IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

CHRISTOPHER KING, J.D. )

A/K/A KINGCAST/MORTGAGE MOVIES

and ) CASE No. 2:17-CV-0031

WALLY BROWN
and
CHRIS NUBBE ) JUDGE MARTINEZ
Plaintiffs,
v. )

HON. STAN J. RUMBAUGH

IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES
Defendant. )

DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF KING

1. I have written for the Indianapolis Star, a large daily newspaper;

2. I have written for, shot pictures for and also edited a statewide
newspaper, the Ohio Call & Post;

3. I have been running online video since 2005 (prior to YouTube) and
have been a YouTube Partner for six (6) years running with 3,689
channel subscribers and 1.6M views;

4. Because of my news and video acumen, I have been selected as a

member of http://iamonlocation.com, a new cutting edge platform
delivering real time video acquisition to newsrooms across the
Country;

5. I have shot video in perhaps 200 court settings since 1998 when I shot
my own successful First Amendment Civil Rights trials;

6. I have never been refused camera access to a Washington Superior

Court in dozens of attempts, following the exact same procedures I
followed with Defendant Rumbaugh;

7. Prospective Notice is a typical method for me that I have used on

several occasions in Washington State and in other states to notify a
Court of my incipient and prospective attendance at trials and
hearings;

8. These Notices allow me to put a Court on Actual Notice of my initial

and/or continued presence;

1
9. I have used, and continue to use such notices to video everything from
Civil lawsuits against Apple Computer over their objection, to mortgage
foreclosure cases to entire murder trials;

10.Not once prior to Judge Rumbaughs denials have I been denied in

Washington Superior Court in dozens of coverage assignments;

11.I am directly aware that Counsel for Defendants lost on this very issue
in State of Washington v. Ungerhueler 2012 WL 4009748 (2012)
affirming the Constitutional Right of Hot Rocks Productions to run video
in open Court;

12.Counsel for Defendants failed to elucidate or to reveal this case;

13.There is no hard and fast Rule regarding prior notice in GR 16. The filed
Notices are a professional courtesy that every other Washington Court
other than Defendant Rumbaugh has appreciated and respected even
if they did not particularly desire my presence;

14.In the Duzan matter I desired to run video of the proceedings because I
have years of experience as a residential closing attorney and have a
vested interest in exposing foreclosure fraud. I had and continue to
have questions about the integrity of the proceedings in that case and
desired to cover these hearings in a manner consonant with GR 16 and
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution;

15.Prior to the scheduled Court hearing in the Duzan case, I sent two or
more comprehensive emails notifying the Court that I had substantial
experience as a journalist and specifically in shooting courtroom video
and that I was appearing in a First Amendment/News coverage context,
see para 16, infra.

16.Prior to filing a Prospective Notice of Media Coverage in the Duzan case

I also provided direct links to the Court for its review that
demonstrated how I prevailed in obtaining access in Washington
Superior Courts over the objection of bank attorneys and for example
Judge Monica Benton:

http://mortgagemovies.blogspot.com/2015/05/kingcast-mortgage-
movies-malcolm-x-and.html

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVNVyijeQKU

17.Defendant Rumbaugh, by and through Counsel, lied to this Honorable

Court and stated that I did not implicate First Amendment concerns in
my emails to Defendant Rumbaugh and his staff in the Duzan case;

18.In the Monica Benton movie linked above I note that most Judges
actually welcome me to Court and many have actually THANKED ME
for my professionalism.

2
19.In point of fact, most Jurists welcome me to the Court as someone
knowledgeable about Mortgages and as a respectful, even-tempered
journalist. Most police grant me access to prime parking as well once I
notify them I am on assignment, such as yesterdays May Day Parade
here in Seattle:

3
4
20.The purpose of my second Notice of Media Coverage (in the Bozgoz
case) concerned an entirely different matter that was unrelated to the
first Notice: I appeared because I knew a layperson with a Durable
Power of Attorney has every right to represent in Open Court when the
grantor does not have the capacity to represent themselves because I
have done so on behalf of my mother when she developed early onset
dementia. The State of Connecticut got away with lying about the
timeliness of our Title XIX application, then granted the application
after I initiated suit on her behalf but the Federal Court in that case still
refused us the Right to Intervene, which was ridiculous in and of itself
but the point remains that I was entitled to represent given the Power
of Attorney. See Shafer and Harder v. Bremby, 12-CV-0039.

21.Further, in the Bozgoz case I continue to be concerned that the Court is

violating the Americans with Disabilities Act.

22.In the Bozgoz case I filed a formal Notice of Media Coverage prior to a
scheduled hearing. I appeared in Defendants Courtroom with extra
copies of said Notice pursuant to my customary best professional
practices, and the two of us made eye contact yet he refused to call on
me until I was compelled to interrupt the proceedings to notify the
Court that it had been completely and intentionally ignoring me in
direct Bad Faith and willful and spirited contravention of GR 16.

23.I am sick and tired of this abuse and it will not be suffered gladly, nor
will I ever accept the lies set forth by Counsel for Defendant; I filed a
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions because all of this conduct is inimical to
the First Amendment.

5
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

_______________________________________
CHRISTOPHER KING, J.D.

_____________________________________
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires:____________________

6
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

We, the undersigned, solemnly swear that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Declaration was sent via email and tracked U.S. Mail on 3 May
2017 to the following:

Daniel R. Hamilton, Esq.

955 Tacoma Avenue South
Suite 301
Tacoma WA 98402
dhamilt@co.pierce.wa.us

Stephen D. Trinen, Esq.

