ART.12.

STATE THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA HAS DEFINED THE WORD STATE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF PART III AND PART IV. THE STATE INCLUDES THE GOVERNMENT AND
PARLIAMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT AND THE LEGISLATURE OF EACH OF THE
STATES AND ALL LOCAL OR OTHER AUTHORITIES WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF INDIA OR UNDER
THE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
SEC 3(31) OF GENERAL CLAUSE ACT SAYS OTHER AUTHORITIES ARE
MUNICIPALITY,MINES,SETTLEMENT BOARD, ELECTRICITY BOARD ETC. ART 13(2) SAYS,ACTIONS
CAN ONLY BE TAKEN AGAINST STATE IF IT INFRINGES ANY FR
UNIVERSITY O MADRAS V. SANTA BAI- HC EVOLVED THE PRINCIPLE OF EJUSDEM
GENERIS ie OF THE LIKE NATURE. IT MEANS THAT THOSE AUTHORITIES ARE COVERED UNDER
THE EXPRESSION OTHER AUTHORITIES WHICH PERFORM GOVT OR SOVERIGN FUNCTION.
UJJAIN BAI V. UOI- SC REJECTED THE PRINCIPLE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS. IT IS OBSERVED
THAT THERE IS NO COMMON GENUS BETWEEN THE AUTHORITIES MENTIONED IN ART 12.
RAJASTHAN STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD V. MOHAN LAL- THE EXPRESSIONOTHER
AUTHORITIES IS WIDE ENOUGH TO INCLUDE ALL THE AUTHORITIES CREDATED BY
CONSTITUTION AND THE INTENTION OF AN AUTHORITIES IS FOR ECONOMIC PUBLIC INTEREST.
SC HELD THAT ELECTRICITY BOARD IS AN AUTHORITY UNDER ART.12.
SUKHDEV V/S BHAGATRAM , LIC , ONGC ANDIFC WERE HELD TO BE STATE AS PERFORMING
VERY CLOSE TO GOVERNMENTAL OR SOVEREIGN FUNCTIONS. THE CORPORATIONS ARE STATE
WHEN THEY ENJOY
( I ) POWER TO MAKE REGULATIONS; ( II ) REGULATIONS HAVE FORCE OF LAW.
AJAY HASIA V. KHALID MUJIB- IN DETERMINING WHETHER A CORPORATION OR A GOVT CO
OR A PRIVATE BODY IS AN INSTRUMENTALITY OR AGENCY OF THE STATE, THE FOLLOWING
TESTS WAS HELD BY THE SC (I) WHETHER THE ENTIRE SHARE CAPITAL IS HELD BY THE
GOVERNMENT.
II) WHETHER THE CORPORATION ENJOYS MONOPOLY STATUS CONFERRED BY THE STATE.
III) WHETHER THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CORPORATION ARE GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS OR
FUNCTIONS LOSELY RELATED THERETO WHICH ARE BASICALLY THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF A
WELFARE STATE,
IV) IF A DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE CORPORATION.
V) THE VOLUME OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE RECEIVED FROM THE STATE.
VI) THE QUANTUM OF STATE CONTROL.
VII) WHETHER ANY STATUTORY DUTIES ARE IMPOSED UPON THE CORPORATION.
VIII) THE CHARACTER OF THE CORPORATION MAY CHANGE WITH RESPECT TO ITS DIFFERENT
FUNCTIONS.
WHETHER JUDICIARY IS STATE? JURIST LIKE H.M.SEERVAI, N.V SHUKLA CONSIDER
JUDICIARY TO BE STATE. THEIR VIEW IS SUPPORTED BY ART 145 & ART 146 OF COI.
NARESH V. MAHARASHTRA- IT IS OBSERVED THAT WHEN RULE MAKING POWER OF
JUDICIARY IS CONCERNED,IT IS STATE BUT WHEN EXERCISING JUDICIAL POWER IS
CONCERNED,IT IS NOT A STATE.
A R ANTULAY V. R.S NAYAK- WHILE SETTLING THE DISPUTES,THE COURT MAY COMMIT
MISTKAE WHICH CANT BE CHALLENGED. ANY COURT CANT BE CHALLENGED UNDER ART 32
OR 226 BUT IT CAN ONLY GO FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW.JUDICIARY ONLY FORM THE PART IF STATE
ONLY WHEN IT PERFORMING ADMINISTRATION OR STATUS MAKING POWER. IT IS NON-
JUDICIAL FUNCTION OF JUDICIARY.
KHODAY DISTELLERIES LTD. V. REGISTRAR GEN. SC OF INDIA -PETITION UNDER ART 32
AGAINST THE FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT UNDER 136 & REVIEW UNDER 137 IS NOT
MAINTAINABLE. IT WAS UPHELD IN ASHOK KHURA CASE AS WELL.
SABHAJIT TIWARI V. UOI- CSIR IS A SOCIETY REGISTERED UNDER SOCIETY ACT. HELD THAT
IT IS A STATE BECAUSE IT PERFORMED GOVT FUNCTIONS. IT WAS ALSO OBSERVED IN
PRADEEP KUMAR V. UOI.

