments and
other Latin American countries and rethinking an antidrug policy that has yielded
small national victories but has fueled a larger regional crisis.
Collective Responsibility and Tangible Initiatives.
Findings: Shared Responsibility
The consumption of drugs produces externalities which are borne by the transit
countries. Those externalities include (i) over 15,000 drug/organized crime related
35
deaths per year in the Northern Triangle, (ii) the corruption, bribery and other efforts to
weaken security and justice institutions, and (iii) the weakening of the moral fiber of
society by strengthening the gangs.
Leading consumption countries should shoulder a greater burden of responsibility in

funding and supporting efforts to bring about the necessary reforms and strengthening
initiatives that are necessary to take the profits out of drug and contraband trafficking,
restore stability in rapidly declining countries and curtail demand on their side of the
fence by applying sufficient resources in addressing the escalating security concerns
and increasing violence in the region.
Recommendations
European countries and Canada could do more by providing funding and

expertise - in supporting U.S. and Latin American efforts to stem the flow of South
American produced cocaine.
Greater technological know-how can be made available to Latin American countries

in the management of airports and seaports.
Findings: Criminal Justice Reform
The process of reform required for Central America must be built on the axis of
Criminal Justice and not the old mantra of Security and Justice. Criminal Justice reform
brings a more comprehensive approach to a broader spectrum of pillars that are
essential to capacity building and development of a more holistic national security
agenda.
Recommendations
Criminal Justice Reform must address transformation of the system as a body and
should include the following:
36
The Spine Rule of Law and Integrity of Justice.
The Spirit Education and opportunity for all economic and social groups.
The Head National Intelligence services that work in harmony.
The Conscience Citizen Security and Public Safety Initiatives derived through
safer cities.
The Hands and Feet Credible Security Forces that have adequate mobility,
communications, equipment and training.
The Heart Restored faith and confidence in the legal and judicial system.
The Stomach Penal systems that educate and prepare inmates for constructive
reinsertion into society.
Findings: The Caribbean Connection
There is a Caribbean connection. With each modest achievement in the Mexican and
Central American fight against drug trafficking, the prospects for the Caribbean decline,
since it is the best alternative route for traffickers. Colombian, Mexican and Central
American TCOs and LCOs have made alliances with the stronger and better-connected
organized criminal networks in the Caribbean and will continue to corrupt state and
government officials there, as they have effectively done in Central America.
Recommendations
Any collective intelligence and or operational instrument used to counter drug

trafficking within Latin America must also be simultaneously applied to Caribbean
interdiction initiatives and coordinated through a central Strategic Management
Committee (SMC) dedicated to the coordinated management and control of
collective actions.
37
Findings: Intelligence Sharing
The security challenge can be addressed by strengthening intelligence sharing between

the Caribbean and Central America, and also by increasing capacity support between
the Caribbean and North America. Such co-operation will minimize the incidence of
traffickers taking the path of least resistance when put under pressure in one place.
Recommendations
Establish closer collaboration between Central American intelligence bodies and

those of CARICOM such as The CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and
Security (IMPACS) and its sub agencies, the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre
(RIFC) and Joint Regional Communications Centre (JRCC) would bring added value
to both regions.
Improve local Counter-Intelligence capabilities to strengthen collective intelligence

initiatives that drive operational and tactical operations.
Vet local intelligence offices so as to regenerate the trust which has been eroded
since their infiltration by organized crime.
Findings: Media Responsibility
Collectively, we should hold media outlets morally responsible for spreading fear,
duress and promotion of the violent acts committed by TCOs and LCOs.
Recommendations
Promote self-restraint by media outlets (radio, TV, print and Internet) from
glorifying the actions of TCOs and LCOs by displaying gruesome images of
murdered individuals and other initiatives that promote duress and fear among the
population of the country. This should in no way infringe upon the freedom of the
38
press, but rather promote responsible reporting that supports the safety of the
masses and not the intent of the criminals.
Findings: Systems of Systems Analysis
Conduct a system of systems analysis of the production, logistics, distribution and sale
of illicit drugs by finding innovative ways of assessing the vulnerabilities of the process
from development to consumption. This analysis must engender ways to curtail the
availability of precursor chemicals for drug production, U.S. manufactured weapons
readily available due to inadequate arms control laws and money-laundering
operations that fund the illegal arms trade.
Recommendations
Establish weapons control policies and mechanisms that are nationally driven and
regional in its approach, context and scope, where traceability is key.
Intercept and limit the availability of precursor chemicals that support the
production of illicit drugs.
Make money laundering and drug trafficking crimes against the state, which is
punishable at the level of maximum sentencing.
Findings: Research-Based Solutions
The issue of drug use, addiction and related social dilemmas is clearly not a one-size-
fits-all scenario. Evidence based researched is emerging that offer credible support to
the global struggle with drug abuse, trafficking and bulk cash profits that feed informal
economies. The past forty years has taught us many lessons and sensible leadership
must now prevail if successful outcomes are to become reality.
39
Recommendations 3
Encourage experimentation by governments with models of legal regulation of

drugs to undermine the power of organized crime and safeguard the health and
security of their citizens. This recommendation applies especially to cannabis, but
we also encourage other experiments in decriminalization and legal regulation that
can accomplish these objectives and provide models for others. Incorporate the costs
of long-term health care and other externalities into the price through taxation. This
would (i) generate fiscal income and (ii) eliminate fears of increased demand due to
price effect.
End the criminalization; marginalization and stigmatization of people who use

drugs but who do no harm to others. Prevention and rehabilitation should be the
main strategy towards end-users.
Challenge rather than reinforce common misconceptions about drug markets, drug
use and drug dependence.
Apply much of the same principles and policies stated above to people involved in
the lower ends of illegal drug markets, such as farmers, couriers and petty sellers.
Many are themselves victims of violence and intimidation or are drug dependent.
Arresting and incarcerating tens of millions of these people in recent decades has
filled prisons and destroyed lives and families without reducing the availability of
illicit drugs or the power of criminal organizations. There appears to be almost no
limit to the number of people willing to engage in such activities to better their lives,
provide for their families, or otherwise escape poverty. Drug control resources are
better directed elsewhere.
Invest in activities that can both prevent young people from taking drugs in the first
place and also prevent those who do use drugs from developing more serious
problems.
Eschew simplistic just say no messages and zero tolerance policies in favor of
educational efforts grounded in credible information and prevention programs that
focus on social skills and peer influences. The most successful prevention efforts
may be those targeted at specific at-risk groups.
40
Focus repressive actions on violent criminal organizations, but do so in ways that

undermine their power and reach while prioritizing the reduction of violence and
intimidation.
Law enforcement efforts should focus not on reducing drug markets per se but
rather on reducing their harms to individuals, communities and national security.
Begin the transformation of the global drug prohibition regime.
Replace drug policies and strategies driven by ideology and political convenience
with fiscally responsible policies and strategies grounded in science, health, security
and human rights and adopt appropriate criteria for their evaluation.
Ensure that the international conventions are interpreted and/or revised to

accommodate robust experimentation with harm reduction, decriminalization and
legal regulatory policies.
Break the taboo on debate and reform. The time for action is now.
Findings: Money Laundering
Over 70% profits from drug trafficking stays in the U.S. Military grade weapons
primarily of U.S. origin or U.S. factories are being sold to Mexican, Colombian and
Guatemalan TCOs and LCOs.
In 2010, Wachovia bank, now part of Wells Fargo & Company and the 4th largest bank
holding company in the United States, paid $110 million to federal authorities for
violating the Bank Secrecy Act, and fined another $50 million for failing to keep an eye
on funds responsible for trafficking 22 tons of cocaine (roughly $550 million in whole
sale value of cocaine). That same year, Wachovia divulged information that between
2004 and 2007 they were responsible for laundering $378.4 billion belonging to the
Sinaloa Cartel. This amount is equal to 1/3 of Mexicos real GDP and 5 times greater
than Guatemalas real GDP. Meanwhile, Forbes magazine rated the leader of this drug
syndicate, El Chapo Guzman, as one of the 68 most powerful people in the world.
41
In brief, Wachovia bank was only fined less than 2% of what it made in 2009, which
amounts to $12.3 billion in profits. Whats more striking is that during the week of the
court settlement, Wells Fargo stock traded at 1% more than the previous week, at
$30.86. Jeffrey Sloman, the federal prosecutor, commented that, "Wachovia's blatant
disregard for our banking laws gave international cocaine cartels a virtual carte blanche
to finance their operations, 4.
Recommendations
Learn mistakes from the Gunrunner project, and find more effective methods to
control and trace weapons sales.
A single global system that stores and documents a guns registration number,
ballistic signature (from factory), and traceability of ownership.
Guatemala is in serious need for a federal police agency, a national intelligence

agency and a joint intelligence committee with strong regional sharing capacity.
Put real, not a slap-on-the-wrist penalties and consequences for money

laundering, and prosecute the cases for which information already exists.
Regulate store valued instruments, such as gift cards, internet payments, and other
methods, which are providing unregulated transfer methods to organized crime.
Raise drug trafficking to the same threat level international repercussion and
awareness as terrorism, by exposing the direct links between both phenomena.
42
INTRODUCTION
The father of penicillin, Alexander Fleming, for some time doubted whether he should
share his invention with the world. The reason was because he knew there was a risk
that his medicine would not always be applied with the intensity and discipline
required and that this could produce a strain of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Dr. Fleming
released his invention to the world but, even as he accepted his Nobel Prize for its
creation, he continued to caution the world on the risks of not using it with lethal
strength.
The United States has invested 40 years and over $1 trillion dollars in the war on drugs.
However, 9% or 21 million of its population still actively consumes drugs today.
Unquestionably there has been progress - in the war being waged on drugs - as U.S.
efforts managed to drastically reduce the use of maritime and air routes from South
America to the U.S. and Europe. However, this effort has not been sufficient to mitigate
the impact of the growth of this global billion dollar illicit enterprise.
Whereas focus on interdiction funding has traditionally fingered the U.S. as the primary
source, Europe and Canada where consumption levels are increasing - should be
equally committed to reducing South American drug supply and assist regional
countries to regain control and get back on the path towards development. For the U.S.
and Canada, this plague is a back door problem, but for Europe the spread of narcotics
is a front door reality as opened borders through EU initiatives have broadened the
playing field for cartels.
Successes derived from the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), Plan Colombia and
Caribbean interdiction efforts have reduced and discouraged maritime and air transit
options. These actions have shifted operational focus to land routes through Central
America and Mexico, and it is evident that business is booming. This shifting dynamic -
of strategic route displacement - forged the implementation of the Merida Initiative in
Mexico, which left Central America open to expansionist ambitions by Criminal
Organizations. While route displacement was in motion due to the success of Plan
Colombia, another strategic displacement was also taking place on the production side
as a result of peace negotiations in Colombia. The chart below demonstrates the
coincidental increase in Colombian cocaine production soon after the appropriation of
43
state property to the FARC by the Pastrana administration. An important point to

mention is that in November 1998 Colombian President Pastrana granted the FARC safe
haven the size of Switzerland in the southeast of the country. From that period
onward Colombia has become the largest global producer of cocaine [inserted from the
Document version 6, pp. 42, under the graph]
Global Potential Cocaine Production (mt), 1990 2008
As an antibiotic applied without the strength, consistency or the extent necessary for 40
years, the groups who were to be affected have become resistant to the medication. It
certainly did not help that, being forced to leave their native environment; the bacteria
landed the petri dish of Mexico and Central America. The region provided them with a
favorable environment to develop and strengthen. They found weak and easily
corrupted institutions that allowed them to coexist and grow without limitation. They
also found young people in poverty, eager to find a way out of that poverty status. With
the passing of time its roots within the power structures strengthened, their
organizational cells became swollen and they came to rule vast areas of territory.
It is within this culture broth that the Merida Initiative was launched four years ago. A
decision was taken to increase the dose of medicine and apply it elsewhere in the body.
However, the disease was now much better prepared to react and manifested itself as
an extreme ailment with crippling effects and an unexpected virulence: demonstrating
44
its ability to coerce its host and to intimidate its members. Drug cartels, gangs and other
clandestine groups have evidenced their capacity and will to perform extreme acts of
violence that coerce the civilian population and influence the policy of governments by
intimidation or hostile take-over. By U.S. definition, these groups operate as terrorist
organizations and pose a serious threat to governance in the region. (See links to
Terrorism in the Analysis section below)
Along with their extreme violence and agenda of fear and intimidation - to affect social
and political decisions - these groups have developed partnerships with global terrorist
organizations through their network of resource sharing, secured trafficking routes and
common target area. Tunnels found along the U.S./Mexico border tell a story all its
own which supports these insights of a common agenda and shared resources. In the
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is working with other U.S.
last 10 years 125 tunnels were
and Mexican discovered
law enforcement along and
agencies to investigate the U.S./Mexico
discover cross-border
tunnels and bring those associated with their construction and operations to
border where drugs,
guns and cash flow without
justice. The restriction and/or detection.
construction of these tunnels can be very complex. In December
2009, the multi-agency San Diego Tunnel Task Force, led by U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), discovered a partially constructed passageway
originating in Tijuana that extended more than 860 feet into the United States. The
tunnel had lighting and ventilation systems, and was equipped with an elevator.
Tunnels Discovered by Law Enforcement

FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
90 93 95 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 TOTAL
Brown
Field, CA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
El Centro,
CA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 7
El Paso,
TX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
San Diego
County,
CA 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 3 3 0 13 5 1 4 5 2 40
Tucson,
AZ 1 0 1 0 3 4 2 3 3 1 3 4 10 14 20 6 10 85
Yuma, AZ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3
TOTAL 1 1 1 1 3 4 2 5 7 5 5 18 16 16 26 12 14 137
Source: Department of Homeland Security
Also in December 2009, the Department of Homeland Security searched a

warehouse in Calexico, California and discovered a partially-built tunnel from
Mexicali to Calexico. The tunnel was a small hole that ran horizontally between
Another worrying situation
the borders. Anis theinvestigation
ongoing case of Walid
resulted extraditedMakled
in the arrest who was recently
of Daniel Bernable
Alvarez-Peralta, a United States citizen. Alvarez explained that he planned to
from Colombia to Venezuela.
insert a twelve-inch "The Arab",
hard plastic pipe throughas he and,is utilizing
one of the
the hole known, a pulley is alleged to be
system, would use the tunnel to pull narcotics into the United States. Alvarez
most influential drug dealers in the world with an estimated turnover of over 10 tons of
cocaine a month from South America to the 44
rest of the world. Media reports speculate
on his alleged links to known terrorist groups. Makled claims that Venezuelan
Legislators and Generals are part of his payroll. Narco-trafficking has been the primary
source of financial support to radical extremists, guerillas groups and terror networks
for centuries. It is assessed that South American cocaine is being sold to U.S. and
European markets to weaken them from within while extracting bulk cash profits - of
45
untraceable funds - to maintain their threat capabilities, territorial control and overall
power.
To address this problem, we must recognize that the Narco problem is really three
problems: Drugs and other illicit trades (supply, demand and accessibility), Guns (lack
of computerized records, political sensitivities and availability) and Cash (laundering,
black markets and corruption). In turn, these three problems must be addressed from
three different geographical aggregations. The United States (and other major
consumption markets), through regional coordination and locally from within each
country. This leads to a 3 x 3 matrix of action:
United States
In the United States cocaine is referred to as the "The party drug." While the U.S. is
partying, Central Americans are burying their dead and living in fear. Although Latin
America makes up 8% of the worlds population, it represents 40% of the worlds
homicides statistics. Given the virulence of the phenomenon and the low impact of the
war on drugs to date, it seems that the population should rethink certain historical
debates as it seeks creative solutions.
The U.S. remains the largest consumer market for illicit drugs and more money is spent
on combating supply and distribution than on demand and addiction. The use of
46
cocaine can be detected using a single hair. Yet, random testing and other proactive
measures have proven effective in other regions like Hong Kong are successfully
challenged by special interest groups and ambitious politicians. More than 15,000
deaths per year are reported in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador! These three
countries have been branded the Northern Triangle and the most dangerous place on
earth outside of active war zones. Over 30 percent of reported deaths are drug related.
Wouldnt you sacrifice a single hair from your head to save 5,000 lives per year?
On another front, United Parcel Services (UPS), the U.S. shipping company, moves and
tracks 15.6 million packages a day! In today's world of technology, it is inconceivable
that there is no comprehensive and cohesive electronic record that enables the tracing of
weapons produced and sold in the U.S. Creative money laundering and smuggling
schemes continue to funnel large amounts of bulk cash out of the U.S. to Mexico and
other countries. A portion of the illicit cash is also used to purchase of weapons and
ammunition in the U.S. Untraceable high-caliber weapons are then shipped to Mexico,
Central and South America and are being used to kill Americans and locals alike.
Homicide Rates in Central America
Regional
Drug trafficking is a global phenomenon. The system involves complex and highly
coordinated logistics from production in South America, to the Maras in El Salvador
and Guatemala to the cartels in Mexico for delivery to counterparts in cities like New
47
York, California and Chicago. Addressing the problem involves uniting as Central
Americans and creating opportunities for cooperation, coordinated strategies and trust
between key actors of the region.
It is only by action that fear is removed and its only by collective initiative that control
of alternatively governed spaces and criminal organizations can be achieved. Initiatives
such as the Central America Integration System (SICA), can make a difference in
forging international alliances, however, it is the people of Central America that must
lead the revolution that deposes apathy, collusion and greed. The creation of Sensitive
Investigation Units (SIU) in El Salvador and Honduras is mandatory as such
investigation and intelligence units can fill vital intelligence and operational gaps -
existing in the region and complement similar initiatives in Mexico, Panama and
Guatemala.
Intensity of Drug Smuggling
Local
It is important to stress constructive initiatives such as crime prevention, the

strengthening of criminal justice institutions, capacity building in the security and
justice sector, public safety and citizen security, as well as ways and means to regain
territorial control and protect our ports and borders. Today in Guatemala the military
spending is only 0.4% of GDP, putting the country in position 136 out of 139. In a
calculated review of current realities, this was a mistake that needs to be addressed to
reestablish a strengthened national security presence and territorial control.
48
There is a perception that prisons and inmates are isolated actors. Our research and
analysis of Central America made it abundantly clear that the prisons control the
streets and that prison reform cannot be effective or complete without factoring this
reality into the equation. Prisons have become universities for crime, terror and
delinquency, when in fact they are meant to be a place of rehabilitation for reinsertion
into society. Governments must see and treat imprisonment as a transitional dilemma
that offers a significant opportunity to listen, learn and act on the dynamics that breathe
and nurture crime in the first place. Criminals should not be treated as societal outcasts
when in fact they mirror the ills and shortcomings of the countrys development. The
influence of deported criminals on TCOs and LCOs operating in the region is very
significant in the displacement and expansion of criminal networks and know-how.
All actors must make great efforts and sacrifices to find funding sources for this fight
against organized crime. Guatemala is ranked - as a country - 139 out of 139 from the
point of view of the costs of insecurity that must be absorbed by companies to operate.
It is estimated that costs of private guards, insurance premiums, theft and other losses
account for 7.7% of the GDP in Guatemala. Moreover, these additional costs are
transferred, to some extent to the consumer, who pays the price of living in an unsafe
country. Today Guatemalans are spending large sums on security, but spending more
has not guaranteed or generated actual safety.
The State's ability to provide Public Safety has eroded; parallel security structures have
emerged, which are independently owned and exercise unimpeded control of their
activities and actions. For example, today Guatemala has an independent security force
which outnumbers by 5:1 the state police. Lower national spending on private security
would be an important source of economic competitiveness. In addition it would result
in better prices and savings for local consumers and other end-users.
49
Potential boost of annual Economic Growth Rate from reducing Homicide rate by 10%
In summary, the patient of the Mesoamerican region is in crisis. Organized crime not
only found a host where it could flourish but also one whose immune system was
prone to penetration. The issue of Narco-Terrorism is an issue of national, regional and
international security. It is an issue that must be addressed in a holistic and integrated
manner. The 3x3 medicine matrix should include strong action in each of the following
axis boxes: Drugs, Guns and Cash as well as the United States, the Regional
Coordination, and the Local Actions. Finally, it will require significant contributions
and commitment from all the stakeholders. Efforts can produce a clear return on
investment if appropriately directed and executed. Guatemalas asset forfeiture law was
recently ratified and is a critical step in the right direction and an example of regional
leadership. As Fleming would recommend, we must apply the medicine with the
intensity, consistency and accuracy required. The patient only has this one chance to
survive.
50
SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS
Whether as producers of illicit crops, as transshipment countries, as entry points to key

markets, as money laundering locales or as consumption markets, all countries in the
Central American region take part in a drug trade that mobilizes tens of billions of
dollars every year. This money flow - and the growing sophistication of the criminal
networks that sustain it - feeds many other illicit activities and have transformed the
regions political and security landscapes.
This situation is also the product of outdated governance structures, ineffective judicial
institutions, morally bankrupt political parties, and a far from propitious external
environment. The consequences of the severe economic downturn in the United States -
particularly in sectors of the economy in which Hispanics are disproportionately active
- have hit Central America with unusual force. All of these factors contribute to
enriching the petri dish that feeds and houses organized crime groups.
UNODC World Drug Report 2010
51
Mechanics of Central American Drug Trafficking
It is important to clarify that what we are defining as land-based trafficking is not

limited to overland smuggling. The methods associated with land-based trafficking can
be divided into three categories: overland smuggling, littoral maritime trafficking and
short- range aerial trafficking. The most straightforward of these is simple overland
smuggling. As a series of investigations in Panama, Costa Rica and Nicaragua
demonstrated last year, overland smuggling operations use a wide variety of
approaches. In one case, authorities pieced together a portion of a route being used by
Mexicos Sinaloa Cartel in which small quantities of drugs entered Costa Rica from
Panama via the international point of entry on the Pan-American Highway. The cocaine
was often held for several days in a storage facility before being loaded onto another
vehicle to be driven across the country on major highways.
Upon approaching the Nicaraguan border, however, the traffickers opted to avoid the
official port of entry and instead transferred the shipments into Nicaragua on foot or on
horseback along a remote part of the border. Once across, the shipments were taken to
the shores of the large inland Lake Nicaragua, where they were transferred onto boats
to be taken north, at which point they would be loaded onto vehicles to be driven
toward the Honduran border. In one case in Nicaragua, authorities uncovered another
52
Sinaloa-linked route that passed through Managua and is believed to have followed the
Pan-American Highway through Honduras and into El Salvador.
The second method associated with land-based trafficking involves littoral maritime
operations. Whereas long-range maritime trafficking involves large cargo ships and
self- propelled semisubmersible vessels capable of delivering multi-ton shipments of
drugs from South America to Mexico without having to refuel. Littoral trafficking tends
to involve so-called go-fast boats that are used to carry smaller quantities of drugs at
higher speeds over shorter distances. This method is useful to traffickers who might
want to avoid, for whatever reason, a certain stretch of highway or perhaps even an
entire country. According to Nicaraguan military officials, several go-fast boats are
suspected of operating off the countrys coasts and of sailing outside Nicaraguan
territorial waters in order to avoid authorities. While it is possible to make the entire
trip from South America to Mexico using only this method and making frequent
refueling stops - it is believed that littoral trafficking is often combined with an
overland network.
The third method associated with land-based drug smuggling involves short-range
aerial operations. In these cases, clandestine planes make stops in Central America
before either transferring their cargo to a land vehicle or making another short flight
toward Mexico. Over the past year, several small planes loaded with drugs or cash have
crashed or been seized in Honduras, Mexico and other countries in the region. In
addition, authorities in Guatemala have uncovered several clandestine airstrips
allegedly managed by the Mexican drug-trafficking organization Los Zetas. These
examples suggest that even as overall aerial trafficking appears to have decreased
dramatically, the practice continues in Central America. Indeed, there is little reason to
expect that it would not continue, considering that many countries in the region lack the
resources to adequately monitor their airspace.
While each of these three methods involves a different approach to drug smuggling, the
methods share two important similarities. For one, the vehicles involved - be they
speedboats, small aircraft or private vehicles - have limited cargo capacities, which
means land-based trafficking generally involves cocaine shipments in quantities no
greater than a few hundred pounds. While smaller quantities in more frequent
shipments mean more handling, they also mean that less product is lost if a shipment is
seized. More importantly, each of these land-based methods requires that a drug-
trafficking organization maintain a presence inside Central America.
53
Share of cocaine flowing to the U.S. through transport corridors
Actors Involved
There are a variety of drug-trafficking organizations operating inside Central America.
In addition to some of the notorious local gangs - such as Calle 18 and MS-13 - there is
also a healthy presence of foreign criminal organizations. Colombian drug traffickers,
for example, historically have been no strangers to the region. However, as we have
observed over the past year, it is the more powerful Mexico-based drug-trafficking
organizations that appear to be overwhelmingly responsible for the recent upticks in
land-based narcotics smuggling in Central America.
Based on reports of arrests and drug seizures in the region over the past year, it is clear
that no single Mexican cartel maintains a monopoly on land-based drug trafficking in
Central America. Los Zetas, for example, are extremely active in several parts of
Guatemala, where they engage in overland and short-range aerial trafficking. The
Sinaloa cartel, which appears to be the most capable Mexican trafficker of cocaine, has
been detected operating a fairly extensive overland smuggling route from Panama to El
Salvador. Information gaps remain regarding, for example, the precise route Sinaloa
follows from El Salvador to Mexico or the route Los Zetas use between South America
and Guatemala. It is certainly possible that these two Mexican cartels do not rely
exclusively on any single route or method in the region. Nevertheless, the logistical
challenges associated with establishing even one route across Central America make it
likely that existing routes are maintained even after they have been detected - and are
defended if necessary.
54
The operators of the Mexican cartel-managed routes also do not match a single profile.
At times, Mexican cartel members themselves have been found to be operating in
Central America. More common is the involvement of locals in various phases of
smuggling operations. Nicaraguan and Salvadoran nationals, for example, have been
arrested in northwestern Nicaragua for operating a Sinaloa-linked overland and littoral
route into El Salvador. Authorities in Costa Rica have arrested Costa Rican nationals for
their involvement in overland routes through that country. In that case, a related
investigation in Panama led to the arrest of several Mexican nationals who reportedly
had recently arrived in the area to more closely monitor the operation of their route.
One exception is Guatemala, where Mexican drug traffickers appear to operate much
more extensively than in any other Central American country; this may be due, at least
in part, to the relationship between Los Zetas and the Guatemalan Kaibiles. Beyond the
apparently more established Zeta smuggling operations there, several recent drug
seizures including an enormous 1,800-acre poppy plantation attributed to the Sinaloa
cartel make it clear that other Mexican drug-trafficking organizations are currently
active inside Guatemala. Sinaloa was first suspected of increasing its presence in
Guatemala in early 2008, when rumors surfaced that the cartel was attempting to recruit
local criminal organizations to support its own drug-trafficking operations there. The
ongoing Zeta- Sinaloa rivalry at that time triggered a series of deadly firefights in
Guatemala, prompting fears that the bloody turf battles that had led to record levels of
organized crime-related violence inside Mexico would extend into Central America.
55
Organized Crime
The criminal mix that affects Central America is in many cases better organized than the
countries in which it operates and forms part of transnational organized crime that has
found a way to profit from the advantages of globalization. Organized crime does not
respect borders or operate through treaties, bilateral or multilateral agreements, but
rather bases its activities on profitability and the convenience of these businesses.
With a history of civil strife, weak institutions, and staggering impunity, the isthmus
has struggled for decades to maintain stability. However, with pressure mounting on
drug traffickers in the past decade in Colombia and Mexico, Central America has found
itself swept into a new era of violence. The traditional problems of public safety (theft,
personal injury, smuggling, homicide and small-scale use and sale of drugs) is now
complicated by the presence and actions of large cartels - involved in drug trafficking,
smuggling, human trafficking and the contributing to the growth of violence, drug
consumption, kidnapping, extortion and contract killing.
56
Key Risk factors for Homicide in Central America
The region is no longer dealing with small criminal groups - that the local police can
control - but with structures that manage territories and illegal businesses and in some
cases are capable of challenging government authority. As a result, hard won
democratic institutions and practices are under severe threat. Leaders are trying to
forge a security plan for a region that many say has been overlooked by the billion-
dollar U.S. aid packages provided for Colombia and Mexico. The situation is quite
serious and Presidents from Central America converged at a security conference hosted
by the Central American Integration System (SICA) in Guatemala City in June 2011. The
SICA conference sought to provide international support for a security protocol signed
in 2007 called the Central American Security Strategy, and to determine what strategic,
operational, financial, human and material resources are needed. Highlights below
from a recent study brings credible light to the problem of organized crime in Central
America 5:
On December 14, 2010, authors of three studies commissioned by the Latin American
Program on organized crime in Central America presented the initial results of their
research. The case studies explored the specific, local dynamics of organized crime in El
Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, the three countries of the Northern Triangle,
while also reflecting on the transnational nature of the major criminal networks in the
region. According to Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin American Program, an
analysis of sub-regional dynamics is especially critical given the levels of violence in
Mexico and the displacement of drug cartel activity from Mexico to Central America.
57
Quoting analyst Stephen Dudley, Arnson noted that 90 percent of illegal drugs arriving
in the United States pass through Central America and Mexico; about half this amount
is trafficked through El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
The transformation of ideological groups into criminal actors was facilitated by their
access to wartime structures and tactics, including intelligence and smuggling routes.
This has led the Mexican and Colombian organizations to use El Salvador as a pipeline
where there are different nodes where you can pop things in, and be sure that the
product [cocaine, immigrants, or money flows] will be delivered on the other side of the
border. As a result, most of the organizations that participate in drug trafficking in El
Salvador are tasked primarily with protection and transportation of the Colombian or
Mexican-owned product. One example of this relationship is the Sinaloa cartels
(Mexico) reliance on Los Perrones Orientales, an organized crime group that transports
product by land from the Pacific Coast to Guatemala. At least one police official
believes that Los Perrones Orientales aspire to become mini Mexican cartels. Indeed,
Farah noted that they frequently emulate the extravagant and risky lifestyles of the
Mexican cartel members through activities like car and horse racing, and narco-
corridas, or musical tributes to their work.
The upper echelons of transnational gangs such as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)
provide security, or muscle, for the Mexican cartels and frequently for transport
organizations like Los Perrones Orientales. These upper levels are often made up of
former combatants. The MS-13 is it is one of the most powerful gangs in El Salvador,
known for its ruthlessness and transnational ties. There is evidence that the Mexicos
Zetas are attempting to recruit upper level gang leaders because of their contacts,
markets and security arrangements in the United States that the Zetas would
otherwise not be able to access. The lower levels of the gang control the small
percentage of drugs received from the cartels and sold locally. Neighborhood cocaine
sales, known as narcomenudeo, drive local violence as gangs fight to control territory in
order to convert cocaine into profit.
According to consultant James Bosworth, Honduras, like El Salvador and Guatemala,

