DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 205278, 21 July 2015, EN BANC (Leonen, J.)

This format is not the official format of UST Law Review. Nonetheless,
use this format just for this assignment. Utilize the Styles above for easy
editing. I created 4 Styles for this purpose Case Title, Citation, Issues/Ruling
Heading and Body.

This digest compilation is limited to Political Law cases only.

FACTS:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the
front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message IBASURA RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present
case. This tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote and lists
candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with a check mark, or (Pro-RH)
Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted
against it form Team Buhay.

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor

paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains
names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in
the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin
is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Courts
power of review.

2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.

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 3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private
citizens.

4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
tarpaulin violated petitioners fundamental right to freedom of
expression.

5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or

content-neutral regulation.

6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners right to property.

7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious
speech.

RULING:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of
prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by
this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review

when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual
or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the
discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it
cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of

whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits
on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.

A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no

constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies
subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this
court.

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 In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right
to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial
scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

SECOND ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative

remedies is not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is

clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by
either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may come
into the picture.

Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and

their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the election offense against
petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative

remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of
their freedom of speech.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to

support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.
However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and
political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any
political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the
enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-
candidate in this case.

FOURTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that every citizens expression with political

consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.

Moreover, the respondents argument that the tarpaulin is election

propaganda, being petitioners way of endorsing candidates who voted against
the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or
failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily

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mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in
return for consideration by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not

included, while sponsored messages are covered.

The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech

Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution

to public deliberation about some issue, fostering informed and civic minded
deliberation. On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as
speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction. The
expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely
political speech.

FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on

the subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time,
place, or manner of the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based.

The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity,

and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.

Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must

be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present
danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to
justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right
of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right
of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The
size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.

SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the
public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to
use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.

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 Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation
of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of
property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties
of due process and equal protection of the laws.

The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where
decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the
citizens private property. Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.

SEVENTH ISSUE: No.

The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners
are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as
to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

Doctrine of benevolent neutrality

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,

benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain
circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion
specifically into account not to promote the governments favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.

As Justice Brennan explained, the government may take religion into

account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental
regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.

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 HON. RAMON JESUS PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DENR SECRETARY
V. HON. TEODORO CASINO, ET AL.

FACTS:

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an

Environmental Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at
Subic, Zambales to be implemented by RP Energy.

Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of
Kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR
secretary on the ground that actual environmental damage will occur if the
power plant project is implemented and that the respondents failed to comply
with certain laws and rules governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and
amendments thereto.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and
invalidated the ECC. Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former
imputing error in invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the
determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond
the scope of a Petition for a Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is
entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the

issuance of a writ of Kalikasan; and

2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

RULING:

Ruling

1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7,
Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases)allow the
parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact and, thus, constitutes an
exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because of the extraordinary
nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan.

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 2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan
because such writ is principally predicated on an actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology,
which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends
political and territorial boundaries.

A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or

irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such
defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a
reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of
an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the
Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-
filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or
even attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere
listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.

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 REYNALDO JACOMILLE v. HON. JOSEPH EMILIO ABAYA

G.R. No. 212831, 22 April 2015, SECOND DIVISION (Mendoza, J.)

FACTS:

Recently, the LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate

Standardization Program (MVPSP) to supply the new license plates for both old
and new vehicle registrants. The DOTC published in newspapers of general
circulation the Invitation To Bid for the supply and delivery of motor vehicle
license plates for the MVPSP and stated that the source of funding in the
amount of P3,851,600,100.00 would be the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
However, a perusal of R.A. No. 10352 or the General Appropriations Act of
2013 (GAA 2013), would show that Congress appropriated only the amount of
P187,293,000.00 under the specific heading of Motor Vehicle Plate-Making
Project. The DOTC proceeded with the bidding process, but delayed in the
implementation of the project. The Senate Committee on Public Services
conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported delays in the release
of motor vehicle license plates, stickers and tags by the LTO.

Petitioner, by counsel and assisted by Retired Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing,

instituted this taxpayer suit, averring that he was a diligent citizen paying his
correct taxes to the Philippine Government regularly; that he was a registered
vehicle owner, as evidenced by the Certificate of Registration of his motor
vehicle and a registered licensed driver; that he would be affected by the
government issuance of vehicle plates thru its MVPSP upon his renewal of the
registration of his vehicle; that not being a participant to the bidding process,
he could not avail of the administrative remedies and procedure provided
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform
Act, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR); that as far as he was
concerned, there was no appeal or any plain or speedy remedy available to him.

