Kimia Inti PDF

Radiation
Protection
Infrastructure
PROCEEDINGS OF A SYMPOSIUM, MUNICH, 7-11 MAY 1990
I N T E R N A T I O N A L A T O M IC E N E R G Y AGE N CY , V I E N N A , 1990
RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
T h e fo llo w in g States a re M em b e rs o f th e In tern atio n al A to m ic E n e rg y A gency:
A FG H A N ISTA N HOLY SEE PERU

A LBA NIA HUN G ARY PH ILIPPIN ES
A LG ERIA ICELAN D POLAN D
A R G EN TIN A INDIA PO R TU G A L
A U STR A LIA IN DO N ESIA Q ATAR
AUSTRIA IR A N , ISLA M IC REPU B LIC O F RO M A N IA
BA NG LA D ESH IRAQ SA U D I ARABIA
BELGIU M IRELAN D SEN EG A L
BOLIVIA ISRA EL SIERRA LE O N E
BR A ZIL ITA LY SIN G A PO R E
BU LG ARIA JAM A ICA SO U TH A FR IC A
BY ELO RU SSIA N SO V IET JAPA N SPAIN
SO C IA LIST R EPU BLIC JORD A N SRI LANKA
CA M E R O O N KENYA SUD A N
CA N A D A K O REA , R EPU BLIC O F S W ED EN
C H ILE KUW AIT SW ITZ ER LA N D
CH IN A LEBANON SYRIA N A RAB R EPU B LIC
CO LO M BIA LIBERIA TH A ILA N D
CO ST A RICA LIBYAN ARAB JA M A H IR IY A TU N ISIA
C O T E D IV O IR E LIE C H TEN STEIN TU RK EY
CUBA LU X EM BOU RG U GA N DA
CY PRU S M AD A G A SCA R U KRA IN IAN SO V IET SOCIA LIST
CZECH O SLO V A K IA M ALAYSIA R EPU BLIC
D EM O C R A TIC K A M PU C H EA M ALI U NIO N O F SO V IET SOCIA LIST
D EM O C R A TIC P E O P L E S M AU RITIU S R EPU BLICS
REPU B LIC O F KOREA M EX ICO U N IT ED ARAB EM IRA TES
D EN M A RK M O N A CO U N IT ED K IN G D O M O F G R EA T
D O M IN IC A N REPU BLIC M ONGOLIA BRITA IN A N D N O R TH ER N
EC U A D O R M OROCCO IR EL A N D
EG Y PT M YA N M A R U N IT ED REPU B LIC OF
EL SALV A D O R NAM IBIA TA N ZA N IA
ETH IO PIA N ETH ER L A N D S U N IT ED STA TES O F A M ERICA
FIN L A N D N EW ZEALAN D U R U G U AY
FR A N C E NICARA G UA V E N EZU ELA
GABON N IGER V IE T NAM
G ERM A N Y NIGERIA Y U G O SLAV IA
GHANA NORW AY ZA IR E
GREECE PAKISTAN ZA M BIA
G U A TEM A LA PAN A M A ZIM BA BW E
H AITI PARA G UA Y
The Agencys Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the
IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957. The Head
quarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is to accelerate and enlarge the
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world .
IAEA, 1990
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obtained by writing to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100,
A-1400 Vienna, Austria.
Printed by the IAEA in Austria
November 1990
PROCEEDINGS SERIES
RADIATION PROTECTION
INFRASTRUCTURE
PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

ON RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
ORGANIZED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
AND HELD IN MUNICH, 7-11 MAY 1990
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA, 1990
IAEA, VIENNA, 1990
STI/PUB/840
ISBN 92-0-020390-6
ISSN 0074-1884
FOREWORD
A prerequisite for the safe use of ionizing radiation in a country is the

availability o f an adequate infrastructure to achieve the desired degree of protection.
The extent o f such an infrastructure, generally comprising regulatory mechanisms
and technical capabilities for application and enforcement of regulations, has to be
commensurate with the stage o f technological development. The expanding
application of ionizing radiation in medicine, industry and research calls for vigorous
promotion o f effective radiation protection efforts, not only to prevent any unsafe
practices but also to assess correctly and provide authoritative information on the
safety of adopted practices.
Experience reveals that radiation protection practices vary considerably from
one country to another. The regulatory structures and type o f organization with
regard to radiation protection are very different, depending on a number o f factors
such as the constitutional framework, the legal and administrative systems of the
country concerned, the state of technical development, the status of application of
radiation sources, the existence o f research and associated institutions, and the tech
nical skills and financial resources available. Radiation protection principles evolve
with time as further experience is gained and as new research evidence becomes
available. Regulation o f radiation protection has to take account o f such changes and
adapt to changing conditions.
It was considered timely to convene an international symposium to review
experience gained in Member States with existing infrastructures for ensuring
radiation safety and to discuss how safety standards can most effectively be applied
in the national context. Upon the invitation o f the Government o f the Federal
Republic of Germany, the symposium was held in Munich from 7 to 11 May 1990.
It was hosted by the Institut fr Reaktorsicherheit. Some 120 experts from 45 coun
tries and several international organizations participated.
The IAEA is grateful to the Government o f the Federal Republic of Germany
for its kind offer to act as host and for the provision o f additional funding that enabled
the IAEA to broaden the participation of experts from developing countries in this
meeting. Thanks are due to the local Liaison Officer, Dr. J. Dumm, and his staff
from the Institut fr Reaktorsicherheit, whose co-operation in the organization of the
symposium helped greatly in ensuring its success. The generous hospitality extended
by Minister Alfred Dick, Bavarian State Government, Ministry for Regional
Development and Environmental Matters, is highly appreciated.
Forty-eight papers from 29 Member States and two International Organizations
were presented in nine scientific sessions. Topics included radiation protection regu
lation and licensing notification, registration, inspection and control programmes,
education and training, the role o f supporting institutions such as national laborato
ries and research institutes, the role of professional associations, the contribution of
radiation protection services, and international activities. A concluding panel
addressed development strategies to strengthen radiation protection infrastructure
and explored how the IAEA could best assist to overcome identified shortcomings.
The Proceedings include the full texts o f papers presented and a summary of
the panel discussion. It is hoped that the publication will be useful in promoting
awareness o f national approaches that have proved effective and foster co-operation
among Member States towards further strengthening national radiation protection
regimes in order to keep safety measures commensurate with technical development.
E D IT O R I A L N O T E
The papers have been edited by the editorial staff o f the International Atomic Energy
Agency to the extent considered necessary fo r the readers assistance. The views expressed
and the general style adopted remain, however, the responsibility o f the named authors or p a r
ticipants. In addition, the views are not necessarily those o f the governments o f the nominating
Member States o r o f the nominating organizations.
The use in these Proceedings o f particular designations o f countries o r territories does
not imply any judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal status o f such countries
or territories, o f their authorities and institutions or o f the delimitation o f their boundaries.
The mention o f specific companies or o f their products or brand names does not imply
any endorsement or recommendation on the p a rt o f the IAEA.
Authors are themselves responsible fo r obtaining the necessary permission to reproduce
copyright material from other sources.
CONTENTS
REGULATION AND LICENSING (Sessions I and )
Regulation o f radiation exposure by the United States Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (IAEA-SM-309/9) ......................................................................... 3
D .A . Cool, H .T . P eterson, Jr.
Organizacin del sistema regulatorio argentino (IAEA-SM-309/25) ............. 11
E. Palacios, A. B iaggio
Legislacin espaola en materia de proteccin radiolgica (IAEA-SM-309/1) 21
B. de la S e m a , M. B ezares, P. Lopez-Franco
United Kingdom radiation protection legislation and its ability to
respond to change (IAEA-SM-309/46) ............................................................ 27
P.F. B eaver
Licensing and inspection of radioisotopes and radiation generating
equipment: The Italian regulatory system (IAEA-SM-309/16) ................... 37
F. D obici, E. Sgrilli
Granting licences for work with radioactive materials or ionizing
radiation in Bulgaria (IAEA-SM-309/41) ........................................................ 47
T.E. Todorov, H. Stoilova
Licencias de construccin y operacin para plantas industriales
de irradiacin (IAEA-SM-309/24) ..................................................................... 51
L. B urgos, E. M oschella
Gestin de autorizacin de instalaciones radiactivas relevantes en Chile
(IAEA-SM-309/60) ............................................................................................... 63
P. Ferruz
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commissions enforcement
programme (IAEA-SM-309/8) ............................................................................ 77
J. Lieberm an
Le service de contrle physique de lentreprise, pivot de la rglementation
belge (IAEA-SM-309/81) ..................................................................................... 89
J.-P . Sam ain, P. Stallaert
Procedures for the approval o f consumer goods containing radioactive
substances (IAEA-SM-309/29) ........................................................................... 101
R .A . P aynter, A .D . Wrixon
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES (Sessions III and IV)
Infrastructure and regulatory control for radiation protection in the

nuclear industry in India (IAEA-SM-309/49) ................................ 115
T.N. Krishnam urthi, S. Som asundaram , A .K . D e
La proteccin radiolgica en Cuba: particularidades, resultados y
perspectivas (IAEA-SM-309/73) ....................................................................... 131
A. V. B ilbao, L .A . Jova, J.R . Quevedo
Control o f radioactive materials in Canada (IAEA-SM-309/42) ................... 145
W.R. Brown
La radioprotection en Tunisie: Etat actuel et problmes (IAEA-SM-309/23) 163
S. M tim et, H .A . G harbi, K. Abdelali, J.-C . Vicel, M .J. G hezaiel,
H. M ahjoubi-C harni, A. A bboudi
The system o f radiation protection applied in Czechoslovakia
(IAEA-SM-309/32) ............................................................................................... 171
E. K unz
Experiencia de Guatemala en el fortalecimiento de la infraestructura
para la proteccin radiolgica (IAEA-SM-309/28) ...................................... 177
R .E . Pineda

(IAEA-SM -309/33) ...................................... 185
. . , . . , . . ,
. . - , . . , . .
(.National radiation safety regulations and standards fo r w ork with
radioactive substances a nd other ionizing radiation sources:
L .A . Buldakov, G .M . A vetisov, E .V . D evyatajkin, I.B . Keirim -M arkus,
V .V Kopaev, O.I. Shamov)
Radiation protection infrastructure and regulatory activities in Bangladesh
(IAEA-SM-309/26) ............................................................................................... 203
M .A . R ab M olla, F. A. K han
Radiation protection infrastructure in Israel (IAEA-SM-309/18) ................... 213
T. Schlesinger, Y. Sham ai, S. B renner
Some essential components of the radiation protection infrastructure
in Hungary (IAEA-SM-309/64) ........................................................................ 217
B .L . Sztanyik
Radiation protection infrastructure in Thailand (IAEA-SM-309/48) ............. 233
C. Krailaksanaw arapar
Strengthening the radiation protection infrastructure in Ghana
(IAEA-SM-309/40) .............................................................................................. 237
C. Schandorf, N .A . Abora VII, G. E m i-Reynolds, E .O . D arko
Radiation protection infrastructure in Iran (IAEA-SM-309/53) .................... 245
M. Sohrabi
Policy, infrastructure and training in radiation protection for the
health services of developing countries (IAEA-SM-309/51) ...................... 257
S. Christofides, A. M allouppas
EDUCATION AND TRAINING (Session V)
Radiation protection in Italy: Education and training (IAEA-SM-309/17) ... 265

G. M altoni G iacom elli

(IAEA-SM -309/34) ............................................. 273
B . . , . . , . . , . .
(System o f unified program m es f o r post-diplom a training o f doctors
a n d other health specialists in radiation safety a n d hygiene: V. V. Kopaev,
N .P . M ashchenko, V.Ya. Golikov, V.l. U so ltsev)
Federal support for health physics education in the USA
(IAEA-SM-309/22) ............................................................................................... 281
R .C . W illiamson
Training and support for the radiation protection adviser in the United
Kingdom national health service (IAEA-SM-309/37) ................................... 285
P .J. R oberts, R .M . H arrison
PERSONNEL DOSIMETRY SERVICES (Session VI)
The national dose registry as a new instrument in the control o f occupational

radiation exposures in Switzerland (IAEA-SM-309/7) .................................. 293
M. M oser
Nationwide quality assurance and control of Italian personal dosimetry
services (IAEA-SM-309/15) ................................... ........................................... 301
A. Cavallini, V. K lam ert
The Health and Safety Executives approval scheme for dosimetry
services under the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1985: Inspection of
dosimetry services (IAEA-SM-309/31) ............................................................ 311
D .N . Sim ister, E .A . W ojcikiewicz
CONTROL PROGRAMMES (Session VII)
Establishing a comprehensive radiation control programme

(IAEA-SM-309/10) ............................................................................................... 323
C. K am m erer
A new system for the control o f environmental radioactivity in Italy
(IAEA-SM-309/11) ............................................................................................... 333
G. Cam pos Venuti, S. P ierm attei, S. R isica, A. Susanna
A database for the national radiation control programme in medical and
dental radiography (IAEA-SM-309/50) ............................................................ 341
J.E . Peixoto, M .C . Cam pos, R .Q . Chaves
Optimization o f radiation protection in diagnostic radiology
(IAEA-SM-309/21) ............................................................................................... 351
S. G rapengiesser, W. L eitz
The system o f controls on radiation sources in a small non-nuclear
country, with selected radiation incidents and their prevention or
control by regulatory or other means (IAEA-SM-309/56) .......................... 365
A. C. M cEwan
The national control system o f sealed radioactive sources in Hungary
(IAEA-SM-309/35) ............. .................................................................................. 375
T. Bir, F. G older, 1. N dasi
SERVICES AND SPECIAL ISSUES (Session VIII)
National radiation protection services in developing countries and the role

o f IAEA support (IAEA-SM-309/39) ............................................................... 383
I. Othman

(IAEA-SM -309/76) ......................... 391
. . , . .
(Radiation safety f o r p ersonnel in nuclear fa cilities in the USSR:
A .F . L yzlov, A .P . Panfilov)
Radiation protection infrastructure o f a university research reactor
institute (IAEA-SM-309/61) ............................................................................... 403
M. Tschurlovits

(IAEA-SM -309/74) ............................................................................................... 411
. .
(Optimum structure fo r a radiation safety service: Yu. V. Sivintsev)

(IAEA-SM -309/75) ............................................................................ 421
. . , . . , . .
(Radiation safety under extrem e conditions: L.F . Belovodskij,
V.l. G rishm anovskij, A .P . Panfilov)
The development o f a regulatory view o f the use o f respiratory protective
equipment in radiological protection in the United Kingdom
(IAEA-SM-309/36) ............................................................................................... 439
M .L . Bacon
The role o f radiation protection societies: the example o f the German-Swiss
Fachverband fr Strahlenschutz (IAEA-SM-309/55) ..................................... 447
H .H . B runner
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES (Session IX)
National and international radiation protection standards to supplement

laws and regulations (IAEA-SM-309/44) ......................................................... 463
K. B ecker
Information de la population en radioprotection dans la Communaut
europenne: L action de la Commission des Communauts
europennes (IAEA-SM-309/38) .................................................................. . 471
H. E riskat, J.-M . Courades
Radiation protection activities under a Regional Co-Operative Agreement
(RCA) (IAEA-SM-309/82) .................................................................................. 483
S. Kobayashi
Panel: The Role o f the IAEA in Strengthening Radiation Protection

Infrastructures ........................................................................................................ 489
List o f Chairmen and Secretariat o f the Symposium ......................................... 497
List o f Participants ..................................................................................................... 499
Author Index ................................................................................................................ 509
Transliteration Index .................................................................................................. 510
Index of Papers by Number ..................................................................................... 511
REGULATION AND LICENSING
(Sessions I and II)
Chairman (Session I)
B. EDER
Federal Republic of Germany
Chairman (Session II)
B. CASTAGNET
France
IAEA-SM-309/9
REGULATION OF RADIATION EXPOSURE

BY THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
D .A . COOL, H.T. PETERSON, Jr.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, D .C .,
United States of America
Abstract
REGULATION OF RADIATION EXPOSURE BY THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION.
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) has legal authority for
the regulation of nuclear reactor safety and for regulating the use of certain radioactive
materials within the USA and its territories. Under this authority, the USNRC regulates the
design, building, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear reactors and the possession, use,
disposal of uranium and thorium (source materials), plutonium and enriched uranium (special
nuclear materials) and fission or neutron activation products (by-product materials). This
process is accomplished through regulations and regulatory guidance, by reactor and material
licensing, and by an active inspection and enforcement programme. Persons designing, build
ing, operating, or decommissioning a nuclear reactor or possessing, using or disposing of
source, by-product, or special nuclear materials are required to have a licence from the
USNRC. The licensing process provides the primary control against such facilities or
materials being used in an inappropriate manner or by unqualified persons so as to produce
a hazard to public health and safety. A USNRC licence is granted only after it is determined
that the proposed application can be conducted in a safe manner and that the persons responsi
ble for the operation are sufficiently trained and qualified to ensure safe operation. In addition
to licensing, safety is assured by an active inspection and enforcement programme to detect
any violations of the USNRCs regulations or requirements written into the specific licence
(licence condition or technical specification).
1. INTRODUCTION
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) was created by the Energy

Reorganization Act of 1974, which dissolved the former US Atomic Energy
Commission and created the USNRC and the Energy Research & Development
Administration (ERDA, now the US Department of Energy). The Commission is a
five member body appointed by the President o f the USA with approval o f the
US Senate (the upper house of the US Congress). One o f these commissioners is
designated as the Chairman and heads the USNRC.
3
4 COOL and PETERSON
Reporting to the Commission is the Office o f the Executive Director for Opera
tions (EDO) who is responsible for the day-to-day operations o f the agency, prepar
ing proposed policies and regulations, and the majority o f the USNRC staff (the total
staff o f the USNRC in 1989 was equivalent to about 3200 full time employees).
Under the direction o f the EDO, the Offices o f Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
and Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) are responsible for program
matic guidance and for the licensing o f facilities. The majority of the inspection
activities, and most o f the radioactive materials licensing, are carried out by five
regional offices near or in: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago,
Illinois; Dallas, Texas; and San Francisco, California. The Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research (RES) is responsible for the agencys research efforts in nuclear
safety and radiation protection and also functions as the focal point for standards
development and regulatory guidance.
The Office o f the General Counsel provides legal review and advice for the
rest o f the agency. The Office o f Governmental and Public Affairs co-ordinates most
of the USNRCs external contacts, including those with State and local governments,
and Indian tribes; international affairs (including those involving the IAEA), con
gressional relations (providing an interface with the congressional committees that
oversee the USNRCs budget and operations), and public affairs (public and media
information such as press releases). The Office o f the Inspector General provides
auditing and inspection o f USNRC staff and USNRC contractor activities.
2. REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDANCE FOR RADIATION PROTECTION
2.1. USNRC regulations
The basic USNRC requirements for radiation protection are contained in Chap
ter I o f Title 10 o f the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). These regulations in
Title 10 have the force o f law, and compliance with them is required.
Title 10 is subdivided into Parts which contain general requirements for all
licensees (such as the Commissions regulations for radiation protection in 10 CFR
Part 20) or specific requirements for a certain class of licensee (e.g. 10 CFR Part 35
provides specific requirements for the medical administration of source, by-product,
or special nuclear materials for treatment or therapy). Radiation protection require
ments are primarily specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Standards for Protection Against
Radiation. The USNRC is considering a complete revision o f 10 CFR Part 20 incor
porating the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) system of
dose limitation given in ICRP Publication 26 [1]. This revision will be discussed in
a following section.
These regulations are issued in final or effective form only after a process of
public review and comment has been carried out. The process under which this is
IAEA-SM-309/9 5
carried out is a statutory requirement o f the Administrative Procedures Act (5 USC

551-553). This process calls for the publication o f the substance o f the proposed rule
with ample time to give all interested parties a chance to present their views. This
can be done by submitting written comments or participating in a public hearing or
public meeting if one is held.
2.2. Regulatory Guides
The USNRC regulations contain the basic requirements that must be met.
However, they do not contain specific directions on how to meet these requirements
(such as analytical procedures to measure a specific radionuclide). This level of
specification is avoided, because it would hinder the application o f analytical or cal-
culational methods that may be better suited to a particular situation or facility, or
might hinder a more recent and better method o f demonstrating compliance with the
regulation. Guidance on how to comply with the regulations is provided in the form
o f Regulatory Guides.
In general these Regulatory Guides specify one or more methods o f showing
compliance with the regulations that would be considered acceptable by the USNRC
staff. However, the licensee may propose an alternative method which could be
acceptable to the USNRC staff if this method can provide the same level of perfor
mance. The advantage to the licensees of using the method in the Regulatory Guide
is that they know it will be acceptable to the USNRC staff without detailed review;
whereas an alternative method would require review by the USNRC staff before its
acceptability could be determined. The Regulatory Guides do not have the force of
law and are not binding on a licensee unless the licensee commits himself to follow
a particular Regulatory Guide as one o f the conditions of his or her licence.
Regulatory Guides are used to provide guidance on: (1) the contents of submit
tals to the USNRC (such as licence applications), (2) methods o f measuring radio
nuclide concentrations and measuring or calculating radiation doses, (3) performance
specifications for radiation monitoring and dosimetry devices, and (4) other areas
where licensees have frequently asked for more information or for clarifications. A
topic affecting only a few licensees would normally be resolved on a case specific
basis, as the Regulatory Guides are used primarily for generic issues. The Regula
tory Guides are prepared by the USNRC staff (often with the assistance o f experts
in specialized areas). Similar to regulations, Regulatory Guides are initially issued
in a draft form for public comment. The final or effective version o f a Regulatory
Guide is not issued until after the public comments on a draft have been considered.
There are ten categories or divisions o f Regulatory Guides. Radiation Protec
tion guidance is contained in Division 1 (Power Reactors), Division 3 (Fuels and
Materials Facilities), Division 4 (Environment), Division 8 (Occupational Health),
and Division 10 (General). Copies of individual guides are sold by the US Govern
ment Printing Office (GPO) and a standing order to receive new or updated guides
6 COOL and PETERSON
for a particular division can be made through the National Technical Information
Service (NTIS).
2.3. Branch Technical Positions
A third category o f information provided to licensees is termed Branch

Technical Positions. These documents are more informal than either regulations or
Regulatory Guides and are used to provide licensees with guidance on what consti
tutes good practice acceptable to the staff (e.g. the elements of an acceptable environ
mental surveillance programme for nuclear power reactors). These positions are
binding on the licensee if they are incorporated into a licence condition or technical
specification.
2.4. Technical reports (NUREG reports)
A fourth category of guidance provided to licensees is through the dissemina

tion o f technical analyses prepared by the staff or by USNRC contractors (including
national laboratories) or the results o f research studies carried out under contract to
the USNRC. These reports are available for sale from the NTIS. Although the use
o f the methods in these technical (NUREG) reports is not required, the reports can
serve as a basis for supporting adoption of that method by a licensee. These reports
receive limited review (primarily within the originating institution and the USNRC).
However, open publication of these studies in a peer reviewed journal is advocated.
3. REVISION OF 10 CFR PART 20
3.1. History
The efforts o f the USNRC to put in place the recommendations o f the ICRP
were initiated shortly after the appearance of ICRP Publication 26 [1]. Several task
groups were formed early in 1978 to review these ICRP recommendations and to
begin formulating a plan to incorporate them into the USNRCs regulations. In 1980,
the USNRC issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [2]. This document
raised a number o f questions regarding the new concepts in ICRP Publication 26 and
solicited public comments on these concepts and on the other topics that NRC was
proposing to incorporate into the revision of Part 20.
In the light of a review of the public comments, a draft regulation based upon
the ICRP recommendations was prepared and was subject to extensive internal
USNRC review. This review was followed by the publication o f the proposed
rule [3]. A 250 day public comment period was provided to permit public comments
to be obtained. Over 800 sets o f comments were received. These comments were
IAEA-SM-309/9 7
carefully reviewed and evaluated and provided the basis for preparing final recom
mendations to the Commission, including the revised 10 CFR Part 20. This revised
rule is currently being evaluated by the Commission.
3.2. Content of the revised 10 CFR Part 20 rule
The revised Part 20 adopts the framework o f the 1977 recommendations o f the
ICRP, incorporating concepts such as the effective dose equivalent, the committed
dose equivalent, planned special exposures, and the recommended dose limits. The
revised rule also incorporates the updated and revised metabolic, dosimetric and
physiological models and parameters associated with ICRP Publication 30 [4] and
its supplements and ICRP 48 [5], in the form o f annual limits on intake, derived air
concentrations and revised air, water, and sewer effluent concentrations.
There are some differences between the provisions o f the revised Part 20 and
those in ICRP Publication 26. One o f the major but less obvious differences is that
the 1 mSv annual limit for members o f the public applies only to the dose from
sources under a licensees control. While the ICRP recommendation is intended to
apply to the total dose from all sources o f radiation (excluding undisturbed natural
background and radiation received as a patient), the probability o f significant
exposures from multiple facilities is small and it is difficult to evaluate exposure of
adjacent members of the public from all other sources beyond those that the licensee
is responsible for.
The provision allowing doses up to 5 mSv in a year is also slightly different.
We believe that the ICRP had intended that the limit for long term continuous
exposures should average out to below 1 mSv per year, but that operation up to
5 mSv per year might be permitted for a limited time and for an adequate reason.
However, we are requiring the licensee to apply for permission to use the higher
limit. This application should set forth the reason why the regular limit cannot be
met, the length o f the time period for which the higher level is needed, and the proce
dures to be used to ensure that the resultant doses are as low as is reasonably
achievable.
A second difference from the 1977 ICRP recommendations is the dose limit
for protection o f an embryo/foetus. The 1977 ICRP recommended limit was 15 mSv
over the period of gestation. We adopt a value o f 5 mSv, consistent with the recom
mendations o f the US National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements [6, 7].
Because the new ICRP system o f dose limitation operates on limiting the sum
o f internal and external doses, there is a greater equality implied in controlling both
sources of exposure. Consequently, the former protection philosophy, which placed
more emphasis on reducing internal exposures and radionuclide intakes than on
reducing external doses and increasing shielding, has been replaced with a
philosophy o f minimizing the total exposures consistent with ALARA (as low as
8 COOL and PETERSON
reasonably achievable) considerations (cost, effectiveness, level of risk). This

approach entails permitting previously prohibited practices, such as allowing an
employee to enter an airborne radioactivity area without respiratory protection, if it
can be demonstrated beforehand that the total effective dose equivalent (our term for
the sum o f the deep dose equivalent from external radiation and the committed effec
tive dose equivalent from internal exposure) is less than would occur if the
respiratory protection were worn.
4. PROBLEMS IN ADOPTING THE ICRP RECOMMENDATIONS IN A

REGULATORY SYSTEM
As the USNRC developed its proposed revision of 10 CFR Part 20, a number
of problems with implementation o f the ICRP recommendations were encountered.
These problems are related to the necessity of translating recommendations o f good
radiation protection practice into requirements that can be inspected and enforced in
a regulatory scheme.
One particular problem was translation of the optimization principle into a
regulatory requirement. Optimization in the USA represents the efforts undertaken
to conduct operations so that exposures are as low as reasonably achievable
(ALARA). There is no specific requirement in the proposed revision to 10 CFR Part
20 for quantitative optimization analyses. However, there is a requirement for the
licensee to have a documented radiation protection programme, and, as one part of
the programme, to use, to the extent practicable, procedures and engineering con
trols based upon sound radiation protection principles to ensure that occupational
doses and doses to members of the public are as low as is reasonably achievable .
We believe that this approach provides an appropriate requirement that can be
enforced by the USNRC while at the same time allowing for both quantitative and
qualitative approaches to reducing exposures.
Another potential problem with dose limits is attempting to implement a limit
which is defined as an average annual dose or as a cumulative dose delivered over
several years. Compliance with a limit that is based upon a moving average is
difficult to assess because the determination o f compliance requires future conditions
which are yet to occur to be satisfied. A similar difficulty is associated with other
recommendations where the limit is represented by a moving average.
A third difficulty was the introduction of a number of new terms to the regula
tory scheme. In general, we have found that changes to terms make acceptance of
the proposal more difficult to explain and defend to both technical individuals and
members o f the public.
In general, the proposed revision of 10 CFR Part 20 adopts the recommenda
tions o f the ICRP and will establish a revised framework for radiation protection for
IAEA-SM-309/9 9
licensees o f the USNRC. Although it involved difficulties, we believe that the public
comment process was a real benefit in this regard, and contributed to obtaining a
sound basis for regulation.
REFERENCES
[1] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Recom

mendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP
Publication No. 26, Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York (1977).
[2] UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Standards for pro
tection against radiation; advance notice of proposed rulemaking, Fed. Regist. 45
(1980) 18029.
[3] UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Standards for pro
tection against radiation; proposed rule, Fed. Regist. 51 (1986) 1092.
[4] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Limits
for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers, ICRP Publication No. 30, Pergamon Press,
Oxford and New York (1979).
[5] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, The
Metabolism of Plutonium and Related Elements, ICRP Publication No. 48, Pergamon
Press, Oxford and New York (1986).
[6] UNITED STATES NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND
MEASUREMENTS, Review of NCRP Radiation Dose Limit for Embryo and Fetus in
Occupationally Exposed Women, Rep, 53, NCRP, Bethesda, MD (1977).
[7] UNITED STATES NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND
MEASUREMENTS, Recommendations on Limits for Exposure to Ionizing Radiation,
Rep. 91, NCRP, Bethesda, MD (1987).
IAEA-SM-309/25
ORGANIZACION DEL SISTEMA

REGULATORIO ARGENTINO
E. PALACIOS, A. BIAGGIO
Comisin Nacional de Energa Atmica,
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Abstract-Resumen
ORGANIZATION OF THE ARGENTINE REGULATORY SYSTEM.
Regulatory activities were begun in Argentina in 1958. As nuclear activities expanded,
the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) adapted its structure to ensure the neces
sary independence of regulatory functions from the promotion, production and use of radio
active materials. The paper starts with a brief historical account and then describes the role
of the CNEA as the regulatory authority and comments on the development of liability con
cepts. Finally, it describes the present licensing system and the structure of the regulatory
framework.
ORGANIZACION DEL SISTEMA REGULATORIO ARGENTINO.

Las actividades regulatorias se iniciaron en Argentina en 1958. A medida que las
actividades nucleares fueron creciendo, la Comisin Nacional de Energa Atmica (CNEA)
fue adecuando su estructura de manera de asegurar la necesaria independencia entre las fun
ciones regulatorias y las de promocin, produccin y uso de materiales radiactivos. El
presente trabajo, luego de una breve resea histrica, describe el papel de la CNEA como
Autoridad Regulatoria y comenta la evolucin de los conceptos de responsabilidad. Por
ltimo, se detalla el sistema de autorizaciones vigente y se describe la estructura de la rama
regulatoria.
1. INTRODUCCION
En 1950, cuando se crea la Comisin Nacional de Energa Atmica (CNEA),

se estableci por ley que una de sus funciones especficas era controlar las investiga
ciones atmicas oficiales y privadas que se efectuaran en el territorio nacional.
Posteriormente, diversas normas legales fueron precisando la competencia de la
CNEA como Autoridad en materia nuclear, particularmente en todo aquello que
hiciera a la proteccin de los individuos y de su medio ambiente contra los efectos
de las radiaciones ionizantes y la seguridad de las instalaciones. Slo queda excluido
del control de la CNEA el uso de generadores de rayos X, que es competencia del
Ministerio de Salud.
11
12 PALACIOS y BIAGGIO
La CNEA fue adecuando su estructura a medida que fueron creciendo las

actividades nucleares, de manera de asegurar las funciones de Autoridad fis-
calizadora con plena independencia de los usuarios y promotores de los usos de tc
nicas nucleares.
Desde el inicio se consider que la eficacia en el desempeo de las funciones
regulatorias requera disponer de suficiente conocimiento tcnico-cientfico como
para juzgar con real independencia el diseo, la construccin, la operacin y la
clausura de las instalaciones sujetas a control.
Dentro de ese marco, la estrategia global del sistema regulatorio se concentra
en los siguientes aspectos bsicos:
a) Investigacin y desarrollo de los aspectos cientfico-tcnicos asociados con la

seguridad radiolgica y nuclear;
b) Realizacin independiente de estudios y anlisis de seguridad radiolgica y
nuclear para el proceso de licnciamiento de isntalaciones relevantes;
c) Inspecciones y auditoras regulatorias para la verificacin del cumplimiento de
las licencias y autorizaciones;
d) Capacitacin de personal en aspectos de seguridad radiolgica y nuclear, tanto
del personal responsable de la seguridad radiolgica de las prcticas sujetas a
control como del personal que desempea actividades regulatorias.
2. RESEA HISTORICA
Por Decreto 10936/50 se estableci como funcin especfica de la CNEA

el control de las investigaciones atmicas oficiales y privadas que se efectuaran en
el territorio nacional. Posteriormente, diversos decretos y leyes fueron precisando
la competencia de la CNEA como Autoridad en materia nuclear, particularmente en
todo aquello que hiciera a la proteccin de los individuos y de su medio ambiente
contra los efectos de las radiaciones ionizantes y a la seguridad de las instalaciones.
Las normas fundamentales son el Decreto Ley 22498/56, ratificado por
Ley 14467, y el Decreto 842/58.
Las actividades efectivas de control se iniciaron en el pas en 1958. Al mismo
tiempo se desarrollaron estudios ambientales para analizar el movimiento de material
radiactivo proveniente del fallout , lo que permiti conocer los parmetros de
transferencia en las cadenas alimenticias y establecer criterios para limitar las des
cargas de material radiactivo al ambiente, mucho antes que se llevaran a cabo
actividades nucleares significativas en Argentina.
Tambin en esa poca se inici el dictado de cursos de capacitacin en
seguridad radiolgica para usuarios de materiales radiactivos en la industria, medi
cina e investigacin y se estableci el sistema de control de estas actividades. El sis
tema de control, ya en aquella poca, inclua actividades de licnciamiento, de
IAEA-SM-309/25 13
evaluacin de diseos y de operacin, el anlisis de accidentes y la realizacin de

inspecciones regulatorias. Hacia aquella poca se remonta tambin la prestacin de
los primeros servicios de monitoraje individual, y el inicio de acciones para controlar
y acondicionar fuentes radiactivas en desuso o cuyo uso estaba, ya entonces,
injustificado (p. ej. emanadores de radn 222).
Posteriormente, en 1965, se reglament el sistema de sanciones adminis
trativas, el cual acta como ltimo eslabn de la cadena de control, pues permite
expulsar del sistema a aquellos casos extremos que as lo justifiquen.
3. ROL DE LA CNEA
A medida que las actividades nucleares se fueron incrementando, la CNEA fue

adecuando su estructura de Autoridad fiscalizadora. En este sentido es importante
resaltar que se ha analizado en profundidad el supuesto problema relacionado con
el hecho de que la CNEA promueve el uso de radistopos y radiaciones en distintos
mbitos, e incluso en algunos casos disea y opera instalaciones y, por otra parte,
fiscaliza la seguridad de las mismas. Como resultado de esas discusiones se concluy
que la independencia necesaria para ejercer estas funciones no se alcanza por el solo
hecho de definir un organismo autnomo con competencia legal en el tema.
El organismo de control slo es independiente cuando posee capacidad
cientfico-tcnica suficiente para juzgar con independencia el diseo, la construc
cin, la operacin y el desmantelamiento de las instalaciones. Tal capacidad tcnica
independiente requiere suficiente personal altamente capacitado y recursos
econmicos, equipos e instalaciones adecuados. En el caso particular de tecnologas
avanzadas, como la nuclear, tambin se requieren medios que permiten asegurar que
las actividades de control evolucionan de acuerdo con los avances tecnolgicos en
el rea.
La rama regulatoria de la CNEA se ha desempeado siempre con gran
independencia tcnica de las actividades sujetas a control y actualmente cuenta con
alrededor de 250 profesionales y tcnicos y ms de 3000 m 2 de laboratorios y ofi
cinas de estudio. Adems de mantener una activa vinculacin con otros sectores de
la CNEA de investigacin y desarrollo, no vinculados con las instalaciones a licen
ciar, dispone de mltiples acuerdos con otras organizaciones tcnicas del pas que
le permiten acceder a los servicios de consultores especializados en reas no directa
mente cubiertas por sus especialistas, tales como anlisis ssmicos, materiales, anli
sis dinmico de estructuras, etc.
4. RESPONSABILIDADES
En 1958, la envergadura y complejidad de las instalaciones en operacin en

Argentina eran tales que no se conceban accidentes con un gran impacto radiolgico
en le pblico. En aquella poca se hizo recaer la responsabilidad de la seguridad

radiolgica de las instalaciones o prcticas en una persona (ahora llamado Respon
sable Primario ), generalmente el Jefe de la instalacin, quien por s mismo, con
el concurso de su personal y contratando servicios de terceros (por ejemplo
monitoraje individual), desarrollaba todas las tareas inherentes a la seguridad radio
lgica. Se exiga que esta persona estuviese adecuadamente capacitada y se le
extenda una licencia o permiso individual que acreditaba tal capacitacin.
Cuando el diseo, construccin y pruebas preoperacionales de una instalacin resul
taban satisfactorios, se extenda la correspondiente licencia o autorizacin de opera
cin, la cual estaba condicionada a que operara bajo la direccin de un Responsable
Primario debidamente autorizado.
Si bien estos conceptos son an esencialmente vlidos para instalaciones de
escasa envergadura, varios refinamientos se fueron introduciendo a lo largo de los
aos. As, cuando las caractersticas de operacin de las instalaciones lo hicieron
aconsejable, se requiri que recibieran formacin especializada y estuvieran sujetas
a licencia varias posiciones del plantel de operacin de ciertas instalaciones, adems
de incrementar los requisitos de capacitacin de todo el personal de operacin.
Por otra parte, en instalaciones complejas, usualmente de larga vida til, se
consider que el disponer de personal de operacin en cantidad suficiente y bien
capacitado no era suficiente para garantizar un adecuado apoyo para el manteni
miento y operacin al mismo nivel de seguridad con el cual fue concebida la instala
cin. Adems, es evidente que el progreso tecnolgico obliga a revisar
constantemente aspectos del diseo e introducir en las instalaciones las modifica
ciones que el estado del arte aconsejan en trminos de seguridad. Esta apreciacin
di origen a la figura de Entidad Responsable que se trata ms adelante.
4.1. Responsable Primario
Para la operacin de toda instalacin se exige, cualquiera sea su envergadura,

que el plantel de operacin acte bajo la direccin de un Responsable Primario .
El Responsable Primario debe hacer todo lo que sea razonable y compatible
con sus posibilidades en sustento de la seguridad, cumpliendo como mnimo con las
condiciones que establece la licencia de cada instalacin, las normas aplicables y los
requerimientos especficos que realiza la Autoridad Regulatoria. Sin embargo, el
cumplimiento de tales condiciones, normas y requerimientos no lo exime de la
responsabilidad de la seguridad radiolgica y nuclear de la instalacin [1].
4.2. Entidad Responsable
En funcin del riesgo asociado a cada instalacin, las mismas se clasifican en

relevantes y no relevantes . Para las instalaciones relevantes se requiere que
IAEA-SM-309/25 15
la instalacin est respaldada por una organizacin capaz de garantizar el apoyo

necesario a las tareas de revisin, mantenimiento, modificaciones, etc.
Esta organizacin, denominada Entidad Responsable , puede respaldar la
operacin de ms de una instalacin. La Entidad Responsable es responsable de la
seguridad radiolgica y nuclear de la instalacin, es decir, debe hacer todo lo razona
ble y compatible con sus posibilidades en favor de la seguridad, cumpliendo como
mnimo con lo establecido en las normas, las licencias y dems requerimientos de
la Autoridad Regulatoria.
De acuerdo con las normas, la Entidad Responsable debe designar en cada
instalacin un Responsable Primario, quien tiene la responsabilidad directa de la
seguridad radiolgica y nuclear de esa instalacin [1]. Por ejemplo, en el caso de
centrales nucleares actualmente en operacin, los Directores son los respectivos
Responsables Primarios de dichas instalaciones.
La Entidad Responsable, adems de prestar todo el apoyo que necesiten los
Responsables Primarios, debe realizar una supervisin adecuada para garantizar que
las instalaciones se operan en correctas condiciones de seguridad radiolgica y
nuclear.
Es importante destacar que el cumplimiento de las normas y requerimientos de
seguridad radiolgica y nuclear no exime a la Entidad Responsable del cumplimiento
de obligaciones y normas que le impongan otros organismos competentes, rela
cionadas con aspectos no radiolgicos (p.ej. condiciones para la descarga de
efluentes qumicos convencionales).
5. SISTEMA DE AUTORIZACIONES
Desde un punto de vista administrativo hay una ligera diferencia entre el trata
miento de las autorizaciones de reactores nucleares e instalaciones del ciclo de
combustible, que usualmente son operadas por orden y cuenta de la CNEA, y las
dems instalaciones del pas, generalmente vinculadas a las aplicaciones mdicas,
industriales y de investigacin. Dado que el organismo que otorga las autorizaciones
y los cuerpos tcnicos que realizan los estudios, inspecciones y evaluaciones pertene
cen a la misma organizacin, esta diferencia es puramente formal y slo se
manifiesta en la terminologa utilizada en los documentos de autorizacin.
Desde un punto de vista tcnico, el sistema distingue explcitamente entre
instalaciones relevantes e instalaciones no relevantes . Las primeras son
aquellas en las cuales son concebibles situaciones anormales que hagan posible el
incurrir en dosis significativas a trabajadores o miembros del pblico. En otras
palabras, las instalaciones relevantes son aquellas en las cuales se deben realizar
estudios de seguridad radiolgica a fin de reducir la probabilidad de ocurrencia o la
magnitud de las concecuencias de ciertos eventos anormales.
Corresponde aclarar que cada solicitud se evala caso por caso, cualquiera sea
el tipo o envergadura de la instalacin de que se trate, y que la regla general es que
el tipo y detalle de los estudios que se requieren deben guardar relacin con la
magnitud de los riesgos previstos.
5.1. Instalaciones no relevantes
Las instalaciones no relevantes solo requieren una autorizacin o permiso de

operacin. Este documento se otorga cuando de la evaluacin de la documentacin
presentada y las inspecciones preoperacionales realizadas surge que se satisfacen las
normas y requisitos aplicables y se dispone de personal capacitado.
El responsable de la operacin de la instalacin (Responsable Primario) debe
contar con un permiso o licencia individual. Son requisitos para acceder al mismo
el demostrar adecuada formacin bsica, formacin especializada y entrenamiento
en el trabajo.
Se llevan a cabo inspecciones preoperacionales en todos los casos y se efectan
luego inspecciones rutinarias con una frecuencia y profundidad acordes con la enver
gadura de la instalacin.
5.2. Instalaciones relevantes
Las instalaciones relevantes requieren en general dos tipos de autorizacin. La

primera es una licencia de construccin, que se otorga cuando se consideran satis
fechas las normas y requisitos aplicables en cuanto al emplazamiento, al diseo
bsico y al nivel esperado de seguridad en la operacin de la instalacin.
La licencia de operacin se otorga cuando de la documentacin y estudios de
detalle presentados y de su evaluacin independiente, as como consecuencia de las
inspecciones efectuadas durante la construccin, el resultado de las pruebas preope
racionales, etc., se demuestra satisfactoriamente que se cumplen las condiciones,
normas y requisitos especficos aplicables. Cabe destacar que ya desde la etapa de
construccin se evala la capacidad de la Entidad Responsable para ejercer sus
responsabilidades, tanto por s misma como mediante servicios contratados.
Por lo expuesto, existen slo dos acciones positivas en el proceso de licencia-
miento establecido por la Autoridad: la licencia de construccin y la licencia de ope
racin. No obstante, existe una interaccin continua entre el futuro constructor u
operador y la Autoridad Regulatoria y el proceso es iterativo, con una complejidad
acorde con la magnitud de los riesgos involucrados. Ello es as puesto que las normas
y requisitos impuestos son del tipo funcional ( performance standards ), lo cual
exige del diseador un esfuerzo significativo y una interaccin constante para
asegurarse de que el resultado final es satifactorio.
Las evaluaciones previas al otorgamiento de la licencia de una instalacin
incluyen aspectos de garanta de calidad, procedimientos constructivos, previsiones
IAEA-SM-309/25 17
para inspecciones en servicio y eventuales reparaciones, procedimientos de opera

cin, etc. Adems, cuando son posibles accidentes con consecuencias radiolgicas
para el pblico se exige que se elaboren planes de emergencia en coordinacin con
los organismos nacionales y provinciales pertinentes.
En lo referente al personal de operacin y apoyo, se debe elevar a la autoridad
la siguiente informacin con suficiente antelacin:
a) Organigrama de operacin;
b) Perfiles para cada funcin de operacin y planes de capacitacin previstos
(incluyendo el reentrenamiento peridico); y
c) Propuesta de las posiciones del organigrama que deberan tener una autoriza
cin especfica.
Si bien se requiere que todo el perosnal est adecuadamente entrenado y

capacitado, acorde con su funcin en la instalacin, la Autoridad requiere que sean
funciones licenciables todas aquellas que tengan influencia significativa en la
seguridad. La evaluacin se efecta caso por caso en funcin de la propuesta de la
Entidad Responsable y el juicio independiente del personal de la Autoridad y sus
eventuales asesores.
Los requisitos de capacitacin y condiciones del personal cubren en general las
cuatro reas clsicas: formacin bsica, formacin especializada, entrenamiento en
el trabajo y aptitudes psicofsicas.
En toda posicin significativa del organigrama de operacin se exige como for
macin bsica el ser graduado universitario con un ttulo acorde con la funcin a
desempear. Tanto la formacin especializada como el entrenamiento en el trabajo
deben acreditarse debidamente y se exige la examinacin de los postulantes mediante
mesas examinadoras ad hoc .
Se extienden dos tipos de documentos regulatorios a las personas. El primero
es una licencia individual que acredita que el postulante ha desmostrado formacin
bsica y especializada adecuada para desempear una dada funcin (o funciones) en
un tipo de instalacin (p. ej. reactores de investigacin de tipo piscina y baja poten
cia) [2]. Este documento se extiende a pedido del postulante y no tiene vencimiento,
pero no es suficiente para que se desempee en una instalacin determinada.
Para poder desempearse como responsable de una funcin en una dada
instalacin, la persona debe contar adems de con la licencia, con una Autorizacin
Especfica , la cual se otorga a solicitud de la Entidad Responsable cuando el
postulante acredita tener un adecuado entrenamiento en el trabajo y aptitudes
psicofsicas apropiadas [3].
En lo que hace a condiciones psicofsicas, es prudente aclarar que no es com
petencia de la Autoridad Regulatora evaluar la compatibilidad de la salud del
trabajador con el ambiente de trabajo, pero s asegurarse de que el postulante rene
requisitos mnimos de salud fsica y mental como para satisfacerse de que no afectar
con su desempeo la seguridad de la instalacin. As, para ciertas posiciones puede
ser descalificante que el postulante sea incapaz de distinguir determinados colores

o que ser proclive a descontrolarse en situaciones de stress .
La Autorizacin Especfica tiene una vlidez temporal limitada a un mximo
de dos aos, aunque suele su vlidez ser an ms corta pues usualmente los
especialistas no otorgan un certificado psicofsico apto para ms de un ao. En
ciertos casos, hay requisitos de reentrenamiento anual (con exmen), que en la prc
tica actan como otro factor limitante de la duracin de la Autorizacin.
6. ORGANIZACION DE LA AUTORIDAD LICENCIANTE
La CNEA est dirigida por un Directorio de seis miembros, uno de los cuales
acta como Presidente de la institucin. La ley que cre esa estructura comtempla
que las actividades regulatorias son competencia del Directorio mientras que las fun
ciones ejecutivas de promocin, produccin y control dependen del Presidente.
FIG. 1. Organigrama de la Comisin Nacional de Energa Atmica.

IAEA-SM-309/25 19
Dentro de ese marco de referencia, la Autoridad Regulatoria est formada

como un cuerpo colegiado presidido por un Director de la CNEA. La Autoridad
Regulatoria y no el Presidente de la CNEA, es la que tiene el poder de otorgar o
suspender una licencia, aprobar en primera instancia las normas de seguridad radio
lgica y nuclear de aplicacin, establecer requerimientos especficos, etc.
Las decisiones de la Autoridad Regulatoria son implementadas a travs de una
Gerencia de Asuntos Regulatorios en Seguridad Radiolgica y Nuclear. Esta Geren
cia, que depende del Presidente de la CNEA, tiene adems una dependencia fun
cional de la Autoridad Regulatoria.
Dicha Gerencia tiene como misin entender en la reglamentacin, licencia-
miento y fiscalizacin de las instalaciones o prcticas sujetas a control, en los
aspectos cientficos y tecnolgicos asociados a la seguridad radiolgica y nuclear y
en la fiscalizacin del uso de materiales radiactivos. En la Fig. 1 se presenta el
organigrama de la rama regulatoria dentro de la estructura de la Comisin Nacional
de Energa Atmica.
REFERENCIAS
[1] COMISION NACIONAL DE ENERGIA ATOMICA, Licnciamiento de Instalaciones

Relevantes, Norma del Consejo Asesor para el Licnciamiento de Instalaciones
Nucleares 0.0.1, CALIN, Buenos Aires.
[2] COMISION NACIONAL DE ENERGIA ATOMICA, Autorizaciones Especficas del
Personal de Instalaciones Relevantes, Norma del Consejo Asesor para el Licencia-
miento de Instalaciones Nucleares 10.1.1, CALIN, Buenos Aires.
[3] COMISION NACIONAL DE ENERGIA ATOMICA, Requerimientos de Aptitud
Psicofsica para Autorizaciones Especficas, Norma del Consejo Asesor para el Licn
ciamiento de Instalaciones Nucleares 10.2.1, CALIN, Buenos Aires.
IAEA-SM-309/1
LEGISLACION ESPAOLA
EN MATERIA DE PROTECCION RADIOLOGICA
. de la SERNA, M. BEZARES
Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo,
Madrid
P. LOPEZ-FRANCO
Hospital de La Princesa,
Madrid,
Espaa
Abstract-Resumen
SPANISH RADIATION PROTECTION LEGISLATION.
Since the middle of the century, when Spain entered the nuclear age, legal provisions
have been necessary both for the peaceful development of nuclear energy and for protection
against risks arising from its use. Various levels of regulations have been established for this
purpose: laws, decrees, ministerial orders, etc. Further progress in radiation protection and
increasing knowledge have made it necessary to revise this legislation, which may become
obsolete in a few years time. Some of the present regulations are being modified and work
is in progress on the drafting of new legal provisions. From the health point of view, radiation
protection of patients is extremely important, and although great benefits can be derived from
the medical applications of ionizing radiation, unnecessary or dangerous exposures and the
delivery of unjustified doses cannot be permitted. In the paper, the Spanish Ministry of Health
and Food reviews the legal standards which have been developed in Spain for radiation protec
tion, describes current legislation in this field and expresses its willingness to contribute to
the development and implementation of this legislation with all the means at its disposal.
LEGISLACION ESPAOLA EN MATERIA DE PROTECCION RADIOLOGICA.

Desde que, a mediados de siglo, Espaa se incorpora a la era nuclear se crea la
necesidad de adoptar medidas legales, tanto para el desarrollo pacfico de la energa nuclear
como para la prevencin de los riesgos derivados de su utilizacin. Con este objetivo se han
elaborado normas de distinto rango: leyes, decretos, rdenes ministeriales, etc. Los continuos
avances y los nuevos conocimientos sobre proteccin radiolgica obligan a la revisin de la
legislacin, que puede quedarse obsoleta en pocos aos, por lo que se estn modificando
algunas normas vigentes y se est trabajando en la elaboracin de nuevas disposiciones legales.
Por otra parte, y desde el punto de vista sanitario muy especialmente, tiene gran importancia
la proteccin radiolgica del paciente. Los grandes beneficios derivados de la utilizacin de
las radiaciones ionizantes en medicina no deben implicar el uso innecesario o abusivo de stas
ni la recepcin de dosis no justificadas. El Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo pasa revista aqu
a la normativa legal que se ha desarrollado en Espaa sobre proteccin radiolgica, da a
conocer la legislacin vigente en este campo, y expresa su disposicin a contribuir a su desa
rrollo y puesta en prctica con todos los medios de que dispone.
21
22 de la SERNA et al.
1. EVOLUCION HISTORICA
La proteccin radiolgica se inicia en Espaa de forma oficial en diciembre de

1959, con la publicacin de una Orden de la Presidencia del Gobierno, que establece
normas de proteccin contra radiaciones ionizantes y lmites de dosis para trabaja
dores expuestos y poblacin en general, atendiendo a las Recomendaciones de la
Comisin Internacional de Proteccin Radiolgica de 1958.
En 1964, la Ley 25/1964 sobre Energa Nuclear dispone la regulacin de esta
forma de energa, con objeto de fomentar el desarrollo pacfico de la misma en
Espaa, regular su puesta en prctica y proteger vidas, salud y haciendas contra los
peligros y los efectos nocivos de las radiaciones ionizantes.
Es la primera disposicin de rango superior que recoge los principios sobre
energa nuclear y proteccin radiolgica vigentes en esa poca, pero lo hace de forma
muy general, marcando directrices que no permiten su aplicacin efectiva hasta su
posterior desarrollo en reglamentos, que se aprueban por medio de decretos, en los
que se contemplan los diferentes captulos que componen la Ley.
As, el Reglamento sobre Cobertura de Riesgos Nucleares, aprobado por
Decreto en 1967, desarrolla los captulos relativos a responsabilidad civil derivada
de daos nucleares, cobertura del riesgo, reclamacin de indemnizacin, reparacin
de daos nucleares, etc.
Pasan los aos sin que se dicten nuevas normas de proteccin, con lo que
siguen siendo de aplicacin las contenidas en la Orden de 1959. De hecho, la
Ordenanza General de Seguridad e Higiene en el Trabajo, publicada en 1971, aunque
establece medidas de prevencin de la exposicin para los trabajadores expuestos a
las radiaciones ionizantes, no presenta muchas novedades respecto a lo dispuesto en
aquella Orden.
Ms tarde, un Decreto de 1972 aprueba el Reglamento sobre Instalaciones
Nucleares y Radiactivas, cuyo objeto es el desarrollo del captulo V de la Ley sobre
Energa Nuclear, dedicado al rgimen de autorizaciones administrativas para las
instalaciones nucleares y radiactivas.
Si bien en este Reglamento la proteccin radiolgica no es un objetivo fun
damental, s es cierto que su entrada en vigor supuso un nuevo avance en la materia,
por los requisitos de seguridad exigidos a las instalaciones para conceder las
autorizaciones.
La solicitud de autorizacin para la puesta en marcha de la instalacin debe
acompaarse de un estudio de seguridad; de un anlisis radiolgico que establezca
las debidas garantas para la salud y seguridad de la poblacin; de normas de protec
cin radiolgica en rgimen normal y en condiciones de accidente; etc.
Tambin se contemplan en este Reglamento las condiciones que debe reunir
el personal de operacin de las instalaciones, entre las que cabe destacar su forma
cin, conocimientos y experiencia en las misiones especficas que vayan a realizar.
IAEA-SM-309/1 23
Un nuevo, y definitivo, avance en el establecimiento oficial de la proteccin

radiolgica en Espaa se produce en 1980, con la publicacin de la Ley 15/1980,
de Creacin del Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear como nico organismo competente
en materia de seguridad nuclear y proteccin radiolgica.
Entre sus funciones est el proponer al Gobierno las reglamentaciones
necesarias sobre proteccin radiolgica; inspeccionar y controlar las instalaciones
nucleares y radiactivas; vigilar los niveles de radiacin y las dosis recibidas por el
personal de operacin en las instalaciones; e informar a la opinin pblica.
Dos aos despus, en 1982, aparece la primera disposicin reglamentaria
especficamente dedicada a la proteccin radiolgica. Se trata del Real Decreto
2519/1982, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento sobre Proteccin Sanitaria contra
Radiaciones Ionizantes, que vena a sustituir la escasa y obsoleta normativa existente.
Este Reglamento se redact teniendo en cuenta las recomendaciones de
diversos organismos internacionales y, muy especialmente, la Directiva 80/836/
EURATOM del Consejo de las Comunidades Europeas. Posteriormente, y dado que
dicha Directiva fu modificada por la Directiva 84/467/EURATOM y que la integra
cin de Espaa en la Comunidad Europea le obligaba a adaptar su legislacin a la
comunitaria, el Reglamento de Proteccin Sanitaria contra Radiaciones Ionizantes se
modific por medio del Real Decreto 1753/1987.
Este Reglamento tiene por objeto establecer las normas de proteccin para
prevenir la produccin de efectos biolgicos no estocsticos y limitar la probabilidad
de incidencia de efectos biolgicos estocsticos, y se aplica a toda clase de instala
ciones nucleares y radiactivas.
Sus distintos captulos estn dedicados a normas de proteccin; medidas de
vigilancia; formacin e informacin de las personas profesionalmente expuestas;
prevencin de la exposicin; determinacin y registro de las dosis; vigilancia m
dica; etc.; y tiene seis apndices sobre definiciones; lmites de dosis; sealizacin
de zonas; y otros.
Otra contribucin reciente a la proteccin radiolgica la constituye la aproba
cin, en marzo de 1989, del Plan Bsico de Emergencia Nuclear, elaborado segn
lo dispuesto en el artculo 11 de la Ley 2/1985 sobre Proteccin Civil, en el que se
prev la aprobacin de planes especiales de mbito estatal o que afecten a varias
Comunidades Autnomas.
El objetivo principal del Plan es evitar, o al menos reducir razonablemente,
los efectos adversos de las radiaciones ionizantes sobre la poblacin, en caso de
accidente nuclear en una central de potencia con repercusiones radiolgicas exte
riores, cuyos mecanismos de disponibilidad, comunicacin y movilizacin de
recursos humanos y materiales pueden ser aprovechados para emergencias radiol
gicas, no necesariamente asociados a centrales nucleares.
A este respecto hay que sealar que el Consejo de las Comunidades Europeas
ha adoptado en noviembre de 1989 una Directiva, la 89/618/EURATOM, relativa
a la informacin de la poblacin sobre las medidas de proteccin sanitaria aplicables

y sobre el comportamiento a seguir en caso de emergencia radiolgica, a la que
Espaa, como el resto de los Estados Miembros, debe dar cumplimiento antes de
noviembre de 1991. Es de esperar pues, que, para esa fecha, existir una nueva nor
mativa que traslade al ordenamiento jurdico espaol las pautas marcadas en la
Directiva, y que la trasposicin se habr llevado a cabo con la colaboracin impres
cindible del Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo, responsable de la asistencia sanitaria
de la poblacin.
2. SITUACION ACTUAL
Tras pasar revista a las diferentes disposiciones legales sobre proteccin contra
las radiaciones ionizantes que se han publicado en Espaa desde que, a mediados de
siglo, se crea la necesidad de adoptar medidas para prevenir el riesgo derivado de
dichas radiaciones, conviene conocer la situacin actual de la normativa al respecto.
La cspide de la pirmide legal espaola en esta materia (Fig. 1), la compo
nen las dos Leyes citadas: la de 1964, sobre Energa Nuclear, y la de 1980, de Crea
cin del Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear.
Inmediatamente debajo estn los Decretos, fundamentalmente los dos Reales
Decretos que recogen el Reglamento de Proteccin Sanitaria contra Radiaciones
Ionizantes, pero sin olvidar el que aprueba el Reglamento sobre Instalaciones
FIG. 1. Pirmide legal espaola de la normativa vigente.

IAEA-SM-309/1 25
Nucleares y Radiactivas, y otros relativos al transporte de mercancas peligrosas

(entre ellas, las sustancias radiactivas); a la gestin de residuos radiactivos; etc.,
cuyos objetivos no son la proteccin radiolgica en s, pero que contribuyen a dis
minuir el riesgo de exposicin a las radiaciones ionizantes.
En este escaln de la pirmide se incluir, en un futuro prximo, el Real
Decreto sobre instalacin y utilizacin de rayos X con fines de diagnstico mdico,
actualmente en proyecto, que concede gran importancia tanto a las condiciones de
seguridad de las salas como a los conocimientos en proteccin radiolgica de las per
sonas que trabajan en instalaciones de esas caractersticas.
La base de la pirmide est constituida por Ordenes Ministeriales que
desarrollan las normas de rango superior.
La eficacia de esta normativa vigente depende, en parte, de su capacidad para
adaptarse a los continuos avances que se producen en este campo, lo que obliga a
modificar las disposiciones.
Con este objeto, el Reglamento sobre Instalaciones Nucleares y Radiactivas
est en revisin, y se prev, asimismo, en un plazo relativamente corto, otra
modificacin del Reglamento sobre Proteccin Sanitaria contra Radiaciones
Ionizantes, ante las nuevas recomendaciones que la Comisin Internacional de Pro
teccin Radiolgica ha presentado este mismo ao.
3. PROTECCION RADIOLOGICA DEL PACIENTE
Merece captulo aparte, sobre todo desde el punto de vista sanitario, la protec
cin radiolgica del paciente.
El Reglamento de Proteccin excluye del cmputo total de dosis las derivadas
de exmenes o tratamientos mdicos. Sin embargo, es preciso adoptar medidas para
prevenir las exposiciones mdicas a radiaciones innecesarias o abusivas y evitar a
los pacientes la recepcin de dosis no justificadas.
Con este fin, el Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo espaol ha publicado, en
Octubre del ao pasado, una Orden por la que se suprimen las exploraciones radio
lgicas sistemticas en los exmenes de salud de carcter preventivo, y ha redactado
un Real Decreto por el que se establecen medidas fundamentales de proteccin radio
lgica de las personas sometidas a exmenes y tratamientos mdicos, que est pen
diente de publicacin oficial. Se trata de una adaptacin de la normativa europea al
respecto, concretamente de la Directiva del Consejo 84/466/EURATOM.
El Real Decreto dispone que toda exposicin a radiaciones ionizantes en un
acto mdico debe estar mdicamente justificada y llevarse a cabo bajo la respon
sabilidad de mdicos u odontlogos. Tanto estos profesionales como el personal tc
nico que colabore con ellos tendrn que conocer las normas de proteccin
radiolgica.
Se introduce, tambin, en esta disposicin la figura del experto cualificado en

radiofsica, que debe estar disponible en las instalaciones de radiodiagnstico, radio
terapia y medicina nuclear.
Se est desarrollando un programa para la formacin del radiofsico, que
incluir tanto los aspectos tericos como la experiencia prctica en el mbito
hospitalario, y garantizar que estos especialistas han adquirido una completa forma
cin en los campos de la proteccin radiolgica, dosimetra clnica, control de
calidad de los equipos, etc.
El propsito del Ministerio espaol de Sanidad y Consumo es contribuir, como
lo ha hecho hasta ahora, al desarrollo de la proteccin radiolgica en todas sus ver
tientes, poniendo para ello todos los medios materiales y humanos que sean
necesarios.
IAEA-SM-309/46
UNITED KINGDOM RADIATION PROTECTION

LEGISLATION AND ITS ABILITY
TO RESPOND TO CHANGE
P.F. BEAVER
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate,
Health and Safety Executive,
London, United Kingdom
Abstract
UNITED KINGDOM RADIATION PROTECTION LEGISLATION AND ITS ABILITY

TO RESPOND TO CHANGE.
The paper describes the way by which United Kingdom general safety legislation has
been developed and its essential content. The organization and structure of the United King
dom Health and Safety Commission (HSC) and the Health and Safety Executive in their policy
formulation and enforcement roles are looked at and attention is focused on the specific needs
of radiation protection legislation. Attention is drawn to the requirement for law makers to
consult those affected and in devising legislation to take account of competition for resources
both within the enforcing agency and in industry. The 1985 Ionising Radiations Regulations
are outlined and the antecedents in the International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP) and other international recommendations noted. The HSCs Working Group on
Ionising Radiations with its dual role of looking backward at existing legislation and forward
at future developments is discussed. The paper concludes with a speculation on those aspects
of the recent ICRP recommendations which will necessitate change and notes recent
epidemiological studies and their possible impact on regulatory requirements.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. General safety law
A radically new framework for safety legislation and its enforcement was
created in the United Kingdom in 1974 when the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act
(the Act) came into force. The general objective o f the Act was to secure the health
and safety o f persons at work and persons affected by work activities by a progres
sive replacement o f old and outdated legislation by modern regulations and codes o f
practice which would be enforced by a regulatory body called the Health and Safety
Executive which responded to a Health and Safety Commission comprised of
representatives from all sides o f industry. The Act itself is couched in very general
terms requiring that employers should do all that is reasonably practicable to reduce
27
28 BEAVER
hazards to their employees at work and furthermore do all that is reasonably practic
able to reduce risks to other persons not at work, such as members o f the public who
might nevertheless be affected by the work activities. The Act itself makes no men
tion of specific agents which might create hazards, other than, significantly, placing
a duty on the Health and Safety Commission to consult the National Radiological
Protection Board on those occasions when the Commission is proposing legislation
in respect o f radiation safety.
1.2. The Health and Safety Commission (HSC)
The Act provides for the setting up o f a Health and Safety Commission consist
ing of a chairman and nine members. Three o f the members are nominated by the
employers organization (Confederation o f British Industry), three by the workers
organization (Trades Union Congress), two by local authorities; the ninth place is
presently unfilled. The role o f the HSC is to agree broad policy and to give general
directions to the Health and Safety Executive on matters such as research on safety
issues. A major duty o f the Commission is to submit to the appropriate Secretary
of State proposals for regulations and approved codes o f practice.
1.3. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
In legal terms the Executive comprises three persons only; the remainder of
the staff of the Executive are technically servants o f the Executive. The Executives
tasks in essence are to formulate the broad policy along the lines advocated by the
Commission in such a way that the Commission can properly endorse it, to develop
the detailed policy which the enforcement arms o f the Executive need to do their job
and to deploy the enforcing inspectorates to best advantage. The Inspectorates (e.g.
Factory, Agriculture, Explosives, Mines and Nuclear Installations) are for the most
part organized on a regional basis together with supporting functions o f laboratory
services, technical assistance and medical advice. The headquarters of the Inspec
torates are in Liverpool (northwest England). The Divisions of the Executive
engaged in formulating policy are London based, there being an overriding need for
these groups to be quickly available to Ministers, to Parliament, and to government
departments. Nuclear safety policy falls to a London based branch of the Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate and within this branch is the group engaged in devising
policy in respect o f radiation protection. Although radiation protection comes under
the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, the policy extends throughout HSE to all uses
o f radiation and all occupational hazards from ionizing radiation. Such hazards are
encountered by all o f the Inspectorates for example, radon in mines by the Mines
Inspectorate, radiation in radiography, industrial uses o f radionuclides by the Fac
tory Inspectorate, and with nuclear and radiation protection in the nuclear fuel cycle
overseen by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate.
IAEA-SM-309/46 29
1.4. Enforcement
The Inspectorates have a range of ways in which safety legislation can be

enforced. In general, persuasion without recourse to formal procedures is highly
effective, however, the other means available are enforcement notices which require
employers to take specified actions to meet the requirements of the Act or regulations
and legal proceedings in Courts, which can lead to fines or, in extreme cases,
imprisonment. The key to successful enforcement, particularly where persuasion is
the technique o f choice, is well trained, knowledgeable and professional Inspec
torates operating to a common and well understood policy. This is even more impor
tant where changes of standards, or change in the quantity o f an agent which is seen
to constitute an unacceptable risk, are proposed and have subsequently to be
implemented.
1.5. M aking o f regulations and approved codes o f practice
The Act provides for the making o f statutory instruments (regulations) and the
formal approval with the consent o f the Secretary o f State. Approved codes of
practice are practical guidance on compliance with the regulations not directly
enforceable at law. They have a semi-legal status in that they may be (and indeed
mostly are) cited in legal proceedings as the way to achieve compliance with a partic
ular regulation. If the defendant chooses to argue that his practice was safe, the onus
o f proof falls to him to show that his practice was at least as safe as that described
in the approved code. Approved codes o f practice are thus highly effective ways of
filling in the detail of more broadly based regulatory requirements and can them
selves be used as a vehicle for communicating the need for change as the level of
perceived risk from a particular agent changes.
The procedures for making regulations and approving codes are laid down in
the Act. Two points have to be made in this respect; first, regulations must reflect
the general provisions o f the Act and secondly, the Commission is required to consult
persons affected by proposed regulations. This inevitably introduces a delay between
the identification o f a need for legislation and the introduction o f that legislation.
However, effective consultation properly carried out has the effect o f improving the
quality of the legislation, revealing weaknesses in enforceability as well as preparing
industry for implementation; often working practices have changed to meet the new
standards before the proposals become legally binding, which means the imposition
o f the requirements is not so traumatic as might be expected. The consultation period
also affords the Inspectorates a chance to re-scrutinize the proposals to see if they
are enforceable in a resource-effective way.
30 BEAVER
1.6. Use of guidance
In addition to the formal legal instruments of regulations and approved codes

a great deal o f use is made o f non-statutory guidance material. This can be generated
in a great many ways. The Executive is able to endorse guidance produced by the
international bodies in the case of radiation protection, the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the Nuclear Energy Agency o f the OECD, and the Commission of
the European Communities (CEC). Standards, which can be used as guidance as well
as guidance booklets, are also produced by the International Organization for Stan
dardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission. Within the United
Kingdom guidance is formulated by, among others, the British Standards Organiza
tion; the National Physical Laboratory, the National Radiological Protection Board
and the Health and Safety Executive. A highly effective way o f generating guidance
which reflects the current state of affairs in industry and to some extent anticipates
evolutionary change is to encourage the industry to produce it for itself. Trade
associations are particularly good at this; success has also been achieved by the
Executive in bringing together selected nominees to make up a drafting group.
2. FORMULATION OF POLICY IN GENERAL
A major task o f the policy group in a safety/regulatory agency is the formula

tion o f regulations and guidance. It is important that the regulations and associated
guidance are devised so as to be able to cope with change. This in turn means that
those responsible for co-ordinating, collating and formulating policy must be respon
sive to change and organize themselves to be aware o f changes in standards, the
quantity o f an agent which constitutes a given level o f risk, the perception o f risk,
the level o f resources which the regulatory authority can and should devote to
enforcement, and the level of resources which industry can and should properly
apply to tackling the hazard. This awareness can come about by structuring and
organizing the rgulation-formulation group within the regulatory authority in a way
which facilitates regular formal and informal contacts both within and outside that
authority.
The organizational arrangement o f the Health and Safety Executive allows for
frequent interchange of views but it has been found necessary to set up a formal liai
son group with representatives from each o f the Inspectorates, together with the
policy makers, with the objectiv o f co-ordinating efforts, harmonizing enforcement
criteria and detecting need for change. In a great many cases the need for change
is not a need to change the words o f legislation but merely to adopt a different, some
times more relaxed, sometimes more stringent, posture towards enforcement of
particular matters.
IAEA-SM-309/46 31
3. FORMULATION OF POLICY ON RADIATION PROTECTION
The view is very clearly taken in the United Kingdom that the recommenda
tions o f the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) are the best
starting point for any regulatory requirements in radiation protection. However,
many of the ICRP recommendations are not appropriate to legislation, being either
more suitable as guidance or as background support for legislative provisions. In
fact, much of the separating out o f that which is appropriate for regulatory provision
is done by the international bodies such as the IAEA in its Basic'Safety Standards
and the Commission o f the European Communities in its Directive on Basic Safety
Standards. Indeed, the best timetable to work to is to follow up ICRP recommenda
tions by IAEA and CEC Basic Safety Standards, followed in turn by national legisla
tion. This can be a very time consuming process, however, as evidenced by the
interval between ICRP Publication 26 in 1977 and the making o f the United Kingdom
Ionising Radiations Regulations in 1985. Considerable publicity now occurs simul
taneously with the pronouncements o f ICRP and thus considerable public pressure
for change without further delay.
Hence, legislation needs to be framed so as to be able to take some account
o f the possible need for change. However, that task can be somewhat easier in radia
tion protection because o f the necessary incorporation of the tenets o f dose limitation
and dose optimization in legislation. In practice, optimization, pursuing the ALARA
principle, is highly effective in almost all industry. The consequence is that numeri
cal values of dose limits are relatively rarely approached and very seldom exceeded.
But for the fact that the numerical value of the dose limit is a parameter in the
perception o f risk and hence in the judgement o f whether or not doses are as low
as reasonably achievable, incorporation of such numerical values in legislation is
barely necessary. What is necessary and what does accommodate change is the
building-in, in a flexible way, o f the ALARA requirement. The United Kingdom
procedure o f consulting widely on the legal requirements, and on any proposed code
and guidance material, verifies that this has been done. Experience indicates that the
more detailed and tightly prescribed a particular provision, then the less is the flexi
bility and the room for change. Many o f course see tightness o f prescription as a
desirable feature providing guaranteed protection for workers and a defence against
unreasonable demands by regulatory agencies and would be prepared to sacrifice
flexibility for those reasons. Hence, there is a continuing need for dialogue between
both sides of industry and the regulator if implementation of legislation is to be suc
cessful when it is such as to allow flexibility and accommodate change. A lot can
be learnt from previous legislation both in form and content; for example, the 1985
legislation does not, as did earlier legislation, make breaching of numerically speci
fied derived working levels o f surface contamination a statutory offence but rather
focuses on the fundamental requirements o f keeping doses as low as reasonably
practicable.
32 BEAVER
4. CENTRAL FEATURES OF LEGISLATION
4.1. Dose limits
The dose limit requirements o f the 1985 regulations reflect the recommenda
tions o f ICRP Publication 26 although, as yet, the later recommendation for a dose
limit for members o f the public of 15 mSv per year has not been incorporated.
Breaching o f dose limits constitutes a prima facie offence on the part of the
employer. No concession or excuse is accepted for accidental or emergency doses
or planned special exposures, although the regulatory authority retains the power to
grant, prior to the event, exemption from dose limits for emergency planning pur
poses and for planned special exposures. In practice dose limits are seldom exceeded
and no instance o f exceeding them has led to enforcement action. However many
successful legal actions have been taken on the basis that doses were not kept as low
as reasonably practicable.
4.2. As low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)
The ALARA requirement o f the ICRP (and other international documents) is

expressed in United Kingdom law by the words as low as reasonably practicable .
This latter form o f words is seen as providing a somewhat higher standard o f protec
tion than might be inferred from ALARA considerations. Many o f the regulations
and much o f the approved code guidance address the requirement to keep doses
as low as reasonably practicable. Guidance is given for specific industries and uses
ranging from dentistry to X ray optics, from industrial radiography to sterilization
plants. However, HSE-generated guidance does not specify cost-benefit analysis,
multi-attribute analysis or any other decision making aid and most certainly does not
suggest cost values for unit collective dose to be used in making judgements.
Thus, a predetermined position has not been adopted and change for
instance a greater desire to push doses even lower relative to the cost of averting
exposures can be instituted somewhat more readily within the legal framework.
4.3. Radiation protection advisers (RPAs)
The idea o f essentially professional advisers being legally required by users of

anything more than insignificant quantities o f radiation was acquired from the exist
ing radiation protection officer appointments in the medical sector and the concept
o f a qualified expert in the CEC Euratom Directive. It has proved to be very
successful in practice. The regulations provide for the RPAs to give advice on a
number o f matters such as delineation of controlled areas and worker access to areas.
IAEA-SM-309/46 33
In this way variations between establishments working practices can be taken into
account and variations can be accommodated which take into account the quality of
facilities or supervision.
The radiation protection advisers functions are purely advisory; they are in no
way accountable under the regulations for the quality o f their advice. The onus is
on the employer to identify and appoint suitable persons. Therefore, employers will
often see the need to be assured that their proposed appointee is suitable. There is
some measure of reassurance in that all appointments as RPA have to be notified to
the Health and Safety Executive, who have the power to challenge unsuitable
appointments. Also, the two major professional bodies in this area, the Society for
Radiological Protection and the Institute o f Physical Sciences in Medicine, operate
peer review appraisal and certification schemes designed to confirm to employers
that the holder o f a certificate is properly qualified. There are proposals to merge
the two schemes in order to achieve a single United Kingdom certificate.
4.4. Contingency planning
The 1985 regulations require all users to assess the accident potential o f their
operations and then, having reduced the potential as far as reasonably practicable,
to devise a contingency plan to mitigate the effects of any accident. The way of
accommodating change in emergency reference levels is by way o f issuing exemp
tion certificates to the large users in the fuel cycle. In practice this involves consider
able consultation which to a large extent repeats the consultation involved in
proposing numerical values for emergency reference levels initially. This is one area
where attempts will be made to streamline procedures in future legislation.
4.5. Dosimetry
The requirement to make individual assessments of dose is mandatory in

United Kingdom legislation. It is important that such assessments are robust, verifi
able and reasonably precise. This has led to the continuation of the requirement from
earlier legislation that dosimetry services should not be permitted to operate unless
they hold a certificate o f approval from the Health and Safety Executive. (Another
paper [1] in this conference gives greater detail on the approvals procedure.)
The requirements to make adequate assessments o f doses to workers are com
plemented by the requirements to keep good records and to make dose summaries
available to those who have cause to know. The HSE requires dose summaries to
be sent yearly to its Central Index o f Dose Information (CIDI) run on its behalf by,
and based at, the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) in which a data
base o f all classified workers is being built up. The HSE can interrogate the database
for a variety o f statistics and trends. The latest analysis has been reported else
where [2]; there is a clear downward trend throughout industry. Most importantly,
34 BEAVER
the number of workers with a dose exceeding 15 mSv per year is decreasing
annually.
4.6. Notifications
The 1985 regulations contain a number o f requirements to report events, inci

dents as well as use of ionizing radiation to the HSE. It is in this area that a careful
balance has to be struck between requiring the employer to be making a stream of
reports o f comparative insignificance and making none at all. Defining significant
events has proved difficult and anomalies are often discovered even in the present
wording. The underlying philosophy is to define the reportable event in terms o f an
assessable quantity (e.g. MBq involved in an incident) which could be traced back
to a dose quantity or even to risk, using a model. This sort o f approach is not so
readily amenable to change essentially because reporting is linked to derived quanti
ties specified in regulations. In some areas where the regulation confines itself to
words like significant, thought is being given to preparing guidance which starts
from a tolerable level of risk in numerical terms and thereby derives a dose quantity
which equates to significant.
5. WORKING GROUP ON IONISING RADIATIONS (WGIR)
In order to assess whether the changes brought about by the 1985 regulations
were o f value and to see what further changes might be necessary, the Health and
Safety Commission set up the Working Group on Ionising Radiations. It is composed
o f nominees from both sides o f industry, and from certain government departments,
hospital physicists and radiologists, the NRPB, academia and local authorities.
The groups first tasks were:
(a) To consider the practical difficulties and resources implications for the system
of dosimetry for actinides (which leant heavily on personal air samplers).
(b) To consider the recent NRPB advice on emergency reference levels.
(c) To consider whether the regulatory provisions relating to the concept as low
as reasonably practicable (ALARP) were as effective as they should be. The
latter consideration was to an extent caught up by the NRPB Publication GS 9,
which advocated control o f workers such that their doses did not exceed
15 mSv per year averaged over a number o f years.
WGIR has published its first report [3], in which it indicated that it had no
reason at that time to press for change in actinide dosimetry procedures; that the
proposals by the NRPB for revised emergency reference levels were acceptable and
that a way o f giving them legislative standing should be pursued.
IAEA-SM-309/46 35
On the question of keeping doses as low as reasonably practicable, WGIR

recommended that the HSC prepare an approved code o f practice making two points:
first, that the revised risk estimates promulgated by ICRP in its Como statement
should lead to even greater emphasis on keeping doses as low as reasonably practic
able. Secondly, that a formal enquiry level should be instituted at an individual level
o f dose o f 150 mSv in any ten years.
At this level a full investigation o f all the circumstances should be carried out
involving the worker, trade union representatives, the employer and the medical
practitioner leading to recommendations which would be in the best interests o f the
workers health. Such matters as the nature o f the work, age o f worker, prospects
o f the worker, possible change in plant design/features, etc. would be taken into
account. The Health and Safety Commission has published a consultative
document [4] which proposes these changes.
6. RESPONDING TO CHANGE
6.1. ICRP
The new ICRP recommendations recently made available as a draft for consul
tation will, if finalized, lead to pressure for change, some of which can be easily
accommodated. For example, a change in dose limits, even if expressed as an aver
age over a number o f years, should present no serious difficulty. The infrastructure
o f dose recording and databases should not need to change and, in practice, the dose
limits as proposed will not have a great effect on many individuals. The idea of
source related constraints will need considerable development and it may prove
difficult to agree on numerical values for some activities. However, the concept
would fit in well with code material already in existence for specific work activities.
It is believed that the present procedures for setting controlled and supervised areas
and identifying classified (i.e. ICRPs Category A) workers will not need change,
either in concept or in numerical values being used as guidelines.
The introduction of risk limits for potential exposure situations is not so much
a change as new thinking leading perhaps to new requirements. In the nuclear safety
field some of this thinking has already been published, for example the HSEs docu
ment on Tolerability o f Risk [5].
The change which will certainly cause the greatest debate will be the proposed
semantic change from effective dose equivalent to effectance. This is a change
which will be seen by many as totally unwelcome and unnecessary.
6.2. Epidemiological studies
It is too early to say what effect if any the recently published work by Gardner
et al. [6] will have on ICRP recommendations and what demands there will be for
36 BEAVER
change when the work has been thoroughly digested. The necessary change might
be as simple as proposing a constraint for some groups of workers or perhaps having
a similar basic requirement for men of reproductive capacity as for women, namely
that doses over relatively short periods o f time should not exceed the relevant propor
tion o f the dose limit. Whatever is decided, the existing United Kingdom legislation
will already be in a process o f change and should be able to absorb further change
along the foregoing lines.
7. CONCLUSIONS
A wide experience o f regulation making and enforcement in this field positions

the United Kingdom well for further advances and further change. Much of the
necessary change can be implemented without radical surgery on existing material
because o f its very general and flexible nature. In any future consideration of
changes, continued account will have to be taken o f the pressure on the resources
both of the regulatory authority and of those on whom the law bears, but not at the
cost o f any loss o f radiation protection.
REFERENCES
[1] SIMISTER, D .N ., these Proceedings, Paper IAEA-SM-309/31.