has experienced the effects of organized crime in Mexico, especially with respect to
illicit trafficking. In recent years, the country has recorded one of the highest (if not the
highest) homicide rates in the world, upwards of 60 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.
Honduras has also become one of the worlds most dangerous countries for journalists.
58
However, Bosworth said, what distinguishes Honduras from its Central American
neighbors is the 2009 coup against President Manuel Zelaya. The coup facilitated the
expansion of organized crime in the country and demonstrated to the international
community the incompatibility of goals of democracy promotion and public security.
Freelance journalist Julie Lpez described Guatemala as a state fighting two wars: one
with organized crime and one with itself, confronting a legacy of corruption and
impunity rooted in the 36-year internal armed conflict. She emphasized that organized
crime incorporates not only foreign criminal networks and local criminal organizations,
but also local authoritiesmilitary, police, and civilian. As in El Salvador, the roles
these actors played during the countrys civil conflict are an importantthough not the
onlypart of the current dynamic of crime and violence in the country. According to
Lpez, organized crime in Guatemala was sheltered by the armed conflict and grew
following the end of the war.
The Colombian cartel incursion into Guatemala was ultimately facilitated by military
corruption. It was not until the 1996 peace accords and the withdrawal of the military
the main contacts for Colombiansthat Colombian influence declined and the Mexican
cartels entered to fill the vacuum. Now, the Zetas have taken over the northern area of
Huehuetenango. The Sinaloa cartel, on the other hand, operates mostly in the southern
and eastern parts of the country. Of the seven organized crime groups alleged to be
operating in Guatemala, Lpez identified two in particular as historical anchors in
Guatemala. The Lorenzano and Mendoza families control drug trafficking in Zacapa
and Petn, respectively. These family-oriented structurescomposed of fathers, sons,
and sons-in-lawsappear to coexist with the Mexican cartels and exercise control over
territories and populations. The relationships these groups foster at the local level help
guarantee their impunity; it has been suggested that the local police in Zacapa warn the
Lorenzanos of any attempts to arrest them and they appear to be supported by their
community.
Almost all institutionscivilian, military, and policehave shown some connection to

organized crime and attempts to address this corruption have created unique
challenges. Police reform and the transformation of the militarys role with respect to
public security are major areas of focus. The governments attempts to demilitarize and
reform the police coincide with a strategy of militarizing certain parts of the country
overtaken by drug trafficking. In addition, a deeper and more comprehensive police
59
reform is financially impeded by the governments inability to convince the Congress

and society to raise taxes.
Finally, political factors will influence how the security agenda is defined and how
policies are developed to respond to organized crime. These political factors include the
levels of polarization in the countries, the 2011 elections in Guatemalawhere criminal
structures operate in over 40 percent of the territoryand the role of military forces in
suppressing political protest in Honduras.
Christopher C. Ashe of the State Departments Central American Regional Security

Initiative (CARSI) described mostly frustration in light of the steady deterioration of
security in Central America since 2008. He noted that homicide rates in Honduras alone
exceed the combined rate of all countries of the European Union. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton traveled to Guatemala in March 2010 and has taken a personal interest
in Central America. Citizen security is the principal concern for the region, he said, and
without development, investment, and social inclusion, the situation will not improve.
Modus Operandi, Structure, Network and Activity of Gangs in Central

America
Across Central America, an array of criminal groups - international drug traffickers,

violent Youth gangs, and organized crime syndicates have largely replaced Marxist
rebels as the chief instruments of disorder. These groups have carved out niches in a
variety of illicit activities - drug smuggling, human trafficking, arms dealing,
kidnapping, robbery, extortion, and money laundering - and made insecurity a fact of
life. In some Central American countries, violence is exceeding levels last seen during
the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s. Even where murder levels are lower, violence and
crime have driven down economic activity, fostered widespread fear, and made life
miserable for much of the population 6.
In nations as varied as Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (the Northern Triangle),

criminal organizations ranging from youth gangs to sophisticated drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs) control large portions of the national territory. They serve as de
facto governments as they collect taxes through dues and extortion, demand the
loyalty, or at least the acquiescence, of the people under their control, and punish those
60
who interfere with their illicit activities. Such groups wage irregular warfaredefined
as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence
over the relevant populationsagainst their competitors and governments 7.
There is no single model of organized crime. Some criminal groups are relatively small
street gangs that are involved mainly in petty robbery, small-scale extortion and drug
trafficking, and murder for hire. At the other end of the spectrum are sophisticated,
multi-tiered organizations that operate in several cities or even on a transnational basis.
Gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) in Central America, Calle 18 and paramilitary
groups like Los Zetas in Mexico, have hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands
of members organized into numerous cells and overseen by a centralized hierarchy.
They employ individuals ranging from hit men to accountants and lawyers, who
occupy key nodes in illicit networks. With different divisions and sub-divisions
responsible for specific activities some criminal groups actually resemble corporations.
Some analysts refer to these groups as third-generation gangs, because they represent
the highest evolution of organized crime in Latin America 8. These gangs use a mixture
of violence and corruption to neutralize governments and protect their business; they
employ a variety of light and heavy weapons, including crude armored vehicles, and
strike with astounding brazenness and savagery. What the gangs are doing, in essence,
is seeking to intimidate the state and the citizenry into submission and win a free hand
in pursuing lucrative illicit business dealings 9. In addition to violence, corruption plays
an integral role in undermining state institutions. Criminals have long used the formula
of plata o plomo (money or lead) to corrupt government officials; third-generation gangs
have become masters of this strategy. Confronted with the choice of an easy payout or a
violent death, law enforcement frequently opts for the former. Gangs are able to batter
the state from without and weaken it from within.
Structure
Drug Trafficking Organizations, Criminal Groups, and Gangs Operating in Central

America
Drug Cartels are largely, highly sophisticated organizations composed of multiple drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) and cells with specific assignments such as drug
transportation, security/enforcement, or money laundering. Drug cartel command-and-
61
control structures in Central in Central America and elsewhere in Latin America

produce, transport, and distribute illicit drugs in the region and in the United States
with the assistance of DTOs that are either a part of or in an alliance with the cartel.
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) are complex organizations with highly

defined command-and-control structures that produce, transport, and/or distribute
large quantities of one or more illicit drugs.
Criminal groups operating in the region are numerous and range from small to
moderately sized, loosely knit groups that distribute one or more drugs at the retail
level and midlevel.
Street gangs known as pandillas are defined as groups or associations of three or

more persons with a common identifying sign, symbol, or name, the members of which
individually or collectively engage in criminal activity that creates an atmosphere of
fear and intimidation. These are gangs that operate throughout the urban and rural
areas of states in the Region. Criminal activities such as violence and drug trafficking
perpetrated by street gangs is magnified as national and regional level street gangs
migrate from urban areas to suburban and rural communities, expanding their
influence and magnifying their presence.
Prison gangs are highly structured criminal networks that operate within prison
systems in the region. They pose a serious national and regional threat, particularly
those that affiliate with and maintain substantial influence over street gangs in the
communities in which they operate. Released members typically return to their home
communities and resume their former street gang affiliations and perform criminal acts
on behalf of the prison gang.
Both street gangs and prison gangs share the same Modus Operandi and are often
made up of the same members. To members, these gangs offer acceptance and a sense
of both street security, a surrogate family, power and control over one's self, others, and
life situations, easier access to money and intimidation.
62
Central American Risk Factors for Youth and Gang Violence 10
Societal
Culture of violence: A system of norms, values, and attitudes that enables, fosters and
legitimizes the use of violence in interpersonal relationships (i.e., physical discipline of
children, violence against women, etc.)
Poverty and income inequality: Although correlated with risky behaviors such as
dropping out of school (a risk factor for youth violence), no causal relationship exists
between poverty and violence. However, relative deprivation in LAC is correlated with
higher homicide rates.
Rapid and uncontrolled urbanization: Patterns of victimization in LAC have shown

that cities whose population had experienced growth spurts also experienced a greater
degree of violence as a result of disorganization and poor urban planning. Deteriorated
public spaces have also been associated with gang presence and victimization of
residents.
Youth unemployment and inactivity: Youth unemployment is associated with a higher

