Academy of American Franciscan History

Hollywood's Rogue Neighbor: The Argentine Film Industry during the Good Neighbor Policy,
1939-1945
Author(s): Tamara L. Falicov
Source: The Americas, Vol. 63, No. 2, Latin American Film History (Oct., 2006), pp. 245-260
Published by: Academy of American Franciscan History
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TheAmericas
63:2 October2006, 245-260
Copyrightby the Academy of American
FranciscanHistory

HOLLYWOOD'SROGUE NEIGHBOR:
THE ARGENTINEFILM INDUSTRYDURING THE
GOOD NEIGHBORPOLICY,1939-1945*

uringWorldWar the United States createda political, economic,

II, aimed at
and cultural policy improving hemispheric relations
between the U.S. and Latin America. Dubbed the "Good Neighbor
Policy,"its objectives were twofold: 1) to insure thatnationsin LatinAmer-
ica werejoined in the Allied war effort and were not associatedwith the Axis
or Communistsympathizers,and 2) to allow the U.S. access to LatinAmer-
ica as a source of raw materials and a market for goods, including films.
Because Argentinadid not side with the Allies, insteadpreferringneutrality,
it was castigatedby an economic boycott. Beginning in 1941, the U.S. sold
small rationsof raw film stock to Argentina,and over time, refused to sell it
all together.The film industryin Argentina,at the time consideredthe most
profitable and advanced in Latin America, began to lose its hold on the
Spanish-languagemarket.
This study examines the standardunderstandingof the period, which is
'
that the United States (vis vis the Good Neighbor policy agencies, the
Office of the Coordinatorof Inter-AmericanAffairs (OCIAA), and its Holly-
wood counterpart,the Motion Picture Society of the Americas (MPSA))
withheldfilm stock from the Argentinefilm industrybecause of Argentina's
pro-Axis sentiments. For example, some charged that Argentinaproduced
pro-Axis newsreels and other propagandaon behalf of the government.
However, my research demonstrates that although there was one film
studio-Argentina Sono Film-that producednewsreels sympatheticto the
Axis, by andlarge,the industryremainedfirmly democraticanddid not sym-

* The authorwishes to acknowledge

Tony Rosenthal,Ana M. Lop6z and Seth Fein for enabling me
to improvethis essay. I also would like to thankBarbaraHall at the MargaretHerrickLibrary,andErwin
Levold and Thomas Rosenbaum at the Rockefeller Archive Center for their assistance in obtaining
archivaldocuments.An NEH Summerstipendenabled me to visit the abovementionedarchives.Thanks
to Chris Ehrickfor organizinga panel on LatinAmericanfilm that allowed us to publish our work as a
group effort.

245

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246 ROGUENEIGHBOR
HOLLYWOOD'S

pathize with the government's censorship tactics against U.S. pro-Allied

films. The Argentinegovernmentduringwartimewas headedby a succession
of conservativemilitaryleaderswho admiredthe Spanishfascist leaderFran-
cisco Francoand Italy's leader,II duce, Benito Mussolini.While the Castillo
government(1940-1943) declared neutralitymainly to continue trade with
both Britainand Germany,they censored Hollywood wartimefilms such as
Billy Wilder'sFive Gravesto Cairo (1943) for its anti-Axisreferences.Later,
governmentofficials institutedprotectionistpolicies such as the imposition
of Argentinenewsreelrequirementsin all movie theatresand finally,a screen
quota was mandatedin 1944 limiting the amountof U.S. theatricalreleases
that could be imported.After the enactmentof these restrictivepolicies, the
U.S. acted in its best interests.For these reasons as well as economic self-
interest,the State Departmentdecided to limit, and laterban, the sale of raw
film stock to Argentina-much to the dismay of Argentina'sdemocraticand
highly developed film industry.The Argentine cinema has never been as
highly organizedor as financiallysuccessful as duringthis "goldenage," the
historicalmomentbefore the U.S. ban on the sale of raw film stock.

A final, but no less importantfactorin explainingthe U.S. boycott against

Argentinawas way the Argentine film industryposed a threatto the U.S.
Hollywood industry:it was powerful and could compete quite well against
its Hollywood counterpartsfor the profitableSpanish-languagemarket.Hol-
lywood looked to Latin America as a potential marketto replace the Euro-
pean marketcollapse. Film historianTino Balio writes that "to offset condi-
tions in the war-torn European countries, Hollywood turned to Latin
America.There, althoughthe industryhad a near-monopoly,the markethad
never been fully exploited."' These external forces hastenedthe decline of
the Argentinefilm industryduringWWII.

This case study serves to shed light on the ways in which the success of
cultural products, such as film, are affected by political and economic
forces; one cannotjudge the success of a nation's film production,exhibi-
tion and distribution solely on the laws of supply and demand. In this
instance there were larger inter-Americanwartime economic and political
policies at stake that negatively impinged on Argentina'sfilm industry.

THEARGENTINE
FILMINDUSTRY THE1930s-1940s
DURING

Argentina,out of all the LatinAmericancountries,was the most promis-

ing market for films. According to Variety,in 1939, Argentinahad 1,208

Tino Balio, TheAmericanFilm Industry(Madison:University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), p. 223.

