Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
RULE 39: EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF October 1, 1996, the Omnibus Order dated November
JUDGMENT 22, 1996 and the writ of execution dated December 2,
1996 and the Order dated December 10, 1996 by the
AIDA P. BAEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ RTC
G.R. No. 133628. January 23, 2002 On February 10, 1998, CA denied Aidas MR.
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 132592, filed by
herein petitioner.
FACTS:
In the meantime, the trial court gave due course
These 2 petitions stem from the decision of RTC
to Gabriels Notice of Appeal and elevated on April 15,
Cebu Br. 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16765. The 1st
1997 the entire case records to the CA. Aida filed with
seeks the reversal of the CAs decision setting aside
the CA a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
the orders dated October 1 and November 22, 1996 of
that Gabriel had failed to file with the CA a Record on
the RTC. The 2nd prays for the reversal of the resolution
Appeal. CA denied the motion to dismiss as well as the
of the CAdenying the motion to dismiss.
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, the
On September 23, 1996, RTC Cebu Branch 20, petition in G.R. No. 133628. SC consolidated the
decided Civil Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among two petitions.
others the legal separation between Aida Baez and
Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual
infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property
relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; ISSUES:
the forfeiture of Gabriels 1/2 share in the net conjugal
I. The core issue in G.R. No. 132592 is whether
assets in favor of the common children; the payment to
execution of judgment pending appeal was justified.
petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as
NO
attorneys fees to be taken from petitioners share in
the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the HELD: Petitions are denied for lack of merit.
use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the G.R. No. 132592:
smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate
As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA
Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common children
381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal is allowed
within 15 days from receipt of the decision.
when superior circumstances demanding urgency
Petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to outweigh the damages that may result from the
modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an
Appeal. instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well
RTC granted Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion become a tool of oppression and inequity.
to modify the decision on October 1, 1996 by In this case, considering the reasons cited by
approving the Commitment of Fees dated December petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior
22, 1994; obliging petitioner to pay as attorneys fees or urgent circumstance that outweighs the
the equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondents damage which respondent would suffer if he
ideal share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the were ordered to vacate the house. We note that
administrator to pay petitioners counsel, Atty. Adelino petitioner did not refute respondents allegations that
B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorneys she did not intend to use said house, and that she has
fees chargeable against the aforecited 5%. two (2) other houses in the US where she is a
In another motion to modify the decision, permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely
petitioner Aida Baez sought moral and exemplary putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to
damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To
9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution pending do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather
appeal. Respondent Gabriel filed a consolidated than the exception.
written opposition to the two motions, and also prayed Similarly, we are not persuaded that the
for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order. P100,000 advance payment to petitioners counsel was
On November 22, 1996, RTC denied Aidas properly granted. We see no justification to pre-empt
motion for moral and exemplary damages and the judgment by the Court of Appeals concerning said
litigation expenses but gave due course to the amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial courts
execution pending appeal. judgment was already on appeal.
Facts: A complaint for ejectment filed by Fajardo and SEC. 14. Return of Writ of Execution. The writ of
Perez against Maria Datuin was finally decided against execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it
the latter. The decision being final and executory. Upon immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in
motion of complainant, the Court issued a Writ of part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full
Execution on March 7, 2000 which was brought by within thirty days (30) days after his receipt of the writ,
respondent Sheriff to the defendant Datuin on March 9, the officer shall report to the court and state the
2000. However the writ was not executed on first reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect
instance because Datuin asked for a 2-week period to during the period within which the judgment may be
move out. enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to
the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings
Thereafter, the writ was still not executed because taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or
Sheriff alleged that there was a restraining order its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports
prohibiting him to do so. On March 24, 2000 upon shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and
verification from the court, complainant found out that shall be filed with the court and copies thereof
there was no restraining order. So he told the promptly furnished the parties.
respondent to implement the Writ of Execution.