ART.14-RIGHT TO EQUALITY-SHALL NOT DENY TO ANY PERSON EQUALITY BEFORE LAW OR

EQUAL PROTECTION LAW.

EQUALITY BEFORE LAW-AS PROVIDED UNDER ART 14,NO PERSON IS ABOVE THE LAW OD
LAND & HE EVERY PERSON WHATEVER HIS/HER RANK OR CONDITIONS IS SUBJECTED TO THE
JURSDCTION OF ORDINARY COURT. EVERY OFFICIAL FROM PM TO A CLERK WILL BE TREATED
SAME.
EXCEPTION: FOREIGN DIPLOMATS ARE IMMUNE FROM JURISDICTION OF COURTS. (ii) ART
361,AFFORDS IMMUNITY TO PRESIDENT & STATE GOVERNOR FOR ANY COURT
PROCEEDINGS.THEY SHALL NOT BE ANSWERABLE TO ANY OF THEIR ACT DONE WITHIN THEIR
OFFICIAL PREMISIS.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW- IT ONLY MEANS THAT ALL PERSON HAVE RIGHT TO EQUAL
TREATMENT IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES BETWEEN ONE PERSON & ANOTHER. THUS THE
RULE IS THAT THE LIKE SHOULD BE TREATED ALIKE & NOT THAT UNLIKE SHOULD BE TREATED
ALIKE. STATE CAN TREAT DIFFERENT PERSONS IN DIFFERENTLY IF CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY
SUCH TREATMENT. THEREFORE,THERE IS A NECESSITY OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION
FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE SOCIETY.

RESONABLE CLASSIFICATION- INTELLIGIBLE DIFFERENTIA & NEXUS RELATION

THERE MUST BE A RELATION BETWEEN OBJECT AND DIFFERENTIA. WHEN THERE IS NO
REASONABLE CLASSIFICATIO, LEGISLATION MAY BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
CHARANLALJIT CH. V. UOI- THE PETITIONER HAS APPROACHED SC AGAINST THE
ENFORCEMENT OF SHOLAPUR SPINING WEEVING CO.THE DIRECTORS WERE ALLEGED OF MIS-
MANAGEMENT WHICH CREATED A HUGE LOSS. THE ACT WAS PASSED FOR SHILAPIR CO ONLY
AND NOT FOR OTHERS,THUS PETITIONER CLAIMED THAT IT IS A VIOLATION OF ART 14. COURT
HELD THAT EVEN FOR 1 CITIZEN,LIKE CO, A REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION CAN BE MADE BY
THE LEGISLATION ON REASONABLE GROUNDS.
TWIN TEST- RAM KRISHNA DALMIA V. JUSTICE S.R.TENDULKAR- CEMENT
COMPANY.CLOSED DOWN DUE TO MISMANAGEMENT.GOVT ACQUIRED.CASE FILE AGAINST
GOVT OF VIOLATION OF ART 14.SC INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF ART 14,HELD THAT:(i) EQUAL
PROTECTION MEANS EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER EQUAL CIRCUMSTANCES. (ii) THE STATE CAN
MAKE REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF LEGISLATION. (iii) THERE SHOULD
BE A PRESUMPTION OF REASONABLENESS (iv) BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON WHO CHALLENGES
THE LEGISLATION(v)LAW CAN BE MADE FOR A SINGLE CO. BUT THERE SHOULD BE A
REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION.
VISHAKHA V. RAJASTHAN SC HAD LAID DOWN THE GUIDELINE TO PREVENT THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN IN THE WORKING PLACES.