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 TAMARA
L. FALICOV 247

movie houses-more theatresthan all of the other Latin American nations

put together.2Film studios such as ArgentinaSono Film, Lumiton,Artistas
ArgentinosAsociados and others hit their peak of popularityin 1942 when
there were 6 majors and 15 to 20 smaller units.3This film industrywas the
most technologically advancedin LatinAmerica.4

In 1935 Argentinahad produced22 sound films. By 1939, 50 films were

released. Argentinawas the most popularand prolific producerof films in
LatinAmerica,and was considerablecompetitionto Hollywood in the Span-
ish speakingworld. It was the world's largestproducerof Spanish-language
films, and each majorstudio could produceapproximately12 featuresannu-
ally.5Argentinecinema had surpassedall other Latin American film indus-
tries to become the "firstrank in the Spanish-productionfield and increas-
ingly becoming a [U.S.] competitor for Latin screen time."6 With the
imposition of the U.S. boycott, the scarcity of raw film stock createda pro-
found crisis in the film industry:a few film studios survivedon black market
dealings but many film studios shut down. Productionnumbersslid from an
all-time high of 56 films in 1942 to 24 films producedin 1944.7

GOOD NEIGHBORPOLICYAGENCIES

As historianPeter Smith argues, the Good Neighbor Policy was a move

away from a historic patternof United States interventionin LatinAmerica,
but it still functionedas a way to maintainU.S. hegemony over the Western
Hemisphere.As Smith puts it, "Insteadof relying on TeddyRoosevelt's "big
stick," on military force and intervention,the United States could now rely
on economic strength and diplomatic persuasion."' However, the U.S.
developed a tailoredapproachto each neighbor,and befriendedcooperative
countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela, who immediately

2 "B.A. vs. 42nd St." Variety,July 28, 1942, p. 15.

3 "ArgentinaTop Producerof Spanish Pictures,"Motion Picture Herald, November 7, 1942. For
more informationon what studios, both large and independentwere operatingduring this period, see
Claudio Espafia,ed., Cine argentino: industriay clasicismo, Vol. 1 (Buenos Aires: Fondo Nacional de
las Artes, 2000).
4 Octavio Getino adds that "therewas no previous instance of an industrial,technical, or commer-
cial entity, although limited, in Latin America"Octavio Getino, Cine argentino: entre lo deseable y lo
possible (Buenos Aires: Edici6n CICCUS, 1998), p. 28.
"ArgentinaTop,"Motion Picture Herald, Nov. 7, 1942.
6 Ray Josephs,"Argentinefilms show signs of leading Spanishfield," Variety,January7, 1942, p. 91.
Statistics from Table 1 in Octavio Getino, Cine argentino: entre lo posible y lo deseable (Buenos
Aires: Edici6nes CICCUS, 1998), p. 337.
' Peter Smith, The Talons the
of Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-LatinAmerican Relations (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 87.

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248 ROGUE
HOLLYWOOD'S NEIGHBOR

allied with the U.S. duringthe war.Argentina,who had announcedits neu-

trality,was considereda threatto U.S. nationalsecurity,and thus subject to
an economic blockade of many agriculturaland industrialitems, film stock
included. In addition,afterArgentinabrokerankswith most LatinAmerican
countriesby remainingneutralduringthe war, the U.S. withdrewits ambas-
sador and withheld diplomatic recognition until Argentina sided with the
Allied cause in 1945.

The central agency to oversee internationalfilm industry relations was

the Office of the Coordinatorfor Inter-AmericanAffairs (OCIAA), (later
changed to the Office of Inter-AmericanAffairs (OIAA) in 1945) headedby
Nelson A. Rockefeller. One of its strategies was to bring Latin American
nationscloser to the U.S., including "good will" toursthroughoutthe Amer-
icas by famous actors and directorssuch as OrsonWelles, CarmenMiranda,
and WaltDisney. Anotherobjective was to distanceitself from the historyof
Hollywood films that denigratedLatin American themes throughits insen-
sitive portrayalof LatinAmericancharacters,themes, and locales.9

Another aim was to work with the heads of Hollywood studios to create
a series of Latin-themedfilms that would resonate favorably with Latin
American audiences. Under the jurisdictionof the OCIAA was the Motion
PicturesDivision headedby JohnHay Whitney (who also served as the vice-
presidentand directorof the MoMA film library)(1940-1944) and later by
FrancisAlstock (1944-46).

Another organizationthat worked hand in hand with the Motion Picture

Division was its privateindustrycounterpart,the Motion PictureSociety for
the Americas (MPSA). This society, financedby a congressionalgrant,was
made up of Hollywood directors,producers,and others and served as a liai-
son between governmentand industry.It acted as a bridgebetween the State
Department,WarProductionBoard, Office of Price Administration,Holly-
wood VictoryCommittee,WarActivities Committee,and othergovernment
agencies in orderto facilitate the productionof pictures with Latin Ameri-
can content.10In a report published by the MPSA in 1944-45, its duties
included reviewing books and scripts with inter-Americanthemes for film

9 For example, a riot ensued after a screening of the Hollywood film ArgentineNights. According
to the Detroit Free Press article "Get the Facts Straight"(May 21, 1941), the authorquotes a film critic
of the Argentine newspaper La Nacidn. The critic states: "As long as Hollywood insists on seeing
Argentinaas an incredibly ridiculous tropical country, no Pan-Americanunderstandingis possible no
matterhow many good-will travelersare sent here."
10 "The Motion Picture Society of the Americas Report, 1944-45" (Beverly Hills, CA: Academy of
Motion PictureArts and Sciences), MargaretHerrickLibrary,p. 11.