[2] KENDALL, G., GREENSLADE, E., BINES, W ., Exposures to UK radiation
workers recorded on the Central Index of Dose Information , CEC Workshop, Oxford,
2-4 April 1990.
[3] HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMISSION, Working Group on Ionising Radiations,
Report 1987-88 (1989).
[4] HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMISSION, Consultative Document: Draft Approved
Code of Practice, Part 4, Health and Safety Executive, Bootle (1989).
[5] HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power
Stations, Health and Safety Executive, Bootle (1988).
[6] GARDNER, M .J., et al., Results of case-control study of leukaemia and lymphoma
among young people near Sellafield nuclear plant in West Cumbria, Br. Med. J. 300
(17 Feb. 1990) 423-434.
IAEA-SM-309/16
LICENSING AND INSPECTION OF RADIOISOTOPES

AND RADIATION GENERATING EQUIPMENT
The Italian regulatory system
F. DOBICI, E. SGRILLI
Radiation Protection Division,
ENEA Directorate for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection,
Rome, Italy
Abstract
LICENSING AND INSPECTION OF RADIOISOTOPES AND RADIATION GENERAT

ING EQUIPMENT: THE ITALIAN REGULATORY SYSTEM.
The regulatory system in force in Italy concerning radioisotopes and radiation generat
ing equipment is based on two statutes dating back to 1962 and 1964; the latter is based on
a 1962 Directive of the European Community, of which Italy is a Member. European Direc
tives of 1980 and 1984 have not yet been enacted into Italian legislation. In the statutes in force
the basic rules are established governing the holding and use of, trading in and disposal of
radioactive material as well as holding and use of radiation generating equipment. These
activities are subject to notification and licensing. Special provisions are established for hold
ing, manufacturing, importation of, trading in, or putting into circulation any consumer goods
containing radioactive material. The medical use of ionizing radiation is also subject to partic
ular rules. The statutes also establish the administrative machinery competent to deal with
notification and issuing of licences, as well as in carrying out inspections and enforcement.
Notification and licensing are based on a two tiered system: a local, regional or provincial
level and a national one, depending on the intersection of a number of parameters. The role
of the governmental organs, state agencies such as ENEA (National Committee for Nuclear
and Alternative Energy), local administrative bodies, their competence and their powers are
discussed with regard to notification and licensing on the one hand and inspection and enforce
ment on the other. Whereas the statutes lay down general principles, more detailed regulations
are given in governmental decrees thought to be an easier rule-making instrument to modify,
though experience in this field has often proved otherwise. For industrial, medical and
research applications of ionizing radiation, governmental regulations have in particular deter
mined levels of relevance, starting from which materials or machines become subject to legal
provisions, and levels of exemption from licensing requirements, which are in general multi
ples of 10 of the exemption levels.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Italian rules concerning radioisotopes and equipment generating ionizing

radiation are based on two statutes dating back to 1962 and 1964 and on related
decrees. The 1962 statute (an Act o f Parliament, Law No. 1860/1962) is concerned
37
38 DOBICI and SGRILLI
with notification, holding, transport, use of and trading in radioisotopes. Herein are
also rules on radioactive minerals, fissile material (239Pu, 233U, enriched uranium)
and other source material which should be mentioned insofar as they are also radio
isotopes and subject as such to general radioisotope rules. The 1964 statute
(Presidential Decree No. 185/1964) is mainly concerned with plant safety and radia
tion protection o f workers and the general public; it also has administrative provi
sions pertaining to notification and licensing o f radioisotopes and equipment
generating radiation; accounting o f radioisotopes is also provided for.
In the Italian system the two above mentioned statutes have the full force of
law and any infraction o f them is a penal offence.
The system is rather rigid and can only be modified by changing the law. The
main features and general principles such as the duties o f a user or holder or trader
were written into the statutes, whereas numerical limits and rules o f procedure, e.g.
relating to exemption levels, are set out in regulations contained in government
decrees. These latter normative instruments were thought to be o f a more flexible
character than statutes, although since the system was first enacted very few decrees
or parts o f them have been modified.
2. RELEVANCE LIMITS
General relevance limits for radioactive isotopes are established by regulations

dating back to 1969 (Presidential Decree No. 1303/1969). These regulations estab
lish that the provisions o f the Safety and Radiation Protection Statute o f 1964 apply
if even one of four conditions is met. The conditions relate to activity, mass, concen
tration, exposure or dose rate:
(1) Conditions relating to activity: radioisotopes are subdivided into four radioac
tivity groups according to their radiotoxicity:
Group I: 3.7 kBq, e.g. for 241Am, 226Ra, 239Pu

Group II: 37 kBq, e.g. for ^C o, 131I, ^Sr
Group III: 370 kBq, e.g. for "M o, 147Pm, 14Sr
Group IV: 3700 kBq, e.g. for 99mTc, 3H, natural uranium.
For instance, it is sufficient to have a 3.7 kBq 241Am smoke detector for some
o f the health and safety provisions o f the 1964 statute to apply, such as those concern
ing notification to local health authorities. The radioisotope classification still in
force in Italy dates back to a 1962 Directive o f the European Community, of which
Italy is a member, European Directives o f 1980 and 1984 having not yet been
enacted into Italian legislation. If a radioisotope is not classified in one of the four
groups, regulations establish an automatic Group I classification unless its radiotox
icity is neither unknown nor controversial. If a radioisotope is not classified in the
IAEA-SM-309/16 39
Italian regulation but is classified in the 1984 EC Directive, ENEAs position is that
the 1984 EC Directive classification applies. Regulations establish that amounts of
different radionuclides o f the same toxicity group obviously are additive; moreover
if amounts are present o f radionuclides classified under different radiotoxicity clas
sifications the following relationship applies:
where A is the sum o f activities actually present for each radiotoxicity group and
A L are activity limits for each group as above.
(2) C onditions relating to specific activity o r concentration:
(1) 370 Bq/g for natural solid radioactive substances

(2) 74 Bq/g for other radioactive substances.
(3) Conditions relating to m ass o f natural uranium a n d thorium , d epleted uranium :
300 g U
9 g Th
(4) Conditions relating to dose rate fo r apparatus, equipm ent a n d an y device

containing radioactive substances:
1 /iS v -h -1
at any point at 0.1 m from the surface and at any moment (e.g. with shutter
opened).
It is worth while noting that the limits mentioned above do not apply in the
following two instances:
(a) When radioisotopes are used for medical, agricultural or veterinary purposes;
(b) When radioactive substances are added to consumer goods (such as food, phar
maceuticals, toys, luminescent devices, body care and make-up products).
The relevant provisions o f the 1964 statute apply for any amount, concentra
tion, mass or dose rates, i.e. even lower amounts than specified under points (1-4)
above. Other, special conditions apply to work in mines.
As can easily be seen, the relevant levels and their combination are such that
some difficulties arise in practical applications. One o f the foremost is the one con
cerning natural radioactive substances: natural uranium is classified in Group IV
with a relevance level o f 3700 kBq. Regulations do not explicitly say whether only
disintegrations from 238U, 234U and 235U have to be taken into account or whether
one has to reckon with disintegrations from the whole chain. It is the authors opinion
that only disintegration from each of the three heads o f the chains has to be
considered.
It is also worth while emphasizing that the 1962 statute has no relevance levels
as such. Being a normative act dealing with certain kinds o f licensing and notification
o f radioactive materials, it only provides for exemption levels.
Relevance levels for equipment generating ionizing radiation are set by a 1968
decree (Presidential Decree No. 1428/1968) as follows:
(1) for tubes, valves and other particle accelerating devices if the energy is more
than 20 keV or if it is more than 5 keV and the dose rate is more than
1 ixSv-h-1 at any point 0.1 m from the surface;
(2) television sets in normal working conditions when the dose rate is more than
5 fi S v -h -1 at any point at 0.05 m from the surface.
3. NOTIFICATION
Notification, as well as licensing, is based in Italy on a two tiered system as

far as radioactive substances are concerned: a local level and a national one.
Holders o f apparatus emitting radiation meeting the conditions specified under
the relevance levels stated above must notify within 10 days the Medical Officer o f
the Province where the apparatus is kept, as well as the Labour Inspectorate and Port
Authorities if the case warrants it. Holders have no other duty of notification.
Less straightforward are the notification rules for radioactive substances. A
distinction must be made according to the intended use: if radioisotopes are to be
used for medical purposes or for addition to consumer foods (see above), relevance
limits do not apply and holders must notify the local authorities mentioned above of
any amount o f radioactivity.
Apart from the very wide powers o f prescription, one o f the features o f the
system is that the Medical Officer can prevent use o f any source if risks to the public
are deemed to exist, even though no licence is required because the source is exempt.
As the rule is established in relation to notification it holds for every type of
source subject to notification. Given the levels o f relevance already mentioned, the
holder has the duty o f notifying the local authorities, although there are minor
exemptions, e.g. for luminescent watches, certain electronic components and
calibration sources that have somewhat higher limits.
Holders o f radioactive substances are also required to notify the Ministry of
Industry and ENEA within five days when amounts o f radioactivity are higher by
a factor of 105 than the relevance levels stated above.
For a radionuclide in the first radiotoxicity group, e.g. for 370 MBq of
241Am, state bodies must be notified. A Government regulation prescribes the form
IAEA-SM-309/16 41
to be used for notification and this is one o f the very few regulations modified in
relatively recent times (1982).
Holders are also required to perform accounting and end-of-the-year updating
duties if activities held are higher than 11.1 X 10(l-1) TBq sealed sources or
370 X 10(l_1) GBq unsealed sources where i is the number o f the radiotoxicity
group.
Rules are given as to accounting procedures; the elements below must be noted
in a register for each operation o f stocking and discharge:
number and date o f the operation

description of source
supplier
carrier
amount o f activity discharged and reason, with the balance of activity still
in stock.
4. USE
As a rule, utilization o f radioisotopes and equipment generating radiation

requires a prior licence if
(1) a source meets relevance levels

(2)a condition for exemption is not satisfied.
The regulatory system to which a licensee is subject, if no exemptions apply,

depends on the intersection o f a number o f parameters:
type o f use, i.e. medical, industrial or research, storage;

amount o f radioactivity;
whether supplementary protection structures are needed beside those
inherent in the source;
particle energy and beam power.
The main features o f the system will be outlined, noting that at least three
national or local bodies hold licensing power and, depending on the licence required,
as many as five state organs are involved in the more complex types of licensing.
It is worth noting that radiation sources cannot be held in storage without a licence
even if they are not used, the idea being that if a radiation source is not exempt from
licensing when used it has to be subject to licensing also if simply kept in storage.
At the local level the competent authority is the Medical Officer o f the Province.
5. USE FOR MEDICAL PURPOSES
This is perhaps the simplest case, the basic idea being that every radioactive
source, regardless of its activity, has to be subject to licensing by the Medical Officer
of the Province prior to its use. The same does not hold for apparatus generating
radiation, such as X ray equipment, for instance. This is subject to licensing
procedures by the Medical Officer only if used for therapeutic purposes, diagnostic
machines being exempt from licensing and only subject to notification. The Medical
Officer may avail himself of a Province Commission for the radiation protection of
the public, an advisory body whose membership is made up of experts in the fields
of radiation protection and public health.
A separate licence for waste disposal of radioactive sources is necessary if
exemption requirements which are rather complex and will not be mentioned
further are not met.
An interesting feature of the system in force at present is that medical use of
accelerators of whatever energy is only subject to local licensing, whereas accelera
tors for industrial purposes, even if sometimes much simpler, are licensed with a
quite complex procedure.
If amounts of activity exceed the limits mentioned for accounting, the use of
radioactive isotopes must also be licensed by the Ministry of Industry; in the licens
ing procedure two Ministries (Labour, Public Health) and ENEA are involved.
ENEA has issued three technical guides detailing the information it requests
from applicants seeking licences for nuclear medicine, teletherapy and brachyther-
apy installations.
Waste disposal must always be authorized by the Medical Officer.
6. USE OF RADIOISOTOPES FOR INDUSTRIAL OR RESEARCH

PURPOSES
The two types of use mentioned are licensed by the Prefect of the Province if
the relevance levels mentioned in Section 2 are exceeded by a factor of 104 (typi
cally 37 MBq for a group 1 source and upscaling by a factor of 10 for each group).
The same rules mentioned in Section 2 apply in the case of different radioiso
topes. As in the case of medical use, waste disposal is subject to a separate licence
by the Prefect and in both licensing procedures the Prefect has to seek the advice
of the Medical Officer.
If the limits in Section 3 are exceeded and the source does not require sup
plementary protection structures besides those inherent to the apparatus as is the
case for a gamma cell for instance licensing takes place as described for a telether
apy source.
IAEA-SM-309/16 43
If total activity is equal to or exceeds the activity relevance levels by a factor

of 106 for unsealed sources and a factor of 3 x 109 for sealed sources and if sup
plementary protection structures are needed beside those inherent to the apparatus
or if installations are intended for treatment or storage of radioactive waste, licensing
power resides in the Ministry of Industries. ENEA and three Ministries (Labour,
Public Health, Interior) then take part in what is usually a three step process.
First a construction licence has to be obtained by the user and a programme
of tests previously approved by ENEA has to be run by the user on the various sec
tions of the installation with ENEA inspectors present. If tests are satisfactory, radio
active sources can be brought into the plant and a second programme of tests, also
previously approved by ENEA, takes place.
If the tests are satisfactory a certificate is issued by ENEA and the user can
have a licence to operate the plant.
In the licences are established prescriptions for construction and operation; as
prescriptions originate in different state organs they are co-ordinated by ENEA from
a technical viewpoint. Waste disposal is licensed in the context of prescriptions for
operation, no other administrative act being necessary, in contrast to other radioac
tive waste disposal. Radioactive material is subject to notification to ENEA and the
Ministry of Industry as well as to accounting and notification updating; however, the
Medical Officer of the Province does not have to be notified as this officer holds no
administrative power over such installations.
7. USE OF RADIATION GENERATING EQUIPMENT FOR INDUSTRIAL

OR RESEARCH PURPOSES
For energies up to 200 kV the apparatus is exempt from licensing, otherwise

it is subject to prior licensing by the Prefect of the Province according to the proce
dures already mentioned.
The same licensing procedure as the one outlined above for installations with
large radioactive sources applies for accelerators with the following characteristics.
(1) electron accelerators where electron energy is either higher than 10 MeV or
higher than 500 keV and beam power greater than 1 kW
(2) accelerators for other particles with energy lower than 10 MeV with a time
averaged neutron yield higher than 107 s -1
(3) experimental fusion apparatus with a time averaged neutron yield higher than
107 s " 1.
44 DOBICI and SGR1LLI
8. TRADE IN RADIOISOTOPES
Prior authorization by the Ministry of Industry is required according to the

1962 statute by traders in radioisotopes and other radioactive materials if levels of
exemption are exceeded.
The said levels are fixed with reference to the number of trade operations per
year (100) and to the amount of activity involved in each operation; the amounts of
activity are the same as reported in Section 3 for notification to state organs (typically
370 MBq for 241Am).
Traders are required to log each operation in an ad hoc register even if they
are exempt from authorization requirements.
Remarkably, this is the only administrative authorization, as far as the nuclear
regulatory system is concerned, where the principle of tacit approval is enacted:
that is, the applicant is entitled to trade if no objection is made by the Ministry within
30 days after application.
This authorization does not allow traders to hold radioactive substances:
premises where radioisotopes are going to be stored have to be licensed according
to the 1964 statute on radiation protection.
Licences to hold radioactive substances for trade purposes are subdivided into
two categories: A and B.
A Category A licence allows for mere storage of quantities below fixed levels,
provided that transport packagings are left unopened. The licence is issued by the
Prefect on the advice of the Medical Officer, the Labour Inspectorate and the Corps
of Firemen.
If quantities exceed the levels allowed for or transport packagings are opened,
trade premises require a Category licence, issued by four Ministries (Industry,
Labour, Public Health, Interior) with the technical advice of ENEA. Licence
prescriptions also allow for waste disposal.
No licence is required under the 1962 and 1964 statutes to trade in equipment
generating radiation.
9. CONSUMER GOODS
Special provisions prohibit holding, manufacturing, importing, using or in any

way putting into circulation any make-up and body care products, luminescent paints
and devices or toys which emit radiation; adding of radioactive substances to these
products is prohibited as well.
Specific exemption levels are established for some products, e.g. luminescent
paints and devices. Exemption is not allowed in the case of toys.
IAEA-SM-309/16 45
In particular instances, exceptions can be made on a case by case basis by the

Ministry of Public Health. TV sets or cathode ray tubes are not allowed if their radia
tion emitting characteristics are above the general relevance level for radiation
generating equipment reported in Section 2. X ray radiography or fluoroscopy on
people is only allowed for health or scientific purposes.
10. INSPECTION
The 1964 statute establishes the general competence of ENEA inspectors over
all plants and premises where radioisotopes or machines generating radiation are
held or used.
In the exercise of their functions ENEA inspectors have vast power: broadly
it may be said that, as far as safety and radiation protection are concerned, they only
encounter those limits inherent in the Italian legal system; their status also implies
powers of search and seizure and powers of prescription.
The notable exception to the powers of ENEA inspectors is plants where
radioisotopes and machines generating radiation are used for diagnostic and
therapeutic purposes, where access is only possible if requested either by the
Ministry of Public Health or by the Ministry of Labour.
A feature of the Italian regulatory system is that failure to comply nearly
always constitutes a criminal offence that must be reported to the Office of Public
Prosecution.
Inspections are also carried out by the Ministry of Labour Inspectorate to check
compliance with radiation protection rules for workers.
Labour Inspectors have one power ENEA inspectors do not have: faced with
breaches of regulations that constitute a criminal offence they can issue an order to
comply instead of reporting to the Office of Public Prosecution.
Compliance with radiation protection rules for the public can also be verified
by Inspectors of Local Health Administrations; in their field they have the same
powers as Labour Inspectors.
Local Health Administrations were instituted by the 1978 National Health Ser
vice Act; this has brought far-reaching modifications in the regulatory system, since
all the powers of the Medical Officer of the Province, who was until 1978 a national
Government officer, were given to regional Governments.
Regional Governments have established particular rules on radiation protec
tion: broadly speaking the licensing powers of the Medical Officer are now extended
to the Mayors.
11. REMARKS
It is the authors opinion that some aspects of the Italian regulatory system for
radioactive isotopes and radiation generating machines need both updating and a
measure of simplification.
The authors fear, for instance, that the current licensing system allows for too
many types of licences and/or authorizations: up to ten, if transportation and mining
are excluded. Here a degree of simplification is evidently called for, as some licences
only differ as regards secondary features. Moreover, the more recent ICRP units of
measure and concepts, though commonly used by operators in the field, have not yet
been written into law. To give an example, legal secondary limits for internal
contamination are still set in terms of Maximum Admissible Concentrations and not
in terms of Annual Limits of Intake.
Relevance limits are set in terms of activity concentration, mass and dose rate
with an or condition: for instance, very low activities can be subject to notification
and possibly licensing because their concentration or specific activity is above the
pertinent relevance limit, as may happen with some scientific applications. The
opposite is the case with natural radioactive substances with low concentration that
are subject to regulation because of their mass and/or activity. The authors feel that
discrimination based on the technical experience gained over many years is also
called for here.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Law No. 1860 of 31 Dec. 1962 (Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy).
Law No. 833 of 23 Dec. 1978 (National Health Service Act).
Presidential Decree No. 185 of 13 Feb. 1964 (Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Rules).
IAEA-SM-309/41
GRANTING LICENCES FOR WORK

WITH RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
OR IONIZING RADIATION IN BULGARIA
T.E TODOROV, H. STOILOVA

Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy
for Peaceful Purposes,
Sofia, Bulgaria
Abstract
GRANTING LICENCES FOR WORK WITH R A D IOACTIVE MATERIALS OR
IONIZING RADIATION IN BULGARIA.
A system for granting licences for work with radioactive substances or ionizing
radiation in Bulgaria is discussed. A structure of national competent authorities for granting
licences is presented as well as the basic standards regulating the activity in this field.
Control over radiation protection and its infrastructure is regulated by the Law
on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes [1] and by the Rules on its
application [2].
State control over radiation protection is exercised by the Committee on the
Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes (CUAEPP) through the Inspectorate
on the Safe Use of Atomic Energy (ISUA). The Inspectorate is authorized to
exercise control over all bodies, organizations and officials, ensuring that they
observe the requirements established by the regulations on radiation protection; to
grant licences for the use of atomic energy and to exercise operative control jointly
with the specialized control bodies such as the Ministry of Public Health and Social
Welfare (MPHSW), the Committee on the Protection of the Environment (CPE), the
Bulgarian Trade Unions (BTU) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA).
Operations or activity involving the use of atomic energy may only be
performed after submitting a permit issued by the ISUAE. Licensing for work with
radioactive materials or ionizing radiation is regulated by Instruction No. 5 of the
CUAEPP [3]. It determines the necessary documents, conditions, procedures and
terms for issuing licences for the use of atomic energy or ionizing radiations.
The Inspectorate issues a permit after receiving a written request from the
organization indicating the operation or activity relevant to the use of radioactive
materials or ionizing radiation and enclosing the necessary documentation.
For monitoring the consistency of this documentation with the requirements of
radiation protection, the ISUAE performs an expert assessment. In the Instruction
given by the CUAEPP it is envisaged that a licence should be granted for each
separate stage of the operations and activities concerning work with radioactive
materials or ionizing radiation. The provisions of the Instruction are applied for sites
47
48 TODOROV and STOILOVA
where radioactive substances or other sources of ionizing radiations are produced,

stored or used. Licences for these activities or operations are granted for a limited
term which may not exceed two years for designing; four years for construction; four
years for commissioning and operation; four years for production, import and export
of radioactive materials or sources of ionizing radiation. For decommissioning of a
site, a special commission defines a time span for the decommissioning on the basis
of a site examination.
The organization requesting a licence for the use of ionizing radiation has to
present to the ISUAE the following documents: argumentation for the necessity of
developing the requested activity or operation; estimation of the effectiveness of this
activity or operation; preliminary description of the type of activity and its organi
zation; and main characteristics of the source of ionizing radiation.
In the case of granting a licence for selection of a site, the applicant should
present in addition: a comparative assessment of all possible sites with respect to
radiation protection; the characteristics and a plan of the proposed site; and an
assessment of the influence of closely located enterprises and installations.
At the request of the applicant the CUAEPP may appoint a commission to esti
mate the fitness of the site for work with sources of ionizing radiation and for startup
of normal operation. A declaration on the availability of the documents and
conditions enumerated in the Instruction is attached to the request for granting a
licence. In compliance with the declaration the applicant prepares and submits to the
commission the following documents:
(1) Order of the applicants Head for the appointment of a Head of Utility.
(2) Documents regulating the organization of the enterprises internal control on
radiation safety.
(3) Instructions ensuring radiation safety at the utility under normal operation.
(4) Instructions for personnel activities in the event of an accident.
(5) Technical documentation of apparatus, devices and equipment and passports of
radioactive substances.
(6) Documents for classification, medical certificates of persons licensed for
work, issued by a specialized medical establishment.
(7) Diary of routine instructions and instructions for special cases with data
entered for each day and month.
(8) Diary for technical maintenance of devices, apparatus and equipment using
sources of ionizing radiation.
(9) Instruction and diary for receipt, storage of and accounting for radioactive
substances from storage.
(10) Programme for radiation monitoring.
(11) Diary for overall and individual dosimetric control.
(12) Certificates of checks and standardization of radiometric and dosimetric
equipment.
IAEA-SM-309/41 49
The ISUAE may grant a licence or refuse it on the basis of a report prepared
by the commission and/or a report on ascertained defects.
The Instruction also sets out procedures concerning changes in the design,
structure and technology that are of importance for radiation protection, production,
import and export of radiation materials; for issuing licences for the transportation
of radioactive substances as well as permits for the use of foodstuffs, water, building
materials, fertilizers and other substances in view of their radioactive content.
To change designs, constructions and technologies the applicant must submit
a written request for the grant of a licence, supported by the following documents:
(1) Reasons necessitating the change.
(2) Revised design, constructive, technological and operational documentation,
including schemes and drawings pertaining to radiation safety.
(3) Documents to be co-ordinated with the main designer.
(4) Analysis and conclusions as regards compliance of the submitted change with
the requirements of standards and technical documents on radiation safety.
When changes of constructions and technologies are carried out while working
at the utility the ISUAE grants a licence after safe storage of the radioactive
substances is assured.
In the case of granting a licence for the import of radioactive substances the
trading organization or applicant must submit:
(1) A draft agreement for the import of radioactive substances.
(2) A generalized specification as to the type, quantity and activity of radioactive
substances.
(3) A specification for the radioactive substances contained in the combined
delivery.
(4) A list of the organizations applying for the import of radioactive substances.
(5) An annual schedule for the import of radioactive substances.
In the case of granting a licence for the export of radioactive substances the
organization or applicant submits:
(1) An explanatory note for that particular case of export.
(2) Technical documentation, instructions, certificates for the sources, producer
instructions.
(3) Certificate for the consistency of the devices, apparatus, equipment and
package sets with the requirements of the appropriate standards.
(4) Protocol for dosimetric measurements.
In the case of granting a permanent licence for transport of radioactive
substances the ISUAE requires the following documents:
(1) Explanatory note for the necessity of a specially equipped transport vehicle,
including data on the type and activity of the radioactive substances trans-
50 TODOROV and STOILOVA
ported, the expected frequency of the transportations, possible destinations.

(2) Certificates for the transport package sets.
(3) Description, with drawings and plans of the measures taken to specially equip
the vehicle.
(4) Radiation safety instructions when using a special transport vehicle.
(5) Instruction for personnel actions under emergency conditions.
(6) Order of the organization or applicants Head appointing persons responsible
for the transportation.
(7) Protocol of the results of radiometric and dosimetric monitoring.
In the case of granting a single licence for the transport of radioactive
substances the ISUAE requires the following documents:
(1) Certificates for the transport package sets.
(2) Description of the type, activity and quantity of a radioactive substance to be
transported.
(3) Description of a transport vehicle, extra radiation protection measures taken,
point of departure, route, destination.
(4) Initial and supposed final date of the transportation.
(5) Order of the organization or applicants Head appointing persons responsible
for the transportation.
(6) Radiation safety instructions during transportation.
(7) Instructions for personnel actions in emergency situations.
(8) Protocol of the results of radiometric and dosimetric checks.
The effectiveness has been confirmed of the preliminary approval of
Instruction No. 5 and its introduction into the infrastructure of radiation protection
along with Instruction No. 2 [4] dealing with cases and procedures for notifying the
CUAEPP in the event of any operational change, accident or emergency relevant to
radiation protection.
A computer system has been developed for monitoring the location of radio
active materials, for making analyses in the case of accident or emergency situations
relevant to radiation protection and control over the strict implementation of the
instructions, etc.
REFERENCES
[1] Law on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, State Gazette No. 79, Sofia.
[2] Rules on Application of the Lawson the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes,
State Gazette No. 66, Sofia.
[3] Instruction No. 5 of the C U A E P P for Granting Licences on the Use of Atomic Energy,
State Gazette No. 13, Sofia.
[4] Instruction No. 2 of the C U A E P P on Cases and Procedures for Notifying the C U A E P P
in the Event of Operational Changes, Accident or Emergency Situations Relevant to
Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, State Gazette No. 26, Sofia.
IAEA-SM-309/24
LICENCIAS DE CONSTRUCCION
Y OPERACION PARA PLANTAS
INDUSTRIALES DE IRRADIACION
L. BURGOS, E. MOSCHELLA
Buenos Aires, Argentina
Abstract-Resumen
G R A N T I N G O F C O N S T R U C T I O N A N D O P E R A T I N G LICENCES F O R INDUSTRIAL
IRRADIATION PLANTS.
The paper describes the steps to be followed for the granting of construction and operat
ing licences for industrial irradiation plants, on the basis of Argentine experience of facilities
of this type. The paper analyses the requirements drawn up by the regulatory authority for
the designation of primary responsibility and for quality assurance. It describes the minimum
content of the mandatory documentation to be submitted to demonstrate compliance with the
general safety principles in force and sets out the requirements to be met for obtaining an oper
ating licence for a facility. The methodology employed for inspections during the construction,
commissioning and operation of a plant is also described. Finally, an analysis is made of the
contents of licences (responsibilities, general and special conditions during construction and
operation, period of validity, reports and inspections).
LICENCIAS D E C O N S T R U C C I O N Y O P E R A C I O N P A R A P L A N T A S INDUSTRIALES
D E IRRADIACION.
El presente trabajo describe los pasos a seguir para el otorgamiento de las licencias de
construccin y operacin de plantas industriales de irradiacin, de acuerdo a la experiencia
recabada en las instalaciones de este tipo que se encuentran en la Argentina. Se analizan los
requerimientos que formula la autoridad regulatoria referidos a la designacin de un responsa
ble primario y a las prcticas de calidad. Se detalla el contenido mnimo de la documentacin
mandatoria necesario para acreditar debidamente los pincipios generales de seguridad
conforme a la normativa vigente. Se establecen los requerimientos que deben cumplirse para
que finalmente se licencie la operacin de la instalacin. Asimismo, se describe la metodologa
empleada en las inspecciones efectuadas durante la construccin, la puesta en marcha y la
operacin de la planta. Finalmente, se analiza el contenido de las licencias otorgadas en cuanto
a responsabilidades, condiciones generales y particulares durante la construccin y operacin,
perodos de vigencia, comunicaciones e inspecciones.
1. INTRODUCCION
Se presentan secuencialmente las instancias que se cumplen durante el licencia-

miento de instalaciones industriales de irradiacin.
51
52 BURGOS y MOSCHELLA
El empleo de radiaciones para la esterilizacin de productos quirrgicos,

mdicos y farmacolgicos, as como para la irradiacin de alimentos y polmeros,
se viene realizando en la Argentina desde 1970.
La Comisin Nacional de Energa Atmica (CNEA) cuenta con una planta de
irradiacin semi-industrial del tipo multipropsito, con una actividad mxima de
3,7 X IO16 Bq (106 Ci).
Tambin existe en operacin una planta privada de igual actividad, destinada
al desarrollo de actividades comerciales.
Los actos regulatorios durante el licnciamiento de estas instalaciones son: el
otorgamiento de una Licencia de Construccin, la autorizacin para la carga de la
fuente y el otorgamiento de una Licencia de Operacin.
2. PRINCIPALES INSTANCIAS EN EL PROCESO DE LICENCIAMIENTO
Las principales instancias en el proceso de licnciamiento son:

Otorgamiento de la Licencia de Construccin.
Extensin de la autorizacin para la carga.
Concesin de la Licencia de Operacin.
La Autoridad establece las normas y requerimientos que debe cumplir el
usuario durante el desarrollo de todas las etapas y tiene a su cargo la supervisin del
cumplimiento de las pautas por ella establecidas.
En el Cuadro I se resumen los principales requerimientos solicitados por la
Autoridad en cada instancia, as como las acciones que la misma lleva a cabo con
el fin del licnciamiento.
3. OTORGAMIENTO DE LA LICENCIA DE CONSTRUCCION
Los requerimientos que formula la Autoridad en esta etapa son:
3.1. Designacin de un Responsable Primario
En la primera interaccin se requiere la designacin de un Responsable

Primario de la construccin y puesta en marcha, quien obrar como interlocutor con
la Autoridad. La persona designada debe ser un profesional con experiencia en
seguridad radiolgica, demostrada a travs de trabajos anteriores o, en su defecto,
mediante una prueba de competencia sobre criterios de diseo, clculo de blindaje
y normas de seguridad radiolgica.
IAEA-SM-309/24 53
CUADRO I. REQUERIMIENTOS PARA EL LICENCIAMIENTO DE PLANTAS

DE IRRADIACION
Requerimientos que
Acto regulatorio formula la Autoridad Acciones
Designacin de un Reconocimiento de la zona

Responsable Primario del futuro emplazamiento
Otorgamiento Prcticas de calidad Anlisis de la documen

de la Licencia tacin presentada y otorga
de Construccin Informe preliminar miento de una Licencia de
de seguridad Construccin
Presentacin de: Inspecciones durante la

construccin
Cdigo de prctica
Manual de operaciones Inspecciones durante la
Manual de mantenimiento puesta en marcha sin
Programa de pruebas carga de la fuente
preoperacionales
Autorizacin Licnciamiento del Verificacin del cumpli

para la carga personal miento de las prcticas
de la fuente de calidad
Anlisis de la documentacin
Autorizacin de carga
de la fuente
Cumplimiento de los Verficacin del blindaje

reglamentos de trans con cada carga
porte y procedimiento
de carga Verificacin del cumpli
miento de las prcticas
Concesin de la Verificacin del blindaje de calidad
Licencia de
Operacin Entrega de documentacin Otorgamiento de una
(versiones finales) Licencia de Operacin
Cumplimiento de
reglamentaciones vigentes
(otros organismos)
Cumplimiento de la Inspecciones peridicas

Licencia de Operacin
Operacin Otras acciones para

mejorar la seguridad
de la instalacin
3.2. Prcticas de calidad
Los requerimientos sobre las prcticas de calidad que formula la Autoridad se

aplican durante la construccin, puesta en marcha y operacin de una planta de
irradiacin. Se detallan a continuacin las prcticas exigidas:
a) Implementacin de un sistema general de documentacin segn el cual se gene
ren, aprueben, distribuyan, revisen y archiven todos los documentos
necesarios para cumplir con las distintas actividades.
b) Asignacin inequvoca y documentada de funciones y responsabilidades.
c) Elaboracin de procedimientos o planes de trabajo para la ejecucin de tareas,
principalmente para procesos especiales y tpicos vinculados con la seguridad,
incluyendo compra y almacenamiento de componentes para reemplazo.
d) Implementacin de un programa de calibracin para todos los instrumentos de
medicin utilizados.
e) Implementacin de un programa de capacitacin especfica del personal que lo
requiera y certificacin peridica de la idoneidad para la funcin.
f) Registro de las actividades llevadas a cabo.
g) Vigilancia y evaluacin peridica de la aplicacin de las prcticas de calidad
por personal no vinculado con la ejecucin de las tareas y dependiente del
mximo nivel de responsabilidad de la planta.
3.3. Presentacin de un Informe preliminar de seguridad
Este requerimiento responde a la necesidad de documentar debidamente los

principios generales de seguridad conforme a la normativa vigente.
La Autoridad establece los lincamientos bsicos para la confeccin del Informe
preliminar de seguridad, de modo tal que su contenido permita evaluar los criterios
de seguridad aplicados en el diseo.
Por lo tanto resulta imprescindible contar con la siguiente informacin:
a) Estudio de emplazamiento y planos de situacin. El contenido requerido
incluye un estudio sobre la sismicidad de la zona y las caractersticas del suelo.
b) Descripcin del recinto de irradiacin y planos generales y de detalle. La
instalacin debe estar concebida de modo tal que las dosis que reciban, tanto
el pblico como los operadores, sean tan bajas como sea razonablemente posi
ble. La informacin suministrada debe demostrar que el diseo est optimizado
y que se asegura un adecuado blindaje de la fuente en toda circunstancia. Los
planos deben indicar las cotas principales y mostrar claramente las posiciones
relativas de los locales de explotacin.
IAEA-SM-309/24 55
c) Descripcin de la pileta. La informacin suministrada debe mostrar las previ

siones de diseo contempladas para las siguientes situaciones:
Irradiacin por prdida del blindaje: se debe garantizar la estanqueidad de
la pileta y prever los medios para controlar el nivel de agua.
Corrosin de la fuente: se deben explicitar cules sern los dispositivos que
aseguran que la resistividad del agua no sea inferior a 105/cm y la concen
tracin de cloruros no supere 1 mg/L.
Fisura de la pileta en caso de sismo: para zonas ssmicas deben suminis
trarse los clculos de resistencia de la pileta a los desplazamientos horizon
tales y verticales del suelo debido a aceleraciones provocadas por eventuales
sismos. Estos estn definidos como caractersticas del emplazamiento por
el Instituto Nacional de Previsin Ssmica.
Asimismo, deben explicitarse cules son las previsiones de diseo en caso
de producirse una prdida de agua.
d) Descripcin de la fuente. La informacin requerida incluye la descripcin de
las fuentes, del porta-fuente, del sistema de izaje y de los dispositivos que pro
tegen la fuente de choques eventuales. Asimismo, la informacin debe con
tener la descripcin de los sistemas de deteccin de la posicin de la fuente y
del sistema de descenso automtico de la misma (el descenso debe producirse
ante la deteccin de cualquier anomala: aumento de la temperatura en el
recinto de irradiacin, ocupacin indebida, falla en la ventilacin, sismo, etc.).
e) Descripcin de la cadena de seguridad. Debe describirse el conjunto de sis
temas, equipos y componentes que conforman la cadena de seguridad para
prever la ocurrencia de los siguientes eventos:
Presencia de personal en el recinto de irradiacin cuando la fuente est
expuesta o cuando el nivel de agua de la pileta descienda por debajo del
nivel de seguridad.
Izaje de la fuente cuando el ingreso al recinto de irradiacin est habilitado.
Los enclavamientos utilizados en la cadena de seguridad deben tener una
confiabilidad mejor de 102 por demanda.
f) Descripcin del sistema de ventilacin. La informacin suministrada permitir
verificar que el sistema de ventilacin mantendr los niveles de ozono por
debajo de 0,1 ppm.
g) Descripcin de los sistemas de vigilancia radiolgica de los locales. Los moni
tores de reas deben estar descriptos y especificadas sus caractersticas tcnicas
y su distribucin de acuerdo con la estimacin de los niveles de irradiacin de
los locales contiguos al recinto de irradiacin.
h) Descripcin del sistema de deteccin y extincin de incendios. Se debe
suministrar una estimacin de la carga de fuego mxima del local y una
descripcin de los sistemas previstos para la deteccin y extincin de
incendios.
i) Descripcin del sistema de transporte. Se deben describir las vas de ingreso

y egreso del material al recinto de irradiacin, el modo de carga y descarga
y los sistemas de impulsin.
Si bien el sistema de transporte es un sistema de proceso, la imporrtancia de
requerir su descripcin radica en el riesgo potencial de ingreso de personas por las
vas de carga y descarga al recinto de irradiacin.
4. CONTENIDO DE LA LICENCIA DE CONSTRUCCION
4.1. Responsabilidades
En la Licencia de Construccin se define la Entidad Responsable, organizacin

que tendr la obligacin de responder por la seguridad radiolgica de la instalacin,
prestando al Responsable Primario todo el apoyo que ste necesite para dar cumpli
miento a lo establecido en la Licencia.
Dentro de las condiciones que se estipulan en este documento se establece que
la Entidad Responsable debe hacer todo lo que sea razonable y compatible con sus
posibilidades en favor de la seguridad, cumpliendo como mnimo las normas y
requerimientos impuestos por la Autoridad. El cumplimiento de esas normas y
requerimientos no la exime de su responsabilidad de la seguridad y si bien puede
delegar total o parcialmente la ejecucin de sus tareas, mantiene ntegramente su
responsabilidad. Todo cambio en la organizacin de la Entidad Responsable que
pueda afectar su capacidad para afrontar las responsabilidades definidas en la Licen
cia deber ser aprobado por la Autoridad.
4.2. Perodo de vigencia
La Licencia de Construccin ser de aplicacin desde el momento de su emi

sin hasta el otorgamiento de la Licencia de Operacin. No obstante y durante dicho
perodo la Autoridad puede modificar o ampliar los trminos de la misma, si el logro
de los objetivos de seguridad as lo hacen aconsejable. Asimismo para iniciar la etapa
de puesta en marcha de la instalacin, la Entidad Responsable deber contar con una
autorizacin adicional otorgada por la Autoridad.
4.3. Condiciones
En la Licencia de Construccin queda documentado que es obligacin de la

Entidad Responsable construir la instalacin de acuerdo con el diseo presentado en
el Informe preliminar de seguridad y que cualquier cambio significativo en el diseo
que pudiera afectar la seguridad radiolgica de la instalacin debe ser previamente
autorizado.
IAEA-SM-309/24 57
A partir de la emisin de la Licencia de Construccin se fijan plazos para el

cumplimiento sistemtico de los requerimientos venideros. De este modo se preve,
en los tiempos acordados en la Licencia, la entrega de la siguiente documentacin:
1) Cdigo de prctica
2) Manual de operaciones
3) Manual de mantenimiento
4) Programas de pruebas preoperacionales
5) Informe final de seguridad
6) Informe sobre los resultados obtenidos en las pruebas de puesta en marcha
7) Solicitud de la Licencia de Operacin.
5. REQUISITOS PARA LA CARGA DE LA FUENTE
Para extender la autorizacin de carga de la fuente deben cumplirse los requeri

mientos que la Autoridad formula. Las Secciones 5.1 y 5.2 detallan los requeri
mientos solicitados.
Asimismo, el contenido de la documentacin que la instalacin presenta en esta
etapa, debe satisfacer los lineamientos preestablecidos y ajustarse a los criterios de
seguridad vigentes.
La Autoridad efecta inspecciones durante la construccin y puesta en marcha
en fro. El resultado de dichas inspecciones suministra la informacin complemen
taria para evaluar la extensin de la autorizacin para la carga. Las Secciones 5.3
y 5.4 detallan la metodologa aplicada en las inspecciones.
5.1. Presentacin de la documentacin mandatoria
Durante esta etapa, de acuerdo al cronograma establecido en la Licencia de

Construccin, la Entidad Responsable debe presentar una serie de documentos a la
Autoridad. A continuacin se explicita el contenido mnimo requerido de los
documentos en cuestin:
a) Contenido del cdigo de prctica
Organigrama y funciones.
Delimitacin de reas.
Procedimientos para el ingreso, permanencia y egreso del personal en las
distintas reas.
Plan de monitoraje personal y de reas.
Procedimientos para casos incidentales y accidentales.
b) Contenido del manual de operaciones
Descripcin de la conduccin de las operaciones previstas en situacin
normal (incluye carga y descarga de la fuente).
c) Contenido del manual de mantenimiento

Organigrama, funciones y responsabilidades.
Clasificacin de los sistemas, equipos y componentes.
Instrucciones de mantenimiento dadas por el fabricante.
Procedimientos para efectuar el mantenimiento.
Especificaciones de materiales y componentes para reemplazo.
Frecuencias de mantenimiento.
Operaciones de mantenimiento preventivo o correctivo.
d) Contenido del programa de pruebas preoperacionales
Organizacin y responsabilidades.
Procedimientos. Cronograma.
5.2. Licnciamiento del personal
La Licencia personal es un certificado expedido por la Autoridad que reconoce

la capacidad tcnico-cientfica necesaria para desempear una funcin en un tipo de
instalacin relevante.
Por otra parte, la Autorizacin Especfica es la habilitacin expedida por la
Autoridad que faculta a una persona a ejercer una funcin especificada en una
instalacin relevante determinada.
La formacin bsica y la especializada que deben poseer los aspirantes a cubrir
las posiciones licenciables estn claramente establecidas en la normativa vigente en
el pas. Asimismo estn definidos tanto los requerimientos de aptitud psicofsica
como los conocimientos y experiencias de detalle para el desempeo adecuado de una
funcin especificada. Las posiciones licenciables en Argentina son: Jefe de la instala
cin, Jefe de operacin, operadores y encargado de mantenimiento.
5.3. Inspecciones durante la construccin
Durante las inspecciones efectuadas en esta etapa es punto de inters toda cons
truccin comprometida con el blindaje (llenado de los muros, pileta, losa del techo).
Se efectan controles sobre las probetas tomadas de las distintas coladas a fin de
verificar la densidad del hormign. Durante la construccin debe verificarse el cum
plimiento de las prcticas de calidad oportunamente requeridas.
5.4. Inspecciones durante la puesta en marcha sin carga de la fuente
Las inspecciones efectuadas en esta etapa se basan en listas de chequeo que

constituyen un registro de pruebas para evaluar el funcionamiento de los sistemas de
seguridad. Las listas de chequeo contienen, para cada prueba efectuada, la condicin
previa a la ejecucin, el objetivo de la prueba y la descripcin en cada caso.
IAEA-SM-309/24 59
6. AUTORIZACION PARA LA CARGA DE LA FUENTE
El incremento en la actividad de la carga se debe realizar en etapas, mediando

en cada una de ellas una autorizacin. De acuerdo a la actividad final de la fuente
se programan las sucesivas cargas.
Del resultado del programa de pruebas preoperacionales aprobado previa-
miente por la Autoridad surgen las condiciones en las que se extiende cada nueva
autorizacin de carga. Asimismo, la operacin de transporte debe ajustarse a los
requerimientos emergentes del Reglamento para el Transporte Seguro de Materiales
Radiactivos del OIEA (Coleccin Seguridad 6, Texto revisado de 1973 (enmen
dado)) y del Reglamento para el Transporte de Materiales Peligrosos (Ministerio de
Obras y Servicios Pblicos, Comisin Nacional del Trnsito y la Seguridad Vial,
abril de 1988)!
7. CONCESION DE LA LICENCIA DE OPERACION
Luego de cada carga parcial de material radiactivo se realizan inspecciones

para verificar tanto el informe final de seguridad como el resto de la documentacin
presentada.
Asimismo, la Autoridad efecta requerimientos en esta etapa. Los mismos se
detallan en las Secciones 7.1-7.3.
7.1. Verificacin del blindaje
La puesta en marcha con carga de la fuente debe realizarse segn las condi
ciones impuestas en la autorizacin correspondiente. En cada carga se verifica la efi
ciencia del blindaje y la correlacin entre las dosis medidas y los valores calculados
en forma terica. Los resultados deben ser documentados y enviados a la Autoridad.
7.2. Entrega de documentacin
La Entidad Responsable debe entregar la documentacin corregida conforme

a las observaciones que oportunamente efectuara la Autoridad y a las modificaciones
introducidas en el desarrollo de las etapas de construccin y puesta en marcha. Estos
documentos deben presentarse dentro de los plazos fijados en la Licencia de
Construccin.
7.3. Cumplimiento de reglamentaciones de otros organismos
La mayora de los riesgos no radiolgicos emergentes de la operacin de una

planta de irradiacin (electrocucin, mecnicos, incendios, etc.) estn previstos en
las respectivas reglamentaciones de los organismos competentes en cada caso. La

Autoridad requiere, previo al otorgamiento de la Licencia de Operacin, la certifica
cin de los controles efectuados por dichos organismos.
8. CONTENIDO DE LA LICENCIA DE OPERACION
8.1. Responsabilidades
Se definen las obligaciones de la Entidad Responsable, del mismo modo que

cuando se otorgara la Licencia de Construccin, aadindose a lo ya mencionado que
aqulla debe designar al Jefe de la instalacin, quin sera el Responsable Primario.
8.2. Perodo de vigencia
La Licencia de Operacin otorgada es aplicable desde el momento de su emi

sin. No obstante ello, la Autoridad puede suspender su validez o modificar los tr
minos de la misma, si por razones de seguridad radiolgica lo considera necesario.
Antes que la instalacin cese definitivamente de operar y con la suficiente
antelacin, debe presentarse a la Autoridad el plan preliminar de puesta fuera de
servicio.
8.3. Condiciones de operacin
Dentro de las condiciones generales de operacin que se estipulan en la Licen

cia, se establece que la instalacin debe ser operada por personal debidamente licen
ciado y autorizado.
Asimismo, se limitan las dosis que puede recibir el personal afectado a la
operacin de la planta y la actividad mxima de material radiactivo con la que se
autoriza a trabajar en la instalacin.
En la licencia se estipulan tambin las condiciones particulares que deben
respetarse durante la operacin:
a) Se definen las reas en las cuales el acceso debe ser controlado y se establecen
las restricciones de acceso al recinto de irradiacin.
b) Se fijan las condiciones que debe cumplir el agua de la pileta: resistividad, con
centracin de cloruros, lmite de contaminacin de material radiactivo y altura
mnima que puede alcanzar el agua antes del accionar de los enclavamientos
de las barreras de acceso al recinto.
c) Se limita la concentracin de ozono por encima de la cual el personal no puede
ingresar al recinto de irradiacin (0,1 ppm).
IAEA-SM-309/24 61
d) Se establece que toda modificacin de un sistema, componente o procedimiento

que tenga influencia significativa en la seguridad de la instalacin o en la pro
teccin radiolgica de su personal debe ser previamente autorizado por la
Autoridad.
e) Se prohibe expresamente el ingreso al recinto de irradiacin de todo material
capaz de generar un evento que pueda afectar la integridad de la fuente.
8.4. Documentacin mandatoria
La Licencia define que la operacin debe encuadrarse en los procedimientos,

disposiciones y restricciones que se estipulan en los siguientes documentos:
Licencia de Operacin
Informe de seguridad
Manual de operaciones
Cdigo de prctica
Manual de mantenimiento
Toda norma, reglamento o recomendacin emitida por la Autoridad que sea
aplicable a la instalacin.
8.5. Registros y comunicaciones
En la Licencia se establecen los registros y comunicaciones que el Responsable

Primario debe efectuar durante la vida til de la instalacin y sus obligaciones en
oportunidad de las inspecciones que lleva a cabo la Autoridad.
9. OPERACION
La Licencia de Operacin constituye el marco regulador durante toda la vida

til de la instalacin.
No obstante, la Licencia de Operacin puede ser modificada por la Autoridad
Regulatoria si la prctica lo hiciera aconsejable.
La Autoridad planifica las inspecciones peridicas segn la metodologa
descripta. Asimismo, se efectan inspecciones extraordinarias en perodos de
recargas, mantenimiento y otras situaciones excepcionales que puedan presentarse.
Las plantas de irradiacin situadas en la Argentina se ajustan al esquema
descripto dentro de la dinmica propia de los nuevos criterios a nivel mundial.
BIBLIOGRAFIA
BURGOS, L., CASTRO, E., Principios generales de seguridad en plantas de irradiacin,

contenido mnimo de la documentacin mandatoria , Asociacin Argentina de Tecnologa
Nuclear, Buenos Aires, Resmenes (1989) 114.
COMISION N A C I O N A L D E E N E R G I A ATOMICA, Autorizaciones Especficas del Per

sonal de Instalaciones Relevantes, Norma del Consejo Asesor para el Licnciamiento de
Instalaciones Nucleares 10.1.1, CALIN, Buenos Aires.
COMISION N A C I O N A L D E ENE R G I A ATOMICA, Licnciamiento de Instalaciones

Relevantes, Norma del Consejo Asesor para el Licnciamiento de Instalaciones Nucleares
0.0.1, CALIN, Buenos Aires.
COMISION N A C I O N A L D E E N E R G I A ATOMICA, Requerimientos de Aptitud Psicofsica

para Autorizaciones Especficas, Norma del Consejo Asesor para el Licnciamiento de
COMISION N A C I O N A L D E E N E R G I A ATOMICA, Seguridad Radiolgica Ocupacional de

Instalaciones Radiactivas Relevantes, Norma del Consejo Asesor para el Licnciamiento de
IAEA-SM-309/60
GESTION DE AUTORIZACION
DE INSTALACIONES RADIACTIVAS
RELEVANTES EN CHILE
P. FERRUZ
Comisin Chilena de Energa Nuclear,
Santiago, Chile
Abstract-Resumen
LICENSING O F RADIOACTIVE FACILITIES IN CHILE.
The licensing of radioactive facilities in Chile has gone through various stages, and a
wealth of experience has been gained concerning the functioning of a competent authority. The
aim of the paper is to describe how the Chilean competent authority dealt, technically and
administratively, with the task of licensing and supervising these installations by setting up
an infrastructure for radiation protection, personnel and biological dosimetry, and standardiza
tion, in order to obtain the information necessary for adequate decision making. The paper
describes the main features of the computerized cross-referenced records system, designed as
a monitoring tool for the competent authoritys supervisory activities. It also reviews national
experience in co-ordinating the work of the two national competent authorities, while allowing
them independence and autonomy within their respective areas of jurisdiction.
GESTION D E A U T O R I Z A C I O N D E INSTALACIONES RADIACTIVAS R E L E V A N T E S

E N CHILE.
La historia relativa a las autorizaciones de las instalaciones radiactivas relevantes
chilenas existentes ha pasado por varias etapas, gracias a lo cual se ha ganado toda una
experiencia que permite enfrentar adecuadamente la problemtica de una Autoridad com
petente. El objeto de este trabajo es dar a conocer la forma como esta Autoridad en Chile
enfrenta tcnica y administrativamente la tarea del licnciamiento y control de estas instala
ciones implementando para ello una infraestructura en proteccin radiolgica, dosimetra per
sonal, estandarizadora y biolgica orientada, fundamentalmente, a complementar la
informacin necesaria para una adecuada toma de decisiones de la Autoridad competente. Se
muestran los fundamentos del diseo de un sistema computarizado de archivos correla
cionados, como herramienta de seguimiento de la gestin controladora de la Autoridad compe
tente y, tambin, cul ha sido la experiencia nacional en orden a lograr una interaccin coordi
nada entre las dos Autoridades competentes nacionales, manteniendo una adecuada indepen
dencia y autonoma dentro de sus respectivas reas de jurisdiccin.
63
64 FERRUZ
1. INTRODUCCION
La legislacin nacional original [1] estableca dos Autoridades competentes

(AC): la Comisin Chilena de Energa Nuclear (CCHEN) y el Ministerio de Salud
(MINSAL), ambas con jurisdiccin claramente diferenciada, a saber:
1) CCHEN. Slo las instalaciones nucleares de investigacin y tambin las radi
activas que se encuentren dentro de sus emplazamientos.
2) MINSAL. Todas las instalaciones radiactivas existentes en el pas.
Posteriormente, como consecuencia del accidente de Goinia, las Autoridades
del Gobierno estimaron que debia ser la CCHEN la institucin que asumiera la fun
cin de autorizacin y control de las instalaciones de primera categora, o instala
ciones radiactivas relevantes (IRR) que hasta ese momento eran de jurisdiccin del
MINSAL, dada la experiencia, infraestructura tcnica y humana especializada que
posea la CCHEN en el rea de la seguridad radiolgica.
Actualmente las IRR1 que deben someterse al proceso de control superan las
600 a lo largo de todo el pas, incluyendo los equipos porttiles de gammagrafa
industrial y, tambin, fuentes selladas relevantes habilitadas para ser desechadas
definitivamente.
Aclarado lo anterior, y en este contexto, el trabajo solo abordar la gestin de
proteccin radiolgica de la AC en relacin con las IRR.
El tema sobre la gestin de autorizacin y control de las instalaciones nucleares
de investigacin, que actualmente existen en Chile, no se abordar en este trabajo.
2. PROBLEMATICA ACTUAL DE LAS AUTORIDADES COMPETENTES
Las legislaciones nacionales, en general, establecen que todas las actividades

vinculadas a las radiaciones ionizantes deben estar debidamene autorizadas por la
Autoridad competente, concretamente: las instalaciones, los operadores, el trans
porte, la importacin, exportacin o transferencia de fuentes radiactivas o equipos
generadores de radiaciones ionizantes (EGRI) a cualquier ttulo, y la eliminacin y
disposicin final de los desechos radiactivos.
No obstante, uno de los principales problemas que enfrentan habitualmente las
AC es el de no disponer de la informacin actualizada relativa de la poblacin de
instalaciones, fuentes y equipos existentes en el pas, debido fundamentalmente al
desconocimiento, por parte de los usuarios, de la legislacin que obliga a
1 De acuerdo con la legislacin vigente, se consideran IRR las instalaciones de primera

categora; plantas de irradiacin, radio y roentgenterapia profunda, aceleradores lineales,
gamma y radiografa industrial y laboratorios de alta radiotoxicidad.
IAEA-SM-309/60 65
A1
A 2
A U T O R ID A D 2
C O N C E P T O P A R TIC U LA R
G e n e ra lm e n te fa cu lta d
de las Com isiones
A t m ica s o Nucleares.
FIG. 1. Autoridad dependiente.
propietarios, usuarios, importadores, personal tcnico en mantencin y otros, a cum

plir determinados requerimientos y a tener sus correspondientes autorizaciones
vigentes.
Adicionalmente, a juicio del autor, la existencia de distintas AC en un pas,
sin ninguna vinculacin tcnica entre ellas, incorpora dificultades adicionales, tanto
para el usuario como para las propias AC, debido a las inevitables intersecciones que
existen entre las facultades de ellas; para el usuario, en tanto que debe dar cumpli
miento a requisitos impuestos por diferentes AC, criterios de inspeccin diversos,
procedimientos y formatos distintos en cuanto a la entrega de informacin, etc.;
y para las AC, en tanto cada una de ellas debe cumplir su funcin, aun sabiendo que
la(s) otra(s) debern hacer lo mismo.
Estas intersecciones se producen generalmente debido a que atribuciones
legales muy amplias otorgadas a una de ellas hace que las facultades correspon
dientes a la otra sean, conceptualmente, un subconjunto de las facultades de la
primera y, por tanto, la gestin de control, adems de ser doble para el usuario, aca
rrea consecuentemente una subordinacin del accionar de una AC a la otra (Fig. 1).
La situacin aqui reseada se di en Chile a partir del ao 71 y hasta el ao
1984, perodo durante el cual la CCHEN cumpla la funcin de AC, por delegacin
de facultades del MINSAL. No obstante esta delegacin, el MINSAL conservaba
todas sus facultades adems de la de sancin, la cual nunca deleg en la CCHEN.
Tambin se originan intersecciones porque las distintas AC poseen facultades
legales equivalentes, sin un adecuado marco normativo que regule su intervencin
en aquellas zonas en donde las facultades de las distintas autoridades se superponen
(Fig. 2).
66 FERRUZ
A C C IO N C O M U N DE A M B A S A C
REFERIDAS A L M IS M O O B JE T O
FIG. 2. Facultades legales equivalentes.
La consecuencia de esta segunda situacin es obvia: la zona de interseccin

podra terminar siendo tierra de nadie y, lo que es peor, las actividades all desa
rrolladas podran evolucionar y realizarse sin ningn control, por el natural conven
cimiento de que dicha zona corresponde a la otra AC.
Esta es la situacin que de alguna manera se vive actualmente en el pas y, a
objeto de prevenir los problemas antes citados, se trabaja en forma conjunta (Al y
A2, Fig. 2) en aquellos tpicos que caen en la zona de interseccin.
3. PERSPECTIVA EN CHILE
3.1. Situacin legal actual
Como ya se mostr, Chile no ha estado al margen de las situaciones organiza-

cionales y de dependencia anteriormente sealadas (Figs. 1 y 2), las cuales distan
mucho de ser sistemas que faciliten la gestin licenciadora y controladora de cual
quier AC.
Del anlisis de las situaciones anteriores se desprende como solucin obvia la
independencia total entre las AC, situacin que se vivi en Chile desde 1984 hasta
antes del 10 de agosto de 1985 [2] (Fig. 3) y que, ajuicio del autor, es ideal en tanto
exista claridad en cuanto a facultades y mbito de accin perfectamente definidos
IAEA-SM-309/60 67
para las distintas AC y no exista ni interaccin ni dependencia de ningn tipo entre

ellas. No obstante, a partir de la fecha anteriormente sealada, y como consecuencia
de un cambio en la legislacin nacional, se entregan parte de las facultades que tena
el MINSAL a la CCHEN, cayndose con ello, nuevamente, en el esquema de
funcionamiento sealado en la Fig. 2.
3.2. Interaccin entre Autoridades competentes
Con la experiencia previamente vivida, antes de 1984, bajo un sistema de

compartir atribuciones [3], se gan como enseanza que, en esas circunstancias,
debe existir una instancia de coordinacin entre las AC con organizacin, metodolo
ga de trabajo, propsitos y metas claramente establecidas, con el nico fin de per
mitir una adecuada gestin licenciadora y controladora de las autoridades, evitando
con ello las tierras de nadie y la proliferacin de actividades sin el
correspondiente control. Es as como al producirse la interaccin y, ms an, la
interseccin entre ambas autoridades en Chile, se gener una instancia de coordina
cin denominada Grupo Tcnico de Trabajo (GTT), cuya funcin se describe ms
adelante.
3.2.1. Esquema de organizacin
La organizacin que permite en Chile el trabajo coordinado entre ambas AC

es la que se seala en la Fig. 4.
CCHEN MINSAL
FIG. 3. Autoridades independientes.

68 FERRUZ
FIG. 4. Esquema de organizacin para la interaccin entre las AC.

IAEA-SM-309/60 69
3.2.2. Mecnica de trabajo
Tal como lo demuestra el esquema de organizacin (Fig. 4), existen dos instan
cias tcnicas de trabajo, la instancia del Grupo Tcnico de Trabajo (GTT), y la del
Grupo Tcnico de Especialistas (GTE), y una instancia poltica, el Grupo Mixto
(GM). No obstante, el grupo que tiene por funcin estudiar los problemas comunes
inherentes a aquellas situaciones relevantes para la gestin de control de ambas AC
es el GTT.
El GTT, constituido por tres representantes de cada institucin, es la instancia
en la cual cada AC presenta sus respectivos puntos de vista relacionados con los
problemas normativos, de gestin de licnciamiento y control y de todo aquello que
corresponde realizar a las AC All se proponen alternativas de solucin, se fijan
plazos para el cumplimiento de metas y se deciden las acciones a seguir.
Este grupo decide:
Aquellas actividades o conceptos que, al ser de inters general, deben ser de

conocimiento de las autoridades nacionales y, por lo tanto, sometidas a ellas
para su resolucin. (GTT-GM.)
Aquellas actividades que estn dentro del mbito de accin del mismo GTT y,
por tanto, se resuelven en este mismo grupo, o se encomiendan las actividades
directamente a uno o varios miembros del mismo. (GTT-GTT.)
Aquellas actividades de corte tcnico puntual, o muy especializadas, que deben
ser trabajadas en grupos inter o multiinstitucionales constituidos por
especialistas. (GTT-GTE.)
En la Fig. 5 se muestra un diagrama lgico de funcionamiento de esos tres
grupos de decisin y la forma de relacionarse.
Tanto los temas tratados, como los acuerdos logrados, las actividades a desa
rrollar y los plazos fijados se estampan en actas con la firma de todos los integrantes
del GTT. De dichas actas se desprenden: las directrices en el rea de la seguridad
radiolgica que cada A.C. debe cumplir con sus propios recursos, as como la cons
titucin de los diversos grupos interdisciplinarios de especialistas (GTE), los cuales
deben reportar sus resultados al GTT dentro de los plazos previamente fijados.
Los GTE son grupos pequeos que, en general, estn constituidos por tres o
cuatro profesionales especialistas en las areas o temas de discusin. Son los encar
gados de estudiar problemas puntuales que aparecen de las discusiones del GTT y
que, por ser de una gran especialidad, escapan del alcance y resolucin de este grupo
tcnico de trabajo (GTT). El GTE estudia los problemas especficos y expone sus
resultados y proposiciones de soluciones al GTT para su discusin y aprobacin.
Ahora bien, si la situacin as lo recomienda, se promueve y coordina una
reunin del Grupo Mixto (GM), el cual se encuentra constituido fundamental
mente por ambas autoridades institucionales nacionales, esto es, el Director Ejecu
tivo de la CCHEN y el Subsecretario de Salud. Los integrantes del GTT tambin
70 FERRUZ

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FIG. 5.
IAEA-SM-309/60 71
participan en esta instancia, pero slo como asesores de las respectivas autoridades
institucionales. Estas autoridades institucionales deciden polticamente las acciones
a seguir, respecto a las actividades propuestas por el GTT.
En cuanto a la modalidad de sesiones de los distintos grupos, se contempla una
reunin ordinaria mensual del GTT y tantas reuniones del GTE como sean
necesarias, y a lo menos una reunin al ao del GM para informar de los logros y
avances realizados.
3.2.3. Programa de actividades
Entre las actividades ms relevantes que se pueden destacar, como consecuen

cia de esta interaccin coordinada de ambas AC, estn las siguientes:
a) Estudio del inventario real de fuentes y equipos existentes en el pas;

b) Delimitacin del accionar de cada AC dentro del marco de la legislacin
vigente;
c) Modificacin del Reglamento de Proteccin Radiolgica;
d) Estudio del marco legal vigente y ampliacin del mismo;
e) Estudio del hombre estndar nacional y su correspondiente dieta promedio;
f) Capacitacin y difusin en el mbito de aquellas instituciones nacionales que,
de una u otra forma, pueden o deben cooperar con la AC;
g) Coordinacin de acciones en caso de emergencias radiolgicas;
h) Generacin de diferentes GTE para estudiar especficamente:
Glosario de trminos nucleares
Intercomparaciones, de dosimetra personal
Intercomparaciones de dosimetra estandarizadora
Criterios de aplicacin de la reglamentacin a instalaciones que caean en el
mbito de accin de ambas A.C.
Aplicacin del Reglamento de Transporte
Criterios asociados a la proteccin radiolgica y uso del Ra-226 en uso
mdico
Contenido de cursos de proteccin radiolgica para operadores.
Todas estas actividades, ms otras, han derivado en la realizacin de acciones
concretas, tales como inspecciones conjuntas, intercomparaciones in situ, etc., y
tambin en la preparacin del proyecto de las normas que en un futuro prximo debe
rn ser de aplicacin nacional.
<
3.3. La CCHEN como autoridad competente
3.3.1. Programa de legislacin nacional
Si bien es cierto que la legislacin vigente [4-6] da atribuciones equivalentes

a ambas AC, no es menos cierto que slo a la CCHEN se le entrega la respon-
72 FERRLZ
sabilidad de normar las actividades vinculadas con la aplicacin de la tecnologa

nuclear. Por esta razn se trabaja en un programa nacional de reglamentacin y nor
mativa tcnica que ser de aplicacin nacional. Este programa tiene dos com
ponentes: el primero, que consiste en un conjunto de normas que siendo del mbito
de aplicacin para IRR tambin podra servir las restantes instalaciones radiactivas,
en cuyo caso se propone al GTT para su estudio y resolucin; el segundo grupo
consiste en normas, de uso exclusivo para la IRR, que de acuerdo a nuestra legisla
cin corresponde a las instalaciones de la categora, y cuyo trmite de oficializacin
compete nica y exclusivamente a la CCHEN.
Dentro del primer grupo estn los siguientes documentos regulatorios:
Modificacin del Reglamento de Proteccin Radiolgica [7]
Glosario de trminos nucleares
Criterios bsicos de seguridad radiolgica
Procedimientos para la gestin de desechos radiactivos
Norma para la autorizacin de operadores
Norma para la autorizacin de instalaciones
Contenido programtico de cursos de proteccin radiolgica
Procedimiento para la aplicacin del Reglamento de Transporte.
Dentro del segundo grupo se encuentran:
Procedimiento para el licnciamiento de las IRR

Contenido y formato de los informes de seguridad para los IRR
Contenido de los Planes de Emergencia para las IRR
Contenido del Manual de Proteccin Radiolgica de las IRR
Contenido del Manual de Organizacin y Procedimientos de las IRR
Contenido de los planes de pruebas preoperacionales para las IRR
Condiciones psicofsicas para operadores de IRR.
Todo este conjunto de normas, ms las actualmente vigentes, seha basado en
las Normas de Seguridad del OIEA, particularmente en losVols. Nos7 y9de la
Coleccin Seguridad del Organismo, para la elaboracin de la reglamentacin de
Transporte y Proteccin Radiolgica, as como en los Vols. Nos 50-SG-01 a 0 5 y
50-C-0, de cuyos textos se han extrado muchas ideas y conceptos, los cuales, adap
tados a la forma y tcnica legislativas y adecuados al estado de desarrollo nacional,
han pasado a constituir parte importante de los documentos mandatorios, relativos
a las IRR.
3.3.2. Sistema tcnico administrativo de control (STAC)
El manejo de toda la informacin relativa a la gestin de autorizacin y control

que realiza la AC es fundamental, en tanto constituye una herramienta fundamental
para la realizacin de un verdadero y efectivo seguimiento de todas las actividades
IAEA-SM-309/60 73
vinculadas a una instalacin, cualquiera sea la fase en que sta se encuentre (diseo,
pruebas preoperacionales, operacin, cierre). Con esta filosofa, la CCHEN ha
implementado un sistema computarizado que permite correlacionar una actividad
cualquiera con todas las otras que deberan realizarse o debieron realizarse en la
instalacin en un determinado momento de su existencia. En esencia, lo que se per
sigue con este sistema es que, mediante cualquier dato que se obtenga de alguna de
las actividades correlacionadas del sistema, se pueda conocer el estado o situacin
legal de todas las otras que se realizan o se realizaron en esa instalacin. Las
actividades relacionadas consideradas para la operacin del STAC son:
Importacin de fuentes o equipos
Transporte de fuentes o equipos
Licencia de instalacin
Licencia del operador
Informes de inspeccin
Dosimetra personal
Calibracin de equipos y fuentes
Mantencin de equipos
Disposicin y manejo de desechos
Radiomedicina y radiodiagnstico.
El diagrama de la Fig. 6 muestra la forma de relacionar lgicamente tales
actividades y sus correspondientes datos de entrada.
A requerimiento del operador del sistema, se pueden solicitar todos los datos
relativos a cualquiera de los conceptos que existen en el sistema. Por ejemplo, si se
quieren todos los antecedentes de la instalacin, se podr requerir del sistema:
Identificacin total de la empresa e instalacin
Fecha de la ltima inspeccin
Nombre y situacin legal de todos los operadores que all trabajan
Tipos de equipos que existen en la instalacin, etc.
Si ha existido algn retiro de desecho en el ltimo tiempo.
La forma de alimentar el sistema o base de datos se ha hecho con todos los
antecedentes actualmente existentes en los archivos de la CCHEN y se prev,
adems, alimentarlo con los datos del MINSAL para que este sistema sea en el futuro
una base de datos nacional. Por otra parte, toda solicitud que se presenta a la AC
se hace en formularios preestablecidos, en los cuales se debe vaciar toda la informa
cin que ser til para el STAC. Desde un punto netamente administrativo de con
trol, todo el manejo de la informacin se centraliza en una nica unidad: la Oficina
de Autorizaciones, la cual est encargada de manejar el STAC, mantener al da los
expedientes de todas las instalaciones, organizar las inspecciones e informar a los
usuarios de las fechas de las mismas, requerir los informes de inspeccin y remitirlos
a los usuarios, una vez aprobados por la AC, autorizar los transportes, la importa-
74 FERRUZ
cin y reexpedicin de fuentes. En resumen, mantener vigente el STAC mediante

su gestin tcnica de administracin del sistema y de requisicin de datos.
3.3.3. Infraestructura tcnica
Dado el actual estado de desarrollo de la empresa privada en el pas vinculada

a la tecnologa nuclear, no existen empresas o instituciones acreditadas ante la AC
que puedan prestar los servicios esenciales, desde el punto de vista de la seguridad
radiolgica, para apoyar la gestin de licnciamiento de las IRR existentes. En con
secuencia, la propia CCHEN pone al servicio del pas toda su infraestructura tcnica
IAEA-SM-309/60 75
para evaluar y certificar aquellos parmetros fundamentales necesarios para el otor

gamiento de las autorizaciones. Tal infraestructura es la que corresponde para prestar
los servicios de:
Dosimetra personal flmica y TLD

Dosimetra estandarizadora en actividad y dosis para equipos y fuentes
Radiomedicina, dosimetra clnica y biolgica
Retiro, tratamiento y disposicin final de desechos radiactivos.
Mediante la prestacin de estos servicios, se alimenta tambin el STC.
4. CONCLUSIONES
La clara delimitacin de facultades de las distintas AC dentro de un pas es

fundamental para el ejercicio y desarrollo de la seguridad radiolgica [8]. Si tal
delimitacin no es suficientemente clara, se deben buscar los mecanismos necesarios
tendientes a clarificarla y, consecuentemente, aplicar los criterios normativos dentro
del correspondiente mbito de competencia, sin que ello signifique superposicin de
funciones, ni menos dejar vacos en cuanto a la funcin de autorizacin y control que
las correspondientes autoridades deben realizar.
Aunque en la mayora de los pases se presume, de derecho, que los
reglamentos son conocidos por todos los ciudadanos, debe ser preocupacin fun
damental de la AC difundir y propiciar el conocimiento y aplicacin de los mismos.
Ms an, importantes esfuerzos deben ser desplegados a objeto de lograr establecer
un sistema nacional de informacin relativo a fuentes, equipos, operadores, instala
ciones radiactivas y actividades afnes, lo que redundar en una mejor funcin de
control.
Las instancias de intercambio de experiencias y puntos de vista tcnicos con
otras AC son fundamentales para la unificacin de criterios, en cuanto a la aplicacin
de normas, procedimientos, y criterios tcnicos de seguridad radiolgica y, aun
cuando no es simple, se deben abordar en forma conjunta con el rea mdica aspectos
tan importantes como la aplicacin del sistema de limitacin de dosis en dicha rea
y, en particular, el principio de justificacin de prcticas.
REFERENCIAS
[1] Ley de Seguridad Nuclear, Ley 18302 del 2 de mayo de 1984, Repblica de Chile
(1984).
[2] Ley Modificatoria de la Ley 18302, Ley 18730 de agosto de 1985, Repblica de Chile
(1985).
[3] FERRUZ, P., LOPEZ, F., La reglamentacin de proteccin radiolgica en Chile ,
Radiation Protection in Nuclear Energy (Actas Conf. Sydney, 1988), Vol. 1, OIEA,
Viena (1988) 215-223.
76 FERRUZ
[4] Reglamento sobre Autorizaciones para Instalaciones Radiactivas o Equipos Genera

dores de Radiaciones Ionizantes; Personal que se Desempea en Ellas u Opere Tales
Equipos y Otras Actividades Afines, Decreto Supremo 133 del Ministerio de Salud,
del 22 de mayo de 1984, Repblica de Chile (1984).
[5] Reglamento de Proteccin Radiolgica para Instalaciones Radiactivas, Decreto
Supremo 3 del Ministerio de Salud, del 3 de enero de 1987, Repblica de Chile
(1987).
[6] Reglamento de Transporte Seguro de Materiales Radiactivos, Decreto Supremo 12
del Ministerio de Minera, del 2 de marzo de 1987, Repblica de Chile (1987).
[7] COMISION I N T E R N A C I O N A L D E P R O T E C C I O N RADIOLOGICA, Recommenda
tions of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publicacin 26 de la
CIPR, Pergamon Press, Oxford y Nueva York (1977).
[8] FRANGINI, N.L., Legislacin Nuclear Como Factor Decisivo para un Desarrollo de
las Aplicaciones Pacficas de la Energa Nuclear, Comisin Chilena de Energa
Nuclear, Santiago (1988).
IAEA-SM-309/8
THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSIONS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMME
J. LIEBERMAN
Washington, D .C.,
Abstract
T H E UN I T E D STATES N U C L E A R R E G U L A T O R Y C O M M I S S I O N S E N F O R C E M E N T
PROGRAMME.
The paper addresses the enforcement programme of the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. The criteria used in categorizing the significance of violations and
issuing Notices of Violations, Civil Penalties, and Orders, as well as the process, are
discussed.
1. INTRODUCTION
The enforcement programme of the United States Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (USNRC) addresses, in addition to commercial power reactors and
research reactors, the activities of the approximately 8000 licensed users of special
nuclear material, source material, and by-product material. These material users
include such diverse ones as hospitals, universities, nuclear pharmacies, radio
graphers, moisture density users, well-loggers, and nuclear gauge users.
Briefly, the regulatory scheme that is established in the USA is as follows:
(1) promulgation of regulations by the USNRC which implement various statutes to
establish standards for the public health and safety, (2) issue of licences with specific
conditions to persons who meet the requirements in the regulations and who agree
to comply with USNRC requirements, (3) monitoring licensed activities via
information required from licensees and by USNRC inspections and investigations,
and (4) taking enforcement action when violations of requirements are identified or
when safety issues arise.
The enforcement process begins with the identification of a violation, i.e. a
violation of a legally binding requirement. Requirements are found in statutes,
principally the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 USC 2011, and the
Energy Reorganizations Act of 1974, as amended, 42 USC 5801, regulations issued
in Title 10 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) by the USNRC
to implement these statutes, and the conditions contained in licences. In most cases
licence conditions include the statements contained in the application for the
particular licence.
77
78 LLEBERMAN
2. INSPECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS
Violations are identified as a result of USNRC inspections and investigations.

Most inspections are unannounced and occur at a frequency that is dependent on the
potential hazards presented by the activity regulated.
The normal inspection frequency may be adjusted in response to allegations
and licensee reports. Allegations are information submitted to the USNRC by
employees of licensees and their contractors or competitors, and by members of the
public who raise potential safety issues or report violations. Licensees are required
to submit to the USNRC information on a variety of matters such as significant loss
of material, overexposures, contamination incidents, and defective safety equipment.
The frequency of inspections can also be adjusted depending on a licensees past
performance history.
In addition to inspections which are conducted by experienced, technically
trained individuals, the USNRC utilizes investigators trained to conduct criminal
investigations to perform investigations. Investigations are conducted when viola
tions appear to be intentional, in contrast to negligence or oversight. Investigators
are called in to assist inspectors when it appears that licensees are deceiving or lying
to inspectors, or licensees are wilfully violating requirements. The USNRC
considers wilful violations to be very serious with significant impact on public health
and safety because the integrity of licensees and their employees is at the heart of
the required finding, made before issuing a licence, that there is reasonable assurance
that the licensee will comply with USNRC requirements.
3. ENFORCEMENT POLICY
3.1. Civil and criminal process
After establishing a potential violation from an inspection or investigation,

enforcement action is considered. Before going into the details of the enforcement
process, note that in the USA there are two types of enforcement actions: civil and
criminal. All violations are subject to civil action. However, persons who commit
certain wilful violations may also be subject to criminal sanctions. The USNRC
initiates civil action. Civil action may include, as will be discussed shortly, issuance
of Notices of Violations, Civil Penalties, and Orders to modify, suspend, or revoke
licences. The USNRC refers cases to the United States Department of Justice for
consideration of criminal prosecution. Such action can only be initiated by the
Department of Justice. Criminal action may include criminal fines and incarceration,
i.e. sentencing to prison. The criminal process will not be discussed further but it
may be noted that generally, unless the USNRC desires to issue an Order to modify,
suspend, or revoke a licence, it defers civil action pending the decision by the
Department of Justice on whether to prosecute in a criminal court.
IAEA-SM-309/8 79
3.2. Purpose of enforcement
The USNRC enforcement programme is based on the General Statement of

Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions (NRC Enforcement Policy),
which is published in the US Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR Part 2,
Appendix C. The purpose of USNRC enforcement actions is to promote and protect
the public health and safety by:
ensuring compliance with USNRC requirements;
obtaining prompt correction of violations and adverse conditions which may
affect safety;
deterring future violations ; and
encouraging improvement in performance of licensees and, by example, that
of the nuclear industry, including the prompt identification and reporting of
potential safety problems.
It is recognized that licensees have an inherent incentive to operate their

facilities safely. No licensee desires a significant accident or overexposure. Most
licensees recognize that the USNRC may require an extended shutdown for perfor
mance failures that will have significant economic impact on them. Nevertheless,
notwithstanding these incentives there are at times failures to meet regulatory
requirements. Designs have not always ensured that safety systems function as
intended; equipment is not always operable; licence conditions and implementing
procedures are not always followed; supervisors and employees are not always
attentive to duties; safety issues are not always properly reported; deficiencies are
not always identified through surveillance and quality assurance programmes; and
when identified, are not always properly corrected; proper radiation surveys are not
always performed; persons have been overexposed; and employees have been
discriminated against for raising safety issues.
The enforcement programme is designed to provide additional incentives to
avoid these and other failures and to emphasize the need for meticulous attention to
detail and to maintain the high standards of compliance that both the USNRC and
the public expect of licensees of the Commission. Each enforcement action is
dependent on the circumstances of the case. However, licensees who cannot achieve
and maintain adequate levels of protection are not permitted to conduct licensed
activities.
Recognizing that violations have variations in significance, a graded enforce
ment process is used to distinguish between minor and significant violations of
regulatory requirements. The three basic enforcement tools that the Commission
uses in response to violations are Notices of Violations, Civil Penalties, and Orders.
Before these sanctions are discussed, it should be noted that the USNRC
enforcement programme focuses primarily on the licensee, as licensees or employers
can only act through their employees and agents. It has been a long-standing position
80 LIEBERMAN
of the USNRC that the licensee should be held accountable for all violations
committed by its employees. Enforcement actions are, therefore, normally issued to
licensee-employ ers.
In some cases, however, where the employee has committed wilful actions it
is also appropriate, in addition to action against the licensee, to take action that is
directed to the employee, as will be discussed subsequently.
3.3. Overview of enforcement actions
3.3.1. Notice o f Violation
A Notice of Violation, which is described in 10 CFR 2.201 of the USNRC

regulations, is a written notice that is the standard method of formalizing the
existence of a violation. It requires a written response stating
the reasons for the violation,
the corrective action taken or to be taken, and
the date when full compliance will be achieved.
3.3.2. Civil Penalty
A Civil Penalty is a monetary penalty established by Section 234 of the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 USC 2282), for violation of USNRC require
ments. The penalty provided by statute is up to $100 000 per violation and each day
that a violation continues may be considered a separate violation for purposes of
assessing a Civil Penalty.
Civil Penalty authority was assigned to the USNRC in 1969. Prior to that time,
the USNRC had a choice of issuing a Notice of Violation or an Order. This has been
described as a choice between using a fly swatter or a sledgehammer. There was no
intermediate option. Civil Penalty authority was given to the USNRC to provide it
with the authority to deal with violations of varying severity, thereby assisting the
USNRC in carrying out its responsibilities. Civil Penalties could also be used to
emphasize regulatory concern without depriving a licensee or its employees of their
means of livelihood or without requiring the termination of activities which might
be of material benefit to the public.
The procedures for issuing Civil Penalties are found in 10 CFR 2.205. A
penalty is first proposed in writing. The licensee is then provided an opportunity to
show why the penalty should not be imposed. If the USNRC decides to go forward
with the action, an order imposing the penalty is issued. A licensee may either pay
the penalty or request an administrative hearing within the USNRC. Thereafter, if
the licensee does not pay the penalty, the USNRC may seek collection of the penalty
in a Federal District Court.
IAEA-SM-309/8 81
In practice the vast majority of licensees pay the Civil Penalty following the
Notice of a Proposed Civil Penalty without waiting for the USNRC to issue an order
imposing the penalty.
3.3.3. Order
An Order may suspend or revoke a licence or may modify a licence by

directing the licensee to take or refrain from some action. The procedural require
ments for Orders are found in 10 CFR 2.202 and 2.204. Orders also provide an
opportunity for a hearing. Orders may be made immediately effective prior to a
hearing if the USNRC determines that the public health, safety, and interest so
require or if the violations underlying the Order are wilful. The most common use
of Orders is when the USNRC concludes that without significant changes it does not
have reasonable assurance that licensed activities will be properly conducted. If after
a hearing the licensee is not satisfied with the outcome, the licensee may seek review
in the US Court of Appeals.
4. ENFORCEMENT PROCESS
4.1. Severity levels
After a violation has been established, the first step in the process of deter
mining whether to initiate enforcement action and, if so, which enforcement action
to use, is to determine the severity of the violation. Five Severity Levels are used
to categorize the relative safety significance of each violation. Severity Level I and
violations are defined as very significant. A Severity Level in violation is defined
as a violation of significant regulatory concern. A Severity Level IV violation is one
of more than minor concern which, if left uncorrected, could become a significant
concern. A Severity Level V violation is defined as a violation of minor concern.
Severity Level I, , and in violations are considered escalated actions. These
are the more significant violations. Enforcement actions based on them require
approval of the USNRC headquarters Office of Enforcement and, depending on the
nature of the case, approval of the Deputy Executive Director or the Commission.
Actions based on Severity Level IV and V violations are normally issued by one of
the five USNRC regional offices.
The USNRC Enforcement Policy provides examples of Severity Levels for
categorizing violations in eight supplements for different areas of licensed activities.
These include examples for reactor operations, safeguards, health physics, trans
portation, material operations, and miscellaneous matters. This last category
includes examples for failure to provide complete and accurate information to the
Commission and discrimination against employees for protected activities.
82 LIEBERMAN
Some examples might be helpful to illustrate severity categorizations.

Examples within the Supplement for Reactor Operations include for Severity
Level I a system designed to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event not being able
to function if called upon to work because of a violation. A Severity Level
violation would be a system that, had it been called upon to work, would not have
functioned because of the violation. A Severity Level violation would be a system
that would not have worked under certain conditions, such as loss of off-site power.
A Severity Level IV violation would be a degraded system.
In the Health Physics Supplement, the severity levels are proportioned to
exposures. For example, a violation involving a 25 rem whole body exposure1
would be considered a Severity Level I violation. A Severity Level HI violation
would be an exposure of 3 rems or greater to the whole body. A violation of less
than 3 rems would be categorized as Severity Level IV. Regardless of the actual
exposure, a failure to do a radiation survey if there was a substantial potential for
exposure or a release could be categorized as Severity Level .
In all the supplements a breakdown in control of licensed activities involving
a number of related violations or recurring violations that represent a significant
lack of attention towards licensed responsibilities would be categorized as Severity
Level III.
It is important to note that the examples of severity level in the eight supple
ments provide guidance. They are neither exhaustive nor controlling. Judgement is
used in determining the severity level best suited for the violation and its surrounding
circumstances. The categorization process considers not only the individual safety
significance of a violation viewed in isolation, but also the circumstances sur
rounding the violation, including the root cause. For example, a violation involving
an inadequate survey without a high likelihood of an overexposure would normally
be categorized at a Severity Level IV because, while it is not a significant concern,
it is more than a minor one. However, if the same violation was caused by inadequate
training or management failures, the violation might be categorized at a higher level.
The severity level might also be increased if the violation was wilful.
There is also flexibility to categorize the significance of violations by
considering the violations either as individual issues or by grouping violations
together into a problem area.
4.2. Notices of Violation
Returning to the process, the next step is to determine the type of enforcement
action to be taken.
1 1 rem = 0.01 Sv.

IAEA-SM-309/8 83
Usually all violations result in Notices of Violation. However, in order to

encourage licensee actions to identify and correct violations, a Notice of Violation
is generally not issued for violations that are documented in inspection reports and
that are:
(1) licensee identified,
(2) involve Severity Level IV or V violations,
(3) reported to the USNRC, if required,
(4) corrected within a reasonable time, and
(5) not repetitive.
Notices of Violation are also not normally issued for isolated Severity Level
V violations documented in an inspection report where corrective action has been
initiated before the inspection ends, regardless who identifies it.
4.3. Enforcement conferences
If the violation involves the potential for categorization as Severity Level I, ,

or , or any violation for which a Civil Penalty may be appropriate, an enforcement
conference is normally held between the USNRC and the licensee. This is a non
public meeting conducted by the USNRC Regional Offices. This is an important step
in the enforcement process. There are two purposes for holding an enforcement
conference.
First, the conference is used to ensure that the licensee understands the
USNRCs views concerning the significance of the violations and the need to take
effective corrective action. Second, the enforcement conference is an opportunity for
a licensee to bring up factual differences in the understanding of a violation, any
extenuating circumstances, the licensees views on the safety significance of the
violation, the licensees corrective actions, and the licensees views on the appli
cation of mitigation or escalation factors of the Enforcement Policy. The conference
does not meet to debate or negotiate the sanction. It serves to ensure that USNRC
management has a full understanding of the case and that there is an adequate factual
basis for proceeding with the case.
Following the conference, if it is determined that a violation did not occur or
that the violation is a Severity Level IV matter to be treated with a Notice of
Violation, the Region proceeds. If, on the other hand, the Regional Administrator
believes the matter involves (1) a Severity Level IV violation deserving of a Civil
Penalty, (2) a violation that should be categorized as Severity Level IV but fits an
example of a Severity Level III violation, (3) a violation at any severity level
involving wilfulness, or (4) a Severity Level I, , or III violation, the case is
escalated to the Office of Enforcement for the USNRC headquarters approval.
84 UEBERMAN
4.4. Civil Penalties
Severity Level I, II, or HI cases are by definition violations of significant

regulatory concern and are never acceptable. Civil Penalties are frequently the
enforcement action used to address these violations.
Civil Penalties result in much attention both within the licensees organization
and in the media. The desire of licensees to avoid Civil Penalties with their attendant
negative impact is a contribution to improved performance. Licensees who are
subject to Civil Penalties are also placed on notice by these actions that their
performance must improve. These actions are designed to encourage licensees to
examine their past performance and management controls and take effective actions
to avoid more stringent sanctions.
Therefore, to provide added incentives to identify and correct significant
violations when a Severity Level I, , or in violation occurs, the USNRC considers
Civil Penalties.
4.4.1. Civil Penalty factors
If the decision is to consider Civil Penalties, the first step is to establish a base
Civil Penalty which is obtained from a table in the Enforcement Policy, based on
the type of activity the licensee is engaged in. The base penalty is then adjusted for
severity level as follows. A Severity Level I violation is 100% of the base penalty,
Severity Level is 80%, Severity Level HI is 50%, Severity Level IV is 15%, and
Severity Level V is 5 %. In a general way the base Civil Penalty takes into account
the significance of the violation and the size of the licensed activity. Using the table,
the base penalty for a Severity Level HI violation for a power reactor is US $50 000;
for a research reactor it is $2500, for a radiographer $5000, for a hospital $2500,
and for a gauge user $500. The base penalty can also be modified based on the ability
to pay. For example a major radiographer may receive a larger Civil Penalty. In one
case a radiographer received a $50 000 Civil Penalty for a Severity Level IH
violation. Similarly a Civil Penalty may be substantially reduced or not proposed for
a licensee who has significant financial difficulties. It is not the USNRCs intent to
use a Civil Penalty to put a licensee out of business. In such cases a Suspension Order
would be issued.
Given the selected base penalty, the amount is adjusted up or down to reflect
a number of policy considerations. These are designed to emphasize and encourage
licensee self-identification and correction of violations and to avoid potential
concealment of violations. The six adjustment factors are: (1) identification and
reporting, (2) quality of corrective action, (3) previous past performance, (4) prior
notice, (5) multiple examples, and (6) duration of the violation.
IAEA-SM-309/8 85
Balancing these factors may result in no Civil Penalty and conversely may
result in a Civil Penalty even if a licensee identified and corrected a violation. Let
us briefly go over the factors.
Identification and reporting
A base penalty may be decreased by as much as 50% if the licensee identifies

and reports the violation. Similarly, a penalty may be increased up to 50% if the
USNRC identifies the violation and the licensee could have been expected to identify
it first. This factor is to encourage licensee identification of violations. It is not
applicable if action is not taken immediately to correct the violation.
Corrective action
A base penalty may be increased up to 50% for marginal corrective action. It

can be decreased up to 50% for prompt and comprehensive corrective action. This
factor is to encourage the licensee to take lasting corrective action once the violation
has occurred. In applying this factor the USNRC considers the timeliness of correc
tive action, the degree of licensee initiative, and the comprehensiveness of the
actions.
Prior notice
A penalty may be increased up to 100% if the licensee had prior notice of a

similar problem based on a regulatory or industry notice or licensee audit. The
purpose of this factor is to provide an incentive to take effective action in response
to potential problems.
Past performance
A base penalty may be increased up to 100% based on poor prior performance

and decreased up to 100% for prior good performance. This factor focuses on
whether the violation is an isolated concern, whether past corrective actions have
been effective and overall performance. This factor also emphasizes the importance
of lasting corrective action.
Multiple examples and duration
A base penalty may also be increased to reflect the added significance resulting
from additional examples of the violation as well as the duration of a violation. In
some cases it is appropriate to assess Civil Penalties for each day a violation
continues uncorrected.
86 LIEBERMAN
Notwithstanding the various factors, a penalty may be increased because of

wilfulness or significant breakdowns in management controls. The policy also
permits the exercise of discretion not to impose a Civil Penalty where a licensee is
clearly identifying and correcting significant problems and the violations do not
reflect current performance.
To illustrate the application of the adjustment factors, let us consider a
hypothetical situation involving a radiographer failing to perform surveys of the
guide tube following each exposure, resulting in an overexposure to the radio
grapher. For purposes of the analysis assume (1) that the USNRC inspector
identified the violation by observing the radiographer with an off-scale dosimeter,
(2) the radiographer admitted he normally only surveyed the source tube after the
first and last exposure, (3) the licensee had identified in an audit that the radiographer
was not following procedures and was reminded to do surveys, and (4) the licensee,
following USNRC identification of the violation, took good corrective action,
including retraining and testing all employees, removing the radiographer involved
from licensed activities, and hiring a new radiation safety officer for performing
audits.
This example would be considered a Severity Level HI violation with a base
penalty of $5000. Because the licensee might have identified the violation earlier
because of the practice of the radiographer not to do regular surveys, the penalty
could be increased by 50% for USNRC identification. Because of the corrective
action which could be considered comprehensive the penalty could be reduced by
50%. However, the penalty could be increased 100% because the licensee was on
notice because of its audit that the radiographer was not always doing surveys. This
could result in a penalty escalated 100% to $10 000. If there was prior poor perfor
mance the penalty could be increased an additional 100% to $15 000. This penalty
would emphasize the need to identify and correct violations.
If the facts changed and the licensee because of past audits increased the
frequency of audits and identified the same violation, other things being equal, the
penalty could be reduced to zero assuming average past performance. This would
be based on reducing the base Civil Penalty by 50% for licensee identification of the
violation. Another 50% reduction would be based on corrective action. Because the
licensee responded to the prior notice of the past audit and increased the frequency
of.audits, the penalty might not be adjusted for prior notice assuming that some
corrective action had also been taken as a result of the first audit. In this situation
no Civil Penalty would be appropriate because the licensee was acting responsibly,
identifying and correcting violations.
These examples demonstrate the type of judgements that are made on a case
by case basis to arrive at a Civil Penalty to emphasize improved future performance.
In the first example, if the licensee had accepted the audit findings without taking
any corrective action for the failure to do surveys, consideration would also have
been given to issuing an order to suspend the licence because of a breakdown in the
IAEA-SM-309/8 87
licensees control of licensed activities. Consideration would also have been given
to issuing an order to the licensee to remove the radiographer from licensed activities
if the USNRC was satisfied that the radiographer was aware of his responsibility to
do the surveys and deliberately chose not to do them, for example because he was
in a rush to go home.
4.5. Orders
In addition to Civil Penalties, Orders may be issued. They are used when Civil
Penalties have not proved effective and where the public health and safety require
a licensee to take or refrain from some action. For example, Orders have been issued
to suspend licensed activities because licensees have been either unwilling or unable
to comply with requirements. Suspension Orders may be appropriate pending a
completion of an investigation, if significant misconduct is identified. Enforcement
orders have been issued to require the licensed activity to be reviewed and monitored
by an independent consultant. Orders are also issued to suspend licences to remove
ongoing threats to the public health and safety. The Atomic Energy Act provides the
USNRC with broad authority to issue Orders for any reason that would justify not
issuing a licence on an original application. While Orders are relatively infrequent,
Confirmatory Action Letters (CAL) are a more frequent action. This is an informal
agreement by a licensee to take or refrain from some action and does not entail the
right to a hearing.
4.5.1. Orders involving individuals
As indicated above, the USNRC normally issues enforcement actions against

licensees and does not single out individual employees. However, there are times
when it is appropriate to issue an order to a licensee to remove or limit the involve
ment of an individual if that persons continued involvement causes the USNRC to
lose its reasonable assurance that activities will be properly conducted with that
person present in licensed activities. These cases frequently involve issues of
individual integrity such as where the person provides false information to a USNRC
inspector, wilfully violates a USNRC requirement, or attempts to cover up a
violation. Action is not normally taken against individuals if the fault is primarily
the responsibility of management, is due to inadequate supervision, training, or
procedures. However, if a serious violation caused by an individual is involved
where the individual fully understood his or her responsibility, knew of the required
actions, and deliberately decided not to comply, an order removing the individual
from licensed activities may be appropriate. Individual actions have included
removal of physicians using licensed material, reactor operators, plant managers,
and radiographers.
88 LIEBERMAN
5. SUMMARY
The USNRC enforcement programme provides a broad structure to mnintain

consistent application of enforcement sanctions with the necessary flexibility to tailor
each enforcement action to the circumstances of each case. Each action is intended
to provide a regulatory message and to emphasize the need for licensees to identify
and correct violations for the purpose of improving the public health and safety.
Licensees who are either unable or unwilling to comply with regulatory requirements
are not allowed to operate.
The USNRC has been averaging annually over the past three years about
100 Civil Penalties, 27 Notices of Violation at Severity Level without a Civil
Penalty, and 13 enforcement Orders.
Each enforcement action is a matter of public record. Widespread distribution
is given to significant actions so that similarly situated licensees can learn from the
mistakes of other licensees and avoid similar failures before potential safety issues
arise. In that regard, the more significant actions are published quarterly in a
USNRC publication entitled Enforcement Actions Significant Actions
Resolved, NUREG-0940.
IAEA-SM-309/81
LE SERVICE DE CONTROLE PHYSIQUE

DE LENTREPRISE, PIVOT DE
LA REGLEMENTATION BELGE
J.-P. SAMAIN
Ministre de la Sant publique et de l environnement,
P. STALLAERT
Ministre de l Emploi et du travail,
Bruxelles, Belgique
Abstract-Rsum
SERVICE F O R T H E PHYSICAL C O N T R O L O F T H E W O R K P L A C E , PIVOT O F T H E
BELGIAN REGULATIONS.
Radiation protection regulations in Belgium were first developed within the broader
framework of legislation governing the safety of workers and protection of the public. Since
1958 they have been based on a specific law, although their structure stillbears the clear stamp
of the concepts which dominated the previous regulations. For example, it is the operator of
a facility where ionizing radiation is used who is responsible for the safety of both the
employees and the public. The General Regulations for the Protection of the Public and Wor
kers Against the Danger of Ionizing Radiation, drawn up for the specific purpose of applying
the 1958 law, encompass all the relevant rules and regulations in this area. The physical con
trol service is a body which is closely integrated into the company. It is competent in the area
of radiation protection and is responsible for monitoring the application of the Regulations on
a daily basis. The head of this service holds a key position in the company.
LE SERVICE D E C O N T R O L E PHYSIQUE D E L ENTREPRISE, PIVOT D E L A

R E G L E M E N T A T I O N BELGE.
La rglementation belge en matire de radioprotection sest dabord dveloppe dans
le cadre plus gnral de la lgislation en matire de scurit des travailleurs et de protection
de la population. Base depuis 1958 sur une loi spcifique, sa structure demeure fortement
imprgne des ides qui dominent les rglementations antrieures. En particulier, cest sur
lexploitant dune installation o sont utiliss les rayonnements ionisants que repose lobliga
tion de scurit tant pour les employs que pour le public. Pris en application de la loi de 1958,
le Rglement gnral de la protection de la population et des travailleurs contre le danger des
radiations ionisantes rassemble toutes les prescriptions rglementaires relatives cette
matire. Le service de contrle physique est un organe troitement intgr dans lentreprise.
Comptent en matire de radioprotection, ila pour mission dassurer le suivi quotidien de lap
plication des dispositions du Rglement. Le responsable de ce service occupe une position cl
dans lentreprise.
89
90 SAMAIN et STALLAERT
Ministre de la Sant publique et de lenvironnement

D
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*0
1 1 (U
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Autorits

IAEA-SM-309/81 91
1. INTRODUCTION
La Belgique est un pays de vieille tradition industrielle o les problmes de

scurit et de sant se sont poss trs tt, tant pour le public que pour les travailleurs.
En rponse ces besoins, la rglementation sest mise en place au fur et
mesure que les activits industrielles se sont dveloppes; les tches d inspection
taient gnralement confies des services dEtat dj existants avant que ne soit
cr, ventuellement, un service spcialis.
La radioprotection n a pas fait exception cette coutume: les premires
rglementations en matire de protection contre les radiations ionisantes ont t
introduites au travers du Rglement gnral pour la protection du travail qui, comme
sa dnomination ne lindique pas, visait aussi bien la protection de lenvironnement
que celle des travailleurs.
Il nest ds lors pas tonnant que ces rglementations aient volu de manire
parallle: elles prvoient d ailleurs que le service de contrle physique, que tout chef
d entreprise doit organiser, soit dirig par le chef du service de scurit et d hygine
prvu par le Rglement gnral pour la protection du travail, en matire, donc, de
scurit classique.
Le tableau I rsume la situation au plan lgal comme au plan rglementaire.
Comme le Rglement gnral pour la protection du travail (RGPT), le Rgle
ment gnral en matire de radioprotection (RGRI) se caractrise par deux
approches, en apparence contradictoires: d une part, un ensemble de dispositions
rglementaires spcifiques de caractre dtaill et technique et, d autre part, des dis
positions qui, procdant de lobligation patronale de scurit obligation tradition
nelle du droit civil, nagure transpose en droit pnal et dsormais revigore
obligent lemployeur prendre efficacement en mains lorganisation d une radio
protection performante dans son entreprise.
2. LE REGLEMENT GENERAL CONTRE LE DANGER DES RADIATIONS

IONISANTES (RGRI)
Avant de dvelopper plus en dtail ce dernier aspect, examinons rapidement

lensemble de la rglementation dcoulant de lArrt royal du 28 fvrier 1963.
Pris en application de la loi du 29 mars 1958 relative la protection de la
population contre les dangers rsultant des radiations ionisantes, lArrt royal du
28 fvrier 1963 rassemble toutes les prescriptions rglementaires propres garantir
la protection de la population comme celle des travailleurs.
Cette rglementation belge sinspire troitement des directives dictes par les
Communauts europennes dont, conformment aux dispositions du trait Euratom,
elle constitue la transposition en droit national. Comme les directives europennes,
TABLEAU II. CHAMP D APPLICATION DU RGRI
Importation, production, fabrication, dtention, transport, emploi des fins commerciales,

industrielles, mdicales ou autres, d appareils, installations ou substances capables d'mettre
des radiations ionisantes.
Offre en vente, vente, cession titre onreux ou gratuit de substances capables d mettre des
radiations ionisantes ou d appareils ou d installations en contenant.
Traitement, manipulation, stockage, limination et vacuation des substances et dchets

radioactifs.
Sont exclus:
le domaine militaire,
les transports ordonns par la dfense nationale,
le fond naturel.
elle suit lvolution des recommandations de la Commission internationale de protec

tion radiologique (CIPR).
2.1. Cham p d application (Article 1)
Celui-ci a t voulu aussi large que possible: il est dfini analytiquement par
une numration exhaustive (tableau II) qui nexcepte que le fond naturel des
radiations.
Il faut prciser toutefois que ce rglement ne vise pas les activits de dfense
nationale pour lesquelles existe un rglement particulier fort semblable celui-ci
(Arrt royal du 27 janvier 1976).
2.2. Dfinitions (Article 2)
Cette rglementation, pas plus que la matire quelle entend rgir, ne peut
viter lemploi d un vocabulaire technique propre; une cinquantaine de termes tech
niques sont donc dfinis: ils comprennent aussi bien des grandeurs physiques et des
units que des concepts comme l exposition ou l quivalent de dose et des tres juri
diques comme les personnes professionnellement exposes ou lentreprise.
Cette dmarche n a videmment rien d original.
IAEA-SM-309/81 93
2.3. Objectif
L objectif de la rglementation est fix, de faon qualitative, par la loi: cest

la protection de la sant de la population et de lenvironnement.
Il est explicit, de manire plus quantitative, par les deux articles cls que sont
les articles 20 (Limitation des doses) et 21 (Limites drives) regroups dans la
section I (Normes de base concernant la protection contre lexposition aux rayonne
ments ionisants) du chapitre III intitul Protection gnrale.
Les dispositions gnrales de larticle 21 reprennent les principes classiques de
la radioprotection tels que la CIPR les a noncs et que les directives europennes
les ont rpts.
Les limites de dose sont ensuite prcises, d abord pour les personnes profes
sionnellement exposes (actuellement 50 mSv par 12 mois conscutifs glissants),
indiquant les procdures spciales en cas dexpositions exceptionnelles concertes,
d expositions accidentelles et d expositions d urgence des travailleurs, et, ensuite,
pour les apprenti(e)s et les tudiant(e)s ainsi que pour les personnes du public.
Il faut noter que la protection de la femme enceinte et mme de la femme en
tat de procrer a fait l objet d une attention particulire.
2.4. Moyens d actions
En dehors des articles 20 et 21 prcits, le RGRI peut tre considr comme

lensemble des moyens donns pour atteindre les objectifs fixs prcisment par ces
deux articles.
Ces moyens d actions peuvent tre ventils en deux catgories:
1) les moyens utiliser l intrieur de lentreprise;
2) les moyens de gestion ou de contrle externe qui relvent plutt de la police
administrative.
Les moyens propres lentreprise sont de deux ordres:
1) organisationnels (section II du chapitre II):
le contrle physique,
le contrle mdical,
linformation et la formation des travailleurs et les devoirs qui en dcoulent;
2) matriels (section III du chapitre III):
lamnagement des lieux en vue d assurer la protection collective (5 facteurs
de scurit),
la sous-criticit,
les mesures de protection personnelle.
Les moyens de gestion ou de contrle administratifs comportent:
a) des procdures d autorisation pralable relatives:

aux tablissements classs (chapitre II),
l importation, au transit et la distribution des substances radioactives
(chapitre IV),
au transport de celles-ci (chapitre VII),
aux vhicules propulsion nuclaire (chapitre VIII),
aux radio-isotopes utiliss sous forme non scelle en mdecine humaine ou
vtrinaire (chapitre V),
aux applications mdicales des radiations ionisantes (chapitre VI);
b) des interdictions totales ou partielles (chapitre IX);
c) des procdures d agrment pour les experts de contrle physique, les
organismes de contrle et les mdecins du travail (section II du chapitre XI);
d) des procdures relatives llimination des dchets radioactifs (section IV du
chapitre III);
e) des mesures exceptionnelles en cas de vol ou d accident (chapitre X);
f) le dispositif de surveillance radiologique du territoire (section I du
chapitre XI);
g) dautres dispositions organisaiionnelles des autorits ou leur bnfice
(sections III VI du chapitre XI).
3. LE SERVICE DE CONTROLE PHYSIQUE
Le Rglement fait porter aux employeurs la responsabilit pratique de la pro

tection radiologique des travailleurs comme, d ailleurs, d autres rglements le font
pour d autres aspects de leur sant et de leur scurit. Il leur enjoint encore de se
donner les moyens adquats, le principal tant l organisation d un service de contrle
physique. Ce service, partie intgrante et complment du service de scurit, de
l hygine et d embellissement des lieux de travail (SHE), est charg, d une manire
gnrale, de lorganisation et de la surveillance des mesures ncessaires pour assurer
lobservation des dispositions du Rglement concernant la scurit et lhygine du
travail, la scurit et la salubrit du voisinage.
Comme le service SHE, le service de contrle physique est un organe troite
ment intgr l entreprise qui a pour mission spcifique dassurer le suivi quotidien
des dispositions rglementaires.
Encore linstar du service SHE, ses missions sont dfinies de faon trs
dtaille par la rglementation:
1) dlimitation et signalisation des zones contrles;
2) examen et contrle des dispositions et des moyens de protection existants;
3) proposition des moyens de protection complmentaire que ce service juge
ncessaire;
IAEA-SM-309/81 95
4) examen et approbation pralables des projets d installations comportant un

danger d irradiation ou de criticalit et de leur implantation dans ltablisse
ment lorsque ces projets nimpliquent pas une nouvelle autorisation conform
ment au chapitre II du Rglement;
5) examen et approbation pralables des expriences, essais, traitements et
manipulations qui, en raison de leur nature ou des circonstances, pourraient
prsenter du danger et qui n auraient pas t approuvs antrieurement dans
une forme identique par le service de contrle physique;
6) rception des nouvelles installations vises sous 4), du point de vue du contrle
physique de protection;
7) surveillance du fonctionnement et de lemploi correct des instruments de
mesure;
8) examen et approbation pralables des projets de transports de substances radio
actives ou fissibles lintrieur ou lextrieur de ltablissement et qui
n auraient pas t approuvs antrieurement dans une forme identique par le
service du contrle physique;
9) surveillance de lemballage, du chargement et du dchargement lintrieur
de ltablissement de substances radioactives ou fissibles; cet gard, le ser
vice de contrle physique vrifie si les dispositions rglementaires en vigueur
sont respectes, y compris celles concernant le transport;
10) des dterminations:
a) la dtermination de lintensit du rayonnement et lindication de la nature
des radiations dans les endroits intresss;
b) la dtermination des contaminations radioactives, lindication de la
nature des substances radioactives contaminantes, de leur activit, de
leur concentration volumtrique ou superficielle, de leur tat physique
et, si possible, de leur tat chimique;
c) la dtermination des doses individuelles et des doses cumules, y com
pris la dtermination de la dose provenant d irradiations internes excep
tionnelles, concertes ou non, ainsi que des circonstances qui ont
entran ces irradiations exceptionnelles;
11) tude des mesures ncessaires pour prvenir tout incident, tout accident, toute
perte ou tout vol de substances radioactives ou fissibles.
Le rapport de ces activits se fait dans un registre infalsifiable conserver
pendant 30 ans.
L excution de ces missions suppose une spcialisation pousse laquelle les
autorits accordent une grande importance.
Cette spcialisation est d ailleurs une fonction directe des activits exerces et
des quantits de radioactivit prsentes (tableau III).
Lagrment des experts par un arrt ministriel conjoint des deux ministres
concerns (Emploi et travail d une part, Sant publique et environnement d autre
TABLEAU III. SPECIALISATION DU CHEF DU SERVICE DE CONTROLE