Respondent, accompanied by a policeman and the
We find respondents explanation to be utterly
barangay captain went to the place where the Writ of
wanting. He is guilty of dereliction of his duty as a
Execution is to be implemented at 10:00 that morning
sheriff, because he failed to (1) execute the Writ within
but when they reached the place, respondent did not
30 days from his receipt thereof, (2) submit his Report
do anything except to ask the defendant to bring out
of Service within the same period, (3) make periodic
her personal properties. His reason is that an employee
reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully
of the Probation Office, Mr. Leonardo Martinez, talked
satisfied, and (4) furnish the parties with copies of the
to him. At 5:30 p.m., the restraining order was brought
Reports.
to the place, and the respondent told him that the writ
of execution can no longer be implemented.
By his own words, respondent admitted his
dereliction of duty. First, as we have said earlier, he
Complainant asserted that respondent favored, or
should have immediately executed the Writ when he
showed partiality in favor of the defendant to his
served it upon the defendant on March 9, 2000.
prejudice.
On August 21, 2002, respondent filed with the In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court
COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal was rendered after almost one year of trial and revision
of his petition in SPR No. 20-2002. After five days, he of the questioned ballots and found petitioner as the
filed a supplemental petition in SPR No. 20-2002. candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent
appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. In the
Barely two days later, on August 28, 2002, and while
his motion for reconsideration and supplemental meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the
petition in SPR No. 20-2002 were pending, respondent Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as
filed another petition with the COMELEC, docketed as determined by the trial court in the election protest,
SPR No. 37-2002. The petition contained the same had to be respected and given meaning. The
prayer as that in the supplemental petition filed in SPR Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed the
20-2002. services of a mayor even while the election protest was
pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially
On September 3, 2002, the COMELEC issued an Order
directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante determined to have been chosen by the people.
and enjoining petitioner from assuming the functions of
Forum-shopping is an act of a party against whom an FACTS: On 4 March 1999 petitioner Rizal Commercial
adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one Banking Corporation (RCBC) filed a complaint for
forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable recovery of a sum of money with prayer for a writ of
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
preliminary attachment against respondents Magwin
special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that Anderson Uy.On 26 April 1999, the trial court issued a
one or the other court would make a favorable writ of attachment. On 4 June 1999 the writ was
disposition. For it to exist, there should be (a) identity returned partially satisfied since only a parcel of land
of parties, or at least such parties as would represent purportedly owned by defendant Benito Sy was
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights attached. In the meantime, summons was served on
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
each of the defendants, respondents herein, who filed
on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the their respective answers, except for defendant Gabriel
other action will, regardless of which party is Cheng who was dropped without prejudice as party-
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under defendant as his whereabouts could not be located. On
consideration. 21 September 1999 petitioner moved for an alias writ
of attachment which on 18 January 2000 the court a
In the case at bar, respondent obtained an adverse
quo denied.
decision when his petition in SPR No. 20-2002 was
dismissed by the COMELEC. He thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration and a supplemental Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for
petition, praying for the nullification of the trial courts pre-trial. For about six (6) months thereafter,
order for the execution of its decision pending appeal. discussions between petitioner and respondents
Two days after filing the supplemental petition, and Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy
while the same was very much pending before the
and Anderson Uy, as parties in Civil Case No. 99-518,
COMELEC, he filed a wholly separate petition for
certiorari, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002, wherein he were undertaken to restructure the indebtedness of
pleaded the same reliefs prayed for in the respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation.
supplemental petition. In doing so, respondent sought
to increase his chances of securing a favorable On 9 May 2000 petitioner approved a debt
decision in another petition.
payment scheme for the corporation which on was
Considering that respondent was indubitably guilty of communicated to the latter by means of a letter dated
forum-shopping when he filed SPR No. 37-2002, his for the conformity of its officers, i.e., respondent
petition should have been dismissed outright by the Nelson Tiu as President/General Manager of Magwin
COMELEC. Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a Marketing Corporation and respondent Benito Sy as
Director thereof. Only respondent Nelson Tiu affixed his
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
5|REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
signature on the letter to signify his agreement to the On 7 December 2000 petitioner elevated the
terms and conditions of the restructuring. Orders dated 8 September 2000, 6 November 2000
and 16 November 2000 of the trial court to the Court of
On 20 July 2000 the RTC of Makati City, on its Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
own initiative, issued an Order dismissing without Rules of Civil Procedure. In the main, petitioner argued
prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518 for failure of petitioner that the court a quo had no authority to compel the
as plaintiff therein to "prosecute its action for an parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to enter into an
unreasonable length of time . . .." amicable settlement nor to deny the holding of a pre-
trial conference on the ground that no compromise
Subsequently, the petitioner moved for agreement was turned over to the court a quo.