*NEW CONCEPT OF EQUALITY: PROTECTION AGAINST ARBITRARINESS.

E.P.ROYAPPA V. TN- EQUALITY IS A DYNAIC CONCEPT. IT CANT BE CRIBBED,CABINED&
CONFINED WITHIN THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINAL LIMITS. STATE CANT ADOPT ANY ARBITRARY
TECHNIQUE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE PEOPLE & SUCH TECHNIQUES WOULD BE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL & ULTRA-VIRES.
D.S NAKARA V. UOI- SC STRUCK DOWN RULE 34 OF CENTRAL SERVICE PENSION RULE AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THE GROUND IF DATE. Ie THE PENSION GIVEN ON THE BASIS OF
DATE. HENCE THIS CLASSIFICATION IS OF ARBITRARY NATURE; BECOME VOID.
MITHU V. PUNJAB- S-303 OF IPC WAS STRUCK DOWN AS VIOLATIVE OF ART.14 AS THERE IS
NO INTELLIGIBLE DIFFERENTIA. THERE IS NIT VALID CLASSFICATION BETWEEN WHO COMMIT
MURDER & WHAT PUNISHMENT WOULD BE GIVEN.
AIR INDIA V. NARGESH MIZZA- SC STRUCK DOWN AI & INDIAN AIRLINES REGULATION ON
RETIREMENT & PREGNANCY BAR OF THE AIR HOSTRESS AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THE AGE OF
RETIREMENT WAS 35 YR & THERE SERVICE WIL BE TRMINATED IF THEY GET MARRIED OR
PREGNANT WITHIN 4 YEARS OF SERVICE. IT SEEMS UNREASONABLE. HENCE VOID.

*ARBITRARY ACTION: STATE LIABLE TO PAY COMPENSATION TO A CITIZEN.

LDA V. M.K.GUPTA- SC HELD THAT IF LOSS OR INJURY IS CAUSED TO A CITIZEN BY ANY
ARBITRARY ACTION,THE STATE IS LIABLE TO PAY COMPENSATION TO HIM.

*RULE OF NATURAL JUSTICE IMPLICIT IN ART 14.

CIWTC V. BRAJONATH- SC HELD THAT SERVICE RULE EMPOWERING GOVT CORP TO
TERMINATE THE PREMANENT EMPLOYEE WITHOUT GIVING 3 MONTHS NOICEL.IT IS VIOLATION
OF ART 14 BEING ARBITRARY,UNCONSTITUTIONAL & AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST.
BENSBURY RULE- TATA CELLULAR V. OUI- IT IS A CASE OF NATURAL JUSTICE. IT TALKS
ABOUT ALL THE FORMALITIES OF STATE. IT STATED THAT ACTS OF THE STATE OR ITS AGENCY
MUST BE JUST,FAIR& REASONABLE. IT IS ALSO CALLED BENSBURY RULE.
ARTICLE 21-NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF HIS LIFE OR PERSONAL LIBERTY EXCEPT
ACCORDING TO PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW.