PHYSIQUE
Le Chef du service de contrle physique

Etablissements
(Chef du service SHE ou un adjoint direct) doit tre
Classe I
(centrales nuclaires, Expert agr de classe I
usine de retraitement du
combustible irradi, etc.)
Classe II
(petites quantits de Expert agr de classe I ou II
matires fissiles, grandes
quantits de nuclides radio
actifs, stockage et/ou traite
ment des dchets, utilisation
des gnrateurs de rayons
X-Uer 200 kV, acclrateurs
de particules)
Classe III
(petites quantits de Expert agr de classe I, II ou III
nuclides radioactifs,
utilisation de rayons
X-Uer 200 kV)
part) concrtise lintrt des autorits pour la spcialisation des responsables du

contrle physique. Cet agrment suppose d abord que le candidat possde une
exprience juge suffisante dans le domaine des sciences nuclaires et de la protec
tion contre les radiations ainsi que la pratique des appareils de mesure et de contrle
indispensables.
L agrment est limit dans le temps (6 ans au maximum actuellement) et peut
tre limit un tablissements ou un groupe d tablissements similaires pour mieux
tenir compte de certaines spcificits (par exemple, les racteurs nuclaires).
De plus, des exigences de formation minimale sont imposes, en fonction
encore de la classe de ltablissement. En ce qui concerne les experts de classe I:
a) Ils doivent possder le diplme d ingnieur physicien ou d ingnieur en
sciences nuclaires ou celui de licenci en physique ou en chimie ou d in
gnieur civil ou tout autre diplme reconnaissant au porteur une formation que
IAEA-SM-309/81 97
la Commission spciale juge approprie la mission envisage. A lexception

des deux premiers, les titulaires de ces diplmes doivent, en outre, tre
titulaires du diplme ou certificat complmentaire d tudes nuclaires
postuniversitaires, dlivr par une universit ou une institution spcialise de
niveau jug quivalent par la Commission spciale ou justifier devant cette
Commission de connaissances quivalentes,
b) Ils doivent faire lobjet d un avis favorable de la Commission spciale. Cette
Commission peut convoquer et entendre lexpert. Elle peut aussi constituer un
jury technique devant lequel lexpert est tenu de fournir la preuve de ses
connaissances thoriques et pratiques.
Les experts de classe II doivent possder le diplme d ingnieur physicien ou
d ingnieur en sciences nuclaires ou dingnieur civil ou celui de licenci en phy
sique ou en chimie ou tout autre diplme confrant au porteur une formation que les
ministres de lEmploi et du travail et de la Sant publique jugent approprie la
mission envisage.
Les experts de classe III doivent possder le diplme d enseignement technique
du degr A 1 avec spcialisation en nergie nuclaire ou lun des diplmes prvus
ci-dessus ou tout autre diplme reconnaissant au porteur une formation que le
ministre de lEmploi et du travail et le ministre de la Sant publique jugent
approprie la mission envisage.
La Commission spciale est une commission consultative compose paritaire
ment de fonctionnaires et de spcialistes universitaires, charge d clairer les
autorits, notamment en matire d autorisation pour les tablissements de classe I.
Le responsable du service de contrle physique, en tant que chef de service
SHE ou son adjoint, bnficie des prrogatives de celui-ci au sein de lentreprise,
notamment de sa relative indpendance. Celle-ci dcoule de la position spciale quil
doit occuper dans la hirarchie de lentreprise: le RGPT stipule, en effet, que le chef
du service de scurit relve directement de la personne charge de la gestion jour
nalire de lentreprise ou du sige d exploitation. Le chef du service de scurit et,
par consquent, le responsable du service de contrle physique occupent sans discus
sion une fonction de cadre et ils ne peuvent tre subordonns d autres cadres,
responsables, par exemple, de la production ou de lentretien.
Cette position dans lentreprise lui confre une influence certaine sur la ligne
hirarchique puisquil apparat comme un collaborateur privilgi du chef
d entreprise.
En outre, la rglementation confie directement des responsabilits d excution
au chef du service de contrle physique. En effet, chaque fois que survient un vne
ment de nature compromettre la scurit ou la sant des personnes, celui-ci doit
prendre immdiatement toutes mesures utiles pour pallier le danger dcel. Il doit
ensuite procder une tude approfondie des circonstances dans lesquelles sest
produit lincident ou laccident et prsenter au chef d entreprise un rapport dans
lequel il lui recommande les mesures prendre pour remdier toute dfectuosit
et prvenir toute rcidive.
Toutes ces considrations montrent bien que le chef du service de contrle phy
sique est le personnage cl de la radioprotection dans l entreprise.
4. LORGANISME AGREE
Si le service de contrle physique joue un rle primordial dans lorganisation

et lapplication de la radioprotection dans l entreprise, il existe un deuxime chelon
de contrle: lorganisme agr.
Compos lui-mme d experts de niveau quivalant ltablissement
contrler, un tel organisme, caractre priv, travaille dans un cadre rglementaire
strict, sous la surveillance des autorits de tutelle, en l occurrence les deux
ministres dj cits. Cet organisme a pour missions spcifiques:
1) le contrle de la bonne excution de la mission du service de contrle physique

propre ltablissement, contrle permanent dans les tablissements de
classe I, trimestriel dans ceux de classe II et annuel dans ceux de classe III;
2) la rception, avant mise en activit, des tablissements de classe I et II (police
des tablissements classs);
3) le contrle et lapprobation des dcisions favorables du service de contrle
physique;
4) le contrle et lapprobation des dcisions du service de contrle physique
en ce qui concerne les expriences dans les racteurs nuclaires ou laide de
substances fssibles (dans les tablissements de classe I);
5) en ce qui concerne le transport, la surveillance permanente du chargement, du
transport et du dchargement de substances fssibles (uranium naturel et
appauvri exclu) en quantit dpassant la moiti critique maximum (tablis
sement de classe I videmment).
Enfin, le chef d entreprise, sil ne dispose pas d un expert de la comptence
voulue, doit confier les missions dvolues au service de contrle physique un
organisme agr de classe correspondante. Toutefois, cette latitude nexiste que pour
les tablissements de classe II ou III; en classe I, la prsence d un service propre
lentreprise est imprescriptible.
5. LES SERVICES D INSPECTION DE L ETAT
Ceux-ci interviennent au troisime niveau de contrle, en sappuyant donc sur

un service de contrle enracin dans lentreprise, en premire ligne, et sur lexpertise
de l organisme agr en deuxime ligne.
IAEA-SM-309/81 99
6. CONCLUSION
Tel quil vient d tre dcrit dans ses trs grandes lignes et caractris,
notamment, par l accent mis sur la scurit intgre dans lentreprise dont un cadre
joue le premier rle en matire de radioprotection, le Rglement belge a permis
d tablir et de maintenir un excellent niveau de scurit dans lindustrie nuclaire
belge.
IAEA-SM-309/29
PROCEDURES FOR THE APPROVAL

OF CONSUMER GOODS
CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES
R.A. PAYNTER
National Radiological Protection Board,
Cookridge, Leeds
A.D. WRIXON
National Radiological Protection Board,
Chilton, Didcot,
Oxfordshire
United Kingdom
A bstract
PROCEDURES FOR THE APPROVAL OF CONSUMER GOODS CONTAINING RADIO

ACTIVE SUBSTANCES.
The Euratom Directive stipulating the revised basic safety standards for the protection
of the health of the public and workers against the risks of ionizing radiations obliges the
United Kingdom to set up a system of prior authorization in respect of: (a) the use of radioac
tive substances in toys and the importation of toys containing radioactive substances and
(b) the addition of radioactive substances in products for household use and the importation
for commercial purposes of such goods if they contain radioactive substances. Regulations are
currently being drafted that will implement these requirements. These Regulations are
expected to be made and come into force during 1990. The paper reviews the operation of
the Boards voluntary scheme for the control of consumer goods, the changes that are expected
to be brought about by the introduction of the Regulations and the criteria that have been
developed for the approval scheme to be operated under these Regulations.
1. INTRODUCTION
It has long been recognized in the United Kingdom that it is impossible to

ensure that goods containing radioactive substances, once they have been supplied,
will be used in the manner intended by the manufacturer, or that they will be
disposed of in any recommended fashion. It would be impracticable therefore to con
template exercising control over the doses that persons might receive following the
sale of the goods. This contrasts markedly with the way in which the doses of wor
kers involved in the manufacture and marketing of such goods are controlled; these
doses are controlled in the same way as they are from any other source of radiation
101
102 PAYNTER and WRIXON
in the workplace. The only feasible form of control that can b exercised over con
sumer goods containing radioactive substances is by approval prior to their supply
to the public. The value of a prior approval scheme is that doses can be assessed
before products are supplied and unsatisfactory products need never appear on the
market.
When the National Radiological Protection Board was established in 1970 it
took over the functions of the Radioactive Substances Advisory Committee. In 1956
this Committee appointed a Miscellaneous Sources Panel to formulate advice on the
use of those sources of ionizing radiation that might cause some irradiation of the
general public. Since its inception, the Board has continued to provide advice to
manufacturers and suppliers of consumer goods containing radioactive substances,
with a view to avoiding unjustifiable exposure of the public to radiation hazards and
reducing any exposures to levels that are as low as reasonably achievable. Consulta
tions have so far been voluntary as there has been no requirement in the United King
dom for a licence or prior approval to be given by a statutory authority.
The Euratom Directive stipulating the revised basic safety standards for the
protection of the health of the public and workers against the risks of ionizing radia
tions [1] obliges the United Kingdom to set up a system of prior authorization in
respect of:
(a) the use of radioactive substances in toys and the importation of toys containing
radioactive substances and
(b) the addition of radioactive substances in the production and manufacture of
cosmetics and products for household use and the importation for commercial
purposes of such goods if they contain radioactive substances.
Regulations are currently being drafted under the Consumer Protection Act
1987 that will implement these requirements. These Regulations are expected to be
made and come into force during 1990.
This paper reviews the operation of the Boards voluntary scheme for the con
trol of consumer goods, the changes that are expected to be brought about by the
introduction of the Regulations and the criteria that are being developed for the
approval scheme to be operated under these Regulations.
2, VOLUNTARY SYSTEM OF CONTROL 1970-1989
One of the main products to occupy the Board during this period was the ioni
zation chamber smoke detector (ICSD). ICSDs containing radium-226 or
americium-241 sources had been used in industrial premises for many years, and,
during the 1970s, there was an increasing demand for a simple, single station detec
tor that could be installed in private homes. There were obvious life saving benefits
associated with the use of domestic smoke detectors but there was a need to ensure
IAEA-SM-309/29 103
that the risks associated with both external radiation and radioactive contamination
resulting from abuse, accidents or uncontrolled disposal were kept as low as reason
ably achievable. With this in mind, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development set up an Expert Group
to draw up radiation protection standards. The Board was closely involved in this
work and assisted in developing a series of tests to simulate the handling and misuse
that ICSDs were likely to be subjected to in the home.
These tests were incorporated into the NEA recommendations for ICSDs [2]
which were issued in 1977. Although not legally obliged to do so, a large number
of suppliers have subsequently voluntarily submitted ICSD models for testing to
these standards. In the early days of this voluntary testing, a number of detectors
failed the tests because of the use of inappropriate materials in the mounting of the
source, but very few failed as a result of poor construction of the detector. The
experience from those tests has led to improvements in ICSD design such that no
detector tested over the last six years has failed the tests.
The practice of luminizing timepieces with radioactive substances has been an
established use of radioactivity for many decades, but in the 1970s there was a trend
towards the use of digital timepieces with the display illuminated by gaseous tritium
light sources (GTLSs). These had the advantage of being clearly visible under all
conditions of ambient light without providing a heavy drain on the watchs battery.
Furthermore, the use of GTLSs for illumination was considered to be preferable,
from a radiological protection point of view, to using radioluminous paints because
the sources were sealed and exhibited only very low external dose rates. The Board
carried out a review of the radiation hazards associated with these products and
issued construction guidelines to manufacturers in 1977 . The majority of the watches
tested performed satisfactorily, although shortcomings in GTLS construction were
initially relatively common. A revised series of guidelines on the radiological protec
tion standards for timepieces incorporating GTLSs was issued in 1980 [3]. The use
of GTLSs in digital watches has decreased significantly in recent years and the Board
is unaware of any such watches currently on the United Kingdom market.
3. CRITERIA FOR APPROVAL
In 1980 the Board published a Consultative Document which proposed criteria

that might be used under a statutory approval scheme. The proposals were prepared
with the help of an advisory group that reflected a wide range of interests. The group
also assisted in reviewing the comments received on the proposals and in formulating
the final criteria which were eventually published [4].
The report considered that approval of a product should be conditional on
goods complying with the ICRP principles of justification, optimization and dose
limitation. Some products were deemed to be unacceptable in principle because there
TABLE I. DOSE RESTRICTIONS
Restriction on dose equivalent

Category User or Circumstance (mSv in a year)
non-user
Effective Skin Lens of eye
I (Safety products) User Normal use 0.05 5 1.5

(Other) User Normal use 0.005 5 1.5
I and Non-user Normal use Adequately protected by user
and disposal restriction
I and II User and Accident and 1 50 15
non-user misuse
would appear to be no justification for the use of radioactive substances in them. A

definitive list could not be given but examples of such products were considered to
be articles of jewellery, childrens toys and art forms. Justified uses of radioactive
substances were considered to fall into two categories, category 1 relating to safety
and category 2 relating to all other uses. It was considered that the net benefit from
the use of radioactivity in most consumer goods would generally be small and hence
the maximum dose to an individual should be restricted to a relatively trivial level.
The report concluded that the annual effective dose equivalent to a user of a
category 1 and category 2 product should not exceed 50 /xSv and 5 /tSv respectively.
It was felt that incidents, either accidents or misuse, are likely to be rare and there
fore that the ICRP dose equivalent limits for members of the public should be used
as guides when assessing the significance of doses that might be received. At the time
the effective dose equivalent limit for members of the public was 5 mSv in a year.
A subsequent NEA publication [5] on the control of consumer products is in
general agreement with the Boards criteria, although the principal effective dose
equivalent limit is now taken to be 1 mSv in a year and the dose limit for the lens
of the eye, 15 mSv in a year.
The dose restrictions recommended by the NEA are summarized in Table I and
the Board is considering whether to modify its criteria to be consistent with them.
A list of the products currently available to members of the public in the United
Kingdom is given in Table .
IAEA-SM-309/29 105
TABLE . CONSUMER PRODUCTS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE IN THE

UNITED, KINGDOM
Maximum activity or
Product Nuclide
mass per product
Ionization chamber Am-241 40 kBq

smoke detectors
Luminized timepieces T 300 MBq

Pm-147 6 MBq
Compasses containing
gaseous tritium light
sources (GTLSs) D 7.5 GBq
Gas mantles Th 1.6 kBq
Enamelled badges U 400 B q-g-1
Electron tubes D 800 kBq

C-14 1700 kBq
Co-60 6 kBq
Ni-63 35 kBq
Kr-85 7 kBq
Cs-137 40 kBq
Pm-147 320 kBq
Fluorescent lamp starters Th 0.05 mg

T
4. THE RADIOACTIVE PRODUCTS (SAFETY) REGULATIONS, 1990
The United Kingdom Radioactive Products (Safety) Regulations are about to

be laid before Parliament and are expected to be made by mid-1990. These Regula
tions will cover all consumer goods containing solid sources with an activity concen
tration of 0.4 B q-g"1 or greater, and liquid or gaseous sources that would be
defined as radioactive by the Radioactive Substances Act, 1960. Building materials,
geological specimens and products for use in vehicles will not, however, be covered,
partly because these are controlled by other arrangements.
The Regulations will require prior approval of consumer goods containing

radioactive substances before such goods are supplied to the public. In determining
whether an approval ought to be given, the Board will be required to have regard
to any circumstances appearing to be relevant and in particular to:
(a) the level of radiation emitted
(b) the intended use
(c) any benefits which may be produced by the use of the goods, and
(d) the appropriate dose restrictions.
The Board considers that is the responsibility of the manufacturer to provide

proof of compliance with the approval criteria. Manufacturers will be asked to for
ward details of the tests their products have undergone, together with any supporting
dose calculations when they apply for approval. Guidance will however be given on
the approval criteria for specific types of products. The relevant tests for some
products are already well established; it is likely for example that ICSDs will be
approved provided they have passed the relevant NEA tests. Approval of products
containing GTLSs will be dependent on the intended use, the total tritium and
tritiated water content of the GTLS, as well as the adequacy of the construction of
the device. The required data for other products will vary considerably, but will
include source construction details together with information on accessible external
dose rates and individual doses in the event of misuse.
5. STANDARDS FOR TYPES OF PRODUCT
The approval criteria being considered by the Board for some of the main con
sumer products are listed below.
5.1. Ionization chamber smoke detectors
(a) Design specification

Nuclide should be americium-241
Activity should not exceed 40 kBq
Maximum accessible dose rate must not exceed 1 fiSv - h '1 at 0.1 m
External levels of
radioactive contamination must not exceed 0.4 Bq-cm"2.
IAEA-SM-309/29 107
(b) Prototype tests

Compliance with the following NEA tests [2]:
(1) temperature
(2) impact
(3) drop
(4) vibration
(5) fire (600C)
(6) incineration (1200C).
(c) Labelling requirements

(1) On the packaging, a label with the wording Contains a radioactive sub
stance whose inclusion in this product has been approved by the National
Radiological Protection Board .
(2) On the base of the detector, a label as in (1) above.
(3)On the ionziation chamber, a label incorporating the trefoil symbol and
the word Radioactive.
The labels in (1) and (2) above will need to incorporate the reference
number of the approval.
(d) Quality control
Details of the quality control procedures used in the manufacturing of the
ICSD will be required.
5.2. Gaseous tritium light devices
Approval will be dependent on the particular device containing gaseous tritium

light sources. Nevertheless, for justified uses some generic requirements can be
specified.
(a) Design specifications
Activity depends on application but should
not exceed 20 GBq tritium
Percentage tritiated water should not exceed 2% of total tritium

content (as specified in British Standard
5499: Part 2: 1986, Specification for self-
luminous fire safety signs)
Leak rate should not exceed 2 kBq per day.
(b) Prototype tests
Compliance with the following NEA tests [6]:

(1) temperature
(2) thermal shock
(3) vibration
(4) pressure
(5) drop
(6) crushing
(7) puncture.
(1) On the packaging, a label with the wording Contains a radioactive sub
stance whose inclusion in this product has been approved by the National
Radiological Protection Board.
(2) On the GTLD, a label as in (1) above.
Both of these labels will need to incorporate the reference number of the
approval.
(d) Quality control

GTLS will be required.
5.3. Luminized timepieces
(a) Design specifications

Nuclide should be tritium or promethium-147
Activity should not exceed 300 MBq tritium
or 6 MBq promethium-147
Maximum accessible must not exceed 2 /S v-tr1 at sur
dose rate face of watch.
(b) Prototype tests
Compliance with adhesion and solubility tests as specified in ISO 3157: 1975,
Radioluminescence for Time Measurement Instruments Specifications.
IAEA-SM-309/29 109
A label attached to the watch or packaging with the wording Contains a radio
active substance whose inclusion in this product has been approved by the National
Radiological Protection Board. This label will need to incorporate the reference
number of the approval.
(d) Quality control

timepiece will be required.
Approvals will remain in force for five years, or a shorter time if specified in
the approval, by which time the product will need to have been resubmitted for
approval. The principal reason for re-approval is to enable goods to be reassessed
against any modified standards or criteria that may have been established subsequent
to the original approval.
6. LABELLING
The question of labelling of radioactive consumer goods has exercised the

Board for some considerable time. Compulsory labelling of consumer goods is nor
mally confined to those products that might present significant hazards to the health
or safety of the consumer and to products where the provision of information on such
matters as their content and price is considered necessary to aid consumer choice.
For goods with radioactive substances that meet the Boards criteria, labels would
not appear essential to safety. It is recognized, however, that there is a substantial
demand on the part of consumers for appropriate information at the time of purchase
so that the consumer can make a choice as to whether he or she wishes to buy a
product containing a radioactive source. The Regulations will require each good to
be clearly labelled with a statement that it contains a radioactive substance whose
inclusion has been approved. This labelling will be required to appear on the goods
or be attached to the goods in such a way that it is clearly visible when the goods
are displayed. Furthermore, if the goods are sold in packaged form the particulars
must appear on the packaging. However, items containing extremely small amounts
of tritium or krypton (5 MBq or less in both cases) or natural thorium (5 kBq or less)
will not be required to be labelled. This exemption is expected to cover such items
as fluorescent lamp starters and electronic tubes. Items exempted from the labelling
requirement will, however, still need to be approved before sale.
7. DISCUSSION
The application of the Regulations is unlikely to create a problem for the

majority of suppliers. The major suppliers of ICSDs in the United Kingdom have
been voluntarily submitting their products for testing to NEA standards for a number
of years, and the additional requirement of suitable labelling is unlikely to be over-
onerous. Similarly, the suppliers of products containing GTLSs will have been
required by various national and international standards to limit the total tritium con
tent and also to test the ruggedness of construction. For other products, however,
the situation may not be so straightforward.
Luminous timepieces should be constructed in accordance with the Interna
tional Standard ISO 3157 (1975) and it is upon this standard that the approval criteria
are likely to be based. However, many suppliers purchase luminous watches from
a worldwide range of manufacturers and are often unaware which watches have been
painted with a non-radioactive phosphorescent paint as distinct from, radioluminous
paint. Suppliers will need to determine which of their products are radioluminous
and then obtain information that demonstrates compliance with the ISO standard
before applying for approval.
One of the more difficult products to deal with will be thoriated gas mantles.
Previous assessments of radiation doses to users of gas mantles have indicated that,
under certain conditions, the effective doses can be as high as 60 /Sv in a year, and
the dose following inadvertent ingestion of thorium from a mantle can be as high as
2 mSv [7]. Both of these values exceed the proposed dose criteria for type approval.
The Board is currently carrying out a detailed review of doses to users from gas man
tles and it may be that eventual approval will be conditional on a reduction in the
thorium content of mantles, or instructions to the user on precautions to be taken in
their handling and storage.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Once supplied to the public, consumer products containing radioactive sub

stances can no longer be subject to formal control. Unless such products are to be
prohibited from being supplied and the public deprived of any benefits that they may
offer, the only effective means of controlling them is by a system of prior approval.
Such a system should be directed at ensuring that the public is not unjustifiably
exposed to radiation and that the exposure from justified uses are kept as low as is
reasonably achievable. For many years a voluntary system of control has operated
in the United Kingdom and in general this arrangement has worked well. It has been
of benefit to the potential supplier and the public since both can be assured that the
product meets radiological protection requirements. To meet certain requirements of
a Directive of the European Communities, a statutory system of control over such
IAEA-SM-309/29 111
products is expected to be introduced. This will oblige all suppliers of products

covered by the Regulations to obtain the prior approval of the Board. The advantage
of a statutory approval scheme is that it is often more readily understood by suppliers
and manufacturers and there is of course the major element of obligation.
Whatever the arrangements for control of these products, whether voluntary
or statutory, the onus is on the approving body to provide an objective decision. The
responsibility of the decision maker in this matter is however substantial and he
needs to ensure that his decisions are in the interest of the public rather than simply
a reflection of his own personal views. It is for this reason that clear criteria need
to be generated and in this context the Board has found it beneficial to obtain the help
of its advisory group on consumer goods. The criteria now under consideration for
use in the approval scheme have developed out of the experience gained under the
voluntary arrangements and are in accord with those established internationally.
REFERENCES
[1] Council Directive of 15th July, 1980, amending the Directive laying down the basic
safety standards for the health of the general public and workers against the dangers
of ionizing radiations. Official J. Eur. Comm., 23, No. L246, (17 Sep. 1980).
[2] NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, Recommendations for Ionization Chamber Smoke
Detectors in Implementation of Radiation Protection Standards, NEA/OECD, Paris
(1977).
[3] WRIXON, A .D ., Radiological Protection Standards for Digital Timepieces with Back
Illumination of the Display by Gaseous Tritium Light Sources, Rep. NRPB-M50,
National Radiological Protection Board, Chilton (1980).
[4] NATIONAL RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION BOARD, Criteria of Acceptability
Relating to the Approval of Consumer Goods Containing Radioactive Substances,
Rep. NRPB-GS2, HMSO, London (1983).
[5] NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, A Guide for Controlling Consumer Products Con
taining Radioactive Substances, NEA/OECD, Paris (1985).
[6] NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection Standards for Gaseous Tritium
Light Devices, NEA/OECD, Paris (1973).
[7] O DONNELL, F.R., ETNIER, E.L., An Assessment of Radiation Doses from Incan
descent Gas Mantles that Contain Thorium, NRC Rep. NUREG/CR-1910, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC (1981).
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES
(Sessions III and IV)
Chairm an (Session III)
B. AGU
Nigeria
Chairm an (Session IV)
J. LIEBERMAN
IAEA-SM-309/49
INFRASTRUCTURE AND REGULATORY CONTROL

FOR RADIATION PROTECTION IN
THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IN INDIA
T.N. KRISHNAMURTHI, S. SOMASUNDARAM,

A.K. DE
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board,
Anushaktinagar, Bombay,
India
Abstract
INFRASTRUCTURE AND REGULATORY CONTROL FOR RADIATION PROTEC
TION IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IN INDIA.
The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), constituted in November 1983 by the
Government of India, carries out certain safety and regulatory functions envisaged under the
Atomic Energy Act, 1962. The paper describes the legal provisions, responsibilities, structure
and organization of ERB, with special emphasis on radiation protection. The responsibilities
of the Board cover nuclear, radiological and industrial safety within the installations of the
Department of Atomic Energy and radiological safety in the manifold applications of radioiso
topes and radiation sources within the country. An adequate and competent infrastructure has
been built to cater to the diverse radiation protection requirements of all nuclear installations
in India, arising at different stages from site selection to day-to-day operation. The paper
describes the multilevel review which is carried out by the Board prior to issue of authorization
for nuclear installations. A number of safety codes, guides and manuals have been prepared
to provide specific guidance to design, construction and operating organizations of nuclear
power plants. The Regulatory Board receives considerable support from the Health and Safety
Group of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in discharging its responsibility with regard to radi
ation protection surveillance. The Safety Review Committee of AERB monitors the safety
status of all nuclear fuel cycle facilities in operation. In addition, periodic inspections of the
installations are carried out. AERB has conducted an in-depth study of specific areas of opera
tional safety of nuclear power plants. AERB ensures that the radiation exposures of workers
and radioactive releases to the environment are kept as low as reasonably achievable
(ALARA) and that the installations maintain at all times a capability to handle local, site and
off-site emergencies.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) was constituted in November

1983 by the Government of India to carry out certain safety and regulatory functions
envisaged under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. The paper describes the legal provi
sions, responsibilities, structure and organization of AERB with special emphasis on
115
116 KRISHNAMURTHI et al.
radiation protection. The responsibilities of the Board cover installations of the

Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and radiological safety in the manifold appli
cations of radioisotopes and radiation sources within the country.
2. LEGAL PROVISIONS FOR RADIATION PROTECTION
The legal provisions on radiation protection are contained in the following

Rules made under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962:
(1) Radiation Protection Rules, 1971
(2) Atomic Energy (Working of Mines, Minerals and Handling of Prescribed
Substances) Rules, 1984 and
(3) Atomic Energy (Safe Disposal of Radioactive Wastes) Rules, 1987.
In addition to the above rules, the Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1981 were
promulgated under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962. These rules are being amended
so as to be in conformity with the Factories Act, 1948 (as amended) and Factories
Rules, 1987.
AERB is also designated as a statutory agency to perform the functions under
certain sections of the Environmental Protection Act, 1986 and the Environmental
Protection Rules, 1987 with regard to discharge of environmental pollutants from
factories owned by the Government and engaged in carrying out the purposes of the
Atomic Energy Act, 1962. These sections confer on AERB the power of entry and
inspection of nuclear facilities and power to take samples of discharges and follow
the procedures in connection therewith.
3. FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF AERB
The functions and responsibilities of AERB are briefly described below:

(1) Develop safety codes, guides and standards for siting, design, construction,
commissioning, operation and decommissioning of different types of plants
and ensure compliance of safety codes and standards by DAE and non-DAE
installations;
(2) Review the safety aspects in the design and operation of DAE projects/plants
and issue authorizations/licences for siting, construction, commissioning and
operation of the plants;
(3) Review operational experience in the light of radiological and other safety
criteria recommended by the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP), the IAEA and other international bodies and thereby evolve
major safety policies;
IAEA-SM-309/49 117

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118
KRISHNAMURTHI et al.
FIG. 2. Organizational structure of AERB.

IAEA-SM-309/49 119
(4) Prescribe acceptable limits of radiation exposure for occupational workers and
members of the public and acceptable limits of environmental releases of radio
active substances;
(5) Prescribe limits for environmental releases of conventional pollutants for DAE
installations;
(6) Review the emergency response plans and preparedness regarding nuclear
plants and transport of large radioactive sources (e.g. spent fuel, kilo/mega
curie sources, fissile materials);
(7) Review the training programme, qualifications and licensing policies for plant
personnel;
(8) Promote research and development efforts for fulfilling the above functions
and responsibilities.
The Board consists of a full time Chairman, an ex-officio member and three
part time members of whom one should be from the medical profession. The Chair
man reports to the Atomic Energy Commission. The Department of Atomic Energy
assists AERB in budgetary and legal matters. Figure 1 shows the organizational
chart of DAE and its nuclear plants.
AERB carries out its functions with the help of a secretariat consisting of
technical and scientific staff. The organizational structure and the functions of the
different divisions of the secretariat are shown in Fig. 2. AERB involves experts
from other organizations of the Central Government, higher academic institutions
and reputed engineering consultancy firms in safety assessment of projects, opera
tional safety reviews and for specific advice in certain highly specialized areas.
It will be noted that AERB has been assigned responsibilities covering the DAE
as well as outside institutions. Sundara Rao et a l.1 have described the regulatory
activities of the AERB covering industrial, medical and other uses of radioisotopes
in the country. This paper describes the regulatory activities of AERB, connected
with the nuclear fuel cycle in the country.
4. ADVISORY COMMITTEES
AERB has set up standing committees of experts (Advisory Bodies) to review

the activities of the Bords secretariat in nuclear safety and radiological protection
and to give recommendations. These recommendations are considered by the Board
for implementation.
1 SUNDARA RAO, I.S., DE, A.K., Regulatory provisions for radiation protection
and their enforcement in India , Radiation Protection in Nuclear Energy (Proc. Conf.
Sydney, April 1988), IAEA, Vienna (1988) 205-210.
A Committee on Radiation Protection Standards (CRPS) has also been

constituted to review from a national perspective the recommendations of interna
tional organizations such as the ICRP before they are adopted for implementation in
the country.The CRPS has constituted working groups to collect and review the
information and data on (1) the normal incidence of cancers in the Indian population,
(2) the incidence of genetic and chromosomal abnormalities in live born children,
(3) normal risks of injuries and fatalities in Indian industries and (4) the specification
of anatomical, physiological and metabolic standards of Indian reference man,
woman and child. The working groups have specialists and experts as members and
are currently completing the tasks assigned to them.
5. AUTHORIZATION OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS
For major nuclear installations such as nuclear power projects, heavy water
projects, front end and back end of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities, AERB issues
authorizations at different stages. The major stages of the authorization process for
nuclear power plants are (1) siting, (2) construction, (3) commissioning (in several
interim stages) and (4) power operation (in several stages from first criticality to
rated power operation). At each stage before authorization a detailed review cover
ing all safety aspects is conducted. AERB has issued a Safety Manual Governing
the Authorization Procedures for Nuclear Power Plant/Projects. In general, a three
tier review process is followed before any activity is authorized. The first level of
review is by the Site Evaluation Committee (SEC) or Project Design Safety
Committee (PDSC) or Civil Engineering Design Review Committee (CEDRC), as
appropriate to the stage of authorization. These committees review the submissions,
starting from site evaluation report to the final test and commissioning reports. The
next level of review is conducted through an Advisory Committee for Project Safety
Review (ACPSR). The ACPSR meets only when the application for authorization
has been reviewed by SEC/PDSC/CEDRC. The Advisory Committee reviews the
recommendations of these committees and offers in turn its recommendations to the
Regulatory Board. The Board of AERB is the statutory authorizing agency and it
considers the recommendations of ACPSR and decides on the authorization. All
important authorization stages such as siting, construction, first approach to critical
ity, first power generation stage and rated power generation stage are generally
considered by the Board.
The three tier review is followed for each of the major authorization stages.
The authorization document for a specific activity establishes the requirements and
conditions governing the performance of the activity and where appropriate, places
a time limit on the validity of authorization.
Radiological safety is one of the key areas reviewed for authorization
purposes. The project management has to submit information relating to the site with
IAEA-SM-309/49 121
particular emphasis on factors important to radiation safety and emphasizing those

site characteristics which may influence the design and operation of the nuclear
power plant (NPP). Information concerning the interaction of the NPP and the
environment should also be provided in the Site Evaluation Report.
Those features of the design and operation of the facility, provided primarily
for protection of operating personnel from radiation hazards should be submitted for
review along with other design basis reports. These include containment philosophy
and design (structure, isolation, ventilation, leakage, monitoring), engineered safety
features, protective and regulating systems, instrumentation systems (nuclear,
process and radioactivity), layout and zoning for contamination control, radiation
shielding, ventilation system, the area radiation monitoring system, health physics
control and personnel monitoring programmes, radiation survey and activity mea
suring instruments for the plant health physics unit, schemes for radioactive waste
management, post-accident monitoring systems, the environmental monitoring
programme, emergency response plans and preparedness for on-site and off-site
actions, etc. The review also covers the adequacy of trained manpower at the plant
and also training in radiation protection for plant personnel and health physics
personnel.
Authorization procedures for chemical and metallurgical plants of the nuclear
fuel cycle and heavy water plants are almost identical to those established for nuclear
power plants, except for the differences in the stages of authorization.
6. CODES AND GUIDES
Development of codes, guides and manuals is one of the most important activi
ties of AERB. These documents lay down the regulatory requirements and give an
acceptable methodology and approach for safe design, construction, quality assur
ance and operation of nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities. These cover
the areas of nuclear and industrial safety and radiation protection.
The following codes, guides and manuals have been approved for
issue/publication:
(1) Code of Practice for Nuclear Power Plant Siting

(2) Code of Practice on Quality Assurance for Safety in Nuclear Power Plants
(3) Code of Practice on Design for Safety in Pressurized Heavy Water Based
Nuclear Power Plant
(4) Code of Practice on Safety in Nuclear Power Plant Operation
(5) Safety Manual Site Emergency Plan for Nuclear Installations
(6) Safety Manual Off-site Emergency Plan for Nuclear Installations
(7) Safety Manual for Civil Engineering and Building Works for Nuclear Power
Plants
(8) Safety Manual Governing Authorization Procedure for Nuclear Power

Plant/Project.
The following documents are in an advanced stage of review for approval and
issue by AERB:
(1) Safety Guide for Seismic Studies and Design Basis Ground Motion for Nuclear
Power Plant Sites
(2) Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules
(3) Handbook for Medical Management of Persons Exposed in Radiation
Accidents.
The codes and guides are prepared with the help of specialists and are reviewed
by the Advisory Committees mentioned above, before they are published as AERB
Codes and Guides.
7. OPERATIONAL SAFETY SURVEILLANCE
After authorization for operation is issued to a nuclear installation, safety

surveillance during the operational phase is conducted by the Operating Plants Safety
Division (OPSD), under the guidance of the Safety Review Committee for Operating
Plants (SARCOP). Periodic reports on plant performance and radiation safety status
and reports on safety related unusual occurrences from the various nuclear facilities
are reviewed and the installations are inspected at intervals by a team of experienced
engineers and health physicists. These reviews are modelled on the Operational
Safety Analysis and Review Team (OSART) missions conducted by the IAEA.
SARCOP also reviews changes/modifications in design proposed by the operating
units and grants approval with necessary conditions or restrictions, where relevant.
Violations of technical specifications by the plants are also examined by SARCOP.
SARCOP is empowered to impose restrictions or suspension of operation of the
facility under intimation to AERB and the DAE. Non-compliance with AERB
directives by the operating units will also be reviewed by SARCOP and if necessary,
restrictions or suspension of operation of the facility will be imposed. In general,
recommencement of operations after suspension, following serious violations of
safety norms or an unusual occurrence of serious safety significance will be permit
ted only after a detailed review and approval by the regulatory board.
SARCOP has set up Unit Safety Committees for all nuclear installations to
examine in detail safety related matters. These committees include members from
outside the unit to provide independence in the review.
There is a regulatory requirement for nuclear power plants to conduct periodic
drills with their respective emergency plans. These drills are observed by personnel
from the AERB/OPSD to ensure implementation of the required actions in an
emergency.
IAEA-SM-309/49 123
8. SPECIAL REVIEWS
SARCOP/OPSD has also undertaken special studies and status reviews of

DAE facilities such as a review of the design of Indian pressurized heavy water reac
tors in the light of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. Special task forces
were constituted for this purpose and their recommendations are in general being
implemented in the operating units and in the design of future units.
9. MANUAL ON RADIATION PROTECTION
Regarding radiation exposure control at the nuclear facilities, SARCOP and

OPSD have issued a Radiation Protection Manual for Nuclear Facilities. Recom
mendations of the ICRP (Publications 26 and 30, and the ICRP Paris statement,
1985) have formed the basis for guidelines for regulation of radiation exposure of
plant personnel as well as members of the public. The Manual specifies annual dose
equivalent limits for occupational workers (50 mSv) and members of the public
(1 mSv). The Manual also lays down dose equivalent limits for planned exposure of
occupational workers (10 mSv in a month) to meet situations that may occur infre
quently during normal operations. Justification for such exposures should be submit
ted to SARCOP.
When the lifetime dose equivalent for uniform irradiation of the whole body
exceeds 0.5 Sv, further exposures to such individuals will be allowed only after
review of their health status by the medical authorities. The lifetime dose equivalent
for uniform irradiation of the whole body shall not exceed 1 Sv. The Manual also
specifies the emergency exposure level to an occupational worker who in the event
of a serious accident volunteers to undertake jobs of an urgent nature such as saving
a life, preventing injuries or preventing a substantial increase in the magnitude of
the accident. An exposure level of 250 mSv shall not be exceeded in such situations
and justification for such exposures shall be submitted to SARCOP.
Emergency reference levels are also laid down in the Manual for members of
the public. Accident analysis of the nuclear facilities should demonstrate that the dose
resulting from the Design Basis Accident at the site boundary does not exceed these
levels. It is of relevance here to state that the site boundary begins at the plant exclu
sion zone radius of 1.6 km from the nuclear power plant.
The Radiation Protection Manual lays down guidelines for investigation of
overexposures and frequency of routine medical examination of all occupational
workers in nuclear facilities (once in two years).
All industrial units of the DAE have implemented the provisions of the Radia
tion Protection Manual.
124 KRISHNAMURTHI et al.'
10. RADIATION PROTECTION SURVEILLANCE
The Regulatory Board receives considerable support from (he Health and
Safety Group of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) for discharging its respon
sibility with regard to radiation protection surveillance. The organizational structure
of the Health and Safety Group is illustrated in Fig. 3. The Health and Safety Group
has established plant health physics units at all DAE nuclear installations to monitor
the radiation safety status of the plants. These units are administratively independent
of the plant management and report to the Director, Health and Safety Group,
BARC. This scheme ensures total independence in the discharge of their functions,
which are as follows:
(1) Radiation protection training of workers regular, temporary and contract

labour
(2) Enforcement of radiation protection procedures in operations and maintenance
(3) Monitoring of the workplace routine, operational and special
(4) Personnel monitoring external and internal exposures
(5) Radiation protection aspects of emergency response planning and preparedness
plant, site and off-site emergencies
(6) Analysis and review of the results from monitoring of the workplace and
personnel and
(7) Follow-up action with plant management, Health and Safety Group, BARC
and Regulatory Authority (SARCOP/AERB).
The chief health physicist functions more or less as the Resident Inspector at
the plant. The health physics personnel in the plant health physics units (CHPUs),
at nuclear power stations and fuel reprocessing plants are covered by a qualification
scheme established by the DAE. The plant health physicists, who are categorized
into four levels, are required to pass written examinations, field checklists covering
both systems and operations, a walk-through test and a viva voce, before they are
licensed to perform health physics work at the installation.
The BARC Health and Safety Group has set up personnel monitoring laborato
ries at NPP sites for prompt reading of the thermoluminescent dosimeters to ascer
tain the exposure status of workers.
The BARC Health and Safety Group has also set up an environmental survey
laboratory (ESL) and a micro-meteorological laboratory (MML) at major nuclear
sites for surveillance of environmental radioactivity. Such units have been estab
lished at all operating nuclear power plant sites (Tarapur, Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam
and Narora), a uranium mining site (Jaduguda), a nuclear fuel fabrication site
(Hyderabad), a monazite/thorium processing site (Alwaye) and at BARC, Bombay,
where many nuclear facilities such as research reactors, reprocessing plant, waste
management facilities and isotope production facilities are located. The ESLs carry
out comprehensive monitoring of radionuclide contents in different environmental
IAEA-SM-309/49 125
---------------------------- LINES O F C O M M U N IC A T IO N
PHPU - P L A N T H E A L T H PHYSICS U N IT
ESL - E N V IR O N M E N T A L S U R V E Y L A B O R A T O R Y
MML - M IC R O M E T E O R O L O G IC A L L A B O R A TO R Y
FIG. 3. Organizational structure o f the Health and Safety Group, BARC.

matrices from aquatic, atmospheric and terrestrial domains to obtain activity distri
bution patterns and estimate the intake of radionuclides by man through inhalation
and ingestion routes.
The MMLs are engaged in micro-meteorological studies of the NPP site and
in the evaluation of radiation dose to the population from radioactive discharges from
the plant through the atmospheric route.
ESLs and MMLs are assigned important roles in the action plans for an off-site
emergency. ESLs at the NPP sites have been denoted by the Department of Environ
mental Protection, Government of India as accredited laboratories for the purposes
of the Environmental Protection Act, 1986. ESLs at Kalpakkam and Bombay also
function as certifying laboratories for the radioactivity content of foodstuffs imported
into or exported from the country.
The health physics units (PHPU, ESL, MML) issue quarterly/annual reports
on the radiation safety status of the plant and its environment. The reports include
details on personnel exposures, job-wise and section-wise analysis of collective dose,
radiation and contamination levels in plant areas, radioactive discharges, unusual
occurrences, violation of health physics procedures and technical specifications, and
results of environmental monitoring studies undertaken by ESL and MML. The
reports are reviewed by the respective Unit Safety Committees and SARCOP.
Recently, a one-year training course on health physics has been started to
meet the demand for trained health physics personnel at nuclear facilities. The train
ing course comprises about seven months of academic training at the training centre
and five months of field training in a nuclear installation. The syllabus for the
academic training has been based on that of the Interregional Training Course on
Radiation Protection, conducted jointly by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and the
International Atomic Energy Agency in Bombay from December 1984 to May 1985.
However, keeping in view the responsibilities of health physics units in the nuclear
facilities, the syllabus has been expanded to include environmental radioactivity
surveillance, radioecology and industrial hygiene and safety. Furthermore, the
trainees are given extensive training in the use of personal computers in radiological
protection work.
The Health and Safety Group also provides assistance to DAE units in radio
logical safety evaluations at the design stage of DAE projects. The analyses are made
available to AERB as project reports for review before authorization.
Another unit of the Health and Safety Group, the Division of Radiological
Protection (DRP) is responsible for radiation safety in all non-DAE installations in
the country. It provides:
(1) Countrywide personnel monitoring services to persons in DAE units as well
as in medical, industrial and research institutions
(2) Advisory and safety inspection services to industries and hospitals handling
radioisotopes and radiation sources
IAEA-SM-309/49 127
(3) Training of Radiation Safety Officers (RSOs) and operational staff for radia
tion users in the country in safe handling of radioisotopes and radiation
sources.
Reports of the DRP on the above activities are reviewed by the AERB
secretariat. The Division of Radiological Protection assists AERB in the enforcement
of rules and regulations in non-DAE units.
11. TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Transport of radioactive materials in the public domain is regulated by AERB

through surveillance. The Surveillance Procedures for the Transport of Radioactive
Materials (1987) issued by the competent authority under the Radiation Protection
Rules, 1971, stipulate the safety requirements. The design of transport packages is
approved by AERB after ensuring that the packaging adequately meets the require
ments. The competent authoritys approval is required for certain shipments such as
transport of high activity sources, irradiated fuel, etc. Emergency response plans to
mitigate consequences in the event of an emergency or accident during transport are
also approved by AERB. The DRP assists AERB in processing and evaluating the
applications from the consignor for approval of shipment by the competent authority,
i.e. the AERB chairman.
12. OPERATIONAL SAFETY REVIEW BY AERB
AERB has carried out a detailed review of specific aspects of operational safety
through ad hoc expert committees. AERB conducted an in-depth assessment of
quality assurance practices followed in India in the manufacture of components and
systems important to the safety of PHWRs. Certain generic features representing
strengths and weaknesses in quality assurance were identified and reported by the
committee.
As part of the operational safety review programme of AERB, expert
committees reviewed the operational experience of Tarapur Atomic Power Station
(TAPS) and safety related unusual occurrences over five years (1980-85) at the
Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS).
The review committee for TAPS found continuous improvement since 1977 in
the control over radiation exposures at the station and that the releases of radioactive
effluents to the environment have been kept well below the authorized limits. The
committee recommended introduction of ABC analysis for further control over radi
ation exposures and also measures to enhance safety in operation. The committee
followed the OSART guidelines of the IAEA for the review.
The committee for review of unusual occurrences at RAPS, finding that

conventional equipment such as the turbine generator had caused a large number of
incidents, recommended the use of components of proven quality to ensure reliable
and trouble free performance. The committee identified measures to prevent recur
rence of some of the serious unusual occurrences that had taken place. It is of interest
to note that the radiation hazards related occurrences represented about 6% of the
total occurrences.
13. REVIEW OF TRAINING, QUALIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF

NPP PERSONNEL
An expert committee of AERB reviewed the training programmes, qualifi

cation and licensing policy for nuclear power plant personnel. Recommendations of
the committee covered areas such as manpower planning and training, staffing of the
control room and operation section, simulator and computer aids for training, etc.
Important recommendations included: practice on mock-ups in the use of safety
related equipment and equipment located in radiation areas to reduce exposure time;
retraining for non-standard operations and emergency procedures; periodical review
of syllabi of courses, training manuals and checklists; involvement of AERB in all
stages of qualification, certification and licensing; compulsory training on a simu
lator for control room personnel and engaging a licensed engineer for radioactive
waste management and the ventilation system in view of the importance of these to
environmental safety.
14. REVIEW OF RADIATION PROTECTION MEASURES
Nuclear power plants contribute about 60% of the occupational collective dose
arising in the nuclear fuel cycle in India. An expert committee reviewed the radiation
protection measures at the three operating nuclear power stations. The committee
recommended upgrading of radiation protection training programmes for plant
personnel, particularly for maintenance staff. For senior engineers, radiation protec
tion training needs augmentation to include principles of ALARA and its implemen
tation in design and operation, the use of collective dose as an indicator of stochastic
detriment, and for accident situations, source term characterization, consequences of
off-site releases and measures for protection of the population and principles of
setting emergency reference levels for introducing various countermeasures. The
committee recommended introduction of a system of qualifying the contractors who
undertake radiation jobs. Each licensed contractor must be required to employ a
qualified and approved Radiological Safety Officer (RSO) to advise the contract
labour about radiation safety aspects of the work carried out by it. The RSO should
IAEA-SM-309/49 129
keep track of individual doses and schedule the work properly so that specified dose
limits set by AERB are not exceeded. The committee also recommended introduction
of a unique identification code for each worker so that radiation doses received by
him or her in different places at different times during each year are entered in a
single file to facilitate enforcement of the annual dose limits to temporary workers.
15. INVESTIGATIONS OF COLLECTIVE DOSE REDUCTION AT

NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
An expert committee of AERB investigated causes of high occupational

collective doses at Indian NPPs and recommended measures for reduction of collec
tive dose. The committee outlined a number of organizational actions such as
management commitment, designer-operator co-ordination, training in dose reduc
tion methodology, design phase radiation safety review, etc. Various technical solu
tions were recommended for dose reduction, material selection and control,
including for instance, the use of cobalt-free stainless steel, chemical control and
control of fission product buildup, source control measures to maintain fuel integrity,
system decontamination, development of remote tooling and handling techniques,
control measures for tritium doses, etc.
The committee advocated the need for reduction of manpower at the stations
and formulating a meaningful man-rem budgeting scheme aimed at dose reduction.
The committee proposed a centralized man-rem management programme with an
ALARA co-ordinator at each site. The committee fixed targets for the occupational
collective doses for the new generation PHWR units and for the currently operating
units as well.
16. CONCLUSION
An adequate and competent infrastructure has been built to cater for the diverse
radiation protection requirements of all nuclear installations in India, arising at
different stages from site selection to day-to-day operation. AERB ensures that
radiation protection aspects are given appropriate consideration during siting,
design, construction and commissioning, that the radiation exposures of workers and
radioactive releases to the environment are kept as low as reasonably achievable and
that the installations maintain at all times a capability to handle local, site and off-site
emergencies.
IAEA-SM-309/73
LA PROTECCION RADIOLOGICA EN CUBA:

PARTICULARIDADES, RESULTADOS
Y PERSPECTIVAS
A.V. BILBAO, L.A. JOVA, J.R. QUEVEDO

Centro de Proteccin e Higiene de las Radiaciones,
La Habana, Cuba
Abstract-Resumen
RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION IN CUBA: SPECIAL FEATURES, RESULTS AND
PROSPECTS.
The Cuban nuclear programme is expanding and is taking due account of international
experience and scientific and technical progress in the field of radiological protection. Th
Centre for Radiation Protection and Hygiene, supported by the local branches of the Executive
Secretariat for Nuclear Affairs, has played a major role in this area. In creating the National
Radiological Protection System efforts were made to strengthen the national regulatory frame
work, which includes a set of measures to ensure that exposure of workers, the population
and the environment to ionizing radiation is kept within internationally accepted limits. Impor
tant features of the system include centralized dose monitoring of all workers, centralized
monitoring of environmental radioactivity, and other activities aimed at strengthening the level
of radiological protection during the use of ionizing radiation. The paper describes some of
the results obtained in recent years and outlines some of the prospects for this field in the
immdiate future.
LA PROTECCION RADIOLOGICA EN CUBA: PARTICULARIDADES, RESULTADOS

Y PERSPECTIVAS.
El programa nuclear cubano se desarrolla teniendo en cuenta la experiencia interna
cional y los avances cientfico-tcnicos en el campo de la proteccin radiolgica. En este sen
tido, el Centro de Proteccin e Higiene de las Radiaciones, con el apoyo de las Delegaciones
Territoriales de la Secretara Ejecutiva para Asuntos Nucleares, ha venido desempeando un
papel principal. El trabajo desplegado en la conformacin del Sistema Nacional de Proteccin
Radiolgica en Cuba ha tenido como premisas el fortalecimiento de las bases regulatorias, que
incluyen el conjunto de medidas tendientes a garantizar que la exposicin a las radiaciones
ionizantes de los trabajadores, la poblacin y el medio ambiente se mantengan dentro de
lmites aceptables intemacionalmente. Entre las particularidades ms importantes se encuen
tran el control dosimtrico centralizado de todo el personal ocupaciortal, la ejecucin cen
tralizada del control radiolgico ambiental y otras actividades dirigidas al fortalecimiento del
nivel de proteccin radiolgica durante el empleo de las radiaciones ionizantes en Cuba. En
este trabajo se ilustran algunos de los resultados obtenidos en estos aos, esbozndose tambin
algunas perspectivas inmediatas en este campo.
131
132 BILBAO et al.
1. INTRODUCCION
El uso pacfico de la energa atmica y de las tcnicas nucleares resulta sin

dudas una va fiable y segura del desarrollo en diferentes direcciones de la economa
nacional cubana, y en particular para la produccin de energa elctrica en los
prximos aos. Desde inicios de la dcada pasada nuestro pas ha venido trabajando
para garantizar este objetivo, teniendo en cuenta para ello la experiencia interna
cional y los avances cientfico-tcnicos en el campo de la proteccin radiolgica.
Un esfuerzo fundamental ha sido el trabajo dirigido a la creacin de las bases
jurdicas, normalizativas y regulatorias, as como a la organizacin de la infraestruc
tura que d respuesta al uso seguro de las tcnicas y ciencias nucleares en nuestro
pas. Un ejemplo de ello lo representa el sistema actual de proteccin radiolgica
cubano, en cuya implementacin ha desempeado un papel principal la Secretara
Ejecutiva para Asuntos Nucleares (SEAN).
2. AUTORIDAD NACIONAL COMPETENTE
A partir de la promulgacin en 1981 de las Reglas Bsicas de Seguridad del

Sistema Nacional de Proteccin Radiolgica, se estableci por primera vez en Cuba
una norma para la limitacin de dosis de los trabajadores y el pblico. Esta norma
responde al principio de garantizar que toda exposicin a las radiaciones ionizantes
est justificada y que no se sobrepasen los lmites bsicos de exposicin establecidos
internacionalmente, as como disminuir las dosis de exposicin hasta los niveles ms
bajos que se pueda razonablemente conseguir. Las reglas de referencia establecen
las categoras de personas expuestas y los grupos de rganos crticos, y no compren
den las dosis recibidas por los pacientes durante el tratamiento o diagnstico mdico,
as como las debidas a la radiacin natural de fondo [1].
Un paso importante en la conformacin del sistema actual de proteccin radio
lgica cubano se dio en 1982 con la promulgacin del Decreto-Ley 56 para la
regulacin del uso pacfico de la energa nuclear en Cuba. En este documento se
establece un Sistema Nacional de Proteccin Radiolgica que incluye el conjunto de
medidas regulatorias tendientes a garantizar que la exposicin a las radiaciones
ionizantes de los trabajadores, la poblacin y el medio ambiente se mantengan dentro
de los lmites aceptables [2]. Este Sistema se ejecuta a nivel nacional, ramal y en cada
una de las instalaciones donde se empleen materiales nucleares, sustancias radiac
tivas y otras fuentes de radiaciones ionizantes. Este Decreto-Ley establece que el
Ministerio de Salud Pblica (MINSAP) se encuentra encargado de regular lo relativo
a este Sistema en las instalaciones de rayos X de sus unidades, as como de ejercer
la vigilancia mdica necesaria de todos los trabajadores ocupacionalmente expuestos
(TOE).
IAEA-SM-309/73 133
El documento establece adems un Sistema de Medidas de Seguridad de las

Instalaciones Nucleares y otorga a la SEAN el carcter de autoridad nacional com
petente en materia de proteccin radiolgica y seguridad nuclear al encargarle la
organizacin y supervisin a nivel nacional de dichos sistemas.
Para la supervisin y funcionamiento del Sistema Nacional de Proteccin
Radiolgica, en 1985 la SEAN constituy el Centro de Proteccin e Higiene de las
Radiaciones (CPHR), centro tcnico rector de toda la vigilancia radiolgica en el
pas, el cual se apoya para su trabajo en las Delegaciones Territoriales de la SEAN
(DT-SEAN), ubicadas en las ciudades de Cienfuegos, Holgun y prximamente en
la de Camaguey [3].
3. BASES REGULATORIAS
Desde su constitucin, la autoridad nacional competente ha prestado especial

atencin a la elaboracin de la base regulatoria en materia de proteccin radiolgica,
la cual se ha visto fortalecida con la promulgacin de otros documentos nor-
malizativos y metodolgicos vigentes en Cuba, entre los cuales son de destacar el
Reglamento para la seguridad durante la transportacin de sustancias radiactivas ,
el Reglamento para la vigilancia mdica de los trabajadores ocupacionalmente
expuestos y el Reglamento para el trabajo con sustancias radiactivas y otras
fuentes de radiaciones ionizantes .
En dichos documentos se establecen las normas de seguridad que garantizan
que la transportacin de sustancias radiactivas se realice respetando los lmites
bsicos de dosis establecidos, a fin de disminuir al mnimo posible los riesgos a que
puedan estar sometidas las personas que directa o indirectamente intervienen en estas
operaciones [4] ; se establecen las disposiciones que norman la vigilancia mdica de
los trabajadores que, por razones de la labor u oficio que desempean, estn
expuestos a los efectos de las radiaciones ionizantes [5]; y se reitera que los princi
pios fundamentales que rigen el empleo de las sustancias radiactivas y otras fuentes
de radiaciones ionizantes se basan en que todas las prcticas relacionadas con la
exposicin de las personas a las radiaciones ionizantes tengan que estar debidamente
justificadas y evaluadas, as como que, durante las prcticas autorizadas con sus
respectivas licencias, no se puedan violar los lmites de dosis establecidos,
manteniendo en todo momento los niveles de exposicin tan bajos como se pueda
razonablemente conseguir [6].
La promulgacin a finales de 1987 del Decreto-Ley 98 sobre la supervisin
estatal de la seguridad de las instalaciones nucleares [7], estableciendo las disposi
ciones que norman la organizacin y ejecucin de esta actividad en el territorio
nacional, est dirigida a garantizar la explotacin de dichas instalaciones en condi
ciones seguras y sin riesgos para el personal, la poblacin y el medio ambiente.
Dicha supervisin se orienta hacia la garanta de la calidad de la construccin, la
134 BILBAO et al.
explotacin segura de las instalaciones y la creacin de la documentacin tcnico-

normalizativa de seguridad de estas instalaciones, teniendo en cuenta el progreso
cientfico-tcnico alcanzado en esta direccin, la elevacin de la calidad de los
trabajos, la seguridad y confiabilidad de los equipos y sistemas de estas instalaciones,
la aplicacin de medidas de seguridad y proteccin fsica, as como la comprobacin
de los conocimientos del personal de estas instalaciones sobre las medidas de
Seguridad. Una caracterstica importante de este sistema lo constituye el otorga
miento de licencias por etapas a los objetivos nucleares, o sea para emplazamiento,
construccin, puesta en marcha, explotacin y cierre definitivo, incluyendo el
otorgamiento de permisos y aprobaciones especiales para la realizacin de deter
minadas operaciones que por su importancia as lo requiran.
De acuerdo con este Decreto-Ley, la SEAN, como autoridad nacional
competente, ostenta la direccin metodolgica de la supervisin estatal de la
seguridad de las instalaciones nucleares en el territorio nacional y a tales efectos
organiza, coordina y controla el trabajo que en el mbito de sus respectivas com
petencias realizan otros organismos estatales involucrados y participantes en el sis
tema [7]. Precisamente con este objetivo se constituy el Consejo de Organos de
Supervisin Estatal, el cual adems se encarga del anlisis de los resultados de las
inspecciones, la aprobacin de documentos tcnico-normalizativos y regulatorio-
metodolgicos, el intercambio de criterios tcnicos y recomendaciones, valoracin
de medidas a tomar, el anlisis de los resultados de las investigaciones tcnicas de
situaciones de avera, la planificacin del trabajo de la supervisin, y de la prepara
cin y certificacin del personal entre otros aspectos.
Un esfuerzo importante realizado en estos aos para la implementacin de las
regulaciones vigentes en el campo de la proteccin radiolgica lo ha. constituido la
elaboracin de guas e instrucciones metodolgicas orientadas a garantizar la co
rrecta implementacin de los reglamentos puestos en vigor.
En la actualidad se trabaja en la consolidacin de la base regulatoria, prestn
dole especial atencin a la proteccin radiolgica de las instalaciones nucleares
futuras. En fase de aprobacin se encuentran varios reglamentos dirigidos a regular
los trabajos vinculados con la gestin de los residuales radiactivos, as como para
regular la proyeccin y operacin de centrales electronucleares y reactores de inves
tigacin y experimentales. Atendiendo a las recomendaciones formuladas por la
Comisin Internacional de Proteccin Radiolgica (CIPR), se encuentran en revisin
las Reglas Bsicas de Seguridad para su nueva edicin en el transcurso del o 1990.
Finalmente, es necesario significar el importante papel que ha representado la
base regulatoria referida en el fortalecimiento de la proteccin radiolgica de las ya
ms de 160 entidades usuarias del pas, sin contar aquellas que emplean rayos X de
diagnstico y que ya hoy superan las 550 entidades. Ello ha permitido en el decursar
de estos aos ir ganando en experiencia en el proceso de licnciamiento y de inspec
cin a los usuarios de radiaciones ionizantes, donde se conjugan la entrega por las
entidades de la documentacin exigida para ser concesionaria de una licencia con la
IAEA-SM-309/73 135
participacin activa de la parte interesada en la ftmdamentacin de su solicitud ante

los representantes de la SEAN como autoridad nacional competente.
Esto ltimo ha conducido a la elevacin de la concientizacin del personal
dirigente y tcnico en la imprescindibilidad de lograr el nivel requerido de proteccin
radiolgica en sus entidades, garantizando las soluciones tcnicas y organizativas que
se requieran para ello. Actualmente se elaboran un reglamento para el licnciamiento
de las instalaciones radiactivas del pas y las indicaciones metodolgicas dirigidas a
la ejecucin de la proteccin radiolgica en las entidades; estos documentos regulan
y uniforman esta actividad a nivel nacional, estableciendo la documentacin
requerida en cada licencia por etapas, la frecuencia de las inspecciones segn la
actividad de que se trate, y la comprobacin de conocimientos y certificacin del per
sonal responsable, entre otros aspectos importantes.
4. SERVICIOS CIENTIFICO-TECNICOS
Como parte integrante del Sistema Nacional de Proteccin Radiolgica

cubano, y como forma de elevar el nivel de proteccin radiolgica en las entidades
usuarias de radiaciones ionizantes, se ha previsto la realizacin centralizada de servi
cios cientfico-tcnicos en apoyo a la supervisin estatal. En tal sentido es necesario
destacar la dosimetra personal y la vigilancia ambiental, as como el aseguramiento
metrolgico de la instrumentacin empleada en la proteccin radiolgica, la gestin
de los residuales radiactivos, el control de fuentes radiactivas, y la preparacin del
personal responsabilizado con la seguridad de los trabajadores y del medio ambiente
en las instalaciones que emplean radiaciones ionizantes.
Una particularidad importante de nuestro sistema, para garantizar la proteccin
radiolgica en las entidades usuarias de fuentes de radiaciones ionizantes en el te
rritorio nacional, lo representa la centralizacin por la SEAN del control dosimtrico
individual en unos 1530 TOE, con el apoyo tcnico del CPHR y las DT-SEAN en
los territorios de su atencin.
En coordinacin con el MINSAP se realiza adicionalmente el control cen
tralizado de aproximadamente 4600 TOE vinculados a entidades que emplean
rayos X con fines de diagnstico mdico. Este control directo por la SEAN, como
autoridad nacional competente, ser extendido tambin a las instalaciones nucleares
futuras, lo cual representa la va ms efectiva y racional de llevar a cabo el referido
control, atendiendo a nuestras condiciones especficas, nivel de desarrollo, dis
ponibilidad de recursos y fuerza de trabajo calificada para esta actividad.
En Cuba, el mtodo de control dosimtrico individual externo ms empleado
es la dosimetra flmica. El 100% de los TOE se controla por dosimetra flmica con
frecuencia mensual de cambio, y slo unos 100 TOE se controlan adems con
dosimetra termoluminiscente (TLD), teniendo en cuenta que esta ltima se encuen
tra an en estado de comprobacin experimental en la prctica para su implementa-
136 BILBAO et al.
CUADRO I. RESULTADOS DEL CONTROL DOSIMETRICO DE LOS

TRABAJADORES OC UPACION ALMENTE EXPUESTOS EN 1988
Nmero de trabaja
Fraccin del
Dosis media dores que recibi
Grupos de lmite anual
anual dosis superiores a:
trabajadores permisible
(mSv)
(%) 15 mSv 30 mSv
Medicina nuclear 3,4 6,8 11 0

y terapia
Defectoscopa industrial 1,33 2,7 2 0
Investigaciones 1,3 2,7 0 0
Otros servicios 1,25 2,5 0 0

(aduanas, metrologa, etc.)
FIG. 1. Curva de calibracin dosis-respuesta in vitro en linfocitos de sangre perifrica

humana.
IAEA-SM-309/73 137
cin a nivel nacional; adems, a unos 200 TOE se les realiza dosimetra neutrnica
y a otro nmero reducido se le realiza dosimetra de extremidades con anillos TLD.
Los resultados de la determinacin experimental del proceso de desvanecimiento
(fading) de la informacin dosimtrica registrada en las pelculas empleadas [8]
demuestran que para las condiciones climticas de nuestro pas, a diferentes niveles
de dosis de radacin, y en las diferentes condiciones de conservacin, el desvaneci
miento principal ocurre dentro de los primeros 15 das y en lo adelante la variacin
en la densidad ptica de las pelculas es inferior al 15%; a partir de este resultado
se valora actualmente la frecuencia ptima de cambio.
Los resultados de los estudios realizados en el perodo 1979-83 [9] han demos
trado que los grupos de trabajadores con mayor riesgo de exposicin son por orden
los de radioterapia, medicina nuclear y rayos X de diagnstico. En dicho perodo la
dosis media anual de un TOE no sobrepas el 10% del lmite de dosis permisible.
Los valores obtenidos en 1988 coinciden con los reportados anteriormente. En este
ao slo 13 trabajadores superaron la dosis de 15 milisievert. Esto ltimo se ilustra
en el Cuadro I, donde aparecen los resultados principales obtenidos en el control
dosimtrico del TOE de las entidades usuarias cubanas en 1988.
Igualmente, se le ha prestado atencin al control dosimtrico interno del per
sonal que por las caractersticas de su actividad puede incorporar al organismo radio-
nucleidos. Para ello, en los ltimos aos se ha llevado a cabo un control por con
taminacin interna mediante la toma de muestras biolgicas en unos 430 trabajadores
a nivel nacional, que laboran con fuentes abiertas de sustancias radiactivas en algo
ms de 30 entidades usuarias.
Con este objetivo se ha orientado, desarrollado y montado el mtodo para la
determinacin de la contaminacin interna en tiroides por yodo 131, directamente
por parte de los usuarios, mediante la utilizacin del mismo equipamiento empleado
en los hospitales en las captaciones de yodo radiactivo. Adems, en los ltimos
3 aos se han montado los mtodos para la determinacin y control de tritio,
carbono 14, azufre 35 y fsforo 32 en muestras biolgicas. Las investigaciones en
esta direccin alcanzarn mayor desarrollo an a partir de 1990 en que nuestro pas,
mediante un proyecto de asistencia tcnica del OIEA, dispondr de un contador cor
poral con cmara blindada.
Partiendo de su importancia, tambin se trabaja en el desarrollo de la
dosimetra biolgica. Para ello se realiz, siguiendo las recomendaciones inter
nacionales, la evaluacin dosis-respuesta in vitro en linfocitos de sangre perifrica
humana, confeccionndose la curva de calibracin para la irradiacin corporal total
[10], que se ilustra en la Fig. 1. Esta curva se compar con las de otros pases como
el Reino Unido, Italia, URSS y Japn, no observndose diferencias sustanciales.
Por otra parte, la determinacin de cidos nucleicos totales en leucocitos de
sangre perifrica se inici analizndo las cifras bases de este indicador en humanos
no expuestos por su ocupacin laboral a las radiaciones ionizantes. El estudio se
realiz en 410 personas clnicamente sanas, las cuales fueron sometidas a exmenes
138 BILBAO et al.
CUADRO II. MEDICION DE POTENCIA DE DOSIS REALIZADAS EN

EMPLAZAMIENTOS DE FUTURAS INSTALACIONES NUCLEARES
CUBANAS
Potencia de dosis en microroentgen3 por hora
Estacin Cmara de ionizacin Dosimetra

teirmoluminiscente
RSS 111 NB-3201 TLD (LiF)
H -l 5,500,10 6,100,1 _
H-2 7,500,10 8,700,1
H-3 5,400,10 5,200,1
H-4 4,000.10 4,300,1
H-5 5,200,10 5,700,1
J-l 5,500,10 5,20 0,2 ___
J-2 5,000,10 5,800,1
J-3 5,600,10 5,300,1
J-4 4,900,10 4,600,1
E-l 4,600,10 8,2 0,1

E-4 6,100,10 6,10,3
E-16 6,400,10 6,4 0,6
E-22 6,300,10 6,3 0,3
1 R = 258 C/kg.
complementarios de laboratorio, a fin de verificar su adecuado estado de salud y

establecer las conclusiones entre la determinacin de cidos nucleicos y los otros
parmetros. Los resultados demostraron la inexistencia de diferencias significativas
entre los grupos de edades escogidos y tambin que la distribucin de frecuencia en
esos grupos fue normal. Actualmente se contina trabajando en el desarrollo de estas
dos tcnicas biolgicas para determinar la dosis absorbida en casos de sobre-
exposicin humana a las radiaciones ionizantes.
Los estudios realizados en estos aos en materia de vigilancia ambiental han
estado dirigidos a establecer una lnea base o fondo, que describa los niveles medios
de radiactividad en el pas para poder evaluar su variabilidad y distribucin en el
tiempo y en el espacio, sobre todo en las zonas de emplazamiento de las futuras
instalaciones nucleares.
IAEA-SM-309/73 139
Los resultados de las mediciones sobre la potencia de dosis gamma [8] y los
niveles de radiactividad [11], ilustrados en los Cuadros II , son bajos y demues
tran que estamos en presencia de zonas normales, afectadas slo por las precipita
ciones radiactivas globales. Los valores medios y los intervalos de variacin se
encuentran dentro de los rangos reportados en la literatura para regiones sin altera
ciones del fondo radiactivo ambiental.
Sobre la base de la experiencia acumulada, y fundamentalmente a travs de los
resultados de los estudios ambientales realizados, se ha llevado a cabo un amplio
trabajo normalizativo-metodolgico para encaminar y uniformar todos los esfuerzos
nacionales al mismo objetivo. Se han elaborado procedimientos tanto de muestreo
como de anlisis de muestras ambientales, que se emplean en el trabajo de los dos
laboratorios de vigilancia radiolgica ambiental existentes en la actualidad en el pas,
participndose en intercalibraciones y mediciones comparativas.
En estos aos tambin se obtuvieron resultados concretos en el estudio del
comportamiento fsico-qumico de diferentes radionucleidos (Fe-59, Co-60, Nb-95
y Ce-144) en el agua de mar y en la zona de mezcla de las aguas fluviales y de mar.
CUADRO III. NIVELES DE RADIACTIVIDAD AMBIENTAL EN UNA ZONA

DE INTERES
Concentracin en mBq/g mBq/L

Radionucleido Medio
Valor Intervalo Segn datos
medio de variacin de literatura
Sr-90 Suelo 1,9 0,4-5,5 5-34

Pasto 1,5 0,4-6,5 5-34
Agua 2,6 0,5-5,9 18-130
Leche 27,00 15-71 40-300
Cs-137 Suelo 10,2 3-34 0,1-114

Agua 4a 0,7-2
K-40 Suelo 238 40-430 100-700
Ra-226 Suelo 22,8 9-50 10-50
Th-232 Suelo 24,3 15-50 7-50
a Lmite de deteccin del equipamiento empleado.

140 BILBAO et al.
Ht, e xte rn a
Ht . precip ita cion e s
Dosis e fe ctiva (o ra l)
H t, gases in ertes ra diactivos
Dosis e fe ctiva (in h a la ci n )
Ht, aerosoles
1 10 10 0 *
D IS T A N C IA A L A C E N (km )
FIG. 2. Niveles de dosis de irradiacin como resultado del funcionamiento normal de la

CEN.
Adems fueron determinados los coeficientes de distribucin de los radionucleidos

antes mencionados para muestras de sedimentos marinos tomadas de la costa norte
de Cuba [12]. Estos procedimientos y resultados permitieron establecer la base
metodolgica para continuar investigaciones con otros radionucleidos a fin de preci
sar la distribucin de stos en el sistema marino. Su importancia es de particular
inters si se tiene en cuenta que nuestras futuras centrales electronucleares sern
enfriadas por agua de mar.
En la actualidad se cuenta adems con unas 50 postas radiolgicas, no incluidas
en los planes preoperacionales de las instalaciones nucleares. El tratamiento
estadstico de los resultados en cada posta se realiza analizando sus fluctuaciones
temporales y en el supuesto que estas postas sern tomadas como referencia al
producirse cualquier alteracin del medio ambiente provocada por el funcionamiento
de las instalaciones u otras causas cualesquiera.
En cuanto al impacto radiolgico ambiental, toda una serie de factores carac
tersticos de los emplazamientos seleccionados para las futuras instalaciones
nucleares han requerido en estos aos ser estudiados. Para ello se ha tenido en cuenta
la magnitud de nuestro programa nucleoenergtico y las particularidades naturales
y socioeconmicas del pas [13].
Una tarea actual y de relevante significado prctico han sido las investigaciones
de pronstico sobre el impacto radiolgico a la poblacin cubana resultante del fun
cionamiento de sus futuras instalaciones nucleares. Los primeros trabajos en este
IAEA-SM-309/73 141
campo se encaminaron a presentar un modelo para la estimacin preliminar de las

tasas de dosis anuales a la poblacin a consecuencia de los efluentes de gases y aero
soles radiactivos de las centrales nucleares [14].
Una atencin particular en los estudios realizados sobre las dosis individuales
y colectivas requiri la valoracin de los coeficientes de dilucin atmosfrica
teniendo en cuenta la teora estadstica de la difusin turbulenta de mezclas radiac
tivas. Los valores de estos coeficientes fueron establecidos en diferentes zonas de
inters. Pudo comprobarse que, para el caso cubano, a distancias cercanas a las
instalaciones nucleares el factor principal tambin lo ocupan las precipitaciones
hmedas y que a medida que nos alejamos del foco de emisin aumenta el aporte
de las precipitaciones secas. Pudo demostrarse adems que la dosis de irradiacin
externa, debida a los aerosoles radiactivos, y de irradiacin interna, por inhalacin
de yodo, no representan ningn aporte significativo a la dosis total que recibe el
individuo. Por ltimo, se concluy que las mayores dosis durante el funcionamiento
de una central electronuclear se producen como resultado de los gases inertes radiac
tivos de la fisin [15], tal y como se ilustra en la Fig. 2.
Sin embargo, con el aumento de la distancia, el aporte ms significativo a la
dosis corresponde a la irradiacin externa resultante de los aerosoles radiactivos que
se precipitan y contaminan la superficie terrestre. Las dosis individuales estimadas
para regiones de posible desarrollo nucleoenergtico en Cuba indican por sus resul
tados riesgos realmente insignificantes, tal y como se deduce de los datos del
Cuadro IV.
CUADRO IV. VALORES ESTIMADOS DE LAS DOSIS INVIDUALES NOR

MALIZADAS Y DE LA MAGNITUD DEL RIESGO EN LOS LIMITES DE LA
ZONA DE PROTECCION DE UNA CENTRAL NUCLEAR
Dosis Riesgo3
Zonas estudiadas
[Sv/MW(e)-ao] [1/ao]
Regin Sur-Central 2,21 X 1 0 '10 6,6 E x 109

(CEN Juragu)
Regin Norte-Oriental 6,09 x 1 0 '10 1,8 X 10~8
Regin Norte-Occidental 2,24 x 1010 6,7 x 10"9
a Considerando un coeficiente de riesgo igual a 10 2/Sv, una potencia elctrica de 4 GW(e)

y una utilizacin de la capacidad instalada igual a 0,75.
142 BILBAO et al.
Los estudios de pronstico sobrte el impacto radiolgico de las futuras instala

ciones nucleares cubanas seguirn desarrollndose y perfeccionndose en los prxi
mos aos, no slo para precisar sus resultados con los obtenidos de la vigilancia
radiolgica ambiental durante el funcionamiento de los reactores, sino tambin para
contribuir a fundamentar los lmites permisibles de emisin de efluentes gaseosos y
aerosoles radiactivos durante el proceso de licnciamiento de dichas instalaciones.
Igualmente el CPHR brinda actualmente un servicio centralizado de verifica
cin y calibracin de los dosmetros y radiomtros empleados en las entidades,
garantizndose de este modo que los instrumentos empleados en las mismas para
realizar las mediciones estn comprobados en cuanto a las magnitudes de las radia
ciones ionizantes a medir. Importante lo es tambin el asesoramiento que se brinda
con relacin a los instrumentos a emplear o adquirir por las entidades para garantizar
la proteccin radiolgica.
Sobre la base de las amargas experiencias de algunos accidentes radiolgicos
ocurridos en el mundo, como el de Goinia, Brasil, en 1987, desde hace algo ms
de dos aos se ha logrado sistematizar un trabajo por la SEAN dirigido a la recogida
centralizada de las fuentes radiactivas declaradas en desuso por las entidades. Ello,
de forma preventiva, nos ha permitido minimizar el riesgo asociado al uso indebido
de fuentes en el pas. En la actualidad han sido recogidas cientos de fuentes radiac
tivas selladas con una actividad total de varios cientos de terabequerelios.
Es indiscutible que el papel del hombre es determinante en la utilizacin de la
tcnica y, unido a ello, como la prctica demuestra, ste representa el eslabn ms
dbil cuando no se atiende debidamente. Por ello, se ha hecho tambin todos estos
aos un esfuerzo notable en la preparacin del hombre durante el uso de las radia
ciones ionizantes. Desde hace varios aos se programan e imparten peridicamente
cursos nacionales de proteccin radiolgica para los responsables de dicha actividad
en las entidades usuarias, permitiendo este proceso no slo comprobar los conoci
mientos adquiridos por ellos y autorizarles a velar por las prcticas que empleen
radiaciones ionizantes en sus respectivas entidades, sino adems crear una cultura en
los trabajadores de la esfera en materia de proteccin radiolgica. Ello se refleja en
los resultados obtenidos hasta el presente y en el bajo nmero de incidentes radio
lgicos ocurridos en Cuba, no reportndose hasta la fecha accidentes con conse
cuencias radiolgicas graves para el personal, la poblacin o el medio ambiente,
o siquiera con valor que resulte significativo por sus consecuencias para su notifica
cin o toma de medidas determinadas.
5. CONCLUSIONES
En los ltimos diez aos se ha fortalecido sustancialmente en Cuba el trabajo

en el campo de la proteccin radiolgica; el nfasis fundamental ha estado dirigido
a crear las bases organizativas y materiales, normalizativas y regulatorio-
IAEA-SM-309/73 143
metodolgicas. Todo ello culmin en 1987 con la constitucin del sistema cubano
de supervisin estatal de la seguridad de las instalaciones nucleares, el cual posee
caractersticas propias y que conjuga el otorgamiento de licencias y permisos, la
preparacin del personal y las inspecciones con el control directo por la SEAN, como
autoridad nacional competente, sobre el personal y el medio ambiente.
Una caracterstica importante de este sistema es la centralizacin: del control
dosimtrico individual de los trabajadores ocupacionalmente expuestos a nivel
nacional; de la vigilancia radiolgica ambiental del entorno a los emplazamientos
seleccionados para las futuras instalaciones nucleares cubanas; de la verificacin de
los equipos dosimtricos y radiomtricos empleados para la proteccin radiolgica;
de la gestin de los residuales radiactivos de las entidades usuarias, incluyendo la
recogida centralizada de fuentes radiactivas declaradas en desuso; y de la poltica de
licnciamiento e inspeccin y preparacin del personal responsable de la proteccin
en las entidades.
Lo anterior ha originado tambin en estos aos la asimilacin de los avances
de la ciencia y la tcnica en este campo de la proteccin radiolgica. Tal y como se
ha descrito en el presente trabajo, la direccin fundamental de nuestro trabajo ha
estado encaminada a la obtencin de resultados concretos, en lneas actuales a nivel
internacional. Esto nos ha permitido: estudiar los factores principales que influyen
en el impacto radiolgico a la poblacin comprobndose el insignificante riesgo que
resulta del funcionamiento normal de las futuras instalaciones nucleares; comprobar
los bajos niveles de radiactividad ambiental existentes; identificar los grupos de
trabajadores de mayor riesgo radiolgico por su actividad ocupacional; y desarrollar
los mtodos de dosimetra biolgica, entre otras tareas importantes.
Los resultados obtenidos nos permiten concluir que Cuba se esfuerza en garan
tizar la seguridad de su programa de desarrollo nuclear con el rigor interna
cionalmente exigido. Ello ha requerido la existencia de un rea con una
infraestructura material y humana, capaz de garantizar la proteccin radiolgica, la
cual resulta cada vez ms fortalecida con una concepcin clara y precisa de sus
objetivos.
Nuestra experiencia, aunque modesta an, augura que un pas como Cuba
pueda plantearse un programa nuclear autctono para su desarrollo con bases slidas
que garanticen su seguridad.
REFERENCIAS
[1] Norma Cubana NC 69-01-81, Reglas Bsicas de Seguridad, Comit Estatal de Nor
malizacin, La Habana (1981).
[2] Decreto-Ley 56, Para la Regulacin del Uso Pacfico de la Energa Nuclear, Gaceta
Oficial de la Repblica de Cuba, La Habana (1982).
[3] CASTRO DIAZ-BALART, F ., Energa nuclear y desarrollo , Realidades y Desafos
en los Umbrales del Siglo XXI, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, La Habana (1990) 365.
144 BILBAO et al.
[4] Decreto N 137, Reglamento para la Seguridad Durante la Transportacin de las Sus
tancias Radiactivas, Gaceta Oficial de la Repblica de Cuba, La Habana (1987).
[5] Resolucin Conjunta: Reglamento para la Vigilancia Mdica de los Trabajadores
Ocupacionalmente Expuestos, Gaceta Oficial de la Repblica de Cuba, La Habana
(1987).
[6] Decreto 142, Reglamento para el Trabajo con Sustancias Radiactivas y otras
Fuentes de Radiaciones Ionizantes, Gaceta Oficial de la Repblica de Cuba, La Habana
(1988).
[7] Decreto-Ley 98, Sobre la Supervisin Estatal de la Seguridad de las Instalaciones
Nucleares, Gaceta Oficial de la Repblica de Cuba, La Habana (1987).
[8] BILBAO, A. V ., La seguridad y la proteccin radiolgica en el programa cubano de uso
pacfico de la energa nuclear, Nucleus 7 (1989) 6-14.
[9] QUEVEDO, J.R ., MORENO, C ., Resultados de la dosimetra individual en Cuba en
1979-83 , Procesos de Dosimetra Individual e Irradiacin Externa (Actas Simp. Ber
ln, 1985), CAME (1985) 156.
[10] GARCIA-LIMA, O ., IOHSON-MAYETA, J., et al., Relacin entre la dosis de radia
cin gamma in vitro y las aberraciones cromosmicas en los linfocitos humanos,
Nucleus 4 (1988) 20.
[11] JOVA, L.A ., QUEVEDO, J.R ., et al., Estudio del fondo radiactivo ambiental en una
zona de inters, Nucleus 1 (1986) 15.
[12] JOVA, L.A ., SHUMILIN, E .N ., et al., Comportamiento fsico-qumico de radio-
nucleidos en la zona de mezcla de aguas pluviales y de mar, Radiokhimiya 4 (1987)
554.
[13] BILBAO, A .V ., La energtica nuclear y su perspectiva de desarrollo, Ciee. Tc. 5
(1979) 59.
[14] BILBAO. A.V., Estudios de los niveles de contaminacin ambiental durante el
funcionamiento de centrales electronucleares, Ciee. Tc. 1 (1977) 75.
[15] BILBAO, A.V., Estimacin de la Carga Radiacional a la Poblacin por la Emisin de
Gases y Aerosoles de las Centrales Electronucleares Durante el Desarrollo de la Ener
gtica Nuclear en Cuba, Instituto Energtico de Mosc (1984).
IAEA-SM-309/42
CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN CANADA
W.R. BROWN
Atomic Energy Control Board,
Ottawa, Canada
Abstract
CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN CANADA.
The Atomic Energy Control Board is the Canadian agency responsible for the
regulation of all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including safeguards, the possession, sale,
use and disposal of radioactive materials, and the packaging of radioactive materials for
transport. However, a prerequisite for the safe use of radioactive materials in any country is
an adequate infrastructure to achieve radiation protection for staff, the public and the environ
ment. The paper describes in detail the regulatory mechanisms, inspection procedures,
enforcement capabilities and relationships with other organizations for the control of
radioactive materials and nuclear facilities in Canada.
1. INTRODUCTION
A prerequisite for the safe use of radioactive materials in any country is an

adequate infrastructure to achieve radiation protection for staff, the public and the
environment. This paper describes the major organizations, groups and infra
structure that currently exist in Canada for radiation protection from radioactive
materials.
Since the mandate of the Atomic Energy Control Board is limited to radioactive
materials that are directly or indirectly involved in the nuclear fuel cycle, this paper
will not deal with non-ionizing radiation, X rays or naturally occurring radioactive
materials that are an unwanted by-product of processes outside the fuel cycle, such
as fertilizer production or gypsum processing.
2. CANADIAN NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
In order to evaluate the Canadian radiation safety infrastructure, it is necessary

to know the extent of the nuclear industry; the major components are as follows:
18 power reactors
3 reactors in advanced stages of decommissioning
4 power reactors under construction
8 research reactors
145
146 BROWN
25 research, 33 medical and 6 commercial particle accelerators

8 uranium mines
1 uranium refinery
4 fuel fabrication facilities
1 heavy water plant
13 waste management facilities
4858 radioisotope licences (nuclear medicine, radiography, gauges,
research, etc.)
45 prescribed substance licences (uranium, thorium and heavy water).
3. ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL BOARD
The Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) consists of a full time President,
an ex officio member who is also President of the National Research Council, and
three other members, who are appointed by the government for two-year terms that
are usually extended several times.
As of 31 March 1989, the staff of the AECB consisted of 261 employees,
210 of whom are located at the head office in Ottawa. In addition, 23 are located
at nuclear power reactor sites, 5 at our laboratory in Ottawa, 8 at the Elliot Lake
uranium mining area, and 15 at our three regional compliance offices. The AECB
has, however, received approval for an additional 93 persons to be added over the
next two years.
The organizational structure of the AECB is shown in Fig. 1 and the resources
allocated to each major function are shown in Fig. 2. The President, who is the only
full time member of the Board, receives advice directly from the Legal Adviser and
Medical Liaison Officer. The President also receives advice from two independent
committees, the Advisory Committee on Radiological Protection and the Advisory
Committee on Nuclear Safety, both of which are composed of technical experts from
outside the AECB. They advise on generic issues and are not directly involved with
licensing actions.
The Directorate of Reactor Regulation is responsible for the regulation of
power and research reactors, accelerators and the qualifications of reactor operators.
It also provides safety evaluation and quality assurance functions for all the Boards
licensing divisions.
The Directorate of Fuel Cycle and Materials Regulation is responsible for the
regulation of uranium mines and mills, refineries and conversion plants, nuclear fuel
fabrication plants, heavy water plants, radioactive waste management facilities, and
the use of radioisotopes. Additional responsibilities of this Directorate include
regulating the transportation of radioactive materials, the analytical laboratory
facilities, most compliance inspection services, and the implementation of domestic
and international nuclear materials safeguard programmes.
IAEA-SM-309/42
147
FIG. 1. Organization chart of the Atomic Energy Control Board.