reconsideration of the Order by informing the trial
court of respondents' unremitting desire to settle the ISSUE:
case amicably through a loan restructuring program.
On 22 August 2000 petitioner notified the trial court of 1) Whether or not the petitioner is required to pay
the acquiescence thereto of respondent Nelson Tiu as again the requisite docket fees.
an officer of Magwin Marketing Corporation and
defendant in the civil case. 2) Whether or not the court a quo may dismiss a claim
for failure of the parties to submit to a compromise
On 27 July 2000 petitioner filed in Civil Case agreement.
No. 99-518 a Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for
Pre-Trial Conference alleging that "[t]o date, only HELD:
defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the
letter which informed the defendants that plaintiff 1) No. There is no substantial policy worth
[herein petitioner] already approved defendant Magwin pursuing by requiring petitioner to pay again the
Marketing Corporations request for restructuring of its docket fees when it has already discharged this
loan obligations to plaintiff but subject to the terms and obligation simultaneously with the filing of the
conditions specified in said letter." complaint for collection of a sum of money. The
procedure for dismissed cases when re-filed is the
This motion was followed on 5 October 2000 by same as though it was initially lodged, i.e., the filing of
petitioner's Supplemental Motion to Plaintiffs answer, reply, answer to counter-claim, including other
Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial foot-dragging maneuvers, except for the rigmarole of
Conference affirming that petitioner "could not submit raffling cases which is dispensed with since the re-filed
a compromise agreement because only defendant complaint is automatically assigned to the branch to
Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the May 10, which the original case pertained. A complaint that is
2000 letter . . .."Respondent Anderson Uy opposed the re-filed leads to the re-enactment of past proceedings
foregoing submissions of petitioner while respondents with the concomitant full attention of the same trial
Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito court exercising an immaculate slew of jurisdiction and
Sy neither contested nor supported them. control over the case that was previously dismissed,
which in the context of the instant case is a waste of
The trial court, in an undated Order (although a judicial time, capital and energy.
date was later inserted in the Order), denied
petitioner's motion to calendar Civil Case No. 99-518 What judicial benefit do we derive from starting
for pre-trial because of the failure of the plaintiff to the civil case all over again, especially where three (3)
submit a compromise agreement. of the four (4) defendants, i.e., Magwin Marketing
Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy, have not
On 15 November 2000 petitioner filed its contested petitioner's plea before this Court and the
Notice of Appeal from the said Orders. On 16 courts a quo to advance to pre-trial conference?
November 2000 the trial court issued two (2) Orders, Indeed, to continue hereafter with the resolution of
one of which inserted the date "6 November 2000" in petitioner's complaint without the usual procedure for
the undated Order rejecting petitioner's motion for pre- the re-filing thereof, we will save the court a quo
trial in the civil case, and the other denying due course invaluable time and other resources far outweighing
to the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the "Orders the docket fees that petitioner would be forfeiting
dated 8 September 2000 and 6 November 2000 are should we rule otherwise.
interlocutory orders and therefore, no appeal may be
taken . . .." It must be emphasized however that once the
dismissal attains the attribute of finality, the trial court
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
6|REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
cannot impose legal fees anew because a final and willingness to discuss a possible compromise is
executory dismissal although without prejudice divests expressed by one or both parties; or (b) If it appears
the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil case as well that one of the parties, before the commencement of
as any residual power to order anything relative to the the action or proceeding, offered to discuss a possible
dismissed case; it would have to wait until the compromise but the other party refused the offer,
complaint is docketed once again. On the other hand, if pursuant to Art. 2030 of the Civil Code. If despite
we are to concede that the trial court retains efforts exerted by the trial court and the parties the
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 99-518 for it to issue the negotiations still fail, only then should the action
assailed Orders, a continuation of the hearing thereon continue as if no suspension had taken place.