955 Tacoma Avenue South
Suite 301
Tacoma WA 98402
strinen@co.pierce.wa.us

___________________________________________
Christopher King, J.D.

___________________________________________
Wally Brown

___________________________________________
Chris Nubbe

7
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

CHRISTOPHER KING, J.D. )

A/K/A KINGCAST/MORTGAGE MOVIES

and ) CASE No. 2:17-CV-0031

WALLY BROWN
and
CHRIS NUBBE ) JUDGE MARTINEZ
Plaintiffs,
v. )

HON. STAN J. RUMBAUGH

IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES
Defendant. )

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR RULE 59(a)(1)(b) or (e) RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

OVERVIEW THE COURTS MATERIAL MISGIVINGS

The Problem with the Courts Decision of 6 April 2017 is that it is

based on three or more essential fallacies discussed in Plaintiffs
Request for Judicial Notice (Docket ___) and his Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions filed contemporaneously with this Motion after 27 days of
Safe Harbor Notice to Defendant and Counsel.
To wit:
Accepting all facts alleged in the Complaint as true. The Court
agrees with Defedant that his actions were in the performance
of a quintessential judicial function and that he therefore is
immune from suit in this case. On this ground alone Plaintiffs
claims are rightly dismissed. (Order at 12).

False. The Record reveals that the Court at no time engaged in

ANY analysis of Administrative vs. Judicial capacities. There mere fact
that a Judge sits on the bench whilst functioning does not ipso facto
mean that he or she is engaged in Judicial activity, as noted in Section
IV, infra. A Judge can order lawyers to be haled into court and
threatened, and he or she may order a young lady sterilized but those
are different actions involving people who are substantively involved
with the Court as actual or potential litigants. Before that very Court.
Plaintiffs on the other hand, are NOT potential litigants and thuse their

8
 conduct is not one of a Judicial nature before the Court. They are more
akin to law clerks or court employees seeking administrative relief.
To wit:
Plaintiff King did not state he was a member of the news media.
(Order at 2).
The subsequent requests by Plaintiff King to film in the Courtroom did
not give Defendant any reason to believe that he was a member of the
news media as opposed to a colleague of Plaintiff Brown. 1

False. Paras 8 - 10 of the Complaint clearly read:

8Plaintiff King and Plaintiff Brown are Western Washington area
journalists who routinely run Courtroom and other video
pertaining to the fallout from Americas 2008 financial/mortgage
crisis.
9. The two of them have worked together on several projects since
King moved to Seattle in 2013.
10.Neither of them has been subject to reprimand or sanctions
regarding their in-Court or out-of-Court news coverage.
11.
The mention of both Plaintiffs clearly contemplates journalism and news
coverage so in point of fact the Court is NOT reading the facts in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, yet there is more, as noted in Plaintiffs Request
for Judicial Notice and Notice of Fraudulent Defense (Docket 23). Let us
review the pertinent passage:
********
3. Judicial Notice and Lie #2.

In addition to the Judicial Notice of the scheduled hearing that Defendant and
his lawyers are trying to hide by omission there is also the fact that they try
to claim that Plaintiff did not notify them of his media purpose in an email.
The email is contained at Appendix A.

From Defendants Reply to Plaintiff Kings First Amended Complaint:

King's emails prior to the hearing made no claim he wanted to make a

recording as "news media" but only that he had "run Courtoom video
throughout the County" as a business and was "request[ing] access as
well" because "you have denied by colleague Wally Brown camera
access ." Dkt. 1-2 at 2-4, 11-18.

1 Even if this were true about the Duzan request, it is clearly not true of the Bozgoz
request as Plaintiff Brown was not involved in that matter in any way shape or form.
This Court was clearly giving short shrift to Plaintiffs valid arguments.

9
Not so fast. There is a thing called the Rule of Completeness folks: That email
also contained two direct links to other First Amendment activity, including
the following colloquy before Judge Monica Benton.
http://mortgagemovies.blogspot.com/2015/05/kingcast-mortgage-movies-malcolm-x-
and.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVNVyijeQKU

I'm going to get to the specifics and substance of the case soon, and it
involves a purportedly lost Note with a date uncertain for when an
indorsement was issued on it, but for now you need to know that my
First Amendment Rights as a Citizen, as a Journalist, and as a Citizen
Journalist were somewhat imperiled today when I was called back into
Honorable Monica Benton's Judicial Chambers where the following
colloquy ensued:

"What are your credentials?"

"Well Your Honor I was a reporter for a large daily newspaper, and
editor of a statewide daily before law school.... and I've been shooting
these movies in courtrooms throughout the Country for 4 or 5 years
now, and I've been covering this case already...." (I neglected to tell

10
 her I was an escrow attorney who worked for WAMU but that is noted in
my Notice of Media Coverage, as is the fact that Joseph McIntosh and
his buddies unlawfully threatened to have me arrested as seen in this
video, Judges Will Watch as Foreclosure Mill Attorneys Threaten Depo
Videographer with Security and Arrest).

"Well I haven't seen you with a camera in this case."

"Well Your Honor Judge Schubert has (one and two) and we and are on
great terms. He respects what I do and he said as much, I have that on
video I recorded on prior occasion."

"I have some concerns about whether you are media."

"Well Your Honor even if my prior experience and background weren't

enough as a journalist, I am still authorized as a public citizen to video
these proceedings."

"Where is your website?"

"It's right there Your Honor," as I handed her my card. "

You might audio but I'm not certain that entitles you to run video
(Googling Pooley+Mortgage Movies after I had told her to Google
Mortgage Movies) I'm at your website now and I see you have the
hear/see/speak no evil monkeys and skeletons...."

"Well I believe it does, and if this Court cannot take any step that
would infringe on my right to portray what I see as I see it, because
that would be inimical to the First Amendment."

"We'll see about that. Have a seat in the Courtroom."