148 BROWN
Fuel cycle a nd m aterials re g u la tio n 36%

R ea ctor re g u la tio n 30%
P la n ning a nd a d m in istra tio n 20%
Research a nd ra d ia tio n p ro te c tio n 8%
P resident's o ffice and se cre ta ria t 6%
FIG. 2. Allocation o f staff resources.
The Research and Radiation Protection Branch is responsible for the initiation
and management of projects in the mission oriented research programme that is
designed to provide information for use in the AECBs regulatory functions. It is also
responsible for the assessment of radiation hazards and radiation protection
programmes for licensed activities, for the development of related standards and
guidelines, and for staff radiation protection training.
Since expert advice on a number of subjects is required before correct licensing
decisions can be made, a number of specialized groups exist within the AECB to
provide this advice. A brief description of the major groups that advise the licensing
divisions is given in Appendix A.
4. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
With the passing of the Atomic Energy Control Act in 1946 by the Canadian
Parliament, the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) was established to control the
development, application and use of nuclear energy. The chosen method of control
was the use of regulations that specify the requirements in general terms and a
IAEA-SM-309/42 149
comprehensive licensing system that provides specific requirements for the given
application.
Regulatory control is achieved by issuing licences which contain conditions
that must be met by the licensee. Before issuing a licence, the AECB requires
sufficient information to demonstrate that required health, safety, security and
environmental protection standards will be met and maintained, and that any wastes
will be managed in a satisfactory manner. To exercise its regulatory role, the AECB
defines these standards, assesses the potential licensees capabilities to meet them
and, once a licence is issued, carries out compliance inspections to ensure that the
requirements are continually met.
The requirements for licensing vary from those for nuclear generating stations,
through the less complex facilities involved in fuel production, to the possession and
use of radioactive sources for use in medicine, industry and research. In all cases,
the aim is to protect both workers and the public from unnecessary exposure to
radiation and radioactive materials associated with the operations.
The regulations are periodically amended to ensure they adequately control the
nuclear industry. Changes require a public consultation process and evaluation of the
costs associated with the changes before the amendments can be submitted to
Parliament for approval.
In addition to the regulations, the AECB issues regulatory documents in the
form of Regulatory Guides and Regulatory Policy Statements. These further define
the requirements and criteria that the AECB expects to be met for specific nuclear
operations. Regulatory documents, before being issued formally, are submitted as
Consultative Documents for public comment. These may be referred to one or both
of the Advisory Committees for review.
5. REGULATIONS
In the following sections, a brief summary of the Atomic Energy Control

Regulations will be given. If precise details are needed, the regulations should be
consulted for the exact wording.
5.1. General
The Atomic Energy Control Regulations require anyone who uses, possesses,
imports, exports or sells significant quantities of radioactive material to have a
licence issued by the Atomic Energy Control Board. The following are some of the
exemptions which apply. No licence is required if:
(1) Less than 10 kg of uranium or thorium are involved (this does not apply to
233U or 235U).
150 BROWN
(2) The quantity of radioactive material in each source does not exceed a scheduled
quantity, and not more than ten sources per year are involved. The scheduled
quantities for common isotopes are listed in the regulations. Examples are:
isotope scheduled quantity

cobalt-60 10 nCi (370 kBq)
radium-226 0.1 Ci (3.7 kBq)
caesium-137 10 i (370 kBq)
tritium 1 nCi (37 MBq)
(3) The device does not contain more than ten scheduled quantities of radioactive
material and has been approved by the AECB.
5.2. Dose limits
The regulations limit the doses that atomic radiation workers and members of
the public may receive. When an atomic radiation worker, who is defined as
someone who is likely to receive a dose in excess of any dose limit for members of
the public, exceeds a dose limit, he or she is removed from work that could add
TABLE I. MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE DOSES*
Atomic radiation workersb Any other person

Organ
(remsc per quarter) (rems per year) (rems per year)
Whole body, gonads 3 5 0.5

Bone, skin, thyroid 15 30 3
Extremities 38 75 7.5
Any other single
organ or tissue 8 15 1.5
a Amendments to the Regulations are being prepared which would, among other things,
make the maximum permissible doses consistent with the International Commission on
Radiological Protections Publication 26. However, quarterly limits will remain.
b The dose to the abdomen of a pregnant woman shall not exceed 1 rem during the period
after the pregnancy is known.
c 1 rem = 0.01 Sv.
IAEA-SM-309/42 151
significantly to their dose until the AECB approves a return to normal duties. The
return requires a request from the person and is usually processed in several weeks,
unless the person has exceeded twice a dose limit. In such cases, the AECBs medical
advisor must be consulted. If the size of the dose is not known for certain,
chromosome aberration studies may be performed. Maximum permissible doses are
shown in Table I.
It should be noted that until a pregnancy is confirmed, the dose limits for males
and females are identical.
5.3. Records
Every licensee is required to keep records of:
(1) the form and quantity of radioactive material

(2) all disposals, with full particulars
(3) the location of all radioactive materials
(4) the doses of radiation received by any person as a result of the licensees use
of radioactive materials. I
5.4. Reports
Any person who is in possession of radioactive material or in charge of a

device containing radioactive material is required to report to the AECB within
24 hours if any person received or is likely to have received a dose of ionizing
radiation in excess of the regulatory limits.
5.5. Signs
The regulations require that any person in charge of an area, room or enclosure
must mark it with a radiation warning sign if the dose rate exceeds 2.5 mR/h, or if
the area, room or enclosure contains more than 100 scheduled quantities of radio
active material. In addition, any container which holds more than 1 scheduled
quantity must be marked.
5.6. Radiography
Since industrial radiography is responsible for the largest number of incidents

and overexposures, it is specifically covered by the regulations. In fact, radiography
represents about 5% of AECB licences but 70% of significant radiation exposures.
Control is very difficult because of the nature of the work, which may involve remote
areas and adverse weather conditions.
152 BROWN
The most significant aspect of the radiography regulations is the requirement

for everyone to pass an AECB administered radiation safety examination before
operating an exposure device (camera). This requirement was introduced in 1983,
because experience had shown that the largest exposures were occurring to untrained
operators while the experienced radiographer was in the dark room developing and
interpreting film. It should be emphasized that this examination only covers radiation
safety and not such subjects as developing or interpreting film.
Another aspect of the regulation is the sharing of responsibility between the
qualified operator and the licensee. The qualified operator is legally responsible for
wearing a thermoluminescent and direct reading dosimeter, using a survey meter
after each exposure, locking the camera and ensuring that there are adequate signs
and barriers to prevent people from entering the exposure area. The licensee is
legally responsible for equipment maintenance, keeping specific records, limiting
camera use to qualified operators, and ensuring the qualified operator has sufficient
safety equipment. Many requirements, such as safety procedures and dose control,
are jointly shared to emphasize that good radiation protection practice is a responsi
bility shared between the worker and the licensee. For example, licensees could
assign unrealistic production schedules which would make it impossible for the
qualified operator to follow radiation safety procedures.
5.7. Powers of inspectors
The regulations give each AECB inspector the right to enter any premises
where radioactive materials are located. He or she may order remedial actions to
correct deficiencies or an immediate halt to work with radioactive materials if a
serious radiation hazard exists. However, these actions are not taken lightly because
of the significant effect that these actions could have on a licensees operations.
5.8. Enforcement
In the case of serious violations of the regulations or licence conditions,

following an opportunity for a hearing by the Board, the AECB can amend, suspend
or revoke a licence, or the case may be taken to court where penalties up to 10 000
Canadian dollars and five years in jail are possible. On average, three licensees have
been prosecuted annually.
5.9. Import and export control
Without control of the importation of radioactive material, the AECB would

be unable to fulfil its mandate. Therefore, the AECB works in conjunction with the
Department of External Affairs to ensure that only authorized persons or organiza
tions import radioactive material. This requires inspectors at each border crossing
IAEA-SM-309/42 153
and port of entry, but this system, which could not be justified for radioactive
materials alone, already exists for numerous other reasons such as taxes and the
prohibition of certain products.
Canada issues export permits for radioactive material, but only notifies the
receiving country of exports of fissile material.
5.10. Transportation
In addition to licensing users, the AECB, in conjunction with Transport

Canada, has responsibilities for controlling the transportation of radioactive
materials. The AECB administers the Transport Packaging of Radioactive Materials
Regulations that are based upon IAEA Safety Series No. 6. Control consists
primarily of inspections, certification of Canadian Type containers, endorsement
of foreign Type containers, and the review of user testing of Type A containers.
Transport Canada is responsible for all carrier aspects of dangerous goods such
as driver training, emergency plans, placarding and documentation.
5.11. Exemptions from licensing
In addition to the exemptions from licensing (see Section 5.1), the Regulations
allow the AECB to exempt specific devices containing radioactive material from end
user licensing. The distributor and manufacturer (or importer) are licensed in order
to control distribution and ensure reords are maintained. Owing to the loss of
control that results, the AECB has been reluctant to authorize these exemptions
unless the sources do not exceed a few scheduled quantities (see Section 5.1) and the
radiological hazard is extremely small. The list of devices that have been exempted
from end user licensing is as follows:
smoke detectors that contain less than 200 kBq of americium-241, are labelled
properly and are judged to be tamper-proof using normal tools;
tritium exit signs that comply with ANSI N540, contain less than 2% tritiatd
water at any point in their useful life, and are marked with an expiry date (note:
only emergency exit signs are included);
tritium gunsights that contain less than 7400 MBq of tritium, comply with
ANSI N540 and are properly labelled;
dials incorporating radium luminous paint, provided the content is less
than 1 MBq;
surge voltage protectors that contain less than 37 MBq of tritium or 370 kBq
of nickel-63, and are able to withstand two drops from 1 metre onto a rigid
steel plate.
154 BROWN
6. ASSESSMENT OF LICENCE APPLICATIONS
Before any licence is issued, renewed or amended, an assessment is performed

by the AECB to ensure that the specific use will not pose an unacceptable risk to
staff, public or the environment. For new applicants, the assessment is based upon
the application and any supporting documentation, but for renewals or amendments,
the licensees previous performance is also considered.
An essential component of any assessment is suitable standards by which to
judge the applicants design and procedures. Whenever possible, the AECB uses
national or international standards such as those produced by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, the International Commission on Radiological Protection,
the International Organization for Standardization, the American National Standards
Institute, the Canadian Standards Association, the National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. A list
of the significant standards in use by the AECB is given in Appendix B.
Another aspect of an effective assessment is consultation with a number of
external organizations because of their mandate and expertise in subjects associated
with the nuclear industry. The major ones are summarized in Appendix C.
7. EDUCATION AND TRAINING
For certain tasks within the nuclear industry, the AECB requires specific
training and experience to ensure the person can perform the tasks safely. When
suitable qualifications from other organizations exist, they are adopted, but if none
are available, the AECB has the regulatory authority to give examinations.
Probably the most demanding task within the nuclear industry is that of the
reactor operator. For this position, the AECB relies upon the licensee to prepare the
candidate to pass a series of examinations that are given by the AECB.
Since industrial radiography results in the largest number of incidents and
overexposures, the AECB introduced an examination programme in 1983. Before
anyone can operate a gamma exposure device (i.e. camera), except under the direct
(i.e. over-the-shoulder) supervision of a qualified person, the operator must have
passed an AECB administered examination in radiation safety as it applies to indus
trial radiography. The examination, offered throughout the country every two
months, consists of 60 multiple-choice questions and a short essay on the safe method
to resolve an emergency situation. Owing to logistical problems, the AECB does not
impose a practical examination although we recognize that one would be desirable.
Since the radiography examination was introduced, the magnitude of over-
exposures has decreased but, unfortunately, we have not seen a reduction in the
number of overexposures or incidents.
IAEA-SM-309/42 155
For nuclear medicine departments, the AECB requires each licensee to have
a radiation safety officer who is a registered technologist in nuclear medicine, a
certified medical physicist or a nuclear medicine physician. Each of these qualifi
cations is determined by other organizations, but they have proved to be suitable for
use by the AECB.
For other uses of radioactive material, the AECB has not specified education
or experience requirements, and in general this has not caused any problems.
However, the AECB is considering introducing requirements for consolidated
university programmes and for the use of radioactive materials in the oil and gas
industry (i.e. tracing or operations, involving radioactively tagged sand).
8. COMPLIANCE
Since experience has shown that an effective compliance and enforcement

programme is essential for regulatory control, the AECB has allocated approxi
mately 10% of staff directly to this function.
The compliance function varies with the type of licence. For power reactors,
Board staff are resident at the site. For radioisotopes, the group that forms the largest
number of AECB licences, inspectors visit the sites where radioactive material is
used or stored according to a schedule that is based upon the risks associated with
the particular use of radioactive material. For licensees that are not meeting the
requirements, the frequency is increased.
When violations are found, the licensees are informed in writing and a copy
of the report is sent to the appropriate licensing division. Depending upon the
seriousness of the infraction, the inspector has a range of alternatives from immedi
ately terminating the operation to directing the licensee to take corrective actions and
notify the AECB when they have been completed. These actions may be augmented
at a later date by changes to the licence (i.e. suspension, amendment or revocation),
or by prosecution in a court of law that can prescribe fines up to 10 000 Canadian
dollars and jail terms up to five years. Since experience has shown that the legal
penalties are currently too small to be a significant deterrent and prosecutions are
very time consuming and expensive for the AECB, a fine or ticketing system is being
seriously considered.
For each type of radioisotope licence, a target inspection frequency has been
established. Table shows the target and actual inspection frequencies for 1987, but
additional resources have recently been granted to the AECB in order to raise the
number of inspections.
Radiography, the application that results in the largest number of over-
exposures and incidents, also has the lowest number of inspections as a percentage
of the target, due to the remote nature of many jobs. The Regulations allow the
AECB to direct licensees to inform the AECB of each radiography job carried out
156 BROWN
TABLE . INSPECTION FREQUENCIES FOR RADIOISOTOPE LICENCES
Target Target Actual % of

Use type
(freq./year) (insp./year) (insp./year) target
Analyser 0.5 115 92 80

Bone density 0.5 33 33 100
Brachytherapy 1 44 28 64
Calibration 0.5 304 336 111
Consolidated 1 37 35 93
Chromatograph 0.5 197 160 84
Dewpointer 0.25 30 39 130
Gauges 0.5 462 382 83
In vitro 1 415 227 55
In vivo 1 240 163 68
Irradiator 1 54 29 54
Logging 2 204 108 53
Light sources 0.25 16 22 138
Open sources 1 327 150 46
Other 1 103 41 40
Portable gauge 1 506 307 61
Radiography 3 570 164 29
Smoke detector 1 7 4 57
Static elim. 0.25 202 265 131
Supplier 1 212 118 56
Surge tubes 0.25 3 4 133
Tritium target 0.5 6 11 183
Teletherapy 1 30 12 40
Total 4117 2730 67

AEA-SM-309/42 157
during a given period of time. This allows the AECB to select specific jobs for
inspection. By requesting information on all jobs carried out during a specific period
of time, the AECB makes it difficult for the licensee to take additional radiation
safety measures on all jobs which may be inspected.
9. ENFORCEMENT
Since 1980, there have been 23 prosecutions proposed by the AECB.

Fourteen have been successful, two were unsuccessful and nine are pending.
The number of prosecutions has been increasing, as can be seen by the number which
are currently pending. The average fine has been 800 Canadian dollars, but this does
not include the licensees legal fees and, in some cases, the adverse publicity has
been much more significant than the fine itself.
The AECB has the authority to revoke a licence for serious violations. This
is normally done only for licensees who have a history of non-compliance, after all
other options have been exhausted, because this action could have the effect of
putting a number of people out of work. In such cases, the licensee may appeal to
the five member Board for reversal or modification of the revocation.
10. COST OF REGULATION
During the fiscal year ending 31 March 1989, the cost of AECB operations was
26.5 million Canadian dollars, approximately 50% of which was attributable to
salaries and employee benefits.
At the request of Parliament, the AECB will begin a 100% cost recovery
programme.
Appendix A
AECB GROUPS THAT SUPPORT LICENSING ACTIVITIES
Group Function
Legal Services To provide advice to the Board and staff on legal

matters. This includes advice on the legality of
Board actions, preparation of regulations, prose
cutions, interpretation of the regulations and review
of all facility licences.
158 BROWN
Radiation Protection
Division To provide advice on all radiation protection matters.
This includes assessment of radiation protection
programmes, detailed appraisals of operations,
development of regulatory policies on radiation
protection and dose calculations.
Regulatory Research To administer research projects funded by the
AECB. Since certain decisions require information
that is often not currently available, the AECB has a
budget of approximately 2.5 million Canadian dollars
to fund research that is specifically directed at
assisting the AECB in making correct, timely and
credible licensing decisions.
Office of Public
Information To facilitate communications between the Board and
the public. This consists primarily of publishing
news releases and other information documents, and
responding to inquiries from the public and news
media.
Compliance Services and

Laboratory Division To provide compliance and laboratory services for
the Board. The radioisotope laboratory was estab
lished to provide facilities to analyse samples as part
of the AECBs monitoring and inspection pro
grammes, and to calibrate and repair the Boards
detection instruments. The compliance part of the
Division consists of inspectors who visit licensees
on a regular basis to ensure they are operating in
accordance with the regulations and licence condi
tions. In addition, the Division provides the AECB
with an emergency response capability.
Safety Evaluation
Division To assess the safety aspects of licence applications.
This includes thermohydraulics, civil and electrical
engineering, reactor physics and human factors.
Components and Quality

Assurance Division To assess the quality assurance programme of facili
ties and companies that supply critical components
to facilities.
IAEA-SM-309/42 159
Appendix
STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) American National Standards Institute, New York
1.1. N538 Classification of Industrial Ionizing Radia

tion Gauging Devices (1979)
1.2. N540 Classification of Radioactive Self-

Luminous Light Sources (1975)
(2) Canadian StandardsAssociation, Ottawa
2.1. Z299 Quality Assurance Program Standards

(1986)
2.2. N288 Guidelines for Calculating Derived
Release Limits for Radioactive Material in
Airborne and Liquid Effluents for Normal
Operations of Nuclear Facilities
(3) International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna

3.1. SafetySeries No. 23 Radiation Protection Standards for Radio-
luminous Timepieces (1967)
3.2. Safety Series No. 6 Regulations for the Safe Transport of

Radioactive Materials (1985)
(4) International Commission on Radiological Protection, Oxford

4.1. Publication 15 Protection Against Ionizing Radiation from
External Sources (1969)
4.2. Publication 26 Recommendations of the International
Commission on Radiological Protection
(1977)
4.3. Publication 30 Limits for Intakes of Radionuclides by
Workers (1978)
(5) International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva
5.1. 601-2-1 Particular Requirements for the Safety of

Medical Electron Accelerators in the
Range 1 MeV to 50 MeV (1981)
160 BROWN
5.2. 601-2-11 Particular Requirements for Safety of

Gamma Beam Therapy Equipment (1987)
(6) International Organization for Standardization, Geneva
6.1. 2919 Sealed Radioactive Sources Classi

fication (1980)
6.2. 3999 Apparatus for Gamma Radiography

Specification (1977)
(7) National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Washington

7.1. 37 Precautions in the Management of Patients
Who Have Received Therapeutic Amounts
of Radionuclides (1970)
7.2. 49 Structural Shielding Design and Evaluation

for Medical Use of X-Rays and Gamma
Rays of Energies Up to 10 MeV (1976).
Appendix
SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS
Health and Welfare Canada
The Bureau of Radiation and Medical Devices of this department supplies

thermoluminescent dosimeters to most users of radioactive materials and maintains
the National Dose Registry. In addition, this bureau assists in the development of
dosimetry standards and provides bioassay calibration equipment and devices. In the
event of overexposures, physicians from this department advise the AECB on the
medical aspects of the case.
External Affairs
This department works in conjunction with the AECB to ensure that all
importation and exportation of radioactive material is in accordance with AECB and
government policy. Its major involvement concerns the movement of fissile
materials.
IAEA-SM-309/42 161
Transport Canada
The transportation of all dangerous goods, whether by rail, road, air or ship,
must be in accordance with the requirements of Transport Canada. In this regard,
the AECB advises it on radioactive materials in addition to being responsible for
ensuring that all radioactive materials are packaged in accordance with the Transport
Packaging of Radioactive Materials Regulations.
Department of Justice
In order to write regulations, prepare prosecutions, review licences and in

general advise the Board and staff on all legal matters, the Department of Justice
provides two lawyers for the exclusive use of the AECB (the number will soon
increase to three).
Environment Canada
For facility licensing matters which could significantly affect the environment,
Environment Canada is consulted to ensure that any releases will be in accordance
with their requirements.
Canadian Provincial Governments
Each provincial government has a group that is concerned with radiation since
X rays, health and worker safety fall within the mandate of the provincial govern
ments according to the Canadian Constitution. The AECB regularly consults with
them on matters of mutual interest and involves them in the assessment of certain
applications for licences.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
In view of the amount of trade involving radioactive materials between Canada

and the USA, regular contact between the two agencies is essential. For example,
the USNRC provides the AECB with access to their approved device registry and
joint investigations have been undertaken following transportation incidents involv
ing transborder shipments of radioactive materials.
IAEA-SM-309/23
LA RADIOPROTECTION EN TUNISIE
Etat actuel et problmes
S. MTIMET, H.A. GHARBI, K. ABDELALI,

J.-C. VICEL, M.J. GHEZAIEL, H. MAHJOUBI-CHARNI,
A. ABBOUDI
Centre national de radioprotection,
Tunis Jabbari, Tunisie
A bstract-Rsum
RADIATION PROTECTION IN TUNISIA: CURRENT SITUATION AND PROBLEMS.
The specific law governing radiation protection in Tunisia is of recent origin (1981).
It makes the Ministry of Public Health responsible for radiation protection of occupationally
exposed workers and the public and for safety and surveillance measures. The possession of
any ionizing radiation source is subject to prior authorization. The regulations specify techni
cal measures by classifying occupationally exposed workers and places of work, and by laying
down administrative measures, the employers responsibilities and annual dose equivalent
limits. The National Radiation Protection Centre is responsible for promoting protection
against the dangers of ionizing radiation. It guarantees the quality of radiation protection by
providing training, inspecting facilities and recording all relevant statistical data. It has an
independent budget and a specialized laboratory for this purpose.
LA RADIOPROTECTION EN TUNISIE: ETAT ACTUEL ET PROBLEMES.

La loi spcifique la protection radiologique en Tunisie est de date rcente: 1981. Elle
confie au Ministre de la sant publique la protection radiologique des travailleurs exposs et
celle de la population, ainsi que les mesures de scurit et de surveillance. La dtention de
toute source de radiations ionisantes est soumise une autorisation pralable. La rglementa
tion prcise les mesures d ordre technique par la classification des travailleurs exposs et des
lieux de travail, les mesures dordre administratif, la responsibilisation de lemployeur et les
limites d quivalent de dose annuel. Le Centre national de radioprotection a pour mission de
promouvoir la protection contre les dangers des radiations ionisantes. Il veille la qualit de
la radioprotection, en assurant la formation, en inspectant les installations et en enregistrant
toutes les donnes statistiques. Pour cela, il dispose dun budget autonome et de laboratoires
spcialiss.
1. INTRODUCTION
La Tunisie na pas de racteur ni d industrie nuclaires. Elle a adhr aux mul

tiples conventions internationales de non-prolifration nuclaire. Elle a ratifi deux
conventions relatives la notification rapide d un accident nuclaire et l assistance
163
164 MTIMKT et al.
en cas daccident nuclaire ou de situation durgence radiologique par la loi 88-67

du 16 juin 1988. Elle utilise largement des sources de rayonnements ionisants (RI)
dans les domaines de la mdecine, de l industrie et de la recherche. Longtemps
dpendante du Dpartement de mdecine prventive du Ministre de la sant pu
blique (MSP), la radioprotection (RP) na pris sa configuration officielle quen 1981,
anne de la publication d une loi spcifique la protection radiologique et de la cra
tion du Centre national de radioprotection (CNRP).
Nous allons prsenter successivement la rglementation, la structure d applica
tion (le CNRP) ainsi que les problmes que posent lapplication de la rglementation
et les insuffisances de celle-ci.
2. LA REGLEMENTATION NATIONALE
Cette rglementation a t labore en troite collaboration avec l Agence

internationale de lnergie atomique (AIEA) et l Organisation mondiale de la sant
(OMS). Elle respecte les principes et les recommandations de la Commission inter
nationale de protection radiologique (CIPR).
La loi 81-51 du 18 juin 1981 confie au MSP la protection radiologique des
travailleurs exposs aux RI et de la population, ainsi que les mesures de scurit et
de surveillance.
La rgime des inspections, du constat des infractions et des poursuites
judiciaires sont du ressort du MSP.
Le dcret 86-433 du 28 mars 1986 fixe les bases de la rglementation tuni
sienne. Les mesures prvues par ce texte se rsument comme suit.
2.1. Champ dapplication
La dtention, la manipulation, l utilisation, la transformation, le stockage, la

cession, le commerce, le transport et llimination de toute source de RI sont soumis
une autorisation pralable.
Des exemptions l autorisation pralable sont possibles.
Sont interdites l utilisation de substances radioactives dans la fabrication de
jouets ainsi que laddition de substances radioactives dans la fabrication de denres
alimentaires, de produits cosmtiques et de produits usage domestique.
2.2. Dispositions gnrales
Conditions de radioexposition: conditions normales et anormales

Respect des limites de dose
Lexposition aux RI nest autorise que si lapplication produit un avantage net
positif.
IAEA-SM-309/23 165
2.3. Limites dquivalent de dose annuel pour les radioexpositions contrlables
Limite de dose primaire pour les travailleurs exposs pour les tudiants et
apprentis; radioexposition exceptionnelle concerte et limites de doses pour les
personnes du public
Radioexposition accidentelle ou due aux situations d urgence
Principes fondamentaux de la surveillance de la sant de travailleurs
Mesures d ordre administratif: responsabilit de l employeur en matire de
formation de son personnel et de la mise sa disposition de matriel de protection
appropri
Mesures d ordre technique: classification des lieux de travail; dfinition des
travailleurs exposs A et exposs B; dfinition de la zone contrle et de la zone
surveille; surveillance et contrle du milieu
Mesures d ordre mdical: responsabilit de lemployeur pour la surveillance
mdicale du personnel expos
Enregistrement des rsultats: responsabilit du CNRP pour lenregistrement et
larchivage des rsultats des diffrents contrles relatifs aux conditions d exposi
tion et des rsultats des mesures enregistrs chez les travailleurs
2.4. Principes fondamentaux de la surveillance de la sant publique
Autorisation pralable au rejet de substances radioactives dans

l environnement
Surveillance de tout rejet au point d mission
Archivage des documents relatifs aux rsultats de lvaluation des doses reues
par des personnes du public par le CNRP
2.5. Irradiation mdicale
Formation des praticiens utilisant les RI, choix des techniques les moins
irradiantes.
2.6. Contrle des sources, substances et appareils radioactifs
Exemption au rgime d autorisation pralable

Autorisation pralable:
a) conditions d obtention et dure de validit des autorisations;
b) dfinitions des diffrents types d autorisation: autorisation des fins
mdicales, vtrinaires, industrielles et de recherche;
c) conditions de renouvellement des autorisations:
recours: commission de recours,
inspection: conditions,
transport: autorisation du MSP et du Ministre des transports.
166 et al.
2.7. Commission nationale de radioprotection
Prrogatives, composition, fonctionnement, dispositions pnales.
2.8. Arrt du 10 septembre 1986
Cet arrt dtermine les renseignements et prcisions devant accompagner les

demandes d autorisation concernant les sources radioactives et les appareils
d irradiation.
Il prcise la qualification des utilisateurs responsables en RP. De mme,
il dfinit les conditions de surveillance des travailleurs, en terme d quivalent de
dose et de sant, qui doivent accompagner les demandes. Il prcise aussi les carac
tristiques techniques des quipements et des locaux destins leur utilisation.
3. STRUCTURE D APPLICATION DE LA REGLEMENTATION: LE CNRP
Le dcret 82-1380 du 27 octobre 1982 dfinit lorganisation et: les attributions

du CNRP. Le CNRP est un tablissement public caractre administratif dot de
la personnalit civile et de lautonomie financire, plac sous la tutelle du MSP.
3.1. Mission et attributions du CNRP
Il a pour mission de promouvoir lchelon national les mesures et les

mthodes destines la protection contre les dangers des RI. Ses attributions sont
rsumes ci-aprs.
3.1.1. Dans le domaine de la rglementation
proposer la codification des mesures ducatives, prventives et curatives

appropries applicables dans les centres utilisant les RI et veiller leur
application;
veiller la qualit des mesures de RP tablies par ces centres et les inspecter.
3.1.2. Dans le domaine de la formation
participer la formation et la spcialisation du personnel mdical, para-

mdical et technique et en assurer le recyclage dans la RP;
organiser des sminaires d information et de formation.
IAEA-SM-309/23 167
3 .1 .3 . D ans le dom aine de la recherche
participer ltablissement de campagnes nationales de sant et d ducation

sanitaire;
participer l laboration et lexcution des programmes intressant la RP;
centraliser toutes les donnes statistiques et la documentation intressant les RI
et leur utilisation;
promouvoir la recherche en RP sur tous les plans et en particulier prventifs
et curatifs.
3.2. Organisation et fonctionnement du CNRP
Le Centre est dirig par un mdecin directeur nomm par dcret sur proposi
tion du MSP, choisi parmi les professeurs de biophysique ou de radiologie, ayant
exerc les fonctions de chef de service hospitalo-universitaire pendant 4 ans au
moins.
Le directeur est responsable du bon fonctionnement de lensemble des services
du Centre. Il est assist dans la gestion administrative et financire du Centre par
un chef de service administratif et financier.
Sur le plan mdical et technique, il est assist par des chefs de service:
d inspection des personnes exposes aux RI;
de prvention et de formation en RP;
d inspection des quipements;
de dosimtrie.
3.3. Dispositions financires
Le budget du Centre est rattach pour ordre au budget de l Etat. Il est prpar,
approuv et rgl dans les formes et suivant les rgles applicables au budget de
l Etat.
Les tarifs des actes et des diffrentes prestations rendues par le Centre sont
fixs par arrt.
Actuellement, le Centre dispose:
d un laboratoire de dosimtrie pour la surveillance mensuelle du personnel
expos;
d un laboratoire de spectromtrie et de mesure, destin au contrle des denres
alimentaires, la mesure de la radioactivit naturelle et celle du milieu
(environnement);
d un service d inspection et d tudes des installations mdicales et industrielles
utilisant les sources de RI.
Il organise chaque anne une semaine nationale de RP destine linformation
du public et la vulgarisation des techniques de RP.
168 MTIMET et al.
Pour faire face un ventuel accident radiologique, une Commission nationale

de radioprotection, dont le Centre assure le secrtariat, a t cre par dcret le
28 mars 1986. Prside par le Ministre de la sant publique, elle a labor un projet
de plan d urgence radiologique, en cours d adoption.
4. PROBLEMES
Des progrs trs importants ont t raliss dans le domaine du contrle de

lutilisation des sources de RI en Tunisie. Toutefois, des problmes subsistent et frei
nent l application efficace des textes rglementaires chez les utilisateurs dans notre
pays. Les principales difficults auxquelles nous nous heurtons sont voques
ci-aprs.
4.1. Le manque de ressources humaines et de moyens matriels
4.1.1. Les ressources humaines du CNRP
La mise en uvre de la rglementation ncessite un personnel qualifi et en

nombre suffisant. Les tches sont nombreuses car elles dcoulent de l application de
lensemble des prescriptions prvues par les textes avec un ordre de priorit. Les
utilisateurs sont plus de 300, avec un total de 1500 sources de rayonnements en
mdecine, 450 sources dans lindustrie et plus de 2500 personnes professionnelle
ment exposes.
Actuellement, l quipe forme d une dizaine de personnes est pleinement
occupe par le fonctionnement des laboratoires.
En consquence, il est impossible actuellement, faute de personnel, de mettre
en place un plan visant contrler tous les utilisateurs et, en particulier, ceux
qui utilisent les sources de rayonnements depuis plusieurs annes et surtout avant
mars 1986, date de la mise en application du rgime de demande dautorisation
pralable avant acquisition.
Le manque de personnel repose essentiellement sur les difficults de recrute
ment et de formation universitaire.
4.1.2. Les moyens matriels du CNRP
Le budget attribu au CNRP ne lui permet pas de disposer de locaux, d quipe

ments et de moyens de transport adapts sa vocation nationale.
La limite des moyens fait que son activit est surtout concentre sur le fonc
tionnement des laboratoires et sur les tudes sur dossiers techniques qui lui sont
prsents par les utilisateurs.
IAEA-SM-309/23 169
4.2. Le manque de sensibilisation des utilisateurs
La mise en place de la rglementation de RP en Tunisie a impos des

contraintes aux utilisateurs responsables et au personnel expos.
Les aspects positifs de ces contraintes ne sont pas toujours bien perus.
Un important travail de sensibilisation doit tre entrepris auprs des responsa
bles et des travailleurs exposs: titre d exemple, 50% des dosimtres personnels
dlivrs chaque mois ne sont pas retourns au CNRP dans les dlais impartis.
4.3. Le manque de formation des utilisateurs
De nombreux utilisateurs de sources de RI, principalement dans l industrie, ne

disposent pas dune formation en RP suffisante pour assurer correctement leur
responsabilit en matire de scurit radiologique.
Compte tenu de l importance que prsente cette formation pour les utilisateurs,
le CNRP organise, dans la mesure de ses possibilits et malgr son peu de personnel,
des cours de formation.
La formation en RP du personnel expos est une action prventive extrment
importante qui doit retenir toute lattention des pouvoirs publics. Une structure d en
seignement et des programmes de formation adapts aux diffrentes utilisations des
sources de rayonnements en Tunisie doivent tre mis sur pied le plus rapidement pos
sible. Cette politique de formation repose toutefois sur le recrutement d enseignants
qualifis et expriments.
4.4. Une rglementation incomplte
Un certain nombre de textes importants nont pas t publis ce jour, notam

ment ceux relatifs aux domaines suivants.
4.4.1. Prescriptions auxquelles doivent satisfaire
les gnrateurs lectriques de rayonnements ionisants;

les appareils quips de sources radioactives scelles;
les installations quipes de gnrateurs lectriques de RI;
les installations utilisant des appareils quips de sources radioactives scelles;
les installations utilisant des sources radioactives non scelles.
4.4.2. Transport des matires radioactives
4.4.3. Gestion des dchets radioactifs
Ces textes sont importants et ils correspondent des problmes pratiques que
doit rsoudre chaque jour le CNRP.
170 MTIMET et al.
5. CONCLUSION
La Tunisie, consciente des problmes que pose l utilisation des RI dans la

mdecine, lindustrie et la recherche, sest dote rcemment de textes rglementaires
visant contrler cette utilisation.
Cette rglementation, fruit d une collaboration fructueuse avec lAIEA et
l OMS, respecte les principes et les recommandations de la CIPR. Elle repose sur
la notion de trois permis: le permis d acqurir vrifie la conformit des quipements,
le permis d installer assure la conformit des locaux aux normes et le permis
d irradier garantit la comptence du personnel.
Bien quelle paraisse incomplte et partielle, elle permet une utilisation ras
surante des RI.
Le CNRP, structure d application de cette rglementation et disposant de
moyens modestes, ne cesse depuis sa cration de promouvoir les mesures et les
mthodes destines la protection contre les dangers des RI.
IAEA-SM-309/32
THE SYSTEM OF RADIATION PROTECTION APPLIED

IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
E. KUNZ
Radiation Hygiene Centre,
Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology,
Prague, Czechoslovakia
Abstract
THE SYSTEM OF RADIATION PROTECTION APPLIED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
The concept of the radiation protection system (RPS) that has been gradually set up in
Czechoslovakia was based on the Recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection. A decree defines the responsibility, as well as more detailed obliga
tions of organizations using radiation sources, as regards the protection of workers as well
as the public, and includes the obligation to ensure an effective monitoring of radiation situa
tions and of doses to persons. Expert supervision of adherence to the radiation protection regu
lations is carried out by the Hygiene Service, a public health inspection service whose
activities in radiation protection are set up at the regional and central level. In each region
there is a Radiation Hygiene Department with qualified personnel and appropriate instrumen
tation for the evaluation of exposure situations which may occur in the region. The depart
ments supervise all workplaces using radiation sources, prepare binding recommendations to
the regional health offices regarding the design of laboratories, licences for the use of radiation
sources, and approval for the start or termination of a practice. Central components of the
structure directing the RPS in the country are the chief health officers of Bohemia and Slovakia
and their expert bases the Radiation Hygiene Centres at the Institutes for Hygiene and
Epidemiology in both Republics. Apart from preparation of radiation protection standards and
regulations, guidance as to methods and quality assurance for the work of regional Depart
ments, these expert bases play a co-ordinating role in the system of handling radiation acci
dents and providing medical assistance to overexposed people. The Radiation Hygiene Centre
in Prague acts as a centre for the radiation monitoring network in cases of nuclear accidents,
in which the regional stations, nuclear power plants, research institutes and other bodies par
ticipate. A system of technical services in radiation protection has been established for users
of radiation sources (personal dosimetry, disposal system for radioactive wastes, etc.).
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In the postwar period a nuclear industry started to be built up in Czecho

slovakia. It comprises now two nuclear power plants (NPPs) with four reactors
440 MW(e) each of the Soviet PWR type; four similar reactors and two PWRs of
1000 MW(e) are under construction. A substantial programme for building further
171
172 KUNZ
NPPs is now being reconsidered. A 150 MW(e) reactor of the gas cooled and heavy
water moderated type is in the process of decommissioning. Nuclear energys share
of total energy production is now 27 %. Extensive mining and milling of uranium ore
developed after 1945 in various parts of the country. In 1989, when a slowing down
programme started, some 6000 miners were working underground in 16 pits, and
four chemical mills were active. The doses from the natural background lie at the
upper level of the interval typical for normal countries. A major radon daughter
exposure problem has been established in connection with the use of building
materials with a high content of 226Ra or in poorly insulated houses in certain
regions. The proportion of houses where the intervention level of 200 Bq of equiva
lent 222Rn concentration per m 3 is exceeded has been estimated to amount to few
per cent. More than 900 X ray and about 25 radionuclide medical investigations are
performed annually per 1000 inhabitants.
Czechoslovakia is a federation of two Republics which are divided into
altogether twelve regions, including both capitals, and 135 districts. The administra
tive division of the country will shortly be changed, the regions will be abolished
and the number of districts decreased.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)
The building up of a radiation protection structure in Czechoslovakia started

in the second half of the nineteen-fifties, when a broad application of radiation
sources and preparation of a nuclear energy programme began and understanding of
needs in radiation protection (RP) and of appropriate steps to be taken in this .field
increased. From the beginning the regulative component of the RPS was ensured by
the public health authority, i.e. the Hygiene Service. This was connected with the
role of preventive medicine as conceived in Czechoslovakia, the tradition of occupa
tional health, which provided the initial basis for the RP public health structure, in
the absence of an Atomic Energy Authority, which was created only later. This
directing role consisted in issuing the first RP standards and regulations, supervision
of adherence to them in design and operation of workplaces using radiation sources
and initiation and fostering of various technical services important for the ensuring
of RP requirements. This regulatory function was gradually enlarged to encompass
exposure of the public also, including that from natural sources and medical
exposure.
Other state inspection bodies, competent in general for specific fields of health
or environmental protection, such as the Food Inspectorate or the Clean Air Inspec
torate, did not develop their own radiological capacities, with the exception of the
Clean Water Inspectorate which, however, mostly followed the criteria set by the
public health authorities. Some misinterpretation of these criteria occurred, causing
transitory problems.
IAEA-SM-309/32 173
3. LEGISLATION IN RADIATION PROTECTION
The conceptual basis for the RPS and for our RP regulations has always been
the Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP) and, based on them, the Basic Safety Standards of the IAEA. Full adherence
to these documents was facilitated by our participation in their preparation. For tech
nical reasons at the ministerial level we now have a long delay in official issuance
of regulations based on the Safety Standards 1982 edition. Most probably a new draft
taking account of future ICRP recommendations now in preparation would be the
solution. However, the concepts introduced in the 1977 ICRP Recommendations,
such as the dose limitation system, including radiation protection optimization, effec
tive dose equivalent, etc., have already become our practice and common usage,
being incorporated in some official documents issued at a lower legal level or in tech
nical standards and technical literature.
The current regulations as well as the draft of the revised ones start from the
premise of primary responsibility of those using sources of possible exposure to
ensure and demonstrate appropriate radiation safety of exposed workers or members
of the public. Such a responsibility presupposes appropriate equipment and technical
means, including monitoring capacities and also an appropriate level of competence.
This is ensured by education in RP being an obligatory part of the school curriculum,
by courses for users of radiation sources and by verification via examinations,
differentiated for those in charge of work with exposure sources and supervisors
(these examinations are held before public health authorities) and for other personnel
using the sources (these are periodically examined by the supervisor at the work
place). An obligation to have at least one competent supervisor-RP officer at the dis
posal of the organization using exposure sources was established in the regulations.
However, whether his or her position in the management is as an adviser only or
as an assistant to the management has not yet been fully clarified.
Apart from RP criteria, the basic regulations define a series of operational
requirements applicable flexibly to various applications of radiation. Only a few
specific regulations for specific types of application have been issued, such as for
medical and technical X ray laboratories or for milling and mining of radioactive
ores.
4. COMPETENT ORGANIZATION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
In spite of the important role of an appropriate primary level of supervision,

of self-checking on the spot, i.e. in organizations using the exposure sources, there
is an obvious need for a competent national organization able to (a) identify and
determine all radiation situations which might occur, (b) assess such situations from
RP aspects and formulate appropriate RP requirements general rules or specific
174 KUNZ
rules for concrete conditions, and (c) assist in adherence to these requirements by
advice and inspection (supervision).
Such an organization may be a logical basis for other important functions in
the RPS, such as the preparation and performance of appropriate measures in the
event of nuclear accidents, or for handling radiation accidents and providing medical
assistance to overexposed people, for RP education, etc.
The above mentioned functions of such a competent organization are fulfilled
in Czechoslovakia by the Departments of Radiation Hygiene of the Regional Hygiene
Stations and by the Radiation Hygiene Centres of the Institutes for Hygiene and
Epidemiology in Prague and Bratislava. These structures work in close collaboration
despite somewhat differing tasks. The regional Departments perform the operational
tasks, i.e. assessing radiation situations, requesting appropriate RP measures and
inspecting their execution, licensing the use of radiation sources, etc., vis--vis
specific organizations. Together they form a network adequate to the needs for quick
contact with all localities in the light of economic considerations. This network per
mits a sufficient frequency of visits to all workplaces (once in one to three years).
A special Institute for Industrial Hygiene in the Uranium Industry coming under the
Ministry of Health and having separate Departments in various mining regions can
be considered as part of the operational component of the system described.
The role of the Radiation Hygiene Centres is to provide methodical guidance
of the regional Departments (and of the above mentioned structure for the uranium
industry), direct assistance in complex problems great expertise concerning pro
tection problems in NPPs being systematically built up in the Centres and verifica
tion of the quality of work of the regional structures. The Centres periodically assess
the state of exposure of the population from different sources and lead research in
problems connected mostly with practical tasks in our RPS or with specific condi
tions encountered in Czechoslovakia.
5. THE RADIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM IN THE EVENT OF AN

EMERGENCY OR AN ACCIDENT
For the assessment of radiation accidents and to provide medical assistance to

overexposed or contaminated people a system has been realized which comprises the
following activities:
The participation of the workplace or organization where the accident
occurred. To this aim a plan of action has to be prepared and tested by every
workplace; general first aid instructions have been prepared by the Radiation
Hygiene Centre.
Medical first aid will be given by the physician attached to the workplace (as
detailed in the emergency plan). Instructions for the physicians have been pre
pared for the whole spectrum of possible accidents.
IAEA-SM-309/32 175
Provision has been made for specialized medical care in central institutions,
i.e. a haematological hospital department for acute post-irradiation syndrome,
the department for burns of the teaching hospital for plastic surgery for radia
tion burns and contaminated punctures, the hospital for occupational diseases
as the basis for hospitalization of internally contaminated cases.
An assessment of the accident will be made by the Regional Radiation Hygiene
Department.
Co-ordination of the above activities will be the responsibility of the Radiation
Hygiene Centre, which will assist directly in dose assessment and monitor
internal contamination.
The system of provisions in the event of a large accident connected with danger
to the public is based on the co-operation of the organization where the accident
occurred with other institutions according to the plan approved by the Hygiene
Service and further supervising bodies. The activities of these are co-ordinated by
the regional and governmental emergency commissions. The Radiation Hygiene
Centres participate in the preparation of criteria and instructions on performing pro
tective measures and in the work of the emergency commissions in the case of an
accident.
In the system an important part is played by the monitoring network of
Czechoslovakia, directed by its headquarters the Radiation Hygiene Centre in
Prague. The network proved its effectiveness in following up the situation on the
territory of Czechoslovakia following the accident to the Chernobyl NPP. The net
work comprises a system of activities set into action in the event of an accident, and
a continuously monitoring network with stations both in the area of NPPs and over
the entire territory (continuous gamma dose rate measurements, continuous air
sampling, TLD). Participants in the network include the Regional Hygiene Stations,
institutions of the Hydrometeorological Service, dosimetry laboratories of NPPs and
of some research institutes and laboratories of the Water Economy Service and of
the Veterinarian Inspectorate.
6. OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE RPS
A system of technical services in radiation protection has been established for

users of radiation sources. It comprises, among others, a nationwide service of per
sonal dosimetry covering the great majority of workplaces and a nationwide disposal
system for solid radioactive wastes.
Good co-ordination of the activities of the various components of the RPS has
been achieved. The changes now in progress in many sectors of our politico-
economic system, e.g. in the territorial administrative division of the country, may
176 KUNZ
influence further structures and activities of the system of radiation protection. The
importance of continuous work at the core of this system the competent profes
sional organization of radiation protection and the development of close international
contacts and exchange of experience and ideas should therefore be stressed.
IAEA-SM-309/28
EXPERIENCIA DE GUATEMALA
EN EL FORTALECIMIENTO
DE LA INFRAESTRUCTURA
PARA LA PROTECCION RADIOLOGICA
R.E. PINEDA
Direccin General de Energa Nuclear,
Guatemala, Guatemala
Abstract-Resumen
GUATEMALAS EXPERIENCE IN STRENGTHENING ITS RADIATION PROTECTION
INFRASTRUCTURE.
In Guatemala the issue of radiation protection is complicated by social and economic
factors and the lack of an adequate infrastructure to deal with the main problems arising in
this area. The paper describes the difficult situation confronting the General Directorate for
Nuclear Energy, the institution responsible for radiation protection, and the major activities
carried out and successes achieved under a working plan to strengthen the infrastructure neces
sary for attainment of the Directorates objectives. This plan has four main aims: (a) strength
ening of the institutional framework; (b) drafting of a law and regulations; (c) construction
of laboratories; and (d) personnel training. Owing to the limited economic resources, social
problems and other factors, the rate of development in Guatemala is different from that of
other countries. It is nevertheless clear that in recent years significant progress has been made
in the four areas mentioned, which are at the base of Guatemalas efforts to strengthen its radi
ation protection infrastructure.
EXPERIENCIA DE GUATEMALA EN EL FORTALECIMIENTO DE LA INFRA

ESTRUCTURA PARA LA PROTECCION RADIOLOGICA.
La problemtica que existe en Guatemala en el rea de la proteccin radiolgica guarda
una estrecha relacin con la situacin econmica y social del pas y con la falta de una infra
estructura adecuada para dar solucin a los principales problemas que se presentan en este
campo. En el trabajo se exponen el diagnstico de la situacin en la que se encuentra inmersa
la Direccin General de Energa Nuclear, institucin responsable de la proteccin radiolgica,
as como las actividades realizadas y logros ms importantes que se han obtenido dentro de
un plan de trabajo que persigue fortalecer la infraestructura necesaria para el logro de sus
objetivos. Dicho plan fue elaborado sobre cuatro factores fundamentales, a saber:
a) fortalecimiento del marco institucional; b) elaboracin de la ley y sus reglamentos;
c) construccin de laboratorios; y d) capacitacin de personal. Es preciso tomar en cuenta que
Guatemala tiene recursos econmicos limitados, problemas sociales y otros elementos que
imponen un ritmo de desarrollo distinto al de otros pases! Sin embargo, es evidente que en
los ltimos aos se han logrado importantes avances en los cuatro factores mencionados y que
en esencia constituyen la experiencia de Guatemala en el fortalecimiento de la infraestructura
para la proteccin radiolgica.
177
178 PINEDA
1. INTRODUCCION
Las radiaciones ionizantes se utilizan en Guatemala en medicina, agricultura,

industria e investigacin. Sin embargo, como en muchos otros pases, las aplica
ciones mdicas constituyen la principal fuente de exposicin de la poblacin a las
radiaciones.
Se estima que existen aproximadamente 1500 equipos de rayos X en el pas,
concentrndose ms del 50% en la capital. La carencia de una ley que regulara todo
lo relacionado con la instalacin de tales equipos dio lugar a una proliferacin de cen
tros radiolgicos sin ningn control, desconocindose a la fecha el nmero exacto
de dichos centros y de personas ocupacionalmente expuestas.
Se ha comprobado que en muchos centros radiolgicos no se cumplen las
normas bsicas de proteccin radiolgica, al extremo que el haz de radiacin prin
cipal est orientado en la direccin menos aconsejable. Los equipos de rayos X, en
general, son muy antiguos y un alto porcentaje del personal que los opera es
emprico, a pesar de que existe una escuela para formacin de tcnicos radilogos
que cuenta con el aval del Ministerio de Salud Pblica y Asistencia Social.
En el rea de radiologa dental la situacin es muy similar. En un estudio piloto
realizado en 1987, se estableci que la dosis suministrada al paciente fue en todos
los casos superior a la dosis ptima para ese tipo de exmenes.
La medicina nuclear se realiza en muy pocos centros, establecindose que los
tratamientos con yodo se administraban nicamente con base al clculo del decai
miento radiactivo, sin utilizar las medidas de proteccin adecuadas. Posterior al
tratamiento, el paciente abandonaba el hospital sin ningn control ni seguimiento, y
se tiene conocimiento de que en algunas ocasiones el paciente reciba el contenedor
con el yodo, previo al tratamiento, incrementando el riesgo de una sobreexposicin
innecesaria, como consecuencia del manejo inadecuado de material radiactivo.
Existen cinco centros de radioterapia con unidades de Co 60, complementada
con fuentes para tratamiento intersticial e intracavitario. Sin embargo, el pas carece
de un laboratorio debidamente cualificado y equipado para efectuar calibraciones
dosimtricas, por lo que miles de pacientes de cncer han sido tratados sin que los
equipos cuenten con un control dosimtrico peridico, ni sigan las normas de protec
cin radiolgica en radioterapia sugeridas por la CIPR [1]. Adems, el pas no cuenta
con fsicos mdicos, tcnicos dosimetristas, etc.
Por otro lado, se cuenta con un irradiador de 1,48 PBq (40 000 Ci) de
cesio 137, que se emplea para el Programa de Erradicacin de la Mosca del Medi
terrneo. Existen tambin varias unidades de Ir-192 y rayos X para uso industrial,
equipos medidores de nivel, densidad y humedad de suelos y perfilaje de pozos con
fuente radisotpica.
El material radiactivo llegaba al pas sin control alguno, crendose varios
depsitos de desechos radiactivos en diferentes instituciones, lo que constituye un
IAEA-SM-309/28 179
riesgo potencial de accidente radiolgico; tampoco se realizaba control sobre trans

porte de material radiactivo y no existen planes de accin para casos de emergencia.
El panorama descrito resume la realidad en la cual se encuentra inmersa la
Direccin General de Energa Nuclear (DGEN). Adems, para la mayora de la po
blacin, la energa nuclear es un lujo que solo los pases desarrollados pueden darse,
por lo que les resulta paradgico hablar de su empleo habiendo tantos problemas
bsicos que resolver. En virtud de lo expuesto, muchas personas consideran que es
ms conveniente concentrar los escasos recursos en actividades ms prioritarias, por
ejemplo, fortalecer la infraestructura del sector salud para atender mejor a una pobla
cin que crece a una tasa de aproximadamente un 3% anual; o bien, incrementar los
programas de alfabetizacin y enseanza pblica, argumentando que es preferible
avanzar comenzando por lo ms elemental, dejando para el futuro la realizacin de
actividades que requieren el empleo de alta tecnologa.
De acuerdo con la Constitucin Poltica de Guatemala, la salud de los
habitantes es un bien pblico. Todas las personas e instituciones estn obligadas a
velar por su conservacin. Sobre esta base, se consider que, a pesar de las condi
ciones econmicas y sociales que privan en el pas, la DGEN no poda sustraerse
o permanecer indiferente a la problemtica existente en el rea de la proteccin
radiolgica, establecindose la poltica de participar activamente y dedicar los
mayores esfuerzos a mejorar la misma a nivel nacional.
Habindose diagnosticado las causas, definida una poltica y conscientes de la
realidad nacional, se hizo fcil sealar la medicina para mejorar la situacin
existente. Para el efecto, se establecieron cuatro pilares fundamentales sobre los que
se ha venido trabajando y que en esencia constituyen laexperiencia de Guatemala
en el fortalecimiento de la infraestructura para proteccin radiolgica:
1) Fortalecimiento institucional
2) Formulacin de la ley y sus reglamentos
3) Construccin y equipamiento de laboratorios
4) Recurso humano cualificado.
A juicio del autor, ninguno de los factores antes sealados basta por s solo y
cada uno resulta necesario para la consecucin de los dems.
2. FORTALECIMIENTO INSTITUCIONAL
Primero conviene aclarar que el fortalecimiento institucional en el rea de pro

teccin radiolgica se ha realizado en forma paralela con las actividades de promo
cin y desarrollo de las aplicaciones nucleares, debido a razones puramente
circunstanciales, aun cuando se considera que lo primero es prerequisite para lo
segundo.
180 PINEDA
Una vez ubicados en este contexto, se debe sealar que la DGEN se cre en
1978 por Decreto Ley 57-78 del Congreso de la Repblica, como una dependen
cia del ahora Ministerio de Energa y Minas, indicndose en el Acuerdo de Creacin
que le correspondan las funciones concernientes al uso y aprovechamiento pacfico
de la energa nuclear, una expresin tan amplia que en realidad dice muy poco.
En 1984 se aprob el reglamento interno de la DGEN, donde qued claramente
establecida su estructura orgnica y administrativa, adecuada a los programas a
desarrollar. Se definieron sus objetivos generales y especficos y sus funciones. Se
planificaron los programas y actividades prioritarias, tendientes a solucionar
problemas propios del pas. Merece especial atencin el hecho de que las autoridades
del Gobierno han brindado su decidido apoyo a la institucin, lo que ha permitido
un rpido crecimiento y el fortalecimiento institucional de la misma.
3. FORMULACION DE LA LEY Y SUS REGLAMENTOS
Considerando que las radiaciones se empleaban en la medicina, industria y

agricultura sin que existiera un ordenamiento legal que regulara su empleo, la DGEN
elabor un proyecto de ley que fue presentado a las autoridades del Ministerio de
Energa y Minas (MEM) para su trmite correspondiente. En consejo de Ministros,
por Decreto Ley 11-86 se promulg la Ley para el Control, Uso y Aplicacin
de los Radistopos y las Radiaciones Ionizantes que entr en vigor el 18 de enero
de 1986 [2].
La Ley tiene por objeto controlar, supervisar y fiscalizar todas las actividades
relacionadas con el uso de los radistopos y las radiaciones ionizantes, en sus
diversos campos de aplicacin, a fin de proteger la salud de la poblacin y el medio
ambiente.
Es importante destacar que en la Ley se estableci con toda claridad que la
DGEN es la autoridad competente para, en nombre del Gobierno, controlar, supervi
sar, fiscalizar y establecer las condiciones mnimas de seguridad que deben obser
varse en la instalacin y operacin de equipos generadores de radiaciones ionizantes,
as como para otorgar licencias de uso, importacin, aplicacin y transporte de sus
tancias radiactivas.
De acuerdo con la Ley, a la DGEN le corresponde el control de todos los
equipos emisores de radiaciones ionizantes, incluyendo los equipos de rayos X de
diagnstico. Esta es una gran responsabilidad para una institucin que cuenta con
recursos limitados. Sin embargo, la decisin se tom con el fin de evitar la duplica
cin innecesaria de esfuerzos, para tratar de resolver problemas similares, garantizar
la utilizacin ms racional de los recursos existentes y para que cada institucin se
dedique preferentemente a los aspectos que le ataen ms directamente por la ndole
de su trabajo o funciones.
lAEA-SM-309/28 181
La definicin de la autoridad competente en el campo de la proteccin radio

lgica es aceptada sin reserva por el Ministerio de Salud Pblica y Asistencia Social,
con el que se mantiene una estrecha colaboracin. A juicio del autor, la definicin
de la autoridad competente contribuye positivamente a evitar la confusin, dilucin
de responsabilidades y conflictos interinstitucionales, como los que se presentan en
algunos pases de la regin, donde la autoridad competente no existe o no est
claramente definida.
Para el cumplimiento de la Ley, la DGEN puede solicitar la asistencia de cual
quier autoridad o institucin pblica, quienes quedan obligados a prestarla. Adems,
los titulares de las licencias estn obligados a informar sobre toda situacin que
pueda afectar la seguridad de una instalacin. La Ley otorga amplias facultades para
realizar inspecciones destinadas a comprobar el cumplimiento de la Ley y las condi
ciones de seguridad para el personal y el pblico en general.
En este orden de ideas se debe sealar que actualmente se realizan los trmites
administrativos para la aprobacin de los reglamentos sobre licnciamiento de
instalaciones radiactivas, y sobre proteccin radiolgica. Para la elaboracin de
dichos reglamentos se tomaron como referencia las recomendaciones de la CIPR, la
Coleccin Seguridad del OIEA, y se cont con la asesora de expertos que han
trabajado conjuntamente con el personal de la DGEN. En lo que respecta al trans
porte de material radiactivo, se ha utilizado el Reglamento de Transporte del OIEA.
En la elaboracin de la Ley y sus reglamentos se ha mantenido la poltica de que los
mismos sean lo ms armnicos y coherentes con la legislacin y reglamentacin
vigente en la regin.
4. CONSTRUCCION Y EQUIPAMIENTO DE LABORATORIOS
Resulta imposible pretender el logro de los objetivos basndose nicamente en

un marco institucional y legal, por muy perfecto que sea. Es indispensable disponer
de laboratorios y equipos adecuados para velar por el cumplimiento de la Ley. Por
tal razn y siguiendo los planes inicialmente esbozados, se emprendieron las
acciones correspondientes para construir el edificio de la DGEN.
En 1984, el Gobierno de la Repblica aprob el presupuesto para la construc
cin del edificio, pero no se dispona de los fondos suficientes para el equipamiento
del laboratorio de radioproteccin y dosimetra. Por consiguiente, se present la
solicitud de asistencia al OIEA, a fin de obtener el equipo correspondiente.
El OIEA respondi que no podra aprobar dicho proyecto si Guatemala no con
taba con las instalaciones necesarias para la colocacin del equipo. Por su parte, el
Ministerio de Energa y Minas no poda realizar la construccin sin tener asegurado
el equipamiento. Bajo estas condiciones, el proyecto presentaba muy pocas
posibilidades de ejecutarse.
182 PINEDA
1980 1986 1990
A O S
FIG. 1. Incremento del rea construida para la Direccin General de Energa Nuclear de
Guatemala.
El autor particip en las negociaciones con el OIEA a fin de lograr una varia
cin en esta posicin, obteniendo la aprobacin del proyecto, que inclua un financia-
miento mnimo el primer ao y se incrementara en el futuro si se concluan las
instalaciones correspondientes. Este acuerdo demostr la buena voluntad del OIEA
en colaborar con Guatemala, lo que a su vez permiti que el Ministerio de Energa
y Minas aprobara la ejecucin del proyecto.
Por razn a la brevedad, se debe sealar que por diversos motivos los
presupuestos aprobados para los aos 1984, 1985, 1986 no fueron utilizados.
Finalmente en diciembre de 1987 se licit la obra y se firm el contrato correspon
diente, inicindose la construccin a finales de ese ao.
El edificio fu inaugurado por el Sr. Presidente de la Repblica el 18 de
octubre de 1989. En esa fecha se concluy el gran esfuerzo orientado a establecer
la infraestructura fsica necesaria para dejar definitivamente establecida la participa
cin de la energa nuclear en el desarrollo del pas, as como el laboratorio para
radioproteccin, el cual tendr la responsabilidad de velar porque las radiaciones se
utilicen de forma segura para la poblacin y el ambiente.
El edificio cuenta con un Laboratorio para Radioproteccin y Dosimetra, que
incluye un Laboratorio para Dosimetra Personal por pelcula y TLD, y un
Laboratorio Secundario de Calibracin Dosimtrica con tres bunker, uno para
Co-60, otro para rayos X y un recinto para bajas dsis. Se espera que el Laboratorio
de Dosimetra cumpla las funciones de un laboratorio con carcter de secundario [3]
AEA-SM-309/28 183
y forme parte de la red mundial de medicin de radiaciones. Se acondiciona un rea

para colocar un contador de cuerpo entero, y se est ampliando el laboratorio para
medicin de radiacin ambiental. El edificio tiene dos aulas, bilioteca, rea adminis
trativa y laboratorios para aplicaciones nucleares. El costo total del proyecto fue de
aproximadamente 755 000 dlares de los Estados Unidos, sin incluir el mobiliario
ni el costo del terreno.
La DGEN en 1980 contaba con 100 m 2, en 1986 con 380 m 2 y ahora en 1990
con 3600 m 2. Se puede apreciar que el incremento es significativo, disponindose
adems de nuevas instalaciones para velar por el cumplimiento de la Ley y sus
reglamentos. (Fig. 1.)
5. RECURSOS HUMANOS CUALIFICADOS
Se ha dejado al final uno de los pilares ms importantes y preciados para el

logro de los objetivos propuestos. Sin embargo, en Guatemala es evidente la enorme
escasez de personal con capacitacin adecuada en proteccin radiolgica. No se tiene
un acuerdo sobre el personal mnimo necesario.
Desde su inicio, la DGEN estableci la poltica de mantener en forma per
manente la capacitacin del personal, a fin de lograr un grupo de profesionales con
la madurez tcnico-cientfica para establecer las funciones de proteccin radiolgica.
Para ello se ha obtenido asistencia del OIEA y cooperacin bilateral con el Gobierno
de los Estados Unidos de Amrica, con el fin de tener profesionales especializados
a un nivel elevado. Sin embargo, nuestra debilidad persiste, pues a pesar de que
contamos con excelentes profesionales, su nmero es insuficiente y an se requiere
de capacitacin en aspectos puntuales para cumplir con nuestros objetivos.
En otro orden de ideas, se debe sealar que Guatemala ha tenido el privilegio
de ser uno de los pases visitados por la misin RAPAT y ser considerado Plan Piloto
sobre proteccin radiolgica en el marco del Programa Arreglos Regionales
Cooperativos para la Promocin de la Ciencia y la Tecnologa Nucleares en Amrica
Latina ARCAL, el cual adems de permitir la capacitacin del personal a travs
de diferentes cursos ha facilitado servicios de expertos para cumplir con un plan
elaborado congruentemente con la realidad nacional. Gracias a este proyecto se han
recibido varios expertos, quienes han trabajado conjuntamente con el personal
nacional para darle seguimiento al plan ya estructurado y desarrollar las actividades
en l programadas, tales como elaboracin de reglamentos, asesora, etc.
Es justo reconocer que el OIEA ha contribuido grandemente a que Guatemala
se encuentre en la posicin actual. Se hace extensivo el reconocimiento a los
Gobiernos de los Estados Unidos de Amrica y del Reino Unido de Gran Bretaa
e Irlanda del Norte por los fondos extrapresupuestarios brindados para la ejecucin
del proyecto del Laboratorio de Radioproteccin y Dosimetra auspiciado por el
OIEA.
184 PINEDA
Se tiene ahora un cuadro pintado con pocos y gruesos rasgos sobre la realidad
de Guatemala, la problemtica en el rea de proteccin radiolgica, las acciones que
se han tomado para superarla y los logros ms importantes. Es evidente que se ha
tenido un avance muy significativo en el fortalecimiento de la infraestructura para
proteccin radiolgica.
En conclusin, se puede decir que en solo 10 aos se ha obtenido reconoci
miento de la importancia de la funcin que la DGEN debe desempear en el rea
de proteccin radiolgica. Frecuentemente se reciben solicitudes para inspeccin de
instalaciones radiactivas por parte de los propietarios o personas que se consideran
que pueden ser afectadas. Se tiene un mayor control sobre la importacin de material
radiactivo, principalmente para uso industrial y de alta actividad, pues, en este caso,
la Direccin General de Aduanas no autoriza el desalmacenaje sin la licencia co
rrespondiente. El el rea de medicina nuclear se mantiene una estrecha relacin con
los centros donde se realizan estas actividades, y se emiten licencias para operacin
de nuevas instalaciones, importacin y transporte de material radiactivo.
Ahora el pas cuenta con una Ley y Reglamentos, un edificio que es conside
rado nico en Centro Amrica y con un grupo de profesionales con los conoci
mientos adecuados para realizar su labor.
REFERENCIAS
[1] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIATION PROTECTION, Protection of

the Patient in Radiation Therapy, ICRP Publication No. 44, Pergamon Press, Oxford
and New York (1985).
[2] Ley para el Control, Uso y Aplicacin de Radistopos y Radiaciones Ionizantes (Ley
Nuclear), Decreto Ley 11-86, Direccin General de Energa Nuclear, Ministerio
de Energa y Minas, Guatemala (1986).
[3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Secondary Standard Dosimetry
Laboratories: Development and Trends, IAEA, Vienna (1985).
IAEA-SM-309/33
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Abstract-
NATIONAL RADIATION SAFETY REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS FOR WORK
WITH RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES AND OTHER IONIZING RADIATION
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A review is given of the national radiation safety regulations and standards, the use and
development of basic radiation protection principles within these documents, regulations con
cerning exposure of persons during the course of their work, and protection of the public. The
consequences of the Chernobyl accident are analysed, and the paper discusses the strategy
employed by the National Commission on Radiation Protection when establishing exposure
dose limits for the public after the accident.

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IAEA-SM-309/26
RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE AND

REGULATORY ACTIVITIES IN BANGLADESH
M.A. RAB MOLLA, F .A. KHAN

Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Division,
Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission,
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Abstract
RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE AND REGULATORY ACTIVITIES IN
BANGLADESH.
The paper describes briefly and in general terms past and present activities regarding
radiation protection and the proposed programmes, including setting up an infrastructure with
a legal framework in Bangladesh. The peaceful applications of radioactive materials and ioniz
ing radiations, including X rays, for socioeconomic development in diverse sectors have been
increasing steadily in Bangladesh over the years. Since 1964, the Atomic Energy Commission
has been the only organization in the country offering radiation protection services covering
its own activities and, on request, those of some other national organizations, on a very limited
scale. As there is no legal framework in the country for controlling and regulating the uses
of ionizing radiation there are reports of considerable misuses, particularly in diagnostic
X rays and in industry, leading to damage to public health and the environment. In order to
ensure safe usage, radiation protection rules, regulations, etc., are to be formulated under the
umbrella of a Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Act, the promulgation of which has
been long awaited. For the enforcement and implementation of the provisions of the Act and
the rules, regulations, etc., framed thereunder, the creation of a radiation protection infra
structure with the establishment of an optimum organizational set-up having trained man
power, laboratory equipment and supporting facilities has been suggested. The active co
operation and support of the IAEA and other international communities in the implementation
of the proposed radiation protection programmes in Bangladesh are strongly urged.
1. INTRODUCTION
Radioactive materials and other forms of ionizing radiations, including X rays,

are being widely used in Bangladesh for the improvement of public health and for
socioeconomic development. Since 1964, the health physics discipline in the Atomic
Energy Commission has been rendering radiation protection services on a limited
scale. After the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 the Bangladesh Atomic Energy
Commission (BAEC) continued these services and the overall regulatory activities
in the country. The organization chart of the BAEC, established in 1973, is shown
203
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IAEA-SM-309/26 205
in Fig. 1. The health physics and radiation protection activities of the AEC may
be broadly summarized as follows:
Research and development (R&D);
Health physics and radiation protection services such as survey, inspection and
calibration of all radiation facilities in the country, including diagnostic and
therapeutic X ray machines and radiation measuring instruments;
Training and education;
Regulatory activities relating to drafting of the Nuclear Safety and Radiation
Protection Bill, including issuance of permits for import, export, transport,
etc. of radioactive materials;
Advisory services.
In order to pursue some of the regulatory activities, the BAEC formed its first
Nuclear Safety Committee (NSC) in March 1976. In the absence of a nuclear safety
and radiation protection ordinance/act, the function of the NSC was to advise the
Commission on the safety aspects of the then proposed Atomic Energy Research
Establishment (AERE), Savar. Subsequently, the NSC was dissolved and recon
stituted by the Government in December 1981 to study and evaluate different safety
analysis reports of the 3 MW TRIGA Mark II Reactor for AERE. In order to look
into the nuclear safeguards aspects of AERE and to fulfil the international obligations
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Safeguards Agreements signed in
September 1979 and June 1982 respectively with the IAEA, the Commission formed
a six member Nuclear Safeguards Cell. Two additional Standing Committees for
specific functions were formed on the recommendation of the NSC, namely, the
Research Reactor Safety Committee and the Research Reactor Utilization
Committee.
The Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Division (NSRPD) was created
in 1987 as a result of the BAECs appreciation and recognition of the importance
of radiation protection and nuclear safety in the country as a whole and within the
BAEC in particular. The creation of this Division was also necessary to advise and
co-ordinate the above mentioned activities of different committees and identify
problems relating to nuclear safety and radiation protection for consideration of the
NSC and other committees. Under this division a radioactivity testing laboratory has
been set up at Chittagong for the analysis of radioactivity in both imported and
locally produced foods and other materials. In addition, all research and development
activities in areas of health physics and radiation protection in various laboratories
of the BAEC are being planned, executed and supervised under the guidance of the
NSRPD.
2. EXISTING RADIATION FACILITIES AND SOURCES IN THE

COUNTRY
Both sealed and unsealed sources of radioactive materials and ionizing radia
tions, including X rays, are being increasingly used both in the private and public
sectors. The important radiation facilities and sources used for various purposes in
Bangladesh are described below:
A 3 MW TRIGA Mark research reactor installed in 1986 by Bangladesh
Atomic Energy Commission at AERE, Savar for carrying out R&D activities
and production of certain short lived radioisotopes to meet local requirements,
particularly in medicine;
A 3 MeV positive ion Van de Graaff accelerator (VDG) installed in 1964 at
the Atomic Energy Centre, Dhaka (AECD) for R&D activities;
A number of neutron sources have been installed in the BAEC and some
universities for R&D, gauging and other quality control activities;
A large but unknown number of X ray machines of different types are being
operated for medical diagnosis, therapy, industrial radiography, analytical and
structural research and other purposes;
Very recently the Combined Military Hospital (CMH) procured a 6 MeV
(photon energy) accelerator for radiotherapy, the first of its kind in
Bangladesh. (Properly designed housing facilities for this accelerator are under
the purview of the NSRPD);
A significant number of radiation sources of varying strengths ranging from
500 to 50 000 Ci of ^C o and 137Cs are being installed1 and operated in the
BAEC and in hospitals for R&D work, radiotherapy, medical sterilization,
food preservation and other routine work;
A significant but unknown number of sealed 192Ir sources (around 100 Ci
strength) are being constantly used for NDT work by different public and pri
vate firms;
A considerable number of radioisotopes including radioactive labelled com
pounds is being used in various research laboratories and nuclear medicine
centres of BAEC, universities, research institutes, hospitals, etc. for R&D and
routine activities;
A significant amount of thorium nitrate is being used in private industry for
gas mantle preparation;
A significant amount of monazite tailings (ore of thorium) is arising following
separation of heavy minerals of beach sands of Coxs Bazar and offshore
islands in the Bay of Bengal through a pilot plant installed at Coxs Bazar.
1 1 curie = 3.7 x 1010 Bq.

IAEA-SM-309/26 207
ZRPC: Zonal Radiation Protection Centre
OBJECTIVE: REGULATION OF ALL NUCLEAR A N D RADIATION

PROTECTION ACTIVITIES (INCLUDING X RAY M ACHINES)
SALIENT FUNCTIONS: (a) Formulation of standards, guides, codes, etc.

(b) To fix safe limits
(c) To issue licences
(d) To inspect, monitor, penalize, etc.
(e) To inform and educate the public
(f) Training
(g) To advise and co-ordinate in emergencies
FIG. 2. Proposed organizational structure o f the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection
Division.
As far as nuclear energy is concerned, the Government of Bangladesh is con

templating the establishment of a nuclear power plant at Rooppur, Pabna (approxi
mately 160 km west of Dhaka) to meet the growing power demand of the country.
At present there is no legal framework in the country for controlling and
regulating applications of ionizing radiations, radioactive materials and nuclear
energy except an administrative arrangement making BAEC responsible for ensuring
safe usage of all radiation sources. There are reports of some misuses and
indiscriminate applications of ionizing radiations and radioactive materials in differ
ent areas, particularly in diagnostic radiology and industrial radiography, resulting
in unnecessary radiation exposure to occupational workers and members of the pub

lic. A survey conducted by a team of health physicists of the BAEC revealed the fact
that most of the diagnostic and therapeutic X ray installations are being operated
without any radiation protection and safety measures being observed. Similarly, a
few cases of serious misuses in industrial sectors have also been noticed. Very
recently a serious case of overexposure of ionizing radiation leading to burn injuries
and subsequent amputation of fingers of a worker occurred in an industrial radiogra
phy unit using a 50 Ci 192Ir source [1].
In order to ensure safe application of ionizing radiations appropriate radiation
protection rules and regulations are to be drawn up and implemented under the provi
sion of the proposed Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Bill. For the creation
of an appropriate radiation protection infrastructure, including the trained man
power, laboratory and associated facilities vitally needed as per the provisions of the
proposed ordinance, a Project Evaluation Proforma (PEP) has been prepared by the
BAEC and submitted to the Government for approval and implementation. The PEP
aims at establishing a central regulatory body under NSRPD at Dhaka with the provi
sion of new Zonal Radiation Protection Centres [2] for discharging all activities of
nuclear safety and radiation protection on a national basis. The organogram of the
proposed NSRPD is shown in Fig. 2. However, in the absence of any radiation pro
tection ordinance, the radiation protection rules and regulations of the IAEA and
other international bodies are being followed at present in Bangladesh, taking local
conditions into consideration.
3. PRESENT STATUS OF RADIATION PROTECTION IN BANGLADESH
Since 1965 the Health Physics Division of the AECD has been carrying out
radiation protection activities on a limited scale because of resource constraints and
a shortage of trained manpower. The main activities were research and development
in radiation protection and providing occupational radiation monitoring services to
BAEC and to some outside organizations on request. In addition, data on background
radiation level and related meteorological parameters were collected over a period
of five years from 1965 to 1970 as a prerequisite for the installation of the proposed
nuclear power plant at Rooppur.
In 1983 a Health Physics and Radiation Protection Laboratory was established
at AERE, Savar, to carry out radiation protection activities involving all the radiation
and nuclear facilities and particularly in and around the 3 MW TRIGA Mark II
research reactor.
The management and disposal of radioactive wastes generated in the AERE
and other radioactive laboratories in the country are also envisaged under this
programme. A Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratory (SSDL) has also been
IAEA-SM-309/26 209
TA BLE I. BAEC SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL INVOLVED

IN RADIATION PROTECTION
Name of the
CSO/ PSO/ SSO/ SO/ Technical
Institute/Centre/ Total
equivalent equivalent equivalent equivalent staff
Division of BAEC
Nuclear Safety and 1 2 1 1 5

Radiation Protec
tion Division,
BAEC, Dhaka
AEC, Dhaka 2 2 4 8 4
INST, AERE, 2 4 2 8 4
Savar
Radiation Testing 1 2 3 2
Laboratory (RTL),
Chittagong
Total 1 6 8 9 24 10
CSO = Chief Scientific Officer, PSO = Principal Scientific Officer, SSO = Senior Scientific
Officer, SO = Scientific Officer.
established for the calibration of radiation measuring instruments for precise deter
mination of doses, particularly for radiotherapy. The Chittagong Radioactivity Test
ing Laboratory is functioning as part of the proposed Zonal Radiation Protection
Centre (ZRPC). The main function of this laboratory, among others, is to determine
radioactivity both in imported and locally produced food materials. There are provi
sions for the establishment of such ZRPCs in other parts of the country (Fig. 2). The
overall duties and responsibilities of the NSRPD among others are summarized as
follows [2, 3]:
Formulation of policy guidelines and co-ordination, regulations, direction and

control of the activities of radiation protection laboratories;
Completion of all preparatory work for the promulgation of the Nuclear Safety
and Radiation Protection Act/Ordinance;
Formulation of standards, guides, codes of practice, rules and regulations for
all activities involving the use and handling of radioactive materials and
sources, special nuclear materials and for the construction and operation of
nuclear power plants, radiation facilities, installations producing ionizing radi
ation, etc.;
Planning and creation of the appropriate radiation protection infrastructure;

Issuance of licences or permits for procurement of radioactive materials and
conduct of surveillance activities;
Study and assessment of the background levels of radioactivity;
Establishment of permissible levels of radioactivity in food, beverages and var
ious other commodities;
Research and development work to improve the control of radiation protection
activities, including radioactive waste management.
Making contacts and maintenance of liaison with relevant establishments and
organizations/agencies both within the country and abroad (e.g. IAEA, ICRP,
the World Health Organization, the United Nations Environmental Program,
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, amd correspond
ing foreign national bodies, etc.) on matters of nuclear safety and radiation
protection;
Advisory and co-ordination activities in the event of major accidents or emer
gencies involving radiation incidents.
Co-ordination and arrangement of technical and secretarial services to the
Nuclear Safety Committee and other such committees of Bangladesh.
Table I shows the number of BAEC scientific and technical personnel engaged
in radiation protection and nuclear safety activities.
4. CONCLUSIONS
From the foregoing discussion it may be noted that the present radiation protec
tion services in Bangladesh are inadequate and in most cases do not meet the national
requirements. In ordr to ensure safe and peaceful applications of ionizing radiation,
radioactive materials and nuclear energy for the countrys socioeconomic develop
ment it is necessary to:
Enact the proposed NSRP bill at an early date;
Formulate appropriate rules, regulations, codes of practices, standards, metho
dologies, guides, etc. and their implementation and enforcement under the pro
vision of the Act;
Create an appropriate infrastructure, e.g. trained manpower, laboratory and
associated facilities, etc.;
Enforce and implement the other provisions of the NSRP Act.
It is felt that the radiation protection is an international problem and is not
limited by national borders. Countries having similar geographical conditions and a
similar socioeconomic background may have common problems in this field and
benefit from each others knowledge. Therefore, co-operation in research in radia
tion protection between Member States both on a regional and on an international
IAEA-SM-309/26 211
basis is needed. For the enactment of a national radiation act, the good offices of
the international communities may be necessary in some Member States. Moreover,
international co-operation is badly needed for the creation of a cadre of trained man
power in nuclear safety and radiation protection and necessary logistic support.
REFERENCES
[1] JALIL, A., MOLLA, M .A.R., An overexposure in industrial radiography using an

Ir-192 radionuclide, Health Phys. 57 1 (1989) 117-119.
[2] Basic Safety Standards, Bangladesh, RAPAT Mission to Bangladesh, Rep. IAEA-
TA-2430, IAEA, Vienna (1989).
[3] BANGLADESH ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, Proceedings of the Nuclear
Safety Committee, NSRPD/NSC-1, BAEC, Dhaka (1989).
IAEA-SM-309/18

IN ISRAEL
T. SCHLESINGER, Y. SHAMAI
Soreq Nuclear Research Centre, Yavnei
S. BRENNER
Research Institute for Environmental Health,
Ministry of Health, Tel Aviv
Israel
Abstract
RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE IN ISRAEL.
The protection of workers and the general public from ionizing and non-ionizing radia
tion and the control of the application of radioactive materials in Israel are based on a well
developed infrastructure founded on basic legislation and related codes of practice, implemen
tation and enforcing systems, education and training programmes, and a system of radiation
protection services. The practice of sharing responsibilities for radiation protection among the
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and the Israel Atomic Energy
Commission has been developed. Details relating to this infrastructure are presented.
1. INTRODUCTION
Radioactive materials and various ionizing and non-ionizing radiation-

producing devices, such as X ray machines, computer tomography scanners, linear
accelerators, radiotherapy installations, lasers, RF sealers, etc., are used extensively
in Israel in many areas of application, e.g. medical diagnosis and therapy, industry,
agriculture, research and development, and related subjects. In all these fields of
activity there is therefore a potential danger of exposing humans to ionizing radia
tion, with resultant possible damage to their health or wellbeing.
To avoid unnecessary exposures, a radiation protection infrastructure of regu
lations, educational facilities, licensing and supervision arrangements was developed
in Israel. This infrastructure includes the following:
(a) Basic legislation and supporting codes of practice related to the purchase and
use of radioactive materials and radiation machines (emitting ionizing and/or
non-ionizing radiation), building and equipment requirements for radioactive
laboratories and X ray facilities, the formulation of radioactive waste disposal
213
214 SCHLESINGER et al.
regulations, personal monitoring requirements, basic safety standards for

radiation protection, as well as guidelines for the exemption of individuals or
facilities from some or all of the restrictions;
(b) An implementation and enforcement system;
(c) Education and training requirements and their implementation;
(d) Radiation protection services (for personal monitoring, bioassay, monitoring
equipment, calibration, etc.).
The practice of sharing responsibilities for radiation protection among the

Ministry of Health (MOH), the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLS A) and
the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) was developed.
Points (a) to (d) are further elaborated below.
2. RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
2.1. Basic legislation and supplementary codes of practice
2.1.1. Pharmacists regulations radioactive elements and products thereof
These regulations, under the authority of the MOH, prohibit the purchase, dis
tribution, transportation and any application of radioactive materials and radiation
machines unless a special licence has been issued to the user. Licences are issued
by the Chief Radiation Executive (CRE), appointed by the Minister of Health. In
recent years, the Minister of Health appointed the Head of the Research Institute for
Environmental Health (RIEH) to act as the CRE.
The regulations specify the conditions under which a licence will be granted.
These conditions are related to basic facility and equipment requirements such as
floor and working surface coatings, washing facilities, sewage, ventilation and
shielding arrangements, etc.
The regulations also specify practices and activities exempt from licensing and
regulations, and list services and practices which may not be undertaken without spe
cial permit from the CRE (such as dosimetry, waste disposal, radiotoxicology ser
vices, etc.).
The regulations also require the appointment of a National Advisory Commit
tee for Radiation Protection whose members are professionals in various fields of
science and technology, and experts in radiation protection.
Finally, the regulations require that the CRE consult the IAEA prior to licens
ing certain practices (e.g. offering waste disposal services), or when relatively large
quantities of radioactive materials (beyond specified limits) are concerned.
IAEA-SM-309/18 215
2.1.2. Regulations regarding the medical application o f radiation machines
These regulations, under the authority of the MOH, require the registration,
with the MOH, of radiation machines intended to be used for medical purposes (diag
nosis and/or therapy). Registered machines also require a licence. Individual periodi
cal licences (for 1 to 5 year periods, depending on type and use) for every machine
are issued by the MOH after the completion of a series of QA and safety tests by
a team of inspectors.
The regulations authorize the MOH to disqualify machines which fail to
comply with the standards specified in the US National Bureau of Standards
Handbook 76.
2.1.3. Safety-at-work regulations (persons engaged in ionizing radiation)
These regulations are enforced under the authority of the MOLS A. They set
forth guidelines for control in facilities where employees handle radioactive
materials or radiation equipment. The managers of such installations should take the
following steps:
(a) Nominate a qualified radiation protection officer
(b) Notify the inspector of the MOLSA of all unusual occurrences
(c) Procure the equipment necessary for shielding from and monitoring of
radiation
(d) Restrict access to hazardous areas
(e) Ensure compliance with the regulations for the safe operation of the facility
(f) Train the radiation workers
(g) Advise the officials of radiation exposure in excess of themaximum recom
mended doses.
The limits for the annual radiation doses to the whole body and to single organs
of radiation workers are based on the recommendations of the International Commis
sion on Radiological Protection.
2.2. Implementation and enforcement system
Radiation protection policies and regulations are implemented and enforced by

the MOH and the MOLSA by special teams of inspectors from the RIEH and from
the Radiation Safety Department (RSD) of the Soreq Nuclear Research Centre
(Soreq NRC) (of the IAEC). The inspectors are nominated by the CRE (with the con
sent of the Chief Occupational Health and Safety Inspector of the MOLSA). An
annual inspection is carried out, during which each radioactive facility/laboratory
and radiation machine is subjected to intensive scrutiny. The annual renewal of the
licence is subject to the recommendations of the radiation safety inspectors.
216 SCHLESINGER et al.
2.3. Education and training
Radiation safety officers and radiation workers are trained in special courses,
most of which are conducted at the Feige Memorial Radioisotope Training Institute
run by the IAEC (at the Soreq NRC). The training periods extend from short three
day courses to extensive six week courses.
Adequate training is a prerequisite for granting most of the licences.
All nominated radiation officers are required to undergo a special examination
(written and oral) by radiation protection experts from the Soreq NRC. The results
of these examinations are reported to the CRE.
2.4. Radiation protection services
A national personnel dosimetry service and a national bioassay (urine and

whole body counter) service is run by the Nuclear Measurements Unit in the RSD
of the Soreq NRC. The same department also offers the calibration of radiation pro
tection monitoring instruments, measurement of smear test samples and determina
tion of radioisotope concentrations in environmental samples (water, milk,
vegetables, meat, wheat, etc.).
Radwaste disposal services and some of the above are offered by the IAECs
Nuclear Research Centre Negev (NRCN).
IAEA-SM-309/64
SOME ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF

THE RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
IN HUNGARY
B.L. SZTANYIK
Frdric Joliot-Curie National Research Institute
for Radiobiology and Radiohygiene,
Budapest, Hungary
Abstract
SOME ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF THE RADIATION PROTECTION INFRA
STRUCTURE IN HUNGARY.
In connection with the introduction of nuclear power and the rapid increase in the use
of radiation sources for various purposes, an Atomic Energy Act was passed by the Parlia
ment, the supreme legislative body of the country, in April 1980. Distribution of responsibility
among the national authorities in relation to radiation protection was defined at the same time
by a decree of the Council of Ministers enacting the law. Protection of people against the
harmful effects of ionizing radiation is the responsibility of the Minister of Health, whose
Ministerial Order issued in 1988 is considered to be the basic radiation protection regulation.
Compliance with radiation protection rules and regulations is supervised by the state public
health and epidemiology inspectorate directed by the Inspector-General. The inspectorate
relies on the expert advice and technical assistance provided by the National Research Institute
for Radiobiology and Radiohygiene as well as by the radiation hygiene laboratories of the 19
counties and the capital. Participation in education and training in radiation protection is
requested from each worker who is involved in the use of radiation sources either directly or
indirectly. Three levels of education have been defined in the relevant Ministerial Order, i.e.
basic, extended and comprehensive. The level of knowledge required depends on the level of
risk of radiation exposure in a given position.
1. INTRODUCTION
The medical application of X rays and natural radioactive substances for diag
nostic and therapeutic purposes started in Hungary soon after the discovery of these
phenomena. It is obvious, therefore, that some radiation protection rules and mea
sures had to be established and introduced as soon as the detrimental health conse
quences of exposure to radiation were recognized. Various devices and procedures
were elaborated not only for the enhancement of the diagnostic capabilities of X ray
examinations and the therapeutic efficiency of radiation treatment of cancer and other
malignant diseases, but also for the improvement of the protection of personnel using
radiation sources at the medical radiological units.
217
218 SZTANYIK
In 1928, when a Committee was established by the second International Con

gress of Radiology for elaboration of recommendations on protection against the
harmful effects of X rays and radiation emitted by radium, Gustav Grossman, a
Hungarian scientist, was already among the first members of the Committee [1].
After the Second World War, he was the initiator of the first Hungarian regulation
issued on the protection of professional workers exposed to radiation in the field of
medical radiology.
The first comprehensive regulation on the use of atomic energy was only estab
lished in the mid-1960s, about ten years after large scale applications of artificial
radionuclides had been launched in the country. According to the Governmental
Order of 1964, the promotion of atomic energy applications was assigned to be the
responsibility of the National Atomic Energy Commission (NAEC), while the regu
lation and supervision of radiation protection were the responsibility of the Ministry
of Health [2]. Technical committees were established by the NAEC to facilitate the
use of radioactive isotopes in medicine, agriculture and industry, research and educa
tion, and radiation hygiene groups were included in the structure of some public
health institutes to check that practices in the establishments complied with the rele
vant radiation protection rules and regulations.
2. THE CURRENT NATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION

REGULATIONS
In connection with the introduction of nuclear power and the rapid increase in
the use of radiation sources in various spheres of activity, including medicine,
agriculture and industry, research and education, an Atomic Energy Act was passed
by the Parliament, the supreme legislative body of the country, in April 1980. Simul
taneously, a decree of the Council of Ministers enacting the law was also published,
specifying the distribution of responsibility among the national authorities, the minis
tries and other organs of national competence. Subsequently, several Ministerial
Orders were issued containing specific rules and regulations on various aspects of
atomic energy applications, including radiation protection matters.
In addition to the Law and the Ministerial Orders, a third level of legislation
is constituted by the national standards giving detailed guidance concerning technical
aspects of radiation protection practices (Table I).
2.1. Act I of 1980 on atomic energy and the decree of the Council of Ministers
on its enactment
In preparing the Atomic Energy Act of 1980, the recommendations of the

International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) contained in its Publi
cation 26 were taken into consideration as far as possible [3]. In order to meet the
IAEA-SM-309/64 219
TABLE I. LEVELS OF RADIATION PROTECTION REGULATIONS
Issuing authorities Specimen regulations
Parliament Act I of 1980 on atomic energy
Council of Ministers No. 12/1980 (IV.5): Decree of the Council of Ministers on

enactment of the Act I of 1980 on atomic energy
Minister (or head of No. 7/19888 (VII.20): Order of the Minister of Health and Socia
an organ of national Affairs regarding the enforcement of the Act I of 1980
competence) on atomic energy
President of the MSZ 836-80: Protection against Radiation at

National Bureau of Industrial X Ray Equipment and Technical
Standards Irradiation Facilities
objectives of radiation protection, the main principles of the dose limitation system
of the ICRP were incorporated into the text of the Act as follows:
(a) In the Hungarian Peoples Republic, the applications of atomic energy,
the related research and development shall serve the interests of society as a whole.
Nuclear energy may only be used in a way that does not result in any damage to
human life, to the health and living conditions of present and future generations, to
mans environment and material goods.
(b) Within the authorized dose limits, radiation exposure shall be reduced
to a level as low as reasonably achievable.
(c) Exposure of workers employed in atomic energy applications and mem
bers of the public to all sources of radiation must not result in annual doses exceeding
the dose limits authorized by the relevant regulations on the basis of the current level
of knowledge and the recommendations of competent national and international advi
sory bodies.
Section II of the Act, which deals with the safety of atomic energy applica
tions, prescribes that the safety requirements in connection with the atomic energy
applications shall be defined in statutory provisions, safety regulations and national
standards, taking into account scientific results and international experiences; and
they shall be continuously updated in accordance with the advances of science and
technology. It states, furthermore, that applications of atomic energy may be used
exclusively in a manner defined by the statutory provisions and subject to regular
220 SZTANYIK
TABLE II. SECTIONS OF THE ORDER OF THE MINISTER OF HEALTH

REGARDING THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT I OF 1980 ON ATOMIC
ENERGY
Scope
Proprietary rights and operation
Safety requirements
Dose limits and reference levels
Quality control in respect to radiation protection
Education and training
Dosimetry control and medical surveillance of workers
Radiation protection rules
Radiation protection services
Emergency plan and preparedness
Prevention of the spread of radioactive contamination
Licensing
Particular regulations regarding radioactive substances
Closing provisions
surveillance by the State. It shall be ensured through measures taken by the compe
tent authorities that applications of atomic energy are in compliance with the statu
tory provisions, and with the requirements of safety, radiation protection and
environmental protection [4].
The decree of the Council of Ministers on enactment of the Atomic Energy Act
defined the distribution of responsibility among the different ministers and heads of
national organs, including the Ministers of Defence, Education and Training, Health,
Transportation and Postal Affairs, Industry, the Interior; the Presidents of the
NAEC, the National Office of Environmental Protection and Nature Conservation,
and the National Office of Water Economy [5].
Responsibility for regulating the uses of radioactive substances and devices
emitting ionizing radiation, setting dose limits for workers and members of the pub
lic, supervision of radiation protection services in the establishments, and exemption
of radiation sources and practices involving radiation from regulatory control has
been assigned to the Minister of Health (now entitled Minister of Health and Social
Affairs, MHS A).
IAEA-SM-309/64 221
2.2. Order of the Minister of Health and Social Affairs regarding the enforce
ment of the radiation protection provisions of the Atomic Energy Act
The Ministerial Order issued in 1988 was prepared taking into account the
recommendations of the ICRP contained in its Publication 26 and some subsequent
publications as well as the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), International Labour Organisation (ILO), World Health Organiza
tion (WHO), and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co
operation and Development (NEA/OECD) as given in their jointly sponsored and
published Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection 1982 Edition [6].
In addition to the main text of this ministerial order, which is divided into 14
sections (Table ), the most important radiation protection prescriptions are con-
TABLE III. ANNEXES TO THE ORDER OF THE MINISTER OF HEALTH

REGARDING THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT I OF 1980 ON ATOMIC
ENERGY
1. Dose limits for exposure of workers employed in atomic energy applications and of
members of the general public.
2. Health and radiation protection regulations for places of work in relation to the atomic
energy applications.
3. Training and refresher training in radiation protection
4. Dosimetry control of personnel.
5. Hospitalization of individuals having radiation injury or suspected of having radiation
injury.
6. Tasks of the radiation protection services.
7. Prevention of radiation accidents and mitigation of their consequences.
8. Submission of information for a licensing request.
9. Competent authorities involved in the licensing procedure of the Public Health and
Epidemiology Inspectorate.
10. Special health regulations in relation to the establishment and operation of nuclear
power plants.
11. Radiation protection requirements for ultimate disposal of radioactive waste.
12. Fee payable for expert opinion given in radiation protection matters.
222 SZTANYIK
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tained in 12 annexes (Table ) [7]. Among these, detailed regulations are given on
subjects such as
(a) the dose limits to be applied under normal conditions for exposure of workers
employed in atomic energy applications and of individual members of the
public,
(b) the rules of work performed with sealed and unsealed radiation sources,
(c) education and training required from workers employed in atomic energy
applications,
(d) special health prescriptions in relation to the siting, design, commissioning and
operation of nuclear power plants,
(e) radiation protection requirements for the ultimate disposal of radioactive
waste.
In principle, the sections of the main text of the ministerial order contain the more
general and lasting prescriptions of radiation protection, while the majority of the
numerical values and shorter term requirements are dealt with in the annexes, which
can be changed, if needed, without altering the main text.
2.3. National standards on nuclear technology and radiation protection

practice
As mentioned before, the most detailed guidance on various technical aspects

of radiation protection practices is given in the relevant national standards that are
issued by the National Office of Standards (NOS) affiliated to the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO). The very first rules and regulations on radia
tion protection matters in Hungary have also been published in the form of national
standards [8].
These standards contain the most flexible and detailed instructions for both the
manufacturers and users of radiation sources. There are standards defining the terms
and concepts, describing methods of dosimetry and radioactivity measurements, out
lining classification of radiation sources and constituents of nuclear power installa
tions, providing instructions on the safe transportation of radioactive material and
handling of radioactive wastes (Table IV).
Experts on radiation protection employed by the competent authorities,
research institutions and establishments of atomic energy applications are usually
involved in the preparation and regular updating of these standards on a contract
basis. Following the issuance of the Ministerial Order signed by the MHSA, revision
of the relevant national standards has been started and is still continuing.
IAEA-SM-309/64 225
3. STRUCTURE OF THE N ATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION

AUTHORITY
According to the decree o f the Council o f Ministers on the enactment o f the

Atom ic Energy Law, protection o f people against the harmful effects o f ionizing
radiation has to be regulated and supervised by the Minister o f Health. Regulation
o f other aspects o f atomic energy applications is the responsibility o f other authori
ties, e.g . the head o f the National O ffice o f Environmental Protection and Nature
Conservation is responsible for the authorization o f airborne radioactive releases into
the environment, and the head o f the National O ffice for Water Economy for the pro
tection o f water resources against radioactive contamination. Their regulatory activi
ties have to be accomplished in agreement with the Minister o f Health. (In the
meantime, these two former national authorities have been united into a Ministry o f
Environmental Protection.)
The responsibility o f the Minister o f Health for regulation and supervision o f
radiation protection practices is discharged through the State Public Health and
Epidem iology (PHAE) Inspectorates, which consist o f a Head Inspectorate directed
by the Inspector-General and his deputies, and the Inspectorates o f the 19 counties
and the capital o f the country, Budapest. In each establishment where radiation
sources are produced, stored, used or repaired, and where procedures involving
radiation exposure are applied, a radiation protection service should be set up or, at
least, a radiation protection officer should be appointed (if the establishment is o f
small size).
The primary responsibility for ensuring com pliance with the radiation protec
tion rules and regulations in the establishments lies with these services or officers,
who are then supervised by the state PHAE inspectors o f the county. Assistance in
radiation protection matters is provided by the appropriate radiation hygiene group
o f the regional PHAE station. Such a group can be found in every third PHAE sta
tion. A PHAE station fulfilling such regional tasks is called a radiation hygiene sub
centre. Each o f these has its own special task, for instance, the supervision o f the
uranium mine, the Paks nuclear power station, the Nuclear Research Institute in
Debrecen operating a cyclotron and other accelerators, the Central Physical
Research Institute in Budapest, with a research reactor, etc. The only radioactive
waste repository in the country is also operated by one o f these subcentres at the
Budapest PHAE Station (Fig. 1).
The radiation hygiene groups o f the PHAE stations are equipped with portable
instruments for on-site measurements o f radiation dose rates and levels o f radioactive
contamination, with devices for taking samples at the place o f work and from
environmental media, such as air, water, soil, plants and food products. Preparation,
chemical analyses and radioactivity measurements o f these samples are performed
in the laboratories o f the group within the PHAE station.
226 SZTANYIK
FIG. 1. Structure o f the national radiation protection authority.