would not trigger a disbursement for docket fees on
the part of petitioner as this would obviously imply the Ostensibly, while the rules allow the trial court
setting aside of the order of dismissal and the to suspend its proceedings consistent with the policy to
reinstatement of the complaint. encourage the use of alternative mechanisms of
dispute resolution, in the instant case, the trial court
2) only gave the parties fifteen (15) days to conclude a
deal. This was, to say the least, a passive and paltry
Besides the semantic and consequential attempt of the court a quo in its task of persuading
improbabilities of respondent Uy's argument, our ruling litigants to agree upon a reasonable concession.
in Goldloop Properties, Inc., is decisive of the instant Hence, if only to inspire confidence in the pursuit of a
case. In Goldloop Properties, Inc., we reversed the middle ground between petitioner and respondents, we
action of the trial court in dismissing the complaint for must not interpret the trial court's Orders as dismissing
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute its case, which was the action on its own motion because the parties,
in turn based on its inability to forge a compromise specifically petitioner, were anxious to litigate their
with the other parties within fifteen (15) days from case as exhibited in their several manifestations and
notice of the order to do so and held - motions.
Since there is nothing in the In fine, petitioner cannot be said to have lost
Rules that imposes the interest in fighting the civil case to the end. A court
sanction of dismissal for failing may dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur
to submit a compromise but the real test of the judicious exercise of such power
agreement, then it is obvious is whether under the circumstances plaintiff is
that the dismissal of the chargeable with want of fitting assiduousness in not
complaint on the basis thereof acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude.
amounts no less to a gross Unless a party's conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible,
procedural infirmity assailable contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial
by certiorari. For such grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-
submission could at most be appearance in the case, the courts should consider
directory and could not result lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving
in throwing out the case for the desired end. In the absence of a pattern or scheme
failure to effect a compromise. to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton
While a compromise is failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the
encouraged, very strongly in rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar,
fact, failure to consummate courts should decide to dispense rather than wield
one does not warrant any their authority to dismiss.
procedural sanction, much less
an authority to jettison a civil Clearly, another creative remedy was available
complaint worth P4,000,000.00 to the court a quo to attain a speedy disposition of Civil
. . . Plainly, submission of a Case No. 99-518 without sacrificing the course of
compromise agreement is justice. Since the failure of petitioner to submit a
never mandatory, nor is it compromise agreement was the refusal of just one of
required by any rule. herein respondents, i.e., Benito Sy, to sign his name on
the conforme of the loan restructure documents, and
As also explained therein, the proper course of the common concern of the courts a quo was dispatch
action that should have been taken by the court a quo, in the proceedings, the holding of a pre-trial conference
upon manifestation of the parties of their willingness to was the best-suited solution to the problem as this
discuss a settlement, was to suspend the proceedings stage in a civil action is where issues are simplified and
and allow them reasonable time to come to terms (a) If the dispute quickly and genuinely reconciled. By
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
7|REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
means of pre-trial, the trial court is fully empowered to some occupants therein to vacate for the failure of
sway the litigants to agree upon some fair compromise. Iligan City to provide them for disturbance
compensation.
Dismissing the civil case and compelling
petitioner to re-file its complaint is a dangerous, costly Thereafter, Principal Management Group requested
and circuitous route that may end up aggravating, not payment from iligan City for the portions of the project
resolving, the disagreement. This case management which they already finished. Iligan City on the other
strategy is frighteningly deceptive because it does so hand responded on the negative, stating that the
at the expense of petitioner whose cause of action, agreed price of 14M will only be paid upon completion
perhaps, may have already been admitted by its of the project.