2
Upon which First Amendment access as a reporter was GRANTED.

But of course Counsel for Defendant fraudulently withholds that

crucial information as provided to them, and misleads the Court in
violation of Rule 3.3 Candor to the Tribunal because Plaintiff Kings

2 Not only that, of course the Notice of Media Coverage itself reads: KingCast
Mortgage Movies employs Mr. Kings legal background and experience as a licensed
title insurance producer and escrow attorney to analyse legal matters relative to
foreclosure; all footage shall be made available for media pooling orders or requests
in this regard. Plaintiffs are not exactly sure how much more clear it can be..
unless of course you are dishonest and trying to run from the cameras, and whether
or not such argument is ad hominem or not if the shoe fits then Defendant wears it.
Such is not our fault or shame, but is rather the shame of Defendant and his lawyers,
who have now poisoned this Court with their lies and deceit, caught red-handed.
Appendix B.

11
email clearly referenced news coverage consistent with the
mandates of GR 16.

*********
Yet there is still more: Plaintiff King also wrote on 23 August 2016:
From: Christopher King <kingcast955@icloud.com>
Date: 7/23/2016 3:58 PM (GMT-08:00)
To: mreagan@co.pierce.wa.us, duzabalm@yahoo.com, fortune2000@fairpoint
.net, cpeterson@robinsontait.com
Cc: Christopher King <mortgagemovies007@gmail.com>, Steve Morberg
<stevemorberg@yahoo.com>, Michelle Darnell
<michelledarnell7@gmail.com>, Scott Stafne
<scott@stafnelawfirm.com>, jean7.fts@gmail.com
Subject: Re: Notice of Media Coverage and Unlawful denial of camera access.

I am appalled at what I heard about Judge Rumbaugh's blatant disrespect of

Stautory and Constitutional Law.

Be prepared for litigation in the next calendar month, that much is certain.

The only things uncertain will be the number of Plaintiffs and whether it will
be filed in the next week or two.

Sent from my iPhone

********
Yet there is still more from Plaintiff Brown on this front. He wrote:
From: Wally Brown [mailto:fortune2000@fairpoint.net]
Sent: Tuesday, July 19, 2016 11:28 AM
To: Merri Reagan <mreagan@co.pierce.wa.us>
Subject: video in the court

Hi Merri,

I am Wally Brown and I have been contracted by Brenda Duzan to be added

to her defense team in the court proceeding for Friday July 22nd. I am giving
the normal 3 day notice to the judge that is presiding over her case: FNMA v
Brenda J. Duzan Case No. 14-2-12022-8

Unless I hear back from you to the contrary, I will be driving up there to
Tacoma to record this hearing. I am a professional court room reporter and
will stand by the normal procedures for courtroom recording, staying out of
the way of all that is going on.

Wally Brown
16717 Vail Loop, SE
Rainier, Wa 98576

12
(360) 446-1015

...... The issue here is that Mr. Brown is entitled to a First Amendment
analysis even if he is not a traditional news reporter and that is precisely the
sort of analysis actually engaged in by other more scrupled members of the
Pierce County Judiciary. See State of Washington v. Ungerhueler 2012 WL
4009748 (2012) affirming the Constitutional Right of Hot Rocks Productions to
run video in open Court and also State of Washington v. Maldonado, 2007 WL
5310340 (2007). But again, of course Counsel for Defendants lost on that
issue even after filing a Motion for Reconsideration but they tried to hide all of
that from this Honorable Court and from Plaintiffs, but Plaintiffs are very
resourceful and worse yet, honest and diligent. See Appendix A.
After speaking with learned Counsel yesterday, Plaintiff King is aware
that with respect to Appendix A, the media crew that was awarded the ability
to shoot video was someone making a documentary film, not a news concern.
The point is clear: Defendant Rumbaugh is a rogue judge who hates the First
Amendment and truly independent Free Press. This is the sort of conduct that
is frowned on in the Washington State Courts and should not gain any quarter
before this Court or in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals or before the U.S.
Supreme Court for that matter.
***********
It simply does not pass the Giggle Test to say that Defendant was not
on Actual Notice of News Coverage and First Amendment sorts of
Constitutional claims. The Court did not view the facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiffs and that dovetails right into the next fallacy:

To wit:
It is also not clear to the Court how a Judges violation of GR 16
creates a cause of action for Plaintiffs who were not parties in the
matter before the judge, Plaintiffs cite to no case law establishing such
an action, and this Court would be disinclined to create such a cause of
action on these facts given the purposes of GR 16.

First of all, which facts? The facts of what really happened or the lies put forth
by Defendants? Second, this whole discussion is a sophistry: It was clear in
the first place that King put Defendant on Actual Notice of his presence as

13
News Media, and as to Brown even if he had not, he need not be a member of
the press and Counsel for Defendants know this because the videographer
was making a documentary film in State of Washington v. Ungerhueler 2012
WL 4009748 (2012) affirming the Constitutional Right of Hot Rocks
Productions to run video in open Court.. over the objection and Motion to
Reconsider of Counsel for Defendant, who neglected to mention this adverse
case law to the Court in potential violation of Rule 3.3 Candor to the Tribunal
but of course thats nothing new to them, sadly. The Cause of Action is the
First Amendment, and related State Law Constitution, that much is simple.
There can be no doubt that Defendant Rumbaugh has thwarted the
specific
dictates and intent of GR 16, as contemplated by two cases out of Pierce
County that will be
discussed in Section IV, infra. These are cases that Counsel for Defense
should have noted as
adverse authority pursuant to Rule 3.3. The only question remains whether
said violation is
subject to Qualified Immunity with our without monetary damages because
as a matter of
Law and Fact, a Judge is not operating in a Judicial Capacity when he or she is
considering
an administrative action such as regulation of Reporters. This function does
not address any
substantive or procedural laws or protections of anyone who is litigating in
the Court or
their attorneys.
As noted in Section IV, there are clear cut arguments in Plaintiffs favor,
despite the
heavy-handed dismissal afforded by this Court. This is particularly true in
light of the material lies set forth by Counsel for Defendant as noted in
Plaintiffs Notice of Fraudulent Defense and Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
(Dockets 23 and 27).