IAEA-SM-309/64 227
* unattached unit
FIG. 2. Structure o f the Frdric Joliot-Curie National Research Institute fo r Radiobiology

and Radiohygiene.
228 SZTANYIK
Additional supervision o f radiation protection practices in the establishments

o f primary importance and the second degree inspections are performed by the head
inspectorate with reliance on the expert advice and technical assistance provided by
the Frdric Joliot-Curie National Research Institute for Radiobiology and Radio
hygiene [9]. The institute comprises three departments, radiobiology research,
radiohygiene, radiation and radioisotope applications, a division o f non-ionizing
radiations unattached to any o f these departments, units o f central services, economy
and finance. The department o f radiohygiene consists o f operational and environ
mental radiohygiene divisions, personnel dosimetry and environmental dosimetry
divisions, and a division o f computer assisted analyses and internal dosimetry. D irec
tion o f the institute is assisted by a directorial council and an advisory board o f out
side scientists (Fig. 2). The institute is directly subordinated to the Minister o f
Health and Social Affairs.
4. EDUCATION A N D TRAINING IN RADIATION PROTECTION
Education in Hungary is at three levels: general or elementary level, medium

and high. General level education is the task o f the primary school, and it is obliga
tory for all children from the age o f 6 years old up to the age o f 14 years old. Medium
level education is the duty o f the secondary or middle school, which can be either
a gymnasium that provides a general background knowledge for university or other
high school studies, or a technical school that prepares qualified workers for various
spheres o f the national econom y, such as agriculture, industry, commerce and the
civil service. The high schools are represented by the universities, academies, col
leges, conservatories, etc., producing graduates with academic degrees.
Workers belonging to any o f these categories may be em ployed in jobs which
involve exposure to ionizing radiation. Such workers are requested to participate in
special education and training in radiation protection principles and practices. Three
levels o f education in radiation protection have been defined in the relevant
Ministerial Order: basic, extended and com prehensive (Table V ).
Participation in an organized training course (or other type o f instruction)
providing a basic knowledge in radiation protection and in refresher training courses
at five year intervals is required o f each worker who is employed in work where a
limited risk o f radiation exposure may exist without direct contact with a radiation
source, e.g . for an operator or supervisor o f equipment containing a. sealed and low
activity radiation source; and o f each individual who is indirectly exposed to a radia
tion source, such as members o f general services, administrative personnel, cleaning
staff, drivers, guards, storemen, etc.
Extended knowledge o f radiation protection rules and regulations is expected
o f professional workers employed in a working condition that is associated with a
moderate risk o f radiation exposure (working condition B), such as operators o f
IAEA-SM-309/64 229
TABLE V. RADIATION PROTECTION TRAINING REQUESTED FOR PER

SONNEL IN VARIOUS SPHERES OF ATOMIC ENERGY APPLICATIONS
Sphere of atomic energy application Requested training in radiation

and category of employees protection
Basic Extended Comprehensive
(1) Indirectly exposed auxiliary

personnel
(2) Technical personnel with low
risk of exposure
(3) Medical radiology (X ray diag
nostics, nuclear medicine and
radiation therapy)
assistants
physicians and other graduate
personnel
(4) Other medical applications
(e.g. pulmonology, stomatology,
traumatology)
assistants
physicians and other graduate
personnel
radiation protection officer
(5) Industrial radiography
auxiliary radiographer
qualified radiographer
head radiographer
(6) Irradiation technology
technicians
graduate personnel
(7) Nuclear installations
auxiliary personnel
operators, maintenance workers
radiation protection officers
230 SZTANYIK
sealed and unsealed radiation sources o f limited activity and/or energy; supervisors
o f these types o f activity; and health workers o f departments where sources o f ioniz
ing radiation are only used occasionally (for instance in pulm onology, stomatology,
traumatology, and urology units).
Comprehensive knowledge o f radiation protection rules and regulations is a
prerequisite o f appointment o f a worker to a position associated with an enhanced
potential risk o f radiation exposure (working condition A ), e.g . in a nuclear installa
tion, at an accelerator facility or irradiator o f high activity, in an establishment pro
ducing, storing or using radioactive substances in large quantities; a supervisor or
safety controller o f such places o f work (radiation protection officer); physicians and
other health workers regularly applying radiological procedures for diagnostic
and/or therapeutic purposes, and their supervisors; inspectors o f the competent
authorities supervising compliance with the radiation protection rules and
regulations [7].
Organization o f the lower level o f training is the responsibility o f the manage
ment o f the facility. The medium level o f training is organized by specialized second
ary and technical schools, and by the radiation hygiene groups o f the PHAE stations.
The highest level o f training is provided by the universities or postgraduate training
institutes, as w ell as by the radiation protection societies. For medical professionals
and other graduate scientists employed in the medical field, com prehensive training
in radiation protection is regularly organized by the Chair o f Radiobiology and
Radiohygiene o f the Postgraduate Medical Training Institute established and oper
ated under the aegis o f the Frdric Joliot-Curie National Research Institute for
Radiobiology and Radiohygiene.
A ll training programmes o f radiation protection must be submitted by their
organizers to the State Public Health and Epidemiology Head Inspectorate for
approval.
5. SUM M ARY
1. Radiation protection legislation has been developed in Hungary at three

levels:
(a) The Act I o f 1980 on atomic energy contains the basic requirements concern
ing the safe use o f atomic energy in Hungary, including the fundamental princi
ples o f radiation protection as recommended by the International Commission
on Radiological Protection, the International Atom ic Energy A gency and other
competent international bodies. Distribution o f responsibility among the
national authorities has been defined by the decree o f the Council o f Ministers
enacting the law.
IAEA-SM-309/64 231
(b) The order o f the Minister o f Health, who is responsible for the specific radia
tion protection regulations, sees to dose limits, the organization and supervi
sion o f radiation protection services, and the licensing o f radiation sources and
practices involving radiation.
(c) Detailed guidance on various technical aspects o f radiation protection is given
in the national radiation protection standards.
2. Compliance with the radiation protection rules and regulations at particular

places o f work is supervised by the State Public Health and Epidem iology Inspec
torate, directed by the Inspector-General, and supported by radiation hygiene labora
tories as w ell as by the Frdric Joliot-Curie National Research Institute for
Radiobiology and Radiohygiene.
3. Participation in a training course providing basic, extended or comprehen
sive knowledge in radiation protection is a prerequisite o f appointment o f a worker
to a position that is associated with a low , moderate, or high level o f risk o f radiation
exposure.
REFERENCES
[1] TAYLOR, L.S., Radiation Protection Standards, CRC Press, Cleveland (1971).
[2] Order No. 10/1964 (V.7) of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers - Peasants
Government on radioactive materials and preparations, Magyar Kzlny 30 (1964) 189
(in Hungarian).
[3] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Recom
mendations, ICRP Publication 26, Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York (1977).
[4] Act I of 1980 on Atomic Energy, Magyar Kzlny 21 (1980) 293 (in Hungarian).
[5] Decree No. 12/1980 (IV.5) of the Council of Ministers enacting the Act I of 1980 on
Atomic Energy, Magyar Kzlny 21 (1980) 301 (in Hungarian).
[6] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Basic Safety Standards for Radia
tion Protection, 1982 Edition, jointly sponsored by IAEA, ILO, NEA(OECD), WHO,
Safety Series No. 9, IAEA, Vienna (1982).
[7] Order No. 7/1988 (VII.20) of the Minister of Health and Social Affairs on the enforce
ment of the Decree No. 12/1980 (IV.5) of the Council of Ministers enacting the Act I
of 1980 on Atomic Energy, Magyar Kzlny 33 (1988) 863 (in Hungarian).
[8] Nuclear Technics, Practical Radiation Protection, Collection of MSZ Standards 53.
Szabvnykiad, Budapest (1983) 1-1044 (in Hungarian).
[9] SZTANYIK, L.B., Experience gained in Hungary on the role and responsibility of
the public health authority in the nuclear power programme , Nuclear Power
Experience (Proc. Conf. Vienna, 1983), Vol. 4, IAEA, Vienna (1983) 741.
IAEA-SM-309/48

IN THAILAND
C. KRAILAKSANAW ARAPAR
Health Physics D ivision,
O ffice o f Atom ic Energy for Peace,
Bangkok, Thailand
A bstract
RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE IN THAILAND.

On 15 October 1957 Thailand became the fifty-eighth Member State of the IAEA. Radi
ation protection measures in Thailand have been very successful in all respects,and to date no
significant radiation hazard or accidents have occurred. This is due to the national radiation
protection policies, programmes and plans to strengthen radiation protection infrastructures,
based on international standards and recommendations such as those of the IAEA and the
International Commission on Radiological Protection. From time to time the regulations have
been revised so as to ensure harmonization in the long term.
1. INTRODUCTION
World War Tw o introduced atomic energy to the world in the form o f a power
ful and deadly weapon. The Atom s for Peace programme was initiated by the USA
to counter the pessim ism associated with the idea o f nuclear radiation and as som e
form o f reparation for the atomic bomb. This programme stimulated the nations o f
the world to set up their own research institutions and develop nuclear energy organi
zations to utilize atomic energy for peace, aid development and upgrade living stan
dards, health and wealth.
Thailand set up its O ffice o f Atom ic Energy for Peace (OAEP) in 1961, follow
ing the enactment o f the Atom ic Energy for Peace Act.
On 31 March 1960 the Governments o f Thailand and the United States o f
America signed a contract on the utilization o f atomic energy for civilian purposes.
This agreement remained in effect until 12 March 1961.
On 3 January 1962 Thailand signed a contract with the United States Atomic
Energy Comm ission (USAEC) for the lease o f special materials such as fuel rods
with 90% enriched 235U , amounting to 5.35 kg.
On 25 July 1962 the OAEP purchased from the USAEC 80 g o f 239Pu as a
239P u-B e source and 3.68 g o f 90% enriched 235U , in two fission chambers
(W estinghouse type WL 6376).
233
234 KRAILAKSANAWARAPAR
On 27 October 1962 the staff o f O A EPs reactor operation division brought

the first Thai research reactor (TRR-1) to criticality. Thus the first step was taken
in research and development and towards a better standard o f living.
Initially m ost o f the activities were directed to fundamental research and by
1986 126 research papers had been published. H ow ever, ionizing radiations are not
only the concern o f OAEP research but also o f many branches o f medicine, industry
and other disciplines. Hence there is rapid expansion in the applications o f ionizing
radiations, whereby the biological effects o f doses, however small, need to be
considered.
Under the Atom ic Energy for Peace Act (the Act) the Thai Atom ic Energy
Comm ission (Thai AEC) was set up to expedite the initiation and promotion o f the
utilization o f atomic energy for peace. To facilitate it in its tasks and to provide con
trol and measures for the safe use and handling o f ionizing radiations, it has eleven
subcommittees:
(1) Atom ic Energy in Agriculture

(2) Atom ic Energy in M edicine
(3) Nuclear Reactor Safeguards
(4) Licensing o f Nuclear Materials and By-products
(5) Nuclear Law
(6) Safeguarding o f Nuclear Materials
(7) Atom ic Energy in Industry
(8) Control Board for the Irradiation o f Food and Agricultural Products
Programme
(9) Co-operation in Science and Nuclear Technology (between the Japanese
Ministry o f Science and the Thai authorities)
(10) Irradiation Technology Transfer
(11) Code o f Practice and Safety Control Measures for Nuclear Power Plants.
2. REGULATORY PROVISIONS
The Act and Ministerial Regulations have been revised from time to time by
the Nuclear Law Subcommittee, and the national radiation protection standards and
norms are designed to keep the exposure o f workers and members o f the public to
radiation as low as reasonably achievable.
Radiation protection regulations are implemented and enforced by sending a
group o f inspectors with the necessary health physics instruments to all laboratories,
licensed institutions, workplaces and organizations. The inspectors give advice and
strengthen radiation protection measures, and also calibrate measuring instruments.
There is no exemption from regulatory control: even consumer products con
taining very small amounts o f radioactivity require an import/export licence (e.g.
lighting conductors, smoke detectors, calibration sources, etc.).
IAEA-SM-309/48 235
Most o f the radiation protection regulations and procedures have been adopted
from the recommendations o f such international bodies as the IAEA and the Inter
national Comm ission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), both as regards general
principles and as regards such concepts as primary dose equivalent lim its, secondary
lim its, derived lim its, and reference levels.
3. LICENSING INSPECTION A N D CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
At present, the Licensing o f Nuclear Materials and By-products Subcommittee

is the only national authority which may grant licences for the possession, use,
export or import o f radioactive materials on behalf o f the Thai AEC. Users o f X ray
equipment or other apparatus involving ionizing radiations have to apply for a licence
from the M edical Sciences Department o f the Ministry o f Public Health, acting on
behalf o f the Thai AEC.
When radioactive material is used in manufacturing, is transferred or disposed
of, the OAEP has to be notified in writing and the conditions set by the OAEP
have to be met. M ost o f these conform to the relevant IAEA Safety Series
recommendations.
The OAEP also sends letters to all licensees, notifying them that a team from
the competent authority w ill pay a visit o f inspection to check radiation safety and
conformity with the regulations. If the OAEP w ishes to make any recommendations
or suggestions, it communicates directly with the head o f the licensee organization,
and may propose corrective actions to be carried out within a stated period o f time.
Failure to comply or violations may be punished by imprisonment, a fine, or both.
A s regards personnel monitoring, the M edical Science Department o f the
Ministry o f Public Health is the only government agency to provide such a service,
apart from the OAEP. Currently, private organizations are not permitted to do so.
For the accreditation o f health physicists, the OAEP has provided a short training
course on radiation protection. This is free o f charge and is available throughout the
year. A certificate is awarded to those who complete the course and pass a test set
by the training committee.
4. SPECIAL SERVICES, RADIATION PROTECTION RESOURCES

A N D M ANAGEM ENT
A ll the universities in Thailand act as supporting institutions, assisting the

national authority in its radiation safety work and providing special services such as
environmental radiation monitoring networks.
The main resources needed for radiation protection are health physics instru
ments, laboratories and equipment, and shielding materials. The scope o f activities
236 KRAILAKSANAWARAPAR
and manpower available vary considerably, as do the costs, which may range from
a few dollars up to many hundred thousand US dollars.
Reports on licensing control are submitted to the Thai AEC quarterly and an
OAEP Newsletter is distributed to m ost libraries, government agencies and
academics. Radiation protection societies exist to promote public understanding o f
the philosophy o f radiation protection, o f radiation protection precautions and
measures, and, among professionals, to exchange information, encourage co
operation and pursue research and development.
5. EDUCATION, TRAINING A N D COM M UNICATION
The OAEP has set up a training section to carry out training in all subjects
related to nuclear science and technology, including its transfer. This section also
covers radiation protection, and in time the OAEP plans to acquire highly qualified
manpower by inviting the IAEA to organize and support an international or inter
regional training course on radiation protection in Thailand. At the same time it is
planned to upgrade the OAEP radiation protection course.
Education programmes on radiation protection per se are not yet available in
schools and universities. H owever, it may be touched on in related subjects such as
radiological physics, radiation chemistry, or radiation biology.
6. POLICY A N D RESPONSIBILITIES
On 15 October 1957 Thailand became the fifty-eighth Member State o f the

IAEA.
To strengthen radiation protection infrastructures, the Minister o f Science,
Technology and Energy has laid down a policy to OAEP that a radiation protection
training course and technology transfer o f nuclear science and technology are top
priorities.
In sharing the responsibility for radiation safety among various institutions and
ministries, the OAEP has set up a Radiation Emergency Control Committee to inte
grate an already existing locally produced plan into a National Emergency Master
Plan adopted from the IAEA Safety Series N os 55, 72 and 91, ICRP Publications
28 and 40, and the IAEA ENATOM Manual. This plan (OAEP-SG-E-1) w ill be
implemented in the event o f any radiation emergency resulting from the use o f radio
active materials.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Atomic Energy for Peace Act, B.E. 2504, Bangkok (1961).
OFFICE OF ATOMIC ENERGY FOR PEACE, 25th Anniversary Report, OAEP, Bangkok
(1987).
IAEA-SM-309/40
STRENGTHENING THE RADIATION PROTECTION

INFRASTRUCTURE IN GHANA
C. SCH ANDORF, N .A . ABORA VII,

G. EM I-REYNOLDS, E.O . DARKO
Physics Department,
National Nuclear Research Institute,
Ghana Atom ic Energy Comm ission,
Legon, Ghana
Abstract
STRENGTHENING THE RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE IN GHANA.
The radiation protection infrastructure developed over the past ten years through a
Technical Assistance and Co-operation project between the Ghana Atomic Energy Commis
sion and the International Atomic Energy Agency is presented. The paper describes the pro
grammes envisaged for the next two years to further strengthen the already existing
infrastructure.
1. INTRODUCTION
For the past ten years the IAEA has been assisting the National Nuclear
Research Institute (NNRI) o f the Ghana Atom ic Energy Comm ission (GAEC) to
develop the follow ing radiation protection infrastructure:
(1) Manpower resources, through training fellowships and courses, workshops

and seminars
(2) Provision o f appropriate equipment
(3) Expert services in the areas o f personnel dosimetry, radiological protection
inspection procedures, food and environmental protection dosimetry, and
radiation protection legislation.
The Radiation Protection Advisory Team (RAPAT) m ission to Ghana sup

ported the need to strengthen the radiation protection infrastructure in the areas of:
(a) Human resources development in radiation protection

(b) Developm ent o f semiautomatic computerized personnel dosimetry to keep pace
with the increasing use o f ionizing radiation in Ghana
237
238 SCHANDORF et al.
(c) Developm ent o f internal dosimetry capability

(d) Developm ent o f further regulations to support the Radiation Protection Law
(e) Developm ent o f an organization in charge o f em ergency plansand prepared
to deal with any nuclear accident or radiological emergency.
2. RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
The NNRI has made available a total o f 250 m 2 room space to house all the
equipment and accessories supplied by the IAEA. The staff consists o f one senior
scientific officer, two scientific officers, one assistant scientific officer, one principal
technician, one technician and one national service person. These have received vari
ous levels o f training.
Radiation protection is organized through the Health Physics section o f the
Physics Department o f NNRI, Fig. 1.
The various radiation protection services initiated and ongoing are as follow s.
FIG. 1. Organization o f radiation protection.

IAEA-SM-309/40 239
B38IResearch
X ray diagnostic
400 ^ 3 X ray technical division
Nuclear medicine
Industry
350
BH Total
300
250

0
1 200
Q.
-

150
Z
100
50
FIG. 2. Personnel monitoring statistics.
2.1. Radiological protection inspections of installations which house ionizing

radiations
The inspection procedures consist of:
(1) Evaluation o f safety devices at the workplace

(2) Shielding evaluation
(3) Measurement o f scatter and leakage radiation
(4) Measurement o f X ray tube performance characteristics
(5) Evaluation o f fluoroscopy equipment.
To date 55 inspections have been conducted and recommendations to the insti

tutions involved have helped to improve the level o f safety when implemented.
There are 120 X ray machines, 45 sealed and 20 unsealed sources in the coun
try which need regulatory control.
2.2. Personnel dosimetry using thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs)
The personnel monitoring service caters for about 360 personnel in five differ
ent working groups, namely research, X ray diagnosis, the X ray technical division,
nuclear m edicine, and industry. Figure 2 shows the growth o f the service from 1986
240 SCHANDORF et al.
Research
X ray diagnostic
1.4 X ray technical division
Nuclear medicine
1.2 Industry
1.0
0.8
)
ai
A
0 .6
I
0.4
0.2
si
1986
I 1987
Year
1988 1989
FIG. 3. M ean ann u a l do se equivalent f o r various w orking groups.
to 1989. Figure 3 shows the mean annual dose equivalent for the five working
groups.
The medical field workers, who form about 1.4% o f persons monitored,
receive the highest mean annual dose. The X ray workers form about 64% o f the
personnel being monitored.
Our investigation level o f 1.0 mSv was exceeded on occasions where there
were special operations and as a result o f poor work practice.
2.3. Food and environmental monitoring
The high pure germanium, computerized, low level gamma spectrometry sys
tem is being used to control radioactivity contamination in imported food items and
also for the assessment o f radioactivity in environmental samples and local foods.
2.4. Calibration facilities
To ensure reliable and accurate measurementswith the various types o f equip

ment supplied the follow ing calibration and analytical quality control facilities exist:
(1) 1.2 Ci 137Cs panoramic irradiator1

(2) 1.0 mCi Co irradiator
1 1 Ci = 3.7 x 10 Bq.
IAEA-SM-309/40 241
(3) 0 .5 mCi 90Sr irradiator

(4) Philips MG 325/165 X ray system
(5) Amersham liquid mixed radionuclides gamma ray reference standards
(6) IAEA quality assurance reference materials, IAEA/RGK -1, IAEA/RGTH-1,
IA EA /R G U -1, S-14, S-16.
2.5. Legislation
The above mentioned activities are being pursued without any legal basis for
the enforcement o f effective radiation protection in Ghana. To solve this problem a
basic radiation protection law has been presented to the Government o f Ghana for
promulgation.
The radiation protection law provides the framework for the establishment o f
a Radiation Protection Board (RPB).
The RPB w ill serve as an advisory body to government and harmonize and
exercise regulatory control over all institutions concerned with the utilization o f
ionizing radiations. The Board w ill be required to draw up radiation protection
strategies and develop further regulations to support the basic law.
3. STRENGTHENING THE RADIATION PROTECTION

INFRASTRUCTURE
Since the project which is currently assisting Ghana in the field o f radiation
protection is being phased out by the end o f 1990, a new Technical Assistance project
has been proposed to the IAEA for 1991-1992 for strengthening the radiation protec
tion infrastructure in Ghana.
It is envisaged that additional room space o f 250 m 2 w ill be provided for
implementation o f the project.
3.1. Training
To strengthen the staff the follow ing training strategy would be adopted:
Period Number o f
Field o f training Type o f training
(man-months) trainee(s)
(1) Personnel dosimetry Fellowship 4 2

(2) Licensing and inspection Fellowship 6 2
(3) Internal dosimetry Fellowship 4 2
(4) Reactor health physics Fellowship 2 1
(5) Emergency planning Training course 0.8 1
and preparedness
242 SCHNDORF et al.
3.2. Expert services
Expert services projected to be requested are listed below:
,, r Duration
Field o f service
(man-months)
(1) Personnel dosimetry 0.5

(2) Internal dosimetry 1.0
(3) Legislation 0.5
(4) Emergency planning and preparedness 0.5
3.3. Equipment
The equipment requested under the project may be summarized as follows:
Estimated
Type o f equipment Field o f utilization price
(US $)
(1) Semiautomatic TLD Personnel dosimetry, 50 000

system external and extremities
(2) Software Radioactive source inventory, 5 000

personnel monitoring data
storage
(3) D ose/dose rate meters Inspection 3 000

(4) W hole body counter Internal dosimetry 120 000
(5) M iscellaneous 10 000
3.4. Development of further regulations
To be fully equipped for the expanding activities involving radiation, further

specific regulations need to be developed in the following areas:
(1) Safety and design o f a gamma irradiator for the 50 000 kCi semicommercial
gamma facility to be commissioned at NNRI.
(2) Safety and design o f research reactors to cater for the projected miniature neu
tron source reactor. A Safety Analysis Report is being prepared.
(3) Safety o f sealed and unsealed radioactive sources.
IAEA-SM-309/40 243
4. CONCLUSION
In view o f the legal basis for radiation protection soon to be established and
the anticipated expansion o f activities involving ionizing radiations, the envisaged
programme for strengthening the radiation protection infrastructure in Ghana would
achieve the primary objectives of:
(1) Having w ell trained, efficient and adequate personnel

(2) Having state o f the art equipment and facilities for effectively enforcing regula
tory control over all activities involving the use, storage, importation, trans
portation and disposal o f radioactive materials in Ghana.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Basic Safety Standards for Radiation

Protection, Safety Series No. 9, 1982 Edition, IAEA, Vienna (1982).
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, General Princi

ples of Monitoring for Radiation Protection of Workers, ICRP Publication 12, Pergamon
Press, Oxford and London (1969).
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Recommenda

tions of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP Publication 26,
Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York (1977).
IAEA-SM-309/53
RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE IN IRAN
M. SOHRABI
National Radiation Protection Department,
Atom ic Energy Organization o f Iran,
Tehran, Islamic Republic o f Iran
A bstract
RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE IN IRAN.

The protection of human beings, their progeny and their environment against harmful
effects of radiation requires the enforcement of rules, regulations and standards by a national
competent authority on radiation protection. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Radiation
Protection Act of 1989 has empowered the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and in turn
its National Radiation Protection Department as a competent authority to regulate and to con
trol the entire range of radiation source applications. The Act has evolved from the radiation
protection infrastructure in the country and it has filled the gaps in the Act of 1974. The paper
presents and discusses the state of the radiation protection infrastructure in Iran, including
regulatory provisions, the organizational structure, licensing and inspection, responsibilities,
education and training, as well as some highlights of research, development, services and
experiences gained in the development of the radiation protection infrastructure and
organization.
1. INTRODUCTION
Radiation protection (RP) activities in the Islamic Republic o f Iran have a long
history, dating back to the time when the first X ray machine was installed [1, 2].
The seed o f development o f an infrastructure for RP activities was implanted with
the establishment o f the Tehran University Nuclear Centre (TUNC) in 1957 and
achieved a broader scope when the 5 MW research reactor o f the Atom ic Energy
Organization o f Iran (AEOI) went into operation in 1967. How ever, it was only in
1974 that the infrastructure o f a nationwide RP programme was formally established
when the Atom ic Energy Act o f Iran was legislated and ratified [3]. The Act ascribed
the responsibility for RP control and supervision as w ell as the preparation o f rules
and regulations to AEOI and in turn to its RP Department, where an RP programme
was established, as previously described [1, 2].
The Atom ic Energy Act o f 1974 did not properly and clearly em power the
AEOI to enforce rules, regulations and standards: there were no provisions for sanc
tions and penalties. In particular, the increasing applications o f radiation sources in
m edicine, industry, agriculture, education, research and the nuclear fuel cycle
required further upgrading and strengthening o f the existing status to fulfil regulatory
245
246 SOHRABI
provisions in the country. To achieve this goal on a solid regulatory basis, the Radia
tion Protection Act o f Iran was legislated and ratified in April 1989 [4]. The Act pre
cisely formulated responsibilities and clearly empowered the AEOI and in turn its
RP Department as a National Radiation Protection Department (NRPD) with
authority to regulate and to control the entire range o f radiation protection activities
in different disciplines. In this paper, the state o f the RP infrastructure and activities
in Iran based on the RP Act o f 1989 are presented and discussed.
2. REGULATORY PROVISIONS
The Radiation Protection Act o f 1989 empowered the AEOI and in turn the
NRPD with the responsibilities to regulate and to control RP activities over the entire
range o f ionizing and non-ionizing source applications. The Act consists o f five
chapters with 23 articles on General Concepts, Licences and Responsibilities,
Inspection and Supervision, Sanctions and Penalties, and Special Provisions [4]. It
covers a broad range o f RP responsibilities including:
Protection o f individual human beings, their progeny, mankind, as a whole and

the environment against the harmful effects o f radiation;
Developm ent o f criteria, recommendations, guidelines, rules, regulations and
standards on radiological safety and protection;
Licensing and inspection o f radiation sources and facilities, production,
manufacture, possession, procurement, import, export, transport, transfer,
distribution, purchase, sale, exploration, extraction and waste management as
related to radioactive materials and/or radiation producing installations.
Establishment and provision o f nationwide dosimetry services for routine and
emergency personnel monitoring, environmental measurements and instru
ment calibration, etc.;
Environmental protection from natural and man-made sources;
Research, development o f methods and techniques o f internal and external pro
tection to promote radiation protection services as w ell as to contribute to
world trends in the promotion o f RP science and technology;
Education and training o f radiation workers and the public;
Sanctions and penalties for any violations o f the regulations o f the Act.
The Radiation Protection Rules o f the Act o f 1989 have been recently prepared
by the N R PD and approval by the Government Board is awaited [5]. The rules cover
radiation work; responsibilities o f a licensee, a responsible officer, a health physicist
and a radiation protection officer; categories o f radiation tasks; medical examination
requirements; retirement benefits and regulations for payment, and benefits o f good
RP practices by radiation workers.
IAEA-SM-309/53 247
The Basic RP Standards o f Iran [6] are under revision, and there will be updat
ing o f radiation protection regulations, based on standards and recommendations o f
international organizations such as the IAEA, the World Health Organization
(W HO), the International Comm ission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the Inter
national Comm ission on Radiation Units and Measurements(ICRU), etc. as w ell as
the implementation o f regulations o f the Radiation Protection Act o f Iran [4].
H ow ever, on the basis o f the Act and its rules and regulations, the weekly and annual
working hours o f the radiation workers in Iran should be decreased, which in turn
entails a reduction in the annual dose limit [2]. A s a w hole, the ICRP system o f dose
limitation is applied using the A LARA principle, in particular with the implementa
tion o f the new ICRP recommendations [7].
In general, RP rules, regulations and standards have been implemented and
enforced effectively in Iran [8]. In particular, there has been major concern regard
ing radiation work where the risk o f exposure for the radiation workers and the pub
lic is high, as in industrial radiography, nuclear m edicine, etc. The Atom ic Energy
Act [3], the Radiation Protection Act [4] and Radiation Protection Rules [5] o f Iran
permit strict enforcement o f RP practices. A ll radiation sources imported are directly
received by the NRPD and stored at AEOI before being distributed to the authorized
users. This has also prevented the import o f unauthorized sources. A lso, a national
waste collection and management programme was established originally at NRPD
and it is now operating independently at AEOI under the regulatory provisions o f
the NRPD.
3. LICENSING A N D INSPECTION
Radiation applications in Iran utilize a broad range o f radiation sources: small

ones in universities, in radiopharmaceuticals, in industrial radiography, radio
therapy, etc.; X ray machines used in medicine and industry; high energy electron
and X ray medical accelerators; diffractometers; in Tc generators and nuclear
m edicine, neutron and gamma gauges; in high activity gamma irradiators; in zero
power reactors, and in a 5 MW nuclear research reactor as w ell as nuclear power
reactors under construction; in the nuclear fuel cycle, etc. According to the Radiation
Protection Act, any type o f such radiation work should be licensed and the AEOI
is authorized to grant licences to individuals and institutions as w ell as to inspect their
facilities and sources prior to licensing and/or on subsequent occasions. The Radia
tion Protection Act also empowers the inspectors designated by the competent
authority to make inspections and to provide recommendations.
The requirements for granting a licence depend on the qualifications o f the
applicant and radiation workers; source applications, radiation levels; the impact o f
the facility on the workers, public and the environment; availability o f safety and
protective equipment, em ergency equipment and procedures, etc., as recommended
248 SOHRABI
by international organizations such as the IAEA, W HO, International Organization

for Standardization (ISO), ICRP, ICRU, etc., by taking into account the national
needs. The applicant for a licence must also introduce a responsible officer (RO)
specializing in radiation work and a health physicist or a radiation protection
officer (RPO) with qualifications approved by the NRPD. For example, for a radio
therapy centre, the applicant should introduce at least a radiotherapist and a RPO or
a medical physicist. On the other hand, in centres with limited radiological work,
the responsibility for the licence and the RO and the RPO posts can be given to one
or two qualified individuals. As an example, in a radiology clinic with only one radi
ology unit, a radiologist can be granted a licence whilst also having the responsibility
o f the RO and the RPO. In general, proper education and training o f the responsible
individuals for task specific radiation work and the RPO post are the main require
ments for licensing. The minimum training requirement for RP qualification, except
for the sources exempted, is usually a pass in the N R PD s intensive courses.
According to the Radiation Protection Act and depending on the application,
after meeting the requirements the applicant should receive a licence from the rele
vant governmental authorities for General Occupational Practice and a licence from
the NRPD for Radiation Practice. For example, an applicant wishing to establish
a radiological unit should receive a licence for medical practice from the Ministry
o f Health and a licence for radiation practice from the NRPD . In fact, since the
application o f radiation sources in medicine predominates, the application for radia
tion work should be reviewed and be investigated by a committee o f four members;
two from the Ministry o f Health and two from the N R PD . After the approval o f the
Committee, the licence for radiation practice w ill be granted by the NRPD. The
Committee is also responsible for review and approval o f the regulations on radiation
sources used in medicine.
4. THE N R PD S ORGANIZATION A N D FUNCTIONS
The NR PD , as part o f the AEOI, is authorized to regulate and to control radia

tion protection activities in Iran. It has developed an infrastructure to discharge its
tasks according to the regulatory provisions o f the Radiation Protection Act o f 1989.
The new organizational structure consists o f six scientific and regulatory Divisions,
including a Radiation Control D ivision, a Radiation Dosimetry D ivision, an Environ
mental Radiological Control D ivision, a M edical and Radiobiology D ivision, a
Non-Ionizing Radiation Control D ivision and a Support Division as w ell as an
Experts Committee, a Licensing Committee, a Regulations and Standards Group, a
Documentation and Records Group, and a Radiological Emergency Team. Each
D ivision discharges its tasks through different technical and scientific groups.
IAEA-SM-309/53 249
63 65
Year
FIG. 1. The number o f film badge users (solid bar) and institutions (hatched bar) using a
monthly service from NRPD between 1963 and 1990.
The Radiation Control D ivision is responsible for registration, inspection and

licensing over the entire range o f radiation source applications as w ell as for prepara
tion o f regulatory drafts, procedures and recommendations. It consists o f six Sec
tions; a Radiology and Radiotherapy Control Section, an Industrial Control Section,
a Nuclear M edicine Control Section, a Nuclear and Educational Institutes Control
Section, a Mining Radiation Control Section and an Import and Registration Control
Section. The medical radiation control sections also provide dose assessment o f foe
tus exposure in medical examinations o f pregnant women. Meanwhile, efforts have
been made through TV programmes, journal articles, recommendations, etc., to
reduce such exposures [9]. A lso, the genetically significant dose (GSD) due to radio
logical diagnosis has been determined as 0.29 mSv [10]. The D ivision as a whole
has developed good control and supervision o f the implementation o f RP rules,
regulations and standards in different radiation applications.
The Radiation Dosimetry D ivision has the responsibility for research, develop
ment and provision o f nationwide dosimetry services for radiation fields, radiation
workers, the environment and the public. The division discharges its tasks through
four Sections: a Neutron and Charged Particle Dosimetry Section, basically a solid
state nuclear track detector (SSNTD) laboratory [11, 12], a Film Badge Dosimetry
250 SOHRABI
Section, a Thermoluminescence Dosimetry Section and a Calibration Section. The

D ivision has w ell established nationwide radiation dosimetry services; i.e. personnel
monitoring services are provided monthly to about 8000 radiation workers from
1240 institutes using film badges and thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) [13], a
service in operation for nearly 30 years, as shown in Fig. 1. A nationwide radon
monitoring service has been established for indoors using the AEOI passive radon
diffusion dosimeters developed at the N R PD , in particular for the high natural
radiation areas o f Ramsar [14,15]. A lso, a neutron dosimetry service has been under
development, based on the electrochemical etching o f neutron induced recoils
[16,17] and the AEOI Neutriran albedo neutron personnel dosimeter [16,17]. Radia
tion field and instrument calibrations are routine for all radiotherapy installations.
A Secondary Standard Dosim etry Laboratory has been under development jointly
with the IAEA. The Division is also involved in fundamental and applied research
on different aspects o f radiation dosimetry [10 -2 3 ], with a potential to provide some
types o f services to other IAEA Member States on request [8].
The Environmental Radiological Control D ivision is responsible for the pro
tection o f the public and the environment against natural and man-made radioactivity
contamination. The D ivision, consisting o f five Sections, includes a Radioecology
Section, a Food Control Section, an Air Surveillance Section, a Radiation
Spectrometry and Measurements Section, and a Meteorological Section. The D ivi
sion provides research and services on different aspects o f environmental protection
to assess critical radionuclides, critical exposures, determination o f man-made and
natural radioactivity contaminants in food, water, air, etc. For example, food
contamination control has been a major issue within the past few years. Over
40 000 food samples have been analysed for food import and export control since
1986. Determination o f radium in water nationwide is a test in routine use.
The Medical and Radiobiology D ivision has three Sections; a Medical Care
Section, a Radiobiology Section, and an Internal Contamination Section. The M edi
cal Care Section is responsible for periodic examination o f the AEOI personnel,
monitoring medical tests o f radiation workers and treatment and health care o f
individuals overexposed; e.g . the treatment o f a radiographer with a relatively high
exposure was successfully carried out in this Section [24]. The Internal Contamina
tion Section provides research and services routinely to workers in nuclear centres,
nuclear medicine clinics, etc., using bioassay, whole body counting, organ counting
and calculations. The Radiobiology Section provides research and services on bio
logical dosimetry using chromosome aberration and sister chromatid exchange
methods for highly exposed workers [25] and inhabitants o f high natural radiation
areas o f Ramsar, Iran, where the International Conference on High Levels o f Natural
Radiation w ill be held from 3 to 7 November 1990 by AEOI in co-operation with
the IAEA, W HO and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). The Non-
Ionizing Radiation (NIR) D ivision has three Sections; a Regulatory Control and
Supervision Section, a Rules and Regulations Section, and a Measurement and
IAEA-SM-309/S3 251
Instrumentation Section. It was established to study NIR physics, NIR effects on

human beings and regulatory provisions. Although the D ivision is not as far
developed as are those dealing with ionizing radiation, it has received requests for
inspection and supervision from NIR users in industry and medicine.
The Support D ivision has three Sections, a Computer and Statistics Section,
a Budget and Finance Section, and a Technical Service Section. The D ivision as a
w hole provides support services for various activities o f the NRPD.
5. EDUCATION A N D TRAINING
The education and training o f radiation workers and the public are the major
counterparts o f efficient enforcement o f RP regulations and can be divided into five
major categories:
(a) Academic university courses: the academic courses offered by universities

through degree programmes can play a major role in the development o f quali
fied manpower to establish a firm infrastructure. The first formal RP course
was offered in the nuclear programme o f the University o f Tehran (UT) as a
three credit hour MSc course. This course has been offered since then with a
potential for specialization through a M Sc thesis [11]. A M Sc equivalent
programme was also offered twice by the Health Faculty o f the UT in co
operation with WHO during 1973 to 1975. In 1977, the AEOI trained 30 col
lege graduates in a one year M Sc equivalent RP course. They are now serving
as responsible RP officers at the AEOI and other organizations. At present,
nuclear physics, health physics and radiation detection courses are being
offered at BSc and/or M Sc levels in almost all technical universities in Iran.
A MSc and a PhD programme in nuclear science and technology with an option
in health physics were established at the Amirkabir University jointly with the
AEOI in 1986.
(b) Intensive courses: intensive national and international RP courses have been
offered on different occasions. A six w eek course on Radioisotope Applica
tions with emphasis on radiation protection has been offered many times since
1960. An international course on Handling o f Radiation Accidents was also
offered by the IAEA at the Tehran University Nuclear Centre (TUNC) in
1967. Since then many intensive courses have been offered. In particular, three
intensive courses were established in the NRPD o f the AEOI during the past
two years; one for medical, one for industrial and one for dental workers. The
first two courses consist o f 100 hours o f theory and practice over three weeks.
The third is a one w eek course with 40 hours o f theory and practice for dentists
and dental hygienists. The courses have one examination at the beginning,
one after each w eek o f instruction and a com prehensive examination two weeks
252 SOHRABI
1988 1989 1990

80
60
(V
D
40
1 I
Z
20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Course number
FIG. 2. The number o f students attending each NRPB intensive course (dotted bar), total
number o f examinees (hatched bar) and number passing the course and receiving certificates
(solid bar).
after the course. Over 664 radiation workers from medical, dental, industrial,
educational and research institutions have attended and 406 participants suc
cessfully passed the course. Figure 2 shows the number o f participants, the
number o f examinees and the number passing the course and receiving certifi
cates issued by the NRPD. The courses have been a very effective approach
for the enforcement o f rules and regulations, especially for industrial workers.
(c) Public education and training: public education and training have been carried
out by providing TV programmes, journal articles, brochures, posters, etc. A
formal set o f TV programmes, each o f half-hour duration and covering differ
ent task specific radiation applications, was prepared with the co-operation o f
the national TV network for the public and radiation workers, with emphasis
on protection o f the public and prevention o f foetus exposure due to medical
examinations. Such programmes have gained attention nationwide from
medical doctors and the public.
(d) Education and training by research: Over 20 M Sc and PhD thesis projects have
been submitted to the NRPD within the past few years; e.g . on TL dosimetry,
IAEA-SM-309/53 253
radon monitoring, neutron dosimetry, SSN TD s, alpha detection, chemical and

electrochemical etching, environmental monitoring, genetically significant
doses (GSD), chromosome aberration studies, in particular in high natural
radiation areas, etc. This has also been the most effective approach for the
development o f qualified manpower as w ell as for the promotion o f research
and development in the country.
(e) On the job training: this programme has also been o f concern for BSc, MSc
and PhD students as w ell as radiation workers. Participation o f students and
radiation workers from industrial and medical institutions in on the job training
programmes has been very effective in the provision o f trained manpower. In
fact, BSc, M Sc and PhD level projects can also be considered as an effective
approach for the development o f qualified manpower.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Long term radiation protection activities in Iran have resulted in an infrastruc

ture for the enforcement o f rules, regulations and standards based on the Radiation
Protection Act o f Iran; and research, development and services as w ell as education
and training. Experience shows that for the enforcement o f rules, regulations and
standards in a country, it is vital to have a governmental authority backed by a
national law, a qualified leader, qualified experts, inspection and licensing pro
grammes, proper equipment, personnel dosimetry services, maintenance techni
cians, budget and m otives to protect the public and radiation workers. In particular,
an educational programme to train radiation workers and the public should be o f
primary concern. In fact, proper education and training will have a greater effect
than would law s, regulations and standards without such education. However, rules
and regulations are necessary to prevent radiation abuse. In this respect, IAEA pro
grammes can play a major role, in particular in developing countries. The recom
mendations o f the international RP organizations such as the IAEA, WHO, ISO,
ICRP, ICRU and NCRP are vital for the development o f scientific and regulatory
programmes in an RP infrastructure. H owever, national requirements should also
be met.
In general, development o f an RP infrastructure for research, development and
the provision o f services with a capacity to enforce rules, regulations and standards,
and the development o f highly qualified manpower are often problem areas in devel
oping countries. Such problems are not usually expected and encountered in
developed countries. Therefore, the international organizations should give proper
credit for any such developments made in developing countries.
254 SOHRABI
R EFER E N C ES
[1] SOHRABI, M., PARNIANPOOR, H., Past, present and future radiation protection
trends in Iran , Trans. Iran Conf. Trans. Nucl. Tech. Persepolis, Iran (1977).
[2] SOHRABI, M., The state of radiation protection in Iran , Radiation Protection Prac
tice (Proc. 7th Int. Congr. IRPA, Sydney, April 1988), Vol. 2, Pergamon Press
(1988) 951.
[3] The Atomic Energy Act of Iran (1974).
[4] The Radiation Protection Act of Iran (1989).
[5] The Radiation Protection Rules of Iran (1990).
[6] The Basic Radiation Protection Standards of Iran, NRPD, AEOI (1977).
[7] BENINSON, D., ICRP, personal communication.
[8] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection Advisory
Team Report to Iran, IAEA, Vienna (1989).
[9] SOHRABI, M ., Procedures to prevent fetus exposure in radiology and nuclear medi
cine, Nucl. Energy, AEOI Internal Bull. 5 (1987) 23.
[10] SOHRABI, M., SHOUSHTARIAN, J., BORHAN AZAD, S., Determination of
Genetically Significant Dose due to Radiological Examinations in Iran, Rep. No.
AEOI-NRPD-3-89, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (1989).
[11] SOHRABI, M., Electrodeposition of uranium and its application in fast neutron dosim
etry by fission fragment registration in silver activated phosphate glasses and the design
of the accidental dosimetry stations of TUNC Research Reactor, MSc Thesis, Tehran
University (1969).
[12] SOHRABI, M., BECKER, K., Fast neutron personnel monitoring by fission fragment
registration from neptunium-237, Nucl. Instrum. Methods 104 (1972) 409.
[13] BORHAN AZAD, S., Film badge dosimetry using Agfa films, AEOI Sei. Bull. 6
(1987) 48.
[14] SOHRABI, M., SOLAYMANIAN, A. R., Some characteristics of the AEOI passive
radon diffusion dosimeter, Nucl. Tracks Radiat. Meas. IS 1-4 (1988) 605.
[15] SOHRABI, M., SOLAYMANIAN, A. R., Indoor radon level measurements in some
regions of Iran, ibid., p. 613.
[16] SOHRABI, M., Electrochemical etching amplification of recoil tracks in polymers and
its application in neutron personnel dosimetry, Health Phys. 27 (1974) 598.
[17] SOHRABI, M ., MORGAN, K. Z., A new polycarbonate fast neutron personnel
dosimeter, Am. Ind. Hyg. Assoc. J. 39 (1978) 438.
[18] SOHRABI, M ., A new dual response albedo neutron personnel dosimeter, Nucl.
Instrum. Methods 165 (1979) 135.
[19] SOHRABI, M ., KATOUZI, M., Some characteristics of the AEOI Neutriran Albedo
Neutron Personnel Dosimeter, Radiat. Prot. Dosim. (in press).
[20] SOHRABI, M ., Discovery of an internal heating effect during electrochemical etch
ing of polymeric dosimeters, Nucl. Instrum. Methods Phys. Res. A 238 (1985) 517.
[21] SOHRABI, M., On the discovery of some phenomena in the electrochemical etching
of polymeric dosimeters, Nucl. Instrum. Methods Phys. Res. A 255 (1987) 225.
[22] SOHRABI, M., SADEGHIBOJD, S., A new development of dyed ECE tracks for neu
tron dosimetry, Radiat. Prot. Dosim. (in press).
IAEA-SM-309/53 255
[23] SOHRABI, M ., SADEGHI BOJD, S., UV and IR spectrophotometry of electrochemi-

cally etched tracks for neutron dosimetry, Radiat. Prot. Dosim. (in press).
[24] SABERI, N., SHEIBANI, ., POURABDI, M., BARATCHI, Z., A report on an
acute exposure of a person accidentally exposed to an Ir-192 source, AEOI Sei. Bull.
9 (1989) 43.
[25] ASSAEI, R., HEIDARY, A., Chromosomal aberration analysis of occupationally
over-exposed persons to X and gamma rays during 1984-1985 in Iran, AEOI Sei. Bull.
7 (1988) 23.
IAEA-SM-309/51
POLICY, INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRAINING

IN RADIATION PROTECTION FOR THE
HEALTH SERVICES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
S. CHRISTOFIDES
M edical Physics Department,
Nicosia General Hospital
A. M ALLOUPPAS
WHO Collaborating Centre
on Training and Research,
Higher Technical Institute
N icosia, Cyprus
A bstract
POLICY, INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRAINING IN RADIATION PROTECTION FOR

THE HEALTH SERVICES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
The strengthening of collaboration between the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the World Health Organization and other international agencies will be beneficial and cost
effective in assisting developing countries to strengthen their management of radiation protec
tion services. This can be achieved by utilizing the expert personnel and facilities of the World
Health Organizations Regional Training Centres and the network of Secondary Standard
Dosimetry Laboratories and by exploiting the benefits of health care technology and thus con
tributing to the improvement of health care and safety.
1. INTRODUCTION
The present unavailability o f effective and efficient radiation protection ser

vices for personnel in the health sector and patients in developing countries arises
from the inability o f these countries to provide efficient, effective, safe and afforda
ble health care at all levels. This is due to the lack o f technical expertise, the lack
o f a national technical service infrastructure and inadequate manpower development
and training.
A s a consequence o f the above situation there is an appreciable wastage o f
limited national resources resulting mainly from:
(a) Purchasing o f sophisticated equipment which remains under-utilized or never

used, because^ o f lack o f appropriate training o f operating and maintenance
staff and o f medical expertise to support its use;
257
258 CHRISTOFIDES and MALLOUPPAS
(b) Shortening o f the useful life o f equipment as a result o f the inexperience o f

operators and service staff;
(c) Increasing costs due to purchase o f additional-accessories, spare parts, testing
equipment and modifications o f buildings, initially unforeseen because o f lack
o f expertise in choosing the appropriate systems;
(d) Lack o f standardization, resulting in increased costs o f spare parts and extra
workload on the limited maintenance staff;
(e) E xcessive downtime o f equipment due to lack o f spare parts and o f planned
preventive maintenance.
The largest proportion o f capital investment for health care equipment, both
in the diagnostic and therapy areas, is in the purchase and maintenance o f radiation-
producing machines. A s a result o f the above inadequacies there.is an excessive
workload on functioning equipment, which frequently results in the operators over
looking the main principles o f radiation protection [1], with a direct consequence o f
unnecessary radiation exposure mainly o f the patient, but also o f the operator. Lack
o f user training also results in unnecessary radiation exposure o f patients and staff
and poor safety precautions.
2. DISCUSSION
The World Health Organization (WHO), in order to assist developing countries

in formulating effective policy and in more efficiently and better maintaining health
care equipment [2], runs training courses, through its Regional Training Centres
(RTCs) [3].
In the early nineteen-seventies it was realized by certain regions o f W HO, and
particularly that o f the Eastern Mediterranean (EMRO), that the provi sion o f training
for technical personnel was a better long term investment than merely donating
equipment to developing countries. It was for this reason that the first RTC was set
up in Cyprus in 1978 and it has since run courses on Maintenance and Repair at vari
ous levels and different specializations, in which almost 400 students have graduated
from developing countries o f EMRO and the Commonwealth. In later years other
RTCs were set up, although providing technician training at low er level, at
Freetown, Sierra Leone and Lyon, France. However countries have also been
encouraged by WHO and other agencies to set up National Training Centres (NTCs).
These now exist in Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Kenya, Zimbabwe, the Philippines, Brazil
and elsewhere.
In the early nineteen-eighties it was realized that training alone is not enough
to solve this multidisciplinary and complex issue. A committed national policy on
health care equipment management, the existence o f an effective Health Care
IAEA-SM-309/51 259
Technical Service (HCTS), in conjunction with manpower development, training

and information support, are essential if the proper management o f equipment is to
be provided. It is these objectives that W H O s Global Action Plan [2] aims to address
through a coherent programme.
Nuclear m edicine and radiotherapy equipment form a specialized category o f
equipment that a national HCTS needs to cater for. Thus the general objectives and
actions already envisaged for other types o f equipment, such as diagnostic X ray,
clinical laboratory, operating theatre and dental, need also to be applied to nuclear
m edicine and radiotherapy equipment. Thus it is imperative that in the field o f train
ing, as w ell as that o f policy, HCTS infrastructure and information support, the
IAEA should collaborate with WHO and other agencies, such as the Commonwealth
Secretariat (CFTC), in order to promote appropriate actions.
The experience o f existing RTCs, som e o f which are WHO Collaborating
Centres in this field, should be used to promote the development o f short and longer
term training courses, as w ell as to develop information support and training
materials for use at country level.
The IAEA, in order to assist developing countries in formulating effective
policy, creating a suitable infrastructure and improving their radiation protection
services, runs regional and interregional training courses, organizes international
symposia and publishes their proceedings [4]. It also publishes a large number o f
recommendations, standards and reports [5], often in collaboration with other
international agencies (WHO, the International Commission on Radiological
Protection, the Nuclear Energy A gency o f the OECD, etc.).
The IAEA assists financially the participants from developing countries to
enable them to participate in these training courses and symposia. Without this
assistance these participants could not attend.
The training courses are usually directed to the people who do the day-to-day
radiation protection work, to whom these courses are extremely beneficial, in terms
o f learning new techniques or refreshing their knowledge o f existing techniques. The
problem that these newly trained people often face on their return home is how to
persuade their authorities to help them implement the new techniques and knowledge
that they have gained from the courses they attended. M ost o f the time nothing is
done and there is no improvement in the radiation protection services o f the country
in question.
The IAEA through its Radiation Protection Advisory Teams (RAPAT) advises
developing countries, when invited to do so, on how to improve their radiation
protection services, studying the existing radiation protection infrastructure, services
and personnel status. The advisory team produces a detailed report o f its findings
and makes recommendations for the improvement and future development o f the
radiation protection services. If the recommendations o f the advisory team are
implemented in reasonable time then the radiation protection services o f the country
in question should achieve the same standard as that in developed countries.
There are several problems in relation to RAPAT missions:
(a) It is not always easy to persuade the policy makers in the administrative struc
ture o f a developing country to request a RAPAT m ission from the IAEA.
(b) Once a request is made to the IAEA there may be a time gap o f up to one to
two years before the results o f the missions are presented for consideration.
By this time the policy makers who requested the m ission may w ell have been
replaced by other persons who may not share the same view s.
(c) Radiation protection is not regarded by policy makers o f a developing country
as a topic o f immediate priority and often, by the time it is decided to allocate
funds for the implementation o f the RAPAT m issions recommendations, a few
years have passed and a new RAPAT m ission may be required.
The IAEA, together with W HO, has established a network o f Secondary Stan
dard Dosimetry Laboratories (SSDLs) with the twin aims o f facilitating proper radia
tion calibration and verification o f the instruments used for the measurement o f
radiation in developing countries. They also assist in the linking o f national radiation
measurement facilities with the international dosimetry system, in order to ensure
proper calibration o f radiation measurements against primary radiation standards [6].
One o f the criteria for the establishment o f an SSDL is that the laboratory staff
should possess adequate qualifications and experience in measurement procedures
and practices appropriate to their responsibilities.
There are over fifty laboratories participating in the SSDL network and a num
ber o f other laboratories which are partly operational or planned. A number o f these
laboratories are in developing countries and their personnel may be the only experts
in radiation measurement and radiation protection in that country or even in a wider
region.
3. HEALTH CARE TECHNICAL SERVICES (HCTS) INFRASTRUCTURE
It is imperative that an effective and efficient HCTS exists at country level in

order to promote the proper management o f all categories o f equipment. Nuclear
medicine and radiotherapy equipment is o f particular importance since it is usually
more expensive than other types o f equipment and requires comprehensive and
meticulous safety procedures in order to protect staff, patients and the public.
For this reason national governments should be made aware o f the various
policy issues involved and be encouraged and supported to provide the necessary
HCTS funds, career structure, security and incentives which are essential if the
service is to provide the required results.
Within the objectives o f a national HCTS som e form o f training for both user
and service staff must be encouraged and promoted, particularly through the setting
up o f NTCs. Radiation protection and basic quality assurance procedures should
IAEA-SM-309/51 261
form part o f the national training schedule o f such centres. In realizing this objective,
existing RTCs and SSD Ls may be utilized to assist NTCs to com m ence or strengthen
such activity.
4. RECOM M ENDATIONS
It would be beneficial if the IAEA were to strengthen its collaboration with

W HO in facilitating the more efficient use o f RTCs and SSDLs in assisting develop
ing countries to:
(a) Promote awareness, policy formulation, planning development and

implementation;
(b) Strengthen health care technical services effectiveness and efficiency;
(c) Enhance expertise on the effects o f radiation and improve radiation protection
services, through appropriate training o f user and service staff;
(d) Improve working safety and career conditions o f all staff at all levels o f the
health sector;
(e) Realize effective information support by collecting, collating, assessing, dis
seminating and updating relevant information.
Although the IAEA, W HO and other world organizations have already put a
lot o f effort and resources into trying to satisfy the above recommendations through
the activities mentioned above, it might be more efficient and cost effective if these
organizations were to strengthen their collaboration by utilizing the local expertise
and facilities o f the RTCs and SSDLs.
The experienced personnel o f the local centres could provide specific training
courses to cover the local needs o f radiographers and other users o f radiation-
producing m achines, as w ell as training the local engineers in maintenance and repair
o f these machines. These courses should cover the principles o f operation o f highly
sophisticated equipment and the specific radiation protection required for the users
and patients, the daily user maintenance and quality assurance required to keep the
equipment operating within the recommended international standards.
Courses could also be arranged with the help o f experts from international
organizations for personnel higher up the structure o f health care technical services
o f developing countries. These courses could be used to help personnel to provide
better equipment management and to strengthen the infrastructure and effectiveness
o f radiation protection services, which should satisfy the needs o f health services in
providing better health care for all.
The local centres (RTCs and SSDLs) could also be used as focal points o f a
world data bank which can be used to collect, collate, assess, disseminate and update
information required by personnel at all levels o f the health sector in developing
countries.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The above recommendations aim to strengthen the management o f radiation

protection services in developing countries by exploiting the benefits o f health care
technology in order to contribute to the improvement o f health care and safety.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors acknowledge the valuable encouragement o f the Cyprus A ssocia

tion o f Medical Physics and Biomedical Engineering.
REFERENCES
[1] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Basic Safety Standards for Radia
tion Protection, 1982 Edition, Safety Series No. 9, IAEA, Vienna (1982).
[2] WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Global Action Plan on Management,
Maintenance and Repair of Health Care Equipment, Rep. WHO/SHS/NHP/87.8,
WHO, Geneva (1987).
[3] WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO Interregional Meeting on the Main
tenance and Repair of Health Care Equipment, 24-28 Nov. 1986, Nicosia, Cyprus,
Rep. WHO/NHP/87.5, WHO, Geneva (1987).
[4] Optimization of Radiation Protection (Proc. Symp. Vienna, March 1986), IAEA,
Vienna (1986).
[5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Training Courses on Radiation
Protection, Technical Reports Series No. 280, IAEA, Vienna (1988).
[6] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Secondary Standard Dosimetry
Laboratories: Development and Trends, IAEA, Vienna (1985).
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
(Session V)
C hairm an
P . FER R U Z
Chile
IAEA-SM-309/17
RADIATION PROTECTION IN ITALY

Education and training
G. M ALTONI GIACOMELLI
Department o f Physics,
University o f Bologna,
Bologna, Italy
A bstract
RADIATION PROTECTION IN ITALY: EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

An overview of Italian education and professional training in radiation protection is
given for three different levels of education: (a) postgraduate schools (Scuole di specializzazi-
one); (b) undergraduate schools and courses (Scuole a fini speciali e insegnamenti per corsi
di laurea); () high schools. Training outside the official education system is also outlined.
1. INTRODUCTION
In Italy the first official body o f rules on radiation protection was issued in the
nineteen-sixties (Presidential Decree (DPR) 185, 1964-02-13) after tradition and
practice in the physics and chemistry o f ionizing radiation were scientifically w ell
established. The rules required professionally qualified experts to ensure correct
radiation protection procedures wherever radioactive sources or ionizing radiations
were used. This necessitated specific training in this field.
Short education courses in radiation protection for ionizing radiation operators
were, at that time, organized jointly by nuclear scientific organizations and educa
tional institutions. Both graduate and undergraduate participants were accepted.
In 1966-1967 the first university specialist course was started in Bologna at
the Institute o f Physics with the support o f CN EN (the Italian Nuclear Energy Com
mittee). The one year course was open to graduates in various scientific disciplines.
The curriculum stressed the technical handling aspects o f radiation sources, for the
safe use o f radiation both by operators and the public. A s a matter o f fact, for many
years the Bologna school was the only official training for full experts in radiation
protection surveillance. The radiation protection law (DPR 185, 1964-02-13)
provided for three levels o f expertise, according to the degree o f responsibility
involved. The third level is required when nuclear plants, high energy accelerators
or neutron sources are operated or used. The third level validation requires two years
experience in a nuclear plant (or the equivalent) or a university diploma from a
specific graduate specialist school.
265
266 MALTONI GIACOMELLI
At the same time private or semi-private institutions interested in radiation

research or nuclear energy periodically offered short courses (one w eek or longer
period) or workshops specifically concerned with radiation protection.
After the international campaign for radioactive fallout monitoring died out,
the Italian nuclear energy project brought about a renewed interest in industrial radia
tion applications and consequently the need for radiation protection. Thus arose the
urgency for introducing more regular courses in radiation application in the univer
sity curricula for degrees in physics, chemistry, engineering and medicine. A post
graduate specialist course in nuclear engineering was also begun in several
engineering faculties. Later on, this same course was abandoned, follow ing the
introduction o f a specific curriculum leading to a degree in nuclear engineering
(corso di laurea in Ingegneria Nucleare).
Wider education and training in radiation protection were also needed. Other
universities (besides Bologna) interested in radiation physics and management
offered the opportunity o f special postgraduate advanced courses in health physics.
2. SPECIALIST POSTGRADUATE SCHOOLS
Along with the reorganization o f the Italian university system (DPR 382,
1980-07-11) all postgraduate university training has been modelled according to
more uniform standards acceptable on a European basis (DPR 162, 1982-03-10).
The existing activities in this area were gradually unified in their programmes and
denominations.
At present, in Italy, there are five specialist schools (Table I) in Health Physics
(Scuole di Specializzazione in Fisica Sanitaria) organized to give the necessary inter
disciplinary preparation for professionals in human health and environmental protec
tion from noxious agents. Radiation protection forms a major part o f the courses,
but these cover much more than radioprotection techniques and policy. The health
physics qualification in Italy is mainly used in the public health service, because the
already poor opportunities in the nuclear energy field were com pletely cancelled
after Italys recent change in nuclear policy. So specialists are mainly absorbed into
the hospital health physics services (Servizio di Fisica Sanitaria ospedaliera) which
were established in a specific decree in 1969 (DPR 128, 1964-03-27) as special units
in the diagnostics and therapy area.
The formal assignments o f the new units, besides radiation protection responsi
bilities, include duties relating to specific technologies and methodologies applied to
clinical problems. Therefore, the hospital health physicist needs up-to-date interdis
ciplinary training in several medical topics. M oreover, some o f the university
schools (such as the one in Bologna) are also expanding their programmes towards
non-ionizing radiation protection, industrial hygiene and environmental protection
physics principles. For these reasons the curricula o f the specialist schools in health
IAEA-SM-309/17 267
TABLE I. POSTGRADUATE
HEALTH PHYSICS SPECIALIST
SCHOOLS IN ITALY
(Scuole di specializzazione in Fisica
Sanitaria)
University Curricula Length (years)
Bologna 1 2
Milan 1 2
Pisa 1 2
Rome I 1 2
Rome II 2 3
TABLE II. F U N D A M E N TA L COURSES IN THE

SPECIALIST SCHOOLS OF HEALTH PHYSICS
Advanced topics in physics (1 year)

Elements of biology, human anatomy and physiology (1 year)
Radiation physics and dosimetry (2 years)
Biomedical instrumentation and technologies (2 years)
Informatics and statistics in health applications (1 year)
Personal and environmental protection (1 year)
Radiation normative rules (1 year)
Optional subjects (2 years)
physics include various topics concerning applied physics in m edicine and biology
(Table II).
Each course covers at least two academic years, provides also for laboratory
training (not less than 50% o f the time) and an experimental thesis for which 3 -4
month periods at specialized units are organized.
Officially, admission is limited to 10-15 graduate students per year selected
by regular tests among physicists, chemists or engineers, but o f late only physicists
have applied, because, by law, the health physicists in the hospital units must be
physicists.
268 MALTOM GIACOMELLI
The teaching o f radiation protection is usually covered in all specialist courses

on:
medical radiology and radiotherapy

nuclear medicine
cardiology
veterinarian radiology.
3. U N DERG RADUATE RADIATION PROTECTION TEACHING
A s far as education and training in the undergraduate area are concerned, a

standard Italian situation can hardly be outlined. The only initiative which provides
a specific qualification (diploma) in the health physics area is a course started in 1989
at the University o f Parma. This two-year course, which stresses the technical
aspects o f radiation in the medical field, is intended to provide qualified technicians
for hospital health physics units.
Optional courses covering radiation protection fundamentals are often given in
the main Italian universities with programmes suited to the purposes o f each faculty
or field.
Table ID gives a com plete list o f the courses o f health physics available in
Italian universities in 1987.
TABLE . UNDERG RADUATE

HEALTH PHYSICS COURSES
(Fisica Sanitaria)
University Faculty
Bologna Science
Catania Medicine
Ferrara Science
Modena Science
Pavia Medicine
Pisa Engineering
Rome I Science
Rome II Medicine
IAEA-SM-309/17 269
TABLE IV. U N DERG RA D U A TE COURSES OF RADIATION PROTECTION
University Faculty Title
Bari Medicine Radioprotection

Catania Medicine Radioprotection
Cattolica (Milan) Medicine Radioprotection
Genoa Medicine Radioprotection

Milan Medicine Radioprotection
Parma Science Radioecology
Other courses covering the basic principles o f personal and environment radia
tion protection are the radioprotection courses for the m edical faculties listed in
Table IV and the radioecology course given at Parma for the natural sciences faculty.
Elements o f radiation protection may be covered, but not necessarily, in other
courses such as:
radiobiology: in 15 universities (13 medical faculties, 2 sciences faculties)

radiogenetics: Rome I (sciences faculty)
medical radiology: in each medical faculty
veterinarian radiology: in each veterinarian faculty
radiochemistry: in seven universities (science, pharmacy and industrial
chemistry)
safety and radiation protection (or similar): in almost every nuclear engineer
ing curriculum
tracer chemistry (or similar): in curricula such as fundamental, industrial or
pharmaceutical chemistry.
4. HIGH SCHOOL TEACHING
At the high school level som e technical institutes (Istituti Tecnici) have special
options in health physics leading to the diploma o f perito di fsica sanitaria (health
physics technical expert). M ost o f these technicians are usually employed in the
Italian public health service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale) either in the hospital
health physics services or in the environmental physics units o f the local safety and
prevention centres.
270 MALTONI GIACOMELLI
5. TRAINING OUTSIDE THE OFFICIAL EDUCATION SYSTEM
Numerous opportunities aimed to improve radiation use and protection stan

dards are offered every year by various scientific or industrial institutions at different
levels and times, restricted to em ployees, or for the general public.
One w eek or longer courses or workshops are organized, fairly regularly, by
nuclear or health organizations such as
CCR (Centro Comune Ricerche), Ispra, Varese

CESNEF (Centro Studi Enrico Fermi), Milan
ENEA (Comitato Nazionale per la Ricerca e per lo Sviluppo dellEnergia
Nucleare e delle Energie Alternative), Rome and Bologna
ISS (Istituto Superiore di Sanit), Rome.
Scientific associations often take part in specific training in radiation topics.

Som e o f the courses organized are meant as refresher courses for updating or
improving scientific or technical knowledge. The leading associations in this field
are:
AIRP (Associazione Italiana di Radioprotezione) and

AIRM N (Associazione Italiana Radiologa e Medicina Nucleare).
6. CONCLUSIONS
In the authors opinion, education and training in radiation protection in Italy

is not bad at the professional level, but there still is a dangerous gap at the cultural
level. This was obvious after the Chernobyl accident.
The m ost successful way to improve cultural information is to start with better
general health education in all levels o f schools.
This demands a wider professional qualification o f the teachers and a more
convincing promotion o f the subjects related to health and environment. Little has
been done in this regard, with the exception o f a few local initiatives. Periodic
courses on these topics should be organized for teachers and should be considered
an essential part o f their professional training.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
DPR 185, 1964-02-13 (Deer. Pres. Repubbl., Suppl. Ord. Gazz. Uff. n.95, 16 Aprile
1964).
1969).
IAEA-SM-309/17 271
DPR 382, 1980-07-11 (Deer. Pres. Repubbl., Suppl. Ord. Gazz. Uff. n.209, 31 Luglio
1980).
1982).
MALTONI GIACOMELLI, G., Uomo, energia, ambiente, oggi per domani: Infor
mare per educare , Conf. Nat. sullenergia Min. Ind. Com. Agr., Rome, Feb. 1987.
MALTONI GIACOMELLI, G., Professioni scientifiche e laurea in fsica ,
74th Congr. Ital. Soc. Phys., Biomedica VI 3 (1989)
MALTONI GIACOMELLI, G ., Quale futuro per la radioprotezione? , 26th Congr.
Ital. Ass. Rad. Prot., Verona, Sep. 1989.
IAEA-SM-309/34
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Abstract-
SYSTEM OF UNIFIED PROGRAMMES FOR POST-DIPLOMA TRAINING OF

DOCTORS AND OTHER HEALTH SPECIALISTS IN RADIATION SAFETY AND
HYGIENE.
A description is given of the system of unified programmes for post-diploma training
of doctors and other health specialists in radiation safety and hygiene. The extent and organiza
tion of the training are examined with particular attention to specialization and topic related
advanced training. Emphasis is given to the number of courses and course units dealing with
radiation health and safety problems in the nuclear power industry and their content.

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IAEA-SM-309/34 277
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IAEA-SM-309/22
FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR HEALTH PHYSICS

EDUCATION IN THE USA
R .C . WILLIAMSON
United States Department o f Energy
Graduate Fellowship Program,
Oak Ridge Associated Universities,
Oak Ridge, Tennessee,
United States o f America
Abstract
FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR HEALTH PHYSICS EDUCATION IN THE USA.
In the USA there is a critical shortage of highly trained and educated health physicists.
The university programmes in health physics have had difficulties in keeping up with this high
employment demand. In order to solve this problem the US Department of Energy has
instituted two graduate fellowship programmes to encourage talented students to enter educa
tion and eventually accept a career in health physics.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on the issues regarding government support for graduate
education in radiation protection/health physics in the U SA . Given the seemingly
endless conditions o f high demand for health physicists, especially by government
agencies, and low student enrolments, it appears that new and innovative approaches
to support health physics education should be adopted. Owing to the recent establish
ment o f two new programmes it appears that a revival o f US government support
is in the making. Whether or not this support w ill be successful in creating a better
balance between supply and demand is a matter o f concern.
2. THE SUPPLY
Over the past several years it has been recognized that in the USA the demand
for qualified health physicists greatly exceeds the supply. In addition, the graduate
education programmes (masters and doctoral) have suffered from declining enrol
ments [1]. Many o f these advanced degree programmes were established through the
financial support received from the US Department o f Energy and its predecessor
agencies. This support was given because a majority o f the graduating health physi
cists were hired by the government or their contractors to oversee radiation protec
tion and safety programmes.
281
282 WILLIAMSON
Since 1974 the Department o f Energy (DOE) has recorded the number o f
degrees granted by universities with health physics programmes in the USA. An
analysis o f the 12 DOE approved universities (for DOE fellowship participation)
indicates that there has been no appreciable growth in the number o f degrees granted
at the masters level. Starting with 80 graduates in 1974, the low est output was 60
in 1987 and the highest was 89 in 1988. At the doctoral level the trend is t i tlin g
and it has reached a critical point. In 1974 33 health physics PhDs were granted by
the 12 universities. By 1982 the number had decreased to 15; by 1988 only nine
PhDs were awarded in health physics. A s a result universities are having serious
difficulties in hiring qualified candidates to fill faculty vacancies in health physics.
For exam ple, one university has been searching for over two years to hire a replace
ment for a faculty member who wishes to retire.
3. THE D EM AN D
An individual in the USA who has a degree in health physics and is involuntar
ily unemployed is extremely rare. Several studies have predicted a high employment
demand for health physicists that w ill extend to the 21st century [2]. Between 1981
and 1987, the employment o f health physicists increased 35% w hile the supply o f
BS, MS and PhD graduates who have US citizenship decreased 30% [3].
Another indicator in the disparity between supply and demand for health physi
cists has been the growth in starting salaries. Salary data for health physicists has
been kept since the early 1970s. At that time entry level salaries for health physicists
were equal to those for other physical and life scientists. Today, these entry level
salaries are comparable and in som e cases exceed those o f nuclear engineers, who
previously had the highest level for any engineering group [3].
4. THE GOVERNM ENTS RESPONSE
From 1951 to 1973 the US Atom ic Energy Commission (AEC) spent over six
m illion dollars in supporting approximately 900 graduate students in health physics.
During this same period o f time the number o f health physics graduate programmes
recognized by the AEC grew from three to eighteen. From 1974 to 1982 support for
health physics education came from various sources but there was little direct effort
from the DOE. In 1982 a modest programme that supports ten students a year at an
annual funding level o f approximately $220 000 was established by the DOE. In
1982 the DOE recognized 12 universities as having qualified graduate programmes
in health physics. In 1989 health physics graduate education received a boost through
the establishment o f a masters degree fellowship programme. This programme sup
ports 20 students a year at a funding level o f approximately $440 000 a year and
13 health physics MS programmes are recognized by the DOE.
IAEA-SM-309/22 283
Is it reasonable to expect that a higher level o f financial educational support

w ill encourage more students to pursue health physics as a career option? Graduate
fellowships are known to have significant impact on encouraging talented individuals
to pursue areas o f scientific and technical interests o f the U SA . Fellowship support
has been shown to lead to an increase in the number o f students pursuing graduate
degrees [4], to increase the likelihood that students w ill com plete their graduate
degrees [5], to increase the degree level to which recipients aspire, and to reduce
the length o f time required to complete the degree [6]. It has also been shown that
fellowship support affects the choice o f graduate school [7] and the choice o f
specialty field [7]. The fellowship programmes operated by the AEC provided an
excellent example o f the potential effectiveness o f fellowship programmes. Eighty-
four per cent o f the roughly 3300 who participated in the programmes went on to
pursue careers in the field in which they were trained. More than half reported that
they would not have attended graduate school without the support. Furthermore, they
indicated that if they had undertaken a graduate programme, it would have been in
a different field from that o f their fellowship. Decades after having been supported
under the programme, AEC fellow s are known to be w ell represented in the DOE,
its laboratories or with DOE contractors [8]. A ll o f this was accomplished without
requiring a service obligation from the fellowship recipients.
REFERENCES
[1] OAK RIDGE ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, Health Physics Radiation Protection

Enrollments and Degrees, 1988, DOE/ER, Oak Ridge, TN, Oak Ridge Associated
Universities (1988).
[2] BAKER, J.G ., Health Physics Manpower in the Atomic Energy Field, 1968-2000,
unpublished report, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, 1977, p. 5.
[3] OAK RIDGE ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, Health Physics Employment and Edu
cation Trends, US Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, TN (June 1989).
[4] SCOTT, C., The market for Ph.D. economists: the academic sector, Am. Economic
Rev. 69 (1979).
[5] ETHINGTON, C ., SMART, J ., Persistence to graduate education, Research in Higher
Education 24 (1986).
[6] FREEMAN, R., The Market for College Trained Manpower, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA (1971).
[7] OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, Educating Scientists and Engineers:
Grade School to Grad School, Rep. OTA-SET-377, Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC (1988).
[8] OAK RIDGE ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, Scientists and Engineers for the
Nuclear Age: Final Report on the AEC Fellowship Programs, Oak Ridge, TN (1972).
IAEA-SM-309/37
TRAINING AND SUPPORT FOR THE

RADIATION PROTECTION ADVISER IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
P.J. ROBERTS, R .M . HARRISON

Institute o f Physical Sciences in M edicine,
York, United Kingdom
Abstract
TRAINING AND SUPPORT FOR THE RADIATION PROTECTION ADVISER IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE.
Radiation protection advisers (RPAs) in health care could be isolated without the benefit
of a national institute to advise on their training and accreditation. Support is given in the
United Kingdom by the Institute of Physical Sciences in Medicine, the professional association
for graduate scientists practising in health care. This support comprises accreditation schemes,
meetings, publications, communication channels and comparisons of methods and measure
ments. It does not provide direct financial support for training as this is the proper province
of the employers; it does however ensure that costs for services to its members are kept to
a minimum so that exchange of information is facilitated. The paper seeks to highlight the
benefits of nationally organized support for RPAs, through the offices of a scientific institute.
1. BACKGROUND: THE UNITED KINGDOM N ATIONAL HEALTH

SERVICE
In the United Kingdom, the national health service is divided into regions, each
o f which contains many Health Districts comprising populations o f about 125 000
each. Every Health District uses ionizing radiation for diagnosis and/or treatment o f
patients and many also use non-ionizing radiation. Health Districts are employers o f
staff and as such need to appoint Radiation Protection Advisers (RPAs) to advise on
radiation protection matters in as far as they affect staff, visitors and patients in
hospitals. An RPA may be appointed to more than one Health District and som e form
themselves into corporate bodies to provide a service to a group o f Districts or a
Region. In the United Kingdom health service, RPAs must be graduates in physical
science with a considerable amount o f experience in their chosen specialty. The
Institute o f Physical Sciences in M edicine (IPSM) provides advice and support for
its RPA members and has also provided advice on minimum staffing levels for the
proper execution o f radiation protection activities in various specialties.
285
286 ROBERTS and HARRISON
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR RPA CERTIFICATE

Academic 1st or 2nd class honours degree in a
physical science (or equivalent)
Experience 6 years professional in health care

2 years (whole time equivalent) supervised
in radiation protection
Professional Currently practising in radiation protection
Application Demonstrates adequacy of training,

professional and managerial expertise
Referees Support from two accredited referees
FIG. 1. Criteria for accreditation.
2. RADIATION PROTECTION ADVISERS IN HEALTH CARE
The IPSM has amongst its membership 200 appointed RPAs working in health
care. About 10% are em ployed overseas. RPAs accredited by IPSM are designated
as competent within various ionizing radiation disciplines such as radiotherapy,
nuclear m edicine, diagnostic radiology or alternatively for the non ionizing disci
plines such as ultraviolet, lasers, microwaves, etc. The vast majority, however, are
accredited in the traditional fields o f ionizing radiation.
3. ACCREDITATION OF RPAs
The accreditation procedure for RPAs takes the form o f peer review within the
IPSM in conjunction with the Society for Radiological Protection (SRP) whose own
RPAs cover mainly the nuclear industry. The two schemes are recognized by the
health and safety authorities and are being brought closely into line with each other
by the Councils o f the two societies. The criteria for accreditation in each case are
shown in Fig. 1. Every applicant completes an application form detailing his or her
training and experience. Each application must be supported by two referees who
must themselves be practising RPAs. A panel then sits in judgement over the
application to determine the candidates suitability for accreditation as an RPA.
IAEA-SM-309/37 287
4. TRAINING AVAILABILITY
To support health care RPAs in obtaining their accreditation and in maintaining

their level o f training and expertise, the IPSM recognizes certain training courses
organized by various establishments as being appropriate either for initial training
or for continued training. The courses may be general in content or specific to a
particular discipline.
In addition to these training courses, the IPSM, through its Radiation
Protection Topic Group, arranges annual update meetings where the RPAs can meet,
learn about the latest legislation and its implementation and discuss the consequences
for health care. These meetings are usually very w ell attended with an average o f
50% o f appointed RPAs at each annual m eeting, for the last four years at least.
Representatives o f the legislative bodies in the United Kingdom are usually in
attendance if not actually presenting papers. The fields covered include diagnostic
radiology, radiotherapy and nuclear medicine. Extension into non-ionizing radiation
fields has been a recent venture as has been discussion o f radiation em ergencies and
environmental monitoring, as knowledge o f these topics is expected these days o f
RPAs. A programme for the update meeting planned for 1990 is shown in Fig. 2.
PAPERS WILL BE GIVEN

ON THE FOLLOWING: BY:
Legal Status of the Ionising Health & Safety Executive,

Radiations Regulations 1985 Policy Division
Legal Status of the Ionising Department of Health,

Radiation Regulations 1988 Medical Division
The Chain of Responsibility Department of Health,

Legal Section
Training Program m es and IR P A Representative

Certification for R P A s
Proposed Amendments to the Pollutions Inspectorate

Radioactive Substances Act 1960
Revision of the Carriage of Radioactive Department of Transport

Substances by Road Regulations 1974
IC R P Recommendations and National Radiological

the Likely Effect on Regulations Protection Board
FIG. 2. 1990 Update meeting programme on legal and administrative aspects of

radiation protection in health care.
5. PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS FOR RPAs
Further support for RPAs is provided in the form o f publications produced by

the IPSM. The range o f publications includes radiation equipment calibration and
use [1], quality assurance o f radiation equipment performance [2, 3], guidance on
the role o f the RPA [4], guidance on the implementation o f the various regulations
[5], accident response [6], dosimetry [7], etc. These publications are written by
working groups o f experts in each field and published in paperback format to ensure
that costs are kept low so that every RPA is able to afford to purchase copies. Scien
tific meeting proceedings are also published by the IPSM for the benefit o f its
members, e.g . Refs [8 -1 0 ]. Copies are also available to non-members o f the IPSM.
In addition to these publications, the Radiation Protection Topic Group o f the
IPSM produces regular bulletins or news-sheets that contain information o f specific
interest to RPAs. They might include problems that have occurred, details o f new
legislation, interpretations o f the law or general guidance relating to common or
indeed uncommon practices.
6. COMPARISONS OF M ETHODS A N D M EASUREM ENTS
A particularly practical form o f support for RPAs is in maintaining lists o f

members involved in particular types o f work so that user groups can be readily
identified. This enables discussion and co-ordination o f research programmes in
radiation protection. One such user group involves approved personal dosimetry
services. This group m eets twice a year to discuss the results o f their own internally
organized dosimetry intercomparisons and other legislative and scientific matters o f
mutual concern.
Another practical form o f support is for radiotherapy dosimetry. In 1987, the
IPSM organized the first national comparison o f radiotherapy dosimetry through the
physicists working at each radiotherapy centre in the United Kingdom. Industrial
support was obtained for the measuring equipment and physicists gave their time
voluntarily to ensure that dosimetry was comparable across the w hole o f the country.
Such a national comparison naturally takes a great deal o f time and, consequently,
the first series o f measurements is not yet quite complete. The results are to be
published by the IPSM when the survey has been completed.
Similarly, a survey o f diagnostic radiology dosimetry measurements is about
to begin. This is a collaborative effort being co-ordinated through the IPSM with the
National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB). A comparison o f techniques in
measurements o f mammographie doses has already been made but the dosimetry is
yet to be tested. Other surveys initiated by the NRPB have received the full support
o f the IPSM and its members. These have involved, for example, a somatic dose
IAEA-SM-309/37 289
survey in diagnostic radiology, a survey o f doses in nuclear m edicine using " T c m

and a survey into radiation doses in computer tomographic scanning.
Other surveys and intercomparisons related particularly to equipment calibra
tion and radiation measurement have also been carried out in conjunction with the
National Physical Laboratory. The IPSM is also supporting the recent Council o f the
European Communities research action on quality criteria for diagnostic radio-
graphic images. Another matter o f radiation protection interest is a survey o f the
level o f radiation dose received by relatives when visiting members o f their families
being treated in hospital.
7. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR RPAs
RPA members o f the IPSM are members, through their sister organization, the
Hospital Physicists A ssociation, o f the British Radiation Protection Association. This
in turn is a member o f the International Radiological Protection A ssociation, so that
information relating to radiation protection in all member countries is promulgated
throughout the United Kingdom.
Exchange o f scientific information in the field o f radiation protection is
essential for uniformity o f implementation o f directives, regulations and other legis
lation. It also ensures that the A LARA principle is fully appreciated. Comparisons
o f occupational and personal exposure serve this purpose and are a real aid to dose
reduction techniques. Having an organization like the IPSM to support its members
in radiation protection ensures that the best in radiation protection practice applies
in the United Kingdom s health care service.
REFERENCES
[1] INSTITUTE OF PHYSICAL SCIENCES IN MEDICINE, Commissioning and Quality

Assurance of Linear Accelerators, Rep. No. 54, IPSM, York (1988).
[2] HOSPITAL PHYSICISTS ASSOCIATION, Measurement of the Performance
Characteristics of Diagnostic X-ray Systems used in Medicine Part VI, X-ray Image
Intensifier Fluorography Systems, Rep. TGR-32, HPA, London (1983).
[3] INSTITUTE OF PHYSICAL SCIENCES IN MEDICINE, Commissioning and
Routine Testing of Mammographie X-ray Systems, Rep. No. 59, IPSM, York (1989).
[4] HOSPITAL PHYSICISTS ASSOCIATION, The Role of the Medical Physicist as
Radiation Protection Adviser in the Use of Ionising Radiations in Health Care, A Policy
Statement, HPA, London (1986).
[5] INSTITUTE OF PHYSICAL SCIENCES IN MEDICINE, Radiation Protection in
Radiotherapy, Rep. No. 46, IPSM, York (1986).
[6] INSTITUTE OF PHYSICAL SCIENCES IN MEDICINE, Chernobyl: Response of

Medical Physics Departments in the UK (HAYWOOD, J.K ., Ed.), Rep. No. 50,
IPSM, London (1986).
[7] WALL, B.F., HARRISON, R.M ., SPEIRS, F.W ., Patient Dosimetry Techniques in
Diagnostic Radiology, Rep. No. 53, IPSM, York (1988).
[8] HOSPITAL PHYSICISTS ASSOCIATION, Practical Radiation Protection Dosimetry
(LAW, J., Ed.), Rep. CRS-34, HP A, London (1981).
[9] HOSPITAL PHYSICISTS ASSOCIATION, Practical Aspects of Non-Ionising
Radiation Protection (LAW, J., HAGGITH, J.W ., Eds), Rep. CRS-36, HP A, London
(1982).
[10] HOSPITAL PHYSICISTS ASSOCIATION, Dosimetry in Diagnostic Radiology
(FITZGERALD, M., Ed.), Rep. CRS-40, HP A, London (1984).
PERSONNEL DOSIMETRY SERVICES
(Session VI)
Chairman
R.E. PINEDA
Guatemala
IAEA-SM-309/7
THE NATIONAL DOSE REGISTRY

AS A NEW INSTRUMENT IN THE CONTROL
OF OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURES
IN SWITZERLAND
M. MOSER
Federal O ffice o f Public Health,
Bern, Switzerland
Abstract
THE NATIONAL DOSE REGISTRY AS A NEW INSTRUMENT IN THE CONTROL OF
OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION EXPOSURES IN SWITZERLAND.
In 1989 the Swiss National Dose Registry started a test phase of data collection and
processing. It contains new features in the organization of personal dosimetry and the control
of occupational radiation exposures. Together with the current revision of the Radiation Pro
tection Regulations it represents some changes in the practice and structure o f radiation protec
tion. The umbrella organization for personal dosimetry in Switzerland is outlined. The history,
the database structure and the way of operation of the registry is described, and the role of
the registry in the Swiss radiation protection infrastructure is discussed.
1. BASIC ORGANIZATION OF PERSONAL DOSIMETRY IN

SW ITZERLAND
1.1. Authorities and legislation
Using the definition contained in the regulations and according to the statistics
for 1989, there are about 50 000 radiation workers in Switzerland (6.6 million
inhabitants).
The regulatory provisions relating to occupational radiation exposures are
given by the Radiation Protection Regulations [1] dated 1976-06-30. Currently, very
intensive work on revising the regulations is going on and is planned to be finished
in 1992. The new regulations should be based on the new Radiation Protection Law
which w ill be discussed in Parliament in June 1990. These activities are stimulating
much discussion considering radiation protection practices and the organization o f
the infrastructure, whereby modifications may be expected in the very near future.
293
294 MOSER
In the field o f personal dosimetry there are three main national authorities
which ensure control and compliance with the regulations:
The Federal O ffice o f Public Health (FOPH) provides control for about 86%
o f all radiation workers. In addition, the FOPH is in charge o f granting
licences for work with radioactive material and radiation-generating machines
(except nuclear power installations).
The National Accident Insurance Fund (NAIF) provides control for radiation
workers in industry and m edical surveillance o f all radiation workers.
The Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (NSI) o f the Federal O ffice o f Energy pro
vides control for radiation workers in nuclear power installations.
In addition, there is an advisory group for personal dosimetry called the Expert
Group for Personal Dosim etry, established by the Swiss Federal Commission on
Radiological Protection in 1975. This group consists o f experts from authorities,
dosimetry services and independent institutions. The group gives recommendations
in the field o f personal dosimetry, organizes annual comparisons between the dosi
metry services and issues annual reports on occupational radiation exposure in
Switzerland.
1.2. Personal dosimetry regulations
The follow ing requirements for radiation workers are defined in the regula
tions: individual monitoring o f the radiation exposures, dose recording (every radia
tion worker should possess a Radiation Booklet with personal, dose and employer
information) and medical surveillance. The whole responsibility o f meeting these
legal requirements lies with the employer, who is obliged to make an arrangement
with an approved dosimetry service to keep and to update the Radiation Booklet for
all his radiation workers and to see to their m edical examinations.
1.3. Personal dosimetry services

Currently there are 11 dosimetry services for external exposure in Switzerland
which are either public or private, o f which four are on the site o f nuclear power
installations. They are responsible for the regular issue o f dosimeters, dose assess
ments and dose record keeping. Their functioning is regulated by the Dosimetry
Services Regulations [2] which cover approval criteria and procedure, technical
requirements and information to be sent to the appropriate authorities.
The technical requirements are checked by periodic quality tests and annual
comparisons [3]. The data from all dosimetry services are summarized in the annual
reports that are issued by the Expert Group for Personal Dosimetry.
M ost o f the dosimetry services are using thermoluminescent dosimeters to
measure external, w hole body or extremities X ray and gamma doses. Only one ser
vice is using film dosimeters. For neutron dosimetry, solid state track detectors and
IAEA-SM-309/7 295
film s are used. A ll dosimeters are issued monthly, exceptionally every three months.
The measured quantities correspond to the new International Commission on Radio
logical Units (ICRU) quantities, dose equivalent penetration and dose equivalent
superficial [4].
2. THE SWISS N ATIONAL DOSE REGISTRY (SNDR)
2.1. History
The idea o f a Swiss National D ose Registry was first discussed in 1982, but,
given the com plex situation with the heterogeneous dosimetry services and the
responsibility shared by different authorities, it was not easy to find a widely
acceptable solution. The requirements for confidentiality made it even more com pli
cated. Several proposals have been dropped for different reasons. Finally, the arising
need, coupled with the very strong development o f computing techniques, especially
database system s, led to the realization o f the Registry. In 1986 the FOPH assumed
responsibility for carrying out the project. A working group consisting o f authority
delegates was created to establish the requirements and concepts for the Registry.
It is important to note here that the FOPH does not run its ow n dosimetry ser
vice. A ll the information is based on the data obtained from the dosimetry services.
This contrasts with the situation in countries where the national registry grew out o f
a dosimetry service. After analysing the situation o f the dosimetry services it
emerged that all o f them already had computer databases being used for dosimeter
issues, dose assessments and data recording. The problem was that these databases
were quite different and it would have taken a lot o f time to m odify them to achieve
compatibility. So it was decided to use the existing ones and have the registry make
the necessary adaptations.
The next decision was to build the registry with the manpower and the com
puter equipment already available at the FOPH. By doing this w e hope to understand
better the w hole structure and to be able to m odify it if necessary. In addition,
flexibility is important in order to keep up with trends and developments in personal
dosimetry and radiation protection in general.
Finally the guidelines for building the registry were set as follows:
no additional requirements on the dosimetry service side

use o f the existing MIMER database with a fourth generation language
high flexibility
much attention to confidentiality.
The manpower needed was estimated at 25 man-months. The database design

and the programming work started at die beginning o f 1987. Currently about 90%
296 MOSER
o f the data from the dosimetry services have been included in the registry. The regu
lar data processing is in a test phase.
2.2. Database design

The database for the SN D R , called STRADOS, is based on the commercial
MIMER database management system (DBM S) and is installed on a V A X 8650
computer.
The database consists o f a number o f tables that are coupled through special
keys. The main key is an internal number called personal identification number
(PIN), given to each person at the moment o f enrolment in the registry. The national
insurance number (NIN) would be better suited, but is unfortunately not always
included in the data. NIN , where available, is defined as a secondary index and is
used in the personal identification algorithm.
The follow ing information is included in the SNDR:
Personal identification information (PIN number, NIN number, first name,

name, previous first name if applicable, date o f birth, sex, nationality).
Employment information (employer number, which is a cross-reference to the
em ployer table, dates o f beginning and end o f the employment). The employment
record may contain several sequences related to the different employers.
Dosimetry information (dosimetry service, type o f dosimeter, data and time o f
exposures and dose values). There may also be sequences o f the dosimetry record
correlated to the sequences o f the employment record. In addition several subseg
ments for the different dosimeter types are provided. The possibility that one person
may wear two dosimeters either at the same time (parallel) or one after the other
(serial) is foreseen. Special codes are considered for such cases as dosimeter lost,
etc. Both Hp (dose equivalent penetrating) and Hs (dose equivalent superficial) are
recorded. Internal dosimetry is not yet included in the database but this is planned.
Employer information (employer number, address).
Statistical codes (worker category, job classification, type o f radiation,
employment group, etc.). These codes are built in to permit statistical studies.
Administrative information includes a number o f special purpose codes.
There are actually two databases: an active and an archive one, the structure
o f both being exactly the same. Once a year the data for persons not being exposed
to radiation any more are moved from the active to the archive database, which can
then be removed from the system to save storage capacity. At any time it can again
be reloaded as an extension o f the active database.
2.3. Data transfer from dosimetry services to the SNDR

The regular data transfer from the dosimetry services to the FOPH is organized
(and is already w ell functioning) in the follow ing way: the dosimetry services send
IAEA-SM-309/7 297
a copy o f their original data (save sets, backups) to the FOPH. A s data carriers mag
netic tapes, diskettes and in one case direct mail via Telefax are used. The FOPH
maintains 11 translating programs, one for each dosimetry service, which translate
these data into sequential files, all having the same structure. In the next step all these
data can be processed and read into the STRADOS database with only one program.
The advantages o f this kind o f data transfer are:
Very great flexibility: any possible change by one dosimetry service requires
only m odifications to the corresponding translation program without influenc
ing the database or other services. A change in the database can be made
without influencing the dosimetry services.
The data from dosimetry services can be obtained with their present
equipment.
The disadvantage is clearly the need to run a number o f different translating

programs, but in the situation described it seem ed to be the only acceptable solution.
2.4. Method of operation
The data from the dosimetry services are processed and added to the
STRADOS database monthly. This processing includes:
inserting the new dose values

comparing the dose values with the dose limits
enrolling the new radiation workers
modifying the existing data for changes, e.g . o f address or name, link the
old to the new employer, etc.
production o f listings for further administrative purposes.
In addition to this regular data processing there should be the possibility to

obtain certain information on-line at any time. For this purpose a number o f program
supported masks and dialogues w ill be supplied to simplify the procedures. Direct
access w ill be granted only to the control authorities NAIF and NSI to the data they
are entitled to. The dosimetry services do not have direct access to the SNDR. Pro
grams for various statistical reports including the annual report are also being
developed.
3. THE ROLE OF THE N A TIO N A L DOSE REGISTRY IN THE CONTEXT

OF SWISS RADIATION PROTECTION
3.1. The importance of having cumulative dose records
Keeping a cumulative record o f an individuals radiation exposures is o f

increasing importance. It is the only reliable way to control the cumulative dose
298 MOSER
limits. The quarterly, annual and lifetim e dose limits already exist where the more
sophisticated dose limits, such as the age or average dose dependent ones, are under
discussion. There are Radiation Booklets but it is difficult to control whether they
are filled in regularly and correctly.
Especially for those persons changing their em ployer frequently the SN D R is
the only real solution for arriving at the cumulative dose. A big problem is the people
working on nuclear power plants during the maintenance period only. These are
Sw iss and foreign workers moving from one power plant to another, maybe in differ
ent countries. This population o f radiation workers has relatively high dose rates per
person and therefore the control o f their radiation exposure is very important. The
SND R is attempting to solve the problem o f having a cumulative dose record for the
Swiss radiation workers and for the foreigners working in Switzerland. The complete
solution o f this problem is possible only by the collaboration o f different countries,
and the national registers may play the central role.
A further advantage o f having cumulative dose records is to have an easily
accessible personal dose history for insurance and compensation purposes.
The goal o f the SND R is to keep a cumulative dose history which covers the
entire working life o f the individual. The main problem in achieving this is to keep
track o f and to correlate successive periods o f employment o f the individual.
3.2. The SNDR link to the database containing licences for radiation
generating machines
A very special feature o f the SNDR is the possibility to have a link to two
related databases.
One o f them is BEBERA, a database containing all the licences for radiation
generating machines and the related activities [5]. It is also run by the FOPH; it is
installed on the same computer as STRADOS and it has just started to operate. As
it was developed at about the same time it was possible to include a cross-reference
to BEBERA in STRADOS, as every employer in STRADOS has to have a licence
and therefore a record in BEBERA. This point is going to be verified. For every
newly issued licence it w ill be checked whether an arrangement with a dosimetry ser
vice has been made for the individual monitoring o f the personnel. V ice versa, for
every em ployer who gave up dosimetry, it w ill be checked whether the licence has
been withdrawn. In addition, a kind o f indirect survey o f radiation-generating
machines is possible through checking the occupational exposures o f the personnel.
3.3. The role of SNDR in the organization of medical surveillance
According to the present Regulation, each radiation worker undergoes a medi

cal examination before starting to work. Further medical examinations should be
IAEA-SM-309/7 299
made periodically or when a certain dose limit is exceeded. These medical examina
tions are organized and controlled by the NAIF.
Currently the NAIF is planning to create a database containing all the reports
o f the various medical examinations (the NAIF is also responsible for medical con
trol o f the em ployees in other fields o f the industry). A part o f this database should
be devoted to the m edical examinations o f radiation workers. The SN D R is going
to have a link to this database. The cross-reference should be the N IN number, which
is going to be used more strictly in future. On the basis o f the link to BEBERA and
the information from dosimetry services the FOPH is going to produce monthly
listings o f radiation workers needing to undergo either the first or the control exam i
nation. The relevant facts such as eligibility w ill be sent back to the FOPH to be
included in the SND R . Doing this, a better control w ill be provided and it will
becom e possible to introduce new criteria for the control examinations, such as a
check after certain dose thresholds have been exceeded.
3.4. Statistical studies
The possibility o f producing various statistical studies is a nice reward for all
the problems and difficulties one is confronted with in building the Registry. Various
statistical reports can be produced by pushing a button, on condition that the cor
responding statistical codes are built and correctly filled in. There are various statisti
cal codes included in STRADOS. Some o f them are already available, others are
planned for the future.
The first report produced on the basis o f STRADOS is going to be the annual
report, equivalent to the one issued by the Expert Group. The two can then be com
pared. Som e differences are expected owing to the radiation workers changing their
em ployer and at the same time their dosimetry service. Using current methods, these
persons are counted twice, causing the number o f radiation workers to be
overestimated.
3.5. The administrative role of the SNDR
The SN D R w ill help the authorities to fulfil their legal obligations. Therefore
only authorities have direct access to the Registry. It is not within the scope o f this
paper to cover all the administrative procedures, although som e o f them have already
been mentioned in the previous sections.
3.6. The position of the SNDR in the new Radiation Protection Regulations
A s already mentioned, the revision o f the existing Radiation Protection Regula

tions was under way at the time the SND R was being set up. W hile designing the
SND R all the relevant revision discussions were taken into account and a certain
300 MOSER
degree o f flexibility for future regulations was allowed. The revision is not yet com
pleted, so only the main discussion points that were considered in the SND R may
be mentioned here: definition and categories o f radiation workers, dose limits, dose
recording and keeping o f individual dose records, organization o f medical surveil
lance, data protection and confidentiality. It is obvious that the existence o f the
SN D R offers a valuable new instrument to influence the limiting values for radiation
exposures that w ill certainly be built into the new regulations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author is grateful to B. Michaud, W . Zeller and G. Fischer for comments

on drafts o f this paper.
REFERENCES
[1] Verordnung ber den Strahlenschutz vom 1976-06-30 (in German and French).
[2] Verordnung ber Anerkennung und Betrieb von Personendosimetriestellen vom
1981-11-11 (in German and French).
[3] WERNLI, C ., VALLEY, J.-F ., JOSSEN, H., Personnel dosimetry in Switzerland:
a status report , Personnel Radiation Dosimetry, Proc. Technical Committee Meeting
to Elaborate Procedures and Data for the Intercomparison of Personnel Dosimeters,
IAE A-TECDOC-402, IAEA, Vienna (1985).
[4] WERNLI, C ., JOSSEN, H ., VALLEY, J.-F ., Methods of measurement and calibration
in personnel dosimetry for external irradiation: presentation of the concept and the
results of a test programme in Switzerland, Radiat. Prot. Dosim. 28 1/2 (1989).
[5] WYSS, P ., MEILE, ., Projet TED BEBERA de lOffice Fdral de la Sant Pub
lique, Berne/Suisse , Application of Computer Technology to Radiation Protection
(Proc. Int. Sem. Bled, 1987), Josef Stefan Institute, Ljubljana (1989) 535-541.
IAEA-SM-309/15
NATIONWIDE QUALITY ASSURANCE AND CONTROL

OF ITALIAN PERSONAL DOSIMETRY SERVICES
A . CAVALLINI
Comitato Nazionale por la Ricerca e por lo Sviluppo
d ell Energia Nucleare e delle Energie Alternative
(EN EA ),
Bologna
V . KLAMERT
Istituto di Ingegneria Nucleare,
Politcnico di M ilano,
Milan
Italy
Abstract
NATIONWIDE QUALITY ASSURANCE AND CONTROL OF ITALIAN PERSONAL
DOSIMETRY SERVICES.
A working group (called ENEA-EDP, personal dosimetry experts) has been established
in the framework of ENEA institutional tasks to assure the quality of Italian personal dosime
try services. The results are quite important as no official guidelines on the performance of
personal dosimetry services have been established in Italy. The paper outlines the activity of
the ENEA-EDP group and recalls the reliability evaluation criteria detailed in a different
report. The paper also summarizes the procedures to be followed by the services, on a volun
tary basis, in order to be listed among the officially reliable ones. Results and comments of
six test sessions for 51 services are also described.
1. INTRODUCTION
Eighty personal dosimetry services (PDSs) are operational in Italy today: they
are either private organizations or structures linked to universities or local health
care agencies. Som e services have been operational for only a few years
The precise number o f these services is not known because no official
acknowledgement is required to start and run such a service. A lso, legal controls on
the reliability o f the services measurements have still to be enforced.
The measurements for the evaluation o f the doses are passed to a specialist,
who must be on the official list o f qualified experts. Adm ission to the list is granted
through an ad hoc examination. The qualified expert is also the person responsible
for the correct operation o f the instrumentation used to compute the doses and, there
fore, for the selection o f the PDS.
301
302 CAVALLINI and KLAMERT
W hile waiting for an expected change in the current regulations , it was deemed
necessary to organize a test programme in order to evaluate the reliability o f the
w hole body dosimeters, to give the PDSs the reference framework to check them
selves and to help the qualified expert to make his or her choice. Such a test
programme may suggest improvements and could also help to identify systematic
errors or wrong methods.
Several years ago, a small group o f experts in personal dosimetry, working
within the major and well-established Italian PD Ss, decided to study the problems
concerning personal dosimetry and to carry out the above test programme, for pho
ton radiation only. In 1984 this group became an official working group o f ENEA
(National A gency for the Developm ent o f Nuclear and Alternative Energy) as
ENEA-EDP.
TABLE I. DOSIMETER CATEGORIES
Category Energy (MeV)
1 0.25-3.00
2 0.02-0.25
3 0.02-3.00
2. CRITERIA FOR TESTING RELIABILITY
The Group has issued a paper: Criteria for testing the reliability o f individual
X and gamma ray dosimetry services [1], which is currently used as a standard
reference for the tests.
The PD Ss may volunteer to undergo the tests: if they pass them, they receive
a reliability acknowledgement (accreditation). It should be noted, however, that this
accreditation has no legal value.
The accreditation may be requested for one or more o f the three categories o f
individual dosimeters, identified by their energy range (Table I). The accreditation
is given for each category for which the PDS passes the relevant test.
Passing the test for category 1 and category 2 is not equivalent to passing it
for category 3.
The test programme is made up o f two steps. First, the PDS methods, facili
ties, instruments, organization and staff are investigated through a detailed question
naire and an in-depth interview o f the technical supervisor, conducted by at least two
members o f the ENEA-EDP group.
IAEA-SM-309/15 303
The technical supervisor o f the PDS must have a university degree in physics,
chemistry or engineering and proven experience o f ionizing radiation dosimetry o f
at least three years.
Exceptionally, longer and acknowledged experience could be accepted in the
absence o f a university degree.
Once a PDS has passed the first step o f the test, it takes a strict irradiation test,
as described below .
The dosimeters are irradiated at normal incidence, free in air, with heavily
filtered X rays (B series ISO 4037) [2], 137Cs and Co gamma rays in the
5 .2 X 10 61.3 X 1 0 _3 /kg exposure range.
The number o f irradiated dosimeters is 10 for category 1, 76 for category 2
and 110 for category 3.
Som e dosimeters are irradiated with a single energy irradiation and some
others with two energies. The test is highly reliable because, if the dosimetric method
is not precise, the results obtained with som e m ix o f energies are clearly wrong.
The exposure evaluated by the PDS (Xv) and the actual exposure supplied by
the irradiation laboratory (Xa) must m eet the follow ing condition:
0 .7 1 ] < R < 1.5 i l + --------------- ------ ] (1)

-
(. Xo + Xaj ( 2Xo + X j
where R is the ratio Xv/X a and X0 is the lower lim it o f the exposure range
(5 .2 x 1 0 _6 /kg for whole body dosimeters).
Less than 10% o f all tested dosimeters and, at most, two o f those exposed to
radiation o f the same energy, may exceed the limits established by formula (1). As
an alternative evaluation critrium, at m ost one dosimeter for every radiation energy
may exceed the above limits.
Formula (1) is similar to the one proposed by the DIN Standard [3] in the
Federal Republic o f Germany. However, the Italian criterion is more restrictive,
because o f the limitation on the number o f dosimeters exceeding each irradiation
energy.
The accreditation has a two year validity. On expiry, the accreditation is
granted again, every two years, after an irradiation test o f the dosimeters. This test
is simpler than the initial one.
3. RESULTS A N D COMM ENTS
Figure 1 shows the distribution o f PDSs in relation to the type o f dosimeters

issued. Fewer use films than thermoluminescent (RL) dosimeters because film
dosimetry is more demanding than TL dosimetry. A higher level o f automation is
36%
Detector type
Film
DQ TL
Film + TL
55%
No. o f PDSs = 56
FIG. I. Breakdown o f PDSs according to type o f detector used (1989).
Accredited film
Non-accredited film
E j Non-tested film
Accredited TL
42%
Non-accredited TL
24% Non-tested TL
Accredited film + TL
Non-accredited film + TL
t%l Non-tested film + TL
17%
No. o f dosimeters issued yearly = 1 300 000
FIG. 2. Usage o f dosimeters by various categories o f PDS (1989).