adverse parties as shown by three (3) of four (4)
PMGI filed a complaint for the rescission of the MOA
defendants not willing to contest petitioner's
and damages against City of Iligan. The latter then
allegations, and more critically, since this approach
filed its answer. Nevertheless, PGMI moved for partial
promotes the useless and thankless duplication of hard
summary judgment claiming that there was no genuine
work already undertaken by the trial court. As we have
issue as to the obligation of the City of Iligan and that
aptly observed, "[i]nconsiderate dismissals, even if
the City of Iligan had not specifically denied under oath
without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a
the genuiness of the Letter of Credit and the MOA.
solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they
lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of The Trial Court granted the motion of partial summary
individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate judgment. On the other hand, City of Iligan filed a
reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied.
lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better Considering that the MR by Iligan was denied, Iligan
served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and City filed a notice of appeal.
final disposition of the cases before the court.
A Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was then filed
by the PGMI, which was granted over the objection of
Iligan City.
In the present case, the good reason relied upon by Without acting on respondents request for
both the trial and the appellate courts was that the reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on
partial adjudication of the case was based on
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
9|REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
19 July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG,
preventive suspension for 90 days without pay pending appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
investigation for alleged grave misconduct. granted respondents motion for the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari for being moot and academic.
On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary
Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non-extendible
to their mother unit since more than 90 days had extension until 13 December 1996 within which to file
already lapsed. Respondents also sought the petitioners memorandum. However, the OSG failed to
intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a file the memorandum.
result, the Ombudsman inquired from Secretary Garcia
the action taken on respondents request for On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new
reconsideration of the detail order. counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution
and to Suspend Sheriffs Sale. In his motion, petitioner
On 22 November 1995, Secretary Garcia replied to the alleged that the trial courts decision never became
Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum dated final and executory as the trial court deprived him of
9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the
respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia OSG failed to file Petitioners memorandum in CA-G.R.
declared that the law does not sanction the continuous SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his appeal.
detail of respondents. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed to
inform him of the dismissal of his appeal and of the
Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner trial courts order granting respondents motion for
failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their execution. Petitioner further asserted that the
mother unit. On 24 January 1996, respondents filed a Resolution of the Ombudsman superseded the decision
Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a of the trial court.
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, which the The Ombudsmans Resolution
trial court granted on February. approved the following recommendation of the
reviewing Assistant Ombudsman:
Meanwhile, Judge Aurora Navarette-Recia of the trial
court was appointed Chairman of the Commission on PREMISES
Human Rights. Consequently, the case was re-raffled CONSIDERED,
and assigned to Branch 231 of the Regional Trial Court, respondent MODESTO
Pasay City.On 12 April 1996, the trial court issued an ABARCA, JR., is hereby
order modifying the 23 February 1996 order of Judge found GUILTY of
Recia. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary violation of Section 7(d)
mandatory injunction ordering petitioner to comply of Republic Act 6713,
with the 9 November 1995 order of Secretary Garcia for which the penalty of
directing petitioner to recall respondents to their Suspension Without
mother unit until further orders by the trial court. Pay for Six (6) Months
is hereby
For petitioners continued failure to comply with the recommended
writ of preliminary injunction, respondents moved to pursuant to Section
cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to 10(b), Rule III of
declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer Administrative Order
within the period prescribed in the trial courts order of No. 07, in relation to
26 January 1996. On 28 May 1996, the trial court Section 25(2) of
granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of Republic Act No. 6770.
indirect contempt. The trial court issued a bench
warrant against petitioner. It is also respectfully
recommended that the
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General charge against
(OSG), filed a special civil action for certiorari with the respondents
Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts order finding REYNALDO FERNANDO
petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. Also the trial and MARY LOU
court declared petitioner in default for his failure to file CLEOFAS be DISMISSED
an answer to the petition for mandamus and damages.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial
Fortune Tobacco interposed an appeal to the NLRC. (c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for
Petitioner did not appeal. NLRC affirmed with housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the losing
modification the assailed Arbiters Decision in the party such as he may select, of a value not exceeding
sense that the complaint against Fortune Tobacco was the amount fixed by law;
dismissed. This Decision became final and executory.
Thus, the award specified in the Decision of the Arbiter (d) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for
became the sole liability of petitioner. The records were three (3) months;
then remanded to the Arbiter for execution.