ACCORDING TO THIS ARTICLE RIGHT TO LIFE MEANS THE RIGHT TO LEAD MEANINGFUL,
COMPLETE AND DIGNIFIED LIFE. IT DOES NOT HAVE RESTRICTED MEANING. THE OBJECT OF
THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 21 IS TO PREVENT ANY RESTRICTION BY THE
STATE TO A PERSON UPON HIS PERSONAL LIBERTY AND DEPRIVATION OF LIFE EXCEPT
ACCORDING TO PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW.

THE MEANING OF THE WORDS PERSONAL LIBERTY CAME UP FOR CONSIDERATION OF

THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A.K. GOPALAN V. UNION OF INDIA. THE
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 21 WAS A BIT NARROW AT THAT TIME. IN THIS CASE THE SUPREME COURT
HELD THAT THE WORD DEPRIVATION WAS CONSTRUED IN A NARROW SENSE AND IT WAS
HELD THAT THE DEPRIVATION DOES NOT RESTRICT UPON THE RIGHT TO MOVE FREELY WHICH
CAME UNDER ARTICLE 19 (1) (D).

FINALLY, IN MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION OF INDIA, THE SUPREME COURT HAS OVERRULED
GOPALANS CASE AND WIDENS THE SCOPE OF THE WORDS PERSONAL LIBERTY, WHICH IS
AS FOLLOWS:THE EXPRESSION PERSONAL LIBERTY IN ARTICLE 21 IS OF WIDEST IN NATURE
AND IT COVERS A BUNDLE OF RIGHTS WHICH GO TO CONSTITUTE THE PERSONAL LIBERTY OF
MAN AND SOME OF THEM HAVE RAISED TO THE STATUS OF DISTINCT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
AND GIVEN ADDITIONAL PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE 19

PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW-SC TOOK THE VIEW THAT ART 21 MEANS PROCEDURE
PRESCRIBED BY LAW AS ENACTED BY THE STATE AND REJECTED TO EQUATE IT WITH THE
AMERICAN DUE PROCESS OF LAW. (A.K.GOPALAN CASE), BUT, IN MANEKA GANDHI V
UNION OF INDIA THE SUPREME COURT OBSERVED THAT THE PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY
LAW FOR DEPRIVING A PERSON OF HIS LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY MUST BE RIGHT, JUST
AND FAIR AND NOT ARBITRARY, FANCIFUL AND OPPRESSIVE, OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE NO
PROCEDURE AT ALL AND THE REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE 21 WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED.
JUSTICE V. R. KRISHNA IYER, SPEAKING IN SUNIL BATRA V DELHI ADMINISTARATION HAS SAID
THAT THOUGH OUR CONSTITUTION HAS NO DUE PROCESS CLAUSE BUT AFTER MANEKA
GANDHIS CASETHE CONSEQUENCE IS THE SAME, AND AS MUCH AS SUCH ARTICLE 21 MAY
BE TREATED AS COUNTERPART OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTION.
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF RIGHT TO DIE - THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER
RIGHT TO LIFE UNDER ARTICLE 21 INCLUDES RIGHT TO DIE OR NOT. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA V. MARUTI SRIPATI DUBAL-BOMBAY HC HELD THAT THE RIGHT TO LIFE
GUARANTEED UNDER ART 21 INCLUDES RIGHT TO DIE & HC STRUCK DOWN SECTION 309 IPC
WHICH PROVIDES PUNISHMENT FOR ATTEMPT TO COMMIT SUICIDE BY A PERSON AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

P RATHINAM V. UOI-SUPPORTED THE VIEW OF MARUTI CASE HELD THAT UNDER ARTICLE 21
RIGHT TO LIFE ALSO INCLUDE RIGHT TO DIE AND LAID DOWN THAT SECTION 309 OF INDIAN
PENAL COURT WHICH DEALS WITH ATTEMPT TO COMMIT SUICIDE IS A PENAL OFFENCE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

GIAN KAUR V. STATE OF PUNJAB-SC OVERRULED THE P. RATINAMS CASE AND HELD THAT
RIGHT TO LIFE UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT INCLUDE RIGHT TO
DIE OR RIGHT TO BE KILLED AND THERE IS NO GROUND TO HOLD THAT THE SECTION 309,
IPC IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID.