IAEA-SM-309/15 305
TABLE . PDSs ACCORDING TO THE NUM BER OF YEARLY ISSUED

DOSIMETERS OF ALL TYPES
Dosimeters/year No. of PDSs
< 1 000 3
1 000 - 5 000 14
5 000 - 10 000 12
10 000 - 20 000 12
20 000 - 50 000 8
50 000 - 100 000 6
> 100 000 1
also available for the processing o f TL dosimeters. In addition, TL readings do not

need further analysis, whilst with film s the correct interpretation o f the densities
frequently requires long practice.
Table relates PDSs to the number o f dosimeters o f all types issued per year.
A s shown in Fig. 2, more film dosimeters are issued each year than TL
dosimeters. The explanation is straightforward: the largest Italian PDSs have been
on the market for many years and they all use film s. Only one o f the oldest PD Ss,
using film s, switched to TL dosimeters a few years ago and now issues about 80 000
dosimeters yearly.
The distribution o f Fig. 2 shows in addition to the type o f dosimeters, the
proportion issued by accredited PD Ss, by non-accredited ones and those that still
have to be tested. Data refer to 1989, after six testing sessions and two biennial
checks. F ive PDSs did not pass the check.
Irradiation for the testing session takes place at member laboratories o f the
Italian calibration services (Servizio Italiano di Taratura SIT). SIT is a network
o f calibration centres with proven, w ell-known and regularly checked metrological
capacity in certain measurement fields: i.e. exposure and exposure rate.
The laboratories use , 137Cs and X ray sources to generate beams accord
ing to the ISO 4037 Standard: thus the spectral distribution o f the beams is compara
ble among the laboratories.
Looking at the irradiations needed to plot the calibration curves (which are
essential for the correct interpretation o f dosimeter readings), w e note that only a few
PDSs have their ow n equipment to perform the irradiation. It is therefore difficult
to derive the response curve as an energy function as X ray sources and com plex
and expensive hardware have to be used. The capital expenditure would also be too
high in relation to the quantity o f dosimeters issued.
From this scenario stems the demand for a number o f irradiation centres that
may work competently and with a satisfactory technique, thus removing the need to
call on the SIT laboratories, which work to a higher precision than is required for
this type o f exposure.
The EN EA-ED P paper does not conflict with the Italian U N I standards on per
sonal dosimeters currently in force:
Personal photographic dosimeters classification, basic characteristics and

tests (UN I 7814) [4]. This is the Italian translation o f the ISO 1757 standard
[5], now under revision. This standard does not deal with dosimetric methods
and their reliability.
Personal dosimeters accuracy test (UN I 9104) [6]. The subject matter
reflects the EN EA-ED P paper as regards irradiation tests.
Thermoluminescent dosimeters for personal and environmental dosimetry
classification and test methods (UNI 4892) [7] (already approved, but not yet
issued). This standard is in line with a similar draft standard [8] and, again,
does not deal with the reliability o f the dosimetric methodology.
The present members o f the ENEA-EDP group ran intercalibration sessions

among their ow n film dosimeter services, in the years before the startup o f the relia
bility tests. The sessions tested the responses o f the dosimeters as w ell as those o f
the equipment used to measure the exposures o f the dosimeters used to plot the
calibration curves.
ENEA organized workshops in the years 1981-1986 for the PDSs using TL
dosimeters. In these workshops, the reading procedures w ere compared, as w ell as
the results from dosimeters, all exposed to the same source and to the same exposure
value.
X and gamma ray irradiations also took place and the responses o f the same
dosimeters w ere compared, follow ing the irradiation at the PD Ss and at a reference
laboratory.
An outcome o f the workshops was the self-check o f the PD Ss which gave them
the data to fix som e faults in the dosimetric method. Som e o f the PDSs later agreed
to take the EN EA-ED P reliability test.
From 1986 to the end o f 1989, 51 PDSs were tested in six sessions: 22 o f them
use film detectors, 26 use TL detectors and three use film + TL dosimeters.
During irradiation tests, about 4000 dosimeters were processed. The results
were analysed using, as a parameter, the ratio R o f formula [1].
Figure 3 shows the distribution o f the mean values o f R for the dosimeters o f
all tested and accredited PDSs.
A tendency to underestimate is clearly evident.
IAEA-SM-309/15 307
TABLE . Rmean A N D STA N D A R D DEVIATION FOR DOSIMETERS OF

ACCREDITED PDSs
Number of
Service Standard
Detector irradiated ^mean
No. deviation
dosimeters
1 110 0.84 0.147

2 110 0.96 0.184
3 110 0.99 ; 0.088
4 110 1.00 0.137
Film 5 110 1.01 0.153
6 110 0.98 0.180
7 no 0.95 0.180
8 110 : 1.04 0.224
9 110 1.12 0.212
1 10 0.76 0.073
2 110 0.82 0.103
3 110 0.93 0.103
4 110 0.95 0.213
5 76 0.97 0.086
6 110 0.98 0.104
7 110 0.98 0.141
8 76 1.14 0.631
9 110 1.23 0.145
TL 10 110 1.06 0.106
11 110 1.03 0.151
12 110 0.96 0.108
13 110 0.91 0.068
14 110 0.97 0.104
15 110 1.07 0.238
16 110 1.09 0.186
17 110 0.90 0.226
18 110 0.90 0.107
19 110 0.99 0.102
1 110 0.88 0.167

Film + TL 2 110 0.93 0.126
3 110 0.94 0.160
20
Or
g. 10 4
4>
All tested PDSs
^ Accredited PDSs
J L p p p p . _,
0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.151.20 1.25 1.30 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.50 1.55
FIG. 3. Distribution o f mean R values for tested and accredited PDSs.
The detailed analysis o f the mean R and the related standard deviation for each
PDS may help the PD Ss that failed the test to detect the sources o f error and may
also help the accredited ones further to improve their quality and performance.
Table shows the mean R and standard deviation values evaluated for
accredited PDSs.
PDS N o. 13 (category 3) which uses TL dosimeters, underestimated the
exposures, but the standard deviation was low: this is probably the consequence o f
a systematic error in calibration that could be easily corrected. The dosimetric proce
dures seem to be good. PDS N o. 8 (category 2 ), which uses TL dosimeters, has a
very high standard deviation. In fact, only three R values are outside the fixed range,
and they are clearly wrong. If one recalculates the mean R and the standard deviation
without the three values, the mean R is lower and the standard deviation becom es
very small. The source o f these erratic mistakes needs to be investigated.
These are only som e examples o f the analysis performed on the data. The
ENEA-EDP Group informs each PDS on the conclusions not only to justify the
accreditation, but also to improve quality and techniques.
IAEA-SM-309/15 309
REFERENCES
[1] GRUPPO DI LAVORO ENEA-EDP, Criteri per la verifica dellaffidabilit di un servi-

zio di dosimetra personale per radiazioni X e gamma, ENEA-EDP 89/1 (1989).
[2] INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, X and Gamma
Reference Radiations for Calibrating Dosemeters and Dose Ratemeters and Determin
ing their Response as Function of Photon Energy, ISO 4037 (1979).
[3] DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FR NORMUNG, Filmdosimetrie nach dem filter
analytischen Verfahren zur Strahlenschutzberwachung, DIN 6816 (1984).
[4] ITALIAN STANDARDS ORGANIZATION, Dosimetri fotografici individuali: clas-
sificazione, caratteristiche fondamentali e prove, UNI 7814 (1978).
[5] ITALIAN STANDARDS ORGANIZATION, Personal photographic dosimeters, ISO
1757 (1980).
[6] ITALIAN STANDARDS ORGANIZATION, Dosimetri individuali: verifica dellac-
curatezza, UNI 9104 (1988).
[7] ITALIAN STANDARDS ORGANIZATION, Dosimetri a termoluminescenza per
dosimetra personale ed ambientale caratteristiche e metodi di prova, UNI 4892 (in
preparation).
[8] INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION, Thermoluminescence
dosimetry for personal and environmental monitoring, IEC draft (in preparation).
IAEA-SM-309/31
THE HEALTH AND SAFETY

EXECUTIVES APPROVAL SCHEME
FOR DOSIMETRY SERVICES UNDER THE
IONISING RADIATIONS REGULATIONS 1985:
Inspection o f dosimetry services
D .N . SIMISTER, E .A . WOJCIKIEWICZ
Bootle, M erseyside,
United Kingdom
Abstract
THE HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVES APPROVAL SCHEME FOR DOSIMETRY
SERVICES UNDER THE IONISING RADIATIONS REGULATIONS 1985: INSPECTION
OF DOSIMETRY SERVICES.
The Ionising Radiations Regulations 1985 have provided since 1986 a legal framework
in Great Britain for the approval of dosimetry services by the Health and Safety Executive
(HSE). The operation of this system is described in the paper with particular emphasis on the
role of the HSE inspector in judging the adequacy of a service seeking approval under the
Regulations. The criteria by which services are assessed and judged are described and
examples of inspector action are cited together with some problems which are typical of
operational field experience.
1. INTRODUCTION
Good radiation dosimetry is necessary for proper control o f worker exposure

to ionizing radiations and for implementation o f the requirement under United
Kingdom law for risks to be as low as reasonably practicable (the ALARP principle).
In order to ensure the continued provision o f good dosimetry in the United Kingdom,
the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1985 (IRR 85) [1] require employers to have
suitable arrangements for making the necessary measurements, assessing doses and
preparing and keeping dose records. These dosimetry services need to be approved
by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
The IRR 85 were made under the Health and Safety at W ork etc. A ct 1974 [2]
to implement in the United Kingdom the Euratom Directives [3, 4] on radiation
protection. They also drew together, updated and integrated in one regulatory
instrument previous diverse statutory requirements (i.e. Sealed and Unsealed
Sources Regulations, and health physics conditions attached to nuclear site licences)
and non-statutory codes o f practice and guidance on the control o f exposure to
311
312 SIMISTER and WOJCIKIEWICZ
ionizing radiations. The IRR 85 apply to all types o f work during the course o f which
people may be exposed to ionizing radiation and are supported by the Approved
Code o f Practice [5] which gives explanations and guidance on their implementation.
Both documents were prepared after extensive consultation with interested parties
and they set out reasonable and acceptable requirements for adequate protection o f
workers and the public from man-made ionizing radiations.
The task o f monitoring and enforcing compliance with IRR 85 falls on several
Inspectorates o f the HSE, namely Her M ajestys Nuclear Installations Inspectorate
(HM NII), Factory Inspectorate (HMFI) and Inspectorate o f M ines (HMIM), in
accordance with their responsibilities for different sectors o f industry or type o f work
activity.
2. HSE DOSIMETRY APPROVAL SCHEME
The HSE Dosimetry Approval Scheme was described in som e detail by Barrett
et al. at the Malvern symposium [6]. It is summarized here only to the extent
necessary for proper appreciation o f the role o f inspection in the approval process.
The principal aim o f the Dosimetry Approval Schem e, set up and operated by
the HSE since 1986, is to ensure that exposures o f classified workers (Euratom
category A) are measured, assessed and recorded to adequate standards o f accuracy
and reliability, using w ell documented techniques and acceptable methodologies.
Although any reasonable dosimetry system can in principle be submitted for
consideration, approvals under Regulation 15 o f the IRR 85 are granted only to those
dosimetry services which satisfy HSE requirements.
In order to assist applicants for approval the HSE has prepared and published
several statements and guidance notes. These are:
(1) HSE Statement on the Approval o f Dosimetry Services (issued annually) [7]
(2) HSE Guidance N ote on Approval o f Dosimetry Services
Part 1: External Radiations [8]
Part 2: Internal Radiations [9]
Part 3: Co-ordination and Record Keeping [10]
(5) HSE Guidance N ote on Individual Monitoring o f Internal Radiation from the
Prolonged Retention o f Long Lived Radionuclides [11].
These documents have been prepared by the HSE after consultation with
dosimetry experts within the United Kingdom, taking account o f the latest ICRP
recommendations contained in Publication 35 [12] and approval criteria published
previously at H SE s request by the British Calibration Service [1 3 -1 6 ]. The
documents listed above describe the procedure to be followed in preparing and
IAEA-SM-309/31 313
TABLE I. TYPE A N D NUM BER OF DOSIMETRY SERVICES APPROVED BY

HSE (1990)
Number of approved
Field of activity
dosimetry services
Radon 2
Whole body TLD 11
Skin TLD 11
Extremity TLD 23
Whole body film 20
Skin film 6
Whole body, neutron, film 1
Whole body, neutron, PADCa 1
Whole body, neutron fission track 1
Co-ordination and record keeping 28
Internal 22
Accident 7
a Poly Allyl Diglycol Carbonate.
submitting applications for approval, and set out fees to be paid and technical and
administrative criteria to be satisfied before the applications can be considered. The
Certificate o f Approval can be revoked at any time (e.g . when the service ceases to
function or when its performance falls below acceptable standards). It is generally
granted for three years for internal dosimetry, five years for external dosimetry and
seven years for co-ordination and record keeping.
In order to operate the approval scheme the HSE has set up the Dosimetry
Service Panel (DSP) consisting o f a chairman, secretary and several specialist
inspectors drawn from inspectorates responsible for enforcing IRR 85. Each service
which makes an application for approval is allocated to an HSE inspector who is
responsible for processing the case, which is presented in the form o f a laboratory
statement. The D SP, which meets several times a year, considers and discusses the
cases in detail to ensure that each dosimetry service achieves high standards o f
performance in fulfilling the purposes specified in the laboratory statement. Often
the D SP defers its recommendation for approval or makes a conditional recommen
dation subject to further action by the responsible inspector.
So far, about 130 services have been approved by HSE and Table I gives the
breakdown according to type o f service. The D SP deals with all aspects relating to
approval o f individual services. Sometimes matters o f policy arise which affect all
services, or particular groups o f service. The D SP then assumes the role o f the
Dosimetry Policy Group (DPG) to consider and resolve the particular issue.
3. INSPECTION OF DOSIMETRY SERVICES
3.1. General
Inspection plays a vital role in the HSE approval scheme o f dosimetry services.
It is usually carried out by specialist inspectors (health physicists with long
experience in the field o f dosimetry) who also are members o f the D SP and who are
drawn from HM NII, HMFI, HMIM and TD (Technology Division). HMNII
operates a system o f assigning individual site inspectors to every nuclear site in the
field o f its responsibilities. Such site inspectors are more often than not qualified
engineers and not health physicists. Consequently, whenever a dosimetry service
seeking HSE approval is located on a nuclear site inspected by the HMNII, it is
judged more appropriate for the service to be inspected by a specialist inspector and
preferably a member o f the DSP. However, because a site inspector carries overall
responsibility for enforcing safety regulations on his site, he or she is always
informed and consulted about the proposed inspections o f dosimetry services by the
specialist inspector. The site inspector usually accompanies the specialist inspector
during the inspection visit and takes part in any associated discussions about the
results o f the inspection. This serves a useful purpose o f familiarizing the site
inspector with details o f the dosimetry service on the site. It is expected that in due
course, if other commitments allow , the site inspector w ill take over som e o f the
routine aspects o f dosimetry service inspection, such as analysis and discussion o f
annual performance tests.
3.2. Objectives of inspection
The objectives o f inspection o f dosimetry services by HSE inspectors may be

summarized as follows:
(1) to verify that the scope, location, staffing, equipment and operation o f the
service are in accordance with the description given in the laboratory statement
which forms the basis on which the services suitability for approval is judged
(2) to identify any deviations from descriptions given in the laboratory statement
and any other deficiencies and shortcomings and to agree any necessary
remedial action
IAEA-SM-309/31 315
(3) to monitor the arrangements made by the service for ensuring that it maintains
a high standard o f technical and administrative competence
(4) to assess the operation o f the service against published standards and criteria
(5) to maintain contact between the service and the regulating agency.
3.3. Powers of the inspector
The HSE inspector can ask to see copies o f any documents associated with the
approval and running o f the service and can request the operation o f the service to
be demonstrated to him. Dosimetry services are approved under regulations made
under the Health and Safety at W ork etc. Act 1974, and HSE inspectors have powers
to influence the operation o f dosimetry services. In m ost cases any required changes
are achieved by negotiation and discussion. A sanction available is the revocation o f
approval by the HSE. In such a case the service could continue to operate on a local
reassurance monitoring basis but the em ployer would also have to seek the service
o f an approved laboratory, which could be costly. There are clearly strong incentives
for services to operate in accordance with the guidance notes issued by the regulatory
authority (HSE).
3.4. Inspector actions before approval
When the specialist inspector receives a written laboratory statement

describing the service for approval it is checked for conformity with the requirements
set out in the appropriate HSE guidance notes on the approval o f dosimetry services.
This w ill be follow ed by a visit to the service during which the inspector w ill make
a judgement on the adequacy o f the service in meeting the specific requirements for
approval contained in the published literature [8 -1 1 ]. A s part o f the inspection o f the
service the arrangements for staffing and the provision o f laboratory equipment will
be assessed. The inspector w ill judge the methods o f operation (e.g. development o f
film s, storage o f samples, storage and issue o f dosimeters) against nationally
accepted standards [13-16] and expect to see full, detailed and up-to-date written
laboratory instructions and QA procedures. The inspector w ill systematically
compare the operation o f the service with the description in the laboratory statement
and the HSE notes for guidance [8 -1 1 ]. Shortcomings and deficiencies w ill be
discussed with the laboratory management with a view to the service making
appropriate changes to bring the overall arrangements up to the required standard
for approval.
Performance testing operates for film s, thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs)
and tritium internal dosimetry and is a system whereby HSE arranges for samples
o f known concentration or dosimeters o f known exposure to be sent to services for
blind assessment. During the visit the inspector may wish to discuss with the service
the results o f the m ost recent set o f performance tests, which form an important part
TABLE . EXAMPLES OF INSPECTOR INTEREST IN DOSIMETRY

SERVICES
Type of service Problem area Inspector action
Internal dosimetry Traceability of calibration Reference required to

standards inadequate nationally accredited
standard
External radiations Poor performance test Require service to review

(film badge) result for high exposure procedures and/or repeat
calibration films test
All types of service Incomplete/insufficient data Require the service to

on dose reporting forms amend and update
(personal identifiers, documentation
employers name and
address)
External radiations No arrangements for Procurement and

(TLD) checking and recording of installation of glow curve
dose assessment equipment
Co-ordination and Inadequate arrangements Review of local

record keeping for access to dosimetry procedures for
records to guard against passwords/read-write
loss or corruption of data access, etc.
o f the approval process. The HSE inspector would expect a reasonable explanation
o f poor results otherwise a retest may be required before approval can be considered.
At the same time the inspector may also discuss general developments within the
dosimetry field, which som e services, particularly if small and geographically
isolated, could be unaware of. In this respect the inspectors role can be important
in providing a central point o f contact within the regulatory framework.
The types o f problems likely to be encountered are sometimes peculiar to the
individual type o f service (see Table ). In the case o f co-ordination and record
keeping, the inspector would amongst other things ask for evidence o f precautions
to protect against the corruptibility or loss o f data stored in computer files, and also
to ensure that adequate safeguards exist against the unauthorized access to dosimetry
data. For services applying for approval o f external dosimetry (film badge), the
inspector w ill discuss with the service the results o f the latest set o f performance
IAEA-SM-309/31 317
tests. The standard in the United Kingdom is generally good but experience has
shown that deficiencies can be identified using this procedure.
The approval o f internal dosimetry services may require the inspector to
consider a wide range o f dosimetric techniques for assessment o f doses from
bioassay, in vivo and air sampling measurements. The concept o f compliance index
a non-dimensional fraction relating assessed intake and derived limit was
introduced with the guidance notes associated with IRR 85, and a number o f
approved dosimetry services make entries in terms o f deemed d ose (compliance
index multiplied by annual dose limit). The concept o f deemed dose is used
particularly in cases when bioassay or in vivo measurement techniques are not
sensitive enough to make adequate dosimetry measurements, for example uranium
or plutonium in lung. In such cases measurements may be based upon personal
monitoring using PAS (personal air sampler) or environmental monitoring using
SAS (static air sampler). W here cases are submitted for approval based mainly upon
SAS, the Health and Safety Executive requires a rigorous justification supporting the
preference for area monitoring against the use o f personal monitoring. This require
ment can sometimes be very difficult if not im possible to satisfy for applications
which are very site specific, since environmental monitoring may be too remote from
the individual to satisfy the requirements o f IRR 85. Part o f the inspectors visit
to the site in consideration o f this type o f service w ill be to confirm that site
specific problems exist which merit the use o f area monitoring and to examine
technical arrangements such as the recording o f occupancy data, estimation o f
PA S/S AS ratios, etc.
Som e examples o f specific items where inspector action has been considered
appropriate are shown in Table . These have not been chosen to highlight any
particular deficiencies in the United Kingdoms system o f dosimetry services
approval, but rather to give typical exam ples o f what might be expected in the field.
3.5. Inspector actions during approval
The inspector with specific responsibilities for assessment o f a site service will
be expected to pilot the application for approval through the administrative process
o f approval within HSE. Inevitably this can be a lengthy process and casework for
a number o f services can commit a significant staff resource. The inspector must be
satisfied that the service is o f a standard appropriate for approval by HSE. In most
cases, technical queries or issues relating to procedural matters are raised in
discussions at the panel meeting. The inspector is responsible for satisfactorily
resolving any question raised before the final certificate o f approval can be prepared
for signature by a person with powers delegated under the Health and Safety at Work
etc. A ct to grant approval.
3.6. Inspector actions after approval
Formal approval by HSE demonstrates that, at the time o f approval, the

necessary standard o f competence has been achieved. However, approvals may be
for a period up to seven years and it is therefore necessary to have a system to
ensure that standards do not deteriorate. This is achieved in the main by self
regulation and annual performance testing (where appropriate) which is centrally
organized by HSE.
Inspector action is still required, however, in the post-approval stage, although
to a reduced extent. Examples o f this type o f work are as follows:
(1) Periodic visits to services for routine inspection purposes allow the regulating
authority to be satisfied that self-regulation is working effectively and that
standards are not dropping.
(2) Occasionally, an inspection w ill be prompted by a requirement on services to
notify HSE o f any significant changes in the description given in the laboratory
statement these may be staffing changes, technical improvements to
equipment, updating o f methodology. In these circumstances the inspector is
required to assess the significance o f the change, which could in some
circumstances necessitate a new application for approval.
(3) There may be a need to visit the service if the results o f performance tests
indicate that the standard o f operation has fallen to an unacceptable level.
3.7. Examples of problems identified during inspection
3.7.1. Inadequate dem arcation o f responsibilities
IRR 85 requires the appointment o f a Radiological Protection Advisor (RPA)

who has responsibilities for providing advice to employers regarding radiological
safety. In som e cases it is advantageous for both the Approved Dosimetry Services
and RPAs to be independent o f the employers for whom they provide services. Such
independence is desirable to ensure objectivity o f advice, which might otherwise
be affected by the commercial interests o f the employer. However, som e large sites
have their own dosimetry services and RPAs paid directly by the employer. In
general, the situation is satisfactory in that both the dosimetry services and RPAs
value their independent status and are aware o f the need to maintain this position.
On several occasions difficulties have been observed, however, especially in cases
where the same person performs the function o f an RPA and also has management
responsibilities within the approved dosimetry service.
IAEA-SM-309/3 319
3 .7 .2 . Lack of, o r inadequate, traceability o f calibration sources to national

standards
On occasions an inspector may find that documentation relating to traceability

to national standards is m issing, inadequate or out-of-date. Som e services may have
difficulties in obtaining standard sources relevant to their particular application (e.g.
uranium and plutonium). In such circumstances applications are treated on a case by
case basis and alternative methods such as kerma in air measurements may be
accepted as suitable alternatives.
3 .7 .3 . D ifficulties in dosim eter calibration to 10 Sv
Although an application for approval may define a dose range for which
approval is sought, the D SP takes the view that services should be approved for the
full dose range o f a particular technique. It is considered that calibration up to 10 Sv,
particularly o f w hole body dosimeters, is necessary to ensure that high accidental and
em ergency exposures are fully covered. Tw o types o f problem are encountered in
this connection. Firstly, not many services possess large enough calibration sources
to enable them to carry out dosimeter exposures up to 10 Sv in reasonable time and
without causing local disruption o f routine. Secondly, although there are no
problems with the linearity o f exposures o f TLDs at 10 Sv,.saturation o f the optical
density o f film s at doses above about 5 Sv considerably reduces the reliability o f dose
measurements at the top end o f the calibration range. The first problem is being
solved by arranging irradiation o f calibration dosimeters at weekends or long holiday
periods and at central facilities (which, however, often charge high rates for such
services). The second problem is being tackled by exercising extra care in the
construction and interpretation o f the calibration curve. Inspectors take special
interest in these matters to ensure that acceptable standards are maintained.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Great Britain has a w ell established schem e for approval o f dosimetry services
by the Health and Safety Executive. Experience has shown that inspection o f services
by officers o f the regulatory agency is a necessary part o f the process, though the
frequency o f inspections is low and the scheme depends to a large extent upon self
regulation. This allocation o f effort has worked w ell in the majority o f cases but
occasionally som e services require a disproportionate amount o f the resources,
perhaps because o f novel techniques or difficulties o f operation; others may require
direct intervention because o f poor standards or unacceptable operating practices. On
the w hole, however, the scheme has been successful in establishing reasonably
uniform standards o f performance and is cost effective in terms o f manpower
resources.
320 SLMISTER and WOJCIKIEWICZ
REFERENCES
[1] Ionising Radiations Regulations 1985, Statutory Instrument 1985 No 1333,

HMSO, London (1985).
[2] Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, Ch. 37, HMSO, London (1974).
[3] European Council Directive No. 80/836, Euratom, Official Journal No. L246 (1980) 1.
[4] European Council Directive No. 84/467, Euratom, Official Journal No. L265 (1984) 4.
[5] Approved Code of Practice, The Protection of Persons against Ionising Radiation
Arising from any Work Activity, HMSO, London, (1985).
[6] Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium of the Society for Radiological
Protection, Malvern, June 1989, Institute of Physics, London (1989).
[7] HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, Statement on Approval of Dosimetry
Services, HSE, London (1989).
[8] HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, Guidance on Approval of Dosimetry
Services under the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1985, Part 1 External
radiations, HSE, London (1985).
Services under the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1985, Part 2 Internal
radiations, HSE, London (1989).
Services under the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1985, Part 3 Co-ordination and
Record Keeping (revised 1987) HSE, London (1987).
[11] HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, Guidance for Approved Dosimetry Services
on Individual Monitoring of Internal Radiation from the Prolonged Retention of Long
Lived Radionuclides, HSE, London (1986).
[12] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, General
Principles of Monitoring for Radiation Protection of Workers, ICRP Publication
No. 35, Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York (1982).
[13] NATIONAL PHYSICAL LABORATORY, General Criteria for Laboratory Approval.
Provision of Personal Dosimetry Services, Rep. BCS 0803, NPL, Teddington (1977).
[14] NATIONAL PHYSICAL LABORATORY, Supplementary Criteria for Laboratory
Approval. Provision of Personal Dosimetry Services using Film Dosimeters for Beta,
Gamma, X and Thermal Neutron Radiations, Rep. BCS 0821, NPL, Teddington
(1977).
Approval. Provision of Personal Dosimetry Services using Nuclear Emulsion Film
Dosemeters for Neutron Radiations, Rep. BCS 0822, NPL, Teddington (1977).
Approval. Provision of Personal Dosimetry Services using Thermoluminescent
Dosemeters for Beta, Gamma, X and Neutron Radiations, Rep. BCS 0823, NPL,
Teddington (1977).
CONTROL PROGRAMMES
(Session VII)
Chairman
L.A. BULDAKOV
Union o f Soviet Socialist Republics
IAEA-SM-309/10
ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE
RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAMME
C. KAMMERER
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm ission,
W ashington, D .C .,
United States o f America
Abstract
ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAMME.
The mechanism by which States regulate by-product, source material and limited quan
tities of special nuclear material is reviewed. Guidelines used by the Federal Government to
assure an adequate level of public health and safety in the States are discussed. It is shown
how these guidelines are used for establishing and maintaining a comprehensive radiation con
trol programme.
One must keep in mind that the Agreement State programme which I shall
describe is dependent upon the four follow ing points: (1) Federal law s and regula^
tions; (2) State laws and regulations similar to the Federal ones; (3) inspection, both
at the State level and the Federal audit inspection o f the States programme to protect
public health and safety; and (4) training for State personnel which is funded and
administered by the Federal organization.
The United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm ission (USNRC) is involved in a
unique regulatory partnership programme with State Governments which recently
celebrated its 28th year. This programme provides considerable assurance that public
health and safety w ill be protected through comprehensive regulatory programmes
and assistance in forming and maintaining an infrastructure for States to manage
effective radiation control programmes (RCPs).
Prior to the enactment o f the Atom ic Energy Act o f 1954, nuclear industry
activities in the U SA were largely confined to the Federal Government. The Act
made it possible for private commercial firms to enter the nuclear field for the first
time. Because o f the hazards associated with the use o f nuclear materials, Congress
determined that these activities should be regulated under a Federal licensing system
to protect the health and safety o f the workers in the nuclear industry and the public.
The USNRC is the Federal agency charged with this responsibility.
The role o f protecting the publics health and safety has traditionally been a
State responsibility. However, the Act did not specify a role for the States in nuclear
matters. In 1959 Congress added an amendment to the Act which spells out a role
for the States and provides a statutory basis under which the Federal Government
323
324 KMMERER
YEA R
FIG. 1. Materials licences in effect 1961-1987
relinquishes to the States under a signed Agreement between the USNRC Chairman
and the Governor o f the State portions o f its regulatory authority. The 1959 Amend
ment made it possible for the States to license and regulate by-product material,
source material and small quantities o f special nuclear material (see Fig. 1). The
Federal Government, however, retains regulatory authority over reactors, export
and import o f nuclear materials, larger quantities o f fissionable materials, consumer
products, facilities vital to the N ations security and defence and certain types o f
radioactive waste. In 1978 the Act was again amended to require those States wishing
to regulate milling to adopt certain technical and procedural controls. The 1978
Amendment also requires the USNRC to review periodically Agreement State pro
grammes for adequacy and compatibility. In 1981, the USNRC determined that
qualified States might enter into limited agreements for the regulation o f low level
radioactive waste in permanent disposal facilities.
At present, 29 o f the 50 States have entered into Agreements with the USNRC
(see Fig. 2). These States regulate over 65% o f the 24 000 licences for by-product,
source material, and special nuclear material in the USA. The USNRC regulates the
remaining licensed activities.
The ch ief benefits o f the Agreement State programme are: (1) the regulatory
agency is closer to the licensee, (2) inspection costs are lower, allowing for more
frequent inspections, (3) the radiation control agency can be more responsive to
licensees and the public, and (4) State radiation control agencies regulate all radiation
sources.
IAEA-SM-309/10 325
H
2z
I o ^ -
e. S *
5 * 1
5S u
FIG. 2. Agreement State programme.

NORTH DAKOTA
326 KMMERER
Typical Courses
Health physics
Inspection procedures
Licensing orientation
Radiation prodection engineering
Medical
Radiography
W ell logging
Special topics/workshop
Low level waste project m anagement
Programme management
Tailings dam evaluation
Transportation
FIG. 3. Training programme (all States).
The USNRC maintains a continuing relationship with each Agreement State to

assure continued compatibility o f the States regulatory programme and its adequacy
to protect public health and safety. Each agreement provides that the State w ill use
its best efforts to maintain continuing capability with the U SN R C s programme. This
Federal-State relationship includes exchange o f information on a current basis cover
ing regulations, licensing, inspection and enforcement data, consultation on special
licensing, inspections enforcement and other regulatory matters o f common interest.
The USNRC sponsors an extensive and practical programme o f training for State
radiation control personnel. During 1989 the USNRC trained 328 State personnel at
a cost o f US $612 000 (see Fig. 3). Special technical assistance is routinely provided
to the States upon request.
The U SN R C s co-operative relationship with the States was evidenced recently
by its rapid and com plete response to a problem involving leaking polonium static
eliminator sealed sources. A ll known locations in the entire U SA were surveyed and
decontaminated within four to six weeks, thanks to Federal-State co-ordination.
The USNRC conducts on-site, in-depth programme review s periodically (at
least every 18 months) o f each Agreement State in which organizational, administra
tive, personnel, regulatory, licensing, com pliance, and enforcement programme
areas are reviewed. Selected licensing and compliance casework are reviewed in
detail. State inspectors are accompanied by USNRC staff on selected inspections o f
State licensees.
In the continuing spirit o f co-operation between the USNRC and the States, an
annual meeting is held to discuss matters o f mutual safety interest in a very frank
and constructive forum.
IAEA-SM-309/10 327
When programme deficiencies are identified, specific recommendations for

improvements are developed and formally transmitted to the State for action and
response. Follow-up reviews are made as necessary.
A formal set o f guidelines is used to assess the ability o f the States to protect
the public health and safety from radiation hazards and to maintain a programme
compatible with that o f the USNRC. For each o f these guidelines there are extensive
written procedures and standards to be follow ed. The follow ing list indicates som e
o f the major features covered in each guideline.
1. Enabling legislation
D oes statutory authority exist, designating a State radiation control agency?
2. Regulations
Are State regulations in conformity with the Code o f Federal Regulations,

Title 10? Have the public and the USNRC had opportunity to comment?
3. Organization
What is the status o f th State RCP within the overall State organization struc
ture? Is there a clear division o f responsibilities with other State agencies? Is the
internal organization appropriate and effective?
4. Legal assistance
Have knowledgeable legal staff been assigned to the RCP?
5. Technical advisory committees
What technical com m ittees, Federal agencies, etc. may be used to extend RCP
staff capabilities? Is there a State M edical Advisory Committee to advise the RCP?
6. Budget
A re operating funds adequate to support programme needs? D o these com e

from sources which provide continuity and reliability? What are sources o f sup
plemental funds?
7. Laboratory support
D oes the RCP have in-house laboratory support capiability to conduct bio
assays, analyse environmental samples, etc.?
328 KMMERER
8. Administrative procedures
Have suitable written internal policy and administrative procedures been estab
lished to provide continuity and uniformity in regulatory practices and to assure that
the programmes are carried out as required?
9. Management
What is the reporting system for the reviewing the status o f regulatory actions?
A re periodic reviews o f licence cases conducted? Are supervisory reviews per
formed ? Are audits o f regional offices or other Government agencies performed?
10. Office equipment and support services
Is adequate secretarial and clerical support available? Are professional staff

free o f fee collecting and clerical duties?
11. Public information
Are inspection and licensing files available to the public? Are there provisions
for protecting proprietary and personal information? Are there opportunities for pub
lic hearings in accordance with State laws?
12. Qualifications o f technical staff
D o all professional staff have an appropriate degree or training? Are written

job descriptions available so that qualifications needed can be readily identifed?
13. Staffing level
Is the staffing level appropriate? (Professional staffing level should be approxi

mately 1 -1 .5 person-years per 100 licences in effect. RCP must not have fewer than
two professionals available with training and experience to operate RCP with con
tinuous coverage. For States regulating uranium m ill trailings, it appears that about
2 -2 .7 5 professional person-years o f effort are need to process a new mill licence or
major renewal.)
14. Staff supervision
Is the level o f supervisory staff adequate? D o senior personnel review applica

tions and inspect licences independently? D o they participate in the establishment o f
IAEA-SM-309/10 329
policy? How are junior personnel supervised, and what are the limits o f their
responsibilities?
15. Training
Have senior personnel attended NRC core courses ? Has the RCP a programme
to maintain staff competence in areas o f changing technology?
16. Staff continuity
What steps have been taken to minimize staff turnover? Are salary levels ade
quate? What are opportunities for promotion and/or salary increases?
17. Licensing programme
Is the licensing programme efficient and effective? How does it determine

whether the applicant can operate safely and in compliance with the regulations and
licence conditions? How is technical quality in the licensing programme assured?
Are adequate files and records maintained? Are licences clear, complete and
accurate? Are product evaluations adequate? Is the RCP licensing in line with current
USNRC practice?
18. Compliance programme
D oes the RCP maintain an inspection programme adequate to assess licensee

compliance with State regulations and licence conditions? Are adequate statistics
kept, allowing Programme Management to assess the status o f the inspection
programme? Is an inspection plan made in advance, identifying priorities for inspec
tions and setting target dates? Is the frequency o f inspection based on the potential
hazards? Are the inspectors competent and are field evaluations o f their work made
annually? What is the response to actual and alleged incidents? How fast are inci
dents investigated? What enforcement procedures are in place? Are these sufficient
and effective? Are inspection guides consistent with USNRC practice? Are written
inspection policies issued? How are findings o f inspections documented?
19. Independent measurements
Are confirmatory measurements sufficient to ensure the licensees control o f

materials and to validate the licensees measurements? Is RCP instrumentation ade
quate for surveying licence operations? Are instrument calibration services readily
available?
330 KMMERER
CONCLUSION
Under the terms o f the Agreement, the Federal Government relinquishes

regulatory authority over by-product, source material and non-critical quantities o f
special nuclear materials. Conversely, the Agreement States assume regulatory
authority over these same materials and promise to conduct their programmes in a
manner compatible with the U SN R C s regulatory programme.
The 29 Agreement States regulate over 16 000 materials licences, utilizing
approximately 200 professional staff and 60 secretarial and clerical staff. The Agree
ment States expend over ten million dollars annually to implement their programmes.
They conduct approximately 6000 inspections and 12 000 licensing actions annually.
Applying the guidelines as detailed earlier, the U SN R C s audits o f the 29 Agreement
States revealed that in 90% o f the audits a finding o f adequacy and compatibility was
made either at the time o f the on-site audit or shortly thereafter, based on minor
programme changes agreed to in writing. Follow-up audits were required in 6% o f
the cases to emphasize the necessity to make changes in the States programme so
that a finding o f adequacy and compatibility could be made.
Current concerns regarding the use o f radioactive materials include:
(1) The radiation overexposures associated with the use o f sealed sources in indus
trial radiography continue to be the largest contributors to worker radiation
doses;
(2) Loss o f control o f certain devices, such as the large medical sources in Brazil
and M exico, has caused contamination o f private residences, scrap metal yards
and metal foundries; and
(3) The high rate o f turnover among junior level personnel places the Agreement
States in a position o f perpetual recruitment and training.
W hile it is difficult to draw conclusions solely from quantitative data, it can

be concluded that the Agreement States regulate the majority o f the nations materials
licensees and make a significant contribution to public health and safety in the USA.
The author believes that the 19 programme guidelines utilized by the States can
be Used to form the basis o f a comprehensive radiation programme in other nations.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Atomic Energy Act, Section 274, 1959, as amended, United States Nuclear Regulatory Com
mission Document, NUREG-0980 (Aug. 1989).
Suggested State Regulations for Control of Radiation, Conference of Radiation Control

Programme Directors, Inc. (1982).
IAEA-SM-309/10 331
The Council of State Governments Suggested State Radiation Control Act.
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Code of Federal Regula

tions, Title 10, Energy, US Govt Printing Office, Washington, DC.
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Evaluation of Agreement

State Radiation Control Programs, 4 June 1987, Fed. Regist. 52 (1987) 107.
IAEA-SM-309/11
A NEW SYSTEM FOR THE CONTROL OF

ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOACTIVITY IN ITALY
G. CAMPOS V EN U TI*, S. PIERMATTEI**,

S. RISICA*, A . SU SA N N A **
* Laboratorio di Fisica,
Istituto Superiore di Sanit
** D ivisione Radioattivit Ambintale,

ENEA-DISP
Rome, Italy
A bstract
A NEW SYSTEM FOR THE CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOACTIVITY IN

ITALY.
After a description of the regulatory framework, the paper outlines the evolution of
environmental radioactivity monitoring in Italy. The effects of the Chernobyl accident on the
review and improvement of the national network organization are also discussed. The prepara
tion of a Directive to the Administrative Districts to control environmental radioactivity on
their own territory is described. Finally, the scientific content of the Directive is examined
and the work in progress on the organization of this new network is discussed.
1. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The Italian nuclear law dating from 1964 establishes, as required by the
Euratom Treaty, that the control o f environmental radioactivity around nuclear
power plants and nuclear research centres is the responsibility o f the plant manage
ment (Local Surveillance Network).
The general control o f radioactive contamination in air, water, soil and food
stuffs is entrusted to the Ministry o f Health. The CN EN (National Committee for
Nuclear Energy), now ENEA (National Committee for Nuclear Energy and Alterna
tive Energies), has co-ordination and promotion duties.
In the years 1972 and 1977 som e o f the administrative functions o f the State
were transferred by Presidential D ecrees to the 21 Administrative Districts (Regioni)
into which Italy is divided. The control o f environmental radioactivity is one o f these
functions, and surveillance networks at District level are envisaged.
333
334 CAMPOS VENUTI et al.
At national level person-related monitoring programmes [1] were carried out

from the mid nineteen-fifties under the supervision o f ENEA and with the co
operation o f governmental research laboratories, universities, etc. These pro
grammes were oriented mainly to evaluate the global impact o f all, the artificial
radiation sources on the general public.
2. EVOLUTION OF THE ENVIRONM ENTAL MONITORING

PROGRAMME IN ITALY
A s outlined above, the national monitoring network operates according to the

directives o f the Ministry o f Health, w hile EN EA promotes the standardization o f
techniques, comparisons between various laboratories, arid the collection and publi
cation o f data.
From the beginning, air particulate was collected regularly and analysed as
w ell as w et deposition, surface and sea waters. Samples o f m ilk, beef, vegetables,
wheat and fish were also collected and analysed [2]. The measurement techniques
progressed over time from simple total beta and gamma counting to sophisticated
gamma spectrometry. At the same time, efforts were made to standardize the collec
tion o f samples and intercomparison exercises were carried out.
THE NATIONAL MONITORING NETWORK
FIG. 1. Scheme o f the evolution o f the national network after the Chernobyl accident. For
airborne radiometric measurements see Ref. [5].
IAEA-SM-309/11 335
TABLE I. THE SAM PLING A N D M EASUREM ENT ORGANIZATION OF

THE N A TIO N A L NETWORK REVIEWED IN 1985 [4]
Measurements
Sample
Type Frequency
Air Total beta Daily

Gamma spectrometry Monthly
Pu Monthly
Fallout Gamma spectrometry Monthly

Sr-90 and H-3 Monthly
Surface water Gamma spectrometry Quarterly

Irrigation water Sr-90 Quarterly
Sea water Sr-90 and Cs-137 Six-monthly
Drinking water Gamma spectrometry Six-monthly
Sediment Cs-137 Six-monthly
Cows milk Cs-137 and Sr-90 Quarterly

Dairy products Gamma spectrometry Annually
Industrial foodstuffs Sr-90 Annually
Gamma spectrometry Six-monthly
Beef Cs-137 Annually

Pork Gamma spectrometry Six-monthly
Complete diets Cs-137 and H-3 Quarterly

Pu and other transuranic Annually
Over the years the analyses o f som e samples were dropped [2]. However,
historical sets o f data on air particulate, sea water and m ilk are available. A s the
coverage o f the territory was far from com plete, efforts were made in 1985 [3] to
improve, widen and review the national network (see Table I) [4]. The Chernobyl
accident stressed this need: in particular, air monitoring systems able to work in
real time were studied to obtain fast responses in the event o f accident situations
arising outside the country. Different choices o f foodstuffs to be sampled were
introduced and more strict quality control procedures were envisaged. The monitor
ing network was also opened to environmental radioactivity laboratories created to
monitor the territory at local and district level. In Fig. 1 a scheme o f the evolution
o f the national network after the Chernobyl accident is outlined.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT MONITORING NETWORKS
In 1983 a working group was appointed by the Minister o f Health to prepare

a draft Directive to the Administrative Districts to control environmental radioactiv
ity on their own territory as provided for by the National Health Service Law. The
National Institute o f Health and the ENEA Directorate for Nuclear Safety and Radia
tion Protection were represented in this group by the authors o f this paper. Among
others, appointed members were representatives o f the ISPELS (National Institute
for Occupational Safety), the Ministries o f Health, Home Affairs, Labour, D efence
and o f som e Administrative Districts.
The Draft was prepared mainly by the EN EA and the National Institute o f
Health in summer 1984 and promulgated by the Minister o f Health only in February
1987 [6].
The D irective is a scientific document which, starting from the inventory o f
the radiation sources existing on the territory, lays down the basis to set up a source
related and person related monitoring programme. The document is supplemented
with technical appendices in which:
(1) the types o f samples to be collected are analysed, giving emphasis to those
which are o f general interest, that is air, deposition, main components o f
human diets, environmental indicators such as sediments, etc. (see Table );
(2) the criteria to be follow ed to evaluate particular pathways are outlined;
(3) som e general information about the main experimental procedures is given.
M oreover, the Directive is aimed at the co-ordination and harmonization o f the

existing measurement activities and the promotion o f new capabilities. It requires the
District Authorities to appoint or create a reference laboratory responsible for the
monitoring network and acting as an interface between central institutes.
It also stresses the need for standardization and intercalibration o f the
experimental methods, both for sampling and measurements; it requests that the data
collected and elaborated at local level be published at regular intervals. Finally, the
Directive calls for the appointment o f a com m ission, w hose tasks are: (1) to analyse
protocols prepared at local level, (2) to examine and analyse the collected data, (3)
to promote updating or changes in the protocols, where necessary, and (4) to offer
technical advice, if requested. The authors were apppointed members o f this second
Comm ission, too.
Ad hoc funds were allocated by the Minister o f Health for setting up the refer
ence laboratories. The funds were distributed according to the follow ing criteria:
(1) each reference laboratory shall be equipped with basic instrumentation and ad
hoc instruments for natural radioactivity measurements,
(2) som e laboratories w ill be also equipped with instruments aimed at detecting
alpha and beta emitters after radiochemical separation,
(3) other devices w ill be given to selected laboratories, upon request.
IAEA-SM-309/11 337
TABLE . THE SAM PLING A N D M EASUREM ENT FREQUENCY M INI

M U M REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ADM INISTRATIVE DISTRICT MONITOR
ING NETWORK PROVIDED BY THE DIRECTIVE. HIGHER FREQUENCIES
ARE RECOM M ENDED IN CASE OF NEED [6]
Sample Measurement frequency
Air Continuous air filter sampling

Fallout Quarterly on monthly composed samples
Surface water ^
Irrigation water
Almost six-monthly
Sea water
Drinking water j
Sediment Almost six-monthly
Mollusc Almost six-monthly
Cows milk Almost quarterly
Other foodstuffs: local large scale Almost yearly on composed samples
production or import . collected throughout the year
According to a decision o f the Ministry o f Health, the purchase o f the

instrumentation mentioned in (1) and (2) is made at central level. This required an
accurate study o f the appropriate instrument characteristics and performances, start
ing from the analysis o f the major sources o f exposure to ionizing radiation existing
in the country.
A s regards basic instrumentation the Comm ission prepared a detailed list
together with the required technical qualifications. This list includes a complete
gamma spectrometry system (an intrinsic germanium detector with its shielding, the
associated electronic devices, a multichannel analyser (MCA) or a personal com
puter emulating the MCA and the appropriate software); an environmental detector
for gamma exposure; total alpha, beta and gamma detectors for measuring surface
contamination; an air sampler, a shielded total beta counter for measuring air filters
or similar samples; Marinelli beakers and calibration sources for all the detectors.
Each new reference laboratory w ill be equipped with this instrumentation, whereas
the already existing laboratories w ill receive the m issing apparatus.
Instruments for natural radioactivity measurements w ill be assigned to each
laboratory becaue o f the increased attention given by the international scientific com
munity to this radiation source in the last decade. A s is w ell known, this radiation
includes the exposure o f the w hole population to radon and radon daughter concen
trations in the indoor environment and the exposure o f workers due to mining,
exploitation o f spas, fertilizer extraction and use, and other industrial processes con
centrating natural radioactive materials. To cope with this type o f surveillance, the
Comm ission suggested a list o f instruments as follows: a field gamma spectrometer,
a detector for radon in water, a complete system for passive measurements o f radon
indoors (based on solid state nuclear track detectors), a radon and radon daughter
analyser, and a com plete system for passive gamma measurements (based on ther
m oluminescent detectors). It is worth remembering that som e o f the reference
laboratories have been involved in the nationwide indoor natural radiation survey
proposed and organized by the National Institute o f Health and the ENEA D irec
torate for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection and now in progress [7].
A s for the measurements o f alpha and beta emitters in environmental samples,
currently these are carried out in only a few laboratories. The Chernobyl accident
showed the desirability o f increasing this type o f expertise. Indeed, since these radio
nuclides are so highly radiotoxic, they might becom e predominant in other accident
scenarios. Therefore, it was decided to increase the number o f laboratories able to
perform these measurements and to promote their intercalibration. Taking into
account a hom ogeneous geographical distribution and previously gained experience
in basic radiation measurements, some laboratories were given complete equipment
for radiochemical separation and radionuclide detection.
An accurate analysis was also made for alpha and beta emitters o f the best tech
niques and instrumentation available and a com plete list was prepared follow ing the
criteria adopted in the case o f basic instrumentation.
For all the instrumentation which w ill be purchased at central level special war
ranties are requested from the manufactures or suppliers: that is, the detectors and
the equipment must have suitable interfaces; the maintenance o f all the equipment
and the updating o f the software must be guaranteed; tests and final inspections must
be carried out and the training o f the personnel on the equipment must be assured.
M oreover, funds were assigned to the Administrative Districts in order to com
plete the laboratories instrumentation needed for correct functioning. Funds were
allocated using as parameters the area, the population and the productivity o f the
individual District.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Currently, the purchase o f instruments at central level is at a w ell advanced

stage and the basic instrumentation w ill shortly be available for the laboratories.
A certain number o f reference laboratories are already working, particularly
in Northern Italy, and they are sending their data to the Health Ministry. More
difficulties in the set-up o f the laboratories are being encountered in other Districts
IAEA-SM-309/11 339
(particularly in Southern Italy), where the overall social and econom ic conditions
require different priorities in health policy.
In the meantime the new central com m ission called for by the D irective is
working in different subgroups on the type and frequency o f the measurements to
be taken by the laboratories and how to transmit the results to the Health Ministry
(whether by telefax or on-line, etc.), and the protocols for calibrations and inter
calibrations o f the techniques for quality control o f the data.
At the same time the Central Institutes are studying ad hoc training pro
grammes for the technical personnel, envisaging courses on the theoretical and
experimental aspects. These courses w ill take place in the laboratories o f the same
institutes or in the already existing laboratories o f som e Districts. This last phase
represents a necessary step to enable the new laboratories to operate correctly.
This experience can be considered a good example o f co-operation between
central institutions and local health structures.
REFERENCES
[1] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Princi

ples of Monitoring for the Radiation Protection o f the Population, Publication 43, Per
gamon Press, Oxford and New York (1985).
[2] FALOCI, C., MANCIOPPI, S., PIERMATTEI, S., SUSANNA, A., Results of 30
years of environmental surveillance in Italy , Proc. 7th Int. Congr. International
Radiation Protection Association (IRPA), Sydney, April 1988, Vol. 2, Pergamon
Press, Sydney (1988) 922-925.
[3] CAMPOS VENUTI, G., PIERMATTEI, S., Mthodologie de la dtection de la radi
oactivit dans lenvironnement, Radioprotection 23 2 (1988) 121.
[4] ENEA-DISP, Rapporta Annuale sulla Radioattivit Ambientale in Italia (vol. 1 Reti
Nazionali) Rep. DISP-ARA-01/87, ENEA-DISP, Rome (1985).
[5] BELLI, M ., et al., Il rischio ambientale nella produzione di energia: risultati speri-
mentali, calcoli e riflessioni dopo Chernobyl, Annali dellIstituto Superiore di Sanit
23 2 (1987) 1-513.
[6] MINISTERO DELLA SANIT, Circolare 3 febbraio 1987 n.2. Direttive agli organi
regionali per lesecuzione di controlli sulla radioattivit ambientale, Gazzetta Ufficiale
dlia Repubblica Italiana (5 March 1987).
[7] BENASSAI, S ., et a l., Italian survey to evaluate the average effective dose equivalent
due to radon indoors , Proc. 7th Int. Congr. International Radiation Protection Associ
ation (IRPA), Sydney, April 1988, Vol. 1, Pergamon Press, Sydney (1988) 224-227.
IAEA-SM-309/50
A DATABASE FOR THE NATIONAL RADIATION

CONTROL PROGRAMME IN MEDICAL AND
DENTAL RADIOGRAPHY
J.E. PEIXOTO, M .C . CAM POS, R.Q . CHAVES

Instituto de Radioproteo e Dosimetra,
Comisso Nacional de Energa Nuclear do Brasil,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Abstract
A DATABASE FOR THE NATIONAL RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAMME IN
MEDICAL AND DENTAL RADIOGRAPHY.
To support radiation control programmes in diagnostic radiology facilities (medical and
dental) carried out by health authorities, a computer database is under development. During
the surveys, data are collected on the institution, on X ray equipment, frequency of examina
tion and many other parameters related to the exposure of the patient, the staff and the public.
All the routine work to process the input data from the surveys and to compare the assessed
values of single parameters with acceptance values is done by an IBM XT compatible
microcomputer. Regional programmes generate input files for the national database. The data
assessed by the software are an important part of the system of dose limitation. Surveys at
regular intervals will give population trends and occupational doses from radiodiagnostics, and
will evaluate the efficacy of the overall programme of radiation control.
1. INTRODUCTION
In highly industrialized countries the irradiation o f the population and o f the

occupationally exposed persons by medical and dental X ray examinations is quanti
fied and is part o f the system o f dose limitation [1]. Quality control and quality assur
ance o f the sources and their application are therefore very common and are
necessary from the viewpoint o f safe use and the potential benefit to society.
Analytical m odels even relate the frequency o f the use o f radiation sources in
medicine and dentistry to a scale o f industrialization and to the level o f health care
in a society [1]. To rate Brazil on this scale by using available data is not possible
because o f the inhomogeneous geographic and demographic situation o f the country.
Furthermore, no assessment on a national level o f the quality o f procedures using
X rays is possible because o f the lack o f data related to the usage o f radiographic
techniques in general [2].
341
342 PEIXOTO et al.
2. OBJECTIVES
To support quality control and quality assurance programmes in diagnostic

radiology (medical and dental) carried out by regional radiation protection bodies,
a computer based system was developed to supply local health authorities with a uni
form methodology to perform surveys and to issue survey reports to the users. At
the national level, health authorities will have a reliable database to make decisions
as to their policies.
The system described is intended to be implemented step by step in the various
regions o f Brazil and is designed to record data from a total o f about 15 000 medical
and 40 000 dental X ray units. The first step includes data related to radiation protec
tion features and irradiation parameters in radiography. Subsequent steps will deal
with other diagnostic radiology techniques such as fluoroscopy, computer tomo
graphy and so on.
The data assessed by such a system are an important part o f the system o f dose
limitation. Surveys at regular intervals will give the trends in population, the dose
due to radiodiagnostics and w ill evaluate the efficacy o f the overall programme o f
radiation control.
The main applications o f this database w ill be:
(a) to analyse on a quantitative and qualitative basis the radiographic procedures

in the various regions o f the country;
(b) to check the technical performance o f X ray generators and tubes o f different
factories and production lines;
(c) to support licensing activities and routine inspections in X ray facilities (medi
cal and dental);
(d) to assess the quality o f the performance o f the X ray units;
(e) to assess the adequacy o f the protection afforded to patients, members o f the
staff and members o f the public in or in the vicinity o f the X ray rooms;
(f) to issue survey reports with recommendations to the users.
3. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
3.1 Measuring methods and personnel training
In order to get a reliable database, it is necessary to adopt standardized

methods for measurement and for the collection o f the information o f interest. In this
work, standard methods were adopted or developed to obtain data related to X ray
tubes and generators and to radiation protection features (adequacy o f protective
barriers and individual monitoring).
IAEA-SM-309/50 343
In this paper standardization means the selection o f standard measuring tech

niques, test tools and/or measuring instruments and acceptance limits for the m eas
ured parameters. According to this m ethodology, the input data are collected in a
uniform way in all regional programmes.
Personnel training to perform the measurements is also an important com po
nent in data acquisition. To make the training o f inspectors to run the surveys easier,
two user guides were prepared for each parameter measured. One guide describes
step by step how the measurement is to be done.The second one explains the way
to run the software through the description o f the input fields, length o f variables
and so on.
3 .2 . H ardw are
At regional level, the computer system is designed to run on an IBM -PC/XT

compatible microcomputer with PC-DOS version 3 .3 . Owing to the amount o f data
to be recorded and the length o f the executable module, it is necessary to have
40 Mbytes hard disk capacity and 640 kbytes o f RAM memory. Regional pro
grammes generate input files to the national database. At the national level, the data
base needs a mainframe computer in order to allow the processing o f such a large
amount o f data.
4. SOFTWARE DESCRIPTION
The software was developed using the Clipper compiler and the programmes
to process the input data from measurements use a special technique o f overlays in
order to save memory space. With this technique the executable module for radiogra
phy needs only 266 kbytes o f RAM . The whole radiography module is designed to
record data on the institution, the X ray units, radiation protection features, fre
quency o f examinations and six parameters related to the irradiation. To manage
these data 103 computer programs that generate 32 data files are used.
Figures 1 and 2 show the organization o f data acquisition through hierarchical
diagrams for medical and dental facilities respectively.
5. D A TA ASSESSED
5 .1 . In stitution, X ray unit and frequency o f exam inations
The first group o f data is related to the institution (name, address, category and
person responsible for radiation protection), to the X ray unit (maker, m odel, num
ber and characteristics o f generator, X ray tubes and other components such as table,
344 PEIXOTO et al.
X ray
Tube 1
Field size:
A lignm ent
Field size:
Collimation
O utput:
M agnitude
O utput:
Variation
w ith kV
O utput:
Variation
w ith mA
Output:
Variation
with mA-s
Focal spot
size
Total
filtra tio n
FIG. 1. Hierarchical diagram for data acquisition in medical institutions.

IAEA-SM-309/SO
FIG. 2. Hierarchical diagram fo r data acquisition in dental institutions.

346 PEIXOTO et al.
grids, image intensifier, etc.) and to the frequency o f examinations (average number
o f examinations per type and per week).
5.2. Quality assurance and protection features
The remaining data are related to QA and protection features. In medical X ray
facilities, data are collected for the follow ing items relating to occupational and
patient exposure. These include:
radiation output: magnitude, variation with m A, variation with kV, variation

with m A -s and automatic exposure.
beam quality: beam filtration.
kilovoltage accuracy: dial calibration and this calibration against current
variation.
focal spot size: broad and fine focus.
field size: alignment and collimation.
exposure time: accuracy and reproducibility.
individual monitoring.
lead equivalence o f protective barriers.
For dental X ray units and film processing, data related to the follow ing items
are recorded:
exposure at skin entrance.

beam quality: beam filtration.
radiation field size and uniformity.
film processing: developing time, fog and developer activity.
individual monitoring.
6. D A TA ACQUISITION
6.1 M edical facilities
Data related to the institution, the X ray unit, frequency o f examinations and
individual monitoring do not depend essentially on measurements and therefore they
may be acquired and/or updated either by previous information before the inspection
or during the visits. Data related to X ray generator and tube performance and pro
tection features have to be acquired in the course o f the inspections. They are valid
for the time the survey is performed.
IAEA-SM-309/50 347
6.2. Dental facilities
Data related to dental X ray units differ from those for the medical units with
regard to essential elements. Data for radiation protection features are acquired in
the same way as those for medical facilities. The remaining data may be obtained
either by in loco visits or by a postal survey. Exposure at skin entrance, field size
and filtration for a single iolar tooth examination are measured with a postal kit con
taining TLD-100 dosimeters, radiographic film and aluminium filters. When the
postal mode is used, the exposures have to be made by the dentists and they also have
to answer questions concerning technical characteristics of the X ray unit, radio-
graphic film and average number of examinations per month.
To assess the quality of the film processing in the dental office, a special
method was developed. It consists of a paper card containing two pre-exposed dental
radiographic films, both having the same image. The right half registers the latent
image of the molar region of a mandible phantom, and the left half contains four
optical densities (base + fog, 0.25, 1.00 and 2.00 above base + fog density). The
four optical densities are used to determine the mean optical density (OD) of the
images developed at dentists offices [3]. The exposure measuring kit can also be
used in postal surveys.
7. DATA INTERPRETATION
7.1. Acceptance limits for single parameters
Radiation protection features (adequacy of protective barriers and individual

monitoring) have to follow national or international recommendations. Therefore no
range of acceptable values is given [4]. Table I gives an example of the acceptable
limits adopted in the assessment of performance of medical X ray generators and
tubes. They follow the criteria developed by the Hospital Physicists Association [5]
taking into account recent proposals from the literature [6]. Table II gives the accept
able limits adopted in the assessment of performance of dental facilities [3]. These
ranges of values have to be selected according to local circumstances also and they
are, broadly speaking, instruments for justification and optimization of the practice
under consideration.
7.2. Actions deduced
The data analysis will indicate the level of the actions to be implemented in
local programmes. Based upon the local infrastructure of health care and on the exist
ing state of adequacy of the X ray rooms and equipment, health authorities have to
set forth which actions will be implemented collectively. Furthermore, in many cases
348 PEIXOTO et al.
TABLE I. TUBE AND GENERATOR ASSESSMENT: ACCEPTANCE LIMITS

FOR MEDICAL X RAY UNITS
Parameter Good Normal Poor
(1) Radiation output

Magnitude 4.5-5.53 3.5-6.5 <3.5 or >6.5a
(10-2 mGy/mA-s) 8.0-10.0b 7.0-12.0b <7.0 or > 12.0 b
Variation with m A linear within linear within discontinuities,
5% 10% excessively
non-linear
Variation with m A - s 10% 20% > 20%

Variation with k V
(kV)exp(n) 1.9<n<2.3 1.6<n<2.6 n < 1.7 or n>2.5
(2) Filtration >2.5 m m Al 2.2-2.5 m m Al <2.2 m m Al
(3) Focal spot size: Both axes One axis Both axes
Broad focus < tolerance < tolerance > tolerance
Fine focus IEC limits IEC limits IEC limits
(4) k V accuracy with:

Dial calibration 5 k V 10 k V >10 kV
Current variation 5 k V 10 k V >10 kV
(5) Timer accuracy:

Range: Tolerances:
three two one or less
>0.1s 10% measurements measurements measurement
0.01-0. Is 0.005s < tolerance < tolerance < tolerance
<0.01s 0.002s limits limits limits
(6) Field size

Collimation <2% >2%
Alignment <1.5 >1.5
a One phase equipment.

b Three phase equipment.
IAEA-SM-309/50 349
TABLE II. EXPOSURE AND PROCESSING ASSESSMENT: ACCEPTANCE

LIMITS FOR DENTAL X RAY UNITS
Parameter Good Normal Poor
(1) Dose at skin

entrance (mGy)
D Speed group film 2.0-5.0 1.5-6.5 <1.5 or >6.5

E Speed group film 1.7-2.3 1.0-5.0 < 1.0 or >5.0
(2) Total filtration

< 5 0 kV >0.5 m m A1 0.5 m m A1 <0.5 m m A1
50 kV-70 k V > 1.5 m m A1 1.2-1.5 m m A1 <1.2 m m A1
> 7 0 kV >2.5 m m A1 2.2-2.5 m m A1 <2.2 m m A1
(3) Field diameter (cm)

Source-skin distance:
< 18 c m 5.5-6.5 5.0-7.0 <5.0 or >7.0
> 18 c m 6.5-7.5 5.0-8.0 <5.0 or >8.0
(4) Film processing

M e an optical
density (OD) in % + 5 to -10 + 10 to -20 < - 2 0 or > + 1 0
the necessary changes to be introduced are not only a matter of corrections in the
X ray rooms or equipment. In these cases the improvement in the overall radio-
graphic technique needs actions in the field of personnel training, norms and regula
tions and equipment design. As an example, in Brazil there is no special equipment
to perform paediatric examinations. Children are exposed to radiation in the same
way as adults (large field sizes, no gonadal shielding and high doses at the skin
entrance).
7.3. The survey report
The input data are collected in the course of the surveys. In preparing the input
files, data for single parameters are compared with acceptance limits and norms and
a report is issued to the medical or dental institution. The whole report is subdivided
into individual reports for each X ray unit. In the first part of the report information
is given concerning the technical characteristics of the various components of the
X ray unit (generator, tubes, table, image intensifier, etc.). After that, an individual
printout for each parameter with a clear indication of the measured value, its accep
tance (good, normal or poor) and recommendations are given.
350 PEIXOTO et al.
The survey report serves as an important instrument for the users and to local
health authorities in the implementation of their quality control and quality assurance
programmes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This project is supported by IAEA Technical Assistance Programmes

BRA/9/023 and BRA/9/035.
The authors thank Marcia T. Carlos, Antonio Mario Nogueira, Livia
Figueiredo, Rubemar Ferreira and Claudio Domingues from IRD/CNEN-Brazil for
their co-operation in technical aspects of the project. Special thanks are due to
G. Drexler from ISS/GSF-Munich, Federal Republic of Germany, for the discus
sions and overall revision of this paper and to J. Hunt from IRD/CNEN-Brazil for
helping with the English translation.
REFERENCES
[1] U N I T E D N A T I O N S , Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation, United Nations

Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation, Report to the General Assembly,
with annexes, United Nations, N e w York (1988).
[2] D R E X L E R , G., da C U N H A , P.G., P E IX O T O , J.E., Medical and occupational
exposures in Brazil, Workshop on Statistics of H u m a n Exposure to Ionizing Radia
tion, Oxford, April 1990.
[3] P E IX O T O , J.E., BESSA, S.O., F E R REIRA, R.S., Exposure survey in oral radiol
ogy using a postal system, Proc. 6th Int. I R P A Congress Berlin, M a y 1984
(KAUL, E., N E ID E R , R., P E N S K O , J., STIEVE, F.-E., B R U N N E R , H., Eds),
Fachverband fr Strahlenschutz, Karlsruhe, Federal Republic,of Germany (1984).
[4] I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O M M I S S I O N O N R A D I O L O G I C A L P R O T E C T I O N , R ecom
mendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP Publica
tion No. 26, Pergamon Press, Oxford and N e w York (1977).
[5] R E E C E , B.L., The H P A s role in protection of the patient from radiation in medical
diagnosis, Patient Exposure to Radiation in Medical X-ray Diagnosis Possibilities
for Dose Reduction (Proc. Sem. Munich-Neuherberg, April 1981) ( D R E X L E R , G.,
ERISKAT, H., SCHIBILLA, H., Eds), Rep. EUR-7438, Commission of the European
Communities, Brussels (1981).
[6] BRITISH I N S T I T U T E O F R A D I O L O G Y , Technical and Physical Parameters for
Quality Assurance in Medical Diagnostic Radiology ( M O O R E S , B.M., STIEVE,
F.-E., ERISKAT, H., SCHIBILLA, H., Eds), BIR, London (1989).
IAEA-SM-309/21
OPTIMIZATION OF RADIATION PROTECTION

IN DIAGNOSTIC RADIOLOGY
S. GRAPENGIESSER, W. LEITZ
National Institute for Radiation Protection,
Stockholm, Sweden
Abstract
O P T I M I Z A T I O N O F R A D I A T I O N P R O T E C T I O N IN D I A G N O S T I C R A D I O L O G Y .
Radiation protection in diagnostic radiology has high priority in most countries. Doses
to patients are relatively high, although many possibilities for dose reduction have been
suggested. Less effort is needed to reduce patient doses than reducing doses to persons
involved in many other uses of radiation. As in many other fields, the rapid development of
techniques continuously provides new problems for radiation protection in diagnostic radio
logy. But there are more basic reasons for the difficulties encountered: (a) Reduction of dose
is usually considered beneficial unless the cost is too high. In diagnostic radiology, however,
an easily obtained dose reduction might destroy diagnostic quality and cause more harm than
the dose would do. (b) Assessments of collective patient dose have heavy uncertainties, owing
to differences in age, anatomy, etc. It is difficult to verify trends by such measurements,
(c) Too much emphasis on patient protection might cause exaggerated anxiety resulting in
refusals to undergo necessary examinations, (d) Protection measures must be compatible with
the intense workload and need for quick decisions during X ray examinations. These and other
difficulties imply that normal tools of the radiation protection trade are more blunt than usual.
For the optimization procedures recommended by the ICRP, new modes could be useful. In
Sweden, a systematic use of the width of the distribution of doses from certain examinations
has been tested with some success in so-called investigational surveys . So far, only dental
X ray units, full size chest units and mammography screening units have been surveyed, but
further work is planned. Although the surveys often give information about national collective
patient dose, this is not the primary purpose. Instead, the width of the interval observed for
a certain parameter indicates its priority in radiation protection. Additionally, the position of
an individual value in the interval is useful in the planning of local quality assurance activities.
1. APPLICATION OF THE ICRP FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
The three fundamental principles of the International Commission on Radio

logical Protection (ICRP) [1] concerning justification, optimization and dose limita
tion are well known and have long been widely used. No general description is
needed, but their application to diagnostic radiology may be briefly discussed.
351
352 GRAPENGIESSER and LEITZ
1.1. Justification
In diagnostic radiology, decisions on justification are mainly the responsibility

of radiologists. They can be general, i.e. recommended referral criteria, or con
nected to individual examinations. Much could be said from the radiation protection
point of view about these decisions, but that would lead beyond the scope of this
paper.
It is sufficient to note that an accurate measure of the patient dose is usually
not needed for the justification of an examination.
1.2. Optimization
The ALARA principle [1] is supplemented in diagnostic radiology by the con

cept of detriment due to poor diagnostic quality caused by too low doses. The patient
appears in the X ray room not to be protected from radiation but to be intentionally
exposed for very good reasons. The dose must be sufficiently high to produce good
conditions for the diagnostic evaluation and as low as reasonably achievable to
meet radiation protection requirements.
It is often argued that optimization of patient doses can be less stringent
because there is a net benefit to the same person who is irradiated. This implies that
the patient can assess the risks and benefits from modifications of the examination
and decide pro or con. This is not the case. The patient has an option to refuse the
entire examination which is seldom recommendable but can hardly modify the
optimization.
1.3. Dose limitation
The third ICRP principle is not applicable to patients. A discussion is thus out
side the scope of this paper.
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE IN SWEDISH RADIOLOGY
The introduction of a quality assurance (QA) system was muchconsidered

when the Swedish National Institute for Radiation Protection (NIRP) planned forms
for decentralization of its X ray Inspectorate in the mid nineteen-seventies.
2.1. Background
Traditionally as in many other countries X ray equipment was used in

Sweden without maintenance either until it stopped functioning or to the stage when
image quality was not acceptable any more. This principle is sometimes defended
IAEA-SM-309/21 353
by the argument: Periodic maintenance is not necessary in the X ray room. The doc
tor will always find out if something goes wrong.
Although this is true in principle, it implies quite some latitude when defining
the term wrong. A slow drift in technological factors can proceed quite far and
cause considerable changes in image resolution, contrast and patient dose before it
is observed by the radiologist [2]. Similar differences in image quality are often con
sidered totally unacceptable when two images are compared at the same time.
The repair needed acutely when defects have proceeded to a stage when the
equipment no longer functions is often very expensive [3] another indication that
QA is useful.
Diagnostic radiology is actually well suited for QA activities and QA pro
grammes are now used in a number of countries. They foster decentralized responsi
bility, which is a big advantage. Detailed information from local staff can be used
in the planning of QA methods. Proper attention can be given to critical parameters.
Bureaucratic protection procedures that are not applicable locally can be minimized.
Furthermore, there will be little need for routine surveillance from the national
authority. Its resources can be spent on more cost effective activities.
2.2. Mandatory or voluntary QA?
The QA concept originates from the manufacturing industry and was devel
oped to meet customer demands and improve cost efficiency. Various instruments
such as quality manuals and quality control methods were employed to improve qual
ity defined as The totality of ...characteristics of a product or service that ....
satisfy stated or implied needs. In most cases one of these needs was a low price,
so QA aimed among other things at reducing the overall cost of production.
With this purpose, voluntary QA is now well established all over the world with a
remarkable improvement of cost efficiency in many cases.
As the QA concept seemed to be successful, government authorities also
started to express requirements in terms of QA programmes that now became manda
tory. Some components such as feedback concerning the efficiency of the QA
programme itself were, however, difficult to transfer to a mandatory system. The
authorities focused their interest on technical test procedures that were rather easy
to prescribe in detail.
With a large number of mandatory technical checks incorporated, a QA system
can lose its flexibility and become a financial burden because the self-criticism inher
ent in the QA concept is not applicable to the mandatory checks.
In the decentralization of the NIRP X ray Inspectorate, the choice between
mandatory and voluntary QA systems was much considered. A voluntary system was
preferred, but most of the 30 county authorities that operated 95% of Swedish health
care lacked competent staff and had little incentive for investments, as the NIRP
inspections had been free of charge. The new system had to contain some mandatory
component.
2.3. The Swedish QA requirement
The balance between mandatory and voluntary QA was set in a requirement

issued by the NIRP in 1981 [4]. The county authorities were required to perform
periodic tests on all X ray equipment and record the results, but nothing was speci
fied about test methods and acceptance limits. The brief requirement was supported
by an extensive collection of voluntary test methods published separately by a non
governmental body [5].
As a result of this requirement, most counties in Sweden now have QA systems
in full operation. In some rural areas, the primary care X ray facilities are not
included and a few counties have only developed their QA programme inside the
main hospital in the area. But all over the country, competent hospital physicists are
now available for planning and development of QA procedures, test measurements
and staff education.
2.4. National co-ordination and feedback
Almost all processes improve when feedback mechanisms are introduced, and
QA is no exception. Re-evaluation of the QA activities is an essential part of any QA
programme [6]. Such quality revisions can either be made internally as a self-
criticism within the organization or by an independent body if more impartial judge
ments are wanted.
As a governmental authority in the radiation protection field, the NIRP has a
responsibility to follow the development of radiation protection in diagnostic radio
logy, to produce relevant information and to co-ordinate local activities. The infor
mation needed for this could well be collected during external quality revisions
designed to provide the feedback information necessary in county authority QA
programmes.
In general, the national authority has very little need for details about local
radiation protection if QA systems are in operation. Instead, it is important to follow
trends such as changes in working habits or the introduction of new equipment and
new diagnostic procedures.
We believe that this can be done better in a few rather large and well planned
investigational surveys than with traditional authority inspections and mandatory
checks. Additionally, such surveys can provide those responsible locally with possi
bilities to evaluate their own situation.
IAEA-SM-309/21 355
3. QA REVISION THROUGH INVESTIGATIONAL SURVEYS
The concept of investigational surveys was introduced to us during the

so-called ENCUSS project (Expanded NEXT Collaboration between the USA and
Sweden [7]). In this project the well-known NEXT (Nationwide Evaluation of X ray
Trends [8]) programme, developed by the US authority now known as CDRH
(Center of Devices and Radiological Health), was applied in a comparable way to
stationary chest units for full size radiography in Sweden and the USA. An additional
aim was to expand the NEXT survey to produce sufficient information for corrective
action locally.
The NEXT programme yielded a distribution of mean entrance doses to
patients at the participating hospitals. A hospital with very high or very low mean
doses (the outliers) could conclude that improvements were required but received
very few indications where to start. The ENCUSS project should provide such addi
tional information hence the term investigational, in contrast to the statistical
output from NEXT.
The concept has now been further elaborated. According to the model now
developed, three stages can be identified in an investigational survey project.
3.1. Stage one planning and preparation
The first problem to solve is to define which diagnostic modality should be

surveyed. New technical developments, expanding radiological techniques, expected
dose reductions, indications from accident reports, simplicity in follow-up pro
cedures as many factors as possible should be considered in this choice.
When the type of examination is decided on, an optimum clinical procedure
must be defined. This might be a very difficult task. Close collaboration between
radiologists, physicists, radiographers and other experts is needed to avoid sub-
optimization. Sometimes more than one alternative must be accepted and handled in
parallel in the further survey.
Once the optimum diagnostic routine(s) is (are) defined, a technique to mea
sure deviations from the optimum is developed. This technique should be sensitive
to all truly critical parameters in the optimization and be as simple as possible. Some
of the parameters measured are often of a more general interest (patient dose, film
sensitivity, etc.) but this is not essential. Additional measurements of such
parameters can always be added to the survey protocol. The main optimization test
might well give derived quantities on a relative scale.
The optimization test is then applied in a survey at participating hospitals. This
survey should be planned carefully so that all additional information needed is
included from the beginning. Much effort should be spent on avoiding procedures
that add much to the final uncertainty. Patient dose measurements should for instance
be avoided or limited to selected patients with standard anatomy. The survey pro
tocol should be sufficiently detailed so that different interpretations by those doing
the measurements are avoided.
3.2. Stage two measurements and data collection
This stage of the survey is easily described but certainly not so easily carried
out. It contains the effectuation of planned activities and is of course the most time
consuming part of the project.
During the field work it is essential to establish contacts with the QA organiza
tions at the participating hospitals, to encourage participation in the measurements
and to inform them about the survey and its results at that particular hospital. The
success of the project depends on to what extent the information available is really
used in the local quality assurance activities.
3.3. Stage three evaluation of data
In most investigational surveys, quite a few parameters are measured at a large

number of hospitals. The distribution of values for each of these parameters should
be presented with as few corrections as possible, for instance in the form of simple
graphs. Each hospital should be able to find its own position in the distribution
without complicated compilations.
With a properly designed survey, the hospital is provided with clear indications
as to which parameters in the imaging chain or in the diagnostic routine should be
modified and in which direction the modification should go.
For the authority performing the survey, individual results are of less interest
but the shape of the distribution curve is useful. Parameters that show widely differ
ent values are either very poorly optimized or chosen differently at particular hospi
tals for some (unknown?) reason. In the first case, QA initiatives should be
promoted. In the second, the survey should be supplemented with further analysis
concerning the optimum diagnostic procedure (cf. Stage 1).
4. SWEDISH INVESTIGATIONAL SURVEYS
The concept of investigational surveys is perhaps best elucidated through a

description of some test projects that are now at different stages of completion in
Sweden.
4.1. The mammography screening survey
This project is a good example of the difficult definition in Stage 1 of the opti
mum diagnostic procedure.
IAEA-SM-309/21 357
TABLE I. OPTIMUM PARAMETERS IN MAMMOGRAPHIC SCREENING
X ray equipment
Tube voltage 25 kV
Tube current >80 m A
Focal spot size <0.4 m m
Anode material Mo
Compression force Variable up to 200 N
Film screen system
Resolution limit > 2 0 line pairs/mm

Sensitivity > 15 m G y 1
Film processing
Base + fog <0.18 O D

Contrast between net densities
0.25 and 0.5 >1.6
0.5 and 1.5 >3.0
0.25 and 2.0 >2.8
M a x i m u m density >3.5
Typical radiation dose fo r a 45 mm thick object
Without anti-scatter grid 0.6 m G y

With an anti-scatter grid 1.5 m G y
In 1985 a nationwide mammography screening programme was decided on,

following two large randomized studies of the effects of screening (the WE study
[9]). From these studies, two counties had gained much experience of large scale
mammography screening but the remaining 28 counties in Sweden had to establish
their screening organization. QA efforts were obviously needed for such a large scale
operation in order to keep image quality within the sophisticated limits needed for
mammographie evaluations and to keep the increase of patient doses within the
expected limits.
The NIRP decided to contribute through an investigational survey. To define
an optimal system for mammography screening close collaboration was established
with radiologists and physicists at the two facilities from which the WE study was
headed. In a series of experiments with relevant parameters under careful control,
the physical image quality (primarily the contrast) was successively improved while
the radiation dose was kept low. By clinical evaluation it was confirmed that the diag
nostic image quality improved also.
The physical properties of the resulting system, now adopted as a reference,
were then evaluated and analysed in terms of standard measurements and other iden
tifications of the parameters chosen to identify the reference [10, 11]. To satisfy the
needs for diagnostic flexibility, two different systems were necessary one with and
one without anti-scatter grids. The resulting optimal parameters are given in Table I.
To support the counties starting mammography screening and to provide a
good starting point, Stage 2 in the survey was designed as an initial status test on
all X ray equipment installed, before it was used for screening. Test methods based
on experiences from IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) standardiza
tion work were documented.
The survey is still in Stage 2. Preliminary evaluations have been made [11]
to provide a background for QA programmes, but it is too early to present general
conclusions. In a special project, the use of grids in mammography has been
examined [12].
4.2. The ENCUSS project
As mentioned above, the ENCUSS project was the first investigational survey
done by the NIRP. As it has now been fully evaluated [7], it is a good example of
Stage 3 in the previously described model. This project also demonstrates the kind
of information that can be deduced from investigational surveys.
4.2.1. Background and survey method
Chest examinations are simple and usually performed in a very uniform way.
They are also very common. Still, there is a need for rather good image quality.
Chest units are found in most X ray wards. Usually the same film supply and film
developing facilities are used as for other examinations. Improvements in these com
mon facilities caused by a study of chest units would have a very general effect.
In this early project, we did not try to define the optimum form of chest
examinations before the survey started. The project is thus not a good example of
Stage 1 in the procedure. After finishing the project, we are now trying to remedy
this in a follow-up project, where randomized clinical evaluations of humanoid phan
tom images are correlated to survey output data.
In the survey, a chest phantom was used in a simulated postero-anterior chest
examination. In addition to the NEXT protocol, a number of parameters describing
image quality and radiation transmission in the system were registered. Technique
factors for a normal patient as judged by the local hospital staff were used.
Assistance from hospital physicists made it possible to study all stationary chest units
in the country (441 units).
IAEA-SM-309/21 359
40-1 USA scatter suppression (n = 317)
USA no scatter suppression (n = 102)