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 TAMARA
L. FALICOV 249

production,and "supervise[ing]and conferr[ing]in connectionwith the pro-

ductionof motion picturesrelatingto nationaldefense andmorale,and inter-
Americanrelationshipsand activities."During this period, many films with
Latin themes were producedby Hollywood. By February1943, for exam-
ple, 30 films with LatinAmericanthemes or locales had been released and
25 more were in production.By 1945, 84 films dealing with LatinAmerican
themes had been produced."

Films with Latin themes were circulatedboth as theatricalreleases (such

as Disney's Saludos Amigos (1943) and as 16mm instructionalfilms on
public health issues. In a progress report filed by Nelson Rockefeller, he
states that the Motion PictureDivision had:

createda two-wayexchangeof non-theatrical16mmfilmsamongtheAmerican

Republics.Alreadyboth Spanishand Portugueseversionsof 23 reels of such
filmseitherarereadyor en routesouthwardfromtheUnitedStates.Theirvaried
subjectmatterranges from the powerof our warweaponsto strikingscientific
andhealthstudies.'2

In anotherOCIAA memo specifically addressingways to targetArgentina

throughfilm, it states that:

throughregularcommercialdistribution andthroughourprogramof distributing

16mm.printsthroughschools,colleges,civicorganizations, andtheEmbassy,we
endeavorto win thegoodwill of Argentinaby showingit in its bestlightandin
themanyvariedaspectsof its life andculture.Manyof thesubjectsareconcerned
withmilitarysubjects,showingthepowerandstrengthof theUnitedStates.'3

Clearly the films sent to LatinAmericahad propagandisticends and proudly

showcasedthe militaryand technologicalprowess of the North.Accordingto
a StateDepartmentmemorandumon the OCIAA'soverallactivityas of 1942;
"It was the greatestoutpouringof propagandisticmaterialby a state ever."'4

" Donald W. Rowland, History of the Office of the Coordinatorof Inter-AmericanAffairs (Wash-
ington, GovernmentPrintingOffice, 1947), pp. 68, 74. Cited in Ana M. L6pez, "Are All Latins from
Manhattan?Hollywood, Ethnographyand Cultural Colonialism" in John King, Ana M. Lop6z and
ManuelAlvarado,eds., Mediating Two Worlds:CinematicEncountersin the Americas (London:British
Film Institute, 1993), p. 69.
12 "ProgressReport,"Office of the Coordinatorof Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) collection 1943-
44, Series O, Washington,D.C. Files-PresidentialAppointments,in the Nelson A. Rockefeller Personal
Papers, Record Group 4 of the Rockefeller Family Archives at the Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy
Hollow, New York.HereafterdesignatedRAC.
13 "Resumeof Activities Directedto the Argentinein the Field of Motion Pictures."No date, [1942]

OCIAA collection, Motion PictureDivision folder, box 7, p. 6, RAC.

14 Smith, Talons,p. 85.

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250 HOLLYWOOD'S
ROGUENEIGHBOR

THEARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT'S FILMS
OFHOLLYWOOD
CENSORSHIP

Furtherissuestackledby theMPSAweretheArgentinegovernment's cen-

its de
sorshipthrough Direcci6n Espectaiculos. the
During war,Hollywood
filmswerecutandreassembled in Argentinain waysthatrepeatedlyangered
theU.S.Accordingto Usabel,theArgentinegovernment censorsactedunder
repeatedpressure frompro-Axisembassies.15By 1943, therewerefortyU.S.
motionpicturesthatwereeitherbanneddueto theiranti-Axisnatureor were
withheldfromdistribution by theirproducers ratherthansubmitto deletions
demandedby Argentinecensors.16Amongthe bannedfilmswereTwentieth
Century-Fox's SecretAgentof Japan(1942), bannedat the requestof the
JapaneseEmbassyin BuenosAires,and TheInvaders(1941)by Columbia
Pictures,bannedat the behestof the GermanEmbassy."Paramount's For
WhomtheBell Tolls(1943),a Hollywoodpicturesympathetic to the Spanish
resistanceagainstFranco,wasbanneddueto pressurefromtheSpanishgov-
ernment.This film had been producedin consultationwith the OCIAA.
Throughout thewar,theheadof theArgentinecensorshipboardcutanti-Axis
referencesfromHollywoodfilms.Allusionsto dictatorsandremarksabout
Fascistauthorities wereomittedfromU.S. films.18
Onefilm, CharlieChaplin'sTheGreatDictator(1940) causeda scandal
in Argentina.On January8, 1941,the foremostArgentinefilm tradepaper,
Heraldodel cine,reportedthattheArgentinecensorshipboardhaddecided
to banthis film, andthatvariousculturalentitieshadappealedto the Exec-
utive Powerto revise the decreeto ban the screening.19On February5th,
however,thefilmwasshownin theprovinceof Paranli,attheCinesRexand
Select,becausefilms bannedin BuenosAireswerenot necessarilyforbid-
denin theprovinces.Historically,nationalcensorshippolicyhadneverbeen
centralized,so thatprovinceshadthe powerto determineif a workor cul-
turalproductsuchas film couldbe shown.20Thus,TheGreatDictatorwas
shownin theprovincesbeforeit everplayedin BuenosAires.Furthermore,
Usabelnotesthatduringthe warmanyArgentinescrossedoverto Uruguay
of the
to see thefilm.21InAprilof 1942,anarticlewrittenby representatives

15 Gaizka S. de Usabel, The High Noon of AmericanFilms in LatinAmerica (Ann Arbor:University

of Michigan Press, 1982), p. 154.
16
Thomas M. Pryor,"ArgentineCensor Strikes,"New YorkTimes,December 12, 1943.
17 "ArgentinaBans 20th Pic at Jap Request," Hollywood Reporter,August 12, 1942 and "The

InvadersBannedby Argentinaafter 10 Days," Hollywood Reporter,August 13, 1942.