PREM SHANKAR SHUKLA V DELHI ADMINISTRATION WHILE DEALING WITH THE

HANDCUFFING OF PRISONERS AND OTHER HUMILIATIONS INFLICTED ON PERSONS IN
CUSTODY,,SC OBSERVED NO ONE SHALL BE SUBJECTED TO TORTURE OR TO CRUEL, INHUMAN
OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

HUSSAINARA KHATOON- SC NOT ONLY ADVANCED THE PRISON REFORM IN FAVOUR OF

UNDER-TRIALS BUT ALSO DECLARED THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AS AN ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENT OF ARTICLE 21. COURT DIRECTED THE RELEASE OF ALL THOSE UNDER TRIALS
AGAINST WHOM THE POLICE HAD NOT FILED CHARGE SHEETS WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED
PERIOD OF LIMITATION. SUCH PERSONS WERE DIRECTED TO BE RELEASED

DELHI POLLUTION CASE-SC HELD THAT ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEEING

THE RIGHT TO LIFE MUST BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN A HEALTHY
ENVIRONMENT WITH MINIMUM DISTURBANCE OF ECOLOGICAL BALANCE,

CHARAN LAL SAHU V. UNION OF INDIA-THE COURT HELD THAT THE GOVERNMENTS
OBLIGATION TO PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FORCES IT TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT.

FRANCIS CORALIE MULLIN V ADMINISTRATOR, UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI-THE

RIGHT TO LIFE INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO LIVE WITH HUMAN DIGNITY AND ALL THAT GOES
ALONG WITH IT, NAMELY, THE BARE NECESSARIES OF LIFE SUCH AS ADEQUATE NUTRITION,
CLOTHING AND SHELTER OVER THE HEAD AND FACILITIES FOR READING, WRITING AND
EXPRESSING ONESELF IN DIVERSE FORMS, FREELY MOVING ABOUT AND MIXING AND
COMMINGLING WITH FELLOW HUMAN BEINGS.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
SECULARISM UNDER INDIAN CONSTITUTION
ART. 25-28-LAYS DOWN THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION. THE WORD
RELIGION IS NOT DEFINED IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION. THE WORD SECULARWAS
INSERTED IN THE PREAMBLE OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION BY THE 42ND AMENDMENT ACT-
1976. THE PURPOSE OF THIS AMENDMENT WAS INTENDED MERELY TO SPELL OUT CLEARLY
THE CONCEPT OF SECULARISM IN THE CONSTITUTION.

UNDER ART.25 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION ALL PERSONS ARE EQUALLY ENTITLED
TO FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND THE RIGHT FREELY TO PROFESS, PRACTICE AND
PROPAGATE RELIGION. HOWEVER STATE CAN IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON THIS FREEDOM ON
THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS- (I) PUBLIC ORDER, MORALITY AND HEALTH; (II) OTHER
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION; (III) REGULATION OF NON-RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY
ASSOCIATED WITH RELIGIOUS PRACTICE; (IV) SOCIAL WELFARE AND REFORM; (V) THROWING
OPEN OF HINDU RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS OF PUBLIC CHARACTER TO ALL CLASSES OF
HINDUS.