2 SW EDEN (n = 437)


nj
< 0.05 0 05- 0 15- 0.20 0.25- 0.30- 0.35 +

< 0.10 < 0.20 <0.25 <0.30 < 0.35
Entrance skin air kerma (mGy)
FIG. 1. Entrance skin air kerma (ESK) values fo r PA chest examinations in the USA and
Sweden.
The evaluation of the survey serves two purposes. One is to collect statistical
information relevant for general assessments of the radiation protection. The other
is to provide those responsible for local QA activities in the hospitals with feedback
information so they can introduce improvements in quality.
4.2.2. Patient entrance skin air kerma (ESK) distribution
In the ENCUSS survey many parameters were studied. Let us examine the
entrance skin air kerma (ESK) as an example see Fig. 1, where corresponding
values from a US sample of chest units are also indicated.
The measured values showed a wide distribution; wider than expected, as the
phantom measurement excluded the patient the major source for variations. From
a radiation protection point of view one would suspect that high ESK values represent
chest units where the radiation protection is not optimized i.e. with poor quality.
In a wider perspective it is reasonable to assume that outliers with low ESK
values at the other end of the scale also represent poor quality low contrast and
resolution in the resulting images. Poor image quality means less certainty in the
diagnosis and consequently less benefit from the radiation dose given to the patient.
We would like to consider this case as poor optimization of radiation protection just
as in the high dose case.
With both extremes unwanted, it is obvious that one goal in the optimization
procedure should be to minimize the distribution of ESK values. A narrow distribu
tion should indicate good optimization.
The mean ESK value in Fig. 1 is 0.16 mGy for Sweden and 0.14 mGy for the
USA. These figures are, however, not very informative. One cannot exclude that a
true optimization of chest examinations would result in a considerable increase
or decrease of the ESK values in both countries. There could also be very good
reasons for a considerable difference between the values. The average patient
might be different in Sweden and in the USA. Different diagnostic routines can strike
the dose-benefit balance in different ways and it might be difficult to tell which rou
tine is to be preferred.
4.2.3. Influence on ESK distribution from scatter suppression
The use of scatter suppression is an example of different routines. Suppression

of scattered radiation causes an increase of the ESK but improves the contrast. In
the USA scatter suppression is sometimes not used hence the wider distribution
and lower mean value of ESK. For quality improvement one should first find out
if scatter suppression is justified which is very likely and then try to adjust the
ESK distribution with more general QA means.
For units using scatter suppression there is still a surprisingly wide ESK distri
bution both in Sweden and in the USA. Here, too, two techniques can be identified:
(a) conventional anti-scatter grids, and (b) air gaps, which give about half the ESK,
see Fig. 2. For all chest units tested, the transmission factor from phantom exit to
entrance of the cassette varied from 0.13 to 1.0. For units with grids this factor
varied between 0.13 and 0.5 and the air gap units had values from 0.5 to 1.0.
To interpret the distribution of ESK values correctly, a full analysis of the tech
nical background is obviously necessary. A certain ESK value is evidently high
motivating some QA action if air gaps are used, and low motivating rather
different QA activities with anti-scatter grids.
4.2.4. ESK distribution as a protection quality sensor
The additional ENCUSS measurements made in Sweden as a result of modifi

cations of the NEXT protocol allow the imaging chain to be subdivided into several
component parts, each with its distribution of measured values. As with the choice
of scatter suppression they are usually related to the ESK and/or to image quality.
IAEA-SM-309/21 361
Transmission factor (TRA)
FIG. 2. Measured transmission factors from the phantom exit to the entrance o f the cassette
fo r chest examinations in Sweden.
It would lead too far to describe these measurements in detail, see Ref. [6].
The results are condensed in Table , where the intervals of measured values are
indicated together with the ratio between the highest and the lowest ESK values
achieved when the identified parameter is varied within the indicated range with all
other parameters kept constant. This ratio can be seen as a measure of the potential
quality improvement possible from the identified parameter.
Varying sensitivity of the imaging system introduces a factor of 11 between
the highest and the lowest ESK. This parameter is evidently worth most considera
tion in QA activities. This is further supported from the results of a normalization
of ESK values to a common air kerma at the film (6 /xGy) where the ESK max./min.
ratio is reduced from 26 to 8, see Table II. A similar normalization to common film
density does not show the same effect. The choice of film density is evidently not
as critical for the optimization unless it is heavily coupled to the quality of diag
nostic evaluation.
TABLE II. COMPILATION OF SWEDISH RESULTS FROM THE ENCUSS

SURVEY
Parameter Min. Max. Mean Ratio3
Tube voltage (kV) 100 150 133
Half-value layer ( m m Al) 2.5 13 6 2.5

Exposure time (ms) 1.3 209 19
Film density 0.7 2.6 1.4 4.5
E S K b (mGy) 0.022 0.58 0.16
ESK(s)c (mGy) 0.020 0.70 0.14
ESK(r)d (mGy) 0.039 0.33 0.15
C E N e (mGy)'1 50 570 160 11
Processor speed index 42 182 102 4.2
TRAf 0.13 1.0 0.36 7.5
a Ratio = Ratio between the highest and the lowest E S K values when varying the identified
parameter within the indicated range.
b ESK = Air kerma free-in-air in the phantom (patient) entrance plane.
c ESK(s) = E S K values normalized to net film density 1.0 OD.
d ESK(r) = E S K values normalized to 6 G y in the image plane.
e SEN = Sensitivity of the imaging system expressed as the reciprocal value of the air
kerma in the film plane resulting in net film density 1.0 OD.
f T R A Transmission of the radiation beam from phantom exit to entrance of cassette.
Furthermore, varying film processor adjustments gave an ESK max./min. ratio

of 4.2. This parameter will certainly be revised in QA efforts to improve the sensi
tivity of the imaging system in a chest unit. As these components in the imaging chain
are usually used also in other diagnostic modalities, such QA efforts will improve
quality in general in the diagnostic department.
The high ESK max/min ratio (7.5) for transmission of the radiation beam from
phantom exit to entrance of cassette is partly explained by the different choices of
anti-scatter suppression discussed above. After elimination of a few badly centred
anti-scatter grids, hospitals using the same scatter suppression method showed ratios
around 2, which is not so remarkable. The parameter to be questioned here is the
choice of suppression method.
IAEA-SM-309/2X 363
Some image quality parameters were also registered in the ENCUSS project.
They have not been reported here, as they require reference material from the clini
cal optimization that is not yet completed. They have, however, been reported to the
hospital QA programmes as part of the quality revision and the image quality
parameters can be evaluated in terms of distribution intervals just like the more dose
related parameters discussed above.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Some preliminary studies to check the results of the ENCUSS project show that
the former wide distribution of ESK values has now been greatly reduced and that
todays mean ESK value, which could be interpreted as a measure of the collective
patient dose, is considerably lower than during the survey.
This last finding might be a coincidence but we believe that mean dose reduc
tions could be expected from investigational surveys of this kind. Today, much more
effort is spent on producing diagnostic quality and quantity than on dimensioning
radiation doses in diagnostic radiology. Activities aiming at neutral quality improve
ments should thus, on the average, result in lower patient doses. And if this is not
the case, there are good reasons for an increase in dose.
We would finally like to recommend surveys similar to those described above,
as they engage and inform local quality assurance staff and provide them with feed
back information that is easily understood and difficult to obtain any other way. They
also produce a means to compare possible results from more general quality
improvements and radiation protection optimization measures.
REFERENCES
[1] I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O M M I S S I O N O N R A D I O L O G I C A L P R O T E C T I O N , Rec o m
mendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, ICRP Publica
tion No. 26, Pergamon Press, Oxford and N e w York (1977).
[2] F O R S B E R G , H., Clinically acceptable tolerance of roentgen generator exposure
parameters, Acta Radiol., Diagn. 28 1 (1987) 121.
[3] F O R S B E R G , H., Preventive maintenance of X-ray equipment (in preparation).
[4] N A T I O N A L I N S T I T U T E F O R R A D I A T I O N P R O T E C T I O N , Statens strlskydds-
instituts freskrifter o m kontroll av utrustning fr rntgendiagnostik, Rep. SSIFS
1981: 4, NIRS Stockholm (1981) (non-authorized English translation available).
[5] Rntgenutrustningars underhll, (in Swedish), Spri Rd 6.27, 2nd edn, (1987) (in
Swedish).
[6] J U R A N , J.M., Quality Control Handbook, 3rd edn, McGraw-Hill, N e w York (1974).
[7] LEITZ, W.K., H E D B E R G - V I K S T R M , B.R.K., C O N W A Y , B.J.,

S H O W A L T E R , C.K., R U E T E R , F.G., Assessment and comparison of chest radio
graphy techniques in the United States and Sweden, Br. J. Radiol. 63 745 (1990) 33.
[8] B U N G E , R.E., D U C C A , A.T., P R O P E R Z IO , W.S., Exposure in Chest Radiography:
N E X T Results. Optimization of Chest Radiography, H H S publication F D A
80-8124, U S Department of Health and H u m a n Services, Center of Devices and Radio
logical Health, Rockville, M D (1979).
[9] T A B A R , L., et al.,Reduction in mortality from breast cancer after mass screening with
mammography, Lancet i (1985) 829.
[10] Mammografiscreening. Uppfljning och kvalitetsskring, Allmnna rd frn Social-
styrelsen, Vol. 3 (1990) (in Swedish).
[11] LEITZ, W.K., Screening with mammography what quality is required and how is
it checked? Rep. 18, British Institute of Radiology, London (1989) 70.
[12] A L M C A R L S S O N , G., D A N C E , D.R., P E R S L I DE N , J., Grids in mammography.
Optimization of the information content relative to radiation risk, Rep. Uli-RAD-057,
Linkping University, Dept of Radiology (1989).
IAEA-SM-309/56
THE SYSTEM OF CONTROLS ON

RADIATION SOURCES IN A SMALL
NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRY, WITH SELECTED
RADIATION INCIDENTS AND THEIR PREVENTION
OR CONTROL BY REGULATORY OR OTHER MEANS
A.C. McEWAN
National Radiation Laboratory,
Christchurch, New Zealand
Abstract
T H E S Y S T E M O F C O N T R O L S O N R A D I A T I O N S O U R C E S IN A S M A L L N O N
N U C L E A R C O U N T R Y , W I T H SEL E C T E D RADIATION INCIDENTS A N D THEIR
PREVENTION O R C O N T R O L BY R E G U L A T O R Y O R O T H E R MEANS.
Comprehensive legislation governing ionizing radiation uses has been in place in N e w
Zealand for about 40 years. The legislation requires licensing of radiation users, notification
of sales of X ray equipment, and notification and authorization of importation of radioactive
materials. Dose limits are prescribed and there are also requirements relating to exposure
monitoring, and the transport, disposal, recording and labelling of radioactive materials.
Inevitably some incidents involving radiation sources occur. Some incidents during the last
ten years are described together with the regulatory or other steps taken to prevent or limit
recurrences. A failure to check with a survey meter that an industrial radiography source had
returned to its shielded container gave rise to operator overexposures and led to a change in
industrial radiography licence conditions to require audible alarm monitoring devices to be
worn whenever sources are used. Industrial radiography sources also featured in incidents
involving improper assembly of transport packages, and in the case of a fire in a dangerous
goods store where the licence holder, through the inadequacy of records maintained by previ
ous licensees, had no knowledge of a disused source s existence. T w o cases of diagnostic
X ray machines failing to terminate exposure at the set times led to explosive failure of the
X ray tubes. Warnings and recommendations for machine modification were issued. In
another medical diagnostic X ray event a non-deadmanfluoroscopic screening switch was
left on undetected for about 15 minutes. Again, equipment modifications were recommended.
1. INTRODUCTION
New Zealand is a country of 3.3 million people, with well developed medical
services and modest industrial development but no nuclear reactors. The first legis
lation relating to radiation sources was introduced in 1944 and required the registra
tion of X ray equipment. A 1949 Act providing for controls on both radioactive
365
366 McEWAN
materials and X ray machines came into force with accompanying regulations in
1951. Comprehensive legislation governing ionizing radiation uses has therefore
been in place in New Zealand for approximately 40 years.
Regulatory provisions of the present legislation, which is in process of review,
include
licensing of users,
notification of sales of X ray equipment,
notification and authorization of importation of radioactive materials,
a system of exemption from licensing requirements for radioactive materials,
requirements governing dose limits and exposure monitoring, and transport,
disposal, labelling and records of radioactive materials.
The legislation [1] is administered by the National Radiation Laboratory

(NRL), a unit of the Department of Health, which also acts in an advisory and inves
tigative role in radiation protection matters as well as providing personal monitoring
and other services to users.
2. LICENSING
The Radiation Protection Act 1965 restricts the use of X ray equipment or
radioactive materials to persons holding a licence or who are acting on the instruc
tions or under the supervision of a licensee. The licensee is responsible for safe use.
Licences are issued for one or more of about 30 different purposes and may be
further restricted by attached conditions. The provision for imposing conditions is
extensive. For the more common purposes, which include the majority of licensees,
codes of practice prepared by NRL are issued to licensees and compliance with the
code may be a condition of the licence. In the case of licences issued for the use of
unsealed radioactive materials the activities of radionuclides which may be ordered
at one time are specified as a condition on the licence and are dependent on the
qualifications and experience of the licensee and support staff, and the facilities avail
able to them.
The obligation to ensure that there is a licensee at all times for X ray equipment
or radioactive materials is placed on the owner of the equipment or material. It is
also required that in any organization employing more than one licensee areas of
responsibility be clearly defined.
Licensing is not required for activities of radionuclides below an exemption
level specified for each radionuclide, or for radioactive material in exempted classes
of equipment.
IAEA-SM-309/56 367
3. CONTROLS ON THE SALE OF X RAY EQUIPMENT
Sales of irradiating apparatus are required to be notified to the National Radia

tion Laboratory, and may be made only to persons who are licensed for a purpose
for which the equipment has been designed.
4. CONTROLS ON IMPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Control of radioactive material entering the country is maintained by a require

ment for authorization of orders by NRL. This allows surveillance of quantities
imported and ensures that material is acquired and used only by licence holders. In
practice, for the majority of orders the authorization procedure is streamlined
through agreements between overseas suppliers, the New Zealand agents and NRL.
Under these agreements agents are required to process orders only from licensees
and to advise NRL promptly of all orders forwarded. Orders from suppliers with
whom agreements have been reached (referred to as approved suppliers) are for
warded directly through Customs at place of entry. Most radiopharmaceuticals for
medical use, most radiochemicals for other uses, and most industrial radiography
sources are imported from approved suppliers. In other cases an authorization to
import radioactive materials document is required for each shipment, to obtain
release from Customs.
5. EXEMPTION FROM LICENSING AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS
Traces of radioactive substances are found throughout the environment and it

is necessary to set levels of activity and concentration below which legislation is not
applicable. The present Act defines a radioactive material as any article containing
a radioactive substance giving it a specific activity exceeding 100 kBq per kg and
a total radioactivity exceeding 3 kBq. The Regulations further exempt activities and
concentrations below levels set out in a schedule to the Regulations. These levels
were calculated on the basis of the smaller of two activities, one derived from an
external radiation limit and the other based on toxicity [2]. The toxicity limit corres
ponds to 0.1 times the minimum ALI value but because of the time at which values
were derived is based on the International Commission on Radiological Protection
Publication 2 (ICRP 2) rather than ICRP 30 data. It is proposed that in revising the
Regulations the exempt activity should be the lesser of 0.1 times the minimum ALI
(derived from ICRP 30) and 3 x 10-7 A1, where A1 is a quantity used in the IAEA
Transport Regulations and is related to the dose rate at a distance from a point
source.
368 McEWAN
The Regulations also exempt from licensing clocks, watches and other instru
ments containing radioactive luminous material in activities greater than the exempt
limits for some specified radionuclides in activities up to prescribed limits. Similar
exemptions apply to smoke detectors, radiation source educational kits, ionization
and electron capture detectors used in gas chromatography and tritium beta lights.
6. THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL RADIATION LABORATORY
Most countries maintain agencies to provide specialist scientific advice on pro

tection against harmful effects of radiations and to administer radiation protection
legislation. In larger countries advisory and investigative functions are sometimes
placed in an independent body while the regulatory function is undertaken by another
agency. In some smaller countries the advisory/investigative, surveillance and
regulatory and other national agency functions are combined in a single agency. This
is the case in New Zealand, where it has been considered that any splitting or separa
tion of functions of the National Radiation Laboratory is uneconomical because
duplication of equipment, personnel and resources would be required.
The principal functions undertaken by the National Radiation Laboratory are
listed in Appendix 1.
7. SELECTED RADIATION INCIDENTS AND THEIR PREVENTION OR

CONTROL BY REGULATORY OR OTHER MEANS
This selection is made from incidents that have occurred over the last ten years.
(a) Overexposure o f an industrial radiographer following a source holder cable

break
In 1984 an industrial radiographer and assistant, one of three teams of indus
trial radiographers working at night on a synthetic fuels plant under construction,
wound the source cable back into the source camera at the conclusion of a radio-
graphic exposure. A break in the source holder assembly (pigtail) near the source
resulted in the source not being returned to the camera. No instrumental checks were
carried out to ensure the source had been returned, contrary to standard safe operat
ing procedures. The equipment was returned to base and it was then discovered by
another radiographer that the source had remained in an exposed position. A film
badge worn by the radiographer recorded approximately 150 mGy, and cor
responded to an exposure of about 100 mSv effective dose equivalent. The exposure
to the assistant was about half this.
Following this incident a change in the conditions of licence for industrial
radiography was introduced. The conditions now require the use of a suitable survey
IAEA-SM-309/56 369
meter on all occasions an industrial radiography apparatus is used, and all personnel
are required to wear an audible dose-rate-indicating personal monitor. In principle,
these measures should prevent excessive exposure occurring again in any source
retraction malfunction.
(b) Improper assembly o f transport package

The 2.2 TBq (60 Ci) iridium-192 source involved in the previous incident was
shipped back to the suppliers. The break had occurred 1-2 cm from the source. The
source was packed and allegedly monitored for transport by the radiography firm
owning the source, before presentation to an agent for the overseas supplier who
completed transport documentation and certified compliance with international trans
port regulations. In assembling the package however, no material to compensate for
the missing section of the pigtail (which included segments of depleted uranium)
were included, resulting in a shielding defect. Also, if the transport package had been
turned upside down the source could have moved from its central position in the
package to a less shielded position. On receiving transport information the overseas
suppliers checked with their agents on the adequacy of the assembly of the package.
It was subsequently off-loaded from an aircraft and correctly assembled. It was found
that although the source was properly located, the shielding defect in the package
gave rise to a narrow beam of about 0.50 mSv/h at 1 m from the surface. Three or
four passengers may have been exposed to about 0.2-0.3 mSv on the flight, com
parable to the additional cosmic ray radiation from a round the world air trip.
This event, coupled with the previous one, led to a warning to the radiography
firm and clarification with both radiography companies and agents on their respec
tive responsibilities in relation to transport of radioactive packages. This was rein
forced by a circular letter to all relevant persons.
Subsequently, further instances of improper or non-complying assembly of
transport packages were brought to NRLs attention, although again there was no
evidence of excessive external exposure rates arising as a result. In one case careless
ness in package assembly resulted in the dismissal of the person involved by the
radiography firm. In a second case the licence of the person undertaking the package
assembly was cancelled.
(c) Fire involving an unrecorded industrial radiography caesium source

A small concrete store originally constructed and registered as a dangerous
goods store had its heavy concrete door levered open by vandals and the contents
set on fire. The low intensity fire which resulted caused varying degrees of damage
to containers holding sample quantities of agricultural and petrochemical products.
A 200 GBq (6 Ci) caesium-137 industrial radiography source was in the store, but
no damage was suffered by the padlocked source container other than blackening of
the exterior.
370 McEWAN
The matter of primary concern arising from this incident was that the manager
of the firm owning the source, who was also a licensee for the purpose of industrial
radiography, was unaware that the company possessed this source. It had been
obtained along with a number of X ray machines and other equipment when the
assets of a non-destructive testing firm had been taken over some years before. The
caesium source had been rarely used and not at all in the several years preceding the
incident. Shortly before the incident the firm had changed premises and, in ignorance
of the nature of the source, had placed it together with other items in the concrete
store. All the company senior staff had joined the company within the previous
2-3 years and all denied knowledge of this source: it was not included in the com
panys asset register. While there was clear evidence of failure in record keeping on
the part of previous licensees and management of the company, it was not possible
to attach blame to the current licensees and management, and no prosecution was
proceeded with.
To avoid a recurrence of this type of event, two steps were or are being taken.
(1) More frequent and rigorous checking of sources and records held by licensees
is being carried out by NRL with cross-checking against the NRL list of
sources. (NRL records did list this source).
(2) It is proposed to amend the legislation to introduce a requirement for registra
tion of premises in the name of an owner. While there are a number of objec
tives in this move, one of them is that it would have the effect of placing greater
legal responsibility on an identifiable individual to act for or as the owner, and
in particular for this person to have prescribed responsibility for maintaining
adequate records and knowledge of all sources.
This step should help overcome the problems that may arise where there are
changes in licensee, and the owner of sources or equipment is a large organization.
One area of possible difficulty, however, is what constitutes a premise in large
organizations such as a major hospital with multiple radiation areas controlled by
different administration staff and licensed users.
(d) X ray machine exposure termination failure
On two occasions diagnostic X ray machines have remained on at the conclu
sion of the set exposure time, leading to rapid heating and explosion of the X ray
tube. In the first instance skull radiography was being carried out using a Philips
Medio DLX machine in a peripheral hospital. The exposure did not terminate due
to a fault in the termination contactors. The radiographer noted a crackling noise
although the exposure warning light had gone out. The patient was assisted to stand
and go out of the room and had reached the door when the tube housing burst, spray
ing the room with oil.
A subsequent re-enactment showed that the patient would have been exposed
for not more than about 8 seconds. From the technique factors and previously
IAEA-SM-309/56 371
measured X ray tube output, the dose to the patient was estimated as 135 mGy to
the skin and lens of the eye, 7.2 mGy to the thyroid and an ICRP 26 effective dose
equivalent of about 1.8 mSv. The dose to the radiographer, recorded by film badge,
was 0.22 mGy.
The type of contact fitted to this machine has the potential to fail in this way.
It was recommended to owners of all similar machines in the country that they be
modified either by changing the type of exposure contactor or by fitting a back-up
guard timer with separate contactors.
The second incident involved a Chiropax 200 X ray machine used for
chiropractic diagnosis. In this case the tube exploded after only about 4 seconds, or
ten times the set exposure time. The explosion was sufficiently violent to shower the
room with glass and oil and dislodge ceiling tiles. This, coupled with the estimated
short exposure time, suggested the machine fault may have driven the kV or mA far
too high. The patient effective dose equivalent was estimated at less than 1 mSv,
based on the kV and mA factors set.
It is apparent that in cases of radiographic exposures failing to terminate, the
thermal loading on the X ray tube leads to rapid breakdown, thus limiting the degree
of patient exposure.
(e) Inadvertent extended fluoroscopic exposure in a special procedures room

A special procedures room was equipped with undercouch and overcouch
tubes, an image intensifier TV chain and cine film facilities. Immediately prior to
this incident, servicing involving fluoroscopic screening on the undercouch tube had
been carried out. On leaving, the serviceman had turned off the mains switch but
a non-deadman screening switch on a side control panel which was never used by
radiology staff was left in an on position. When this button was depressed it became
flush with two adjacent buttons which were kept depressed to give the correct orien
tation of the video monitor picture. At a glance it was therefore not obvious that the
switch was on.
A femoral arteriogram was scheduled following the servicing, and initially
involved the use of the overcouch tube in a radiography mode. The mains when
turned on would have started the undercouch tube screening but the radiographer
changed tubes to the overcouch tube, which continued screening until after the
development of preliminary radiographs. These were blackened and it was then
noticed that the servicing fluoroscopy button was depressed. It was estimated that
the patient had been exposed for about 15 minutes and the entire incident spanned
about 25 minutes.
The maximum patient entrance skin dose was estimated at 125 mGy and the
highest staff film badge recording (worn at waist level without lead aprons) was
0.31 mGy. Primary beam exposure of hands and arms of radiographers, however,
may have occurred briefly.
372 McEWAN
The following points were noted.

(1) Although compliance with the NRL Code of safe practice for the use of X rays
in diagnosis (medical), NRL C5 [3], is not a condition of licence for the pur
pose of medical diagnosis, the code states A device shall be incorporated in
the X ray equipment to terminate fluoroscopic exposures after a maximum
integrated exposure time of 10 minutes or such shorter time as the licensee
shall decide. At that time an audible warning signal shall sound. Further, the
exposure device should be of the deadman type terminating the exposure if
pressure on it is ceased.
The fluoroscopy timer in this case integrated for 15 minutes then produced a
faint bell-like note. Fluoroscopy terminated but recommenced automatically
half a minute later.
The screening button was of non-deadman variety and its setting was not can
celled by switching off the mains.
(2) The only indication that the overcouch tube was screening was a 10 mm
diameter red warning light on a side control panel. There was no mA indica
tion.
The following recommendations were made:
(1) The screening switch on the side panel to be changed to a deadman variety.
(2) The timer warning signal to be made more audible.
(3) An mA meter to be introduced to indicate the screening current.
7. CONCLUSION
Radiation applications are not static with time. Legislation therefore needs to
be sufficiently flexible to allow and adapt to changing conditions, and regulators need
to be informed and aware of developments and problems. In some cases new technol
ogy such as personal audible alarms or rate meters provides a greater degree of pro
tection than was practicable previously. In other situations protection and safety
remain dependent on the training and conscientiousness of personnel.
REFERENCES
[1] Radiation Protection Act 1965, reprinted with amendments 1986, and Radiation Protec
tion Regulations 1982. Government Print, Wellington (1986).
[2] M c C A H O N , J.F., Exemption of Radioactive Materials from Licensing and Other
Requirements of the Radiation Protection Act and Regulations, Rep. N R L 1980/3,
National Radiation Laboratory, Christchurch (1980).
[3] N A T I O N A L R A D I A T I O N L A B O R A T O R Y , Code of Safe Practice for the Use of
X Rays in Diagnosis (Medical), Rep. N R L C5, National Radiation Laboratory, Christ
church (1983).
IAEA-SM-309/56 373
Appendix 1
FUNCTIONS OF THE
NATIONAL RADIATION LABORATORY
Principal functions undertaken by the National Radiation Laboratory are:
(a) Administration of the Radiation Protection Act 1965 and Radiation Protection
Regulations 1982 and provision of statistical or scientific data for use in
promoting changes to legislation as may be required.
This includes in particular:
(1) licensing users of radioactive materials and irradiating equipment and

ensuring that each use is the responsibility of a suitably qualified person;
and
(2) controlling the import, export, manufacture, transport and disposal of
radioactive materials, and acting as the national competent authority in
relation to international transport of radioactive materials.
(b) Developing and maintaining national standards for radiation exposure meas
urement and providing for calibration of clinical dosimeters and equipment
used in radiotherapy, and other radiation measuring instruments.
(c) Assessing, advising and providing information on hazards and risks associated
with human activities involving ionizing and non-ionizing radiations and radio
active materials, and acting as a national centre of reference on such matters.
(d) Undertaking surveys and research aimed at assessing ionizing and non-ionizing
radiation doses arising from various sources and improving radiation protec
tion measures and programmes. This activity is an essential adjunct to the advi
sory function.
(e) Monitoring of radiation doses received by medically examined persons, and
operation of inspection and advisory services to educate radiation users and to
promote and maintain safe working practices. This includes provision of codes
of practice and training courses where appropriate. Field work is held to be
an important component of the safety assessment and advisory function. It pro
vides on-site contact and improved liaison with licensees as well as the oppor
tunity for instrumental surveys and measurements.
(f) Operation of a personal monitoring service to monitor radiation doses received
by persons occupationally or otherwise exposed, and investigation of any case
of real or suspected overexposure.
374 McEWAN
(g) Monitoring and assessing radioactivity in the environment, undertaking food

certification with respect to its radioactive content, and acting as a collaborat
ing laboratory with the World Health Organization International Reference
Centre in the field of environmental radioactivity, and as the national authority
for notification in the event of a nuclear accident.
With reference to (c) above, the Laboratory produces a quarterly publication

Radiation Protection News and Notes which provides information and comment on
items and events of radiation protection interest. Scientific studies are reported in the
Laboratory report series and/or specialist scientific journals.
IAEA-SM-309/35
THE NATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEM OF

SEALED RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN HUNGARY
T. BIR*, F. GOLDER, I. NDASI

Institute of Isotopes,
Budapest, Hungary
Abstract
T H E N A T I O N A L C O N T R O L S Y S T E M O F S E A L E D R A D I O A C T I V E S O U R C E S IN
HUNGARY.
All radioactive materials are under regulatory and administrative control in Hungary,
with particular attention being given to sealed sources, these being one of the most hazardous
categories. The special features associated with their application are: their relatively long life
time, their likely use in uncontrolled areas even unattended , their incorporation in freely
handled instruments, the fact that they can easily be mistaken for ordinary mechanical compo
nents, etc. The main features of the national control system are: (a) regulatory provisions for
import/export control, licensing and inspection, (b) an itemized national accounting system
from production to disposal, (c) technical capabilities for leak testing, recapsulation and safe
disposal. These activities are backed by comprehensive legislation together with all the neces
sary facilities.
1. LEGISLATION
Comprehensive legislation concerning the licensing, safe handling and control

of radioactive substances dates back to 1964 when the Order 1/1964 was issued by
the Ministry of Health. Although the application of artificial radioactive products
started in the mid nineteen-fifties, most of the basic principles laid down in the said
Order had already been applied. Even sealed radium sources used in the medical
field, which originated from pre-Second-World-War times, were covered, since
by special order all unregistered radium sources had to be reported and collected
(if they were not licensed) in 1960.
Order 1/1964 confirmed the existing practice and prescribed inter alia proper
accounting for radioactive materials both at user and national levels. First of all,
licensed users had to keep consecutively numbered record books issued and authenti
cated by a designated institution, viz. the Institute of Isotopes (hereafter referred to
as the Institute), into which record books data of all receipts, use, disposals and ship
ments have to be entered. One of the supporting documents should be the certificate
* Present address: IAEA, Vienna, Austria.
375
376 BIR et al.
TABLE I. MAIN FEATURES OF ACCOUNTANCY AS PRESCRIBED IN

ORDER 7/1988
Order: 7/1988 (VII.20.) Ministry of Health and Social Affairs
Title: O n the Execution of the Executive Order 12/1980 (IV.5.) M T of L a w 1 1980

on Atomic Energy
Related paragraphs and contents indicate:
15..(4) The Institute of Isotopes (Institute) should be informed on all licences issued
to users.
18..(1) Only the designated institution (Institute) may trade with radioactive
materials.
18..(2) Licenced users may take over radioactive material only from the Institute or
its authorized agent.
19..(1) The receiver of any shipment should be notified in advance.
19..(4),(5) All imports and exports should be governed by the Institute orits authorized
agent. Shipments determined to be illegal should be sent to the Institute.
20.. (1) Prior to final disposal of unnecessary or unsafe sealed sources the Institute
should be notified.
20.. (2) Shipments for final disposal are arranged by the disposal site facility.
issued by the Institute. Such certificates are issued for all radioactive products, items
or substances, both for domestic and imported products, and are consecutively num
bered for each category, such as sealed sources. These certificates form the basis of
the centralized accountancy covering all radioactive materials ever produced in or
imported into the country. In addition, all export and import transactions should have
been performed only by the Institute or its authorized agent (which could be one of
the users), and any transfers between users should have been approved by the Insti
tute prior to shipment. Final disposal of sealed sources can only be effected upon
prior approval of the Institute.
On these conditions as described above a central accountancy system has
been set up, providing the basic information on all radioactive materials in the coun
try. This system consists of an archive of certificates, transaction files and transfer
applications/approvals including final disposal of sealed sources. The weakness of
this system lies in the lack of information on actual inventories, and in the difficulty
IAEA-SM-309/35 377
IMPORT EXPORT
CUSTOM S
HOME
PRODUCTION
sz
INSTITUTE OF ISOTOPES
- to issue certificates, transfer

and disposal approvals and
authenticated record books
copy of
- central accountancy at national approval
LICENSING level FINAL
AUTHORITIES copy *" DISPOSAL SITE
of user s -dealing with export/import reports
licence transactions
- receipt and custody of non

authorized shipments
- providing facilities for leak

test, etc.
shipments,
shipments,
certificates,
reports
etc.
FIG. I. The functional system o f accountancy.
of retrieving information from the vast amount of hard copy. More than 30 000 cer
tificates are issued yearly and the accumulated figure is close to 450 000 as of
May 1990.
In addition to the above regulations a special category of sealed sources, viz.
Pu- neutron sources, is also subject to balance type accountancy under the
Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and Hungary (in force since 1972), also
providing more safety for the handling of Pu- sources.
378 BIR et al.
Order 1/1964 was updated by Act 1/1980 on the Applications of Atomic

Energy and its Executive Order 7/1988 issued by the Ministry of Health and Social
Affairs. The accountancy of radioactive materials at national and user levels will
further be regulated by the order to be issued dealing with sealed sources with stress.
The Act 1/1980 and its Executive Order 12/1980 allocated responsibilities and
designations, while the new Order 7/1988 confirmed the practice described above
(Table I). The new feature introduced by the updated legislation is the reporting of
the transfers, including final disposal and accidental loss, to the Institute. With this
information additional to that already mentioned the central accountancy sys
tem will enable one to follow the life of any sealed source and also enable the estab
lishment of inventories by users, or by other organizations.
It is noted, however, that though the regulations described deal with radio
active material in general, the intention was to lay particular stress on the safe
handling of sealed sources supported by a clear and comprehensive accountancy. In
fact, the provisions concerning inventory changes, such as transfers and disposal,
apply mostly or only to sealed sources.
The functional system of accountancy and related tasks is shown in Fig. 1.
2. THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
Records and copies of certificates have been kept at the Institute since 1954,
when the first artificial radioactive source was imported. Data of all imported and
domestically produced radioactive products are now computerized. In the case of
sealed sources, data of all items ever registered in the country have retrospectively
been fed into a computer. The data are at present processed by a Honeywell 660 type
computer.
Records of sealed sources include data such as:
(1) symbol of nuclide, mass number, half-life, characteristic decay mode;

(2) type of sealed source, activity, identity number, supplier, number of items;
(3) users name and address, licence number;
(4) date of shipment, certificate number.
The data query system allows a large variety of groupings and listings using these
data. Answers to the questions most frequently used can be selected from the main
menu. One of the most important printouts contains data on user nuclide, type of
source, certificate No., date delivered, and activity at present. The query may refer
to any time interval and different kinds of summarizing are possible.
The national accounting system will run by the end of this year with the newly
installed Hewlett Packard 3000 GX Microcomputer, and it is planned that it be used
solely for this purpose. All relevant input data concerning the certificates of radio
active products, shipment documents, etc., will be fed directly via the terminals
IAEA-SM-309/35 379
operating at the producers and the trade offices. This system will ensure that no data
could be lost by chance.
3. TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES
The Institute, engaged in the production, application and trade of radioactive

materials, provides the necessary technical background: this includes the availability
of computer systems and techniques, isotope production facilities, temporary
storage, etc. The Institute is equipped with those techniques and methods which are
required in the course of producing sealed radioactive sources, e.g. hot cells, open
ing and welding devices, transport containers, etc. Test methods and equipment
required by the quality control of sealed sources are available in the Institute for tests
such as: leakage tests, impact tests, vibration and puncture tests. These tests can also
be utilized for checking the condition of the sealed sources already in use. The deci
sion on a sealed source after a proper test may be for a prolongation of its use with
or without recapsulation or for its disposal as waste.
The recapsulation of used high activity ^C o sources was done in a few cases,
and a lot of used radiographic 192Ir sources have been collected and renewed by
reactivation.
At the user site sealed sources are regularly checked for contamination by
means of smear tests. Sources for final disposal are collected and transported to a
central disposal site where they are placed in safe underground steel and concrete
pits.
4. SUMMARY
The above described legal, administrative and technical system enables us to

establish inventories or to follow up and control all sealed sources used or stored in
Hungary.
Information gained from the national accounting system has been used mostly
by authorities, and by some producers. Attempts to fulfil the ever stricter environ
mental protection requirements together with the rigorous demands of public accep
tance underline the importance of a regular and extended on-the-spot control of
sealed radioactive sources; this can be carried out effectively when supported by a
well-functioning central accounting system.
SERVICES AND SPECIAL ISSUES
(Session VIII)
C hairm an
S. CHRISTOFIDES
C y p ru s
IAEA-SM-309/39
NATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION SERVICES

IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND
THE ROLE OF IAEA SUPPORT
I. OTHMAN
Protection and Safety Department,
Atomic Energy Commission,
Damascus, Syria
Abstract
N ATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION SERVICES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
AND THE ROLE OF IAEA SUPPORT.
It is difficult to establish a regulatory body in developing countries according to the
IAEA guides. However, it is possible to accomplish the duties o f such a body by deriving a
suitable structure. Training o f group leaders could help in running the local training courses
for different uses o f radioisotopes. W ell-planned technical co-operation programmes could
help in creating an acceptable level in operational radiation protection and preparedness to
meet the control requirem ents o f the authorities should an accident occur.
1. INTRODUCTION
In developing countries, nuclear activities range from various uses of sealed

or unsealed sources in medicine, industry and research to nuclear power plants.
Countries starting their nuclear activities (most probably) will not have a radiation
protection infrastructure or a regulatory pyramid. The IAEA plays an important role
in helping developing countries to establish their regulations by providing them with
the required training courses for manpower development. Alternatively, such coun
tries may take into consideration IAEA publications and adapt them according to
their special needs.
The Syrian Atomic Energy Commission was created with two main objectives:
(a) to promote the use of nuclear science and technology to improve the living stan
dard of the people; (b) to control the application of radiation from the radiation pro
tection and safety point of view. These two objectives are found in similar
institutions in many other countries. To achieve the second objective a department
of protection and safety was created to act as a technical body to the regulatory
authority in all matters related to nuclear safety and radiation protection, as well as
to provide services in fields such as personal dosimetry calibration, effluent monitor
ing, inspection, decontamination and waste disposal. Also, the department has the
383
384 OTHMAN
responsibility of preparing and running programmes to qualify and train local techni
cal staff in the basic aspects of protection and safety when handling radioisotopes and
radiation sources.
2. THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY PROGRAMMES IN DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES
A nuclear safety programme is intended to provide the means to ensure that

people and the environment are reasonably protected against the toxic effects of
ionizing radiation. Such means will depend on current nuclear activities in the coun
try as well as those planned for the future.
Three different groups of activities may be identified.
2.1. Use of radioisotopes and radiation sources
In all developing countries there is a central radioisotope laboratory. There are

also other isotope users dealing with sealed and unsealed sources. Moreover, there
could be in any country a large number of X ray devices for medical uses, most of
which are uncontrolled.
It is clear that these ongoing activities need a safety programme. Nevertheless,
the implementation of the programme requires the promulgation of a basic law and
the approval of basic regulations related, as a minimum, to aspects such as safe
handling of radionuclide and radiation sources, safe transportation of radionuclides,
safe handling and disposal of radioactive wastes, qualifications of users of radio
isotopes and radiation sources, and qualifications of radiation protection personnel.
In addition to these regulations or safety guides, there should be a higher level docu
ment on the Basic Safety Standard for Radiation Protection; this standard and the
above mentioned regulations could be developed from the relevant IAEA documents.
Apart from the uses mentioned above and those which arise when a nuclear
research centre becomes operational, one could expect a big increase in the use of
all types of radioactive sources and radiation generators. Therefore, this increase
should be taken into account when planning the nuclear safety and radiation protec
tion programme for the country.
2.2. Development of a nuclear research centre
When a nuclear research centre is planned by the concerned authority of any

developing country, the nuclear research reactor and radioisotope fabrication are
considered as the most significant from the protection and safety points of view.
These activities alone demand a substantial nuclear safety programme. One impor
tant consequence is that in many developing countries atomic energy commissions
IAEA-SM-309/39 385
will be at the same time the owner-operator of the centre and the technical body for
the licensing authority.
The above problem has been solved in different ways. In many cases, the
Director of the institution on the one hand is considered as the applicant, who must
fulfil the same conditions as an outsider. The corresponding regulatory group will
then advise the highest authority on the matter. Frequently, also, the highest
authority has nominated advisory bodies to advise on the decision making. The first
task to be addressed by the safety programme will be the site selection for the centre,
followed by obtaining the construction licence for the research reactor and other
radioactive installations. That will then be followed by setting up the inspection
system during the construction stage and the commissioning of the various facilities.
At the operation stage such facilities are sources of significant and numerous safety
problems which must be considered beforehand.
Nuclear safety is so wide in scope that specialists are needed in such unrelated
fields as meteorological dispersion and metallography. For this reason, it is wise to
secure any possible assistance. This requires that the persons responsible for safety
must have enough knowledge and understanding to be able to ask experts the right
questions, to combine in a meaningful document the expertise received and produce
a safety evaluation report which will help in the decision making process.
2.3. The nuclear power programme
In any developing country which has decided to build an NPP, a site survey
has to be performed. The responsibility for the construction and operation must be
under one of the Ministries concerned, while the Atomic Energy Authority will be
the technical body responsible for advising the licensing authority.
The case above is typical for an importing country ordering its first nuclear
station from an exporter. In this particular case, the station will belong to the State.
Cases like this are common. Successful nuclear safety programmes in developing
countries require the use of a reference plant; this gives the assurance of help. They
must also establish a formal agreement with the regulatory counterpart of the
exporter and other institutes in countries with similar power plants.
3. FUNCTIONS OF THE SYRIAN REGULATORY BODY
The functions of the Syrian regulatory body (Safety Committee) are clearly
defined in its statute and more specifically in the draft nuclear law. The main objec
tive of securing protection for people, the environment and the installations them
selves can be accomplished by performing three major tasks or functions, i.e.
development of regulations, guides and standards;

performing safety reviews and assessments of applications for licences;
386 OTHMAN
conducting inspections to verify compliance with regulations and licensing

conditions.
When the above mentioned tasks are applied to the particular needs of the
country, one could derive a suitable structure for the regulatory body as follows.
First of all, it must be recognized that the Commission is the technical body
serving the licensing authority. To cover such responsibility, the Commission has
already created a department of safety and protection. This department will provide
services such as dosimetry, decontamination or operational safety. There should be
sufficient separation between licensing and servicing responsibilities.
Most regulations applicable to isotopes and radiation sources which are of
great interest to developing countries have already being developed in IAEA publica
tions, especially in the Safety Series and Technical Reports Series. It is highly
recommended that individuals should get a practitioners knowledge of such
documents.
Apart from adopting or adapting such documents, the regulatory organization
will have to create expertise to review and assess applications and to verify compli
ance with regulations.
From the regulatory point of view, the most important document is the IAEA
Safety Series No. 35, Safe Operation of Research Reactor and Critical Assemblies,
1984 edition, to which the documents in the NUSS Series should be added.
The above mentioned documents were regarded as the basis to ensure the
safety of the research reactor. A specialized department of protection and safety and
the management of the reactor project had discussed the contents of. that document
and come to agreement on how to implement it in the project. That agreement
had been transmitted to the supplier and discussed with him during the contract
negotiations.
The regulatory body will assign the following duties to the Department of
Protection and Safety:
(1) Perform the safety review and assessment of the safety information presented
by the applicants and licensees of nuclear installations (nuclear research centre,
nuclear power plant).
(2) Conduct regulatory inspections to verify compliance with the regulations and
conditions of the licence. The inspectors could audit quality assurance docu
ments and quality control records and have authority to perform measurements
or take samples.
(3) Produce reports aimed at the granting or revoking of licences by the authority.
Ensure that corrective actions are taken when there is a departure from or a
violation of the established rules.
(4) Propose, by adoption, adaptation or otherwise, regulations, guides, codes of
practices, standards, and conditions of the licences to regulate the use of
nuclear energy.
IAEA-SM-309/39 387
In that safety committee (regulatory body), apart from representatives from the
Atomic Energy Commission, other Ministries and independent specialists are
included. Ministries such as those of Electricity, Health, Environment, Transporta
tion and Labour participate in this committee.
4. TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION WITH THE IAEA
Through the Technical Co-operation Programmes, the IAEA provides

assistance to the developing countries by means of experts, equipment and training.
In most radiation protection projects the target groups and beneficiaries are all radia
tion workers in the country, patients subjected to ionizing radiation for diagnostic
or/and therapeutic purposes and the general public exposed to ionizing radiation in
the environment. Thus a project on radiation protection activities in any developing
country is designed to determine future needs and the possible assistance required
from the IAEA.
Many expert missions may take place to advise authorities concerned with
nuclear power training and manpower development, and on the development of
nuclear activities in general.
From our experience, a well designed project and a good understanding
between Technical Co-operation (TC) officers and counterparts of the project could
accomplish all the objectives and put the laboratory involved into good working
order.
In our Technical Co-operation Project (SYR/9/003) progress has been
achieved in all major activities of the project.
4.1. Personnel monitoring service
A routine film monitoring service is in operation (in 1989 it covered

1000 radiation workers in the Syrian Atomic Energy Commisson (SAEC) and 79
outside the institute. In 1986, it covered 200 workers in the SAEC and seven in other
institutes). A postal dose comparison is being undertaken by the IAEA with satisfac
tory results.
The equipment required for thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) personnel
monitoring, which was provided by the project, has been installed and is in use for
both personnel and environmental monitoring. Sufficient training was provided to
the technical staff through the project to enable them to accomplish this task without
any further IAEA assistance. SAEC has established a national register system for all
radiation sources and radiation users to enable it to extend the monitoring services
to all radiation workers in the country.
388 OTHMAN
4.2. Secondary Standard Dosimetry Laboratory (SSDL)
In this project a building and some facilities have been provided by the Govern
ment. A set of calibration instruments and a Philips MG 323 X ray unit provided
by the IAEA has been installed. Cobalt-60 and caesium-137 sources were provided
by SAEC and installed. The SSDL is now able to calibrate radiation protection
equipment and dosimeters used in radiotherapy.
4.3. Environmental monitoring laboratory
Training in environmental protection and monitoring techniques is being

provided to the staff of the laboratory locally and through a fellowship abroad. The
laboratory has started background monitoring.
Beside national projects, the radiation protection department could benefit
from the regional projects; these projects have the advantage of harmonizing the
activity on a regional scale, also they will be of great importance for any comparison
programme.
Training and sharing experience are provided in an environment similar to that
of the actual work. Also, activities largely develop from initiatives within the region,
thus they are responding to actual needs of the countries involved.
5. TRAINING
In many countries atomic energy authorities were established much later than
universities. Universities in these countries concentrate on teaching sciences for
preparing secondary school teachers. These programmes may touch on nuclear
physics but will not provide graduates with the knowledge required to work in the
nuclear field. Here the IAEA is playing an active role for the development of man
power in those countries, providing fellowships to attend university courses in
nuclear subjects and nuclear technique or methodology which are of great impor
tance to the national development.
Many leaflets describe the very important role of the IAEA in the transfer of
nuclear technology by training people from the developing countries. This training
support is in the form of practical learning related to the use of nuclear techniques
rather than theoretical studies. This will no doubt assure the utilization of equipment
and instruments purchased by the laboratory or provided by IAEA Technical Co
operation projects.
IAEA-SM-309/39 389
6. INTERCOMPARISONS
One of the ways to improve the quality of measurement in radiation protection

is to carry out comparisons of radiation protection dosimeters and reference
materials with the regional institutes.
With the assistance of the IAEA, these studies in developing countries can
improve dose evaluation, i.e. ensure that assessment of the dose to the persons
involved is standardized in participating countries, and that doses determined by
different laboratories in different countries are comparable, that they are made with
the accuracy required for radiation protection and that the measurements obtained
lie within an acceptable confidence interval even when different methods are used.
6.1. Regional Middle East intercomparison programme
This intercomparison programme was devoted to environmental dosimeters

used in three countries in the region, namely, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Generally, no
primary standard laboratory was involved, but IAEA laboratories assisted in this
programme as a reference to assure the accuracy of gamma spectrometry and
environmental dose measurements.
These intercomparisons help strengthen the co-operation between laboratories
in the region, beside assuring confidence in the results issued by each laboratory,
especially when we consider that all these laboratories were established after 1986.
In many cases a governmental decision is taken based on their results.
7. CONCLUSION
The use of nuclear techniques requires a radiation protection infrastructure. All

developing countries have to concentrate on establishing this infrastructure before
expanding the use of radioisotopes and radiation sources. Regulations can be adapted
from IAEA publications after taking into account peculiarities of the country. Man
power is the most important factor in radiation protection and nuclear safety depart
ments. The IAEA, through regional and interregional training courses, gives
valuable assistance to developing countries. Technical Co-operation projects are of
great help, when there is a shortage of foreign currency, in providing these depart
ments with the necessary equipment. Finally, intercomparison exercises give trained
personnel confidence in performing their duties.
IAEA-SM-309/76
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Abstract-
RADIATION SAFETY FOR PERSONNEL IN NUCLEA R FACILITIES IN THE USSR.
An exposition is given o f the organizational principles underlying the radiation safety
service in the USSR. Examples are given o f typical structures, and the role o f individual
groups in the service is explained. Attention is drawn to the principle o f double standardization
(monitoring and operational levels). A review is given o f the activities o f the service; chief
among these are the prevention o f overexposure o f personnel at facilities (operational services)
and measurement o f the individual doses received by each w orker (individual monitoring ser
vice). The service makes extensive use o f the ALARA principle in its work. Thus, monitoring
methods are constantly being im proved, new types of individual protection investigated, and
impovements made to equipment used to measure the param eters o f the radiation situation.

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IAEA-SM-309/76 393

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IAEA-SM-309/61
RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURE OF A

UNIVERSITY RESEARCH REACTOR INSTITUTE
M. TSCHURLOVITS
Atominstitut der sterreichischen Universitten,
Vienna, Austria
Abstract
RADIATION PROTECTION I N F R A S T R U C T U R E O F A UNIVERSITY R E S E A R C H
R E A C T O R INSTITUTE.
The radiation protection infrastructure of a university institute operating a research
reactor and some other equipment is discussed. Both the legislative situation as regards
radiation protection in Austria as well as the internal structure are considered. The work of
the institutes radiation protection group is described.
1. INTRODUCTION
The radiation protection group of a university institute operating a research

reactor (with different experimental facilities, e.g. for beam hole experiments and
for radionuclide production) and operating some other radiation producing equip
ment and radiochemical laboratories has in some cases a rather peculiar status.
This is because some administrative, scientific and legislative aspects lead to
different, often contradictory requirements in radiation protection structure and
organization.
Radiation protection standards are typically not designed for a university insti
tute with frequently changing conditions, but rather for facilities with little changing
permanent staff and steady state operating conditions. Obviously, teaching and
research are important tasks, and therefore radiation protection measures have not
only to fulfil legal requirements, but have also to serve as a demonstration of good
practice and recent developments.
The work of the radiation protection group consists of the following tasks:
to be in charge of radiation protection in the institute
teaching
research
to supply expert opinions to the licensing authority.
These aspects, which can be separated into administrative and scientific issues,
are discussed below.
403
404 TSCHURLOVITS
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE FACILITY
The Atominstitut der sterreichischen Universitten is part of the Technical

University of Vienna. It is separate from the main building and located at a different
site. The reactor building was constructed about 30 years ago. The institute provides
facilities for the scientific staff, but also for senior students for preparation of their
diploma theses, where the fields range from theoretical nuclear physics to radiation
protection, and from low temperature physics to radiochemistry, to give a few
examples.
The major facilities requiring radiation protection are:
TRIGA Mark II research reactor
250 kW steady state operation
300 MW pulse operation
4 beam holes
2 thermal columns
facilities for activation of samples
fast pneumatic system
2 MeV Van de Graaf generator
400 keV Van de Graaf generator
5 X ray machines
radiochemical laboratories
hot cell
liquid waste treatment plant
sealed radiation sources up to some hundred GBq.
Therefore, a rather inhomogeneous structure exists, and not necessarily all

students and staff members are actually subjected to potential exposure. However,
they have to be under physical and medical supervision, because there is free access
within the institute between the different facilities.
The institute has a staff of about 70 persons, of whom one half are profes
sionals, and 65 students are working on their theses. These persons are subject to
physical and medical surveillance. In addition, about 100 students are working each
semester in short term laboratory courses in the institute. Altogether, about 1850
dosimeters were issued in 1989.
3. GENERAL ASPECTS OF A UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE WITH REGARD

TO OPERATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION
Although the potential of exposure is low, legislative requirements are fUlly

applied. On the one hand, security and safety regulations of a reactor institute require
careful control of access and physical surveillance of people. On the other hand,
IAEA-SM-309/61 405
however, a university institute has to provide students rather free access to the facili
ties. Control of access might be sometimes considered as disturbing the freedom of
learning. In addition, the institute has to be open for guided visits of high school stu
dents and for other groups. Therefore, there are many persons who are in the insti
tute for a short period only. This leads to some discussion of the still valid but
obsolete definition of controlled area.
Further, it is expected of the staff of the radiation protection group in a univer
sity institute that they should be working actively and at the frontier of the develop
ment of their field. On the other hand, recent legal requirements tend to declare the
same persons as disenabled or incompetent by implying that a correct reading of dose
rate survey meters or dosimeters can be made only by an institute of measures.
Related to this issue is the fact, typical for an interdisciplinary field such as
radiation protection, that every person having reached a given professional and
scientific level in the contributing sciences feels himself or herself to be automati
cally competent over the whole field of radiation protection. Practically everybody
familiar with either the terms radiation or biological effects claims to be an expert
in radiation protection. Experience has shown that this is not true. It is well known
that the greatest confusion is generated in public discussions on radiation effects, on
consequences and related issues, by people involved in the use of radiation in differ
ent fields, but not necessarily in protection from radiation as such.
Typically, for a research institute radiation protection is sometimes considered
as a useless business, with the competent authority occasionally disturbing scientists
in their work with various demands. However, occasionally it is recognized that the
field of radiation protection, because of its interdisciplinary nature, might be of some
use to the institute, e.g. when the public calls into question an institution using radio
activity and radiation sources.
Regarding the scientific issue, it is not yet fully established that radiation pro
tection is a real interdisciplinary field and no longer some by-product of already
established sciences. It is not yet understood that the essence of radiation protection
is not merely detailed knowledge of specific nuclear transitions or minor biological
effects. However, a profound knowledge of these parts of contributing fields which
are important for radiation protection is the key issue. The interaction and the com
pleteness as well as the updating of knowledge of recent developments is of much
more importance for judging a situation than details of interaction coefficients.
Nevertheless it is expected that the staff of the radiation protection division play a
leading role in the scientific work in this field and is also in a position to take respon
sibility for operational radiation protection.
Regarding teaching and training, a university institute has to provide appropri
ate facilities for training in the field. The background must be up-to-date, and good
practice has to be demonstrated. Further, a full time radiation protection officer has
to serve as an adviser, providing some help in non-routine cases.
406 TSCHURLOVITS
The status of the responsible radiation protection officer also deserves some
attention. In practice, legal requirements and hence licensing procedures do not dis
tinguish between two cases. One possibility is that the responsible staff is working
full time in the field, has an up-to-date background and hence identifies itself with
the field of radiation protection. On the other hand, in smaller laboratories there are
some people working part time in radiation protection. In some cases, they identify
themselves with the field only under certain circumstances. Consequently, full time
radiation protection officers need more decision making authority in operational
radiation protection than do part time staff. For example, radiation protection legisla
tion requires, for licensing purposes, a detailed description of future work. On the
other hand, routine experiments are of less importance than experiments directed by
their scientific content rather than by a rather difficult and awkward to handle
administration. For example, laboratories for handling unsealed sources are designed
for given radionuclides. When the sources are changed, a new licensing procedure
has to be performed. Since the licensing procedure is usually time consuming, the
radiation protection officer should have more authority for making decisions than a
part time officer, provided that he is actually fully involved in the business.
4. LEGAL SITUATION (EXTERNAL STRUCTURE)
In Austria, each operation of a radiation source in the broadest sense is subject

to licensing. The first licence for medical X ray equipment was issued in Austria in
1899. The current situation is as follows. In 1969, a Radiation Protection Law was
issued, followed by an ordinance in 1972. Since then, legislation has remained
unchanged. Two drafts of a new ordinance were prepared recently and discussed by
experts, but a new version has not yet been issued. However, the Radiation Protec
tion Law is not subject to updating, and therefore, some obsolete phrases such as as
low as possible or controlled area will still remain valid. Many details are given
on X ray equipment, fewer on radiochemical laboratories and radiation sources, but
in this legislation very little is said about reactors. Therefore most of the licensing
criteria were drawn up by experts.
Regarding the competences of authorities, two cases have to be distinguished:
Non-governmental users such as factories, doctors, laboratories are subject to
licensing by the province.
Official users are subject to licensing by the relevant ministry. Therefore,
nearly all ministries have some responsibility for radiation protection.
No general advisory board or central institute for radiation protection has been
established in Austria. The Ministry of Health (at present within the Chancellors
Office) is in charge of legislation. Therefore, for university institutes, the Ministry
of Science and Research is the competent authority. However, for a reactor or some
IAEA-SM-309/61 407
other large items of equipment (e.g. particle accelerators) an agreement with other
authorities, such as the Ministries for Social Affairs and Labour (Central Labour
Inspectorate) and for Health has to be established. Figure 1 shows the situation in
brief. The full licensing procedure is illustrated in Fig. 2.
FIG. 1. Radiation protection: external structure.
FIG. 2. Licensing procedure (left), examples (right).

408 TSCHURLOVITS
5. INTERNAL STRUCTURE
In the Atomic Institute, the staff of the radiation protection group consists of
three persons, two at a professional and one at an engineer level. One professional
post is currently vacant.
The tasks of the radiation protection group are:
operational radiation protection
teaching at university level
research work.
The operational radiation protection can be separated into:
occupational supervision (including physical and medical surveillance)

release monitoring
environmental monitoring
calibration and maintenance of equipment and instrumentation
setting of radiation protection measures
supervision of monitoring programmes
record keeping
preparing reports for authorities.
Since the staff is obviously too small for the tasks shown above, in particular
for being in charge and hence being present during routine operations , the following
compromise was agreed upon with the authorities. For each group handling sources
or operating equipment, an acting radiation protection officer is assigned, whose task
is to carry out the individual monitoring programme and to supervise routine work,
but who is not entitled to make changes in the protective system.
Several licences have been issued for various items of equipment and sources
by the competent authority in the past few years, but it is planned to bring the struc
ture into a uniform format, as shown in Fig. 3.
Operational radiation protection is subject to annual supervision by the
authority, where the authorities mentioned above check with the help of experts the
appropriateness of measures and the completeness of the surveillance programme
and the control measures.
6 . CONCLUSIONS
The operational radiation protection structure of a major university institute

has other rules than even larger facilities. This is because there is an interaction
between operation, teaching and research. However, there is still some lack of
professional profile, because former generations paid more attention to the scientific
development of the profession than to the establishment of an interdisciplinary field.
IAEA-SM-309/61 409
Protection Protection Protection Protection

Engineer Engineer Engineer Engineer
FIG. 3. Radiation protection: internal structure.
It is shown that the radiation protection division in a university research insti

tute is on the one hand subject to both legal and administrative supervision in regard
to the facilities operated but on the other hand serves, thanks to the highly profes
sional background and the interaction between teaching and practice, as an institution
providing help for the authorities and the public when non-routine questions have to
be answered.
IAEA-SM-309/74
..
. . . ,
,

A bstract-
OPTIMUM STRUCTURE FOR A RADIATION SAFETY SERVICE.

An optimum structure for a radiation safety service was developed between 1952 and
1962 at a time when the I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy was developing at a fast
pace. During that period, the Institute was doing scientific research and experimental design
work in gas diffusion and electromagnetic separation of isotopes (including weighed quantities
of plutonium), in neutron and reactor physics using a cyclotron, critical assemblies and
research reactors, in radiation materials science using a test reactor and hot chambers, and
in the chemistry of transuranium elements, etc. Full time radiation monitoring groups were
set up to perform operational radiation monitoring in the main areas where there was danger
from radiation, their purpose being to evaluate external and internal exposure doses received
by personnel. Essential additional methods, detectors and apparatus were developed in the
scientific laboratories of the Radiation Safety Division. Within the radiation safety laboratory,
an external dosimetry service was responsible for evaluating the environmental effect; its job
was to measure the discharge of gaseous radioactive substances from the individual facilities
at the Institute of Atomic Energy, to assess the weather conditions in the area and monitor
surface concentrations of radionuclides around the Institute. The Radiation Safety Division
developed guidelines and determined maximum permissible levels for discharge of radio
nuclides from nuclear facilities. The first whole body counter in the USSR, which was
developed at the Institute, has undergone four modernizations and is one of the most sensitive
o f its type in the world. Evaluations of internal exposure doses have shown that their contribu
tion to the radiation burden on staff is insignificant. The whole body counter has been used
successfully to monitor people involved in the cleanup activities at Chernobyl. As with other
aspects of the Institutes activities, the optimum structure for the Radiation Safety Division
developed at the Institute has served as a model for the radiation safety system in the nuclear
and nuclear power industries.
.

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IAEA-SM-309/74 419

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IAEA-SM-309/75
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Abstract-
RADIATION SAFETY UNDER EXTREME CONDITIONS.

A description is given of the main radiation safety provisions implemented during the
erection of the encapsulation of Unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant after the accident
on 26 April 1986. The radiation situation at the site during the work was characterized by high
radiation levels and radioactive contamination of the area and the buildings. The situation was
highly complex and developments were difficult to forecast. In view of the extremely danger
ous radiation conditions, the large volume of construction and assembly work had to be carried
out within a very limited period of time. Work in the vicinity of the destroyed unit was carried
out only after radiation reconnaissance had been performed, the main radiation sources deter
mined, and safe working regulations formulated. Both traditional and specially developed
methods were used to monitor the radiation situation. On the basis of radiation reconnaissance
and radiation situation monitoring results, organizational and technical measures were devel
oped and implemented to ensure the radiation safety of personnel. During the construction
work, extensive use was made of remote controlled machinery and technology and various
types of radiation protection cabins and screens were employed. Great emphasis was placed
on the implementation of technical health precautions. A health checkpoint regime was
instituted in the exclusion zone around the plant with changing areas, radiation monitoring
areas, and shower rooms. Staff were equipped with special clothing, special footwear, and
apparatus to protect the respiratory organs. By November 1986 the destroyed unit had been
rendered safe and conditions restored for continued operation of the three remaining units.
Radiation safety requirements were complied with during the work.

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IAEA-SM-309/36
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REGULATORY VIEW OF

THE USE OF RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE EQUIP
MENT IN RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
M.L. BACON
Bootle, Merseyside,
United Kingdom
Abstract
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REGULATORY VIEW OF THE USE OF RESPIRATORY
PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT IN RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM.
United Kingdom legislation has two fundamental requirements with respect to the use
of respiratory protective equipment (RPE). First, it must be adequate and suitable for its
intended purpose; and secondly, it must be of a type, or conform to a standard, in either case
approved by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). In the past, the HSE has taken into
account some of the requirements of adequacy and suitability in the approvals procedure by
attaching conditions to the approval of individual items of equipment. The introduction of
more broadly based regulations has widened the variety and number of items o f RPE requiring
approval to an extent that such detailed approvals procedures are no longer practicable. This,
and the forthcoming requirements of the European free market in 1992, has led to the adoption
of basic standards for approval purposes with the responsibility lying with the employer for
ensuring that RPE is adequate and suitable. The paper relates how the implementation of one
of these sets of regulations, the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1985, resulted in a substantial
review by the United Kingdom nuclear industry of their use of RPE and in the drafting and
publication of guidance on the detailed interpretation of adequacy and suitability.
1. INTRODUCTION
Respiratory protective equipment (RPE) has played a significant role in the

minimization of doses to workers from airborne radioactive contamination. Develop
ments in the United Kingdom legislation since 1985, and the forthcoming require
ments of the European free market in 1992, have led to a change in emphasis of the
regulatory view of RPE. This paper describes the developments in this subject since
1985 as they have affected the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom.
439
440 BACON
2. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The basis of the United Kingdom legislative framework with respect to health
and safety at work is the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HASAWA). This
Act lays down general duties on employers, manufacturers and employees with
respect to safety and enables regulations to be made to cover specific safety matters.
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) was set up under this Act and empo
wered to enforce it and any regulations made under it. In 1985 the Ionising Radia
tions Regulations (IRR85) were made under the HASAWA and it is the effect of
these regulations as they affect RPE which will be discussed in this paper.
3. THE IONISING RADIATIONS REGULATIONS 1985
These regulations require that RPE should only be used if it is not reasonably
practicable to restrict adequately the exposure of employees by means of engineering
controls and design features. However, given that RPE is to be used, the regulations
impose two basic requirements:
(1) RPE shall be adequate and suitable for its intended purpose; and
(2) RPE shall be of a type, or conform to a standard, in either case approved by
the HSE.
Although there had been a requirement for RPE to be suitable in previous regu
lations covering ionizing radiations, the IRR85 introduced the requirement for
approval for the first time in this area. This requirement came into force for all RPE
supplied to employers after 1 January 1988.
4. THE APPROVALS PROCEDURE
The requirement for approval of RPE is not unique to the IRR85, indeed, simi
lar requirements have been in force under legislation covering other industrial activi
ties since long before 1985. The HSE delegates its authority to approve RPE to
designated individuals who take advice as necessary from an Approvals Panel. In
order that a balanced view can be taken on these matters, the Approvals Panel has
representatives of all the enforcing divisions of the HSE, the Field Operations Divi
sion covering factories, agriculture and quarries, the Mines Inspectorate and the
Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. The panel also has experts in occcupational
hygiene from HSEs Technology Division, representatives of the central Policy Divi
sions and is chaired and run by members of the Research and Laboratory Service
Division, who also carry out much of the technical work in respect of RPE
IAEA-SM-309/36 441
approvals. An essential feature of the system is a cross-fertilization of experience of

inspectors who have dealt with the full range of industrial activities, together with
the fundamental requirements of policy and the knowledge of experts fully conver
sant with the latest standards.
There are two fundamental forms of approval:
(1) type approval, where the HSE either tests the equipment itself, or examines
the results of tests carried out by acceptable institutions, and issues a certificate
of approval for that model; and
(2 ) conformity to an approved standard, where the manufacturer can self-certify
that his equipment meets the requirement of a standard approved by the HSE.
Other than the approval of the standard, the HSE is not involved in this
process.
5. THE IMPACT OF IRR85 ON APPROVAL
The IRR85 was the first of two sets of regulations which had a significant effect
on the operation of the approvals system. The second of these, the Control of Sub
stances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Regulations 1988, had a much broader
impact, but the solution of problems raised by IRR85 helped in the development of
a procedure capable of adequately covering all situations. The main effect of IRR85
was to bring into consideration for approval a large number and variety of RPE for
which formal approval had never previously been required.
At the time of the introduction of IRR85 the practice was for the process of
approval to attempt to cover many of the requirements of adequacy and suitability.
This involved extensive testing of equipment, often including field trials. The results
of this testing were carried through to the approval process by the addition of condi
tions on approval certificates restricting the circumstances under which a piece of
equipment could be used. All equipment was type approved in this way. The option
of conformity to an approved standard did not exist since no standards had been
approved.
Although a two year period had been allowed from the main provisions of
IRR85 coming into effect on 1 January 1986 to the RPE approval requirements com
ing into effect on 1 January 1988, it soon become evident that it would not be possi
ble to carry out the approval process for two main reasons. Firstly, much of the RPE
used by the nuclear industry was highly specialized and not available as off the shelf
items. This resulted in a situation where each site had developed its own forms of
RPE, giving a large number of different pieces of equipment to be approved.
Table I gives an indication of the types and numbers involved. There was simply
insufficient time for all the equipment to be tested with the regime then in use.
442 BACON
TABLE I. EQUIPMENT REQUIRING APPROVAL FOR THE FIRST TIME

UNDER IRR85
Pressurized full suits 21 variations

Pressurized half suits 14 variations
Air hoods 39 variations
Air supplied respirators 17 variations
Full face respiratory equipment 19 variations
a In use on 33 sites.
The second reason, which introduced further delays, was that since much of
the equipment was novel, and of a type which had never been used in situations
requiring formal approval, no protocols for testing this equipment existed in a form
which could be readily used.
6 . SITE SPECIFIC APPROVALS UNDER IRR85
The immediate solution to the problem was to issue approvals for a two year
period to the users of the equipment rather than to the manufacturers, as is normally
the case. This was justified on the basis that experience had shown that employees
were not being exposed significantly in a way attributable to inadequate RPE. Rou
tine dosimetry has been carried out at most nuclear sites for many years and it was
considered unlikely that a serious deficiency in the protection afforded by the RPE
would have remained unnoticed. However, it was recognized that the protection
might derive as much from how the RPE was used as from the technical capability
of the equipment itself. The approvals were therefore given to the users and were
conditional upon the equipment being issued, used and maintained and employees
trained in accordance with a set of instructions supplied by the employer/user at the
time of application for approval.
7. PROGRESS SINCE 1988
The Site Specific Approvals were only intended as a temporary measure and
an expiry date of 31 December 1989 was attached to each such approval. In consulta
tion with the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom the following actions were
agreed:
IAEA-SM-309/36 443
(1) the industry would rationalize the wide variety of equipment in use such that
a minimum number of items could be presented for testing and type approval
while still ensuring that these could satisfy the industrys needs;
(2) HSE would produce protocols, where these were not currently available,
against which the above equipment could be tested;
(3) the industry would arrange for its equipment to be tested to the set protocols
and present the results to the HSE for approval to be considered; and
(4) in order that the need to set conditions of use for each item of equipment could
be dropped, the HSE would produce guidance on the requirements for ade
quacy and suitability which would cover such areas as selection, use, main
tenance, testing and issue of RPE as well as training of employees in its use
and the management of the infrastructure required.
By the end of 1989, when the Site Specific Approvals expired, much progress
had been made in the completion of these actions:
The industry had completed an extensive internal consultation exercise to stan
dardize its RPE and had presented a programme to the HSE indicating when
testing results would be available. The initial programme indicated a much
reduced range of equipment. (See Table .)
The HSE had produced all the testing protocols necessary for such testing.
These followed the requirements of CEN (European Committee for
Co-ordination of Standards) standards, or where these were still under
discussion, the latest draft standards. By adopting this approach the eventual
move to harmonized European standards should be more easily achieved.
The guidance on adequacy and suitability of RPE for use against airborne
radioactive contamination was produced jointly by the HSEs Nuclear Installa
tions Inspectorate and occupational hygienists from its Technology Division.
Following extensive consultation with the industry this was published in
January 1990 [1].
Although good progress was made towards the agreed objectives, it was not
possible to change completely to the new standardized equipment by the end of
1989. The approval of this equipment would not have been completed by this time
TABLE . EQUIPMENT SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL FOLLOWING

RATIONALIZATION BY THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
Pressurized full suits 9 variations (21)

Pressurized half suits 4 variations (14)
Air hoods 1 variation (39)
(Figures in brackets are the original number of variations, see Table I).
444 BACON
and the industry argued that it would not have been reasonable to replace their large,
and costly, stocks of RPE in such a short time. It was therefore agreed that further
approvals for a limited selection of currently used RPE would be issued, to be valid
until 1 July 1992. This was on the understanding that the equipment on these certifi
cates would, by that expiry date, either be tested to current standards or be replaced
by approved equipment.
8 . OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
As was indicated above, the COSHH regulations have also had an impact on
the HSEs regulatory position with respect to approval of RPE. The scope of the
COSHH regulations is much wider than that of the IRR85 and most of the effort on
RPE in recent years has been devoted to the effect of these regulations. The practical
approvals process was restructured to give a simpler and more manageable process
while still adhering to the fundamental principles behind the legislation requiring the
approval, and also looking to the future and the European free market in 1992.
The fundamental principle behind United Kingdom safety law is that the crea
tor of a hazard is responsible for corresponding safety measures. The responsibility
for safety of RPE in use therefore lies with the employer/user. An HSE approval will
only indicate that a piece of RPE has met a basic set of criteria and is capable of
giving adequate protection in suitable circumstances as described in Section 9 below.
It was decided that approvals should no longer specify limitations on conditions
of use and that there should be a single HSE approval for any item of RPE, i.e.
separate testing and approval for different regulations such as the Control of Lead
at Work (CLAW) Regulations, the Control of Asbestos at Work (CAW) Regulations
and the Ionising Radiations Regulations would not take place. This harmonized
approvals process now applies to the requirements of COSHH, CAW, CLAW and
IRR85, although for various reasons some legislation still requires separate
approvals.
In order further to concentrate the HSEs efforts on the items with greatest
potential safety significance it was decided that only RPE with a specified Total
Inward Leakage (TIL) of less than 0.2% would be considered for type approval. All
other equipment would be required to conform to an approved standard. Appropriate
standards, again derived from current, or latest draft, European standards, have now
been approved.
From 1992 the United Kingdom, along with all its European partners, will be
obliged to recognize any item of RPE which has achieved certification to European
standards. The HSE has been actively involved in the production of European
standards and the above developments have been aimed at a smooth transition to the
Europe-wide standards position after 1992.
IAEA-SM-309/36 445
9. GUIDANCE ON ADEQUACY AND SUITABILITY
The above approach places great emphasis on the legal requirements for ade
quacy and suitability of RPE. Adequate refers to the ability of the equipment to
protect the wearer and suitable refers to the correct matching of the equipment to
the job and the person. To be considered adequate and suitable RPE must be
correctly selected and used. These definitions come directly from the legislation and
such terms are capable of wide interpretation. Guidance [1] was therefore written
by the HSE to provide its own interpretation of adequate and suitable in terms of the
practical requirements. This covered the following areas:
(1) assessment o f the hazard
Prior to selection of RPE the precise nature of the hazard must be known;
(2) selection o f RPE
once the nature of the hazard is known the appropriate form of RPE must be
selected;
(3) issue and use o f RPE
control is required to ensure that only the correct RPE is issued and used in
accordance with instructions;
(4) training
training is essential for all persons involved in the selection, issue, use and
maintenance of RPE;
(5) maintenance
thorough and regular maintenance of all RPE is essential;
(6 ) storage
inadequate storage can seriously affect the ability of RPE to afford protection;
(7) management systems
a management system is essential to ensure that all of the above aspects are
properly considered and executed.
This guidance lays down a detailed framework to which it is hoped that United
Kingdom employers will refer when considering their own operations. By undertak
ing extensive consultation with the United Kingdom nuclear industry and other
interested parties during the drafting of the guidance, the HSE hopes that the impor
tance it attaches to the requirements of adequacy and suitability has become
understood.
10. THE FUTURE
The dual requirements of adequacy/suitability and approval will continue with

particular emphasis being placed from a regulatory enforcement point of view on the
need for adequacy and suitability aspects to be considered in addition to, not as part
446 BACON
of, approval. For the use of RPE for radiological protection purposes guidance on
this aspect has already been produced and should form a common basis between the
HSE and employers when considering it. From 1992 the approved requirements will
be covered by the requirements of European standards and development of approvals
in the United Kingdom has been aimed at making this transition with a minimum of
disruption.
11. SUMMARY
The introduction in IRR85 of a requirement for RPE to be approved, or con

form to an approved standard, has resulted in a high degree of attention being paid
to the subject of the use of RPE for radiological protection. Discussion has been
necessary, not only between the HSE and individual employers but between different
employers in the nuclear industry. The nuclear industry has been made to look criti
cally at its own operations and significant rationalization has been initiated. The
HSEs position has moved from reliance on detailed testing and approval to one of
adequacy and suitability of RPE being important with approval as a separate con
sideration ensuring that basic safety standards are being met.
It must be stressed that there has been no shift in basic safety policy in that
the responsibility for safety lies with those who create the hazard. In the case of RPE
this responsibility lies with the employer who uses it. Selection of approved equip
ment is not sufficient to discharge this responsibility. Adequate assessment of the
hazard, selection and maintenance of RPE and training of users are essential if RPE
is to provide the necessary protection.
REFERENCE
[1] HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE, Respiratory Protective Equipment for Use
against Airborne Radioactivity, Guidance Note EH53, HMSO, London (1990).
IAEA-SM-309/55
THE ROLE OF RADIATION PROTECTION SOCIETIES:

THE EXAMPLE OF THE GERMAN-SWISS
FACHVERBAND FR STRAHLENSCHUTZ
H.H. BRUNNER
Fach verband fr Strahlenschutz,
Zurich, Switzerland
Abstract
THE ROLE OF RADIATION PROTECTION SOCIETIES: THE EXAMPLE OF THE
GERMAN-SWISS FACHVERBAND FR STRAHLENSCHUTZ.
The role which radiation protection societies can and should play in the radiation protec
tion infrastructure is illustrated by the example of the Fachverband fr Strahlenschutz. In addi
tion to the traditional activities of direct benefit to the members (scientific meetings, bulletin,
publications, etc.) the societies have to become increasingly engaged in external activities such
as serving as an interface to authorities, media and other professional fields, improving their
public relations and information activities, becoming actively involved in legislation, radiation
protection education, quality control, etc. Permanent working groups are excellent mans both
for active participation and improved professional knowledge of the members and for interface
functions to other organizations and institutions. Through the International Radiation Protec
tion Association (IRPA) the national and regional associate societies can co-operate and
become also involved on the international level. In view of the growing influence of political
and environmental pressure groups the societies must form a counterbalance in order to
preserve a reasonable radiation protection philosophy and practice.
1. INTRODUCTION
National and regional radiation protection societies associated to the Interna

tional Radiation Protection Association (IRPA) play several important roles in the
radiation protection infrastructure.
When I began to work in radiation protection in the late nineteen-fifties, it was
still a new science not yet a profession rarely taught at universities, with only
a few textbooks and training courses, the latter mostly international ones. It was one
of the first really interdisciplinary topics at a time when the various faculties still kept
strictly separate from each other. Legislation and regulations were missing in most
countries or only in their first stages. Only slowly were special radiation protection
authorities created, staffed by some of the pioneer health physicists. Technology,
especially measurement techniques, developed rapidly. In that period the radiation
protection societies (RPSs) began to make their appearance, arising from the grow
ing need of the health physicists to have their own forum for presentation of new
447
448 BRUNNER
work and exchange of experiences in a field not or not yet covered by existing scien
tific organizations. At that time the main aims of radiation protection societies were
directed towards their members needs for professional improvement, in some cases
also towards creating a formal professional status. In the mid nineteen-sixties, with
the foundation of IRPA, the already close international collaboration, based on per
sonal contacts, was achieving an official status and contacts were slowly established
between IRPA and international organizations also dealing with radiation protection,
such as the IAEA and others.
Thirty years later the situation has changed in many ways. Radiation protection
is an acknowledged scientific branch and profession. Legislation is established and
being revised according to todays needs and political background. Radiation protec
tion technology is well developed and nearing saturation level. The flood of publica
tions has become unmanageable, but it is more difficult and rare to find good reviews
and introductory publications. Not all developments are positive: authorities have
grown too much, lawyers and administrators have often replaced the pioneer radia
tion protection specialists who could profit from their own practical experience. The
general fear and mistrust of everything linked to nuclear technologies, which has
been created in the face of all facts and sound reason by politicians and media people,
have severely worsened the position of the specialists. Although excellent training
is offered to a large range of people who use radiation sources, there are still some
grave gaps, mainly in medical applications, and the knowledge of the public about
radiation and protection is distorted or insufficient. The health physicists have to
spend too much of their time to fight both administrators and adverse influences from
media and public; too much money has to be wasted unnecessarily on an exaggerated
protection beyond any reasonable levels.
In this situation the individual health physicists cannot fight on their own; they
need support from professional societies more than ever. These societies have to re
orient their activities from a mostly introvert to a much more extrovert
programme which includes public relations, information of the public, improved
contacts with authorities and politicians, strong involvement in the development and
revision of legislation, exchange of experiences with other protection and safety
fields (such as environmental protection, industrial hygiene, traffic safety, etc.). And
in a time when all kinds of fashions, foolish and interesting ones, may spread
worldwide within a few days thanks to the media, international co-operation and co
ordination become even more important also for the societies, which often can use
quite different and even unconventional ways and means of communication com
pared to authorities.
As each country has its own problems, background and customs, it would be
difficult to generalize these tasks of the professional RPSs. So I rather use one society
as an example, the German-Swiss Radiation Protection Association (Fachverband
fr Strahlenschutz, FS), which operates in two countries (one of which is part of the
Commission of the European Communities (CEC)) that in many ways handle radia-
IAEA-SM-309/55 449
tion protection legislation and application differently. The FS has the unique chance
to serve as an interface between the two countries and to gain and compare
experience from various solutions of radiation protection problems.
2. FACHVERBAND FR STRAHLENSCHUTZ
The binational (Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland) Fachverband

fr Strahlenschutz was founded in 1966. Its predecessors were a Federal German-
Swiss-Austrian working group of health physicists at reactor research centres which
for a short time evolved into a European RPS and a Central European Section of the
Health Physics Society. When the International Radiation Protection Association was
formed, the German and Swiss members joined it by founding the FS while the
Austrians formed their own society, VS. The FS has now about 900 members in
research, industry, nuclear installations, medicine, education, authorities and even
international organizations. Thus the relations of the FS reach into all branches and
levels of radiation protection, and the independent and politically neutral society can
provide formal and information interfaces or proving grounds for contacts and
collaboration between any of them without being restricted by political or other
formal boundary conditions.
3. INTERNAL ACTIVITIES
3.1. General remarks
Despite the increased stress on extroverted activities, the internal activities

of the society must not be neglected and have to be adapted to the changing require
ments of the members. Despite (or because of) the large number of publications,
courses, etc., individual health physicists, both old foxes and newcomers, need
help to keep up with the rapid development of science and technology, with the
jungle of regulations and their application. The society has to try to locate such
problems, provide the means to solve them and to fill the gaps which neither authori
ties nor private enterprises are willing or able to cope with. The examples of the FS
given below are only a few of many possible ways to carry out these tasks, and not
all problems have been solved yet to our satisfaction.
3.2. Meetings
An annual meeting in the form of a scientific congress is held every year except
when an International IRPA Congress is taking place in Europe. The congress topics
vary between more special and rather general ones and aim at presenting a review
450 BRUNNER
of the state of the art and an outlook into the future as well as being a forum for
presentation of the recent work of our members. Participation is not restricted to
members and some of the congresses were and are going to be organized together
with neighbouring IRPA associate societies as regional IRPA congresses or with
other German and/or Swiss professional societies related to the topic. The congress
proceedings are always published, since 1989 in a new series Progress in Radiation
Protection, and are distributed free to all FS members [1-5].
3.3. Working groups
While in the first five years the annual congress was the main activity of the
FS, starting in 1971 the FS has extended its activities far beyond holding annual
scientific congresses through the creation of permanent and temporary working
groups (WGs).These WGs provide flexible means for exchange of experiences, for
professional education, for elaboration of new concepts, recommendations or
manuals for practical applications, for public information, for co-operation with
other societies, organizations and authorities, for consultation on new concepts,
drafts of regulations and for improvement of the professional position of the radiation
protection specialists. This is successful despite differences in many aspects between
the two countries, only one of which belongs to the CEC. Experiences in one country
can easily be transferred to the other one or used there as good or bad examples.
Without problems, members from both countries contribute to certain tasks of work
ing groups which are related to or even assigned by one of the countries alone. A
working group chaired by a Swiss prepared a guide on training goals for the Federal
German Government, and members from both countries collaborate in comments or
consultation statements on regulation drafts in either of the two countries. Thanks
to these working groups quite a large percentage of the FS members participate
actively throughout the year.
The present working groups of the FS deal with the following topics: education
and training; decontamination; dosimetry of external radiation; waste management;
incorporation monitoring; non-ionizing radiation; environmental monitoring; contact
with the French Society for Radiation Protection; detection limits (jointly with the
Federal German Normenausschuss Kerntechnik).
Ad hoc or temporary working groups have elaborated principles for radiation
protection which served as a basis for comments on regulations, discussed proposed
new ICRP concepts, commented on Swiss and German drafts for radiation protection
laws and regulations.
The WGs periodically evaluate the state of the art in special fields of measure
ments, instrumentation, sampling and analytical methods, often in collaboration with
standardizing organizations, as in a joint WG on detection limits. Their work does
not duplicate national or international standards such as DIN, but supplements those
on the next lower level with recommendations on their practical application, the
IAEA-SM-309/55 451
feedback of which again helps to improve the standards. For the FS as a whole the
working groups provide a reliable, proficient and quite fast medium when the FS
has to take a position in hearings or consultations which often have rather short dead
lines [6 ].
Several WGs organize or participate in intercomparison and quality control
programmes in several areas of radiation protection measurements, some of which
are based on or connected with programmes offered by the IAEA or the CEC [7].
The WGs meet at changing locations at the institutions of the members and thus
provide front line access and insight into radiation protection, methods used and
problems encountered in many different situations and applications. This is the only
way to learn even about errors, mistakes, difficulties, all those aspects which are
never or only rarely presented at conferences or in journals but which are as impor
tant for practice and progress as the successes.
While there exist some general guidelines on the operation of working groups,
mainly on collaboration with outside bodies, publications and financial matters, the
WGs are quite free to choose and develop their own ways how to work and their
own programmes, although they may have some tasks allocated by the Board.
It must be stressed that all these activities of the FS are done on a voluntary
and part time basis at very low cost, thanks to generous support from employers and
institutions of our members and from our affiliate members. There is no full time
or salaried function in the entire FS, and the annual fees of only about $20 compare
favourably to those of any other professional society, especially taking into consider
ation the free publications distributed every year.
3.4. Publications and information of members
The proceedings of the annual scientific conferences and of seminars organized

by WGs, recommendations, manuals, studies and comments from WGs are pub
lished in the FS publications series and distributed free to FS members, libraries and
authorities. These publications form a valuable addition to the scientific and technical
literature and are one of the means continually to improve the knowledge of the FS
members [1-14].
A quarterly bulletin provides communication with an among the members,
while a semiannual information sheet supports public relations.
Among the products of our working groups are a number of so called loose
leaf collections, recommendations, application guidelines and manuals which are
intended to help health physicists in their tasks. They contain agreed, tested and
proven methods of measurement, interpretations of regulations, etc. These publica
tions are periodically updated and amended and are made available free or at nominal
costs to the members [8 - 1 0 ].
Although FS publications such as proceedings of conferences and publications
of working groups are primarily aimed at our members, many of them find a good
452 BRUNNER
reception outside, too, and quite a number of copies are sold. This has led to a con
tract with a publisher who since 1989 publishes at least one FS publication a year
in a new series Progress in Radiation Protection, supplies us with the copies we
send free to members and scientific libraries and sells the books through book
shops [5].
In view of the hard competition between scientific journals the FS abstains
from publishing its own scientific journal. Instead it encourages its members to sub
scribe through IRPA at reduced rates to Health Physics, Journal of Radiological
Protection or Radiation Protection Dosimetry and to publish their papers there. A
surprisingly large percentage of the members are subscribers to one or several of
these journals.
3.5. Education
The FS sponsors the School for Radiation Protection held every other year
at Berlin, a one week post-graduate training course for radiation protection officers,
including laboratory exercises. Most of the teachers are FS members. The WG on
education (see Section 4.4) is active in quality control and development of curricula
for RP training courses and schools, improvement of teaching methods and of the
professional knowledge of teachers in RP courses. The FS also sponsors prototype
courses for new or special topics in radiation protection which are developed in
co-operation with established radiation protection training institutions and provides
lecturers for special topics.
4. EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES
4.1. Co-operation with professional and scientific societies, institutions, etc.
The constitution of the FS is very flexible and allows quick reactions of the
Board of Directors or of working groups to new developments and ideas or in
co-operation with other societies or bodies. New concepts, ways of collaboration or
of tackling problems can be tried and are only later on formalized as far as that may
be necessary, once sufficient practical working experience has been obtained. This
flexibility and freedom of action has occasionally aroused the envy or jealousy of
official bodies, such as standardizing ones, that are bound by strict rules, formal
procedures and a restricted range of tasks, but because the FS usually has members
on both sides we learn in good time about such feelings and are able to find a satisfy
ing solution for both, for example by forming a joint WG or by allowing members
of the other organization into the FS WG. The working groups form important and
very active interfaces to many of these external partners.
IAEA-SM-309/55 453
4.2. Public relations, statements, publications
Increased emphasis is put on information of the public by publishing a semi

annual information leaflet and by the nomination of an information officer as mem
ber of the Board. After the Chernobyl accident, the FS/VS/IRPA Congress in Sep
tember 1986 at Salzburg was the first scientific meeting that, by quickly extending
its scientific programme, presented a Europe-wide picture of the effects of that acci
dent [2]. This was followed by a seminar in May 1987 at Stuttgart with detailed dis
cussion of the experiences in both countries after Chernobyl with food monitoring
and control and with public information [11]. One WG quickly compiled detailed
environmental monitoring results from both countries and published reports in
German and English that were widely distributed [12, 13].
4.3. Training
Because the laws in both countries require health physicists acting as radiation
protection officers to take certified training courses including examinations, certifi
cation by a professional society has little purpose. Instead, the WG on education and
training actively influences the layout and contents of these certified courses and
schools by having worked out a catalogue of required training topics for all types
of professionally exposed workers and for radiation protection specialists on behalf
of the responsible Federal German ministry. The WG prepares rules for examina
tions, compares, co-ordinates and discusses the programmes of the various training
institutions, collaborates in the training of instructors and provides a periodic forum
for the heads of the training courses; all these activities also contribute to quality con
trol of education and training.
Certification of health physicists by a professional society usually is only con
cerned with the top ten per cent, the requirements being set correspondingly high.
The concept of the FS, and incidentally also of Swiss legislation, is different: we aim
at, and the laws require, sufficient radiation protection training and knowledge for
everybody who uses radioactive materials or devices producing ionizing radiations,
and this training and knowledge must be adapted to the type of work and the level
of responsibility. This has led to systems of training programmes for different types
of workers and professionals, on which our working group has had an important
influence.
5. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION
5.1. International Radiation Protection Association
The formal path of the FS for official contacts and collaboration with other
countries and international organizations goes through IRPA. One of the main activi
454 BRUNNER
ties of IRPA is the organization of international and regional IRPA Congresses in

co-operation with the associate societies. The FS organized the 6 th International
Congress of IRPA in 1984 in Berlin and has actively co-operated in the scientific
programme committees of other international congresses as well as having been a
co-organizer of several European IRPA Congresses [5, 15, 16].
On behalf of IRPA and at short notice the FS made an inquiry regarding revi
sion of ICRP Publication 26 among the IRPA associated societies that provided
interesting answers for the ICRP which owing to its limited administrative means
would have had problems carrying out such additional tasks. The FS WG on non
ionizing radiation comments on drafts of recommendations from the IRPA based
INIRC, the International Non-Ionizing Radiation Committee [4].
The contact group to the French society provides easier access to that societys
activities for French-speaking Swiss members and an interface across the language
barrier for German members who would like to know more about their western
neighbours radiation protection.
The rapid changes in Eastern Europe in the past months present a new
challenge: to assist our colleagues in the east to get in contact and to exchange
experiences with our members, and it is natural that the FS will concentrate on its
German-speaking neighbour, the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Health
physicists from the GDR are invited to working group meetings and coming confer
ences, and FS members, many of whom have family connections with the GDR,
have been invited to similar meetings across the now open border. The Board of the
FS is discussing additional ways to improve this collaboration.
5.2. International organizations
A good example of co-operation between international organizations and radia

tion protection societies is provided by IRPA. Mutual observers are exchanged on
various occasions: IRPA executive council meetings admit observers from the
IAEA, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD, the CEC, the ICRP and other
bodies and organizations and IRPA may send observers to meetings of those. The
1988 combination of an international congress of IRPA and an IAEA conference in
Sydney, Australia, preceded by workshops on non-ionizing radiation in Melbourne
and on radiation protection mining in Darwin, offered an attractive package of meet
ings and a wide but co-ordinated variety of topics which made the long trip really
worth while for the participants from all over the world [16, 17]. Several problems
and ideas discussed at the IRPA congress were taken up again by the IAEA and pos
sible areas of practical co-operation were outlined, for example in improvement of
training programmes.
The FS fully supports such IRPA initiatives and is willing to make its
experiences and publications such as the catalogue on training topics available to
IAEA-SM-309/55 455
IRPA and international organizations and to participate in working groups and com
mittees if such are set up.
6 . LEGISLATION, AUTHORITIES
6.1. Drafting and revising legislation and regulations
Regulatory provisions: In both countries authority officials dealing with radia

tion protection and members of radiation protection commissions, consultative
bodies and working groups preparing regulatory drafts are also FS members. The
FS keeps in close contact with the developments and can not only discuss proposed
changes and new concepts very early but also introduce its own ideas already at the
draft stage, ahead of the formal consultation on final proposals where the FS takes
part as one of many parties being consulted, with the advantage of being quite well
prepared even when the deadlines are very short [6 ]. The experiences with different
concepts in the two countries often provide stimulating sometimes also deterring
inputs and valuable arguments for discussions and decisions on possible solutions.
The FS so to speak has infiltrated authorities and commissions; it is unoffi
cially present through members who can introduce ideas created or discussed in FS
WGs or Board meetings, which in turn receive advance information on (non-
confidential) matters being dealt with. Because lately all sorts of environmental lobby
organizations of more political than professional kinds try to move into commissions
and decision making, the FS is increasingly forced to seek also official seats in some
of these commissions and committees in order to make its presence more visible to
politicians and the public.
The double role of being a member of the FS Board or an FS WG while also
being an authority official has never created difficulties. On the other hand it has
allowed members who are authority officials to voice their personal opinion through
FS channels, as the FS by principle and constitution considers that its members par
ticipate, speak and act in their personal capacity as radiation protection specialists;
nobody is a member by virtue of his or her official position or by delegation from
his or her employer. Several presidents of the FS have held leading posts in national
radiation protection or nuclear safety authorities in both countries during their
presidency, but this has never prevented them from supporting or signing any action
or document which the FS may have produced in a matter concerning the authority
employing that president, such as statements made during official consultations on
drafts or statements to correct erroneous or biased presentations of radiation protec
tion topics by news media.
In some working groups health physicists from the field openly discuss their
problems with members coming from their supervising authorities without fear that
those might take any official action against them. This improves mutual understand-
456 BRUNNER
ihg of the real problems on both sides and allows the authority collaborators to get
interesting insights into the practical world which they cannot get from their desks
or in their official activities and which helps to make their drafts of regulations and
guidelines more practicable.
In such ways a radiation protection society is able to produce a sort of a tunnel
effect through official and formal barriers between applied radiation protection and
authorities or in international contacts.
6 .2 . Interpretation, application, professional advice, task groups
Working groups dealing with monitoring prepare and update manuals and
recommendations on the execution, practical application and measurement methods
in connection with regulations on environmental and emergency monitoring, external
and internal dosimetry.
7. INFORMATION
7.1. Bulletins, information sheets
Links with other IRPA associate societies, institutions of members, other soci
eties, international organizations and commissions, national authorities, etc., and
exchange of bulletins, information and publications provide quick and early access
to new developments and information, allow quick procurement of reliable informa
tions to check dubious or distorted media reports or to answer questions from mem
bers, authorities, etc. Information so gathered is forwarded to WGs, Board and
members, to the latter by means of the quarterly bulletin which also serves as a dis
cussion forum.
Since a few years ago, a semiannual information sheet Radiation Protection
Actualities has been produced and widely distributed, also to media, politicians,
authorities, etc. It contains a pronounced standpoint feature from one of our mem
bers on a controversial or current topic; short reports on FS activities, meetings and
publications; a portrait of an institution, authority or commission; a glossary of spe
cial terms and short news items on radiation protection.
7.2. Media contacts
Contacts and collaboration with the media are a still insufficiently solved
problem, with the exception of contacts to a few newspaper editors, science writers
and editors of professional journals who have managed to keep a sound matter-of-
fact view on topics dealing with radiation, radioactivity, nuclear energy, etc. Despite
increased efforts, among others with publicity and media contacts during FS con
IAEA-SM-309/55 457
gresses, the overwhelming majority of reporters and editors of newspapers, radio

and TV lack a sufficient knowledge of science and facts and therefore prefer to
spread false and distorted information according to the silly media gospel that only
bad news is good news. While any crazy action of Greenpeace or the World Wildlife
Fund, even based on totally wrong measurements, such as recently outside Gsgen
nuclear power plant, receive full and totally one-sided media coverage, we are lucky
if we can attract more than a very few media people to a congress opening or a press
conference, even on very hot topics such as radioactive waste or the lessons from
Chernobyl. Knowing that they will get facts, not sensational fiction, most media do
not even bother to attend. To get TV coverage can only be dreamt of if some very
important local or national politician happens to open a conference, but the cameras
will disappear as quickly as their target. Nevertheless we do not give up. An infor
mation officer has been appointed to the Board, and we try to build up improved con
tacts to individual reporters and editors who are willing to listen to facts and to seek
professional knowledge. We also have learnt in discussions with media people that
we have to change many of our approaches, that we have to simplify our messages,
adapt form and style to those of the various media vessels, and that only very patient
long term work may bring improvements [11]. It may become one of our more
important future tasks to provide some media training for our members.
8 . RADIATION PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY AND POLICY
8.1. International compatibility
Through its radiation protection principles, a set of statements and comments

on relevant issues and concepts which were published after extensive discussions
with the members, the FS took an internationally compatible position in matters to
be dealt with in ongoing and coming revisions of international recommendations,
supranational and national legislation and regulations [18]. Another input to national
and international discussions will be a proposal on a definition of non-radioactive
materials which has recently been prepared by our WG on waste management and
which is now being discussed with our members before being more widely dissemi
nated. The long range planning of the FS, its conference and WG programmes all
try to foresee and prepare for problems of the future, to fill existing gaps in radiation
protection and to improve or correct recognized problems, failures or mistakes. Such
position papers and proposals also serve as inputs to similar activities of IRPA, and
to various international organizations and commissions through members serving on
those bodies. When an urgent statement has to be issued by the Board on a matter
of public interest or in commenting on a draft of legislation or regulation at very
short notice, the answer of the Board can be based on such well prepared documents.
458 BRUNNER
8.2. Professional judgement versus regulations
One of the principles for which the FS is ready to fight very hard is to preserve
as much freedom as possible for sound professional judgement in applied radiation
protection and to combat any attempts to regulate every detail or to base every little
decision or licensing action on compulsory reviews by third-part)' experts or so
called independent experts (who more often than not are not real radiation protec
tion experts or know radiation protection only from books and desks). Regulations
are necessary, but they should rather define boundaries and principles while provid
ing sufficient flexibility to be interpreted according to the local circumstances and
conditions by well trained and experienced health physicists. Health physicists
should be allowed to do their proper job and not be forced to spend most of their
time writing reports and requests to authorities. Most of such red tape does not really
serve radiation protection but only protects the political position, the standing and
the staff size of the authority in question.
9. CONCLUSIONS
As the FS is neither a trade union nor a one sided representative of a special

category of professionals, its aim is not confrontation or opposition but collabora
tion, conciliation, improved mutual understanding between authorities, radiation
protection specialists, radiation workers and users and the public. Success in most
of these activities is not gained in single or short term actions but only by painstak
ing, incessant, dedicated, knowledgeable and patient work on all levels and in as
many fields as possible.
The radiation protection societies should also help to convey good examples
and long experience in radiation protection to other areas such as environmental pro
tection, emergency planning against chemical hazards, etc., in order to work for a
common philosophy and comparable risk perception in all areas of protection against
hazards to the human environment in our homes, at working places and in nature.
REFERENCES
[1] HENNING, K. (Ed.), Strahlenexposition der Bevlkerung (Radiation exposure of

the population) (Proc. Annual Mtg Travemnde/Finnjet, 1985), Rep. FS-85-37-T,
Geesthacht (1985).
[2] HEFNER, A. (Ed.), Twenty years experience in radiation protection review and
outlook (Proc. 13th Regional Congr. IRPA/19th Annual Mtg FS, Salzburg, 1986),
Rep. FS-86-40-T, Vienna (1988).
[3] HUNZINGER, W ., TRAUB, K. (Eds), Entsorgung (Waste management) (Proc.
Annual Mtg Basle, 1987), Rep. FS-87-44-T, Berne (1988).
IAEA-SM-309/55 459
[4] KRAUSE, N. Ed., Nichtionisierende Strahlung (Non-ionizing radiation) (Proc.