18 JohnE. Fagg, LatinAmerica:A General History (New York:McMillian, 1963), pp. 925-27. Cited
in Usabel, High Noon, p. 154.
19 Heraldo de Cine 12:495, January8, 1941, p. 1.
20 Interviewswith film historiansDaniel 'Paran '
Sendr6s and Paula F61ix-Didier,April 2004.
21
Usabel, High Noon, p.154.

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 TAMARA
L. FALICOV 251

ArgentineAcademy of Motion PictureArts and Sciences declared that The

Great Dictator deserved to be on the top-ten list of the best films of 1942.
They were dismayed that they could not list it because it was officially
banned.22The film was finally released in Buenos Aires in August of 1945,
playing for ten weeks to sizable audiences.

This form of censorshipinfuriatedthe Hollywood film industryand was

a contributingfactortowardCongress'decision to enact a ban on the sale of
raw film stock to Argentinain 1941. A 1942 Varietyarticle stated that U.S.
pictureshipmentsfirst needed to be previewedby Argentinecensorshipoffi-
cials in New York City before they were allowed to be shipped into the
country.23According to Usabel, the U.S. authoritiesignored the Castillo
government's mandate and began to restrict the sale of raw film stock in
retaliation.24RobertVogel, an executive at MGM studios and a member of
the Motion Picture Society of the Americas, recalled in an interview that,
generally, the MPSA tried to improve Hollywood films that were exported
to LatinAmerica(i.e. make them less offensive to Latinaudiences)but addi-
tionally, they made sure that U.S. films weren't "incorrectlyexhibited in
LatinAmerica."By this Vogel referredto instanceswherebyU.S. films, usu-
ally of the war genre, were reedited in Argentinain ways to make the Nazi
characterslook like heroes and the U.S. and Allies look weak. Vogel relays
an anecdoterelatingto this situation:

ThebestexampleI canthinkof... [W]ehada pictureat MGMin whichJoan

Crawford playedanAmericanladylivingin Paris.[Reunionin France,1942,dir.
JulesDassin,producedby JosephMankiewicz]JohnWayne,a parachutist who
volunteeredto serve in the BritishAir Force althoughhe was an American,
landedbehindthe scenesandworkedhis waytowardherhome.Thiswasduring
the Germanoccupation.And a coupleof Germanofficersenterthe room-we
are not yet at warwithGermanyofficially,andthey ask Waynewho he is and
Wayne tells them he's an Americanvolunteeringto help the British, whereupon
the leading Germanofficer spits at him. And Wayne gives him one blow to the
chin and knocks him down unconscious and escapes. Now, in Argentina,which
was neutralin favor of Germany,they eliminatedthe spittingso that all that hap-
pened was that this Germanofficer comes and looks at Mr. Wayne and Wayne
knocks him unconscious.And Waynebecomes the heavy. So of course I forbade
exhibition of that picturein Argentina.25

22 Heraldo de Cine 12:556, April 15, 1942.

23 "Pro-NazicampaignAgainst U.S. Pix for Argentine,"Variety,October26, 1942.
24 Usabel, High Noon, p. 170.
25
"An Oral History with Robert M. W. Vogel," interviewed by BarbaraHall. Beverly Hills, CA:
Academy of Motion PictureArts and Sciences, Oral History Program,1991, p. 185.

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252 HOLLYWOOD'S
ROGUENEIGHBOR

However, in Heraldo del cine, there was a review of the abovementioned

film in 1942 which suggests thatthe film was ultimatelyscreened.Based on
the review, it is clear that the re-cut version was the one not screened;nev-
ertheless, the screened version was three minutes shorterthan its original
length.26

Billy Wilder's Five Graves to Cairo (1943) produced by Paramount

would only be allowed in Argentinaif the following changes were made:the
Nazi officer Rommel, played by Erichvon Stroheim,was to be identified as
"Brommel"ratherthan by his real moniker. This was an easy change to
make, as the name was only mentionedtwice in the film. Anotherline that
an Argentinecensor requestedbe omitted was the monologue by von Stro-
heim/Rommel that: "We shall take the big, fat cigar out of Mr. Churchill's
mouth and make him say 'Heil."'27Although the U.S. studios reacted
angrily to censorship and notified authoritiesthat they would abandonthe
Argentinemarket,they stayed there.28

THE POLITICS OF THE SALE OF RAW FILM STOCK IN ARGENTINA, 1941-1945

The censorship of Hollywood films was serious, but it was only one of
the reasonswhy the U.S. punishedArgentinaby banningthe sale of raw film
stock. The U.S. government agencies composed of the War Production
Board, (WPB) the Office of the Coordinatorof Inter-AmericanAffairs, the
Board of Economic Warfareand the State Departmentmade decisions to
allocate quotas of raw film stock to various LatinAmerican countries on a
monthly basis. Argentina's quota, once reserved for purchase by Buenos
Aires agents, was instead sold to Mexico and Chile. At thatpoint, Argentina
no longer had access to Germanfilm stock, and was dependenton the U.S.
supply to keep its industryalive. When this boycott went into effect, it had
deleterious effects on the film industry.Only the two most powerful film
studios,ArgentinaSono Film and Lumiton,had enough reserves to last one
year of production.Countriessuch as Brazil and Chile had a black market
for film stock, but this was an expensive endeavor.