ARTICLE 26- FREEDOM TO MANAGE RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS -

THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT DEFINE RELIGION ANYWHERE, BUT THE SUPREME COURT
GAVE A COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION OF RELIGION IN HRE V. L.T.SWAMIAR ; RELIGION IS
CERTAINLY A MATTER OF FAITH WITH INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES AND IT IS NOT
NECESSARILY THEISTIC.
SECULARISM MEANS (A) REDUCTION OF RELIGIOUS COMPLEXITIES PARTICULARLY WHEN
SUCH COMPLEXITIES ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE OTHER RELIGION.(B) CONTROLLING THE NON-
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH A PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS PRACTICE.(C) PROMOTING
THE SECULAR VALUES IN THE SOCIETY.
S.R BOMMAI V. UNION OF INDIA- SC HELD THAT SECULARISM IS THE BASIC FEATURE OF
THE CONSTITUTION AND ANY STATE GOVERNMENT WHICH ACTS AGAINST THAT IDEAL CAN BE
DISMISSED BY THE PRESIDENT. IT WAS HELD THAT IN MATTERS OF STATE RELIGION HAS NO
PLACE.
PMA METROPOLITAN V. MARAM MARTHOMA- COURT SAYS THAT RELIGIOUS RIGHTS ARE
THE RIGHTS IF PERSON BELIEVING IN A PARTICULAR,FAITH,TO PRACTISE IT,PREACH IT & TO
PERFORM IT. RELIGION IS CONCEPT WHICH BINDS THE SPIRITUAL NATURAL AND
SUPERNATURAL BEINGS.I INCLUDES WORSHIP,DEVOTION ETC.
SHRIMAD PERA RULALA V. TN- RIGHT TO RELIGION DOESNT MEAN YOU WILL CARRY OUT
ANYTHING
STAINISLAUS REV. V. STATE OF M.P- IT WAS OBSERVED THE FREEDOM OF ONE CANNOT
ENCROACH UPON A SIMILAR FREEDOM BELONGING TO OTHER PERSONS. FREEDOM OF
RELIGION DOES NOT MEAN FORCIBLE OR FRAUDULENT CONVERSION AND ANY SUCH
CONVERSION WOULD BE VIOLATIVE OF THIS ARTICLE
CHRUCH OF GOD V. KKRMC WELFARE ASSOCIATION- SC HELD THAT THE EXERCISE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM UNDER ART 25,26. NO PERSON IS ALLOWED TO CREATE NOISE
POLLUTION OR DISTURB HE PEACE OF OTHERS.
MOHD. HANIF QUARESHI V. STATE OF BIHAR- THE PETITIONER CLAIMED THAT THE
SACRIFICE OF COWS ON THE OCCASION OF BAKRID WAS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF HIS
RELIGION AND THEREFORE THE STATE LAW FORBIDDING THE SLAUGHTER OF COWS WAS
VIOLATIVE OF HIS RIGHT TO PRACTISE RELIGION. THE COURT REJECTED THIS ARGUMENT AND
HELD THAT THE SACRIFICE OF COW ON THE BAKRID DAY WAS NOT AN ESSENTIAL PART OF
MOHAMMEDAN RELIGION AND HENCE COULD BE PROHIBITED BY STATE UNDER CLAUSE (2)
(A) OF ARTICLE 25.FOLLOWING THIS DECISION IN STATE OF W.B V. ASHUTOSH LAHIRI-HC
HELD THAT THE SLAUGHTER OF COWS BY MEMBERS OF MUSLIM COMMUNITY ON BAKRID DAY
WAS NOT AN ESSENTIAL TENETS OF MUSLIM RELIGION.
ERJ SWAMY V. TN- THE HEREDITARY PRINCIPAL OF APPOINTING ARCHAK IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
ART25(2)(B)AND 26(B) SHOULD BE READ TOGETHER.
SERVAR HUSSAIN V. ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE- COURT HELD THAT THE MUSLIM
DENOMINATION HAS A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH MOSQUE & EVERYY MUSLIM CAN OFFER NAMAZ.
ISMAILE FARUQUI V. UOI- SC HELD THAT WHILE OFFERING OF PRAYER OR RELIGIOUS
WORSHIP IS A RELIGIOUS PRACTICE,ITS OFFERING AT EVERY LOCATION WHERE SUCH PRAYER
COULD NOT BE OFFERED WILL NOT BE ESSENTIAL & INTEGRAL PART OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
UNLESS THE PLACE HAS A PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE FOR THAT RELIGION SO AS TO FORM AN
INTEGRAL PART OF RELIGIOUS PRATCISE. SC BY MAJORITY HELD THAT THE STATE CAN,
INEXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN POWER ACQUIRE THE PLACES OF WORSHIP.
GULAM KADAR AHMADBHAI MENON V. SURAT MUNICIPAL CORP.- IN THIS CASE THE
RELIGIOUS PLACE WAS ACQUIRED FOR WIDENING ROAD IN PUBLIC INTEREST. COURT HELD
THAT MUNICIPLE CORP HAD ACQUIRED LAND IN PUBLIC INTEREST, THESE KINDS OF
ACTIVITY,IF IT IS JUSTIFIED. COURT HELD THAT IT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ART 25 & 26.