Annual Mtg Cologne, 1988), Rep. FS-88-47-T, Cologne (1988).
[5] FELDT, W. (Ed.), The radioecology of natural and artificial radionuclides (Proc.
15th Regional Cong. IRPA/22nd Annual Mtg FS, NSFS, Visby, 1989), Series
Progress in Radiation Protection , Rep. FS-89-48-T, TV Rheinland, Cologne
(1989).
[6] NARROG, J. et al., Empfehlungen zur Aktualisierung der Richtlinie zur Emissions
und Immissionsberwachung kemtechnischer Anlagen Standpunkt des Arbeit
skreises Umweltberwachung (AKU) (Recommendations on regulations on emission
and immission monitoring viewpoints of working group on environmental monitor
ing), Karlsruhe (1989).
[7] BHM, J., PIESCH, E., REGULLA, D. (Eds), Neue Messgrssen fr Personen
dosimeter Ergebnisse des Vergleichsprogramms 1985 (New quantities for person
nel dosimetry results of intercomparison) (Proc. Sem. AKD/PTB Braunschweig,
1985), Rep. FS-86-38-AKD/PTB-Dos-14, Braunschweig (1986).
[8] AKNIR (WG Non-Ionizing Radiation), Ultraschall (Ultrasound), Rep. FS-84-36-NIR,
Loseblattsammlung (1984).
[9] SCHIEFERDECKER, H., et al., Inkorporationsberwachung auf Plutonium (Incorpo
ration monitoring for Pu), Rep. FS-87-45-AKI, Loseblattsammlung AKI, Karlsruhe
(1987).
[10] SCHIEFERDECKER, H., et al., Inkorporationsberwachung auf Promethium (Incor
poration monitoring for Pm), Rep. FS-87-46-AKI, Loseblattsammlung AKI, Karlsruhe
(1987).
[11] FUCHS, J. (Ed.), Lehren aus Tschernobyl Schutzziele und ihre Anwen
dung/Information der ffentlichkeit (Lessons from Chernobyl) (Sem. Stuttgart, 1987),
Rep. FS-87-42-T, Stuttgart (1987).
[12] WINTER, M ., et al., Radioactivity in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Switzer
land after the Reactor Accident at Chernobyl, Rep. FS-86-39-AKU/e, Karlsruhe (in
German 1986, in English 1987).
[13] WINTER, M., et al., Strontiummessergebnisse aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
und aus der Schweiz nach dem Reaktorunfall in Tschernobyl (Strontium results from
the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland after Chernobyl) , Rep.
FS-87-43-AKU, Karlsruhe (1987).
[14] BARTELS, R., (Ed.), Empfehlungen zur Personendekontamination (Recommenda
tions on personnel decontamination), Rep. FS-89-41-AKK, Pforzheim (1989).
[15] KAUL, A., et al. (Eds), Radiation Risk Protection (Proc. IRPA-6 Berlin,
1984), 3 Vols, Rep. FS-84-35-T TV Rheinland, Cologne (1984).
[16] ROSEN, R., et al. (Eds), Radiation Protection Practice (Proc. IRPA-7 Sydney, 1988),
3 Vols, Pergamon Press, Sydney (1988).
[17] Radiation Protection in Nuclear Energy (Proc. Conf. Sydney, 1988), 2 Vols, IAEA,
Vienna (1988).
[18] FS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Standpunkte des FS zu Fragen des Strahlenschutzes
Diskussionspapier (Standpoint of the FS on Radiation Protection Problems Dis
cussion Paper), Wrenlingen (1986).
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES
(Session IX)
Chairman
I. OTHMAN
Syrian Arab Republic
IAEA-SM-309/44
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RADIATION

PROTECTION STANDARDS TO SUPPLEMENT
LAWS AND REGULATIONS
K. BECKER
Secretariat of ISO/TC 85 Nuclear Energy,
DIN Deutsches Institut fr Normung eV,
Berlin
Abstract
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS TO
SUPPLEMENT LAWS AND REGULATIONS.
The well-known recommendations of various governmental and non-governmental
international organizations on which the radiation protection laws and regulations in about
fifty countries are based are supplemented by almost 2000 consensus type national and interna
tional standards, dealing in more detail with the specific problems in radiation protection. Such
standards, being valuable sources of highly condensed and up-to-date technical know-how, are
an excellent instrument of information transfer to developing countries, as well as an important
tool for the practical implementation of the more basic limits, rules and principles. They may
thus be considered as codes of practice to supplement the general governmental regulations.
Development of voluntary standards occurs mainly on three levels, (a) professional radiation
protection societies, with specialist working groups drafting documents to a pre-standard
level; (b) national standards organizations issuing national standards, and (c) the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), and its sister organization the International Elec
trotechnical Commission, whose Technical Committee 45B is concerned with radiation pro
tection instrumentation. There is intense interaction between these three levels, and close
liaison with other relevant organizations is required in order to avoid redundancies or con
tradictions. With the increasing number and completeness of the standards, their maintenance
(regular revisions, etc.) gains in importance relative to the writing of new standards. Also,
the focal points of work have to be adjusted to changing needs. For example, as a set of widely
used ISO standards on reference radiations for the calibration of radiation protection instru
ments approaches completion, new work has recently been initiated regarding basic problems
of radioactivity measurements such as detection limits, counting statistics, accuracy, etc.
1. A LOOK BACK
In order better to understand the present situation, a brief look at the past may
be of interest. The harmful effects of radiation first became known in 1896; attempts
to measure radiation tolerance limits with photographic emulsions a procedure
still widely used date back to 1902; efforts to provide some radiation protection
463
464 BECKER
guidance were made by the British Roentgen Society in 1915, and sets of radiation
protection recommendations were developed from 1920 to 1922 by a committee of
the American X Ray Society. Around the same time, the German Rntgen Society
also published information sheets and guidelines for its members. In 1927,
a standards office of this Society was established, which published
DIN/RNT-Normen.
On the international level, the Second International Congress of Radiology
formed in 1928 an International Committee on X Ray and Radium Protection,
which later became the International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP). Because of difficulties in developing an international consensus, national
committees were also formed, whose recommendations did not always agree with
those of the ICRP. Between the nineteen-thirties and 1948 the figure for maximum
permissible whole body exposure recommended by the ICRP was more than twice
as high (55 R) as the 25 R recommended by the US National Council for Radiation
Protection (NCRP). Even today such differences still exist. For example, the limits
for population exposures caused by nuclear installations should be limited to 5 mSv
per year according to the recommendations of the ICRP, IAEA, and the Commission
of the European Communities (CEC), but the Federal German regulations specify
a value which is lower by a factor of 17, namely 0.3 mSv/a.
Some facts thus become evident. First, it was the scientific and professional
associations who first became interested in setting radiation protection standards.
This was followed by national, and later by international standards-setting efforts.
Legally binding governmental regulations followed much later.
Secondly, it always has been, and will probably also be difficult in the future
to reach a worldwide consensus regarding the permissible limits of radiation
exposure to radiation workers and the general public. It is, however, much easier
to reach a consensus on the methods to be applied in practical radiation protection,
as specified in technical standards.
2. DEVELOPING AND INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
Today, in each of the 160 member countries of the United Nations (as well as
several non-members such as Switzerland), every day people who may be classified
as radiation workers deal professionally with radiation sources. In the smallest and
least developed countries, there will probably be just a few doctors and technicians
operating simple radiodiagnostic units usually not enough for their countrys
needs: according to the World Health Organization (WHO), 70% of the worlds
population cannot get an X ray examination when they need one, and 40-60% of the
machines are out of order. Obviously, the introduction of some basic radiation pro
tection for both the radiologists and the patients in such countries should not conflict
with the promotion of radiodiagnostics, but supplement it.
IAEA-SM-309/44 465
At the next higher level, radiotherapy, nuclear medicine, non-destructive test

ing with radioisotopes, as well as perhaps some radiation sources for radiation
processing, training or research, will increase the percentage of radiation workers.
Further up the scale, a research reactor, accelerators, or even a nuclear power
programme may be added, introducing more complex requirements for radiation
protection.
Even in the most basic situation, however, some simple radiation protection
programme should exist. So far, however, only about one third of all countries have
any radiation protection laws or regulations at all, and in many of these countries
they lack practical implementation. There are probably not more than 30-40 coun
tries in which the recommendations of ICRP Publication 26 and of the Basic Safety
Standards for Radiation Protection (IAEA Safety Series No. 9, 1982) are actually
implemented and enforced by a competent authority in a sufficiently comprehensive
and reliable way.
In most of the worlds countries there is currently no licensing, training, regu
lar personnel or area monitoring, provision for waste disposal, etc. Even radiation
warning signs, lockable doors for radiation areas, or simple monitoring instruments
cannot be found in most hospitals or private practices, and there are no mechanisms
to enforce regulations if any should exist.
Furthermore, as was pointed out at an earlier IAA symposium [1], many
other factors, such as the limited lifetime of sophisticated instruments in humid and
hot climates, voltage fluctuations and blackouts, problems with maintenance and
spare parts, etc., seriously hamper the use of many of the more sophisticated instru
ments in most tropical countries. However, some apparently simple devices such as
the film dosimeter cannot be used there either, for climatic reasons (fading).
The presentations at this symposium could be somewhat misleading: of the 28
countries who have described their radiation protection infrastructure, almost one
half belong to the industrialized countries (usually with a nuclear power
programme), and eight to the group of developing countries with such a programme.
Only seven represent the majority of countries without research or power reactors
now or in the foreseeable future.
Obviously, as in other areas, there is a tremendous difference between the situ
ation in the poorer of the developing countries on the one side, and the advanced
industrialized countries on the other, with sometimes over-sophisticated and
unnecessarily restrictive regulations undergoing regular updating and subject to strict
enforcement. The USA and the Federal Republic of Germany are examples of this
category. Obviously, it would be neither feasible nor desirable to transfer such regu
lations to countries in which even the most primitive rules of basic radiation protec
tion cannot be implemented. When revising Safety Series No. 9 as a guideline for
developing national radiation protection regulations, the IAEA might like to consider
publishing two versions, namely
466 BECKER
a reasonably sophisticated one for countries with at least a research reactor

and/or a nuclear power programme, and
a simplified version for countries without such plans for the foreseeable future.
3. THE THREE LEVELS OF RADIATION PROTECTION

STANDARDIZATION
In any case, such governmental regulations have to be fairly general, specify

ing, for example, goals and limits, but not specific techniques for reaching and
guaranteeing them. This should be left to the code of practice type of specific radia
tion protection standards as developed by the professional societies, or the national
or international standards organizations. They provide the meat on the bones of
governmental regulations, and the essential practical guidance to radiation workers
as well as radiation protection officers and licensing authorities. They can more eas
ily be adjusted to changes in the needs or advancing technology, or withdrawn if con
sidered obsolete.
Some governments have realized the potential of national standards organiza
tions to supplement the governmental regulations. The ministry in charge of radia
tion protection in the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, has actively
supported the development of radiation protection standards for more than fifteen
years. The German Standards Institute, DIN, on the other hand, has published not
only almost 2 0 0 individual standards covering the whole range of medical and non
medical uses of radiation, but has also compiled the most important standards into
easy-to-use books containing the full text of more than one hundred standards on the
principles [2] as well as the applied aspects [3] of radiation protection. The books
cover a wide range, from terminology, shielding, the design of radionuclide
laboratories and medical installations all the way to thermoluminescent dosi
meters, film and pocket dosimeters, contamination measurements, environmental
monitoring, detection limits, etc.
There are, according to the fifth (1988) edition of our world catalogue of
nuclear and radiation protection standards [4] (the next, revised and updated edition
will be compiled in 1990 and published early in 1991) currently almost 2000
consensus type national and international standards dealing without actually
setting limits in more detail with the multitude of specific problems in radiation
protection. Being valuable sources of highly condensed and up-to-date technical
know-how, such standards are an excellent instrument of information transfer, in
particular to developing countries. They are also an important tool for the practical
implementation of the more basic limits, rules, and principles. They may thus be
considered codes of practice to supplement the general governmental regulations.
IAEA-SM-309/44 467
TABLE I. THE MAIN STEPS IN DEVELOPING A FEDERAL GERMAN (DIN)

RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARD
(1) Proposal of new item by working body, institution, or experts
(2) Desirability and feasibility check, collection of relevant material, etc.
(3) Discussion and approval by steering committee (SC)
(4) Establishment of working group (WG)
(5) Development of successive drafts by WG (or sub-groups) in meetings, by correspon

dence, etc.
(6) Detailed discussion of draft by SC and

return to WG for revisions, or
approval of technical content for publication as draft standard
(7) Review by DIN Standards Control and Co-ordination Office, publication, and
announcement for comments from public
(8) Consideration of comments by WG and SC, approval for publication as DIN Standard
(9) Check for possible internationalization into ISO Standard
(10) Review after < 5 years, resulting in

continued validity,
revision by WG and SC (steps 5-8), or withdrawal
Development of voluntary standards occurs mainly on three levels:

(1) Professional radiation protection societies, such as the US Health Physics
Society and the German-Swiss Fachverband fr Strahlenschutz, with specialist
working groups drafting documents on a pre-standard level, or national advi
sory organizations such as the National Council on Radiation Protection in the
USA, whose over one hundred reports address, some experts believe, current
problems frequently faster and in more detail than the ICRP.
(2) National standards organizations such as AFNOR (France), ANSI (USA), BSI
(United Kingdom), DIN (Federal Republic of Germany) and GOST (USSR)
issuing, occasionally in bilateral or regional co-operation, national standards.
They provide by far the largest number of standards. National standards,
however, sometimes duplicate other national standards, for instance when
smaller countries take over those of their larger neighbours.
(3) The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in its Technical Com
mittee (TC) 85/SC 2, Radiation Protection, and its sister organization the
468 BECKER
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IAEA-SM-309/44 469
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in its TC 45B, Radiation

Protection Instrumentation, have eight active Working Groups each. Their
programme, with almost eighty standards, draft standards, or standards
projects, was discussed in detail at the IAEA Sydney Conference in 1988 [5]
and does not, therefore, require a description here.
There is intense interaction between these three levels: documents prepared by
professional associations are, as in the past, still frequently upgraded to become
parts of a countrys standards system. This usually requires co-ordination with other
relevant national or international documents or projects. More frequently, a new
standards project is initiated by the responsible national standards organization and
developed in a multistage process, as exemplified for the Federal German Nuclear
Standards Committee in Table I.
Some of the national standards (e.g. French, German and US documents on
radioactivity detection limits) may become the basis of an international ISO/IEC
standard, while, on the other hand, international documents frequently form the basis
for the development of new national documents. Such transformations, which
usually involve expert meetings leading to modifications in the text, frequently
amount to an improvement in the standards quality. In other cases, however, a good
and precise national standard may become diluted in the process of reaching a
consensus on an international document.
4. CONCLUSIONS, AND WHERE TO GO
Within the European Community, national borders are becoming increasingly

transparent in this field also. We observe in the Federal Republic of Germany more
and more participation by French specialists interested in the development of
German (DIN) radiation protection standards. With the opening of the borders
between Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, such regional interactions are likely
to increase. The currently still two German States are actively engaged in merging
their standards systems into one, based on DIN.
Besides ISO and IEC, which have been involved in radiation protection stan
dard work for over thirty years [6], several other international organizations are
active in this area. The most important ones are listed in Table . In some of them
the governments are members, others have organizations or individuals as members.
Obviously, the co-ordination of the activities between these organizations in order
to avoid redundancies, contradictions, or the waste of valuable resources, is not
always an easy task and requires the full and open co-operation of experts from many
countries. English became the lingua franca in this work, but frequently documents
are also translated into other languages.
With the increasing number and completeness of the standards, their main
tenance (regular revisions, etc.) gains in importance relative to the writing of new
470 BECKER
standards. Also, the focal points of work have to be adjusted to changing needs. For
example, as a set of widely used ISO standards on reference radiations for the
calibration of radiation protection instruments approaches completion, new work has
recently been initiated regarding basic problems of radioactivity measurements such
as detection limits, counting statistics, accuracy, etc. Also, work on standards related
to the quick determination of radionuclides in air, water, soil, and foodstuffs, or for
the measurement of radon daughter products in air, has gained in importance in
recent years.
The tremendous amount of condensed technical know-how contained in the
voluntary standards is, unfortunately, still not known and accessible in many devel
oping countries, even if the standards are available in the libraries of many national
standards institutions. DIN, for example, distributes its standards to 100 libraries in
81 countries. The IAEA could, through its various publications, radiation protection
advisory teams (RAPAT) and expert missions, training courses, etc., help to
disseminate this valuable supporting material to those who could use it for the
development of a sound, comprehensive radiation protection infrastructure which
should be the basis for any work involving the use of ionizing radiation.
REFERENCES
[1] BECKER, K., DREXLER, G., Radiation protection monitoring in tropical, develop
ing countries , Advances in Radiation Protection Monitoring (Proc. Symp. Stockholm,
June 1978), IAEA, Vienna (1979) 601-609.
[2] BECKER, K., ERDTMANN, W., (Eds), Strahlenschutz Grundlagen, DIN-
Taschenbuch 159, Beuth-Verlag, Berlin (1988).
[3] BECKER, K ., ERDTMANN, W ., (Eds), Strahlenschutz Methoden und Anwendungen,
DIN-Taschenbuch 234, Beuth-Verlag, Berlin (1988).
[4] FICHTNER, N., BECKER, K ., Nuclear and Radiation Protection Standards
Catalogue and Classification, 5th edn, Beuth-Verlag, Berlin (1988).
[5] BECKER, K ., FITOUSSI, L ., Contributions of the ISO and IEC to international Stan
dardization in radiation protection , Radiation Protection in Nuclear Energy (Proc.
Conf. Sydney, April 1988), Vol. 1, IAEA, Vienna (1988) 73-83.
[6] BECKER, K., Thirty years of international nuclear standards in ISO and IEC, Nucl.
Eng. Des. (in press).
IAEA-SM-309/38
INFORMATION DE LA POPULATION
EN RADIOPROTECTION DANS
LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE
L action de la Commission des Communauts europennes
H. ERISKAT, J.-M. COURADES

Division Radioprotection,
Commission des Communauts europennes,
Luxembourg
Abstract-Rsum
INFORMING THE PUBLIC ABOUT RADIATION PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: ACTION OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES.
In the light of the European publics attitude towards potential nuclear risks, the Com
mission of the European Communities has taken various initiatives in this area, among them
a Directive adopted by the Council of Ministers on 27 November 1989 which regulates ques
tions of public information about the measures and behaviour to be adopted in the event of
a radiological emergency. The paper describes how activities undertaken by the Community
attempt to meet the information needs of the public in the European Community.
INFORMATION DE LA POPULATION EN RADIOPROTECTION DANS LA

COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE: L ACTION DE LA COMMISSION DES COMMU
NAUTES EUROPEENNES.
La Commission des Communauts europennes, au vu de lattitude des populations
europennes face aux risques nuclaires potentiels, a pris plusieurs initiatives dans ce domaine
dont la directive adopte par le Conseil des ministres du 27 novembre 1989 sur linformation
de la population sur les mesures applicables et sur le comportement adopter en cas d urgence
radiologique. Ce mmoire a pour objet de dcrire comment les actions communautaires tentent
de rpondre aux besoins d information de la population de la Communaut europenne.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Les pratiques dinformation du public et denseignement dans la

Communaut europenne en matire de radioprotection
Tous les Etats membres de la Communaut europenne ont entrepris des

actions dinformation du public en matire de scurit nuclaire. La question est de
savoir si celles-ci apparaissent suffisantes compte tenu du niveau de comprhension
des risques radioactifs au sein de la population.
471
472 ERISKAT et COURADES
Il faut savoir que la place de la radioprotection dans le systme ducatif des

Etats membres de la Communaut est encore l heure actuelle plutt limite. Elle
ne figure pas dans les programmes denseignement du cycle primaire et ne figure
explicitement dans les programmes de fin de cycle secondaire que dans deux Etats
membres sur douze.
Lintroduction de cette matire reste la discrtion des enseignants de sciences
naturelles ou de physique.
Lorsque la radioprotection est aborde dans l enseignement secondaire, c est
souvent dans le cadre de l enseignement de la physique lors de ltude du phnomne
de la radioactivit.
Indpendamment du cadre rglementaire, les exploitants de centrales
nuclaires dans la plupart des pays ont men des actions dinformation au voisinage
de leurs installations.
1.2. Informations de la population en cas durgence
A notre connaissance, seuls deux Etats membres ont adopt des dispositions
rglementaires spcifiques dans ce domaine.
1.2.1. La France
Linformation du public, diffuse en cas durgence, est de la responsabilit du

Ministre de l industrie. Celui-ci est aid dans sa tche par le Conseil suprieur de
la sret et de linformation nuclaire, organisme consultatif cr par le dcret du
13 mars 1973. En mars 1987, la composition du Conseil a t largie des
spcialistes de communication et dinformation. De plus, aprs Tchernobyl, un
service dinformation par Minitel (MAGNUC) a t mis en place.
En juillet 1987, le Comit interministriel de la scurit nuclaire a dcid que
des laboratoires indpendants pourraient tre agrs par le Service central de protec
tion contre les rayonnements ionisants (SCPRI) pour donner des informations
publiques en matire de radioactivit.
1.2.2. La Rpublique fdrale d Allemagne
Larticle 9 de la Loi de protection prventive de la population contre les radia

tions du 19 dcembre 1986 stipule que le ministre fdral de l environnement, de la
protection de la nature et de la scurit des racteurs peut recommander certains
comportements la population. Dans la mesure o ces recommandations concernent
les denres alimentaires, des produits du tabac, des produits de ncessit courante,
des mdicaments et leurs matires premires ainsi que les aliments pour animaux,
elles sont publies en accord avec le ministre fdral de la jeunesse, de la famille,
IAEA-SM-309/38 473
de la femme et de la sant, le ministre fdral de lalimentation-, de l agriculture et

des forts et le ministre fdral de lagriculture.
Dans la mesure o le ministre fdral de l environnement, de la protection de
la nature et de la scurit des racteurs ne fait pas usage de cette comptence, les
autorits suprieures comptentes des Lnder peuvent, avec son approbation,
adresser des recommandations la population.
1.3. Lexercice de la comptence de la Communaut en matire dinformation

sur lenvironnement
La rsolution du Conseil du 19 octobre 1987 concernant la poursuite et la rali

sation dune politique et dun programme daction des Communauts europennes
en matire denvironnement (1987-1992) stipule que l amlioration de laccs
l information en matire denvironnement est un domaine prioritaire pour la
Communaut.
Or, laction de protection de la sant de la population et de lenvironnement
contre les effets nocifs de radiations nuclaires fait partie du programme daction des
Communauts europennes.
Le programme daction des Communauts en matire denvironnement stipule
que la large diffusion de linformation sur lenvironnement et sur les problmes poli
tiques et programmes denvironnement favorise largement l volution des mesures
ncessaires dans le domaine de lenvironnement et leur acceptation par le public.
La Commission a une approche globale de la diffusion de l information auprs
du public. Plusieurs dispositions communautaires sont applicables ou envisages
dans ce domaine outre la directive EURATOM:
a) La directive 85/337/CEE du 27 juin 1985 concernant lvaluation des inci
dences de certains projets publics et privs sur lenvironnement, dite directive
impact, qui prvoit une information du public sur les projets dinstallations
industrielles l occasion des procdures dautorisation. Cette directive couvre
les centrales nuclaires et les installations de stockage dfinitif des dchets
radioactifs.
b) La directive 88/610/CEE du 24 novembre 1988 modifiant la directive
82/501/CEE concernant les risques daccidents majeurs de certaines activits
industrielles, dite directive Seveso, qui ne sapplique pas l industrie
nuclaire, et qui prvoit linformation permanente de la population susceptible
dtre affecte par un risque industriel majeur.
c) La proposition de directive concernant la libert de l information en matire
denvironnement (COM(88)484) qui prvoit une libert daccs aux donnes
dtenues par les autorits publiques et concernant lenvironnement.
1.4. Les initiatives de la Commission des Communauts europennes

en matire dinformation sur la scurit nuclaire
Laccident survenu en 1986 auprs de la centrale nuclaire de Tchernobyl a

dmontr que les activits en matire dinformation aux niveaux international,
national et local ncessitaient dtre renforces, voire rtudies; la Commission,
quant elle, a dtermin sa position cet gard dans sa communication au Conseil
du 20 aot 1986 sur le dveloppement des mesures prises par la Communaut
en application du chapitre (Protection sanitaire) du Trait EURATOM
(COM(86) 434 du 1er Septembre 1986) en indiquant:
quun effort dinformation important et continu est ncessaire, et
que la Commission devrait tudier les moyens par lesquels elle pourrait
contribuer un accroissement de ces informations.
Depuis lors, la Commission a pris plusieurs initiatives visant amliorer la

collecte des informations et la communication de ces informations la population.
Diffrents types dactions ont t dvelopps cet effet: instrument juridique,
confrence, supports crits et audiovisuels.
Ces activits doivent tre considres comme un support aux initiative prises
diffrents niveaux par les Etats membres.
2. LA DIRECTIVE DU CONSEIL 89/618/EURATOM

DU 27 NOVEMBRE 1989 CONCERNANT LINFORMATION DE
LA POPULATION SUR LES MESURES DE PROTECTION SANITAIRE
APPLICABLES ET SUR LE COMPORTEMENT A ADOPTER
EN CAS D URGENCE RADIOLOGIQUE
Larticle 2(b) du Trait EURATOM prvoit que lune des tches essentielles
de la Communaut consiste tablir des normes de scurit uniformes pour la protec
tion sanitaire de la population et des travailleurs et veiller leur application. Le
chapitre III du titre deuxime du Trait EURATOM est consacr la protection
sanitaire, et c est en vertu des dispositions du chapitre que, depuis 1959, le
Conseil a arrt des directives successives fixant les normes de base relatives la
protection sanitaire de la population et des travailleurs contre les dangers rsultant
des rayonnements ionisants. Les normes de base actuellement en vigueur sont
dfinies dans la directive du Conseil du 15 juillet 1980 (80/836/EURATOM)
modifie par la directive du Conseil du 3 septembre 1984 (84/467/EURATOM).
Laccident de Tchernobyl a cependant mis en vidence le caractre incomplet
de cette directive. Son titre VII stipule, larticle 45 paragraphe 4 point a), que
chaque Etat membre prvoit, pour le cas o se produirait un accident, des niveaux
dintervention ainsi que les mesures prendre par les autorits comptentes l gard
IAEA-SM-309/38 475
des groupes de population susceptibles de recevoir une dose suprieure aux limites
de dose fixes l article 12 de la directive. Larticle 43 de la directive du
15 juillet 1980 du Conseil prvoit galement en tant que de besoin ltablissement
de plans durgence et leur approbation. Larticle 24 de la directive prvoit des
mesures dinformation qui ne concernent que les travailleurs exposs.
Ainsi, bien que des mesures durgence lgard de certains groupes de
populations et des dispositions concernant l information des travailleurs soient
prvues par la directive, celle-ci ne comporte pas de disposition spcifique
concernant linformation de la population en cas daccident.
De plus, les dispositions communautaires concernant les informations
communiquer en cas daccident dans lindustrie chimique (en application de la
directive Seveso) navaient pas dquivalent dans les normes de base applicables
l industrie nuclaire en matire de scurit.
Cette situation sexpliquait par le fait que l historique et la mthodologie des
mesures de scurit adoptes dans lindustrie nuclaire et dans l industrie chimique
ont connu un dveloppement tout fait diffrent. Une comparaison des approches
communautaires suivies en matire de scurit dans ces deux domaines a fait
apparatre clairement que certains aspects de la scurit dans l industrie chimique
pouvaient tre appliqus dans lindustrie nuclaire, notamment, celui de linforma
tion du public.
Pour ces diverses raisons le Conseil a adopt, le 27 novembre 1989, la direc
tive concernant linformation de la population sur les mesures de protection
applicables et sur le comportement adopter en cas durgence radiologique.
La directive est base sur l article 31 du Trait EURATOM puisque deux
nouvelles exigences sont proposes:
l obligation dinformation prventive permanente visant les populations du
voisinage des installations qui font lobjet dun plan durgence, ou lensemble
de la population en prsence dun plan durgence couvrant l ensemble du
territoire national;
l obligation dinformation rapide en cas de relle situation durgence radiolo
gique visant les populations affectes, cest--dire susceptibles de recevoir une
dose suprieure aux limites de dose pour la population (5 mSv/an).
2.1. Champ dapplication du contenu de linformation
2.1.1. L information permanente
En ce qui concerne linformation permanente, celle-ci doit comporter les

quatre lments dtaills ci-aprs.
a) Notions de base sur la radioactivit
Cet lment est plus ducatif quinformatif car caractre scientifique. Non
seulement le phnomne physique de la radioactivit doit tre expliqu au public,
mais galement les effets des rayonnements ionisants sur le plan sanitaire.
b) Prsentation des risques pris en compte
Les risques lis chaque activit utilisant les rayonnements ionisants et qui
ncessitent la prvision de plans durgence doivent tre prsents au public. La
probabilit ainsi que la svrit (effets sur la population sur les divers lments de
l environnement) du risque doivent tre connues de la population.
c) Prsentation des mesures de protection
Une information doit tre donne sur les plans durgence locaux lis aux instal
lations fixes utilisant des rayonnements ionisants et sur les plans durgence dapplica
tion nationale lis aux oprations de transport de matires radioactives ou la chute
sur le territoire de lEtat membre dengins spatiaux propulsion nuclaire, ou la
survenance dun accident grave qui a son origine sur le territoire dun Etat membre
ou sur le territoire dun autre Etat. De plus, les moyens dalerte doivent tre connus
du public.
d) Comportement que la population doit adopter en cas durgence
On ne peut limiter lexposition de la population que si celle-ci adopte un

comportement appropri: les contremesures qui relvent des plans durgence et
les mesures de protection individuelle interfrent avec les conditions de vie
normales: linterdiction de pntrer dans certaines zones, l vacuation, le comporte
ment, la restriction de consommation de nourriture et deau, l utilisation des moyens
de protection respiratoire ou de tout autre vtement de protection, les mesures
individuelles de dcontamination (retirer les vtements contamins, se laver et se
dvtir aprs le passage dun nuage radioactif, etc.).
2.1.2. L information en situation accidentelle
En ce qui concerne linformation en situation accidentelle, le critre fondamen

tal est que le contenu doit tre adapt la situation en cause, cest--dire quil faut
informer tout en vitant dans certains cas dalarmer la population si cela est inutile,
ou, dans dautres situations plus srieuses, en la responsabilisant si ncessaire.
IAEA-SM-309/38 477
Ainsi, on distinguera plusieurs cas de figure:

les situations de pr-alarme (annexe .2 de la directive);
les situations o laccident est connu (annexe II. 1.a de la directive);
les situations o les mesures et un comportement de protection simposent
(annexe II l.b et c de la directive);
les situations o le temps disponible permet de rappeler les notions de base sur
la radioactivit et ses effets (annexe II.3 de la directive).
La directive a galement pour effet dharmoniser les plans durgence sur

laspect de l information':
ils doivent tre non confidentiels, car connus du public dans leurs grandes
lignes en situation non accidentelle;
par ailleurs, ils doivent comporter des dispositions dinformation conformes
l annexe de la directive en situation accidentelle.
Quel type dinformation doit tre donn en cas daccident? Tout dabord, des
informations sur le cas durgence survenu et, dans la mesure du possible, sur ses
caractristiques (telles que son origine, son tendue, son volution prvisible). Ces
lments peuvent porter sur:
le lieu et la date et heure sur l accident;
le type de situation durgence radiologique;
les caractristiques principales des substances radioactives impliques;
ltendue de la zone gographique menace;
lvolution prvisible de la situation et linfluence des facteurs climatiques
mtorologiques.
Ensuite, des consignes de protection doivent tre donnes qui, en fonction du

cas despce, peuvent porter notamment sur les lments mentionns ci-aprs:
restriction la consommation de certains aliments susceptibles dtre conta
mins;
rgles simples dhygine et de dcontamination et confinement dans les
maisons;
l utilisation de substances protectrices;
dispositions prendre en cas dvacuation.
Ces informations doivent saccompagner, le cas chant, de consignes

spciales pour certains groupes de la population:
personnes ges;
femmes et enfants;
certaines professions (les agriculteurs, les mdecins, les enseignants et les
journalistes qui sont des relais de l information et qui, par consquent, peuvent
recevoir une information plus complte et dtaille).
Les populations doivent tre informes sur leurs devoirs en cas durgence
radiologique et, notamment, sur l obligation de respect des consignes qui leur sont
adresses (exemple: confinement du plan dvacuation respecter).
Si la situation durgence est prcde dune phase de pr-alarme, la population
susceptible dtre affecte en cas durgence radiologique devra dj recevoir des
informations et des consignes durant cette phase. Ces informations et ces consignes
seront compltes en fonction du temps disponible par un rappel des notions de base
sur la radioactivit et ses effets sur l tre humain ainsi que sur l environnement.
2.2. Principes de transmission de linformation
2.2.7. Information en situation non accidentelle
En situation non accidentelle, les principes suivants doivent tre respects:
a) Information active de la part des autorits: selon ce principe, la population doit

tre destinataire de l information sans quelle en fasse au pralable la demande.
b) Information passive de la part des autorits: l information doit pouvoir tre
galement accessible, c est--dire se situer dans des lieux accessibles au public,
ou se trouver dans des documents administratifs ou publications accessibles au
public.
c) Information permanente: l information doit tre rpte intervalles rguliers
et galement communique lorsque les modifications significatives et
pertinentes l gard de la population concernant les plans durgence
interviennent.
2.2.2. Information en situation accidentelle
En situation accidentelle, il importe de respecter les principes suivants:
a) L immdiatet de la premire communication officielle au public ds la sur

venance de laccident, voire ds la phase de pr-alarme, de manire ce que
le public ne soit pas inform uniquement par les mdias qui ne sont pas tous
fiables sur le plan scientifique.
b) Le caractre rptitif de l information aussi longtemps que ncessaire de
manire ne pas laisser la population dans l ignorance de lvolution de la
situation.
2.2.3. Information des zones frontalires
Il est ncessaire que le risque frontalier soit pris en compte en prsence dune
situation durgence transfrontalire, afin dviter toute confusion au sein du public
IAEA-SM-309/38 479
et tout malentendu; un change dinformations destines au public doit tre tabli

entre les Etats membres affects par l accident ou susceptibles de ltre.
2.2.4. Information des services de secours
Pour des raisons defficacit des mesures prises en cas durgence radiologique,
une information approprie des services dintervention est propose. Linformation
des professions concernes, tels les mdecins, est galement prvue.
2.2.5. Administration charge de la mise en uvre de la directive
Pour chaque Etat membre, il est utile de crer ou de dsigner une, ou des,
autorits assurant la gestion dun rseau dinformation unique, officiel, et que ces
autorits soient connues du public.
2.2.6. Dlai de transposition
Les Etats membres sont enfin tenus dadopter leurs dispositions nationales pour
se conformer la directive dans un dlai de deux ans compter de son adoption,
soit avant le 27 novembre 1991.
3. LA CONFERENCE PERMANENTE SUR LA SECURITE ET

LA PROTECTION SANITAIRE A LERE NUCLEAIRE
Dans sa communication sur le dveloppement des mesures prises par la

Communaut en application du chapitre III du Trait EURATOM (Protection
sanitaire) de 1986, la Commission a propos de crer une Confrence permanente
sur la protection sanitaire lre nuclaire pour contribuer une amlioration de
linformation de la population.
Lobjectif de cette confrence est dapporter tous les milieux concerns le
maximum dinformations objectives sur les risques potentiels des rayonnements
ionisants de toute origine.
La premire runion de la Confrence sest tenue du 5 au 7 octobre 1987; cette
runion portait essentiellement sur l information du public et des mdias sur la
protection et la scurit concernant les activits nuclaires.
Lun des principaux enseignements de la Confrence a t de montrer l exis
tence dun besoin dinformation non satisfait par les formes et les mthodes utilises
jusqu prsent par les responsables de la protection et de la sret nuclaire.
La Confrence a galement dmontr quil est possible dinstaurer utilement
un dialogue avec les organisations qui ont une position plutt rserve lgard de
lnergie nuclaire (associations des consommateurs, associations des parents et
associations de protection de lenvironnement).
La seconde runion de la confrence, qui sest tenue les 5 et 6 dcembre 1989,

avait pour but dinformer ces organisations sur les dispositions durgence. Elle a
pass en revue les amliorations rcemment intervenues dans la gestion des accidents
nuclaires et dans l organisation des interventions, voquant notamment la protection
des populations et de l environnement contre les radiations. Les discussions ont
essentiellement port sur la coopration dans le domaine de lorganisation des
secours durgence pour lesquels des progrs considrables ont t raliss au cours
des dernires annes dans les Etats membres en ce qui concerne les conseils, les
critres, la formation, la rglementation et les programmes dintervention.
Les participants ont aussi voqu la lgislation adopte au niveau communau
taire aprs l accident de Tchernobyl, pour la diffusion rapide des informations et les
taux de radioactivit autoriss pour les denres alimentaires.
La seconde runion, beaucoup plus technique que la premire dans les
discussions engages, a dmontr que les non-experts ont acquis une meilleure
connaissance des questions de radioprotection.
4. SUPPORTS ECRITS ET AUDIOVISUELS D INFORMATION

DU GRAND PUBLIC
Ces mesures sont soit des outils pdagogiques soit des documents
dinformation.
La Commission a produit la fois des publications de vulgarisation et des pro
grammes vido pour duquer le grand public.
4.1. Brochure sur les radiations ionisantes destine au public
Une brochure intitule Radiation and You destine enseigner la popula

tion des Etats membres les notions de base relatives la radioactivit et ses effets
sur la sant a t ralise en version anglaise. La distribution se fera par le biais des
bureaux dinformation de la Commission dans les capitales des Etats membres.
4.2. Films vido dinformation gnrale du public
La ralisation de deux films vido visant donner au public une information

sur la radioprotection a t confie l Universit de Sheffield qui a ralis dj en
1985 des films vido dans le domaine de la formation et l information des travailleurs
en radioprotection.
Les thmes de chaque film de dure de 20 minutes sont:
les effets biologiques des radiations et la comparaison des risques;
la protection radiologique, la population et l environnement.
IAEA-SM-309/38 481
Ces programmes peuvent sadresser notamment des tudiants et des groupes

cibles de la population. La version originale ralise en anglais sera traduite par la
suite dans les autres langues de la Communaut.
4.3. Etablissement dun manuel type pour les enseignants du cycle secondaire
en radioprotection
Lors dun sminaire sur la formation et linformation des travailleurs en radio-

protection, en novembre 1988, l importance de l ducation sanitaire en radioprotec
tion a t particulirement souligne. Une initiative a t prise en 1989 sur la base
de l exprience acquise lors de ltablissement dun tel manuel pour les enseignants
dans le domaine de la lutte contre la drogue. Dans ce contexte, une runion avec des
reprsentants des autorits comptentes des Etats membres a t organise en
juillet 1989.
4.4. Brochure dinformation: Scurit nuclaire: la communaut europenne

et laprs-Tchernobyl
Ce fascicule destin au public et publi en septembre 1989 dresse un bilan

sommaire des actions entames par la Communaut europenne aprs l accident de
Tchernobyl.
5. CONCLUSION
Les initiatives de la Commission dmontrent la stratgie que la Communaut

entend suivre dans le vaste domaine quest l information sur lenvironnement, o des
rsultats ne peuvent tre obtenus que par une action permanente long terme et
adapte la nature des risques.
Un acquis important dans ce domaine est le droit l information du public
consacr par la directive 89/618/EURATOM du 27 novembre 1989 concernant
l information de la population sur les mesures de protection applicables et sur le
comportement adopter en cas durgence radiologique. Celle-ci crera un droit rel
l information pour les citoyens de la Communaut aprs avoir t transpose dans
la lgislation des Etats membres.
Les populations bnficieront dune action dinformation continue et objective
en situation normale et bnficieraient, en cas de relle situation durgence, dune
information rapide et aussi complte que possible.
Une information objective sur les risques radiologiques et sur les mesures de
prcaution prises lgard de la population en cas durgence radiologique contribue
encourager la responsabilisation et les comportements dautoprotection dans de
telles situations.
IAEA-SM-309/82
Invited Paper
RADIATION PROTECTION ACTIVITIES UNDER
A REGIONAL CO-OPERATIVE AGREEMENT (RCA)
S. KOBAYASHI
National Institute of Radiological Sciences,
Chiba, Japan
Abstract
RADIATION PROTECTION ACTIVITIES UNDER A REGIONAL CO-OPERATIVE
AGREEMENT (RCA).
The current status of a Regional Co-operative Agreement (RCA) project on
strengthening of radiation protection is described. The project started in 1988 following a
preparatory stage in 1987. All the RCA Member States, i.e. Australia, Bangladesh, China,
India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam are participating in the project and providing
the financial and human resources necessary for its implementation. The objective of the
project is to strengthen radiation protection capabilities in the RCA region with emphasis on
the establishment and development of the infrastructure, in particular, manpower development
in dosimetry, dose and risk assessment, protection practices, emergency countermeasures,
regulatory provisions, and educational and training systems. The activities include practical
training, the acquisition of fundamental knowledge and techniques; workshop and study tours
at an advanced level; a co-ordinated research programme to obtain data essential for radiation
protection measures in the region; assignment of experts to address specific problems;
provision of long term fellowships to supplement short term training; provision of instruments
and equipment; participation in the radiation protection advisory team (RAPAT) programme
of the IAEA; and periodic evaluation of the project. These activities are applied in a concerted
way to industrial applications,including nuclear energy and medical and biological appli
cations. In the field of industrial applications, two training courses and two workshops
including study tours were implemented in 1988 and 1989, and one training course and two
workshops are envisaged for 1990. In the medical and biological field, efforts have been
concentrated on the co-ordinated research programme which aims at compiling essential data
of the region for setting Reference Asian Man. The importance is stressed of adopting an
integrated approach to the specified goal as well as of establishing an appropriate mechanism,
both at national and international level, for the co-ordination of activities.
1. INTRODUCTION
Under the Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and

Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology of the IAEA (IAEA-RCA), in
which 14 countries of the Asian and Pacific region, i.e. Australia, Bangladesh,
483
484 KOBAYASHI
China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam are the Member States
involved, a number of co-operative projects are in progress in promoting research,
development and training in the field of nuclear applications in agriculture, biology
and medicine, industry, and energy production. As one of these co-operative ven
tures, a project was initiated in 1988 on Strengthening of Radiation Protection. The
conception of this project dates back to 1982 when an RCA project on medical and
biological applications started. Accordingly, radiation protection aspects of medical
and biological applications were included in a series of RCA Workshop meetings
hosted by the Japan International Co-operation Agency. The initiation of the project
as a formal RCA programme was stimulated by the occurrence of certain nuclear
accidents involving exposure of a considerable part of the population at large such
as the Chernobyl accident which occurred in April 1986 and the accident at the city
of Goinia, Brazil, in September 1987. Especially in the case of the Chernobyl
accident, all the RCA Member States were directly or indirectly affected, though the
effects differed in nature and degree and although these were minor in scientific
terms they were serious in terms of social and psychological impact. Of special note
was the discrepancy between countries as to the limits of radioactivity content in
foodstuffs permitted for import. Such a situation led the officials and scientists
concerned to realize the necessity of developing a radiation protection capability in
each country and in the region as a whole.
The strategy and a long range plan for implementation of the project was
discussed and agreed upon at the Project Formulation Meeting held in Tokyo in
November 1987, which was attended by leading scientists and officials who were
engaged in radiation protection in industrial or biomedical fields in RCA countries,
as well as by responsible officials from the IAEA. The result of the discussions was
summarized in the Project Document, based on which programme activities started
in 1988. The following sections describe the objective of the project, fields to be
covered, modus operandi, achievements and some inherent problems of the project.
2. OBJECTIVE AND FIELDS TO BE COVERED
The objective of the project is the strengthening of radiation protection capa

bilities in the region with particular emphasis on the establishment and development
of an infrastructure. Particular objectives relate to manpower development in
(a) dosimetry, (b) dose and risk assessment, (c) protection practices, (d) emergency
countermeasures, (e) regulatory provisions, and (f) educational and training systems.
The project is also intended to promote research and development capabilities to
meet the specific needs of each Member State.
There are a wide range of industrial, medical and research or educational
activities where radiation or radioisotopes are utilized with a certain degree of proba-
IAEA-SM-309/82 485
bility or risk of radiation exposure to the worker or the public. As the history of
radiation accidents indicates, most of these are industrial. Hence the fields to be
covered are, first, industrial applications including nuclear energy production, where
primary efforts are concentrated; secondly, medical applications where radiation
doses received by the public are relatively high; and thirdly, research and education.
3. METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION AND CURRENT PROGRAMME

ACTIVITIES
The methods of implementation under the project include the following:

(1) practical training and acquisition of fundamental knowledge and techniques;
(2) workshop and study tours for the dissemination of up-to-date information at an
advanced level; (3) a co-ordinated research programme to obtain data essential to
radiation protection measures in the region as well as to develop research capa
bilities; (4) assignment of experts to address specific problems, and also for
supporting national training and research programmes; (5) provision of long term
fellowships to supplement short term training; (6) provision of instruments and
equipment for essential needs; (7) participation in the radiation protection advisory
team (RAPAT) programme of the IAEA; and (8) periodic evaluation of the project
according to the defined targets.
An integrated approach is being applied to attain the objectives: efforts have
been made to make use of multiple methods combined. Wherever possible,
encouragement is given to mobilizing all vehicles training courses, workshops,
CRPs, fellowships, expert assignments and the provision of instruments
towards the attainment of a specific objective. For example, information obtained
from the ongoing Co-ordinated Research Programme is reported at the workshop;
participants in a training course are invited to attend a workshop later on, or given
fellowships for a longer term of training, and then provided with equipment and
materials for essential needs; the trainees at an advanced level are expected to be
trainers in the national programme in the same subject area.
It is also stressed that the project be implemented under a long range
programme with a periodic evaluation of the performance in terms of targets as set
out in the Project Document, followed by proper restructuring of the strategy from
time to time. Expert advisory group meetings and evaluation missions which take
note of the critical, evaluation by participating parties should serve this purpose.
A work plan is shown in Table I. The programme for radiation protection in
industrial and other non-medical fields includes training courses for the years
1988-1990, workshops for 1988-1990 and an envisaged CRP on Environmental
Radiation Dose Measurement. The training course organized by Australia is
intended to provide the participants with fundamental information in broad areas of
radiation protection, while the courses held in Japan centred on the specific subject
486 KOBAYASHI
TABLE I. WORK PLAN OF MAJOR ACTIVITIES IN RADIATION

PROTECTION
A. Industrial and other non-medical fields
( 1) Training Course on Development of Infrastructures for Ensuring Rad iation Protection

(Australia, 1988 and 1990)
(2) Training Courses and Workshops on Basic Techniques in Radiation Protection with
emphasis on dosimetry for external exposure: intercomparison and calibration of
personal dosimeters
(Japan, 1988, 1989 and 1990)
(3) Workshop on Environmental Sampling and Measurement of Radioactivity for
Monitoring Purposes
(India, 1989)
(4) Training Course on Safety Aspects of Industrial Application of Radioisotopes
(India, 1991)
(5) Co-ordinated Research Programme on Environmental Radiation Dose Measurement
(in planning stage)
B. Medical and biological Held
(1) Co-ordinated Research Programme on Compilation of Anatomical, Physiological and

Metabolic Characteristics of Reference Asian Man
(1988 - )
(2) Training Course on Radiation Protection in Medical Application of Radiation and
Radioisotopes
(in planning stage)
C. G eneral
(1) Workshop on Educational Systems for Radiation Protection

(Japan, in planning stage)
area of dosimetry and dose assessment, as did the workshop held in Japan. The
workshop organized by India is complementary to the one in Japan and dealt with
the sampling and measurement of radioactivity for monitoring purposes, a subject
which was not covered in Japan.
In the medical and biological field, emphasis has been placed upon a
Co-ordinated Research Programme on the Compilation of Anatomical, Physio
logical and Metabolic Characteristics of Reference Asian Man. The purpose of this
CRP is to obtain representative physical (anatomical) and physiological (metabolic)
data of the standard population and societal data with regard to food and nutrient
IAEA-SM-309/82 487
intake in order to set up a Reference Man in line with the specific conditions and
status of each main region of Asia and the Pacific. The acquired data, coupled with
the scientific capability developed during the process of study, will contribute to the
appropriate assessment of radiation dose resulting from both external and internal
exposure, as best suited to the conditions of each country.
So far, training activity in the medical field has not been actively pursued
except for a course which has been convened in Japan once every three years since
1983 under the RCA-JICA (Japan International Co-operation Agency) programme.
It was considered essential to sort out the target trainees primary needs and the most
cost-effective approach before starting training activity in this field. With this in
mind, a course is being planned for 1991 or later on Radiation Protection in Medical
Application of Radiation and Radioisotopes.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The entire RCA programme is operated in a spirit of co-operation. This is the

principle by which the Radiation Protection Project is being implemented both
nationally and internationally, as described earlier. An example is the exchange of
lecturers and advisers on training courses and workshops among host institutions,
which was found quite effective technically as well as socially. For instance, a
training course and workshops held in Japan were organized and operated jointly by
the Japan Atomic Energy Institute (JAERI), the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel
Development Corporation (PNC) and the National Institute of Radiological Sciences
(NIRS) with an invited lecturer from the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology
Organisation (ANSTO) and advisers from Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)
of India. Conversely, an Australian course and an Indian workshop were attended
by Japanese lecturers.
It should be stressed that an integrated approach is necessary to attain the goal
most effectively. It should also be emphasized that co-ordination between (a)
regional or inter-regional programmes of international organs and (b) national ones
is necessary both during the planning and implementation of the project, especially
with regard to training, the supply of expert services, and the supply of instruments.
A good example of co-ordination in this regard was shown in the training course
organized in Australia. The first Australian training course on Development of
Infrastructures for Ensuring Radiation Protection in 1988 was intentionally timed
to coincide with the 7th International Congress of the International Radiation
Protection Association which was followed by the IAEA Conference on Radiation
Protection in Nuclear Energy so that the participants were able to attend the two
meetings to acquire information in a way which would otherwise have not been
possible. Similarly, the second Australian course, to be held in September 1990, is
timed to coincide with the 15th Annual Conference of the Australian Radiation
488 KOBAYASHI
Protection Society so that the participants in the training course can attend the
conference to enhance their knowledge gained from the course by exposing
themselves to state-of-the-art information. Another example: in the case of Japan,
there are programmes such as those offered by the Japan International Co-operation
Agency and the Science and Technology Agency (STA) which assign experts,
provide fellowships and instruments as well as training courses, among other things,
in bilateral co-operation with developing countries. It is most desirable, possible and
actually achieved in many instances, that these national programmes are fully
co-ordinated with the regional and interregional programmes.
In this regard, an appropriate mechanism is required to co-ordinate the
regional and interregional programmes currently operated by international organs
with those operated nationally, and vice versa, in order to attain the most cost-
effective performance.
The Radiation Protection Project under the RCA was initiated and has been
implemented with the ambitious intention that it should be a fully concerted venture
by all participating countries in the real sense and that should meet the needs of
participating countries in most cost-effective way. It seems to have had a good start.
However, it may go astray unless we establish a firm tradition by which the spirit
of co-operation and co-ordination is highly regarded by all concerned with the
project. The outcome of the project, we are hoping, will not only benefit the RCA
Member States but also the neighbouring regions as well in strengthening radiation
protection capabilities.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author gratefully acknowledges the strong support given by RCA Member
States and the IAEA to the Radiation Protection Project. He wishes to thank particu
larly P. Airey, RCA co-ordinator, and P. Strohal, the project officer of the IAEA
and J.C.E. Button of ANSTO, Australia, for their devotion to the programme. His
thanks are due to all the participants in the programme who all helped in their unique
way in developing the project. He is also grateful to K. Adachi, T. Kudoh,
M. Takabayashi and H. Amagai for their secretarial assistance.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AUSTRALIAN NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION, Develop

ment of Infrastructures for Ensuring Radiation Protection (Proc. IAEA/RCA Training
Course, 1988), 2 vols, ANSTO, Lucas Heights (1988).
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Report on Project Formulation Meeting

for Regional RCA Project Strengthening of Radiation Protection Infrastructures, Tokyo,
Nov. 1987.
PANEL
THE ROLE OF THE IAEA IN STRENGTHENING RADIATION

PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURES
Chairman:M. Sohrabi (Islamic Republic of Iran)
Members: K. Becker (ISO)

S. Kobayashi (Japan)
B. Lorenz (German Democratic Republic)
I. Othman (Syrian Arab Republic)
E. Palacios (Argentina)
P. Strohal (IAEA)
Scientific Secretary: F.N. Flakus (IAEA)
1. INTRODUCTION
The Panel was included in the symposium programme to highlight important

perspectives on radiation safety control, to draw conclusions as to the directions for
future efforts, and in particular to explore how the Agency could best assist to
overcome current shortcomings of radiation safety control so that adequate radiation
protection measures might be implemented concurrently with the Agencys
Technical Co-operation (TC) projects in Member States.
The following questions were posed: what are the strengths and weaknesses
currently observed with respect to existing safety control infrastructures in Member
States? Is the situation satisfactory, and if not, why is this so, what are the obstacles?
What corrective actions are necessary? How can the Agency best assist?
2. MATTERS OF CONCERN
Today ionizing radiation is widely used in Member States, particularly in the

medical area (radiodiagnostics, radiotherapy) but also in industry, agriculture and
research. For the medical area it is estimated that worldwide 400 000 diagnostic
X ray sets are in use for 1200 million medical X ray tests annually, that
315 000 dental X ray tests are carried out annually, that 22 million in vivo applica
tions of radioisotopes (nuclear medicine) are performed per year and that 4 million
489
490 PANEL
patients are being treated by radiation each year. These applications continue to
grow. For example, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), 40% of
the developing countries do not yet have any radiotherapy services at all, while there
is also a severe shortage of drugs used to fight cancer.
Several radiological accidents outside the nuclear power field have
underscored the importance of safety control. For example, a serious radiological
accident, with one fatality, occurred in February 1989 in San Salvador, El Salvador,
and involved a strong radiation source at an industrial irradiation facility for
sterilizing packed medical products. An international review conducted by the
Agency revealed that, with proper radiation protection in place, this accident could
have been avoided.
There is growing concern that many countries do not have national radiation
protection capabilities consistent with their increasing use of radiation sources. In
contrast to this situation, radiation protection infrastructures and practices are very
well developed in many other Member States, particularly in those that are operating
major nuclear facilities. It should be possible to reduce this gap by placing priority
on better dissemination of the relevant experience and technical knowledge that is
already available.
3. INFRASTRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS
A large body of radiation safety standards, including international standards,

exists. However, the existence of appropriate safety standards is not a guarantee for
good safety practices. A proper national infrastructure is required in each country
for the application of safety standards in order to achieve and maintain the desired
degree of radiation protection in the rapidly expanding uses of ionizing radiation. In
this context radiation protection infrastructure is understood to comprise essentially
three main elements:
(1) legislation and regulation, for setting forth legal, technical and administrative
requirements;
(2) enforcement mechanisms for enabling application of the regulations through
notification, registration and licensing of radiation sources; and
(3) a capable technical base for the provision of various safety services such as
radiation monitoring services (personnel dosimetry, environmental monitor
ing) and emergency response services.
The extent of any national infrastructure needs to be commensurate with the

degree and volume of nuclear technological activities requiring safety efforts,
ranging from electricity production by nuclear power plants to traditional fields of
applications of ionizing radiation in food and agriculture, human health, industry,
earth sciences and physical and chemical sciences. How big should an adequate
PANEL 491
radiation protection infrastructure be in relation to the volume of nuclear applications

in a country? A simple formula cannot be given. One might, however, derive some
quantitative guidelines by comparing national budgets and manpower devoted to
radiation protection in relation to the extent of nuclear applications. Each country
ultimately must itself determine the extent of such infrastructure, since the protection
of people and their environment from radiation hazards ultimately is a national
responsibility.
4. ANALYSIS OF NEEDS
An overview was presented on the Agencys experience with the Radiation

Protection Advisory Team (RAPAT) missions and general conclusions drawn from
findings obtained so far. The purpose of the RAPAT mission programme is to help
assess the national radiation protection status, identify needs and priorities of the
country visited and propose directions for a long term development programme on
radiation safety control. An analysis of the RAPAT findings 49 missions carried
out by the IAEA since 1984 to forty-nine Member States (Table I) underscores
the prevailing needs and the importance of strengthening international co-operation
in the field of radiation protection.
TABLE I. MEMBER STATES VISITED BY RADIATION PROTECTION

ADVISORY TEAM (RAPAT) MISSIONS (Status: April 1990)
1984 (2) China, Iraq

1985 (5) Chile, Egypt, Nicaragua, Malaysia,Turkey
1986 (10) Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Iceland, Kenya, Mexico, Panama,
Portugal, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia
1987 (8) Colombia, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Peru, Philippines, Sudan, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tanzania
1988 (12) Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Cte dIvoire, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala,
Indonesia, Jamaica, Madagascar, Nigeria, Senegal, Viet Nam
1989 (10) Cameroon, Cuba, El Salvador, Ghana, Islamic Republic of Iran,
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Morocco, Thailand,
Zimbabwe
1990 (2) Libian Arab Jamahiriya, Sri Lanka
Total (49)
492 PANEL
TABLE II. STATUS OF RADIATION PROTECTION INFRASTRUCTURES IN

MEMBER STATES
% of Member States
More than
4%
adequate
Desired level of
Adequate 30% radiation protection

Improvements
Inadequate 66%
necessary
There is evidence that today radiation safety control mechanisms are

inadequate in more than half the Member States (Table ). Many countries simply
lack the necessary infrastructure for implementing a safety policy based on
international recommendations. In some countries, national radiation protection
facilites are inadequate; in others, multiple institutions claim responsibility; and in
a few, national authorities have yet to be established. Too often, basic legislation and
supporting up-to-date regulations are wanting. To compound the problem, trained
and knowledgeable personnel is in short supply, and there is no long term strategy
in place to help correct the situation. Special efforts are needed for strengthening
radiation protection infrastructures in such Member States so that they can cope and
keep abreast with current technological developments.
5. CURRENT EFFORTS
The Agency is making enhanced efforts to correct the current situation and to
strengthen radiation protection infrastructures in developing Member States through
activities both under its regular programme and, more importantly, under its
Technical Assistance programme.
Under its regular programme, a subprogramme Control of Radiation Sources
is being executed to generate comprehensive specific guidance. Experts from various
Member States are assisting the IAEA in this work with their advice.
The share of activities under the Technical Assistance programme for improv
ing radiation protection capabilities in developing Member States is significant.
PANEL 493
Within in-country, regional and interregional Technical Co-operation (TC) projects

the Agency provides assistance in the form of experts, fellowships and equipment.
In the year 1990, US $6.2 million are being spent on technical assistance in radiation
protection, i.e. about two thirds of the funds (US $9.4 million) available for safety,
by which is understood radiation protection of the worker, protection of the public
and the environment, research reactor safety and nuclear power plant safety, or over
11% of the total funds available for TC projects (total US $53 million). Not all
proposed and technically justified projects can be financed directly by the Agency.
Certain projects, so called footnote a projects, are financed by donor countries.
Emphasis on radiation protection activities within regional projects in Latin America
(ARCAL), the Middle East and Europe (RER), Asia and the Pacific (RCA) and
Africa (AFRA) is increasing. In addition, interregional activities are being
supported, mainly training courses but also the RAPAT programme.
Technical Co-operation projects involve at least two co-operating partners, the
officers at the Agency and their counterparts in the respective country. In order to
be successful, inputs from both partners must match. A TC project cannot be
managed by remote control from the headquarters of the Agency and effective local
project management is a prerequisite for successful project implementation which in
turn is essential for the desired beneficial project impact. Good project design is vital
for the later success of a project.
TABLE . TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION PROJECT PHASES
PRE-PROJECT PROJECT POST-PROJECT

PHASE PHASE PHASE
designing project reaching assessing

components goals set benefits
through gained
project
execution
494 PANEL
The Agencys TC programme is responsive in character. Project proposals are

formulated by developing Member States and examined by the Agency. Any sound
TC programme must aim at and respond to the priority needs of Member States as
perceived by them. This principle precludes any predetermination of the content of
the Agencys TC programme, but it does not preclude a dialogue for finding common
denominators between national and international priorities. An intensive appraisal
process and dialogue with Member States is essential and is being pursued.
Efforts are under way towards improving TC activities dn safety. The general
policy is gradually to strengthen radiation protection infrastructures in developing
Member States in a systematic manner. Although current emphasis is on streamlining
effective implementation of approved projects, increased emphasis and attention to
the pre-project and post-project phases (Table ) is needed. Expanding assistance
in project design and training in project management are considered to be key issues.
6. DIFFICULTIES
Concerning TC project execution it was noted that field expert assignments for
missions with a very short duration are rather easy to arrange. Recruitment of
experts for prolonged service in the field, i.e. 3 to 6 months, poses great difficulties.
A proposal was made from the floor to recruit retired persons who have accumulated
a vast amount of professional experience, who are more easily available than experts
fully involved in their profession and thus might be ready to work in the field on long
term assignments after retirement.
It was recognized that upgrading of radiation safety control in various countries
is to a certain extent hampered by internal national problems which cannot much be
influenced by the Agency. For example, when radiation protection is not considered
a high priority, lack of local funding restricts radiation protection activities to a
minimum and leaves them too much dependent on Agency support. Organizational
fragmentation is often a problem as well. Regulatory control is effective if the
responsibility for radiation safety rests with one national institution (e.g. the National
Nuclear Energy Commission or a single Ministry) or if the share of responsibility
is clearly defined (e.g. medical/non medical area) and if internal co-ordination and
co-operation on a national level are efficient (e.g. two institutions such as the national
atomic/nuclear energy authority and the Ministry of Health). Regulatory control is
generally not very effective if a number of national institutions claim sole
responsibility for radiation safety in the absence of a strong co-ordinating body.
Another factor is that low salaries, as a consequence of lack of sufficient financial
resources committed to radiation safety activities, are resulting in a serious brain
drain of trained people to better paid jobs in national industries or other countries.
PANEL 495
7. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
How could radiation protection capabilities by improved? To be effective,

radiation safety measures must be established within an adequate national
infrastructure that includes legislation, regulatory mechanisms for enforcement
through licensing and inspection, and physical means for building up and maintaining
a countrys technological capability. First of all it is necessary to recognize that
availability of enough people having appropriate knowledge is essential. It is neither
a question of having or not having sophisticated equipment nor of believing in a
general differentiation between developed and developing countries in the sense in
which these adjectives are sometimes used. The evolution of radiation protection
criteria is continuous and occurs faster than the capability to adaptation of many
competent authorities permits.
How can this situation be improved? It is important to recall that the role of
the safety profession in general and of the radiation protection community in
particular is not only to protect man, the environment and the economy of a country
from any adverse effects that could be caused by ionizing radiation but also to place
radiation in the right perspective. This latter aspect has unfortunately been much
neglected in the past. It is first of all necessary to improve the knowledge of those
who have to take technical decisions. National authorities need to be convinced that
radiation practices should be placed under strict control. They have to be shown that
identification of a competent authority alone is not sufficient but that allocation of
adequate financial resources is essential for keeping reasonable working conditions
to assure the good job performance of trained people. Once this is done, the staff
of the radiation protection authorities responsible for radiation protection need to
restrain themselves from creating complicated organizational structures and from
launching simultaneous projects which might do relatively little to improve the
situation being faced.
What can the Agency do? It was felt that the Agency should continue to support
training through courses, symposia, topical seminars, etc., but defer provision of
costly and sophisticated equipment to the requesting country until it has reached a
reasonable radiation protection level. Establishment of a correct legal framework
with law and regulations, of an effective national competent authority and obtaining
well trained people are more important than proliferation of equipment. Teletherapy
units, big accelerators or irradiation facilities should not be supplied to countries
which cannot demonstrate an effective safety control organization (in response to
requests from its developing Member States the Agency is purchasing radiation
sources within its Technical Assistance programme). Other important developments
can be triggered or promoted by the Agency, for example by providing a model set
of clear and easily understood and usable regulations, guides and additional
supplementary hand-outs; simple textbooks, video films, instruction sets for local or
regional training; procuring reliable, rugged and easy to use monitoring instruments;
496 PANEL
recruiting experienced field experts able to understand and adjust to local conditions,
thus catalyzing adequate international contacts and fostering the exchange of profes
sional experience; promoting quality assurance programmes (intercomparisons) for
personnel and environmental monitoring.
Generally the Agency could assist in streamlining national priorities in order
to achieve a balance between too much protection and too little, and help establish
national infrastructures which are commensurate with the volume of nuclear
activities. Too much safety and over-regulation is just as inappropriate as not enough
safety and under-regulation.
The Agency will increasingly need to assist developing Member States in
determining long term strategies and programme plans regarding radiation safety.
Technical Assistance of the Agency has to focus on determined national needs and
plans and should not support activities that are of low priority. There should be a
continuous surveillance of safety needs in developing countries so that the Agency
can respond properly and in time.
How can a yardstick be put on the strengthening of radiation safety control in
a country? How can progress and success in this area be measured? Monitoring of
TC project impact after TC project implementation could provide qualitative
performance indicators. As stated in Section 3, the amount of national budget funds
or manpower allocated by the country for radiation protection activities might
provide a quantitative performance indicator.
Infrastructural problems have been analysed and defined by the Agency, e.g.
through RAPAT missions. However, follow-up has usually consisted of ad hoc
technical assistance, rather than in evolving co-ordinated elements of a long term
strategy. To overcome these shortcomings, the Agency should endorse a more
systematic approach to problem definition, TC project formulation and TC project
implementation. Such a strategy calls for more active Agency assistance to
developing Member States in formulating Technical Assistance projects, through the
provision of experts to work closely with local authorities in realistically assessing
national resources and assistance available regionally and through the Agency and
other international organizations. Measures to enhance project implementation need
to include training courses on project management for those responsible for locally
implementing Agency assisted TC projects.
The contributions from the floor to the panel during the course of the
symposium confirmed the general picture gained of the needs. A proposal was made
to create an advisory body for the Agency and co-ordinating groups in developing
Member States to reduce random submission of TC project proposals and enhance
a shift of emphasis from analysis to constructive action.
CHAIRMEN OF SESSIONS
Session I B. EDER Federal Republic of Germany

Session II B. CASTAGNET France
Session B. AGU Nigeria
Session IV J. LIEBERMAN United States of America
Session V P. FERRUZ Chile
Session VI R.E. PINEDA Guatemala
Session Vn L.A. BULDAKOV Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
Session V in S. CHRISTOFIDES Cyprus
Session IX I. OTHMAN Syrian Arab Republic
SECRETARIAT OF THE SYMPOSIUM
F.N. FLAKUS Scientific Secretary

H. PROSSER Symposium Organizer
R. PENISTON-BIRD Proceedings Editor
J.-N. AQUISTAPACE French Editor
L. HERRERO Spanish Editor
. MELNIK Russian Editor
497
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Agu, . Federal Ministry of Science and Technology,

9 Kofo Abayomi Street, Victoria Island,
Lagos, Nigeria
Al-Haddad, I.K. Nuclear Research Centre,

Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission,
P.O. Box 765, Tuwaitha, Baghdad, Iraq
Anderer, J. Division of Nuclear Safety,

(IAEA) International Atomic Energy Agency,
P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria
Atta, M.A. Health Physics Division,

Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology,
P.O. Nilore, Islamabad, Pakistan
Bacon, M.L. Nuclear Installations Inspectorate,

St. Peters House, Balliol Road,
Bootle, Merseyside L20 3LZ, United Kingdom
Beaver, P.F. Nuclear Installations Inspectorate,

N11 A4, Room 223, Baynards House,
1 Chepstow Place, London W2 4TF, United Kingdom
Becker, K. DIN, Deutsches Institut fr Normung eV,

(ISO) Burggrafenstrasse 6, Postfach 1107,
D-1000 Berlin
Bergman, C. Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle,

Bezares, M. Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo,

Paseo del Prado 18-20, E-28071 Madrid, Spain
Bilbao, A.V. Coln 201, Piso 11, Apto. 7e,

Bellavista y Panorama,
Nuevo Vedado, Municipio Plaza,
Havana, Cuba
499
500 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Binder, W. Physikabteilung, Allgemeines Krankenhaus,

Universittsklinik fr Strahlentherapie und -biologie,
A-1090 Vienna, Austria
Bird, R.W. Environmental and Medical Sciences Division,

Building 364, Harwell Laboratory,
Oxfordshire 0X11 ORA, United Kingdom
Bischlager, . Bayrisches Ministerium fr Landesentwicklung und

Umweltfragen,
Rosenkavaliersplatz 2,
D-8000 Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
Boehler, M.C. Universit de droit,

13, place Carnot, F-54000 Nancy, France
Bond, J.A. Radiation and Industrial Safety Division,

Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories,
Chalk River, Ontario KOJ 1J0, Canada
Borhan Azad, S. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,

P.O. Box 14155-1339, Tehran,
Islamic Republic of Iran
Brown, W.R. Atomic Energy Control Board,

P.O. Box 1046, Ottawa, Ontario K IP 5S9, Canada
Brunner, H.H. Fachverband fr Strahlenschutz,

c/o BAG-SNAZ National Emergency Operations
Centre,
Ackermannstrasse 26, Postfach, CH-8044 Zurich,
Switzerland
Buldakov, L.A. Institute of Biophysics,

Ministry of Health,
Ul. Zhivopisnaya 46, 123182 Moscow,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Castagnet, B. Commissariat lnergie atomique,

29-33, rue de la Fdration, F-75752 Paris, France
Cervini, A. Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares,

A .P. 116-006,
01141 Mexico City, Mexico
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 501
Christofides, S. Medical Physics Department,

Nicosia General Hospital,
Nicosia, Cyprus
Cool, D.A. Radiation Protection and Health Effects Branch,

Washington, DC 20555, United States of America
Courades, J.-M. Division Radioprotection,

(CEC) Centre Albert Wagner C3,
Rue Alcide de Gasperi,
L-2920 Luxembourg (Kirchberg)
de Kerviler, H. Direction centrale de la scurit,

Commissariat lnergie atomique,
31-33, rue de la Fdration, F-75752 Paris, France
de la Serna, B. Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo,

Paseo del Prado 18-20, E-28071 Madrid, Spain
Dobici, F. ENEA-DISP,
Via Vitaliano Brancati 48, 1-00144 Rome, Italy
Eder, B. Bayrisches Ministerium fr Landesentwicklung und

Umweltfragen,
Rosenkavalierplatz 2,
El-Kekli, A. Tajoura Nuclear Research Centre,

P.O. Box 397, Tripoli, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Eriskat, H. Division Radioprotection,

(CEC) Centre Albert Wagner C3,
Rue Alcide de Gasperi,
L-2920 Luxembourg (Kirchberg)
Ferruz, P. Comisin Chilena de Energa Nuclear,

Amunategui No. 95, Santiago, Chile
Gibbs, D.C.C. Department of Nuclear Science and Technology,

Royal Naval College,
Greenwich, London SW10 9NN, United Kingdom
Golder, F. Institute of Isotopes of the Hungarian Academy

of Sciences,
P.O. Box 77, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
Gmez, A. San Luis Potos No. 192,

Col. Roma, Mexico City, Mexico
Grapengiesser, S. National Institute of Radiation Protection,

P.O. Box 602 04, S-104 01 Stockholm, Sweden
Hefner, A. Abteilung Strahlenschutz,

sterreichisches Forschungszentrum
Seibersdorf GmbH,
A-2444 Seibersdorf, Austria
Hock, R. Siemens-Kraftwerkunion,
Berliner Strasse,
D-6050 Offenbach, Federal Republic of Germany
Hradil, M. Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission,

Slezska 9, CS-12029 Prague 2, Czechoslovakia
Jackson, . Nordion International Inc.,

447 March Road, P.O. Box 13500,
Kanata, Ontario K2A 1X8, Canada
Jones, D.R. Office of Safety Policy and Standards,

EH-352,
Jouan, M. Service central de protection contre

les rayonnements ionisants,
Radioprotection,
B.P. 35, F-78110 Le Vsinet, France
Kmmerer, C. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Kiviskk, E. National Institute of Radiation Protection,

P.O. Box 602 04, S-104 01 Stockholm, Sweden
Klamert, V. Istituto di Ingegneria Nucleare,

Politcnico di Milano,
Via Ponzio 34/3, 1-20133 Milan, Italy
Kobayashi, S. Safety Analysis Unit,

National Institute of Radiological Sciences,
4-9-1, Anagawa, Chiba 260, Japan
Kopaev, V.V. Institute of Biophysics,

Ministry of Health,
Ul. Zhivopisnaya 46, 123182 Moscow,
Krailaksanawarapar, C. Health Physics Division,

Office of Atomic Energy for Peace,
Vibhavadi Rangsit Road, Bangkhen, Bangkok 10900,
Thailand
Krishnamurthi, T.N. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board,

Vikram Sarabhai Bhavan, 4th floor,
Anushaktinagar, Bombay 400 094, India
Krger, F.W. Staatliches Amt fr Atomsicherheit und

Strahlenschutz,
Waldowallee 117, DDR-1157 Berlin
Kunz, E. Radiation Hygiene Centre,

Institute of Hygiene and Epidemiology,
Srobrova 48, CS-10042 Prague 10, Czechoslovakia
Lieberman, J. Office of Enforcement,

Linhardt, W. Bayrisches Ministerium fr Landesentwicklung und

Umweltfragen,
Litai, D. Israeli Atomic Energy Commission,

P.O. Box 7061, Tel Aviv 61070, Israel
Logie, J.W. Health and Safety Division,

Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories,
Chalk River, Ontario K0J 1JO, Canada
Lorenz, B. Staatliches Amt fr Atomsicherheit und

Strahlenschutz,
Waldowallee 117, DDR-1157 Berlin
Lyzlov, A.F. Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry,

Ul. Bolshaya Ordynka 26, Moscow,
Maltoni Giacomelli, G. Dipartimento di Fisica, Universit di Bologna,

Via Imerio 46, 1-40126 Bologna, Italy
Mandl, H. Strahlenschutzdienst,
Landeskrankenhaus Salzburg,
Mllner Hauptstrasse 48, A-5020 Salzburg, Austria
McEwan, A.C. National Radiation Laboratory,

P.O. Box 25099, 108 Victoria 51, Christchurch,
New Zealand
Micallef, J. Department of Health,

(WHO) 15 Merchants Street, Valetta, Malta
Monacelli, G. Ministerio della Sanit,

Via Liszt 34, 1-00144 Rome, Italy
Moser, M. Federal Office of Public Health,

Bollwerk 27, CH-3001 Bern, Switzerland
Mtimet, S. Centre national de radioprotection,

Institut national de sant de l enfance,
Place Bab Saadoun, 1007 Tunis, Tunisia
Mviller-Kiemes, B. Hessisches Ministerium fr Umwelt und

Reaktorsicherheit,
Dostojewskistrasse 8,
D-6200 Wiesbaden, Federal Republic of Germany
Neu, A. Landesanstalt fr Umweltschutz,

Hertzstrasse 173,
D-7500 Karlsruhe 21, Federal Republic of Germany
Niemi, T. Department of Inspection and Metrology,

Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety,
P.O. Box 268, SF-00101 Helsinki, Finland
Ninkovi, M.M. Boris Kidri Institute of Nuclear Sciences,

Vinca,
P.O. Box 522, YU-11000 Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Orli, M. Military Technical Institute,

Kataniceva 15, YU-11000 Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Othman, I. Atomic Energy Commission,

P.O. Box 6091, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic
Palacios, E. Gerencia Proteccin Radiolgica y Seguridad,

Avenida del Libertador 8250,
1429 Buenos Aires, Argentina
Parisi, A. Istituto Superiore per la Prevenzione e la Sicurezza

del Lavoro,
Via Urbana 167, 1-00184 Rome, Italy
Pauli, E. Commissariat lnergie atomique,

B.P. 6, F-92265 Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
Paynter, R.A. National Radiological Protection Board,

Hospital Lane, Cookridge,
Leeds LS16 6RW, United Kingdom
Peixoto, J.E. Instituto de Radioproteo e Dosimetra,

Av. des Amricas km 11, Caixa Postal 37750,
CEP 22642 Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil
Peters, F.K.A. Atomic Energy Corporation,

P.O. Box 582, Pretoria 0001, South Africa
Pineda, R.E. Avenida Petapa 24, Calle Z 12,

P.O. Box 1421, Guatemala City, Guatemala
Placer, A.E. Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear,

Calle Justo Dorado 11, E-28040 Madrid, Spain
Powell, P.E. Defence Radiological Protection Service,

Institute of Naval Medicine,
Crescent Road, Alverstoke,
Gosport, Hants P012 2DL, United Kingdom
Puerta Ortiz, J.A. Instituto de Asuntos Nucleares,

Avenida El Dorado, Carrera 50, Bogot, Colombia
Quevedo, J.R. Centro de Proteccin e Higiene de las Radiaciones,

Calle 18-A Esq. 47, Miramar, Municipio Playa,
Havana, Cuba
Rab Molla, M.A. Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Division,

Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission,
P.O. Box 158, Ramna, Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh
Risica, S. Laboratorio di Fisica,

Istituto Superiore di Sanit,
Viale Regina Elena 299, 1-00161 Rome, Italy
Roberts, P.J. Regional Radiation Physics and Protection Service,

P.O. Box 803,
Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TB, United Kingdom
Rollin, P. Comit de radioprotection,

Electricit de France,
3, rue de Messine, F-75384 Paris Cedex 08, France
Samain, J.-P. Ministre de la Sant publique et de lenvironnement,

Cit administrative de lEtat,
Quartier Vsale, B-1010 Brussels, Belgium
Schandorf, C. Physics Department,

National Nuclear Research Institute,
Ghana Atomic Energy Commission,
P.O. Box 80, Legon, Ghana
Schlesinger, T. Soreq Nuclear Research Centre,

Yavne 70600, Isral
Seda, J. Faculty of Nuclear Science and Physical Engineering,

Technical University,
Brehova 7, CS-11519 Prague 1, Czechoslovakia
Seidel, E.R. Bayrisches Ministerium fr Landesentwicklung und

Umweltfragen,
Simister, D.N. Nuclear Installations Inspectorate,

St. Peters House, Balliol Road,
Bootle, Merseyside L20 3LZ, United Kingdom
Sivintsev, Yu.V. I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy,

Ul. Kurchatova 46, 123182 Moscow,
Sohrabi, M. National Radiation Protection Deptartment,

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,
P.O. Box 14155-4494, Tehran,
Islamic Republic of Iran
Stallaert, P. Service Scurit technique des installations nuclaires,

Ministre de lEmploi et du travail,
Rue Belliard 51-53,
B-1040 Brussels, Belgium
Strohal, P. Division of Nuclear Safety,

Subast, D. Republic Committee for Energy of Croatia,

Iblerov trg 9, YU-41000 Zagreb, Yugoslavia
Sztanyik, B.L. Frdric Joliot-Curie National Research Institute

for Radiobiology and Radiohygiene,
P.O. Box 101, H-1774 Budapest, Hungary
Thijssen, C.L.M. Radiation Protection Division,

Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and
Environment,
P.O. Box 450, NL-2260 MB Leidschendam,
Netherlands
Todorov, T.E. Inspection of Safe Use of Atomic Energy,

Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful
Purposes,
55a Chapaev St., 1574 Sofia, Bulgaria
Toussaint, L.F. Radiation Health Section,

18 Verdun Street, Nedlands WA 6009, Australia
Trousil, J. Institute for Research, Production

and Application of Radioisotopes,
Radiov 1, CS-10227 Prague 10, Czechoslovakia
Tschurlovits, M. Atominstitut der sterreichischen Universitten,

Schttelstrasse 115, A-1020 Vienna, Austria
Van der Werf, B. Radiation Protection Division,

Ministry of Social Affairs,
P.O. Box 69, NL-2270 MA Voorburg, Netherlands
Veglia, A.A. Centre scientifique,

16, boulevard de Suisse, MC-98000 Monaco, Monaco
Vella, L. Department of Health,

(WHO) 15 Merchants Street, Valetta, Malta
Vez Carmona, L. Gerencia Jurdica,

Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares,
11010 Mexico City, Mexico
Wang Chuanying Permanent Mission of the Peoples Republic of China

to the IAEA,
Steinfeldgasse 3, A -1190 Vienna, Austria
Williamson, R.C. Science/Engineering Education Division,

Oak Ridge Associated Universities,
P.O. Box 117,
Oak Ridge, TN 37831-0117, United States of America
Zhu Hongda Institute of Radiation Medicine,

Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences,
P.O. Box 71, Tianjin, China
AUTHOR INDEX
Abboudi, A.: 163 Grishmanovskij, V.l.: 421

Abdelali, K.: 163 Harrison, R.M.: 285
Abora Vn, N.A.: 237 Jova, L.A.: 131
Avetisov, G.M.: 185 Kmmerer, C.: 323
Bacon, M.L.: 439 Keirim-Markus, I.B.: 185
Beaver, P.F.: 27 Khan, F.A.: 203
Becker, K.: 463 Klamert, V.: 301
Belovodskij, L.F.: 421 Kobayashi, S.: 483
Bezares, M.: 21 Kopaev, V.V.: 185, 273
Biaggio, A.: 11 Krailaksanawarapar, C.: 233
Bilbao, A.V.: 131 Krishnamurthi, T.N.: 115
Bir, T.: 375 Kunz, E.: 171
Brenner, S.: 213 Leitz, W.: 351
Brown, W.R.: 145 Lieberman, J.: 77
Brunner, H.H.: 447 Lopez-Franco, P.: 21
Buldakov, L.A.: 185 Lyzlov, A.F.: 391
Burgos, L.: 51 Mahjoubi-Charni, H.: 163
Campos Venuti, G.: 333 Mallouppas, A.: 257
Campos, M.C.: 341 Maltoni Giacomelli, G.: 265
Cavallini, A.: 301 Mashchenko, N.P.: 273
Chaves, R.Q.: 341 McEwan, A.C.: 365
Christofides, S.: 257 Moschella, E.: 51
Cool, D.A.: 3 Moser, M.: 293
Courades, J.-M.: 471 Mtimet, S.: 163
Darko, E.O.: 237 Ndasi, I.: 375
de la Serna, B.: 21 Othman, I.: 383
De, A.K.: 115 Palacios, E.: 11
Devyatajkin, E.V.: 185 Panfilov, A.P.: 391, 421
Dobici, F.: 37 Paynter, R.A.: 101
Emi-Reynolds, G.: 237 Peixoto, J.E.: 341
Eriskat, H.: 471 Peterson, H.T., Jr.: 3
Ferruz, P.: 63 Piermattei, S.: 333
Gharbi, H.A.: 163 Pineda, R.E.: 177
Ghezaiel, M.J.: 163 Quevedo, J.R.: 131
Golder, F.: 375 Rab Molla, M.A.: 203
Golikov, V.Ya.: 273 Risica, S.: 333
Grapengiesser, S.: 351 Roberts, P.J.: 285
509
510 AUTHOR INDEX
Samain, J.-P.: 89 Stoilova, H.: 47

Schandorf, C.: 237 Susanna, A.: 333
Schlesinger, T.: 213 Sztanyik, B.L.: 217
Sgrilli, E.: 37 Todorov, T.E.: 47
Shamai, Y.: 213 Tschurlovits, M.: 403
Shamov, O.I.: 185 Usoltsev, V.l.: 273
Simister, D.N.: 311 Vicel, J.-C.: 163
Sivintsev, Yu.V.: 411 Williamson, R.C.: 281
Sohrabi, M.: 245 Wojcikiewicz, E.A.: 311
Somasundaram, S.: 115 Wrixon, A.D.: 101
Stallaert, P.: 89
TRANSLITERATION INDEX
. . Avetisov G..
. . Belovodskij L.F.
. . Buldakov L.A.
.. Golikov V.Ya.
.. Grishmanovskij V.l.
.. Devyatajkin E.V.
- . . Keirim-Markus I..
.. Kopaev V.V.
. . Lyzlov A.F.
. . Mashchenko N.P.
. . Panfilov A.P.
.. Sivintsev Yu.V.
.. Usoltsev V.I.
. . Shamov O.I.
INDEX OF PAPERS BY NUMBER
IAEA-SM -309/ Page IAEA-SM-309/ Page
1 ........................................... 21 37 .............................................. 285

7 .............................................. 293 38 .......................................... 471
8 .............................................. 77 39 .............................................. 383
9 .................................................. 3 40 .............................................. 237
10 .............................................. 323 41 .............................................. 47
11 .............................................. 333 42 .............................................. 145
15 .............................................. 301 44 .............................................. 463
16 .............................................. 37 47 .............................................. 27
17 .............................................. 265 48 .............................................. 233
18 .............................................. 213 49 .............................................. 115
21 .............................................. 351 50 .............................................. 341
22 .............................................. 281 51 .............................................. 257
23 .............................................. 163 53 .............................................. 245
24 .............................................. 51 55 .............................................. 447
25 .............................................. 11 56 .............................................. 365
26 .............................................. 203 60 .............................................. 63
28 .............................................. 177 61 .............................................. 403
29 .............................................. 101 64 .............................................. 217
31 .............................................. 311 73 .............................................. 131
32 .............................................. 171 74 .............................................. 411
33 .............................................. 185 75 .............................................. 421
34 .............................................. 273 76 .............................................. 391
35 ............................................. 375 81 .............................................. 89
36 ............................................. 439 82 ....... ...................................... 483
511
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Radiation

A FG H A N ISTA N HOLY SEE PERU

PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

A prerequisite for the safe use of ionizing radiation in a country is the

REGULATION AND LICENSING (Sessions I and )

Regulation o f radiation exposure by the United States Nuclear Regulatory

NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES (Sessions III and IV)

Infrastructure and regulatory control for radiation protection in the

Radiation protection in Italy: Education and training (IAEA-SM-309/17) ... 265

PERSONNEL DOSIMETRY SERVICES (Session VI)

The national dose registry as a new instrument in the control o f occupational

CONTROL PROGRAMMES (Session VII)

Establishing a comprehensive radiation control programme

SERVICES AND SPECIAL ISSUES (Session VIII)

National radiation protection services in developing countries and the role

INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES (Session IX)

National and international radiation protection standards to supplement

Panel: The Role o f the IAEA in Strengthening Radiation Protection

Chairman (Session II)

REGULATION OF RADIATION EXPOSURE

D .A . COOL, H.T. PETERSON, Jr.

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) was created by the Energy

2. REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDANCE FOR RADIATION PROTECTION

2.1. USNRC regulations

carried out is a statutory requirement o f the Administrative Procedures Act (5 USC

2.2. Regulatory Guides

2.3. Branch Technical Positions

A third category o f information provided to licensees is termed Branch

2.4. Technical reports (NUREG reports)

A fourth category of guidance provided to licensees is through the dissemina

3. REVISION OF 10 CFR PART 20

3.2. Content of the revised 10 CFR Part 20 rule

reasonably achievable) considerations (cost, effectiveness, level of risk). This

4. PROBLEMS IN ADOPTING THE ICRP RECOMMENDATIONS IN A

[1] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Recom

ORGANIZACION DEL SISTEMA

ORGANIZACION DEL SISTEMA REGULATORIO ARGENTINO.

En 1950, cuando se crea la Comisin Nacional de Energa Atmica (CNEA),

La CNEA fue adecuando su estructura a medida que fueron creciendo las

a) Investigacin y desarrollo de los aspectos cientfico-tcnicos asociados con la

Por Decreto 10936/50 se estableci como funcin especfica de la CNEA

evaluacin de diseos y de operacin, el anlisis de accidentes y la realizacin de

A medida que las actividades nucleares se fueron incrementando, la CNEA fue

En 1958, la envergadura y complejidad de las instalaciones en operacin en

en le pblico. En aquella poca se hizo recaer la responsabilidad de la seguridad

4.1. Responsable Primario

Para la operacin de toda instalacin se exige, cualquiera sea su envergadura,

4.2. Entidad Responsable

En funcin del riesgo asociado a cada instalacin, las mismas se clasifican en

la instalacin est respaldada por una organizacin capaz de garantizar el apoyo

5.1. Instalaciones no relevantes

Las instalaciones no relevantes solo requieren una autorizacin o permiso de

5.2. Instalaciones relevantes

Las instalaciones relevantes requieren en general dos tipos de autorizacin. La

para inspecciones en servicio y eventuales reparaciones, procedimientos de opera

Si bien se requiere que todo el perosnal est adecuadamente entrenado y

ser descalificante que el postulante sea incapaz de distinguir determinados colores

6. ORGANIZACION DE LA AUTORIDAD LICENCIANTE

FIG. 1. Organigrama de la Comisin Nacional de Energa Atmica.

Dentro de ese marco de referencia, la Autoridad Regulatoria est formada

[1] COMISION NACIONAL DE ENERGIA ATOMICA, Licnciamiento de Instalaciones

LEGISLACION ESPAOLA EN MATERIA DE PROTECCION RADIOLOGICA.