probability of youth engaging in risky behavior, including crime and violence. Youth
inactivity rates (youth who are not in school or are unemployed) are often much higher
than youth unemployment rates.
Migration: Evidence shows that school-going youth who feel close to their parents have
lower substance abuse rates and participate less in violence and risky sexual activity. It
has also been demonstrated that children who feel close to their families are about 10
percent less likely to engage in risk-taking behavior such as violence, smoking, alcohol
and drug abuse, and risky sexual activity. This is particularly relevant given the trend
in the last decade of one or both parents migrating to the U.S.
Drug trafficking: Drugs and violence are linked in three main ways: (i) the altered state
generated by drug use can produce violent behavior and a loss of control; (ii) drug
abuse generates physical and psychological dependence, which often leads young
people to become involved in criminal activities as a means of supporting their drug
addictions; and (iii) gang member participation in drug networks and Organized crime.
63
The second hypothesis is that recent armed conflict may contribute to higher violence levels through the
Community
transfer of firearms and munitions into the region. In 2007, about 4.5 million legal and illegal small
firearms wereschool
Low secondary circulatingenrollment,
in Central America (Table 7); the great
completion and majority of them arerates:
attainment illegallyJuvenile
owned.
For example, Guatemala reported just over 147,000 legally owned civilian firearms but estimated a total
delinquency is correlated with lower levels of education due to the low cost that
number of nearly 2 million in circulation. Similarly, Honduras counted about 133,000 registered firearms,
engaging in criminal behavior has for these young people, the absence of positive social
but the number of total firearms actually in the country is estimated at close to 600,000. In Central
influences from mentors and peers, and from delinquency being the best income
America as a whole, there is estimated to be about one weapon for every ten people, ranging from a low
alternative
of 2.8forpera100
young
peopleperson
in Costa without any
Rica to nearly 16marketable
per 100 people skills.
in Guatemala.
School violence:
Certainly notWhile schools
all firearms have been
in circulation can beproven to to
traced back serve as anconflict.
the armed important
Betweenprotective
2000 and
factor in2006several
the lives years
of at-risk youth, they can also teach violence through corporal
after the last of Central Americas civil wars had endedarms imports increased in
punishment
all sixby teachers
Central Americanandcountries.
through In violence
Guatemala,between students.
for example, the value of imported firearms nearly
tripled from about US$3 million to US$8 million during this period. Costa Rica experienced a similar
jump from
Availability under US$1The
of firearms: million to moreofthan
number US$3 million.
firearms Firearms imported
in circulation to the region
has a direct effectincluded
on the
revolvers, pistols, hunting rifles, shotguns, AK-47 assault rifles, M-16s,
ability of those at risk of violence to obtain guns, whether from legitimate sources orrocket launchers, hand grenades
and semi-automatic
illegal firearms sales. rifles, according to official customs data. A thriving illegal trade in firearms
associated with the drug trade is believed to have fueled at least part of this increase. As drugs flow north
into Mexico and the United States, firearms flow south.
Table 7: Firearms Owned by Civilians in Central America,

2007
Country Registered Estimated Guns per 100 people
Costa Rica 43,241 115,000 2.8
El Salvador 198,000 450,000 7.0
Guatemala 147,581 1,950,000 15.8
Honduras 133,185 450,000 6.2
Nicaragua NA 385,000 7.0
Panama 96,600 525,600 5.4
Sources: Karp 2008; Arias Foundation 2005.
Recent spikes of violence in the region have been accompanied by the appearance of more powerful
firearms, resulting in higher Relationship/Interpersonal
mortality levels. Indeed, firearms are used in most murders in Central
America. Figure 12 shows the breakdown by weapon linked to murders in Guatemala and El Salvador.
Household poverty:
The patterns Povertysimilar:
are remarkably within a countries,
in both household canwere
firearms cause one
used for or both
80 percent parents to
of killings.
migrate for better job opportunities or to be absent from the home for many hours, or
can drive the younger
A 2008 victimizationfamily
survey inmembers
Guatemala toconducted
bring additional incomeSmall
by the Geneva-based intoArms
the Survey
home,
causing spotlighted
some youth a range
to of similar in
engage trends.
theFirearms
illegal were
drugoverwhelmingly
trade. present in all reported incidents of
violent crime. In addition, 31 percent of those participating in the survey said they owned some kind of
firearm; a third of them said they had handguns. Of those who did not own a gun, 16 percent said they
would like to own one.
64
Dysfunctional families: Children and youth who experience or observe violent

behavior in the home are more likely to engage in violent behavior themselves.
Peers who are gang members: Studies show that relationships established with peers
who are gang members or juveniles with criminal records typically have a significant
impact on a young persons decision to join a gang. Unlike the families of these young
persons, peers can offer solidarity, respect, and sometimes even access to money.
Individual
Alcohol abuse: Alcohol can increase the likelihood of youth violence by reducing self-
control and the ability to process incoming information and assess risk, by increasing
emotional liability and impulsiveness, and by increasing the likelihood that a young
person will resort to violence.
Lack of identity: Many young people join gangs due to the absence of positive role
models both at home and in their communities, and to being socially excluded (from
education and employment opportunities.
Gangs Network and Activity
From an analytical perspective, it is clear that countries across the region are
experiencing irregular warfare. Gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha (Calle 18 and MS-13)
and the Zetas have used violence to carve out geographic areas where government is
essentially powerless to intervene. In areas of Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador gang
violence has become so intense and gang influence so pervasive that authorities have
largely retreated. Gangs use these areas as free zones for drug trafficking, arms
smuggling, human trafficking, and other illegal activities, and exert their own form of
governance. They lay down a code of conduct, specifying which activities are allowed.
Those who comply with this code are generally rewarded with protection as well as
limited social services like food, toys, and clothing - the allure of which is not to be
underestimated in impoverished areas where the population has long been slighted by
the state. Those who do not comply are punished/killed 11.
65
Maras: Origin, Structure and Network of Activity
The Maras (which began as a Los Angeles barrio gang composed of young Salvadoran
immigrants whose parents had fled that countrys civil war in the 1980s) have evolved
from a street gang to a transnational organization. The U.S. policy of mass deportations
of undocumented immigrants helped spread both MS-13 and Mara 18 (Calle 18) to
Central America. Though they are rivals, their methods and interests are the same.
Some experts claim that both have developed command and control structures; others
say that their component cliques (clicas), who range from ten to 100 members function
as franchises.
Gang cultures in Central America quickly adapted to the California Mara style.
Typically, street gangs are localized; leadership changes frequently and activities
revolve around drug sales, petty crime, and turf battles. Clearly the movement of
money within the gangs seems mysterious. Despite their extortion rackets and sale of
drugs (both highly lucrative enterprises), observers on the ground report that most
member appear to be poor.
Unfortunately, they show no restraint in their use of violence, both against rivals and
within their own organizations to maintain internal order. Indeed, the use of violence is
the most defining characteristic of the Maras. Their vocabularies emphasize brutality
and criminal activity and the leadership promotion process within the gang is based on
violence including random killings of innocent persons for no apparent reason. The
implication of this is that once a gang member has killed another, be he from a rival clica
or some other group, the killer is marked and can never leave the gang. Gang initiation
rites, which involve merciless beatings, can be fatal. Women are initiated either through
beatings or forced sex with some or all the male members of the clica. The Maras fight
very frequently, not only against the authorities but also against each other, for control
of turf and markets, especially to sell drugs. Researchers estimate that on average these
gang members do not reach 30 years of age.
The Maras is one of the largest criminal networks in the Americas, and perhaps one of
the largest in the world. Unlike most other street gangs, Maras have shown a tendency
in recent years to organize in a more traditionally hierarchical manner and to coordinate
their criminal activities not only across the United States but also across North and
Central America. They are organized and sophisticated. They use throwaway mobile
phones and the Internet, including MySpace, to keep in touch 12.
66
Recent reports suggest that the Maras are becoming involved in cross-border human
and arms trafficking, as well as the entrenched drug trade, with some suggesting that
factions of MS-13 are evolving to resemble an organized crime syndicate more than a
street gang. Unlike in the United States where strong legal institutions have kept the
Maras largely in check, weak governments, narrowly punitive policy choices, and a
widespread cultural tolerance of extrajudicial violence have allowed the Maras to
essentially run amok in Guatemala, El Salvador, and especially Honduras, to the point
that they challenge the state's ability to govern. Although there is little evidence that the
Maras have anything to do with foreign terrorist groups, their association with drug
cartels may be contributing to the uncontrolled violence in Mexico's border cities and
elsewhere 13.
The gang problem in Guatemala had its origins in the civil war, as displaced and
uneducatedbut often well-armedyoung people turned to crime. This phenomenon
subsequently received a major boost from destabilizing refugee flows, particularly the
deportation of Guatemalan migrs-turned-gang members from Southern California in
the U.S.
Country Gang Number

Members of
Gangs
Honduras 36,000 112
Guatemala 14,000 434
El Salvador 10,500 4
Nicaragua 4,500 268
Costa Rica 2,660 6
Panama 1,385 94
Belize 100 2
Total 69,145 920
67
A Research Assessment of the Maras 14
There are differences in the nature and scope of the Mara issue in Central America.
There are also major difference in the nature of the threat to security among the
countries of Central America and the responses of the individual governments.
Literature on the gangs in the media is very sensationalist. Some of the reporting comes
through the police or other institutions that may have subjective reasons for portraying
the Maras as even more of a security threat than they appear to be.
Scholarly literature in English on the Maras is almost non-existent; the literature in

Spanish is more balanced.
The greatest limitation is in obtaining accurate statistics. The ways at which

governments arrive at official estimates of the number of gang members in their
countries is quite arbitrary. There is no standardized basis for gang membership. (For
example, in El Salvador the estimate of 10,500 gang members nationwide is based
completely on those who have been imprisoned at one time or another; in Honduras the
estimate is based quite curiously on a reading of gang graffiti multiplied by some
indeterminate factor.) Researchers now go directly to the gangs to do self-report
surveys of its members 15. Obviously, these survey methods involve serious risks for the
researcher. The results may still be inaccurate, if one assumes that many respondents
are lying, to make themselves look good, make the gang look good, and/or to
intentionally mislead authorities.
The following extracts are illustrative:
Gang Activity in Guatemala [World Bank Opinion]
Guatemala is another case in which data paint a mixed picture on the overall
contribution of gangs to violent crimes. For example, during a month in which the
number of homicides was especially high, police statistics attributed only 14 percent of
them to gangs. Moreover, the majority of murders during that period occurred in areas
where gang presence was minimal, but where the presence of organized crime and
drug trafficking was high 16. Additional data from Guatemala on the number of gang
68
members in prison and why they were there, suggest that gang members might not be
as violent as the public believes. Data from the Guatemalan penitentiary system
indicate that gang members accounted for 5.8 percent of the total number of arrestees in
June 2006, a figure suggesting that others are behind the high levels of violence in
Guatemala. Furthermore, 2004 data from the Guatemalan National Police showed that
drugs were the primary reason for arrests of gang members (23 percent), followed by
robbery (20.4 percent). Homicides caused gang member detentions in only 1.8 percent
of cases.
However, other data from Guatemala suggest that gangs might play a larger role in
violence. A study conducted by the Office of the Attorney General for Human Rights
(Procuradora de Derechos Humanos), which analyzed the causes of death for youth aged
25 and under for the period of July 2002 through August 2003, found that 27.4 percent
of these deaths were caused by gang-member attacks on non-gang youths 17. The study
showed that in total, gangs were responsible for about one third of all deaths covered
by the research, including those between gang members and from gang members
leaving their gang. Although deaths caused by gangs accounted for 27.4 percent of all
deaths of those under age 25, common criminal acts accounted for a marginally higher
percentage of deaths of this age group: 28.5 percent 17. Again, data are ambiguous about
gang involvement in these criminal acts, further reducing clarity on the issue.
Central American Gangs (World Bank)
Youth violence and gangs are a critical concern in Central America today. Men between
the ages of 15 and 34 account for the overwhelming majority of homicide victims and
they also comprise the membership of youth gangs. There are more than 900 gangs or
Maras operating in Central America today, with an estimated 70,000 members. While
gangs are doubtless a major contributor to crime in El Salvador, Guatemala and
Honduras, the very evidence indicates that they are responsible for only a minority
share of violence; multiple sources suggest that perhaps 15 percent of homicides are
gang related. Furthermore, reliable data related to the role of youth gangs in the
narcotics trade are scarce.
69
Comparing Anti-Gang approaches and policies: Gang violence in Central America
Issue: 13 March 2009
Government Policy
In their analysis of gang control programs, Malcolm Klein of the University of Southern
California and Cheryl Maxson of the University of California classify official anti-gang
programs as political, ideological or bureaucratic according to the way they develop.
Such programs or policy can be described as political if they are initiated within the
framework of a political or electoral agenda. Ideological programs are largely generated
by the law enforcement agencies and strongly reflect the value system of the police.
Anti-gang policy classified as bureaucratic is developed by local government or
ministries, and is designed to match the capacity and experience of the institutions that
have to implement it.
There is a remarkable difference in anti-gang policies across the various countries of