GR 16 that reads, in Pertinent Part:

14
(b) The judge shall exercise reasonable discretion in
prescribing conditions and limitations with which media
personnel shall comply.

I If the judge finds that sufficient reasons exist to

warrant limitations on courtroom photography or recording,
the judge shall make particularized findings on the records
at the time of announcing the limitations. This may be done
either orally or in a written order.

In determining what, if any, limitations should be imposed, the judge shall be

guided by the following principles:

3. Open access is presumed; limitations on access must be

supported by reasons found by the judge to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh that presumption; (emphasis added)

3. Factual Background.

It is a fact that Plaintiff King is an independent journalist with years of

experience on his own and prior experience editing and reporting for weekly
and daily press, including the Ohio Call & Post and Indianapolis Star, prior to
graduating from a top 50 law school and winning several First Amendment
jury trials. See Declaration of Plaintiff King, filed contemporaneously.
It is also a fact that Plaintiff King was a residential closing attorney for
several years in the 2000s and is now a mortgage consultant, helping
homeowners and also reporting on industry wide corruption in which he was
unwitting fomenting a decade ago. Id.
It is also a fact that Defendant Stanley J. Rumbaugh refused to follow
the dictates of
Washington GR 16 after Plaintiff King issued an ongoing Notice of Media
Coverage in Duzan,
a case involving an apparently unlawful foreclosure in Plaintiff Kings
journalistic opinion,
an opinion he is entitled to have and to exercise subject to the constraints of
GR 16.
It is also a fact that Defendant Stanley J. Rumbaugh refused to follow
the dictates of

15
Washington GR 16 when Plaintiff Wally Brown issued his Notice of Media
Coverage as seen
in Plaintiffs Complaint paras 17-18 (and First Amended Complaint) in Duzan,
with the now
infamous footage of Defendant Rumbaugh stating whats with the camera
followed by Im
media followed by put the camera down now and get out of the
courtroom.
It is also a fact that Defendant Stanley J. Rumbaugh refused to follow
the
dictates of Washington GR 16 when he refused to allow Plaintiff King the
Right to run video
in his Courtroom in the Bozgoz case even though King had filed a Notice of
Media Coverage
prior to the hearing in that matter and had copies of said Notice available for
discussion in
Open Court as directly contemplated by the Rule. Again, see Declaration of
Plaintiff King.

II. The Fraudulent Concealment Issues Color this Entire Case and Dictate
that the Court Must Grant the Sought Relief in this Rule 59 Motion.

On 3 April 2017 Plaintiff filed a Request for Judicial Notice and Notice of
Fraudulent
Defense (Docket 23). It has been steadfastly ignored by this Honorable Court
without explanation.
Then on or about 5 April 2017 Plaintiff issued a Safe Harbor Rule 11
Motion as well as noted in the YouTube video,
A Video Visit to Corrupt Pierce County Attorney Mark Lindquist Office Re:
Judge Rumbaugh
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YsoUjBpu9mQ

The Rule 11 Motion was filed yesterday, on 2 May 2017. The heart of
these Memoranda concerns the fact that Defendant and his Counsel willfully
misrepresented the fact that Plaintiff King had indeed issued a Notice of
Media Coverage in the Duzan case that was prospective in nature, as per his

16
norm. Moreover, his emails to the Court prior to the formal Notice put the
Court on Actual Notice of First Amendment journalism issues. Perhaps the
Court inadvertently overlooked or misunderstood the matters addressed in
Plaintiffs Notice of Fraud Upon the Court, but once again these matters are
dispositive once we understand that Judges do not enjoy Absolute Immunity
for administrative acts, as addressed in subsection IV, infra.
Once we understand and acknowledge that Defendant Rumbaughs
function in this
case had nothing to do with adjudicating substantive rights of litigants or
anyone actually
practicing before the Court, then we can begin to understand why it was so
necessary for
Defendants to lie in order to sustain their baseless arguments.

III. The Case Was Improvidently Removed in a fit of Invidious Forum

Shopping and Should Have Been Succinctly Remanded.

Plaintiff has already noted that this case is procedurally and

substantively indistinguishable from that of King v. Wright, Findlay & Zak,
2016-CV-00397:
In that case before this very Court, KingCast video production, by
and through Plaintiff Christopher King, initiated a Stateside lawsuit largely
sounding in Stateside claims including inter alia, Defamation and Outrage,
with a Stateside Constitutional Claim of and a parallel Federal First
Amendment Claim.
The lawsuit was initiated because the Defendants despised his
cameras and falsely claimed that Plaintiff King had issued a DEATH THREAT
after they reneged on an agreement between Plaintiff and Ha Dao to permit
Plaintiff to run video at the Deposition of Lucero v. Cenlar 2013-CV-602
(2013), in which the Court handed down a whopping $214,000.00 Judgment
against a dirty Mortgage Servicing Company.
The case was Removed to Federal Court and a Motion to Dismiss was
filed. After said Motion to Dismiss was filed Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his
sole Federal Claim and the Court properly Remanded the case.

