Banawa v.
Mirano TEOTICO VS DEL VAL 13 SCRA 406
No. L-24750
May 16, 1980
Facts:
Banawa and Mendoza took their niece Maria Mariano to Mahabang Ludlod, Taa, Batangas. The
spouses reared the child because they were childless. Through a general merchandise, they
were able to generate income to acquire parcel of lands.
Due to an illness, Mariano was survived by her sister Primitiva and the three children of his
brother Martin.
Two parcels of land are in dispute in this case: a parcel of land in Barrio Iba in Taal Batangas
(Iba property) and a parcel of sugar land in Carsuche (Carsuche property). The petitioners
assert that the Iba property were sold to Maria Mariano. Defendant, on the other hand, claimed
that the money used in buying said land pertained to the spouses.
The Carsuche property brought a conflict of evidence between petitioners and respondent.
Petitioners assert that the sale of the property was made in a public instrument in favor of
Maria Mariano. The defendants for their part assert that it was made in writing by Biscocho
who is the original owner of the property.
The CFI declared Maria Mariano the owner of the two parcels of land. Defendants appeal to the
CA but it affirmed the decision of the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied which led to this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Maria Mariano is entitled to both Iba and Carsuche property
Held:
If the money used by Mariano in purchasing the property was given by Banawa and Mendoza,
then the money had to belong to her. The contract entered into by the vendor with Mariano is
not a simulated contract because of the absence of fraud, concealment or deception. The
intention of the spouses to make Maria Mariano the owner of the parcel of land was clearly
shown by their conduct at the time of the execution of the deed of sale.
Art. 1448 of the NCC is not applicable in this case because the deed of sale was executed before
its effectivity. Acquisitive prescription may not likewise be invoked because petitioners were not
able to secure a title.
Sec. 5 of Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court provides that "in case of death of the child, his
parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to
property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents by adoption,
which shall become property of the latter or their legitime relatives who shall participate in the
order established by the Civil Code for intestate estates"
When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly
what it says.
Wherefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed as to the Iba property but reversed as to the
Carsuche property which was acquired by Banawa and Mendoza.
Deceased executed a will naming as heirs her niece and the latters husband and her
grandchildren.
Appellant opposed the probate, claiming to be an adopted child of the deceased sister and an
illegitimate child of the deceaseds bother.
Issue:
Is she entitled to claim as an illegitimate daughter of the brother of the testatrix or as an
adopted daughter of the testatrix sister?
Held:
No, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; ... ."
Likewise, the oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted
child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is
limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the
adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence,
no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a
consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Crisologo vs Singson
Facts:
Donya Leona left a will stating that upon Consolacions Crisologo's death death
whether this happens before or after that of Donya Leona's deathConsolacion's
share shall belong to the brothers of the Donya Leona.
Issue:
Whether or not such substitution is a fideicommissary substitution.
Held:
No, it is not fideicommissary substitution.
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the
substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the o f
ideicommissa kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that
appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property
bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the
testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's deathwhether
this happens before or after that of the testatrixher share shall belong to the
brothers of the testatrix.
Designation of heirs; Purpose of fideicommissary substitution.It is of the essence
of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon the
first heir to preserve and transmit to another the whole or part of the estate
bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event.
The last will of the deceased Da. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion
vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be
effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before
or after that of the testatrix.
In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, GR No. 148311
ADOPTION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on
June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mothers middle name
and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name be changed to
Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed
to Catindig his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to
article 189 of the Family Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie
Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying
that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing
an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her
mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Held:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a
Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.