Central America. In 2002 El Salvador and Honduras declared the gangs to be a national
security problem and developed a strict public safety policy. This policy was largely
based on a political agenda, as evidenced by the names of the programs alone: Operacin
Libertad (Operation Freedom) and Plan Super Mano Dura (Super Iron Fist Plan). The
programs involved the deployment of the military and were accompanied by rapidly
drafted and introduced anti-Mara legislation, which criminalized membership of a
street gang such as Mara Salvatrucha or Eighteen Street Gang. Despite the intense
media coverage, observers rapidly gained the impression that this had more face than
substance. Guatemala hesitantly followed the example set by its neighbors with its Plan
Escoba (Broom Plan), but on a smaller scale and without banning membership of gangs.
The approaches in Guatemala and Nicaragua are more ideological, although there are
considerable differences in approach to dealing with gang violence. In Guatemala the
police conduct patrols with the help of soldiers and hunt down gang members. In
Nicaragua the emphasis is on prevention: the police try to establish a relationship with
70
the local community in the neighborhoods concerned and to organize them into
committees for social crime prevention under the banner of safety and crime
prevention. But the burden of organizing such prevention falls primarily on the police,
who receive relatively little help from other government agencies or NGOs, and
sometimes little support from residents.
The repressive policy pursued in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala seems to be

largely counter-productive. During police operations, which mostly take place in
deprived neighborhoods, suspected gang members are arrested and locked up.
Although the courts immediately release many, the result is that the prisons are
overflowing. The lack of supervision in custodial institutions has helped Mara
Salvatrucha and Eighteen Street Gang become better organized in jail; they regard
prisons as universities for their members. Despite the increased number of imprisoned
gang members, homicide rates have risen and the number of people who fall victim to
crime has remained generally the same. Meanwhile the perception of insecurity among
broad sections of the population has remained the same or has declined only slightly.
Hence, the question remains: how much of this violence are street gangs responsible
for?
Nicaraguas national police focus on the early identification of gang formation and
activities and on demobilizing gangs. Youngsters and their families are called to
account for their violent and criminal behavior. Police attempt to weaken the gangs
position by threatening prosecution of the leaders and offering training and work
experience to members who quit the gang. If the members are open to talking to police
and the local community, the police attempt to reach peace agreements between
neighboring gangs and to organize an official ceremony at which the gangs hand in
their weapons in exchange for study grants. The police are by no means always
successful in dismantling the gangs, but Nicaragua is managing to prevent the
escalation of the problem. Furthermore, the transnational gangs such as the Mara
Salvatrucha and Eighteen Street Gang have not managed to establish cliques in the
country. Nevertheless, Nicaragua has been confronted with the same trends as its
neighbors: violence in terms of homicide figures has increased in recent years; the
proportion of the population that has become the victim of crime has remained the
same and perceptions of insecurity have also decreased.
71
Guatemalas Geostrategic Nightmare
Of all the countries in Central America, Guatemala, which shares an uncontrolled and
porous border with Mexico, is one of the most vulnerable. A national discussion about
violence and crime is dominating this years presidential election campaign in
Guatemala, fed by a steady flow of headlines on violent crimes that contribute to a
sense of rising lawlessness. The perception and the image that most of the Guatemalan
population has is that they are increasingly overshadowed by violent homicides,
corrupt officials, incompetent national security structures and a regional perception of
weakness. There is also consensus that Security Forces need to be reassessed, equipped
and deployed to protect the country. In Guatemala, rooting out corruption will require
significant investment in public institutions, where resources are scarce. The finance
ministry predicts the total tax take in 2011 will equal 11.8 percent of gross domestic
product, which is low even by Latin American standards. The Inter-American Dialogue
reported last year that government revenue in the region averaged 25 percent of GDP,
compared with 42 percent in developed countries. These and other factors have made
Guatemala a vast recruitment pool for foot soldiers and drug runners throughout the
region. Guatemalan nationals are among the causality statistics in most violent
operations in Mexico and Northern Triangle countries.
Challenges to Democracy and Demographic Institutions
Violence and the Impact on Citizen Security
The everyday impact of violence is visible in the genocide of youth in Mexico and
Central America. They are expendable foot soldiers - with limited sentences - in the
service of the international cartels. A very disturbing trend in Mexico is the role of
children in this criminal mix. The Network for the Rights of Children in Mexico
(REDIM), an advocacy group, says some 30,000 children are believed to work for
criminal gangs where delinquency is often blamed on high dropout rates at school.
Detailed figures on the role of minors in the cartels are scarce, but the Mexican
72
newspaper Reforma says the number charged with involvement in organized crime
jumped to 214 in 2010 from 8 in 2007, citing data from the attorney general's office.
"Organized crime has become a job provider for a section of the population who don't
have a lot of other options," said Victor Clark-Alfaro, director of the Binational Center
for Human Rights in Tijuana on the Mexican border with California. Poverty and lack
of economic opportunity plays a vital role in supporting this reality.
Although authorities have arrested a number of teenage hit men in the past few
years, it is highly unusual for women to work as killers for drug gangs. Nevertheless,
the fact that youth unemployment in Mexico is now double what it was ten years ago --
in a country whose growing population is one of the youngest in the Americas -- the
trends present the cartels with a rich source of cheap labor. There is little doubt that the
trend has also spread to Central America. It seems like a new pattern is emerging in the
world of organized crime.
73
Fear and insecurity have become the central concern of the citizenry, surpassing topics
such as poverty and unemployment. Today, according to surveys on victimization and
the perception of security, between 50 and 75 per cent of citizens in the region have
been victims of some type of crime, and more than 50 per cent of the population feels
insecurity has increased.
A very disturbing development is the level and character of related violence. Mexico's
brutal Zetas drug cartel has set up operations in Guatemala in the largely indigenous
region along the countries' shared border with Mexico. The Zetas are blamed for a
recent mass killing in Mexico where 183 bodies were found in mass graves in early May
2011, along with 29 beheaded farm workers in Petn, Guatemala in a single incident -
during the same period. The Zetas are suspected of forcefully recruiting migrants to
fight their former allies in the Gulf cartel. Those who refuse are killed. Never have such
massive killing fields been found in such a short time in Mexico and Guatemalas recent
history and only a few parallels in this hemisphere exist.
The Problem of Alternatively Governed Spaces (AGSs)
The structure and network of activity of TCOs and LCOs have led to a very serious
development, namely the creation of Alternatively Governed Spaces (AGSs) in which
criminal organizations, rather than formal state authorities effectively control the
population and act as the arbiter of internal order. Criminal fiefdoms have taken shape
in Central America against the backdrop of rampant criminality and the competition
between rival drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). Criminal organizations ranging
74
from youth gangs to sophisticated DTOs control substantial portions of national

territory in Central America. They serve as de facto governments, collect taxes
through dues and extortion, demand the loyalty or acquiescence of those under their
control and punish those who try to disrupt their illicit activities.
The Link to Terrorism
On July 1, 2010, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York unsealed an
indictment that outlined the rapid expansion of operations of transnational criminal
organizations and their growing, often short-term strategic alliances with terrorist
groups. These little-understood transcontinental alliances pose new security threats to
the United States, as well as much of Latin America, West Africa, and Europe.
The indictment showed drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Colombia and

Venezuela including the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC); a
designated terrorist organization by the United States and European Union had agreed
to move several multi-ton loads of cocaine through Liberia en route to Europe.
The head of Liberian security forces, who is also the son of the president, negotiated the
transshipment deals with a Colombian, a Russian, and three West Africans. According
to the indictment, two of the loads (one of 4,000 kilos and one of 1,500 kilos) were to be
flown to Monrovia from Venezuela and Panama, respectively. A third load of 500 kilos
was to arrive aboard a Venezuelan ship. In exchange for transshipment rights, the drug
traffickers agreed to pay in both cash and product.
What the drug traffickers did not know was that the head of the security forces with
whom they were dealing was acting as an informant for the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and had recorded all conversations, leaving the clearest body of
evidence to date of the growing ties between established designated Latin American
terrorist organizations/drug cartels and emerging West African criminal syndicates
that move cocaine northward to lucrative and growing markets in Europe and the
former Soviet Union. The West African criminal syndicates, in turn, are often allied and
cooperate in illicit smuggling operations with operatives of al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM), a radical Islamist group that has declared its allegiance to Osama bin
Laden and al Qaeda.
75
What links terrorist and criminal organizations together are the shadow facilitators who
understand how to exploit the seams in the international legal and economic structure,
and who work with both terrorist and criminal organizations. These groups use the
same pipelines and the same illicit structures, and exploit the same state weaknesses. Of
the 43 Foreign Terrorist Organizations listed by the Department of State, the DEA states
that 19 have clearly established ties to DTOs, and many more are suspected of having
such ties.
While the groups that overlap in different pipeline structures are not necessarily allies,
and in fact occasionally are enemies, they often make alliances of convenience that are
short- lived and shifting. Even violent drug cartels, which regularly take part in bloody
turf battles, frequently engage in truces and alliances, although most end when they are
no longer mutually beneficial or the balance of power shifts among them.
An example of the changing balance of power is that of Los Zetas, a group of special
operations soldiers in Mexico who became hit men for the Gulf Cartel before branching
out and becoming a separate organization, often now in direct conflict with their former
bosses of the Gulf organization.
Another case that illustrates the breadth of the emerging alliances between criminal and
terrorist groups is Operation Titan, executed by Colombian and U.S. officials in 2008
and still ongoing. Colombian and U.S. officials, after a 2-year investigation, dismantled
a DTO that stretched from Colombia to Panama, Mexico, the United States, Europe, and
the Middle East. Most of the drugs originated with the FARC in Colombia, and some of
the proceeds were traced through a Lebanese expatriate network to fund Hezbollah, a
radical Shiite Muslim terrorist organization that enjoys the state sponsorship of Iran
and Syria.
Colombian and U.S. officials allege that one of the key money launderers in the
structure, Chekry Harb (also known as Taliban), acted as the central go-between
among Latin American DTOs and Middle Eastern radical groups, primarily Hezbollah.
Among the groups participating in Harbs operation in Colombia were members of the
Northern Valley Cartel, right-wing paramilitary groups, and Marxist FARC.
This mixture of enemies and competitors working through a common facilitator or in