(e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges,
Upon respondents motion, the Arbiter issued a writ of physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers,
execution. Eventually, the sheriff served a writ of surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other
garnishment upon the Chief Accountant of Foremost professionals, not exceeding the amount fixed by law;
Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom petitioner has an
existing services agreement. Thus, petitioners (f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for his
receivables with Foremost were garnished. personal services within the month preceding the levy
as are necessary for the support of his family;
Petitioner filed with the NLRC a "Motion to Quash/Recall
Writ of Execution and Garnishment" which was (g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities
opposed by respondents. Arbiter denied the motion accruing or in any manner growing out of any life
and directed the sheriff to release the garnished sum of insurance;
money to respondents pro rata. The MR was likewise
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
14 | R E M E D I A L LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
(h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him in under Section 13 (i) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
his trade or employment of a value not exceeding Undeniably, a corporate entity such as petitioner
three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos; security agency is not covered by the exemption.
Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain The spouses Digos, secured a loan from the
and clear on what properties are exempt from International Exchange Bank to finance their project for
execution. Section 13 (i) of the Rules pertinently reads: the construction of townhouses. To secure the payment
of the loan, the spouses Digos executed a Real Estate
SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. Mortgage (REM) over the said property. The
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the construction was delayed resulting to the failure of Sps.
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from Digos to pay their loan which subsequently caused the
execution:x x x x x x x x x extrajudicial foreclosure of their REM. Consequently,
the property was sold at public auction, with the bank
(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the as the highest bidder at P4,500,000.00, which
judgment obligor for his personal services within the appeared to be the account of the spouses Digos at the
four months preceding the levy as are necessary for time. The Certificate of Sale executed by the sheriff
the support of his family. was, thereafter, registered at the Office of the Register
of Deeds.
The exemption under this procedural rule should be
read in conjunction with the Civil Code, the substantive When the period to redeem the property was
law which proscribes the execution of employees about to expire, sps. Digos ask for an extension from
wages, thus: the bank to redeem property, to which the bank after
previous refusal agreed to one month extension.
ART. 1708. The laborers wage shall not be subject to
However, instead of repurchasing said property, the
execution or attachment, except for debts incurred for
spouses filed a complaint for the nullification of the
food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance.
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of and sale at public auction and/or redemption of the
Court and Article 1708 of the New Civil Code is meant property against the bank. The latter filed a motion to
to favor only laboring men or women whose works are dismiss which was granted by the trial court.
manual. Persons belonging to this class usually look to
the reward of a days labor for immediate or present Thereafter the bank sold the questioned property
support, and such persons are more in need of the to petitioners. Subsequently, another complaint was
exemption than any other [Gaa vs. Court of Appeals, filed by Sps. Digos against the bank, Perez and Ragua,
140 SCRA 304 (1985)]. for the cancellation and annulment of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by
In this context, exemptions under this rule are confined them in favor of the bank, the sale at public auction as
only to natural persons and not to juridical well as the certificate of sale executed by the sheriff,
entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of and the Torrens title issued to them.
salaries, wages and earning from the personal
services rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule The Digos reiterated their allegations in their first
further requires that such earnings be intended for the complaint that they were not notified of the sale at
support of the judgment debtors family. public auction, and that the banks P4,500,000.00 bid
for the property was unconscionably low compared to
It stands to reason that only natural persons whose the prevailing market price of P25,000,000.00. They
salaries, wages and earnings are indispensable for his also admitted their failure to pay their amortization on
own and that of his familys support are exempted their loans. However, they alleged this time that the
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
15 | R E M E D I A L LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage separate and distinct primary rights are violated by
and the sale at public auction were illegal because the one and the same wrong; or if the single primary right
bank charged much more than the amount due on should be violated by two distinct and separate legal
their loan account, to wit: interest of 26% per annum wrongs; or when the two primary rights are each
on the loan account covering January 2, 1998, whereas broken by a separate and distinct wrongs; in either
under the promissory note executed in favor of the case, two causes of action would result. Causes of
bank, the new interest rate should commence only on action which are distinct and independent, although
March 4, 1993; penalty charges of 26% of the account, arising out of the same contract, transaction or state of
and 5% penalty charges on top of the 26% interest per fact may be sued separately, recovery on one being no
annum, as shown by the banks statement of account. bar to subsequent actions on the others.