17
 In this case, it is precisely the same: A single Federal Claim was
filed that parallels a State claim. Plaintiff specifically stated that he was
seeking less than $75,000 in total damages and offered to Dismiss the
Federal Claim in the event that the Defendant did not wish to clarify the law
on the Federal Claim.
Defendant was scared of litigating the Federal Claim so Plaintiff withdrew it
after Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and waited for the Remand that
never came.3
Again, from King v. Wright, Finlay:

3. Fairness

When analyzing fairness in the context of a motion to remand, courts

have looked to whether a surer-footed reading of state law would be
available in state court, Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; Schneider, 938 F.2d at
996; whether the plaintiff has engaged in any manipulative tactics in
seeking remand, Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 357; see also Albingia
Versicherungs A.G., 344 F.3d at 939; and where the plaintiff originally
filed the action, Fletcher v. Solomon, No. C-06-5492 RMW, 2006 WL
3290399, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2006) (remanding action to state
court after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their only federal claims,
finding that the plaintiffs clearly desire a state forum, as they could
have filed this action as an original matter in federal court but chose
not to do so). [T]he Ninth Circuit has found nothing wrong with
plaintiffs promptly dropping federal claims and seeking to have a
matter remanded. Fletcher, 2006 WL 3290399, at *4 (citing Baddie v.
Berkeley Farms, 64 F.3d 487, 490-91 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Like judicial economy and convenience, fairness arguably supports

remand and at least does not weigh against it. The court has no doubt
that Washington courts will provide a sure-footed reading of the state-
law issues in this case, and no party has suggested
otherwise. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Furthermore, the court does not
find that Mr. Kings tactics have been manipulative. 4

3 Plaintiff would have withdrawn it earlier but he missed the request from Defendant
in the mail as he was devastated by the mauling death of the family dog as
previously noted by way of Plaintiff Kings Declaration filed on 10 February 2017.
Compounding matters in that case is the fact that the government of Mountlake
Terrace has even refused to punish the owner of what turned to be an unlicensed
kennel even though they had previous issued Cease and Desist letters and even
though she had too many dogs in her home per code on the day, date and time that
Livi the Wonderdog was mauled and killed by her own dogs. This was, and is, an
understandably crippling development for the month of January.
4 The Courts Order (Docket 25) at 8-9 claims Plaintiffs do not address the issues of
judicial economy, convenience, fairness or comity, relying solely on their citation to
King v. WFZ. That begs the point: Plaintiffs already stated that the legal decision in

18
 Try as Defendants might, there is simply no material difference
between these two cases regardless of whatever sophistry the Defendant or
Court wish to engage in, and the Defendant was not prejudiced in any way
because they would have had to write the exact same Motion in State Court,
where they knew from firsthand experience that they would likely lose, given
State of Washington v. Ungerhueler 2012 WL 4009748 (2012) affirming the
Constitutional Right of Hot Rocks Productions to run video in open Court and
also State of Washington v. Maldonado, 2007 WL 5310340 (2007), see below.
Lastly, the Court, in trying to distinguish King v. WFZ and the case at bar,
states:

However, in this matter there have been several motions filed by

Plaintiffs, including the aforementioned Motion for Leave to Amend.
(Docket 25 at 9).
The problem with that analysis is that the Motion for Leave to Amend
occurred an entire Month after the Removal and only after Defendant
Rumbaugh again violated GR 16 so now Defendants profit from continued
abuse, a nice touch, that.
To allow this case to proceed in Federal Court by retaining Jurisdiction
unlawfully rewarded invidious forum shopping and provided negative
reinforcement to a Courtroom bully who fancies bellowing against respectful,
peaceful citizen journalists.

IV. The Court Incorrectly Applied the Doctrine of Judicial Immunity in a

Case Dealing with Administrative, Rather than Judicial Functions.

The Constitutional Prior Restraint protections involving presence of cameras

in state courtrooms has been firmly established throughout the entire
Country and for good reason: Pierce County has already addressed the issue
of cameras in the Court even before GR 16 was established: First of all,
Counsel for Defendant have already lost on this very issue, but of course they
failed to present any of this to the Court because of their pattern of deceit
and corruption: See State of Washington v. Ungerhueler 2012 WL
4009748 (2012) affirming the Constitutional Right of Hot Rocks Productions to

that case directly mirrors what should have happened then, so this Court should have
simply analysed the two cases together instead of giving Plaintiffs arguments the
short shrift, again, putting its head in the sand in the manner of an ostrich.

19
run video in open Court. It is not even clear that they were bona fide
journalists, unlike Plaintiffs in the case at bar! (Appendix A).
See also State of Washington v. Maldonado, 2007 WL 5310340 (2007):
The matter of media coverage of the above-entitled action having
been fully considered by this Court, the following Order is hereby
entered and pertains to all future Pierce County Superior Court
proceedings in the above-referenced cause of action in Department No.
19. The purpose of this Order is to provide for full public and media
access to these proceedings in a manner that does not impair the
Court's ability to conduct a fair trial of the issues in this case, to protect
the privacy interests of the jurors and others, and to maintain the
dignity of the proceedings.5

Further, as noted in the successful briefing in People of Colorado v.

Willie D. Clark, 2009 WL 10431159 (2009) Denver TV/Radio Station Group and
the Denver Post correctly noted:

The Colorado Supreme Court has made it clear that it encourages

expanded media coverage of criminal cases because of the importance
of open courts and the educational benefits of allowing the public to
see judicial proceedings. For example, Chief Justice Mullarkey entered
an Order on October 10, 2002, that allows trial courts to waive all
restrictions of Canon 3A(8) and allows a national television network to
videotape and broadcast entire criminal proceedings, including trial
preparation, pretrial motion hearings, jury voir dire and even jury
deliberations. (See Order dated October 10, 2002, attached as Exhibit
A hereto.) Chief Justice Malarkey was quoted as saying that she was
convinced that the benefits of opening up the courts outweighed the
disadvantages.' ABC to Eavesdrop on Colorado Trials, The Denver
Post, Dec. 12, 2002, p. A1. Also, Justice Kourlis stated:

The Supreme Court's support of this program reflects the high priority
we place on public education and jury reform. We believe that we do
have a responsibility to educate the public about what really goes on in
the courts and criminal trials specifically, and this program serves that
goal.6