ARTICLE 28 GUARANTEES- I) CERTAIN DEGREE OF RELIGION-STATE SEPARATION IN THE

FIELD OF EDUCATION, II) RIGHT TO ENDOWMENT OR TRUST EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO
IMPART RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, AND III) RIGHT TO OPTION TO EVERY PERSON WITH REGARD
TO RECEIVING RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION OR PARTICIPATING IN RELIGIOUS WORSHIP IN ANY
STATE RECOGNISED OR AIDED EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION.
DAV. COLLEGE V. PUNJAB-IMPARTING RELIGIOUS EDUCATION DOES NOT MEAN THAT ARE
PROVIDING TENENTS OF A PARTICULAR RELIGION. IN ORDER TO MAKE AWARE OF PHILOSPHY
IT IS NOT ABRIDGING FR. THE TEACHING OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSPHER IS ALLOWED.

ARUNA ROY V. UOI- ACC TO NCFSE, SC RULED THAT ART 28 DOES NOT BAN STUDY OF
RELIGION, WTHE WHOLE IMPHASIS IM IMPORTING RELIGION INSTRUCTION. THERE IS NOT
PROHIBITION IN STUDY OF RELIGIOUS PHILOSPHY & CULTURE.

ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES.

1. Freedom of speech and expression.
2. Assemble peacefully and without arms.
3. Form associations or unions.
4. Reside and settle in any part of the territory of India.
5. Move freely throughout the territory of India.
6. Practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
THERE ARE 8 RESTRICTIONS: 1. SECURITY OF THE STATE 2. FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH
FOREIGN STATES 3. PUBLIC ORDER 4.DECENCY OR MORALITY 5. CONTEMPT OF COURT 6.
DEFAMATION
7. INCITEMENT TO OFFENCE 8. SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF INDIA.
ROMESH THAPAR V. STATE OF MADRAS, (1950): FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE
PRESS LAID AT THE FOUNDATION OF ALL DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS, FOR WITHOUT FREE
POLITICAL DISCUSSION NO PUBLIC EDUCATION, SO ESSENTIAL FOR THE PROPER
FUNCTIONING OF THE PROCESS OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT, IS POSSIBLE."
MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION OF INDIA, (1978): FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
HAS NO GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATION AND IT CARRIES WITH IT THE RIGHT OF A CITIZEN TO
GATHER INFORMATION AND TO EXCHANGE THOUGHT WITH OTHERS NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT
ABROAD ALSO.
PRABHA DUTT V. UNION OF INDIA ((1982) : SUPREME COURT DIRECTED THE
SUPERINTENDENT OF TIHAR JAIL TO ALLOW REPRESENTATIVES OF A FEW NEWSPAPERS TO
INTERVIEW RANGA AND BILLA, THE DEATH SENTENCE CONVICTS, AS THEY WANTED TO BE
INTERVIEWED.
INDIAN EXPRESS V. UNION OF INDIA (1985): PRESS PLAYS A VERY SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN
THE DEMOCRATIC MACHINERY. THE COURTS HAVE DUTY TO UPHOLD THE FREEDOM OF PRESS
AND INVALIDATE ALL LAWS AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS THAT ABRIDGE THAT FREEDOM.
SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING V. CRICKET
ASSOCIATION OF BENGAL("CRICKET ASSOCIATION") (1995): EVERY CITIZEN HAS A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO IMPART AS WELL AS RECEIVE INFORMATION THROUGH THE
ELECTRONIC MEDIA. IT RULED THAT FREQUENCIES OR AIRWAVES ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY, AND
THAT THE GOVERNMENT ENJOYS NO MONOPOLY OVER BROADCASTING. COURT ORDERED THE
GOVERNMENT TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO SET UP AN INDEPENDENT AND AUTONOMOUS
PUBLIC AUTHORITY TO REGULATE FREQUENCIES. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
(ARTICLE 19 .1 & 19.2) PLAYED ANIMPORTANT ROLE IN THIS DECISION.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DPSP AND FR