The spouses Digos also averred that although they
pleaded for a restructuring of their loan account and a The mere fact that the same relief is sought in the
moratorium on the payment of their account, they subsequent action will not render the judgment in the
were unaware of the erroneous computation of the prior action as res judicata. Causes of action are not
balance of their loan account. They maintained that distinguishable for purposes of res judicata by
the banks consolidation of its title over the property on difference in the claims for relief.
September 19, 1999 was premature because they were
given until October 8, 1999 to redeem the property. Comparing the material averments of the two
complaints, it would appear that separate primary
Perez and Ragua filed a motion to dismiss on rights of the respondents were violated by the banks
similar grounds of res judicata, splitting of a single institution of a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
cause of action and forum shopping, which the trial the real estate mortgage and the sale at public
court denied. The MR was also denied. auction; hence, the respondents had separate and
independent causes of action against the bank, to wit:
Upon elevation to via certiorari (rule 65), the CA (a) the first complaint relates to the violation by the
rendered judgment dismissing the petition and bank of the right to a judicial, not extrajudicial,
affirming the assailed orders. The appellate court foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and for an
declared that there was no identity of causes of action extension of the period for the respondents to redeem
in the two cases because the first action was one for the property with damages; (b) the second complaint
injunction and redemption of the property, whereas the relates to the breach by the bank of its loan contract
second action was for the nullification of the with the respondents by causing the extrajudicial
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
and the sale at public auction due to the erroneous for P4,500,000.00 which was in excess of their unpaid
computation of the balance on the respondents account with the bank.
account with the bank; hence, the spouses Digos were
not estopped from filing their second action. The However, we are convinced that the institution by
petitioners filed a motion for a reconsideration of the the respondents of their second complaint anchored on
said decision, which the appellate court denied. their claim that the bank breached its loan contracts
with them by erroneously computing the actual and
Issue: Whether or not the judgment in the first case is correct balance of their account when the petition for
res judicata to the second case. extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
was filed by it designed to avert the dismissal of their
Held: Yes. Splitting a single cause of action consists complaint due to splitting causes of action and res
in dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into judicata, following the dismissal of their first complaint
several parts or claims and instituting two or more and the dismissal of their appeal through their
actions therein. A single cause of action or entire claim negligence. The Court is constrained to conclude that
or demand cannot be split up or divided so as to be this was a last-ditch attempt to resuscitate their lost
made the subject of two or more different actions. cause, a brazen violation of the principle of res
judicata.
A single act or omission may be violative of
various rights at the same time, such as when the act Section 49(b)(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
constitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal provides in part:
obligations. The violation of each of these rights is a
cause of action in itself. However, if only one right may SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. The effect of a judgment
be violated by several acts or omissions, there would or final order rendered by a court or judge of the
only be one cause of action. Otherwise stated, if two
ISSUE: Whether or not there are good reasons to (c) the good reasons must be stated in the
justify execution pending appeal. special order.
RTC dismissed the petition. SolGen agreed the RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, vs.
petition.Fujiki' s MR was denied. Thus, a direct recourse FEDERICO A. SERRA
to SC from RTC under Rule 45 on a pure question of G.R. No. 203241.July 10, 2013. SECOND
law. DIVISION. CARPIO.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a On 22 October 2001, the RTC Masbate ruled in favor of
marriage void does not require relitigation under a RCBC, declaring the donation in favor of Ablao and the
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition subsequent sale to Liok null and void. In a Decision
dated 28 September 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Section 48(b),
Masbate decision. Thus, Liok filed a Petition for Review
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign on Certiorari, while Serra and Ablao filed a Petition for
judgment or final order against a person creates a Certiorari before the SC. In separate Resolutions dated
presumptive evidence of a right as between the 30 June 2008 and 22 October 2008, which became final
parties and their successors in interest by a and executory on 27 August 20087 and 3 March 2009,
subsequent title. Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
AGUIRRE, ALMIRANTE, BAARES, CABREROS, FLORES, JABINES, MORES, ORTEGA, SALGADO,
QUINTO, VILLAMIN, VERGARA-HUERTA
22 | R E M E D I A L LAW REVIEW 1: CIVIL PROCEDURE
respectively, the SC found neither reversible error nor has pursued persistently its action against Serra in
grave abuse of discretion on the CAs part. accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has
continued to evade his obligation by raising issues of
On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of
technicality. While strict compliance with the rules of
the decision in the Specific Performance case. This was
opposed by Serra arguing that the motion for execution procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted
was already barred by prescription and laches, and in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not
that RCBC was at fault for failing to register as lien in serve the ends of justice.