5 The Court went on to issue an Order involving pooling and other decorum
considerations mirrored by Plaintiffs Notices of Media Coverage! Pursuant to Rule 3.3
Defense Counsel should have informed the Court and Plaintiffs of this ruling.
6 Similarly in this case the Washington Legislature had compelling governmental
interests in protecting the Rights of Video Journalists when it crafted GR 16, which is
precisely why the State Courts should have been analyzing this matter as opposed to
a Federal Court when Federal Courts have long disdained or eschewed cameras in
Court. See generally CAMERAS AND THE NEED FOR UNRESTRICTED ELECTRONIC
MEDIA ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTROOMS, Susan E. Harding, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev.
827(1996)

20
With such in mind, perhaps the Court and Defendants were a bit confused
over the appropriate analysis but we need to be addressing Administrative
conduct, rather than Judicial conduct:

Certain conduct enjoys the protection of legal immunity. 1 For example,

when a judge is acting in his judicial capacity, he is absolutely immune.
However, a judge may be protected by immunity from an award of
damages against him and still be subject to an injunction. The United
States Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff who sues a judge for
illegally imposing bail may be entitled to injunctive relief and even
attorney's fees under the Federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C.A. 1983).27

Accord Burg v. Velasco, 2001 WL 1295164 (9th Cir 2001).

Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts
performed in their judicial capacity.
See Duvall v.County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir.2001).
Because Burg complained only of Judge Velasco's judicial acts, the
district court properly concluded that Burg's claims were barred by
absolute judicial immunity. Id.

Let us review what Plaintiffs filed in their Motion for Enlargement of

Time
(Docket 9, filed 31 January 2017) , which was DENIED even though lead
Plaintiff King the only Plaintiff with
experience as a successful First Amendment Trial Attorney and as a Licensed
Federal
Attorney -- was essentially incapacitated for the entire month of January (see
Fn3, infra.).
**********

Pulliam v. Allen 466 U.S. 522 (1984) provides for Injunctive relief and
Plaintiffs have sought same. See also Dalsing v. Ausserer, Lindquist et al. WD
3:15-CV-05520.
Moreover, Judge Rumbaugh does not enjoy absolute immunity in this
context either on the merits or with respect to prospective relief owed to Mr.

7 31 Mass. Prac., Equitable Remedies 11.18 (3d ed.) Massachusetts Practice Series
TM May 2016 Update Joseph R. Nolana0, Laurie J. Sartorioa1 -- Chapter 11. Equitable
Defenses

21
King should the Court of proper Jurisdiction determine that Mr. King does not
have a live case in controversy.8
This case is all about Defendant Rumbaughs abject failure to follow
Washington GR 16, which sets out a number of substantive and procedural
safeguards that must be addressed by a Judge before any Prior Restraint may
be contemplated by the Court. The Rule speaks in absolute:
(b) The judge shall exercise reasonable discretion in prescribing
conditions and limitations with which media personnel shall comply.
Obviously Statutory Construction reveals that the legislature would not
intend an absurd result, i.e. ORDER a Judge to do something then not allow
for any sort of Judicial relief in the abject failure of the Court to follow the
Rule. All of this will be addressed in further detail in the appropriate Court at
the appropriate time.

*********
With that excerpt squarely before us, we now continue our analysis to
reveal that Judicial Immunity, to the extent it exists, only applies to Judicial
Acts and not Administrative Acts. Clearing a reporter to run video has naught
to do with Judicial Acts: See
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9112 S.Ct. 286116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) citing Forrester
v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).

"When applied to the paradigmatic judicial acts involved in resolving

disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of a court,
the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity has not been particularly
controversial. Difficulties have arisen primarily in attempting to draw
the line between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate,
and acts that simply happen to have been done by judges. Here, as in
other contexts, immunity is justified and defined by the functions it
protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches."

As such, Defendant Rumbaugh enjoys only qualified immunity and is subject

to Injunctive or Prospective Relief, which is PRECISELY what Plaintiffs argued
at (docket No. 9 p 2) by citing Pulliam, which was of course ALSO cited in
Forrester, so now that the Court has additional clarity to the prior argument

8 Recall that Plaintiff King filed an ongoing Notice for Media Coverage, requested a ruling and
never heard anything from Defendant so he has a ripe case. All of this is material that is
appropriately suited to Summary Judgment analysis anyway.

22
Plaintiffs have no doubt that the final ORDER will be revised to reflect that
fact that the Defendants Motion to Dismiss was improvidently granted. 9

"Administrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the

very functioning of the courts, have not similarly been regarded as
judicial acts. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880), for example,
this Court declined to extend immunity to a county judge who had
been charged in a criminal indictment with discriminating on the basis
of race in selecting trial jurors for the county's courts. The Court
reasoned:

"Whether the act done by him was judicial or not is to be determined

by its character, and not by the character of the agent. Whether he
was a county judge or not is of no importance. The duty of selecting
jurors might as well have been committed to a private person as to one
holding the office of a judge. . . . That the jurors are selected for a court
makes no difference. So are court-criers, tipstaves, sheriffs, &c. Is their
election or their appointment a judicial act?" Id., at 348.

Although this case involved a criminal charge against a judge, the

reach of the Court's analysis was not in any obvious way confined by
that circumstance.

Likewise, judicial immunity has not been extended to judges acting to

promulgate a code of conduct for attorneys. Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719
(1980). In explaining why legislative, rather than judicial, immunity
furnished the appropriate standard, we said: "Although it is clear that
under Virginia law the issuance of the Bar Code was a proper function
of the Virginia Court, propounding the Code was not an act of
adjudication but one of rulemaking." Id., at 731. Similarly, in the same
case, we held that judges acting to enforce the Bar Code would be
treated like prosecutors, and thus would 229*229 be amenable to suit
for injunctive and declaratory relief. Id., at 734-737.
Cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U. S. 522 (1984). Once again, it was the nature
of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed
it, that informed our immunity analysis."