I would arguethaton the one hand,therewas a legitimatereasonto fearthat

the Argentine government, under Castillo's leadership was cooperating with
the Axis powers. It remained on friendly terms with Germany, Italy, and Eng-

26 I am gratefulto Daniel 'Parani' Sendr6s for pointing this out.

27 Pryor,"ArgentineCensor Strikes."
28 "U.S. Cos. Reported Exit from Argentina,"Variety,December 8, 1943. Cited in Usabel, High

Noon, p. 154.

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 L. FALICOV
TAMARA 253

land in termsof tradeand diplomacy.On a culturallevel, therewas evidence

of pro-Axisnewspaperswith ties to Germanysuch as El Pampero,La Fronda,
El Federal, Cabildo, and Clarinada, the latter which was also anti-Semitic.

At the same time, in the case of the film industry,the studio system in
Argentina was flourishing in the 1930s-1940s and was not dependent on
state support.In other words, governmentpolicy had very little bearing on
the content of the films because they were not getting subsidies of any kind.
In researchingthe possible link between the productionof pro-Axis propa-
ganda and the Argentinefilm industry,therehas only been one clear indica-
tion of evidence that Argentina Sono Film, the oldest film studio in
Argentina, was producing short newsreels sympatheticto the Axis. In an
article for the Hollywood Reporter,VincentPascal writes:

Therehavebeenchargesin severalArgentinepublicationsthatArgentinaSono
Film:(1) is financedby the GermanEmbassythroughits fiscalagencyhere,the
BancoGermanico; (2) thatits newsreel,NoticierosPanamericanos hasa distinct
Naziflavor,frequentlyshowstheGermanambassador, thebigwigsof theBanco
Germanicooften shows postersadvertisingGermanrailwaysin scenes of its
films;(3) thatthoseattheheadof theorganization, as well as its artisticandtech-
nical personnelareNaziphiles;(4) thatits picturesreceiveunusualamountsof
publicityin pro-Naziorgansandthatit patronizesthesesheetsto a greatextent
foradvertising its product;(5) thatrawandthenanti-democratic cracksaremade
to cropup on the dialogof some of its pictures;andfinally,(6) it is believed,
thoughtnot conclusivelyproven,this studioreceivesdirectsubsidiesfromthe
Embassy'sBancoGermanico. Thoughthesechangeswouldordinarily havebeen
open to ruinous libel suitsif not no
true, attempt has been made to denythem.29

The newsreel Noticieros Panamericanos was exhibited in Argentina,as

well as in Chile and Paraguay.The only other clear allegiance to the Axis in
the film sector was film critic Miguel P. Tato (known to be the renowned
"Nestor"in the newspaperEl Mundo), who was an overt Nazi sympathizer,
and in 1942 was employed as a press attach6of the JapaneseEmbassy.30
Moreover, in 1944 he was named by the government as the Supervising
Director in charge of productionof all governmentpropagandashorts and
documentaries.In addition, he wrote film reviews for the pro-Axis paper
Cabildo.31One other notoriously conservative film critic who allied with

29 Vincent de Pascal, "Argentina,"Hollywood February20, 1941.

30 "The Motion Picture Reporter,
Society for the Americas SubcommitteeMinutes"(1941-42), Record Group
229, memo no. 31, October 14, 1942, Beverly Hills, CA: Academy of Motion PictureArts and Sciences,
MargaretHerrickLibrary.
31 "Argentine
Notes," Hollywood Reporter,November 24, 1944.

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254 HOLLYWOOD'S
ROGUENEIGHBOR

Argentina Sono Film during this period was Ratil AlejandroApold, film
critic of El Mundowho became head of publicity at ArgentinaSono Film in
1941.32 Apold was later to become the most hard-line,right-wing censor in
Per6n'sadministration.However,this was the exception ratherthanthe rule,
accordingto Argentinefilm historianDomingo Di Nuibila.He writes that:

[In 1944]Washington couldbe calm:nowtherewas no dangerof infiltrationof

fascistideasin LatinAmericavia the cinema.Thiswas a tragicirony,because
despitethedominantpro-German elementsin the circlesof powerin Argentina,
ourcinemahadalwaysbeenfundamentally democraticandcontributed various
filmsto thethemeof freedom."33

Moreover,some studioheads such as Tito Bontanaof Baires Film Studios

because they refusedto work
were labeled by the U.S. as "ultra-democratic"
with any companydealing with the Axis. Botanawas quotedin a 1942 inter-
view stating:"Wehave even placed a Britishcompanyon our privateblack-
list because it was handlingan Axis product,and we won't advertiseany of
the company'sothernon-Axis merchandiseas long as it carriedthe other."34
In addition,therewere reportsthat manyArgentineproducerswere opposed
to government neutralitybut felt helpless in speaking outright. One pro-
ducer,who remainedunnamed,stated:

It is unfairto considerus all totalitarian-lovers

simplybecauseourgovernment
decidedto remainneutral.Themajorityof us areopposedto thatpolicy,butthere
is littlewe cando aboutit individually.Weproducers shouldnotbe penalizedfor
ourgovernment's but
policies, we believe--on the otherhand-thatwe shouldget
anevenbreakwithotherLatinAmericancountriessuchas BrazilandUruguayin
the shipmentof vitallyessentialmaterials.And raw film stock,to Argentina's
motionpictureindustrycanmeansavingor losinga $25,000,000investment.35

PRO-AXIS THEATRESIN OPERATION

Overall, it was not Argentine feature films themselves that could be

labeled Nazi propaganda,but rather that some Pro-Axis Argentine-made
newsreels and some German film imports were screened in a few movie
houses in Buenos Aires. Some of those theatres were the German studio

32 Heraldo de cine 9:520, July 30, 1941.

33 Domingo Di Nuibila,Historia del cine argentino (Buenos Aires: EditorialCruz de Malta, 1959),
vol. 2, p. 44.
34 "BumRumorof Nazi TieupAlmost Bulls U.S. Relations,"TheHollywood 18,
Reporter,February
1942.
35 "ArgentineFilms Need Help; Asks Vital U.S. Materials,"Hollywood Reporter,September 15,
1942.

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 L. FALICOV
TAMARA 255

UFA house, the TeatroSan Martin,the TeatroAlvear, the Astoria, and the
Cineac theatre. Usabel notes that in the interior,pro-Axis movies repre-
sented only one percent of films shown during World War II. In Buenos
Aires, only 12 movie houses out of the capital's 624 showed any pro-Axis
films.36Furthermore,to put this exhibitionof Germanfilms into perspective,
a 1943 study showed that in that year, there was a ratio of 65 U.S. films to
1 Germanfilm in Argentina.37

One task of the CoordinationCommitteeof Argentinawithin the OCIAA

was to set up blacklistsand grey lists of movie theatresthatshowed pro-Axis
films and otheranti-democraticcompanies.In BuenosAires, Hollywood dis-
tributorsreceived the official U.S. blacklist with 12,000 names of Argentine
exhibitors,producers,labs, distributors,and theaterowners with whom the
Americans were forbiddento conduct business.38This CoordinationCom-
mittee, working with the Motion Picture Division of the OCIAA, would
securethe cooperationof the Treasury,StateDepartment,Boardof Economic
Welfare, and other interestedagencies in enforcing the ban. For example,
KodakArgentinawas advised not to sell raw film stock to ArgentinaSono
Film, since their newsreels, Noticieros Panamericanoswere being screened
at the Cineac, a blacklistedtheatreowned by JuanL6pez Hojas.39

DEBATES WITHIN THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT

Thus, due to these inconsistencieswithinthe Argentinefilm industry(i.e. the

majority of film producers siding with the Allies but the government itself
applying censorship to U.S. films and other restrictions), the U.S. State
Departmenthad to carefully weigh the pros and cons of selling raw film
stock to Argentina.A 1944 State Departmentmemo from NormanArmour,
Ambassador to Argentina, sums up the debate well:

There may conceivably be some question as to whether or not it is completely

fair to the nationalproducingindustryto use the raw stock situationas a lever to
secure sympathetictreatmentfor Americanpicturesin terms of censorshipfrom
the ArgentineGovernment.If the aim is entirely one of helping to win the war,
and if an embargocan be expected to aid in achieving that aim, it is undoubtedly
justifiable, regardlessof who may be hurtin the process;if on the otherhand,the

36 Usabel, High Noon, p. 153.

37 "U.S. Has 65 to 1 Ratio over Nazi Pix in Argentine,"Hollywood Reporter, October 29, 1943,
pp. 1-2.
38 "Listof Blacklist in Argentine,"Variety,June 30, 1943, p. 25. Cited in Usabel, High Noon, p. 171.
39 "Resumeof Activities Directed to the Argentinein the Field of Motion Pictures,"no date [1942]
OCIAA collection, Motion PictureDivision folder, box 7, p. 6, RAC.

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256 HOLLYWOOD'S
ROGUE
NEIGHBOR

conceptof commercialadvantageis a partof the picture,and if an embargo

would result primarilyin benefit to Americancommercialinterestsat the
expenseof anArgentineindustry,the measuremaybe considerably morediffi-
cultto justify.40

NormanArmourexpressed concern about a conflict of interestthat could

occur by instituting a ban that could potentially foster the collapse of
Argentina'sfilm industryand, in essence, help the Hollywood film industry
maintaintheir edge in Argentina'smarket.41Clearly,he articulatesthe ten-
sion between politically underminingan industrythatmay have producedor
exhibited "enemy"propaganda,while at the same time abetting U.S. eco-
nomic interestsby securinga non-competitivemarketfor Hollywood films.
He goes on to characterizethis strategy as a "presentopportunity,heaven-
sent in thatpatriotismand self-interestcall for supportof the same action-
an embargoon raw stock for a competitorwho is becoming more and more
active, and whose very life depends for the moment on a single source of
supply."AmbassadorArmourconcludedthe memo by fearingthatArgentina
would see this boycott of raw film stock as a commercialmove ratherthan
an ideological one. While debatesemergedin variousmemos, ultimatelythe
agency decided to impose an embargoand thus punishArgentinauntil 1946.

GOOD NEIGHBOR COMPARISONS:

THE ARGENTINE VS. THE MEXICAN FILM INDUSTRY

Mexico's film industry,until this time, had been trailing Argentina in

terms of the technicalquality,as well as the quantityof its films. Duringthe
War,however, the Mexican film industryflourished, due in part to its spe-
cial treatmentby the United States. Mexican films increasedin output and
flowered into what is now called Mexico's "goldenage" of cinema from the
1940s to 1950s. According to Variety,the desire to position Mexico as the
most prolific and popularfilm producerin LatinAmerica was no secret:

A terrificU.S. pressureis beingexertedto eliminateArgentinaas the world's

greatestproducerof Spanishlanguagefilms, andelevateMexicointo the spot.

40 Memo by NormanArmour,U.S. Ambassadorto Argentinato State Department,May 16, 1944.

Record Group 229: Records of the Office of Inter-AmericanAffairs, 1937-1951. National Archives at
College Park,College Park,MD.
41 It is importantto point out that the United States was never seriously threatenedby Argentina's
dominationof the market,but rather,its marketsharemay have been compromisedto a certaindegree by
the success of Argentina'sfilms. As noted by Schnitman,"Evenwhen the Argentinefilm industryreached
a high point of 49 films in 1940, threeof the large NorthAmericancompanies (in this case, Paramount,
Metro, andWarner)could each release as many as that or more."Cited in Jorge Schnitman,"TheArgen-
tine Film Industry:A ContextualStudy"(Ph.D. dissertation,Palo Alto: StanfordUniversity, 1978, p. 73).

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 L. FALICOV
TAMARA 257

Actionis partof the squeezebeingexertedby this countryto blastArgentina

fromits friendlyattitudefromtheAxis. FrancisAlstock,filmchiefof the Com-
mitteeof Inter-American Affairs,is constantlyin andoutof Mexicohelpingthe
industry.The WarProductionBoard(WPB) has crackeddown hardon the
volumeof rawstockbeingshippedto Argentina,andis lavishwithMexico.42

In 1942 the Mexican film industryproduced49 films, but by 1944, its

productionincreasedto 78 films. As was previously mentioned,in 1944, the
same year, Argentina's production slid down to 24 films, a 50 percent
decrease from its 1942 level of 56.43 In 1944, a film critic for Varietycom-
mented that

The WPB is still awaitingwordfromthe StateDepartment on whatthe 1944

quotasto the variouscountriesshouldbe. Youwill recallthatabouta yearago,
theallotmentforArgentinawascutbackbecauseof herflirtingwiththeAxis and
Mexicoreceiveda 'super-colossal'footage.44

Reports stated that ratherthan receive 40 million feet of film from the
U.S., Argentinawould receive fifty percent less in 1943. This represented
the deepest cut in LatinAmerica. In contrast,Mexico would be "well taken
care of."45In an interdepartmental memo from the Motion PictureDivision
of the Coordinatorfor Inter-AmericanAffairs, there are reasons listed for
why the Hollywood film industryshould aid the Mexican film industrytech-
nically, materially,and financially.One reason given was:

Thefactis thatMexicowill neverbe a competitor of theAmericancompaniesno

matterhow muchhelp is given to the Mexicanindustry.But if betterSpanish
speakingpicturesweremadethroughthehelpextendedto theMexicanindustry,
it shouldresultin largeraudiences,newtheatres,anda strongandbettermotion
picturesituationin LatinAmerica.It shouldstronglystimulateanddevelopthe
marketforAmericanpictures.It shouldthenbecomemoreprofitable. TheAmer-
icancompanywhichhelpsthe mostmayreapthegreatestbenefit.46

Otherreasons offered were relatedto tax incentives given to Hollywood

that would make it risk-freeto invest in their Mexican counterparts.Finally,
the abovementionedauthor,Merwin L. Bohan, felt that the plan might have

42
"U.S. Ups Mex Films, Cuts Argentinafor Axis Stand,"Variety,May 17, 1943.
43 Schnitman,"TheArgentineFilm Industry,"p. 88.
44 Florence S. Lowe, "WashingtonHullabaloo,"Variety,February8, 1944.
45 "ArgentinePic Biz Faces 50% Raw Film Stock Snip," Variety,April 23, 1943.
46 Merwin L. Bohan, Counselor for Economic Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Argentina to U.S. State

Department:"Reasonswhy American industryshould give enthusiastic,strong supportfor plan." May

26, 1942, OCIAA collection, Motion PictureDivision Folder,box 7, RAC.

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258 ROGUENEIGHBOR
HOLLYWOOD'S

resulted "in developing Mexican talent, the best of which might be utilized
in America.""47 Otherefforts by the OCIAAto assist the Mexican film indus-
try included donatingfilm equipmentto help build film studios. In a memo
by John Hay Whitney and Francis Alstock, (both representativesof the
OCIAA), they stated that in orderto avoid a monopoly of film studios, the
OCIAA would help "consolidatethe interests of the Azteca and Stahl stu-
dios, and the other unit to be the Clasa studios."In addition,they commit-
ted to help set up a finance fund for Mexican motion picturesand promised
to send Hollywood film experts to help train Mexican technicians. Finally,
the OCIAA offered to "negotiatewith the AmericanMoving Pictureindus-
try for the commercial distributionof Mexican pictures in those countries
and territoriesrequestedby the producersof the Mexican Committee"(the
body who met with representativesof the OCIAA).48

Film scholar Roman Gubern explains why the United States aided the
Mexican film industry(while debilitatingArgentina):

The OCIAApolicyto favorthe Mexicanfilm industryhas a doubleadvantage

fromthe pointof view of UnitedStates'interests.Froman ideologicalperspec-
tive, anAlliedcountrywas a betterguaranteeof suitablemotionpicturecontent;
froman economicpointof view,reducingthe importance of theArgentinefilm
industryin LatinAmericasparedNorthAmericanfilm companiesa competitor
fromsomesectorsof theLatinAmericanfilm market,andit gaveNorthAmeri-
can entrepreneursthe opportunity in the developmentof the film
to participate
industryin Mexico(Forinstance,in 1945,49 percentof thestockof Churubusco
studios(themostimportant in Mexicoin the 1940s)was ownedby RKO.49

Thus, Mexico was seen by the Hollywood studios as a potentiallylucra-

tive place to invest in order to diversify their holdings. Argentina's film
industrydeclined primarilybecause it had to buy film stock on the black
marketfrom Chile and Brazil at inflated prices, thus incurringhigher pro-
duction costs.50 At the same time, U.S. films were enteringLatinAmerican
marketsat an unprecedentedpace, in part due to the shrinkageof Europe's
film markets,as previouslymentioned,which had virtuallyshutdown during

47 Bohan, "Reasons."
48
Memo on June 15th, 1942 signed by John Hay Whitney and FrancisAlstock declaringsupportfor
the Mexican moving pictureindustry,OCIAA collection, Motion PictureDivision folder, box 7, RAC.
49 Roman GubernHistoria de Cine, VolumenII (Barcelona:Lumen 1971), p. 95.
50 JuanCarlos Garate,longtime accountantof ArgentinaSono Film recountshow the companydealt
with the lack of film stock: "One business tactic . . . was to work with film stock as contrabandfrom
Brazil and Chile. I flew many times with rolls of film from Santiago, and I've walked many nights on
the portof Rio de Janeirotryingto put five to ten rolls of film on a ship [boundfor Buenos Aires]."Cited
in Claudio Espafia,ArgentinaSono Film (Buenos Aires: EditorialAbril, 1984), p. 272.

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 TAMARA
L. FALICOV 259

the war. In 1945, eight large U.S. distributioncompanies accountedfor 62

percentof all films releasedin Argentina.5" For this reason,therewas clearly
more at stake in systematicallyweakeningthe film industrythan simply the
threatof Nazi propaganda.In 1943, John B. Nathan,the managingdirector
of Paramountfor Argentina,Chile, Uruguay and Paraguaystated that "the
qualityof Argentinepicturesis steadilyimproving,andthey aregettingbetter
receptionfrom the public, especially the interior,where they are takingplay-
ing time away fromthe Hollywood product."52 In short,this politicalpressure
mountedby the U.S. State Departmentand other agencies stuntednational
film production.From that point on, the once-powerful film industrywas
never able to recoverits position as the most prolific and popularfilm indus-
try in LatinAmerica.The U.S. was able to use its economic power and dom-
inance to stifle what it perceivedto be a political-economicthreat.

Argentinadeclaredwar on the Axis on March27, 1945, about two weeks

before the war ended. Despite this however, the United States maintainedits
boycott of raw film stock until mid-1946 when the OCIAAwas disbanded.53
The budget for the OCIAA'sfirst year of operationwas $3.5 million; by the
end of the war it was $45 million. As Rockefeller reflected in 1945, "The
United States came in with a programof truthin answer to enemy lies."54
The Motion Picture Society of the Americas was the first of the war-born
agencies in Hollywood to be createdin April of 1941 and the last to be dis-
mantledon February28, 1946.

CONCLUSION

This paper examines what historianRonald Newton has typified as the

"Nazi menace" in Argentina,which was used as a way to justify how the
U.S. governmentisolated the Argentinefilm industry.By refusingto supply
it with raw film stock, the U.S. seriously underminedthe key to the film
industry'ssurvival.
In researchingarchival documents from the State departmentand other
film industrytrade magazines and memos, one can conclude that the eco-
nomic power of the Argentinefilm industryplayed a significantrole in the
motivations of U.S. actions taken against Argentinaduring World War II.

5' Schnitman,"TheArgentineFilm Industry,"p. 101.

52
"ArgentinePic Business Thrives:Homemade ProductTakingTradeaway from our films,"Holly-
wood Reporter,October 19, 1943.
53 C6sar Maranghello,"Cine y Estado" in Cine argentino 1933-1956: Industriay Clasicismo, ed.
Claudio Espafia(Buenos Aires: Fondo Nacional de las Artes, 2000), vol. 2, p. 56.
54 Smith, Talons,p. 83.

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260 ROGUE
HOLLYWOOD'S NEIGHBOR

While it is truethat the Argentinegovernmentwas censoring U.S. films, the

United States retaliatedto such an extent that it created a space for debate
on how far to starve the film industry.Although it was widely known that
the film industrywas democraticand pro-Allied (exceptingArgentinaSono
Film), still the U.S. bannedthe sale of raw film stock, thus contributingto
the film industry'sdemise.

In summary,there was a tension between political goals and economic

interests that in the end satisfied U.S. objectives. This case study of the
Argentine film industry during WWII provides an excellent counterargu-
ment to proponents of the structuralmarket school of economics who
believe that film industriessurvive because "people pay with their pocket-
book"to see films, as qualityand high productionvalues can help ensurethe
industry's success. In this case, it was political and economic forces that
helped force the demise of a healthy and successful film industryin Latin
America.

Universityof Kansas L. FALICOV

TAMARA
Lawrence,Kansas

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