the original title the Contract of Lease with Option to
Buy. The RTC Makati denied RCBCs motion for HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO
execution. RCBCs motion for reconsideration was
YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON
likewise denied. Thus, RCBC filed this petition.
YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA
ISSUE: vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A.
"GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF
WON RCBCs motion for execution was already barred DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY
by prescription and laches.
No. The Rules of Court provide that a final and FACTS: On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with
executory judgment may be executed by motion within some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation
five years from the date of its entry or by an action of Title and Reconveyance with Damages against
after the lapse of five years and before prescription
respondent Gaudioso alleging that Magdaleno Ypon
sets in. This rule, however, admits of exceptions as
when execution may be made by motion even after the died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving
lapse of five years. These exceptions have one behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J. Claiming to be
common denominator: the delay is caused or the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an
occasioned by actions of the judgment obligor Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage. cancellation of the certificates of title, leading to their
In Camacho v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice of
where the delays were occasioned by the petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives
judgment debtors own initiatives and for her and successors-in-interest.
advantage as well as beyond the judgment
creditors control, the five-year period allowed
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful
for enforcement of the judgment by motion is
son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of
deemed to have been effectively interrupted or
Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School;
suspended.
and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.Further, by
way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a)
In the present case, there is no dispute that RCBC petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the
seeks to enforce the decision which became final and complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the
executory on 15 April 1994. This decision orders Serra case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest,
to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor as there is no showing that the petitioners have been
of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.
Serra transferred the property to his mother Ablao, who
then transferred it to Liok. Serras action prompted
RTC found that the subject complaint failed to state a
RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in
cause of action against Gaudioso. The plaintiffs therein
the execution of the decision was caused by Serra for
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
his own advantage. Thus, the pendency of the
due to the counsels failure to state the date on which
Annulment case effectively suspended the five-year
his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of
period to enforce through a motion the decision in the
Compliance was issued. Petitioners, who were among
Specific Performance case. Since the decision in the
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246, sought direct
Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and
recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
RCBCs motion for execution was filed on 25 August
2011, RCBCs motion is deemed filed within the five-
year period for enforcement of a decision through a ISSUE: Whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case
motion. on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state
a cause of action was proper.
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in
were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are determining whether the same fails to state a cause of
the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to
prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed the proper appreciation of the questions before
by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence,
transfer certificates of title issued in the latters favor since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an
be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or
admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was
reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out
the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship
be made in the corresponding special which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for determined in the proper special proceeding. As such,
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be
the same. devoid of any legal effect.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who CITY OF CEBU vs. APOLONIO M. DEDAMO, JR. G.R.
are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in No. 172852
the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession January 30, 2013
of property. This must take precedence over the action
for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court
has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make
a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT; EMINENT
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
DOMAIN; LEGAL INTEREST
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one
by which a party sues another for the enforcement or FACTS:The present controversy is an off-shoot of Civil
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a Case No. CEB-14632 for eminent domain over two (2)
wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which parcels of land owned by spouses Apolonio and Blasa
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a Dedamo (Spouses Dedamo), filed by the petitioner
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special Branch 13, on September 17, 1993. The petitioner
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are immediately took possession of the lots after
seeking the establishment of a status or right. depositing P51,156.00 with the Philippine National
Bank pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160.