IV

9 Again, Plaintiff King notes that it is not clear whether the Court fully understood the
incomplete briefing earlier but lead Plaintiff King noted in his Declaration (Docket No.
16) that on 29 December 2016 one of his family dogs was mauled and killed in what
was discovered to be an illegal kennel with too many dogs on the day in question.
The governments involved in that case have failed to take any affirmative action
despite years of active violations. Meanwhile King and his partner were completely
devastated for more than a month and have had to retain noted Counsel Adam P.
Karp, Esq. to prosecute that case. Such impact goes well beyond the mere ordinary
Course of Litigation.

23
 In the case before us, we think it clear that Judge White was acting in
an administrative capacity when he demoted and discharged Forrester.
Those acts like many others involved in supervising court employees
and overseeing the efficient operation of a court may have been
quite important in providing the necessary conditions of a sound
adjudicative system. The decisions at issue, however, were not
themselves judicial or adjudicative.

It is much the same in Pulliam, which even extended Qualified Immunity into
the realm of Judicial Acts:

IV

Our own experience is fully consistent with the common law's rejection of a rule of
judicial immunity from prospective relief. We never have had a rule of absolute judicial
immunity from prospective relief, and there is no evidence that the absence of that
immunity has had a chilling effect on judicial independence. None of the seminal
opinions on judicial immunity, either in England or in this country, has involved [466
U.S. 522, 537] immunity from injunctive relief. 15 No Court of Appeals ever has
concluded that immunity bars injunctive relief against a judge. See n. 6, supra. At least
seven Circuits have indicated affirmatively that there is no immunity bar to such relief,
and in situations where in their judgment an injunction against a judicial officer was
necessary to prevent irreparable injury to a petitioner's constitutional rights, courts have
granted that relief. 16

We conclude that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a
judicial officer acting in her [466 U.S. 522, 542] judicial capacity. (Affirming assessment
of Attorney Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988).

And of course Stump v. Sparkman 435 U.S. 34998 S.Ct. 109955 L.Ed.2d
331 (1978) relied on by Defendant and the Court is completely inapposite
because the Judge in that case was clearly performing a judicial function and
exercising discretion with respect to a person whose substantive rights as a
litigant could properly be before a Court. In this case the Reporter does not
have an active case in controversy and is therefore much more akin to, say, a
Court employee who is wrongfully terminated. See Sheppard v. Beerman, 94
F.3d 823 (2nd Cir. 1996). Motivation is relevant, and motivation may only be
ascertained after Discovery:

On February 11, 1991, Sheppard was told not to keep coming in and
out of the courtroom, and was told to be quiet when he sought to reply
to this direction.

24
 The problem here is that the district court dismissed Sheppard's
complaint without allowing Sheppard any discovery. According to
Sheppard's complaint, Beerman expressed deep concern over
Sheppard's claim to have kept notes detailing Beerman's instances of
public corruption, and the possibility that those notes would be made
public. And, after firing Sheppard, Beerman seized Sheppard's personal
files, and inspected them before returning them to Sheppard. 2

If substantiated through discovery, these facts may tend to show that

Beerman's actual motive for firing Sheppard was the content of his
speech, and not Beerman's fear that Sheppard would disrupt the office
working environment. 2The district court therefore erred in finding that
Beerman's actual intent was "irrelevant," and in not allowing Sheppard
discovery to support his claim of unconstitutional motive. If, after
sufficient discovery, Sheppard cannot present particularized (direct or
circumstantial) evidence of unconstitutional motive, Beerman is then,
but only then, entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of
qualified immunity.

In his complaint, Sheppard alleges that Beerman "embarked on a

course of conduct . . . designed to . . . punish [Sheppard] for his
objecting to, or considering to expose," Beerman's alleged judicial
misconduct, and to prevent Sheppard from disclosing that
misconduct.10

Plaintiffs have noted that the primary reason they are following Defendant
Rumbaugh is because of his unlawful bias and misconduct. Such was the
purpose of Plaintiff Kings Second Notice of Media Coverage after his emails
and formal Prospective Notice were COMPLETELY IGNORED IN VIOLATION OF
GR 16. See Declaration of Plaintiff King. As such, the case at bar is a
Sheppard case and not a Stump case. The Defendants argument and
the Courts Order dismissing on a 12(b)(6) were all based on a legal
fallacy. Moreover, monetary damages are indeed permissible:

Sheppard argues that the district court also improperly dismissed his
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The court dismissed
Sheppard's claim for declaratory relief because, having found that
Beerman was immune from damages, there was no case or
controversy remaining upon which Sheppard could base a request for
declaratory relief. 1Because we vacate the district court's dismissal of
Sheppard's claim for monetary damages, the foundation for dismissing
the declaratory relief claim erodes. See generally Ashcroft v. Mattis,

10 In its haste to run Plaintiffs out of Court, this Honorable Court naturally granted
Defendants Motion to Stay Discovery, when the end result of said Discovery would
ultimately reveal unlawful bias and motivations.

25
 431 U.S. 171, 172 (1977). We therefore reinstate Sheppard's claim for
declaratory relief, subject to the discussion above concerning his claim
for monetary damages.

Plaintiff is used to In this case we have bona fide independent

journalists with substantial experience in the field coming together as
members of the Fourth Estate to question Judicial conduct not as litigants but
as members of the Free Press, and that is hardly a distinction without
difference: It is material to this case.11

In short, it is the same way in the case at bar: Defendant Rumbaugh

was not adjudicating anything or addressing the substantive rights of anyone,
unlike other cases in which a Judge was immune for ordering sterilization for
example. No. In this instance Defendant Rumbaugh was simply applying his
own bias in an arbitrary and capricious manner to deny what is clearly a
Constitutional Right, which brings Plaintiff to his next point:

The fact that Counsel for Judge Rumbaugh lied and fabricated a tale in
which Plaintiff Brown had not notified the Court properly and in which Plaintiff
King had not placed the Court on Actual Notice of his pending arrival as a
First Amendment journalist, or that he had not put the Court on Actual Notice
of his ongoing Notice of Media Coverage, when in point of fact he had done
so. See Plaintiffs' Notice of Fraud Upon the Court and Rule 11 Motion for
Sanctions, (Docket Nos. 23 and 26). Also as far as lying prosecutors go -- and
that exactly what the Defendants office contains -- they only have qualified
immunity, rather than absolute immunity, for fabricating and lying about
evidence. See generally Buckley v. Fitzsimmons 509 U.S. 259 (1993).