loose alliance for mutual benefit is a pattern that is becoming commonand one that
significantly complicates the ability of law enforcement and intelligence operatives to
combat, as multiple recent transcontinental cases demonstrate.
76
The cases above show the connectivity among these disparate groups operating along
different geographic parts of the overall criminal-terrorist pipeline. Rather than
operating in isolation, these groups have complicated but significant interactions with
each other based primarily on the ability of each actor or set of actors to provide a
critical service to another, while profiting mutually from the transactions. Many of the
groups operate in what have traditionally been called ungoverned or stateless
regions. However, in many of these cases, the groups worked directly with the
government or have become the de facto governing force in the areas they occupy.
A 2001 Naval War College study insightfully described some of the reasons for the
occurrence of cross-border black holes in terms of commercial and political
insurgencies. These are applicable to organized criminal groups as well and have grown
in importance since then:
The border zones offer obvious advantages for political and economic insurgencies.
Political insurgents prefer to set up in adjacent territories that are poorly integrated,
while the commercial insurgents favor active border areas, preferring to blend in amid
business and government activity and corruption. The border offers a safe place to the
political insurgent and easier access to communications, weapons, provisions, transport,
and banks.
For the commercial insurgency, the frontier creates a fluid, trade-friendly environment.
Border controls are perfunctory in free trade areas, and there is a great demand for
goods that are linked to smuggling, document fraud, illegal immigration, and money
laundering.
For the political insurgency, terrain and topography often favor the Narco-guerrilla.
Jungles permit him to hide massive bases and training camps, and also laboratories,
plantations, and clandestine runways. The Amazon region, huge and impenetrable, is a
clear example of the shelter that the jungle areas give. On all of Colombias borders with
Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, and Venezuelajungles cloak illegal activity.
In parts of Guatemala and along much of the U.S.-Mexico border, these groups have
directly and successfully challenged the states sovereignty and established governing
mechanisms of their own, relying on violence, corruption, and largesse to maintain
control.
77
While the transnational trafficking and financial operations of the Sinaloa Cartel are
important, FARC alliances and actions offer an important look at the use of non-state
criminal/terrorist armed groups by a criminalized state. The well-documented links of
Venezuelas Bolivarian Revolution, led by President Chvez, to both Iran and the
FARC, as well as the criminalization of the Venezuelan state under Chvez point to the
evolution of the model described above in which a criminalized state franchises out part
of its criminal enterprises to non-state actors.
More worrisome from the U.S. perspective is the growing evidence of Chvezs direct
support for Hezbollah, along with his ties to the FARC. These indicators include the
June 18, 2008, U.S. Treasury Departments Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
designations of two Venezuelan citizens, including a senior diplomat, as Hezbollah
supporters. Several businesses were also sanctioned. Allegations included coordinating
possible terrorist attacks and building Hezbollah-sponsored community centers in
Venezuela. OFAC has also designated numerous senior Venezuelan officials, including
the heads of two national intelligence services, for direct support of the FARC in the
acquisition of weapons and drug trafficking.
The Chvez model of allying with state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran while
sponsoring violent non-state terrorist organizations involved in criminal activities and
terrorism strongly resembles the template pioneered by Hezbollah. In fact, the military
doctrine of the Bolivarian Revolution explicitly embraces the radical Islamist model of
asymmetrical, or fourth generation, warfare and its reliance on suicide bombings and
different types of terrorism, including the use of nuclear weapons. This is occurring at
a time when Hezbollahs presence in Latin America is growing and becoming more
identifiable.
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CASE STUDIES
Chicago A Case Study
Chicago is the third most populated city in the United States. The population of almost
3 million is slightly more than 1/3 Hispanic, with the strongest representation being of
Mexican descent. Chicago is a city that was built by immigrants, their hard work ethic
and family values. The city has been designated as the fourth best business city in the
world, due to its diversity in businesses operating in the city. Chicago is also known as
a city of the arts and culture, great restaurants, five star hotels, and Gangsters. Only
New York and Los Angeles consumes more drugs than Chicago, nevertheless, the
brutality of the city and fierceness of the criminal organizations there are second to
none.
Chicago, since its early beginning, has had to deal with criminal elements, from the
Irish mob, to the Italian mob, the gangs and now the bulk cash Latinos that represent
South/Central American drug interests. Chicago is also a city of segregation that plays
right into the hands of organized criminal groups. Many groups started off as the
protectors of their communities to ward off those that wanted to victimize the
newcomers to America. In a short time though, these organizations began to control
their communities with intimidation and violence and the seeds of organized
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communities blossomed into organized crime syndicates.
In the 80s & 90s, African-American and Hispanic youth gangs were becoming major
forces in cities across America. In Chicago, these youth gangs quickly became
entrepreneurs, and are now multi-million dollar organizations with legitimate
businesses through which they cleanse illegal earnings. The largest drug distributing
youth gangs in Chicago are: the Black Gangster Disciples, the Vice Lords, and the Latin
Kings. The Latin Kings have always had a drug connection to Mexico, facilitated by the
Herrera Drug Trafficking Organization. The Kings are considered local wholesalers,
and were connected with Sinaloa and Beltran-Leyva through family ties in Mexico.
In 2005 the Flores twin brothers took drug dealing by youth gangs in Chicago to new
heights, moving what the DEA claims to have been 2,000 - 3,000 kilos per month
which is roughly $55,000,000 USD - for Sinaloa and Beltran-Leyva cartels. The Flores
twins were arrested by the DEA in 2010, and are still awaiting trial. Indictments have
also been made against the leaders of Sinaloa and Beltran-Leyva cartels for their
connection with the 28-year-old Flores brothers, Pedro and Margarito.
It is reported that the Beltran-Leyva cartel gave DEA the intelligence to arrest the Flores
brothers, after Sinaloa ordered the Flores brothers not to accept or sell drugs from the
Beltran-Leyva cartel any more.
Drug Cartels Operating in Chicago
There was a time in the U.S. when both wholesale and retail distribution of cocaine was
facilitated by Colombian cartels through diverse groups that fed the consumption
market. Today most Colombian cartels have been replaced by Mexican TCOs that have
broadened the span of distribution bases throughout the U.S. and brought new levels of
sophistication in moving bulk cash and weapons out of the U.S. to central and South
America. Mexican immigrants are very much a recognized part of todays U.S. society
and economy and their access and local knowledge of the U.S. system has been
beneficial to Mexican drug cartels.
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The Sinaloa Cartel
The Sinaloa Cartel led by Joaquin El Chapo Guzman, is one of the most powerful and
violent drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. Guzman is reportedly obsessed with
establishing himself as the most dominant drug lord in Mexico. While the Sinaloa
organization has a broad presence throughout Mexico, it is particularly dominant on
the western coast of Mexico, from Hermosillo to Acapulco.
The Sinaloa Cartel is said to smuggle drugs along the United States border from
Imperial County, California, across Arizona and New Mexico, and into parts of Texas.
Because the organizations territory overlaps with that of many other drug trafficking
organizations, the opportunities for violent conflict are rampant.
An extremely violent battle for control of the Juarez trafficking routes has been waged
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between the Sinaloa and Juarez Cartels since 2008. Sinaloa also has a growing presence
outside of Mexico. The organization is present in most of the Central American
countries, as well as Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Sinaloas expansion into
Central America is thought to be a response to the increased government efforts and
U.S. pressure within Mexico as increased interdiction activities along the Mexican coasts
and U.S. borders have impacted their operations. The Sinaloa Cartel also operates in
South America, with a presence in Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile, and
Argentina.
The Beltran-Leyva
The Beltran-Leyva Organization also has also been severely weakened. If the Mexican
government succeeds in arresting Hector Beltran, it could represent the first full
dismantling of a drug trafficking organization. Formerly aligned with the Sinaloa
Cartel, the Beltran Leyva organization splintered into two separate factions following
the death of its leader, Arturo Beltran Leyva, in December 2009. One faction retained
the organizations alliance with Los Zetas, while the other operated more or less
independently. Some evidence indicates that remnants of the Beltran Leyva
Organization continue to collaborate with Los Zetas to traffic drugs into the U.S.
through Texas. The Beltran Leyva Organization has been known for its extreme
violence in recent years. For example, in December 2008, the bodies of seven
decapitated soldiers and five other victims were found in southern Guerrero state of
Mexico, a region in which the Beltran Leyva Organization had been battling for control.
The bodies were accompanied by a sign that warned: "For every one of mine that you
kill, I will kill ten." A bag with their heads, some still gagged with tape, was found
nearby. The Beltran Leyva Organization also reportedly maintains a presence in
Colombia.
In December 2009, the Mexican Navy killed Arturo Beltran Leyva and six of his
associates. Beltran Leyva was the leader of the Beltran Leyva Organization and one of
Mexicos principal drug lords. In January 2010, Carlos Beltran Leyva, Arturos brother,
who also held leadership roles in the drug trafficking organization, was arrested in
Mexico. On August 30, 2010, another leader in the Beltran Leyva organization, Edgar
"La Barbie" Valdez was arrested by an elite squad of the Mexican Navy. According to
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Mexican authorities, Valdez is said to have trafficked a ton of cocaine each month and
was responsible for "several dozen" murders. He was known to be extremely brutal,
often videotaping beheadings and torture. It is expected that he will be extradited to the
United States for trial. The strength of the Beltran Leyva Organization following recent
arrests and deaths is unclear.
Herrera Organization
The Herrera Organization has long standing ties with Chicagos underworld. They have
been the kingpins of heroin distribution in Chicago and the Midwest for many
generations. Historically the Herrera Organization had been an independent entity.
They are now partnered with the Sinaloa Cartel.
Street Gangs in Chicago
Image complements, dailycaller.com (http://dailycaller.com/2010/07/15/chicago-street-gangs-

increasing-presence-in-suburbs/)
Latin Kings
The Latin Kings street gang was formed in Chicago in the 1940s and consisted
predominantly of Mexican and Puerto Rican males. Originally created with the
philosophy of overcoming racial prejudice and creating an organization of "Kings," the
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Latin Kings evolved into a criminal enterprise operating throughout the United States
under two umbrella factions--Motherland, also known as KMC (King Motherland
Chicago), and Bloodline (New York). All members of the gang refer to themselves as
Latin Kings and, currently, individuals of any nationality are allowed to become
members. Latin Kings associating with the Motherland faction also identify themselves
as "Almighty Latin King Nation (ALKN)," and make up more than 160 structured
chapters operating in 158 cities in 31 states.
The membership of Latin Kings following KMC is estimated to be 20,000 to 35,000. The
Bloodline was founded by Luis Felipe - in the New York State -correctional system in
1986. Latin Kings associating with Bloodline also identify themselves as the "Almighty
Latin King and Queen Nation (ALKQN)." Membership is estimated to be 2,200 to 7,500,
divided among several dozen chapters operating in 15 cities in 5 states. Bloodline Latin
Kings share a common culture and structure with KMC and respect them as the
Motherland, but all chapters do not report to the Chicago leadership hierarchy. The
gang's primary source of income is the street-level distribution of powder cocaine, crack
cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Latin Kings continue to portray themselves as a
community organization while engaging in a wide variety of criminal activities,
including assault, burglary, homicide, identity theft, and money laundering. Kings have
maintained alliances with Sinaloa, Beltran-Leyva, and Herrera Organization 18.
Black Gangster Disciples
The Gangster Disciples, originally Black Gangster Disciple Nation, is a street gang
formed on the South-side of Chicago in the late 1960s by David Barksdale, leader of the
Gonzanto Disciples, and Larry Hoover, leader of the Supreme Disciples. The two
groups, both members of the Folk Nation alliance, united to form the Black Gangster
Disciple Nation (BGDN). They are by far the largest group that makes up the Folk
Nation coalition of street gangs, which includes the Black Disciples, Maniac Latin
Disciples, Spanish Cobras, Satan Disciples and a number of smaller gangs. They also
have a heavy presence in Southern cities such as Memphis, Atlanta, and Houston.
BGDN criminal activity includes drug trafficking, robbery, extortion and murder. Like
the Latin Kings, the gang's primary source of income is the street-level distribution of
powder cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, and they have developed ties
with the Sinaloa drug cartel.
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Vice Lords
The Almighty Vice Lord Nation is the second largest and one of the oldest street gangs
in Chicago. Their total membership is estimated to be as many as 30,000. They are also
one of the founding members of the People Nation multi-gang alliance. In 1958, the Vice
Lords "club" was founded by several African-American youths originally from the
North Lawndale neighborhood of Chicago. These youths met while incarcerated in the
Correctional Facility. At the time, founding member Edward Pepalo Perry led them.
The name is taken from the dictionary definition of "vice", meaning, "to have a tight
hold".
As the original Vice Lords group was released from incarceration, they quickly began to
recruit other African American youths from their neighborhood and began engaging in
conflicts with other "clubs" from various Chicago neighborhoods. By 1964, they had
grown significantly and law enforcement officials named them as a primary target for
their various illegal activities, including the current street-level distribution of powder
cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. They also have developed ties with the
Sinaloa drug cartel and are strong allies with Latin Kings.
One of the most significant accomplishments of gang discipline in Chicago and Los
Angeles came through the proactive efforts of one of Chicagos Police Officers. A former
gang member himself, he jokingly claims that he saw the light of change after being
shot twice and learned a few life-changing lessons during his recovery.
What both Chicago and Los Angeles accomplished were agreed rules of leadership and
management that enabled the following:
All splintered and nonaligned gangs would have to align themselves to one of the
more powerful gangs for command and control purposes.
Gangs were then asked to police their own neighborhoods, control violence in their
areas and operate in a disciplined and structured manner.
All major incidents from gang members would be dealt directly with the Head of
the organization in the first instance and the Police would address inaction in a
deliberately forceful manner in the concerned area. Maintaining uninterrupted
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business served as an incentive for prompt action, when public safety concerns
arose.
The groups were then informed that their illegal activity remained illegal and
concerning and that the law applied to them in every way.
One can purchase a kilo of cocaine in Colombia for $800.00; in Panama the same kilo
would cost you $1700.00. As a kilo of cocaine moves further north through Central
America and into North America the price escalates and in the U.S. the current
wholesale price per kilo is $25,000.00 USD. That same kilo has a street value of between
$120,000.00 - $170,000.00 depending on the quality received by the end-user (See chart
below) Whereas exact prices may vary depending on the quantity purchased, what
remain constant are the violence, corruption and deaths that each kilo of cocaine
generates throughout the process of production, distribution and consumption. There is
no exact measure to quantify the true impact of drug trafficking, associated violence
and corruption that launders the bulk cash proceeds from the trade.
Just as Mexican and Colombian drug cartels have active operational cells in Latin
America, so too street Hispanic level gangs in the U.S. have coordinated cells operating
in North and Central America. The deportation of gang members arrested in the U.S.
to Mexico and Central American countries has further reinforced these connections
and ties between Latin America criminal organizations.
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Wholesale Price of Cocaine (per kilo)
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
-
Colombia Panama Triangulo Mexico
Norte
Street Value of Cocaine (per kilo)
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
-
Colombia Panama Triangulo Mexico USA
Norte
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Panama - Case Study
FARC and Smuggling
In the last decades Panama has been one of the important connections for shipping
narcotics to the U.S. and other countries. The International Narcotics Control Strategy
has reported that traffickers have managed to smuggle narcotics through the country's
uncontrolled transportation system, such as airfields, coastlines, and containerized
seaports and highways. The FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) has also
contributed the drug increase in the country. Many of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia) soldiers who seek shelter and refugee from Colombian Armed
Forces, cross the border between Darien and Colombia. Since the presence of the FARC
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in Panama, drug trafficking has been increasing in large numbers. Waterways are being
watched carefully by the Panamanian Naval Forces, but the FARC has adapted their
ways of smuggling narcotics through the land across Panama. This unchecked flow of
narcotics trafficking and the resulting devastation has imposed an unprecedented
breach of security and stability for the entire Central American region.
Human Trafficking
Panama is a source, transit, and destination country also for trafficking of persons. Its
location between North and South America provides an intermediary point for
smuggled immigrants. Panama is considered a transit point for victims en route to the
U.S. The Chinese Mafia considers Panama a safe route for trafficking to the United
States, according to a 2007 article by Panama American. Women are trafficked from
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and other Central American countries to Panama.
Instances of trafficking women from Panama to Jamaica have been reported. Trafficking
activity throughout Central America is aided by the free transit agreement between El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, accompanied by a lack of security on
the borders. A lack of technology and tools to investigate certain sexual crimes
contributes to the continuity of child trafficking and sexual exploitation, according to a
2009 article in the Panama Star.
Forms of Trafficking
Women from surrounding countries travel voluntarily to Panama in search of jobs and
are forced into prostitution after their handlers confiscate their passports, leaving them
with no other option for work. A sexual crime prosecutor in Panama has stated that the
most common crimes reported are child pornography, child prostitution, and child
slavery. Children are trafficked internally from rural to urban areas for labor purposes.
Underage children from Columbia and the Dominican Republic are reportedly
employed in massage parlors within the country.
Prostitution
There is a well-established network of corruption in Panama designed specifically to

extort money from the Colombian prostitutes who regularly and routinely have sexual
encounters with tourists for money. This activity is reportedly coordinated through the
Panamanian National Immigration Service. It is done in such a way - using lawyers as
cutouts that actually receive the bribes - that everyone involved can maintain a level of
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"plausible deniability." The people who are involved are immigration officials, lawyers,
and Police Officers on the street. The immigration officials and Police rarely target or
hassle the foreign tourists because the entire point of this operation is to extort money
from the girls. The girls do the work and the system extorts the money from the girls.
Calculated Extortion
Colombian prostitutes are in Panama legally and normally go to the same

establishments to seek business. Therefore, Immigration Officials and the Police simply
carry out periodic "raids" and arrest everyone, legal or not. These women are arrested
and are kept in custody until they pay a fee of $1,000 dollars to be released. The money
is paid in cash to "specialized Immigration Lawyers" that live off of this type of
business. They tell the girls that they have "contacts" within immigration that will get
them released. Once they pay the money they are immediately released with no
paperwork, no change to their status, and no additional stamps in their passport and
obviously no receipts of any kind. It's a huge business and everyone gets paid. Every
raid normally nets about 40 girls that pay $1,000.00 each to be released and these
extortion artists share of the illicit earnings among themselves.
Conclusion
Therefore, in effect, corrupt Panamanian government officials are indirectly involved in

organized crime, and their system allows them to profit from prostitution and other
illegal activities. Everyone in the government knows about it and they have actively
decided not to shut it down - precisely because everyone gets a cut. The Panamanian
National Immigration Service is one of the best producers" of under the table illicit
cash in the government. It all comes from foreign prostitutes who are in no position to
complain. Quite simply, they are being exploited through official channels.
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Guatemala - Case Study
The 1996 Peace Accords in Guatemala marked the end of a prolonged thirty-six year
civil war that deeply polarized the country, dismantled the Security Forces and brought
to life an over-empowered National Police (PNC). After a long series of military-led
governments, failed coup dtats and a growing semblance of democratic rule,
Guatemala finds itself drowning in corruption, crime and violence as its internal
weaknesses are being exploited by TCOs and LCOs that are having a feeding frenzy
over the vulnerability of weak institutions, compromised political leaders and poor
economic circumstances.
After centuries of prominence during the Mayan Dynasty, Guatemala is facing the
measure of a Failed State status as donor countries, international institutions and
concerned citizens piece together loose legislations, sporadic funding and agenda laden
ideas that inspire little hope, renewed fears and intangible results. Guatemalans
recognize the problems that are affecting their country, are aware of the personalities
and groups that benefit from and sustain their security dilemmas and are afraid to
confront this reality for fear of returning to an internal armed conflict that further
destroys the economy and divide the country.
Divided by ethnicity, culture, race, creed, language, aspirations and economic

circumstances, Guatemala like most other failing states globally requires a unifying
91
leader that does not represent any particular segment or sector of the nation, one that
speaks on behalf of all the people, openly embraces the differences of this complex
society and use the diversity of the people to harness creativity and opportunity for all.
Only then can political-will translate meaning on the ground that encourages
Guatemalans to work together for the countrys future.
In retrospect, the dismantling of the Security Forces created free land passages through
the country to Mexico, exposed the border to free transit routes for drugs and
contraband and inadequate accountability systems for weapons and munitions
belonging to the Security Forces, enabled and facilitated the creation of parallel security
structures, clandestine groups. Hidden powers emerged that today fund and support
political powers, which in turn maintain a corrupt bureaucratic system that facilitates
and nurtures impunity and corruption. The statistics and messages below tell a story all
by themselves, as Guatemalas post-civil war dilemma continues.
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CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The trend toward the merging of terrorist and criminal groups to mutually exploit new
markets is unlikely to diminish. Both will continue to need the same facilitators, and
both can leverage the relationship with the other to mutual benefit. This gives these
groups an asymmetrical advantage over state actors, which are inherently more
bureaucratic and less adaptable than non-state actors.
Europe and the United States will face a growing threat from the region, particularly
from radical Islamist groupsthose affiliated with al Qaeda and those, such as
Hezbollah, allied with Iran. Yet given the current budget constraints and economic
situation, it is highly unlikely that additional resources from either continent will be
allocated to the threat.
There are few options for putting the genie back in the bottle. Transnational criminal
organizations and terrorist networks have proven themselves resilient and highly
adaptable, while governments remain far less so. Governments have also consistently
underestimated the capacity of these disparate and non-hierarchical organizations.
Human intelligence, perhaps the most difficult type to acquire, is vital to understanding
the threat, how the different groups work together, and what their vulnerabilities are. A
major vulnerability is the dependence of the Latin American drug traffickers on local
African networks. To make the necessary alliances, cartel operatives are forced to
function in unfamiliar terrain and in languages and cultures they do not know or
understand. This creates significant opportunities for penetration of the operations, as
the Liberian case shows.
Another element that is essential is the creation of functioning institutions in the most
affected states that can both investigate and judicially prosecute transnational criminal
organizations. The most efficient way to do this is through the creation of vetted police
and military units and judicial corps that are specially trained and who can be protected
from reprisals.
The almost universal mantra of judicial and police reform is valid, but it can only be
realistically done in small groups that can then be expanded as time and resources
permit. Most efforts are diluted to the point of uselessness by attempting to do
96
everything at once. The Colombian experience in fighting drug trafficking organizations

and the FARC is illustrative of this. After years of futility, the police, military, and
judiciary were able to form small vetted units that have grown over time and, just as
importantly, were able to work together.
Vetted units that are able to collect intelligence and operate in a relatively controlled
environment, which can be monitored for corruption, are also vital and far more
achievable than macro- level police reform. These are small steps, but ones that have a
chance of actually working in a sustainable way. They do not require the tens of
millions of dollars and large-scale human resource commitments that broader efforts
do. In addition, they can be easily expanded as resources permit.
However, human intelligence and institution building, operating in a vacuum, will

have limited impact unless there is the will and ability to match the trans-
nationalization of enforcement to the trans-nationalization of crime and terror. These
groups thrive in the seams of the global system, while the global response has been a
state-centric approach that matches the 20th century, not this one.
Without this type of human intelligence able to operate in relative safety through vetted
units, the criminal and terrorist pipelines will continue not only to grow but also to
develop the capacity to recombine more quickly and in ever more dangerous ways 19.
The link between organized Crime and Politics
Since the 1990s there have been reason to believe that the drug-politics link has grown
deeper in the region - particularly in Mexico and a little less so in Central America with
the exception of Panama. The funding of parties and candidates is just one of the fronts
where the battle between organized crime and democratic institutions is played out.
Drugs and Politics have a long history in the region but several new political factors
ironically have made Central American (and indeed Latin American politics) more
vulnerable to organized crime.
Competitive Elections: Competitive elections are a victory for a region that knew only
decades of civil war but it may have its downsides. In most Central American countries,
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elections are more competitive. While competitive elections and viable opposition
parties probably help to improve the levels of political transparency, they also tend to
raise the cost of politics. (The current president of Panama, Ricardo Martinelli, a
wealthy businessman, spent $19 million in his campaign, a remarkable figure in a
country with barely 2 million registered voters.) Competitive elections, in other words,
offer terrific opportunities for crime syndicates hoping to make political investments.
Campaign Finance: While Central American countries have made significant strides
toward regulating campaign finance, the enforcement of these rules continues to be
extremely weak. With the exception of El Salvador, every country has either banned
certain kinds of political funding or introduced contribution limits. In Central American
countries, despite numerous blatant violations of political finance laws, not a single
criminal or electoral sanction has ever been meted out to anyone. Mexico stands out as
the only regional example in which a powerful electoral authority has made a genuine
effort to enforce campaign finance laws, in some cases with extraordinary severity.
The weakness of Political Parties and Party Systems throughout the region also has
troubling financial implications. Candidates are heavily dependent on their ability to
attract private contributors. The weak party systems make them particularly prone to
the emergence of political outsiders who are supported by little more than a well-
funded electoral machine.
The capture of parties and elected officials by moneyed interests is bad news for
democracy. At a minimum, it compromises the premise of political equality that
supports the whole edifice of democracy, reflected in the principle of one person, one
vote, and stunts the ability of parties and leaders to channel broader social demands.
Such loss of political autonomy is serious if it occurs vis--vis legitimate interests,
business or otherwise. It is, however, devastating when it involves organized crime.
Unlike interactions between private donors and politicians, where quid-pro-quos are
seldom articulated explicitly and elected politicians always retain the possibility of not
fulfilling the donors expectations, the normal codes of etiquette and uncertainty in the
case of drug traffickers do not apply. In the classic formulation that became Pablo
Escobars trademark, plata o plomo (buck or bullet) are often the only choices public
officials face.
In addition, there is a crucial difference between organized crime and any other interest
group. Legitimate interests that contribute to campaigns seek to shape the law in their
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favor. Organized crime seeks to prevent the law from being enforced altogether - and
strikes at the heart of the viability of the state. In the worst cases of political penetration
by organized crime, (Mexico is the prime visible example today) the distinction between
institutions and crimebetween inside and outside the law - dissolves as the state and
its authorities become effective abettors of criminal activities, and may even depend on
such activities to function 20.
A Reality Check
Trafficking of small and heavy arms, bulk cash money laundering, human trafficking,
rampant corruption, lack of confidence in the institutions of state security, the
widespread and dangerous privatization of security and the rise of non-aligned
clandestine groups are also concerning items in the new menu of security challenges in
the region. A Guatemalan case study brought to reality the chart above, which shows
the vicious cycle of collusion that Hidden, Bureaucratic and Political Powers have spun
into a web of parallel initiatives that have crippled the economic, socio-political and
security environment of the country, while promoting impunity.
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To meet these challenges, the cooperative relationships between governments necessary

to deal with transnational crime are not progressing appropriately. Central American
security and justice institutions each work independently, suffer from issues of
corruption and are not trusted by large segments of the population. Often there is no
coordination between the different police organizations and little teamwork between
public prosecutors, judges, governors, mayors and other agents of the state. Many jails
and adolescent detention facilities are obsolete, overcrowded and fail in their function
to punish, rehabilitate and reinsert lawbreakers into society. Instead they have become
loosely governed institutions that often play the role of universities to train
professionals who continue crime upon their release from prison and advance the
agendas of TCOs and LCOs. Inserting additional resources without cleansing the
institutions, demanding transparency and strengthening Public Controller and Citizen
Oversight will only prove fruitless.
The region cannot put the genie back in the bottle unless they trust sufficiently to work
collectively.
TCOs and LCOs have proven themselves resilient and highly adaptable, while
governments remain far less so. Governments have also consistently underestimated
the capacity of these disparate organizations. Human intelligence and institution-
building (two of the universal tactics for correcting the problem) if operating in a
vacuum, will have limited impact unless there is the will and ability to match the
trans-nationalization of enforcement to the trans-nationalization of crime. These
groups thrive in the seams of the global system, while the global response has been a
state-centric approach that matches the 20th century and not the 21st.
Central American gangs are also spreading across Canada and the U.S.A. In essence,
the threat is much greater than just Mexico and Central America as TCOs extend
their regional and global reach. Interestingly gang leadership originates in U.S.
prisons and transmits instructions through street-level operatives in North
American countries to the various cells operating throughout Central America.
Understanding the true dynamics of whats taking place in prisons would advance
the cause of control, management and interdiction of organized crime.
When TCOs and LCOs become de facto administrations, it is more than a just a
national security problem, as it reflects a much deeper wound within the society
itself. As these become more and more involved in politics, economics, and social
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and civic organizations, TCOs, LCOs and their allies become social actors that win
the confidence of the people. While it appears that monetary gain remains the
primary motivation of these various groups, they are in fact challenging
governments for virtual control of the loyalty and respect of the masses.
In addition to violence, corruption plays an integral role in undermining state

institutions. The financing of political parties and/or candidates by drug money and
organized crime is a direct threat to the survival of democracy in the region.
Criminals have long used the formula of plata o plomo) to corrupt government
officials. Third-generation gangs have become masters of this strategy. What the
TCOs and LCOs are doing, in essence, is seeking to intimidate the state and the
citizenry into submission and win a free hand in pursuing lucrative illicit business
dealings. Criminal organizations are therefore able to clobber the state from without
and weaken it from within.
The ultimate threat of a destabilizing security environment is not instability or even

criminal violence. Instead, it is either state failure or the forced imposition of a radical
socioeconomic-political restructuring of the state and its governance. The challenges come
in many destabilizing forms and in a matrix of different kinds of challenges, varying
in scope and scale.
Most political leaders in the region are still thinking about the phenomenon in
traditional terms of criminal activity, and have not yet caught up with reality. They
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do not appreciate the extent and nature of the threat to political order and
responsible democratic governance being raised by the slow-moving clash of two
types of values. One set of values serves criminal greed. The other seeks the general
wellbeing. The chart below illustrates the availability and distribution of money that
remains the main incentive for corruption and violence in Central America.
Mechanisms of integration, within the Central American sub-region have not

responded adequately to the worsening problems - particularly the organized crime
in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, and the authoritarianism in Nicaragua.
The U.S.-backed Mrida Initiative - started under the George W. Bush
administration and extended under President Barack Obama - has essentially sought
to assist Mexico, through the provision of various kinds of equipment and training,
in its enormously difficult fight against drug-fueled violence and organized crime.
Within that package of some $1.6 billion over three years, however, relatively few
resources have been directed further south, to Central America, despite the
problems aggravated by drug trafficking and the war on drugs. With no hope in
sight for reduced demand for drugs from major consumption countries the
security crisis in Central America would persist in the short-term.
102
The Way Forward
The problem of violence and criminal activities in Central America has produced a
plethora of detailed studies by academics, sociologists, criminologists, security firms
and agencies; however, the situation that affects the region is so broad and dynamic
that there is no holistic documented approach that addresses the situation and solutions
as a collective. Therefore, whereas analyses from various forums are excellent and
recommendations are many, actual solutions and plans of action remain scarce.
Aid from the U.S. and elsewhere has attempted to deal with the situation, but those
efforts have largely been piecemeal. A regional effort to tackle this problem in an
organized fashion is mandatory, but the challenges include a lack of trust and
understanding between countries, a lack of trust and understanding between countries,
a lack of political will and resources and weak institutions.
Noteworthy is the seeming inability or reluctance of the regions leaders to address the
systemic problems of a skewed distribution of wealth, insufficient fiscal income,
corruption, and unrelenting violence. Security, funding of political parties, justice,
greater economic equality, regional cooperation, inclusive dialogue, citizen
participation, and the preservation of democracy have all been identified as the leading
challenges to the consolidation of democracy in the region and to the neutralizing of
criminality.
Some leaders have voiced concern that a Central America initiative will merely replicate
hard line, military-led efforts in Colombia and Mexico. Guatemalan President Alvaro
Colom has sought to reassure Guatemalans that any plan will place an emphasis on
co-responsibility, and will include measures to reduce consumption, arms sales,
money laundering, and the sale of chemicals used in drug production.
One thing is clear: In no country in the region is it simply a domestic issue. At a

minimum, effectively addressing the problem of transnational crime and its impact on
the security of the region requires a multi-track, balanced and integrated strategy and
one that is regional in scope but with strong bi-lateral components. Otherwise, success
in one jurisdiction simply transfers the problem to neighboring areas as the agents of
cartels and organized crime move freely between countries by legal or illegal means.
103
The level of the threat has to be raised to the level of a threat to national, regional and
international security. As Hugo Acero Velzquez 21 sees it, the solution involves three
areas of concentration: struggle against the cartels and mafias; combating the municipal chain
that feeds the large mafias; and working toward peaceful co-existence and security for the
population 22.
Struggle against the Large Mafias
First, there must be a joint strategy to combat the other criminal organizations that are
intimately linked to drug trafficking, such as those involved in illegal arms dealings.
This is a topic where the U.S. can play a fundamental role, since they produce and sell
weapons in their territory that often end up supplying criminal groups in Latin
American countries, sometimes providing sophisticated weapons that not even the
police and other justice organizations in those countries possess.
Second, the discussion must also include the problem of drug consumption, given that
it continues to increase in the region and that, as well as representing a public health
problem, also seriously affects citizen security. On that point, the countries of the
Americas will have to discuss, earlier rather than later, the 2009 proposals of the Latin
American Commission on Drugs and Democracy: decriminalize the possession and
consumption of marijuana, treat drug consumption as a public health issue, focus
strategies of repression against organized crime, and reduce consumption through
innovative information and prevention campaigns.
Combating the Municipal Chain that Feeds the Large Mafias
The strategy against drug trafficking and production must go beyond the pursuit of the
bosses and target the middle levels of command, as yet still unknown, and groups of
youths and children in working-class sectors who today are becoming involved or are
at risk of becoming involved in and used by organized crime. In this regard, a three-
pronged strategy must be designed. The first element involves strengthening
intelligence operations and criminal investigation in the different countries, where
police, public prosecutors and judges work together as a team focused on the
identification, pursuit and detention of the middle levels of command in the criminal
104
organizations so that the process of replacing the management of these groups once the
leaders fall is difficult, or so that such groups are truly dismantled. The second thrust is
aimed at facilitating the exit and social re-insertion of members of criminal groups who
wish to do so and are willing to assist the authorities.
Peaceful Co-existence and Security for the Population
Citizens from the majority of countries in the Americas have seen the problems
associated with organized crime grow, and today daily violence seriously affects the
quality of life and wellbeing of the residents of urban centers. Given this situation,
national governments must prepare integrated plans of peaceful co-existence and
security for their citizens aimed at reducing risks (weapons, drugs, alcohol); giving
attention to vulnerable groups (youth at risk, persons displaced by violence,
immigrants, the poor, etc.); prevention and attention to gender violence; peaceful
resolution of conflicts (interpersonal, family and community); the rehabilitation of
deteriorated urban areas; strengthening of security, justice, intelligence; and criminal
investigation institutions and detention centers. National, integrated plans must be
carried out in municipalities, departments and states with the participation of mayors,
prefects, and governors, and be adapted to the particular contexts at hand.
To make progress along these lines, it is important to delve deeper into these matters
and increase the actions that some multilateral and co-operation agencies have started
to carry out in certain Latin American countries. In addition to these actions, it is
necessary for co-operation agencies and multilateral banks to aim their efforts at
financing the strengthening of security and justice agency resources in terms of the
professionalization of human resources, facilities (police, justice, jails and detention
centers), communications (central communication hubs and personal communication
devices) and mobility (maritime, surface and air).
In this way, the integrated policies proposed for development in the Americas will
include programs and projects for the prevention, control and punishment of crimes,
financed and adapted to both old problems of common crimes and the new problems
imposed on governments by the emergence of organized, transnational crime that
intends to persist and reap the benefits.
105
With the bulk of the cash from cocaine sales residing in the U.S., due to high demand
and uninterrupted supply, money laundering and corruption in the Americas has many
tentacles that go way beyond the global network and influence of TCOs and LCOs that
media outlets give featured reporting. This study has looked at many perspectives on
the subject and arrived at startling conclusions that require more indebt research and
analysis. Nevertheless, what is clear is that the problem is as big as the real actors
behind the scene that enable and facilitate the trafficking of illicit drugs and other
contraband and profit handsomely at the expense of many.
106
Endnotes
1. From the new Middle Ages to a new Dark Ages: the decline of the State and
U.S. strategy Phil Williams.
2. CIA World Factbook, Guatemala.
3. Excerpts taken from the Report: War on Drugs; June 20.
4. Vulliamy, Ed. How a big U.S. bank laundered billions from Mexicos
murderous drug gangs. Guardian.co.uk. The Observer. 3 April 2011. 5 August
2011.
5. The following points are extracts from the Woodrow Wilson International
Center.
6. Sergio Pinheiro
7. DOD/JOC
8. John P. Sullivan
9. USAID Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment: Guatemala Profile
10. Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge, World

Bank/LAC 2011.
11. Manwaring, 2007.
12. (http://www.gangwatchers.org/gang-names.html.) (www.xv3gang.com)
13. Jos Miguel Cruz/ in Bruneau / Dammert / Skinner pre-publication December

2011.
14. Central American and Caribbean Commission of Police Chiefs. There is

controversy on the contribution of Central American gangs to violent crimes and
on the relative success of anti-gang policies.
107
15. Several of these surveys are carried out on a regular basis by prestigious
organizations such as the Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de
Guatemala (Guatemalan Institute for Comparative Studies in Penal Sciences),
Vanderbilt University, the Asociacin de Investigacin y Estudios Sociales
(Association for Research and Social Studies), and the U.S. Agency for
International Development.
16. Lara, 2006.
17. Ranum, IUDOP3.
18. Arrest and Conviction of Alleged Leader of the Chicago-based Latin Kings Street
Gang: http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13315640
19. Extract from Douglas Farahs Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized

States: PRISM, VOL. 2, NO. 3 06/2011.
20. The foregoing discussion on the links between organized crime and politics
draws heavily on the work of Kevin Casas-Zamora, Dirty Money:
(http://www.americasquarterly.org/casas-zamora).
21. A sociologist at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
22. Hugo Acero Velzquez, Citizen Security, a challenge for the Americas,
http://www.focal.ca/images/stories/Acero_Citizen_security_a_challenge_for_t
he_Americas_June_2011_e.pdf
23. Top Banks in the World by Bankersalmanac.com. Bankersalmanac.com. 12 July

2011. Web. 5 August 2011.
24. Krauss, Clifford. Exxons Profit Rises in Quarter, Helped by Higher Oil Prices.
Business Day. The New York Times. 28 July 2011. 12 August 2011.
25. Bernard L. Madoff: Overview. New York Times. 27 April 2011. 12 August 2011.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/bernard_l_m
adoff/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=Bernard%20Madoff&st=Search
26. "Monsanto Annual Report 2010 shows decrease in profits: Annual income and
earnings. Financeinvestments.com. 30 July 2011. 14 August 2011.
108
27. CitiGroup Inc quote. CNNMoney. 14 August 2011. 14 August 2011.

http://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=C
28. Boeing Co. quote. CNNMoney. 14 August 2011. 14 August 2011.

http://money.cnn.com/quote/quote.html?symb=BA
Background Papers and References
1. Crime and Violence in Central America A Development Challenge World

Bank/LAC 2011.
2. PRISM Vol. 2, No 3 06/2011 Center for Complex Operations.
3. UNODC world Drug Report 2010.
4. Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy June 2011.
5. Report of the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control U.S. and
Mexican Responses to Drug Trafficking Organizations May 2011
6. Looking the Monster in the Face Julia Schunemann FRIDE October 2010.
7. CARICOM Report 2007 One Team, One Space, One Caribbean.
8. USAID Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment April 2006.
9. CIEN Policia Nacional Civil de Guatemala 2011
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Drugs, Guns and Cash

Analysis and Proposals on How to Manage

vii. Research Based Solutions

ii. A Reality Check

CHARTS, TABLES AND GRAPHS

1. Global Potential Cocaine Production, 1990 2008 (Graph)

21. Annual Causes of Death in the United States

suggest concrete and cost-effective solutions, and develop an analytical framework,

The Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial y Financial

The National Economic Research Center (CIEN in Spanish) is a 30-year-old private,

The Foundation for the Development of Guatemala (FUNDESA in Spanish) is a 30-year-

Foundation G (Fundacin G in Spanish) is a recently created (2011) private, non-profit

Integrated Security Solutions (ISS)

Recently, former U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Stephen McFarland estimated - in an

IMPORTANT POINTS OF MENTION

2. Culture of Consequences. Latin American countries have struggled to establish a

3. Learn to Deal with Smart Evolving Criminals. The tactics utilized by

4. Strengthen Government Institutions. Increase efforts to strengthen democratic

5. Technological Intelligence. As human development initiatives are improved to

6. Ideological Divide. Rhetorical ideological differences among countries in the

7. Rethinking Tactics and Policies. Globalization has reduced the barriers to

8. Shared Responsibility. World governments have struggled immensely to curtail

9. Smarter Government and Private Sector Involvement. As a national and regional

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings: Alternatively Governed Spaces

Notions of ungoverned spaces or lawless areas increasingly have been seen as a

Develop an Inclusion Indicator by community. The Indicator should gauge the

Findings: Corruption and Politics

In addition to violence, corruption plays an integral role in undermining state

Urgently modify Campaign Financing norms to make contributions transparent and

Establish E-Government and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) strategies to

Findings: Potential State Failure

Create specialized Investigation and Prosecution units for the above-mentioned

Findings: Systematic and Structural Problems

Addressing the deteriorating security environment in the region is a complex and

Promote micro-financing and other market-based poverty reduction solutions to

Consideration of pay-per-performance or pay-per-qualifications should be

Revise criminal laws and punishments to strengthen consequences.

Promote awareness campaigns to inform citizens of the very real cost-benefits

Findings: Citizen Security

Citizen Security is fundamental and critical to success; therefore Safe City

Because violence burdens economic development and direct investment, reductions

Findings: Unbalanced Resource Allocation

There can be no regional integration without security and no security without

Findings: Neutralizing Criminal Organizations

Establish nationally dedicated Intervention Force - the equivalent of a Military

Another element that is essential is the creation of functioning institutions in the

Strategies in Central America must go beyond an effort to salvage judicial systems

Findings: Flourishing Informal and Shadow Economies

Although Central Americas organized crime problem cannot be reduced to drugs as

Findings: Raise the Sense of Urgency

Encourage the public to join the government in standing up to criminal

Findings: Quick Wins

Vetted specialized units capable of collecting actionable information and intelligence

Leverage the power of information to strengthen border security programs,

empower communities to recover spaces that are alternatively controlled and

Findings: Multilateral Alliances

Create and maintain a regional platform for information sharing in support of a

Findings: Territorial and Political Penetration

Findings: Gang Violence

Repression should be replaced by dialogue with gang leaders at their headquarters

Findings: Additional Resources

Develop an instrument to channel and manage financial contributions, ensuring