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For the respondents, the OSG stated that the issues presented had been
rendered moot and academic as the gap in the budget of MVPSP was already
bridged and covered by the full and specific funding by GAA 2014 in the
amount of P4,843,753,000.00 for the item Motor Vehicle Registration and
Drivers Licensing Regulatory Services. With the signing of MVPSP on
February 21, 2014, after the enactment of GAA 2014, the OSG claimed that all
objections that petitioner might have, whether right or wrong, had been
rendered naught.

On the other hand, JKG-Power Plates averred that petitioner had no locus
standi. It pointed out that petitioner had admitted that he was not one of the
bidders in MVPSP and so he would not suffer any direct injury. Likewise, the
present case was not a proper subject of taxpayer suit because no taxes would
be spent for this project. The money to be paid for the plates would not come
from taxes, but from payments of vehicle owners, who would pay P450.00 for
every pair of motor vehicle license plate, and P120.00 for every motorcycle
license plate. Out of the P450.00, the cost of the motor vehicle plate would only
be P380.00. In effect, the government would even earn P70.00 from every pair
of plate.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic,
considering the assailed deficiencies in appropriation have been
substantially complied with.

2. Whether the petitioner has locus standi to bring his case in court.

3. Whether the petitioner established a taxpayers suit.

HELD:

1. NO.

The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication,
there must be an actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. The case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or
other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the
issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and

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an adjudication thereon would be of no practical u se or value as courts do not
sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. xxx Nevertheless, there were occasions in the past
when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered
those petitions moot and academic. After all, the moot and academic principle
is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third,
when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation .of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

In the case at bench, the issues presented must still be passed upon because
paramount public interest is involved and the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. MVPSP is a nationwide project which affects new and old
registrants of motor vehicles and it involves P3,851,600,100.00 of the
taxpayers money. Also, the act complained of is capable of repetition because
the procurement process under R.A. No. 9184 is regularly made by various
government agencies. Hence, it is but prudent for the Court to rule on the
substantial merits of the case.

2. YES.

Locus standi is defined as the right of appearance in a court of justice on a

given question. The fundamental question is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

In the present case, petitioner justifies his locus standi by claiming that the
petition raises issues of transcendental importance and that he institutes the
same as a taxpayers suit. It must be noted that the Court has provided the
following instructive guides to determine whether a matter is of transcendental
importance, namely: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in
the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in the questions being raised.

Petitioner sufficiently showed that his case presents a matter of transcendental

importance based on the above-cited determinants. He elucidated that, first,
around P3.851 billion in public funds stood to be illegally disbursed; second,
the IRR of R.A. No. 9184 and R.A. No. 7718 were violated and the contract for
MVPSP was awarded to respondent JKG Power Plates despite the utter
disregard of the said laws; third, there was no other party with a more direct
and specific interest who had raised the issues therein; and fourth, MVPSP had

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a wide range of impact because all registered motor vehicles owners would be
affected.

3. YES.

A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.
Contrary to the assertion of JKG-Power Plates, MVPSP clearly involves the
expenditure of public funds. While the motor vehicle registrants will pay for the
license plates, the bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate that the
government shall bear the burden of paying for the project. Every portion of
the national treasury, when appropriated by Congress, must be properly
allocated and disbursed. Necessarily, an allegation that public funds in the
amount of P3.851 billion shall be used in a project that has undergone an
improper procurement process cannot be easily brushed off by the Court.

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE

TANON STRAIT v. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES

G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015, EN BANC (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)

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FACTS:

June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE,
entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102)
with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the
Taon Strait.

May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Taon
Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751
kilometers was also done to determine the areas underwater composition.

January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Taon Strait
(PAMB-Taon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the
Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably
recommended the approval of JAPEXs application for an ECC.

March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and
JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Taon Strait. Months
later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a
depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu
Province. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.

Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original
petitions both dated December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that
respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation
of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the service contract is prohibited on the ground that

there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions,
and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.

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RULING:

No, the disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of

indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree
No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted
by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production
of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or
foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people
and the revenues to the Philippine Government.

Contrary to the petitioners argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although

enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a
valid law unless otherwise repealed.

Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the

Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is
also possible, that construction should be preferred. This Court,
in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections expounding on this point,
pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should
be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than
the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute
must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon
which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this
energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed
by Congress, since the Taon Strait is a NIPAS area.

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