V. The Leave to Amend Should Have Been Granted to Expedite Judicial

Efficiency and to Address the Unlawful Pattern and Practice.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the First Amended Complaint should have
been allowed as well: Plaintiffs were stridently investigating the conduct of a
11 Defendant Rumbaughs insouciant comment that Planitiff Kings second Notice of
Media Coverage was contrived is indicative of his willful ignorance of the Law:
Plaintiff King was there to investigate Defendant Rumbaughs conduct on an entirely
different case, and Plaintiff King is clearly entitled to do so whether or not Defendant
Rumbaugh, his attorneys, or this Court appreciate it. Period.

26
Judge who has issued questionable rulings and there is nothing more
important to the integrity of our Country. See Fn 3, supra:
The Supreme Court's support of this program reflects the high priority
we place on public education and jury reform. We believe that we do
have a responsibility to educate the public about what really goes on in
the courts and criminal trials specifically, and this program serves that
goal.

The Amendment was not futile but instead highlighted a pattern and
practice of a rogue judge who operates in direct violation of established case
law in his own County, see again Washington v. Ungerhueler 2012 WL
4009748 (2012) affirming the Constitutional Right of Hot Rocks Productions to
run video in open Court and also State of Washington v. Maldonado, 2007 WL
5310340 (2007),

27
VI. Conclusion and Prayer for Relief.

It is clear that Defendant Rumbaugh was not operating in a Judicial

Capacity but was instead operating in an Administrative Capacity when he
established his own rogue approach to this administrative function, in direct
contravention to other Jurists in his own County, see again Washington v.
Ungerhueler 2012 WL 4009748 (2012) affirming the Constitutional Right of
Hot Rocks Productions to run video in open Court and also State of
Washington v. Maldonado, 2007 WL 5310340 (2007).

Against this backdrop, and given the clear intent of the Rule, and given
the clear-cut lies and misrepresentations issued before this Court by
Attorneys Trinen and Hamilton, and given the fact that this Court has
preservation of the First Amendment and other Constitutional protections as
its Polar Star there can be but one result in this case: Reversal and/or
modification of all salient aspects of 6 April 2017 Order, including the
Dismissal of all Claims as well as the Denial of the Requested First Amended
Complaint as sought by Plaintiffs diligent members of the Fourth Estate
whether Defendant Rumbaugh appreciates it, or not. Especially if he does not
appreciate it.

Respectfully submitted,

___________________________________________
Christopher King, J.D.

___________________________________________
Wally Brown

___________________________________________
Chris Nubbe

28
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

We, the undersigned, solemnly swear that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Motion was sent via email and tracked U.S. Mail on 3 May 2017 to
the following:

Daniel R. Hamilton, Esq.

955 Tacoma Avenue South
Suite 301
Tacoma WA 98402
dhamilt@co.pierce.wa.us

Stephen D. Trinen, Esq.

955 Tacoma Avenue South
Suite 301
Tacoma WA 98402
strinen@co.pierce.wa.us

___________________________________________
Christopher King, J.D.

___________________________________________
Wally Brown

___________________________________________
Chris Nubbe

29
APPENDIX A

30
31
 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

CHRISTOPHER KING, J.D. )

A/K/A KINGCAST/MORTGAGE MOVIES

and ) CASE No. 2:17-CV-0031

WALLY BROWN
and
CHRIS NUBBE ) JUDGE MARTINEZ
Plaintiffs,
v. )

HON. STAN J. RUMBAUGH

IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES
Defendant. )

SUPPLEMENTAL RULE 59 APPENDIX B

Now Come Plaintiffs to note one simple thing that colors this entire
case:

Specifically it is a 20 July email from Defendant and his clerk that clearly
violates GR 16 and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
affirmatively (and falsely) stating:

Video recording of the proceedings, or use of cameras in the courtroom, is

prohibited.

From: Merri Reagan

Sent: Wednesday, July 20, 2016 10:30 AM
To: Brenda Duzan ; fortune2000@fairpoint.net
Cc: cpeterson@robinsontait.com
Subject: RE: FNMA v Brenda J. Duzan Case No. 14-2-12022-8

Ms. Duzan and Mr. Brown,

The official Court Reporter will be making the stenographical court record,
which can be transcribed and provided to any person, litigant or otherwise,
upon payment of the usual and customary fee for that service. Video
recording of the proceedings, or use of cameras in the court room is
prohibited.

Sincerely,

Merri Reagan for Judge Stanley J. Rumbaugh

32
Merri Reagan| Judicial Assistant to Judge Stanley J. Rumbaugh | Pierce County Superior Court | Dept. #18 | 930 Tacoma
Avenue South, Room 334, Tacoma, WA 98402 | Phone: (253) 798-6650 | Email: mreagan@co.pierce.wa.us

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

We, the undersigned, solemnly swear that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Declaration was sent via email and tracked U.S. Mail on 4 May
2017 to the following:

Daniel R. Hamilton, Esq.

955 Tacoma Avenue South
Suite 301
Tacoma WA 98402
dhamilt@co.pierce.wa.us

Stephen D. Trinen, Esq.

955 Tacoma Avenue South
Suite 301
Tacoma WA 98402
strinen@co.pierce.wa.us

___________________________________________
Christopher King, J.D.

___________________________________________
Wally Brown

___________________________________________
Chris Nubbe

33