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES IS BEST
ILLUSTRATED IN THE ARTICLE 37. IT PROVIDES THAT DIRECTIVES ARE NOT ENFORCEABLE IN A
COURT OF LAW. BUT, THEY ARE FUNDAMENTAL IN THE GOVERNANCE OF THE COUNTRY AND
IT SHALL BE THE DUTY OF THE STATE TO APPLY THEM IN MAKING LAWS.

IN VIEW OF SUCH PROVISION, THERE HAVE ARISEN CERTAIN CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE
DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. BUT, AS OF NOW ARTICLE 39(B) AND
39(C) CAN TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT ENSHRINED UNDER ARTICLE 14
AND ARTICLE 19.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND
DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES ARE AS FOLLOWS.

I. DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD FROM 1950 TO 1966 THERE WAS EMPHASIS ON SACROSANCT
CHARACTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. THE SUPREME COURT HELD THE VIEW THAT IF TWO
INTERPRETATIONS OF A LAW ARE POSSIBLE, THE ONE AVOIDING CONFLICT SHOULD BE
ACCEPTED.

BUT IN CASE OF A SINGLE INTERPRETATION, LEADING TO CONFLICT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

WOULD PREVAIL OTHER DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES. IN THIS VIEW, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
1ST AMENDMENT ACT WAS HAILED AS VALID.

II. IN THE HISTORIC GOLAN MATHS CASE, 1967, THE SUPREME COURT EMPHASIZED ON
UNAMEDABILITY OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN A
TRANSCENDENTAL POSITION.

III. THE GOVERNMENT PASSED 24TH AND 25TH AMENDMENT ACT 1971. THE 24TH CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT ACT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE PARLIAMENT HAS POWER TO AMEND ANY
PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION, INCLUDING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

THE 25TH CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT ACT INTRODUCED ARTICLE 31(C) WHICH PROVIDES
THAT IN CASE OF IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 39(B) AND (C) IF THERE IS AXORRFLICT WITH
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, THE , LAW SHALL NOT BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID.

IV. IN KESHAVANANDA BHARATI CASE OVERRULED THE GOLAKNATHS CASE BUT MADE IT
CLEAR THAT COURTS RETAINED THE POWER TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IN CASE OF LAW GIVING
EFFECT TO DIRECTIVES UNDER ARTICLE 39(B) AND (C). ONE OF THE CRUCIAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THIS JUDGMENT WAS BASIC STRUCTURE WHICH CANNOT BE ALTERED.

V. DURING THE PERIOD OF EMERGENCY PARLIAMENT PASSED THE 42 ND AMENDMENT ACT,

1976 WHICH PROVIDED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVES OTHER THAN ONLY UNDER
ARTICLE 39(B) AND (C).

VI. IN MINERVA MILLS CASE, 1980 THE SUPREME COURT DECLARED THAT A BALANCE
BETWEEN PART III AND PART IV WAS A BASIC FEATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION. THIS
ABROGATED THE VIEW OF GIVING PRECEDENCE TO THE DIRECTIVES OVER FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS.