G.R. No.

193854 September 24, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
DINA DULAY y PASCUAL, Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve an appeal from the Decision 1 dated August 4, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03725 affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated October 8, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 194, Paraaque City, finding appellant Dina Dulay guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A. No. 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) 8353 as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation.

The records bear the following factual antecedents:

Private complainant AAA3 was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister
introduced the appellant to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, appellant convinced AAA to
accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Before going to the said wake, they
went to a casino to look for appellant's boyfriend, but since he was not there, they went to Sto. Nio
at Don Galo. However, appellant's boyfriend was also not there. When they went to Bulungan Fish
Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish, they saw appellant's boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA,
appellant and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan
Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, appellant suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a
man known by the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to appellant and heard
"Speed" tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's
hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant's help when she saw the latter peeping
into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, "Speed" and
appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her.

AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and the latter
informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at Barangay San
Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the complaint to the police
station.

The Paraaque City Police Office (Women's and Children Concern Desk) asked the assistance of
the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, upon which the latter assigned the case
to Dr. Merle Tan. Consequently, with the consent of AAA and her mother, and in the presence of a
social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Dr. Tan conducted the
requisite interview and physical examination on AAA. Later on, Dr. Tan issued a Medico-Legal
Report4 stating that there was no evident injury in the body of AAA, but medical evaluation cannot
exclude sexual abuse. During her testimony, Dr. Tan explained that such impression or conclusion
pertains to the ano-genital examination and also stated that she found multiple abrasions on the
back portion of the body of AAA.5
Thus, an Information was filed, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of July 2005, in the City of Paraaque, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with one alias "Speed," whose true name and identity and present whereabouts is still
unknown, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, the herein accused Dina P.
Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee complainant AAA, 12 year old minor, to accused alias
"Speed," who with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge on said minor complainant AAA against her will
and without her consent, which act is prejudicial to the normal growth and development of the said
child.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

With the assistance of counsel de oficio, on August 3, 2005, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.7 Therafter, trial on the merits ensued.

To support the above allegations, the prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA and Dr. Merle
Tan. On the other hand, the defense presented the sole testimony of appellant which can be
summarized as follows:

Appellant met AAA a few days before June 2005 when the latter was introduced to her by her cousin
Eglay Akmad during the wake of a relative of AAA at Palanyag. The cousin of appellant was AAA's
neighbor at Palanyag. Around 1 o'clock in the morning of July 3, 2005, appellant averred that she
was at La Huerta, at the Bulungan Fish Port in Paraaque City with her cousin Eglay and stayed
there for about thirty (30) minutes. They then proceeded to the house of appellant's cousin in
Palanyag. In the said house, appellant saw "Speed" and two (2) other male persons. She also saw
AAA who was engaged in a conversation with "Speed" and his two (2) companions. She asked AAA
what she was doing there and the latter said that it was none of her business ("wala kang pakialam
sa akin"). Because of the response of AAA, appellant left the house and went home to General Trias,
Cavite.

On October 8, 2008, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding Accused Danilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for rape as a co-principal by
indispensable cooperation, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion
Perpetua under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and to pay the offended party the amount
of P 50,000.00 by way of damages.

The period of her detention shall be considered part of the service of her sentence.

SO ORDERED.8
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, the appellant brought the case to the CA. The latter,
on August 4, 2010, promulgated its decision affirming the ruling of the RTC with a modification on the
award of damages, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to
indemnify the offended party the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P 50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P 50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P 25,000.00)
as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, the present appeal.

In her Brief, appellant assigned the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

OF RAPE AS CO-PRINCIPAL BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AAA.10

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the appellee, refutes the above assignment of
errors by stating the following arguments:

I.

CONSPIRACY WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE.

II.

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.

III.

ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL CANNOT BE GIVEN GREATER

EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT THAN THE POSITIVE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.11
An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal
can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision on the basis of grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. 12

The appellant in this case was charged in the Information as having committed the crime of Rape
under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of
R.A. 7610. She was eventually convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape as a co-principal by
indispensable cooperation and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua as
provided under Article 266-B of the RPC.

In sustaining the conviction of the appellant as co-principal by indispensable cooperation, the CA,
ratiocinated:

To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or purpose does not
necessarily mean previous understanding, for it can be explained or inferred from the circumstances
of each case. The cooperation must be indispensable, that is, without which the commission of the
crime would not have been accomplished. x x x

xxxx

The proven facts and circumstances obtaining in this case fall squarely on the above-cited example.
It will be noted that the cooperation of the accused-appellant consisted in performing an act which is
different from the act of execution of the crime committed by the rapist. Accused-appellant
cooperated in the perpetration of the crime of rape committed by "Speed" by acts without which the
crime would not have been consummated, since she prepared the way for the perpetration thereof,
convinced the victim to go with her under the guise of looking for her boyfriend and upon arrival at
the kubuhan, she pulled the victim inside a room where "Speed" was waiting, delivered the victim to
him, and then after receiving some amount of money from "Speed" she settled in another room
together with her boyfriend so that "Speed" might freely consummate the rape with violence and
intimidation, as he did.13

However, this Court is of another view and does not subscribe to the findings of the trial court, as
sustained by the CA that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal by
indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape.

Under the Revised Penal Code,14 an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation,
by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one
must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation
in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.15 Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts
committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events
narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received
money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone
could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could
still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary
consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the
appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information, as well as in the
testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by
"Speed." Thus:

PROS. R. GARCIA: Now, what happened after you met this Dina Dulay?

WITNESS AAA: She invited me to go with her boyfriend, Sir.

xxxx

Q: You went to the bulungan, what happened when you reached the fish port or bulungan, AAA?

A: Pumunta kami sa kubuhan, Sir.

Q: Where is this kubuhan located in relation to the fish port?

A: At the back portion, Sir.

Q: And, when you said pumunta kami, who was then your companion in going to that kubuhan?

A: Dina Dulay and her boyfriend, Sir.

Q: Do you know the name of the boyfriend of Dina Dulay?

A: No, Sir.

xxxx

Q: All right. After reaching the kubuhan, what happened next?

A: Pina-rape po ako, Sir.

Q: What made you say AAA that accused here Dina Dulay had you raped at the kubuhan?

A: Kasi po binayaran siya nung lalaki, Sir.

Q: Now, do you know how much this Dina Dulay was paid by that person who was you said raped
you?

A: No, Sir. I just saw them.

Q: And what did you see that was paid to Dina?

A: Pera, Sir.
Q: Aside from seeing a guy giving money to Dina Dulay, did you hear any conversation between this
Dina Dulay and that man who gave money to her?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court AAA, what was that conversation you heard between this Dina
Dulay and the person who gave money to her?

A: He said to look for a younger girl, Sir.16

xxxx

PROS. R. GARCIA:

Q: Okay. After that conversation and the giving of money to Dina Dulay, what happened to you and
the man?

A: He raped me, Sir.

Q: Where were you raped?

A: At the Kubuhan, Sir. Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court how you were raped by that
person?

A: He tied me up, Sir.

Q: How were you tied up as you said?

A: He tied up both my hands, Sir.

Q: Then after tying your hands what happened next?

A: He raped me and he pointed a knife at me, Sir.

Q: When you said you were raped, are you referring to the insertion of his penis into your sex organ?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And, how did you feel at that time when the organ of this man was inserted into your organ?

A: It was painful, Sir.

Q: And, how did you react when as you said you were being raped by this person?

A: I cannot talk. He put clothes in my mouth, Sir.

Q: For how long did you stay in that kubuhan with this man? May isang oras ba kayo doon?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Now, tell us how AAA many times did this person insert his penis into your organ?

A: Only one (1) AAA, Sir.17

It must be clear that this Court respects the findings of the trial court that AAA was indeed raped by
considering the credibility of the testimony of AAA. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court
and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal. 18However, the review of a criminal case opens up the case in its
entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed,
thus, avoiding general conclusions based on isolated pieces of evidence. 19 In the case of rape, a
review begins with the reality that rape is a very serious accusation that is painful to make; at the
same time, it is a charge that is not hard to lay against another by one with malice in her mind.
Because of the private nature of the crime that justifies the acceptance of the lone testimony of a
credible victim to convict, it is not easy for the accused, although innocent, to disprove his guilt.
These realities compel this Court to approach with great caution and to scrutinize the statements of
a victim on whose sole testimony conviction or acquittal depends.20

In this light, while this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a
principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or
the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which states
that:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:

(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not
limited to, the following:

(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral

advertisements or other similar means;

(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;

(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or

 (5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution.21

The elements of paragraph (a) are:

1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;

2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:

a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral

advertisements or other similar means;

c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;

d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or

e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with

intent to engage such child in prostitution;

3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and

4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.22

Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It
contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a),
the child is abused primarily for profit.23

As alleged in the Information and proven through the testimony of AAA, appellant facilitated or
induced child prostitution. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.24 Thus, the act of apellant in convincing AAA, who was 12 years old at that time, to go
with her and thereafter, offer her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable under the
above-mentioned law. The purpose of the law is to provide special protection to children from all
forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development.25 A child exploited in prostitution may seem to "consent" to what is being done to
her or him and may appear not to complain. However, we have held that a child who is "a person
below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or
condition" is incapable of giving rational consent 26 to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.

It must be noted that in the Information, it was alleged that appellant was accused of Rape under
Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A.
7610, and then went on to enumerate the elements of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610 in its body. The
Information partly reads:

x x x the herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee complainant AAA, 12
year old minor, to accused alias "Speed," who with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge on said
minor complainant AAA against her will and without her consent x x x 27

Undoubtedly, the above-quoted falls under Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, the appellant acting as a
procurer of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution. It must be remembered that the character
of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they may be conclusions of law,
but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. 28 The
sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in
the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which
adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.29 1wphi1

To dispute the allegation and the evidence presented by the prosecution, appellant merely
interposes the defense of denial. It is well settled that denial is essentially the weakest form of
defense and it can never overcome an affirmative testimony, particularly when it comes from the
mouth of a credible witness.30

Anent the penalty, for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610, the penalty
prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Therefore, in the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by the law. 31 Notwithstanding
that R.A. 7610 is a special law, appellant may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.32 Since the penalty provided in R.A. 7610 is taken from the range of penalties in the Revised
Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. 33 Thus,
appellant is entitled to a maximum term which should be within the range of the proper imposable
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to
20 years) and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period
(ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months).34

As to the award of damages, the same must be consistent with the objective of R.A. 7610 to afford
children special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination and with the principle that
every person who contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify
the latter for the same.35Therefore, civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case involving violation of
Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610. This is also in compliance with Article 100 of the RPC which
states that every person criminally liable is civilly liable. Hence, the amount of P 50,000.00 civil
indemnity ex delicto as awarded in cases of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610 36 shall
also be the same in cases of violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of appellant Dina Dulay y Pascual is hereby DISMISSED. However, the
Decision of the CA is hereby MODIFIED as appellant is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape, but of violating Section 5 (a), Article III R.A. 7610, amended, for which she is
sentenced to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is also ORDERED to pay AAA the amount
of P 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172707 October 1, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO
Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y
KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON
A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision1 dated 28 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated 16 October 1998, finding accused-appellants Halil
Gambao y Esmail, Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula, Raul Udal y
Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol y Katol, Monette
Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and Thian Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.

The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged under the criminal
information3 which reads:

Criminal Case No. 98-0928

For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659

That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 oclock in the evening at No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay City
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named-accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and
there by force and intimidation, and the use of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for the
purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for her release
amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of
Lucia L. Chan in the said amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the Civil Code.

The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case: 4

Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish deliveries, which
were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11 August 1998, two
persons, one of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chans residence at
FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been mistakenly
placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the two left. The
next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion identified as Tony Abao (Abao), returned
looking for Chan but were told that she was out. When the two returned in the afternoon, Chan
informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to accompany them to
the airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined
and told Chan that they would be back later that evening.5

Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to Chans

residence that evening. Chans houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the
stairs.6 Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chans son, Levy Chan
(Levy), and the house companions.7 As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy
tried to stop the man by grabbing his mothers feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levys
head forcing the latter to release his grip on Chans feet. 8 Levy thereafter proceeded to the Pasay
Police Headquarters to report the incident.9

Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van. 10 After travelling for about two hours, the group
stopped at a certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not to
shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two women, 11 later
identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad). 12 Chan was
brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and
Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol).13 Ronas and Evad threatened Chan that she would be killed unless
she paid 20 Million Pesos.14

On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the "Tamaraw FX" van.
After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan was brought to
a room on the second floor of the house. Inside the room were three persons whom Chan identified
in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao). 15 Another woman, later
identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived. 16 At about 9:00 oclock in the evening, a man who
was later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and asked Chan
"Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?"17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim
(Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan that he was sent by their boss to
ask her how much money she has.18 Chan was instructed to talk to her son through a cell phone and
she gave instructions to her son to get the P75, 000.00 she kept in her cabinet. 19 The group then
talked to Chans son and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mothers release. It was
agreed upon that Levy was to deliver P400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia
Avenue.20

Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who were
assigned at the Pasay City area to conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping, were
informed that the abductors called and demanded for ransom in exchange for Chans
release.21 During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red
Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victims residence. The inspectors observed
that the occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the house. The inspectors
and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth
Resort and stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in the cottage
was the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to
conduct a rescue operation.22

On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information that the
abductors acceded to a P400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at
Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning of the information, the team immediately and
strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a light
blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the ransom money and
headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team successfully intercepted the
van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The
team was also able to recover the P400,000.00 ransom.23

At about 5:00 oclock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted Cottage No. 1,
resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of her abductors, later identified
in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas. 24

During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim manifested his
desire to change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then explained the
consequences of a change of plea, stating: "It would mean the moment you withdraw your previous
pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, as in fact it
has received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will [outrightly] sentence you to the penalty
provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished the presentation of its evidence. Now that I
have explained to you the consequences of your entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous of
entering a plea of guilty?" Eddie Karim answered, "Yes." 25 On hearing this clarification, the other
appellants likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier conferred with them and
explained to each of them the consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change the pleas
they entered. The trial court separately asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal,
Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they understood the consequence of changing
their pleas. All of them answered in the affirmative. 26Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to
change his plea and assured the trial court that he understood the consequences of such change of
plea.27 Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty, 28 the trial
court directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao,
Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom.
Hence, they appealed to the CA.

In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications the decision of the
trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y
ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL
y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y
KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION that each of them is ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages.

It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON was only 17 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 29

Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the
appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.

In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs. The issues raised by the accused-appellants in their respective briefs, supplemental briefs
and manifestations will be discussed collectively.

Insufficiency of Evidence

Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court believe that the witness, Chan,
was not able to positively identify them because of her failing eyesight due to old age.

This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and the CA found Chans testimony
credible and straightforward. During her testimony, she positively identified the accused-appellants.
If she had not met them before, she could not have positively identified them in open court. In fact,
the participation of these accused-appellants was further established through the testimonies of the
other prosecution witnesses.

Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for
the trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great
respect on appeal. They are conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or
unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been
considered.31 In People v. Taedo,32 this Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling that findings of fact
of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great respect since it had the
opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified in court. 33 It can be observed that the
briefs submitted by the accused-appellants are replete with generalities and wanting in relevant
particulars. It is for this reason that we are giving full credence to the findings of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witness Chan.

Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is insufficient. We also find her
argument bereft of merit.

The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of the seven people apprehended
when they conducted the rescue operation at around 5:00 oclock in the morning of 14 August
1998,34 and the positive identification of Perpenian by Chan constituted adequate evidence working
against her defense of denial.

Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants proffered was denial. It is
established jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses positive identification of the
accused-appellants, more so where the defense did not present convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the
commission of the crime.35

The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant testimonies of witnesses
and the absence of evidence other than mere denial proffered by the defense lead this Court to give
due weight to the findings of the lower courts.

Improvident Plea

As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for
kidnapping for ransom is death. A review of the records 36 shows that on 7 October 1998, the
accused-appellants withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and were re-arraigned. They subsequently
entered pleas of "guilty" to the crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense. This Court, in
People v. Oden,37 laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense. The trial court is mandated:

(1)

to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
the plea of guilt,

(2)

to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability, and

(3)

to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do
so if he desires.38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible
punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of
an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court
and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and
consequence of his plea.39 Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court
on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea. 40

Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on a
free and informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no cogent reason for deviating
from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence41 and thus, adopts the same:

Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching
inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines should be observed:

Ascertain from the accused himself

(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;

(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and

(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is
intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a
state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or
simply because of the judges intimidating robes.

Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a
free and informed plea of guilty.

Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the
certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope
of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a
lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the
accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not
only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment.

Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the
elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him and a denial of his right to due process.

All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.

The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused
must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.

It is evident from the records 42 that the aforesaid rules have not been fully complied with. The
questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants fully
understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the records 43 that
Karim had the mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and
that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the
penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not warned by the trial court
judge that in cases where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected
by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court judges seemingly annoyed
statement that a conditional plea is not allowed, as provided below, is inadequate:

Atty. Ferrer:

Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before the trial. For accused Eddie Karim
we manifest and petition this court that he be allowed to be re-arraigned Your Honor please,
considering that he will plead guilty as charged but the imposable penalty is lowered, Your Honor.

Court:

You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law says. You plead guilty, no condition
attached. Conditional plea is not allowed.

Atty. Ferrer:

Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already repenting

Court:

Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should be no condition attached.
We cannot make that condition and dictate to the court the penalty. 44

Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenians, were improvidently made, this Court will still not
set aside the condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judges shortcomings, we still agree
with his ruling on accused-appellants culpability.

As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the cases are
remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the trial court,
however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in this case, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on
evidence proving the commission of the offense charged. 45 The manner by which the plea of guilty is
made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused. 46

Contrary to accused-appellants assertions, they were convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of
their plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, which was
properly appreciated by the trial court. 47 The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused-
appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.

Degree of Culpability

Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy,
insofar as they were concerned, was not convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his argument on
the fact that he was not one of those arrested during the rescue operation based on the testimony of
Inspector Ouano.48 On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their argument on the fact that they
had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom money.

We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the cottage during the
rescue operation, the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he was one
of the four people apprehended when the police intercepted the "Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols
Tollgate.49 Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently established that Ronas and
Evad were two of those who were arrested during the rescue operation. 50 This Court has held before
that to be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even
take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy.51 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,
since all the conspirators are principals. 52 Moreover, Chan positively identified the accused-
appellants and placed all of them at the crime scenes.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long standing opinion of
this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred
from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime
indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
offense.53 The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the accused-
appellants and how they were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There were
testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to
the victims house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in guarding the
victim; and (3) the accused appellants were those present when the ransom money was recovered
and when the rescue operation was conducted.

Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was established beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered
evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
In Perpenians Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Courts attention to the manifestation made by
the prosecution regarding their disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she was concerned. 55 However,
pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Judge Mogul, 56 once the information is filed, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the
exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the courts; more so in this case, where no
Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution.

The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers and lied several times
under oath during the trial. 57 Perpenian lied about substantial details such as her real name, age,
address and the fact that she saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why she lied several
times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or identified with the other accused-
appellants. The lying and the fear of being identified with people whom she knew had done wrong
are indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore, that there was an ongoing crime being
committed at the resort while she was there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the
consequences of the unlawful act.

As reflected in the records,58 the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her
responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution had was the testimony 59 of
Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian entered the room where the victim was
detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this
Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an
accomplice to the crime.

Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the Revised
Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be
community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or
simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in
an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability. Assuming
1wphi1

arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she
acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan being guarded in
the room. A rational person would have suspected something was wrong and would have reported
such incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even
spent the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present and giving moral support
when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime
committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellants presence and company were not
indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only
liable as an accomplice.62 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. Clemente, et
al.,63 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered
as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.

Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and considering the
evidence presented by the prosecution, linking accused-appellants participation in the crime, no
doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA convicted the accused-appellants of kidnapping for
ransom and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death, applying the provisions of Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, 64 we
modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua, without
eligibility for parole.

Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of
R.A. No. 9344,65 a determination of whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary.
Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, her minority should be appreciated not as an exempting circumstance,
but as a privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.

Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344, 66 the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
shall still be applied even if he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the aforesaid
provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344, 67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of
only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. This
leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled
that death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part of the
equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, 68 the penalty imposed by law on
accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the
penalty one degree lower than what the principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua). 69 Applying
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to
Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that prescribed by law (Reclusion
Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty,
which is one degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of Prision
Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent
any aggravating circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court
imposes the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.

As regards Perpenians possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility in

accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v. Jacinto 70 that the age of the
child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment is not material. What
matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This Court,
however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that Perpenians actual
served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense. For such reason, she may
be immediately released from detention.
We note that in the Order 71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial court admitted the documentary evidence
offered by the counsel for the defense proving that the real name of Thian Perpenian is Larina
Perpenian.

In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is relieved of all personal and
pecuniary penalties attendant to the crime, his death 72 having occurred before rendition of final
judgement.73

There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities arising from the commission of kidnapping for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code. The persons convicted were held liable for P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P75,000.00
as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages, where, as in this case,
the penalty for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed because of the
provisions of R.A. No. 9346:75

1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus
needs no proof; and

3. P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.

These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the penalty warranted
by the facts but is not imposable under present law.

The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros76 is instructive on the apportionment of civil
liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be
apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the
degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Hence, each principal
accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages
than Perpenian who was adjudged as only an accomplice.

Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them shall be liable for
the total amount of P300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable for P288,000.00
(or P32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who shall be liable for P12,000.00. This is broken down
into P10,666.67 civil indemnity,P10,666.67 moral damages and P10,666.67 exemplary damages for
each principal; and P4,000.00 civil indemnity, P4,000.00 moral damages and P4,000.00 exemplary
damages for the lone accomplice.

WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00863
is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL,
EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI,
THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL
and NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility
of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellants are
ordered to indemnify the victim in the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as
moral damages andP100,000.00 as exemplary damages apportioned in the following manner: the
principals to the crime shall jointly and severally pay the victim the total amount of P288,000.00 while
the accomplice shall pay the victimP12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code on
several and subsidiary liability.

The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release THIAN PERPENIAN
A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN due to her having fully served the penalty imposed on her, unless her
further detention is warranted for any other lawful causes.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the
Correctional Institute for Women by personal service. The Director of the Correctional Institute for
Women shall submit to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the decision, the
action he has taken thereon.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 190475 April 10, 2013

JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37,
Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of
Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.

Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:

That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with intent
of gain for himself or for another. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and
acquire from unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth P65, 975.00, belonging to
FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have
been derived from the crime of robbery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC found
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the guilt
of the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1612 also known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of 10 years and 1 day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.

SO ORDERED.4

Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTCs
finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009.

Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.

The Facts

The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:

Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100 by
20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount of P223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber
Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires.
Private complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10,
1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by their serial
numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the
warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat,
Paraaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse,
was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight
(38) tires remained inside the warehouse.

On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight
(38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private
complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at
Fort Bonifacio.

Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business
establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant
chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by
appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply
Firestone tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the
description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse,
based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked appellant if
he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private
complainant then left the store and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the
Southern Police District.

On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation
on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3
Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito
Atienza was appointed as the poseur-buyer.

On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police
District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in
the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted
themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14
Firestone truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display, which
Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more in stock.

Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which
was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private complainant
entered the store, inspected them and found that they were the same tires which were stolen from
him, based on their serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the
buy-bust team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the
warehouse.

After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside
appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen truck
tires be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was
already past 10:00 in the evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police
station for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate thirteen (13)
tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed by
private complainant as stolen from his warehouse. 5

For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the
business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any
knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February
1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from
Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City, for P3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for P45,500, for which he
was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware &
General Merchandise (Gold Link).6

Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The
poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes
later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those
items were stolen tires.7

The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in
the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the
presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D.
1612.8

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty
from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional. 9

OUR RULING

The Petition has no merit.

Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should
have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain
for oneself or for another.10

We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence
in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this case.

First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were
stolen testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was
able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 4565 11 dated 10 November 1994 and
an Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as
evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay 13 taken at the Southern Police District at Fort
Bonifacio.14 The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila
on 27 February 1995.

Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never
denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not
establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13)
out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial
numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ongs possession. 15 Ong likewise admitted that
he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total amount of 45,500 where he was issued
Sales Invoice No. 980.16

Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know"
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24)
years,18 ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller.
Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for
proof of ownership of the tires. 19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of
tires happened in just one day.20 His experience from the business should have given him doubt as
to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and
the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.

In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:

Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of
the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include
the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of
commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly
engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and
therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612
that "mere possession of any goods, . . ., object or anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" a presumption that is, according to
the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of .
. . possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." xxx.22

Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D. 1612
1wphi1

requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item,
object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the
necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the
town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the
public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for
some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a
diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.

In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for all
1wphi1

practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and
may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable. 23 In this
case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove
that Gold Link and its address were fictitious.24 Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by
the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the
prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation,
Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.

Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of
the 25 property.

The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on P5,075 for each tire
recovered, or in the total amount of P65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four
(44) tires from Philtread in the total amount of P223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides a disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair
and regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of business is not overturned
in the absence of the evidence challenging the regularity of the transaction between Azajar ,and Phil
tread.

In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not find
sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong for violation
of P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision
correccional.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 181184 January 25, 2012

MEL DIMAT, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the need to prove in the crime of "fencing" that the accused knew or ought to
have known that the thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or robbery.

The Facts and the Case

The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law 1 before the
Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03, in Criminal Case 02-202338.

Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben
Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgados wife, Sonia, bought from accused
Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave
the vehicles engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.

On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted
the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After
stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-
119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on
their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that
it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.

Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818, which
he mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25,
1998 at Robinsons Gallerias parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.

For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in
good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine
number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle
to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which
the police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not actually the same
vehicle.

On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and sentenced him
to an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion
temporal. The court also ordered him to pay P850,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.

On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR 29794 2 the RTC decision
but modified the penalty to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period,
as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as
maximum, thus, the present appeal.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat
knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from
Mantequilla.

The Ruling of the Court

The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no
part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes,
or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or theft;
(3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he
intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.3

Here, someone carnapped Mantequillas Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in
December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for P850,000.00. Dimats defense is that the Nissan Safari
he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis
number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those transactions. The
Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-119136 and
chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.
But Dimats defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on
the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the
Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct
numbers of the vehicles engine and chassis.

Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a
special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of
criminal intent.4 Of course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known
that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and
that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.1wphi1

Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan
Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of
registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of
registration and official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat
insists that Tolentinos failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado
himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt.

Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt.
But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no
documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new
documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still,
Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering
her purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand
accused in the case.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 2007 in
CA-G.R. CR 29794.

G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SALVADOR ARROJADO, accused-appellant.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, finding accused-
appellant Salvador Arrojado guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 30 years
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amounts of P60,000.00 as civil indemnity, P80,000.00 as moral
damages, and the costs to the heirs of the victim Mary Ann Arrojado.2

The Information against accused-appellant alleged:

That on or about the 1st day of June, 1996, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Mary Ann Arrojado, on the different parts of the
body, to wit:

1. Stab wound, gaping, 1.5 cm. Length with a depth of 5 cm. Located at the supra
sternal area;

2. Stab wound, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 10 cm. depth, directed downward
5 cm. above the left nipple area the level of midclavicular line;

3. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 2.5 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. depth,
located 4 cm. above the left nipple area, midclavicular line;

4. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 18.5 3 cm. in depth,
directed medially downward, located 3 cm. above the left nipple, midclavicular line;

5. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 10.5 cm. depth, located
3 cm. medial to the left nipple;

6. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in depth,
directed laterally downward, located, 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally downward,
located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;

7. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in depth,
directed laterally, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;

8. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. in depth
directed downward, located at the xiphoid area;

9. Stab wound, elongated gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 4 cm. in depth, directed
medially, located 4 cm. below the left nipple;

10. Stab wound penetration, measuring 4 x 4 cm. in length with [e]visceration of the
small intestine;

Thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of her death.

That by reason of the death Mary Ann Arrojado, her heirs incurred actual and moral
damages which may be awarded under the Civil Code of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The information was read and explained to accused-appellant in his native dialect, after which he
pleaded not guilty.5 Trial on the merits then ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution shows the following:

Accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado and the victim Mary Ann Arrojado are first cousins, their fathers
being brothers. The victim's father, Alberto Arrojado, who was living in Canada, suffered a stroke for
which reason he decided to come home to Roxas City and spend the remainder of his days there.
The victim accompanied her father to the Philippines. They eventually settled in a house in Barangay
Tanque, Roxas City, where they lived on the financial support of the victim's sister Asuncion, who
continued to live in Canada, and her brother Buenaventura, who continued to live in Canada, and
her brother Buenaventura, who lived in Manila.

Starting February 15, 1996, accused-appellant lived with the victim and her father. He helped care
for the victim's father, for which he was paid a P1,000.00 monthly salary.6

In the early morning of June 1, 1996, accused-appellant went to the house cousin, Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim had committed suicide. In response, Erlinda, together with
her husband Romulo Magdaluyo and her father Teodorico Arrojado, went with accused-appellant to
the house in Barangay Tanwue where they found the victim dead. The victim, who was bloodied,
was lying on her left side facing the bedroom door with her hands clasped together. On her bed was
a rosary and a cruifix. Near her was a knife (Exh. C). 7Erlinda recognized it to be the knife kept in the
kitchen. Erlinda also noticed that the electric fan was turned on full blast, while all the windows were
closed except the window on the east side which was slightly open. As he went to the other room,
where the victim's father stayed, accused-appellant told Erlinda that he was afraid he might be
suspected as the one responsible for the victim's death.8

The matter was reported to the police which noticed that the victim's room "was very neat as if
nothing happened." The police saw no signs of forcible entry.9 They made a sketch of the victim's
position in relation to the whole house (Exh. D)10 and took pictures of her (Exhs. E-E-3).11

Dr. Ma. Lourdes Roldan, of the Roxas City Health Office, conducted the postmortem examination of
the victim at 1:30 p.m. of June 1, 1996. Her findings revealed that the victim sustained the following
stab wounds:

1. Stab wound, gaping, 1.5 cm. Length with a depth of 5 cm. Located at the supra sternal
area;

2. Stab wound, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 10 cm. depth, directed downward 5 cm.
above the left nipple area the level of midclavicular line;

3. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 2.5 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. depth, located 4 cm.
above the left nipple area, midclavicular line;

4. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 18.5 3 cm. in depth, directed
medially downward, located 3 cm. above the left nipple, midclavicular line;
 5. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 10.5 cm. depth, located 3 cm.
medial to the left nipple;

6. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in depth, directed
laterally downward, located, 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally downward, located 2 cm.
medial to the left nipple;

7. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in depth, directed
laterally, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;

8. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. in depth directed
downward, located at the xiphoid area;

9. Stab wound, elongated gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 4 cm. in depth, directed
medially, located 4 cm. below the left nipple;

10. Stab wound penetration, measuring 4 x 4 cm. in length with [e]visceration of the small
intestine;12

Dr. Roldan testified that the victim died at around midnight of May 31, 1996 from wound nos. 2, 4, 6,
7, and 10, which she deemed fatal. 13 Thus, in the victim's death certificate (Exb. B), 14 she listed
"HEMORRHAGIC SHOCK as the victim's immediate cause of death and "multiple stab wounds" as
the antecedent cause.

Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that the relationship between the victim and accused-appellant
had been strained as the victim constantly picked on accused-appellant even for the slighest
mistake. Erlinda remembered the scolding that the victim gave accused-appellant on May 27, 1996
over the loss of keys. Accused-appellant was badly hurt by the victim's tonguelashing, according to
Erlinda, and complained to the victim, "You're too much." Erlinda said she offered to take the victim
in her house, but the latter refused, saying that her place was with her father. The victim entrusted,
however, her jewelry and bank book with signed withdrawal slips to Erlinda. Three days later, on May
30, 1996, Erlinda returned the same and told the victim that she should no be afraid of accused-
appellant because he was taking care of both her (the victim) and her father. Erlinda said she again
met the victim on May 31, 1996 when she reminded the latter of their agreement to go out the
following day, June 1, 1996. On that day, however, the victim was found dead. 15

Another relative of accused-appellant and the victim, Thelma Arrojado, corroborated Erlinda's
testimony. The father of Thelma's husband, Roque Arrojado, is a brother of the victim's father and
that of accused-appellant. Thelma said that she and her husband lived at one time with the victim,
and she knew the latter to be a snob ("suplada") and overly strict. Because they did not get along
with the victim, Thelma and her husband eventually left. She testified that accused-appellant was
angry at the victim and in fact passed by her store thrice (on May 27, 29, and 31, 1996), complaining
to her of the victim's maltreatment of him.16

Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He told the court that on June 1, 1996, at around 6:00 a.m.,
Alberto Arrojado asked him for food, so accused-appellant went to the kitchen to find out if the victim
had already prepared breakfast. When accused-appellant found that the victim was not in the
kitchen, he proceeded to the victim's room. From the doorway, he saw the victim lying on her bed,
bloodied. He thought that the victim had committed suicide because the victim had told him that she
felt tied down taking care of her father. She in fact once remarked that "It would be better that my
father and I commit suicide." Accused-appellant said that the victim scolded him only once and that
was for buying rotten cabbage.17 He said that the victim was the one who was constantly being
scolded by her father who often found fault with her. When presented with the knife found on the
victim's bed (Exh. C), accused-appellant admitted he was familiar with the knife as he saw the victim
using it in kitchen.
1wphi1.nt

On April 21, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds and declares accused Salvador
Arrojado GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of murder, defined and
penalized by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act
7659, and, there being no aggravating circumstance, hereby sentences him to imprisonment
of thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnity the heirs of the deceased Mary
Ann Arrojado in the amount of P60,000.00, pay them moral damages of P80,000.00, and pay
the costs of this action.

In the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, the accused, who is a
detention prisoner and not otherwise disqualified, shall be credited with the full time of his
confinement under preventive imprisonment, provided he voluntarily agrees in writing to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoners, pursuant to Art. 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.18

The trial court held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict accused-appellant for
the victim's death. In its decision, the trial court said:

The accused was the only person in the world who had the strong motive to eliminate from
earthly existence the deceased, who had no known enemies, as he could no longer endure
the verbal abuse to which he was frequently subjected, even on trivial matters, by the
deceased whom he must have perceived as his evil tormetor. Being older [but] every now
and then scolded, insulted, and humiliated, he must have felt that the deceased had no
respect for him as a person and elder cousin. Suicide being physically impossible and there
being no shared of evidence showing that an intruder could have surreptitiously entered the
house as all doors and windows were securely closed, the killing could have been done only
by someone who was already inside the house. Certainly it could not have been the
deceased's old and invalid father who could not stand on his own, much less walk from his
room to the kitchen, get the fatal weapon, the kitchen knife, from where it was placed therein,
walk to his daughter's room, and then stab her. As there were only the three of them inside
the house, that leaves no one else, by the process of elimination, who could have
perpetrated the dastardly act but the accused who had the only motive to do it and who was
inside the house at the time of the commission of the crime. Reinforcing this conclusion is
 the admission of the accused that when he peeped into the room of the deceased and
allegedly saw for the first time the lifeless body of the victim, he was already sure, even
without going near or touching her body and asking aloud what happened to her, that she
was already dead because he stabbed her not only once, but ten (10) times, inflicting five (5)
mortal wounds. And he had the gall to attribute his cousin's untimely death to suivide
because he could not concoct any other reason to save himself.19

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellants assigns the following errors as allegedly having been
committed by the trial court:

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MARY ANN ARROJADO WAS
STABBED TEN TIMES AT HER HOME.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT MARY ANN ARROJADO
COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED SUICIDE.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE HOUSE OF MARY ANN
RROJADO WAS TOTALLY CLOSED AND LOCKED AGAINST INTRUDERS.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS

ABUSED AND OPPRESSED BY MARY ANN ARROJADO THAT LED ACCUSED-
APPELLANT TO KILL MARY ANN ARROJADO.20

First. Accused-appellant claims that most of the victim's wounds were inflicted after she had already
committed suicide to make it appear that she was murdered. He says that he saw only one wound in
the victim's stomach,21while Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo said she saw only two wounds, one on the
victim's neck and the other in her abdomen. These are wound nos. 1 and 10 in the postmortem
examination.22 Of these two, the stomach wound was fatal, according to Dr. Roldan. 23 accused-
appellant says that the other wounds may have been inflicted on the victim between the time the
body was brought out of the house in the morning and the time Dr. Roldan examined the same at
around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon og June 1, 1996 at the De Jesus funeral parlor.24

Accused-appellant's contention has no merit. That accused-appellant only saw one wound while
Erlinda Magdaluyo saw two one wound while Erlinda Magdaluyo saw two wounds on the victim does
not necessarily mean that the other wounds were inflicted upon the victim afterwards. The two might
have simply missed seeing the other wounds. In accused-appellant's case, it may be because he did
not go inside the room but only viewed the body from a distance. 25 On the other hand, while Erlinda
Arrojado Magdaluyo went near the victim's chest because the latter was dressed. 26 But Dr. Roldan,
who conducted a postmortem examination, testified that the victim actually sustained ten wounds.
Between the cursory examination of the victim by accused-appellant and Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo and Dr. Roldan's exhaustive examination, there is no doubt that the latter's findings are
entitled to credence.

Accused-appellant also argues that the varying depths of wound nos. 2, 4, 5, 8 and 9 (10 cm., 10.5
cm., 5.5 cm., and 4 cm.) despite the fact that they had the same surface length of 3 cm. could only
mean that after the victim was found dead, she was again stabbed with a knife or knives other than
the one (Exh. C) found beside her.27

The contention is without merit. The variance in depth does not necessarily mean that more than
one weapon was used. As has been stated:

[I]t is not possible to determine the depth of penetration of a stab wound with any
degree of accuracy, inasmuch as effusion of blood into the tissues, changes in the
position of the viscera, or numerous other circumstances may alter the conditions
existing at the time when the wound was inflicted. Consequently, the depth of the
track at autopsy may be different from the actual penetration of the instrument at the
time of the stabbing. Moreover, it is not always possible to correlate the depth of the
wound with the blade of the stabbing instrument. For example, a short blade of two
inches can penetrate four inches into a soft area like the thigh or through the anterior
abdominal wall because the force of the thrust may dent the tissues appreciably and
thus deepen the wound. Conversely, a long blade may not be thrust into its full
length, and the wound may be shorter than the blade. For these reasons attempts to
correlate the depth of the track and the length of the weapon should be made with
caution.28

Dr. Roldan in fact testified that the kitchen knife, marked as Exh. C, could have caused all the
wounds sustained by the victim.29 She also testified that the stab wounds could have all been
inflicted in the span of one minute. 30Having examined no less than 100 victims of violence, 31 Dr.
Roldan's conclusions should be given credence.

Moreover, with the exception of wound no. 10, all the wounds were described by Dr. Roldan as
"gaping." As stated in Forensic Medicine:

An ante-mortem wound gapes; there is eversion of the edges; a large amount of blood is
present, this is coagulated and infiltrating the wound; and there is swelling and signs of
inflammation and repair. In a post-mortem wound there is no gaping. The bleeding is slight, if
any, and it does not infiltrate the wound.32

This belies accused-appellant's theory that the victim committed suicide and that it was only after
she was found dead that she was again stabbed to make it appear that she had been killed.

Nor were the bloodsstains which PO2 Orly Baril33 and Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo34 found on the
victim's hands necessarily evidence of the victim's suicide. The bloodstains could have come from
the wounds sustained by her rather than from her attempt to kill herself.

Accused-appellant also insists the victim committed suicide because she was feeling respondent
over her remaining single, her lack of regular employment which made her dependent on the support
of her siblings, and the responsibility of taking care of her father who had become an invalid. He
cites Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo's testimony that the victim entrusted her jewelry and bankbook to
her four days before she died.35
Erlinda, however, testified that the victim did this because she had a premonition that accused-
appellant might harm her, and not became of any intimation that she (the victim) would kill herself. 36

Contrary to the claim of accused-appellant that the victim was a depressed person with a low sense
of self-worth, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo described the victim as "a jolly person" who had many
friends who go to her house. Moreover, according to Erlindam, the victim, while not earning a fixed
income, was not without means of livelihood. The victim was good at cooking and took orders from
neighbors. Erlinda also disclosed that on the very day the victim was found dead, she and the victim
had plans to go out for relaxation.37 This negates any theory that the victim committed suicide.

Second. Somewhat inconsistently with his claim that the victim was a suicide, accused-appellant
disputes the trial court's conclusion that only one of those residing in the house could have killed the
victim because the police found not sign of a break-in. Accused-appellant says that in the morning of
June 1, 1996, he found that the kitchen door leading outside was open. 38

Accused-appellant's contention must fail. Accused-appellant admitted that it did not occur to him that
an intruder was in the house in the evening of May 31, 1996 because "No person could get inside
because the windows were closed and besides the doors were closed." 39

Significantly, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that accused-appellant also said that no person
could get inside the house because the doors and the windows were closed. 40 Accused-appellant
never told Erlinda that the kitchen door was open that morning. Indeed, Erlinda testified that "it is not
possible that somebody would enter the house as the doors were securely locked with additional
barrel bolts, and the windows have grills."41

Third. Accused-appellant contends that Thelma Arrojado's testimony does not deserve consideration
because, by her own admission, 42 the victim's sister Asuncion asked her to testify on accused-
appellant's complaints against the victim's treatment of him. He also claims that it was inconsistent
for Erlinda to testify, on the one hand, that the victim was "loving friendly, and reasonable" and, on
the other to say that she was strict and domineering. Accused-appellant cites the testimony of the
victim's brother, Buenaventura Arrojado, that before her death the victim denied having any quarrel
with accused-appellant.43

To be sure, the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is shown that it overlooked certain facts or circumstances of substance that, if
considered, could have affected the outcome of case. This is because the trial court is in a better
position to decide the question of credibility having heard the witnesses and observed their
deportment during the trial.44 In this case, accused-appellant's contention that the testimonies of
Thelma Arrojado and Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo are incredible is without merit. Thelma Arrojado's
admission that the victim's sister Asuncion had asked her to testify does not impair her credibility.
Thelma was can did enough to say that at first she was hesitant to testify because accused-
appellant is also her relative. But she denied having been coached on what to say, stating that she
only testified as to "what Salvador Arrojado said to me" which is that he could not bear the victim's
maltreatment.45
As for Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, she said that she suspected accused-appellant but she did not
want to say anything until she had proof. 46 She testified also that so far as she knew, only accused-
appellant harbored a grudge against the victim, and that accused-appellant himdelf told her
so.47 With regard to Erlinda's seemingly inconsistent description of the victim, suffice it to say that the
victim's treatment of accused-appellant does not necessarily reflect her attitude and behavior toward
other people.

Anent the testimony of the victim's brother, Buenaventura Arrojado, that the victim denied having any
quarrel with accused-appellant when he called her up two weeks before her death, 48 it is possible
that the victim did not want to bother her brother who was after all too far (since he lived in Manila) to
be of much help. It is only to be expected that Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojdo, who
lived near accused-appellant and the victim, have a much more accurate assessment of the real
relationship between accused-appellant and the victim. Buenaventura Arrojado testified that it was
Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo who told him of the alleged quarrel between the victim and accused-
appellant.49

In sum, the following circumstances point to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime:

1. Accused-appellant, the victim, and the latters father were the only ones living in the house
in which the crime was committed in the evening of May 31, 1996.50

2. No one from the outside can gain entry since all doors of the house were locked and the
windows had grills.51

3. Accused-appellant had access to the victims bedroom because the bedroom doors were
left unlocked so that the victim could check on her fathers condition during the night.
Accused-appellant sleeps in the same bedroom as the victims father.52

4. The murder weapon was a kitchen knife readily accessible to the occupants of the
house.53 As the Solicitor General observed, common sense dictates that if an outsider
entered the house with the intent to kill the victim, he would have brought his own weapon to
ensure the execution of his purpose.54

5. None of the victims belongings was missing or disturbed, indicating that the motive for the
crime was not gain but revenge.55

6. Judging from the number and severity of the wounds (10 stab wounds, half of which were
fatal),56 the killer felt deep-seated resentment and anger toward the victim. Accused-appellant
had admitted those feelings to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojado. 57

7. Aside from accused-appellant, no one was known to harbor a grudge against the victim. 58

8. As the Solicitor General also pointed out, accused-appellants behavior in the morning of
June 1, 1996 was inconsistent with someone who had just found his cousin and employer, a
person he claims to get along with, dead. 59 By his testimony, he did not even go inside the
room to check on her condition on the lame excuse that he was afraid. He also did not inform
 his neighbors about the incident for the equally flimsy reason that he did not know them nor
did he go to the police.60

Under Rule 133, 4 of the Rules on Evidence, cricumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inference are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. As the foregoing discussion shows, these requisites have been established in this
case.

Fourt. With respect to the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the trial court
correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery against accused-appellant. To
appreciate treachery, two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means of execution
that gives the person attacked np opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and (2) the means of
execution is deliberately or consciously adopted. 61 Both requisites have been established in this
case.

Anent the first requisite, Dr. Roldan testified that based on her findings, the victim was not in a
position to fight the assailant and that she might have been stabbed while she was asleep. 62 As
regards the second requisite, the number and nature of the wounds sustained by the victim lead to
no other conclusion thatn that accused-appellant employed means in killong the victim which tended
directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense so many
wounds, a total 10, half of which were fatal, if he had not deliberately adopted such manner of
attack.63 Abuse of superior strength also attended the killing since accused-appellant, a man and
armed with a knife, attacked the victim, an unarmed and dfenseless woman. 64 However, since abuse
of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, there is no need to appreciate it separately as an
independent aggravating circumstance.65

The trial court correctly held that there was no proof of evident premeditation since the requisites
thereor, to wit, (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused had clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between
such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act, 66 have not
been established in this case.

Nor can the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling be appreciated against accused-appellant
since the latter and the victim lived in the same house.67

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, however, is present in this case. For this
aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between the parties
must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier
for him to commit the criminal act. The condifence must be a means of facilitating the commission of
the crim, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belied that the former would not abuse
said confidence.68 In this case, while the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety for which
reason she entrusted her jewelry and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, her fears were
subsequently allayed as shown by the fact that she took back her personal effects from
Erlinda.69 Thinking that accused-appellant would not do her any harm, because he was after all her
first cousin, the victim allowed accused-appellant to sleep in the same room with her father and left
the bedroom doors unlocked.70

The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993
which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death to reclusion
perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence
and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the
penalty of death on accused-appellant. However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure took effect, requiring that every complaint or information state not only the
qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. 71 This provision may be given retroactive effect in
the light of the well settled rule that "statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent."72 The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence
not having been alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to raise
accused-appellant's sentence to death. 1wphi1.nt

In accordance with the ruling in People v. Lucas73 that the penalty of reclusion perpetua remains
indivisible notwithstanding the fixing of its duration from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty
(40) years,74 the trial court erred in imposing on accused-appellant the penalty of 30 years
of reclusion perpetua. In the with the ruling in Lucas, accused-appellant should suffer the entire
extent of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.75

Consistent with current case law,76 the civil indemnity for the crime of murder should be reduced from
P60,000.00 to P50,000.00, while the award of moral damages in the amount of P80,000.00 should
be reduced to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetuain its entire duration and to its full extent. Furthermore, he is ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim Mary Ann Arrojado the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the further
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184500 September 11, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PIIILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WENCESLAO NELMIDA @ "ESLAO," and RICARDO AJOK @ "PORDOY," Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this present appeal is the Decision 1 dated 18 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. HC No. 00246, affirming the Decision2 dated 30 September 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 21-910, finding herein
appellants Wenceslao Nelmida @ "Eslao" (Wenceslao) and Ricardo Ajok @

"Pordoy" (Ricardo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated murder
and double attempted murder, thereby sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellants were likewise ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of each of the
deceased victims, i.e., Police Officer 3 Hernando P. Dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz) and

Technical Sergeant Ramon Dacoco (T/Sgt. Dacoco), the amount of P 50,000.00 each as moral
damages and P50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for the death of each of the said victims. Similarly,
appellants were directed to pay, jointly and severally, Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan the amount
of P 50,000.00 for and as attorneys fees, as well as the costs of the suit.

Appellants and their co-accused Samuel Cutad @ "Sammy" (Samuel), Brigido Abais @ "Bidok"
(Brigido), Pedro Serafico @ "Peter" (Pedro), Eduardo Bacong, Sr. (Eduardo, Sr.), Eduardo Bacong,
Jr. @ "Junjun" (Eduardo, Jr.), Alejandro Abarquez (Alejandro), Ruben Bartolo @ "Yoyoy Bulhog"
(Ruben), Arnel Espanola @ "Toto Ilongo" (Arnel), Alfredo Paninsuro @ "Tambok" (Alfredo), Opao
Casinillo (Opao) and other John Does, were charged in an Amended Information 3 dated 3 October
2001 with the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder,
the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 5th day of June 2001, at SAN MANUEL, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named appellants and their co-accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with assorted high-powered
firearms and hand-grenade, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery,
evident premidation (sic), taking advantage of their superiority in strength and in numbers, and with
intent to kill, ambush, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the persons of the following,
namely:

1. PO3 Dela Cruz, Philippine National Police (PNP);

2. T/Sgt. Dacoco, Philippine Army (PA);

3. Private First Class (PFC) Haron Angni, PA;

4. PFC Gador4 Tomanto, PA;

5. Juanito Ibunalo;

6. Mosanif5 Ameril;

7. Macasubar6 Tandayao;

8. Mayor Johnny Tawantawan;7 and

 9. Jun Palanas

by then and there firing and shooting them with said high-powered firearms thereby inflicting upon
the persons of PO3 De la Cruz, T/Sgt. Dacoco, PFC Haron Angni, PFC Gapor Tomanto, Juanito
Ibunalo, Mosanip Ameril and Macasuba Tandayao gunshot wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of the death of PO3 De la Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco and the serious wounding of
said PFC Haron Angni, PFC Gapor Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo, Mosanip Ameril and Macasuba
Tandayao that without the medical assistance would have caused their deaths, while Mayor Johnny
Tawan-tawan and Jun Palanas were not hit.8

When arraigned, appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo, assisted by their counsel de parte 9 and counsel
de oficio,10respectively; and their co-accused Samuel, likewise assisted by counsel de oficio, 11 all
entered separate pleas of

NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. The rest of the accused in this case, however, remained at large.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

Meanwhile, or on 21 January 2003, however, the prosecution filed a Motion to Discharge Accused
Samuel To Be Utilized As State Witness, 12 which the court a quo granted in an Order dated 12
February 2003.13 Also, upon motion of the prosecution, the court a quo issued another Order dated
17 March 2003,14 directing the release of Samuel from detention following his discharge as state
witness.

As such, Samuel, together with 13 more witnesses, namely, Macasuba Tandayao (Macasuba),
Mosanip Ameril (Mosanip), PFC Gapor Tomanto (PFC Tomanto), Merlina Dela Cruz (Merlina), Senior
Police Inspector Renato Salazar (Senior P/Insp. Salazar), PFC Haron Angni (PFC Angni), Senior
Police Officer 4 Raul Torres Medrano (SPO4 Medrano), Senior Police Officer 1 Ferdinand Suaring
(SPO1 Suaring), Senior Police Officer 2 Ivan Mutia Evasco (SPO2 Evasco), Senior Police Officer 4
Emmie Subingsubing (SPO4 Subingsubing), Juanito Ibunalo (Juanito), Senior

Police Officer 3 Tommy Umpa (SPO3 Umpa), and Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan (Mayor Tawan-
tawan), testified for the prosecution.

The factual milieu of this case as culled from the testimonies of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses
is as follows:

On 5 June 2001, Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, together with his security
escorts composed of some members of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police (PNP) and
civilian aides, to wit: (1) T/Sgt. Dacoco; (2) PFC Angni; (3) PFC Tomanto; (4) PO3 Dela Cruz; (5)
Juanito; (6) Mosanip; (7) Macasuba; and (8) a certain Jun, respectively, were in Tubod, Lanao del
Norte. In the afternoon, the group went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, on board the yellow pick-
up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan with Plate No. JRT 818 driven by Juanito. Sitting at the
passenger seat of the aforesaid vehicle was Mayor Tawan-tawan while those at the back seat were
Mosanip, Jun, and Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind Juanito. Those seated on a
wooden bench installed at the rear (open) portion of the said yellow pick-up service vehicle were
PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco. PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were
sitting beside each other facing the right side of the road while PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco
were both seated behind PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni facing the left side of the road. 15

At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their aforenamed co-accused,
brought Samuel to a waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, the one located on
the left side of the road going to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was instructed by appellants
and their co-accused to stay in the said waiting shed while they assembled themselves in a diamond
position on both sides of the road, which is more or less five (5) meters away from the shed. Then,
appellants and their co-accused surreptitiously waited for the vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-
tawan.16

A few minutes later, Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan
approaching towards the direction of Salvador, Lanao del Norte. The moment the yellow pick-up
service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan passed by the aforesaid waiting shed, appellants and their
co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle using high-powered firearms.

Both Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind the driver, and PFC Tomanto, who was then
sitting on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle, saw appellant Wenceslao on
the right side of the road firing at them in a squatting position using an M-16 armalite rifle.

Macasuba was also able to identify appellants Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido
and Alfredo as among the ambushers. Mayor Tawan-tawan ordered Juanito to keep on driving to
avoid greater casualties. The vehicle stopped upon reaching the army and Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) detachment in Curva, Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Mayor
Tawan-tawan then asked assistance therefrom.17

Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house of Samuels
aunt located, more or less, 10 meters away from the site of the ambush to get their bags and other
stuff. The house of Samuels aunt was the place where appellants and their co-accused stayed prior
to the incident. Samuel followed appellants and their co-accused to the house of his aunt.
Thereafter, appellants and their co-accused hurriedly ran towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality
of Baroy, Lanao del Norte.18

On the occasion of the ambush, two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, namely, PO3 Dela Cruz
and T/Sgt. Dacoco, died, while others suffered injuries. In particular, Macasuba was slightly hit on
the head by shrapnel; Mosanip sustained injury on his shoulder that almost severed his left arm;
PFC Tomanto was hit on the right and left sides of his body, on his left leg and knee; PFC Angni was
hit on his left shoulder; and Juanito was hit on his right point finger, right head and left hip. Mayor
Tawan-tawan and Jun were not injured.19

All the victims of the ambush, except Macasuba, were brought to Bontilao Country Clinic in
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and were later transferred to Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital
in Tibanga, Iligan City. PO3 Dela Cruz, however, died before reaching the hospital while T/Sgt.
Dacoco died in the hospital. PFC Tomanto stayed at Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital for 13 days
before he was transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, and then in
a hospital in Manila and Quezon City. PFC Angni stayed for seven (7) days in Mindanao Sanitarium
and Hospital before he was transferred to Camp Evangelista Hospital, where he was confined for
one (1) month. PFC Angni was transferred to V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City and was confined
therein for two (2) months.20

On the other hand, Mayor Tawan-tawan, Macasuba and the members of the CAFGU went back to
the site of the ambush but appellants and their co-accused were no longer there. Not long after,
SPO4 Medrano, Chief of Police of Salvador Municipal Police Station, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and
his troops arrived. It was while inside the Salvador Municipal Police Station that SPO4 Medrano
heard gunfire and he came to know that the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed prompting
him and his troops to go to the scene of the crime. Mayor Tawan-tawan informed SPO4 Medrano
that appellant Wenceslao was one of those responsible for the ambush. SPO4 Medrano and his
troops, then, conducted an investigation during which he noticed Samuel at the scene of the crime.
Upon interrogation Samuel denied any involvement in the ambush. Even so, SPO4 Medrano still
found Samuel suspicious, hence, he and his fellow police officers arrested him and turned him over
to a certain SPO4 Micabalo, Chief of Police of Lala, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was then brought to
Lala Municipal Jail in Lanao del Norte.

Subsequently, SPO4 Medrano, together with the members of the CAFGU, PNP and the rest of the
troops who were at the scene of the crime, found a trail of footprints believed to be from the culprits.
They conducted a hot pursuit operation towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao
del Norte, where appellants and their co-accused were believed to have fled. They were able to
recover an M-16 armalite rifle caliber 5.26 concealed near a nipa hut. SPO4 Medrano then sent a
Spot Report and a follow-up report about the ambush. He did not, however, reveal the identity of
appellant Wenceslao so that with a warrant of arrest, appellant Wenceslao could be arrested at the
earliest possible time. SPO4 Medrano also informed the provincial headquarters about the incident
through a radio message.21

The following day, or on 6 June 2001, Samuel informed SPO1 Suaring, member of PNP Lala
Municipal Police, Lala, Lanao del Norte, that there were electrical supplies and radio antenna in San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, left by the malefactors. SPO1 Suaring, together with Samuel, Senior
P/Insp. Salazar, SPO4 Subingsubing and a certain SPO4 Sumaylo, proceeded to San Manuel, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, where they found the materials near the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
canal, which is 30 meters away from the house of Samuels aunt. These were photographed. 22

Later, SPO2 Evasco, who was assigned at Lala Police Station, received a call from Barangay
Kagawad Renato Senahon (Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon) that a black backpack was found in Mount
Curay-curay, Rebe, Lala, Lanao del Norte, which is two (2) kilometers away from the highway.
Immediately, SPO2 Evasco and Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon went to the location. Upon inspection, they
recovered from the backpack an army camouflage with name cloth, one Garand pouch and one
fragmentation grenade cacao type. SPO2 Evasco then brought these to the police station in
Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and turned it over to Senior P/Insp. Salazar.23

On 8 June 2001, Samuel executed his sworn statement identifying appellants and their co-accused
as the persons responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions. Samuel
was, thereafter, incarcerated at the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) in Tubod,
Lanao del Norte.24
On 29 August 2001, or more than two (2) months after the ambush, appellant Wenceslao was
arrested while he was in Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. Appellant Ricardo, on the other
hand, was arrested on 20 December 2001 while working in Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte. It
was Senior P/Insp. Salazar who effected the arrest of the appellants. 25

Appellants denied having any involvement in the ambush. Appellant Wenceslao presented as
witnesses Armida Nelmida (Armida), Jeffrey Paninsuro (Jeffrey), Luzviminda Apolinares
(Luzviminda), Rudy Alegado (Rudy), Sergeant Teofanis Garsuta (Sgt. Garsuta) and Master Sergeant
Pio Cudilla (M/Sgt. Cudilla). Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, did not present any witness other
than himself.

Appellant Wenceslao testified that on 5 June 2001, he was in their house with his family. At around
1:00 p.m., he went outside their house to clean the pigsty and feed the pigs. Then, at around 2:30
p.m., Jacob Pepito, Rudy and a certain Romy, who is a military personnel, arrived to get a copy of
the election returns of the 15 May 2001 elections upon the orders of Tanny Pepito, a gubernatorial
candidate. He told them that he has no copy of the returns. He then advised them to get it to Atty.
Aldoni Umpa (Atty. Umpa) who has a copy. At that time, he, Jacob Pepito and Romy were outside
the house while his wife and nieces were just eight (8) to 10 meters away from them. After 10
minutes, his visitors left.26 Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao heard gunfire coming from the direction of
the house of Mayor Tawan-tawan. His nephew, Jeffrey, approached and informed him that Mayor
Tawan-tawan and the latters group were ambushed. After about one (1) or two (2) minutes, he again
heard gunfire. This time the bullets were already hitting the roof and walls of their house. He then
instructed Jeffrey, who is also a CAFGU member, to report the said incident and to ask help from the
members of the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. 27

When Jeffrey left, appellant Wenceslao stayed at their house. He did not know where his wife and
the rest of the women, who were in their house, went after the gunburst. After more or less 15
minutes, he walked barefooted and unarmed towards Camp Allere. There he saw M/Sgt. Cudilla and
he informed the former regarding the incident happened in their house. Not long after, a certain
Captain Esmeralda (Capt. Esmeralda), Commanding Officer of Bravo Company of the Philippine
Army, arrived. He also approached and informed Capt. Esmeralda about the incident in their house.
Capt. Esmeralda then ordered his men to board the samba and a six-by-six truck to fetch appellant
Wenceslaos wife and relatives in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. A six-by-six truck returned
to Camp Allere carrying appellant Wenceslaos wife and relatives.28

On the evening of 5 June 2001, appellant Wenceslao, together with his wife and daughter, slept in
his fathers house located, more or less, 100 meters away from Camp Allere and stayed there for
five (5) days. Appellant Wenceslaos wife then requested for transfer to their sons house in
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, as she could no longer sleep because of what happened at their
house. Thus, they went to their sons house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and stayed there for
eight (8) days. During that period of time, he did not hear of any case filed against him. No
policemen even bothered to arrest him. His wife, however, was still afraid, so they left the house of
their son and moved to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. They stayed there until he was
arrested on 29 August 2001.29
Appellant Wenceslao, however, disclosed that it would only take, more or less, a 15 minute-vehicle
ride from his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to the site of the ambush in San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. Also, from his house to Camp Allere it would only take, more or less,
5 minute-vehicle ride. Appellant Wenceslao also admitted that he ran for the vice-mayoralty position
in Salvador, Lanao del Norte, against Rodolfo Oban during the 2001 elections. Way back in the 1998
elections, he ran for mayoralty position in the same locality against Mayor Tawan-tawan but he lost.
On both occasions, he and Mayor Tawan-tawan were no longer in the same political party. Similarly,
during the term of Mayor Tawan-tawan in 1998, appellant Wenceslao revealed that he and his son
were charged with illegal possession of firearm.30

Other defense witnesses, namely, Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are appellant Wenceslaos
wife, nephew and niece, respectively, corroborated appellant Wenceslaos testimony on all material
points. They all denied that appellant Wenceslao has something to do with the ambush of Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group. Nonetheless, Armida admitted that there is a road connecting San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. There are also vehicles for hire plying
the route of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa. 31

Another defense witness, Rudy, corroborated appellant Wenceslaos testimony with respect to the
fact that on 5 June 2001, he, together with Jacob Pepito and a certain member of the army
intelligence group, went to the house of appellant Wenceslao to get the election returns. However,
he could not recall anything unusual that happened while he was in the house of appellant
Wenceslao. They left the house of appellant Wenceslao at around 2:45 p.m. Still, no unusual
incident happened thereafter. Rudy similarly revealed that he did not go inside the house of
appellant Wenceslao but merely waited for Jacob Pepito and a member of the army intelligence
group inside their vehicle parked at a distance of, more or less, three (3) meters from the house of
appellant Wenceslao. As such, he did not hear the subject of the conversation between appellant
Wenceslao, Jacob Pepito and a member of the army intelligence group. 32

Sgt. Garsuta, who also testified for the defense, stated that in the afternoon of 5 June 2001, while he
was at the legislative hall in Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, to secure the canvass of the
elections, they received a radio call from M/Sgt. Cudilla informing them that Mayor Tawan-tawan was
ambushed and the house of appellant Wenceslao was strafed. Thereafter, Capt. Esmeralda called
them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. As they passed by San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, they stopped to get some information from the police officers therein.
They proceeded to Camp Allere in Salvador, Lanao del Norte. They arrived at Camp Allere at around
4:30 p.m. to 4:35 p.m. and there he saw appellant Wenceslao waiting and talking to 1st Sgt. Codilla.
Appellant Wenceslao then requested that his family and some personal effects be taken from his
house. Thus, Capt. Esmeralda ordered them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to appellant
Wenceslaos house. Upon reaching the house of appellant Wenceslao, nobody was there. Suddenly,
appellant Wenceslaos wife came out from the nearby house. Then they ordered her to board a six-
by-six truck after taking some personal belongings of appellant Wenceslao in the latters house. 33

M/Sgt. Cudilla alleged that at around, more or less, 3:00 p.m. of 5 June 2001, while he was at their
command post at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, his detachment commander, a certain
T/Sgt. Quijano, called and informed him through radio that an ambush incident happened in his area
of responsibility, i.e., Curva Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He advised T/Sgt. Quijano to verify
the incident. M/Sgt. Cudilla then called Capt. Esmeralda to inform the latter about the said ambush
incident. He, thereafter, prepared a perimeter defense in the camp. In the second call of T/Sgt.
Quijano, the latter told him that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed. After about 15 minutes, M/Sgt.
Cudilla heard gunbursts from Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Later, more or less, 10 civilians
arrived at Camp Allere.

M/Sgt. Cudilla further confirmed that on 5 June 2001, also at around 3:00 p.m., he saw appellant
Wenceslao at the back of the stage inside Camp Allere near Km. Post one. Appellant Wenceslao
then informed him of the strafing incident in his house. When their commanding officer arrived,
appellant Wenceslao approached the former. Thereafter, a platoon was organized heading towards
Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.34

Appellant Ricardo, for his part, maintained that on 5 June 2001, he was also in his house in Purok 5,
Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, attending to his wife and children because his wife had just
given birth in April 2001. In the afternoon thereof, he heard a gunburst somewhere in Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte, followed by some commotion in the street. Later, his brother, Joji Ajok,
arrived and informed him that appellant Wenceslao was shot in his house. 35

Appellant Ricardo also confirmed that on the early evening of 5 June 2001, he and his family
transferred to the house of his parents-in-law at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He so
decided when he heard rumors that the supporters of Atty. Umpa, the political rival of Mayor Tawan-
tawan in the 2001 local elections, were being persecuted. Being one of Atty. Umpas supporters, he
got scared, prompting him to bring his family to Camp Allere. They stayed there until the following
morning and then he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and stayed there for three (3)
months. Thereafter, he moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, where he worked in the
farm of his friend. He stayed there until he was arrested on 20 December 2001. 36

Nevertheless, appellant Ricardo divulged that there was never an instance that Atty. Umpa was
harassed or intimidated by the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He claimed that only Atty. Umpas
supporters were harassed. He also revealed that prior to the ambush incident, there was never an
instance that he was threatened by the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He just presumed that Atty.
Umpas supporters were being harassed by the people of Mayor Tawan-tawan because others were
already harassed.37

Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most of whom were victims of the ambush, to
be credible, categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and consistent, coupled with their positive
identification of the appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime and their lack of ill-motive to
falsely testify against them, vis--vis the defense of denial and alibi proffered by the latter, the trial
court rendered its Decision on 30 September 2005 finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder and imposing
upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the aforesaid trial courts
Decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding herein
appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder
with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder, and the Court hereby sentences them
to suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
late PO3 Dela Cruz the amount of P 50,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P 50,000.00
for and by way of civil indemnity ex delicto; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the late T/Sgt.
Dacoco the sum of P 50,000.00 as moral damages plus P 50,000.00 for and by way of civil
indemnity ex delicto; and to pay, jointly and severally, Ex-Mayor Johnny Tawantawan the amount
ofP 50,000.00 for and as attorneys fees, and the costs of suit.

The Armalite rifle with defaced serial number, the hand grenade and the Garand pouch are hereby
ordered turned-over to the Firearm and Explosive Unit of the PNP Headquarters, Pigcarangan,
Tubod, Lanao del Norte, for proper disposition as authorized by law.

The full period of the preventive imprisonment of the appellantsshall be credited to them and
deducted from their prison term provided they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code. Appellant Wenceslao was arrested on 29 August 2001 and detained since then
up to the present. While appellant Ricardo was arrested on 20 December 2001 and detained since
then up to the present.

Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the part of the
prosecution to prosecute the case against the other accused who remain at-large, as soon as said
accused are apprehended.38[Emphasis supplied].

Unperturbed, appellants separately appealed the aforesaid trial courts Decision to the Court of
Appeals via Notice of Appeal,39 and, thereafter, submitted their respective appeal briefs.

In his brief, appellant Wenceslao assigned the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE AND NOT ORCHESTRATED LIES INTENDED TO FALSELY
IMPUTE THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO APPELLANT WENCESLAO;

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE INCONSISTENCIES OF PROSECUTION

WITNESSES ARE HONEST INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR AND TRIVIAL POINTS;

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANTS WENCESLAO AND RICARDO]
FAILED TO CAST ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND THAT
THESE WITNESSES HAD NO IMPROPER AND NEFARIOUS MOTIVE IN TESTIFYING AGAINST
THE APPELLANTS;

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE TESTIMONY OF THE MILITARY MEN WHO
ARE NEUTRAL, IMPARTIAL AND OBJECTIVE WITNESSES;

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANT WENCESLAO ABSCONDED AND IN
IMPUTING MALICE ON THE ACT OF [APPELLANT WENCESLAO] IN TEMPORARILY LEAVING
HIS RESIDENCE;

VI.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WENCESLAO OF THE CRIME

CHARGED BASED ON TESTIMONIES WHICH ARE OF DOUBTFUL VERACITY;

VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF [APPELLANT

WENCESLAO] BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE WHICH ARE NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT
BAR.40

While appellant Ricardo, in his brief, raised this lone assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT RICARDO DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.41

On 18 June 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision affirming appellants
conviction of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence on record disclosed
that the alleged inconsistencies pointed to by appellant Wenceslao refer only to minor matters. The
same did not damage the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly that of PFC Tomanto,
PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan. Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial points
serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime. Moreover, since the
prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants in open court as among the perpetrators of the
ambush, the same must prevail over the alleged inconsistencies, as well as the defense of denial
and alibi interposed by the appellants. Denial is a negative and self-serving assertion that cannot
overcome the victims affirmative, categorical and convincing testimony. In the same way, for alibi to
prosper, it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was impossible for the
accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and not merely assert that he
was somewhere else. As in the present case, the trial court took judicial notice of the distance of
seven (7) kilometers between Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where appellants reside, and San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush incident took place. Appellants, therefore, could not
successfully invoke alibi as a defense because it was not physically impossible for them to have
been at the scene of the crime.42 The Court of Appeals then decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the separate APPEALS are DENIED, and the appealed
Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.43
Still undaunted, appellants elevated the aforesaid Decision of the Court of Appeals to this Court via
Notice of Appeal.

In a Resolution44 dated 19 November 2008, the Court required the parties to simultaneously submit
their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. In lieu thereof, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation45 stating that it will no longer file a supplement to its Consolidated
Appellees Brief46 dated 14 December 2006 there being no transactions, occurrences or events
which have happened since the appellate courts Decision was rendered.

Appellants, on the other hand, filed their separate Supplemental Briefs, 47 which were a mere rehash
of the arguments already discussed in their respective Appellants Briefs 48 submitted before the
appellate court. In his Supplemental Brief, appellant Wenceslao reiterates that: the trial court and the
Court of Appeals committed reversible errors when they decided a question of substance which is
not in accord with established facts and the applicable laws. 49 He, once again, enumerated the
following errors committed by the appellate court, thus:

I.

The court a quo and the Court of Appeals gravely erred when they ruled that the
inconsistencies committed by the prosecution witnesses are on minor and trivial points when
these inconsistencies are indicative of the innocence of appellant Wenceslao;

II.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider as indicative of innocence of
appellant Wenceslao the fact that the authorities did not include in the police report the name
of appellant Wenceslao and did not arrest him immediately after the ambush, or within a
couple of months from the date of the ambush;

III.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they deliberately
refused or failed to consider and appreciate the testimonies of the military officers who are
neutral, impartial, and objective witnesses;

IV.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals miserably failed to consider the evidence for the
defense despite the clear and unmistakable proof of their honesty and integrity;

V.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals clearly and deliberately misinterpreted the facts and
misapplied the laws regarding "flight" as an alleged indication of guilt;

VI.
 The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted appellant Wenceslaobased on
jurisprudence on "alibi" which are not applicable in the case at bar 50 [Emphasis and italicized
omitted].

Appellant Wenceslao contends that a thorough perusal of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses would show these are tainted with glaring inconsistencies, which are badges of lies and
dishonesty, thus, casting doubts on their credibility.

The inconsistencies referred to by appellant Wenceslao are as follows: (1) whether PFC Tomanto
and PFC Angni were already with Mayor Tawan-tawan from Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to Tubod,
Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa, or they merely hitched a ride in Mayor Tawan-tawans vehicle on
their way home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte; (2) if so, the place where PFC Tomanto and PFC
Angni hitched a ride in Mayor Tawan-tawans vehicle; (3) the officer from whom PFC Tomanto and
PFC Angni got permission in order to go home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte; (4) PFC Angni allegedly
knew appellant Wenceslao prior to the ambush incident on 5 June 2001 and he even saw appellant
Wenceslao as among the perpetrators of the ambush, yet, he did not mention the name of the
former in his affidavit; (5) Mayor Tawan-tawan should have mentioned the name of appellant
Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the ambush incident when he reported the same to SPO4
Medrano; (6) SPO4 Medrano should have included the name of appellant Wenceslao in the Spot
Reports he transmitted to the Provincial Police Office of the PNP and should have immediately
caused his arrest if he truly participated in the ambush incident; (7) it would no longer be necessary
to discharge Samuel and to make him as state witness if the victims of the ambush incident, indeed,
saw the perpetrators of the crime; and (8) if appellant Wenceslao was one of the ambushers,
Samuel would not have failed to mention the former in his sworn statement.

Appellant Wenceslao believes that the afore-enumerated inconsistencies only proved that he has no
participation in the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions. The declaration of his
innocence is thus called for.

Appellant Wenceslao further imputes ill-motive and malice on the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses in testifying against him. The motive was to remove him, being the only non-Muslim
leader, in the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, who has the courage to challenge the reign
of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his clan. It was also an act of revenge against him for opposing Mayor
Tawan-tawan during the 1998 elections. As to Samuels motive, appellant Wenceslao claims that it
was for self-preservation, freedom, leniency and some other consideration. Evidently, after Samuels
testimony, the latter was released from jail.

Appellant Wenceslao maintains that he was not at the ambush site on 5 June 2001 as can be
gleaned from the testimonies of M/Sgt. Cudilla and Sgt. Garsuta.

Lastly, appellant Wenceslao argues that his flight was not an indication of guilt. He justified his
temporary absence from his residence by stating that it was because of the traumatic experience of
his wife, who had no peace of mind since their house was riddled with bullets by lawless elements
without any cause.
With all the foregoing, the resolution of this appeal hinges primarily on the determination of credibility
of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

Time and again, this Court held that when the issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses,
the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are
accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they
are telling the truth.51 Moreover, credibility, to state what is axiomatic, is the sole province of the trial
court. In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the
trial court's findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 52 A
careful perusal of the records of this case revealed that none of these circumstances is attendant
herein.

The affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the factual findings of the trial court places this case under
the rule that factual findings are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal to this
Court. No reason has been given by appellants to deviate from the factual findings arrived at by the
trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In the present case, most of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto,
PFC Angni, Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan, were victims of the 5 June 2001 ambush incident. As
such, they actually witnessed what exactly happened on that fateful day, especially Macasuba and
PFC Angni, who vividly saw appellant Wenceslao on the right side of the road and in a squatting
position firing at them with his M-16 armalite rifle. Macasuba and PFC Angni, having seated behind
the driver and on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle, respectively, both
facing the right side of the road, were in such a position to see without any obstruction how appellant
Wenceslao rained bullets on their vehicle with his M-16 armalite rifle while they were traversing the
road of San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, on their way home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte.
Macasuba was also able to identify appellant Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and
Alfredo as among the perpetrators of the ambush.

It bears stressing that the ambush happened at around 3:00 p.m., in broad daylight, such that it
would not be impossible for Macasuba and PFC Angni to have seen and identified their assailants,
particularly appellant Wenceslao, who was once chief of Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), then
municipal councilor and twice elected vice-mayor of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, i.e., 1992 and 1995
elections, and appellant Ricardo, who is a resident of Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. 53

The aforesaid assertions of Macasuba and PFC Angni were equally confirmed by Samuel, an
accused-turned-state-witness, who, in his testimony before the open court, narrated how appellants
and their co-accused, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel,
and Opao, brought him in the waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte;
assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides of the road; surreptitiously waited for the
vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group; and executed the ambush from the moment
the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group passed by the aforesaid waiting shed.
Samuel was in an advantageous position to substantiate the identities of the appellants and their co-
accused as the perpetrators of the ambush because he was near the scene of the crime, i.e., merely
five (5) meters away therefrom. This is aside from the fact that appellants and their co-accused were
the very same people who brought him to the site of the ambush. Appellants and their co-accused
likewise stayed for a long period of time in the house of Samuels aunt prior to the ambush incident
and Samuel is very well-acquainted with these people for he himself resided therein. 54

Given the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that prosecution witnesses, Macasuba, PFC
Angni and Samuel, have firmly established the identities of appellants as the perpetrators of the
ambush. In addition, their testimonies on who and how the crime was committed were characterized
by the trial court as simple and candid. Even their answers to questions were simple, straightforward
and categorical. Such simplicity and candidness in their testimonies only prove that they were telling
the truth, thus, strengthening their credibility as witnesses.

Now, as regards the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant Wenceslao that allegedly cast doubt on
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, this Court finds them frivolous, trivial, minor, irrelevant
and have nothing to do with the essential elements of the crime charged, i.e., double murder with
multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder. In the same manner, they do not detract
from the fact that Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group, which includes PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni,
were ambushed by appellants and their co-accused on 5 June 2001 while on board the yellow pick-
up service vehicle as it passed by the waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte.
And, said ambush resulted in the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco and injuries to
Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito.

It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to minor details or collateral
matters do not affect his or her credibility as these variations are in fact indicative of truth and show
that the witness was not coached to fabricate or dissemble. An inconsistency, which has nothing to
do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction.55

Similarly, PFC Angni and Samuels failure to name appellant Wenceslao in their affidavits/sworn
statements as one of the ambushers does not necessarily render their testimonies implausible and
unworthy of belief.

Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court do not
necessarily discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is
generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice can be
taken of the fact that testimonies given during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those
stated in sworn statements, which are usually incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons.
More so, because of the partial and innocent suggestions, or for want of specific inquiries. In
addition, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statement, hence, omissions and
misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses direct and
categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to their extrajudicial
statements.56 Similarly, the failure of a witness to immediately disclose the name of the culprit does
not necessarily impair his or her credibility.57
A meticulous perusal of Samuels sworn statement reveals that he categorically mentioned therein
the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. In his sworn statement, Samuel
specifically stated that during the ambush, he saw appellant Wenceslao at the other side of the road,
just a few meters away from the bridge, who, at that time armed with an M-16 rifle, was likewise
firing towards the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan.58

Above all, both PFC Angni and Samuel positively identified appellant Wenceslao in open court as
one of those responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. 59 Such open court
declaration is much stronger than their affidavits/sworn statements.

Mayor Tawan-tawans failure to disclose to SPO4 Medrano the name of appellant Wenceslao as one
of those responsible in the ambush and SPO4 Medranos failure to include the name of appellant
Wenceslao in the Spot Reports he transmitted to the Provincial Police Office of the PNP would not
inure to appellant Wenceslaos benefit.

As can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes, when Mayor Tawan-tawan and SPO4
Medrano met at the scene of the crime, the former immediately told the latter that appellant
Wenceslao was one of the ambushers.60 This belied the claim of appellant Wenceslao that Mayor
Tawan-tawan did not tell SPO4 Medrano that he (appellant Wenceslao) was among the ambushers.
Also, SPO4 Medrano provided an explanation 61 for his failure to state in his Spot Reports the name
of appellant Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. And, even granting that his explanation would not
have been satisfactory, still, SPO4 Medranos failure to mention appellant Wenceslaos name in his
Spot Reports was not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. More especially because appellant
Wenceslao was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the
crime.

Even the discharge of Samuel to become state witness does not negate the fact that prosecution
witnesses, Macasuba and PFC Angni, indeed, saw appellants as among the perpetrators of the
crime. To note, appellants were not the only persons accused of the crime; they were many including
Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao. In order to
give justice to the victims of the ambush, especially those who have died by reason thereof, all
persons responsible therefor must be penalized. Since Samuel knew all those who have participated
in the ambush incident, his testimony as to the other accused in this case is material to strengthen
the case of the prosecution against them. Unfortunately, the other accused in this case remained at
large until now.

As aptly observed by the trial court, thus:

x x x The Court is convinced without equivocation on the veracity of the testimonies of the
prosecution eyewitnesses who are all in one pointing to herein appellant Wenceslao as one of those
who participated in the ambush, and on the veracity of the testimonies of the two prosecution
eyewitnesses Macasuba and Samuel to the effect that appellant Ricardo was among the people
who perpetrated the said ambush.

The testimonies of these witnesses were simple and candid. The simplicity and candidness of their
testimonies only prove that they were telling the truth. Their answers to questions were simple,
straightforward and categorical; spontaneous, frank and consistent. Thus, a witness who testifies
categorically, spontaneously, frankly and consistently is a credible witness. 62

Appellant Wenceslaos allegations of ill-motive and malice on the part of prosecution witnesses,
including Samuel, have no leg to stand on.

The records are bereft of any evidence to substantiate the claim of appellant Wenceslao that the
motive of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against him was to remove him as the only non-
Muslim leader in the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and that it was an act of revenge for
opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan during the 1998 elections. Appellant Wenceslao failed to present an
iota of evidence to support his aforesaid allegations. As properly stated by the Court of Appeals,
"mere allegation or claim is not proof. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegation." Also, it
must be emphasized that during the 1998 elections, it was Mayor Tawan-tawan who won the
mayoralty position. It is, therefore, highly implausible for Mayor Tawan-tawan, who emerged as the
victor, to take revenge against the losing candidate, appellant Wenceslao. As such, appellant
Wenceslao failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses. It is settled that
where the defense fails to prove that witnesses are moved by improper motives, the presumption is
that they were not so moved and their testimonies are therefore entitled to full weight and credit. 63

To repeat, most of the prosecution witnesses are victims of the ambush. Being the aggrieved parties,
they all desire justice for what had happened to them, thus, it is unnatural for them to falsely accuse
someone other than the real culprits. Otherwise stated, it is very unlikely for these prosecution
witnesses to implicate an innocent person to the crime. It has been correctly observed that the
natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victims, more so, the victims themselves, in
securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the
culprits, for otherwise, the culprits would gain immunity.64

Contrary to appellant Wenceslaos assertion, this Court is convince that his and appellant Ricardos
flight from the scene of the crime immediately after the ambush is an evidence of their guilt. It is
noteworthy that after the ambush incident, appellant Wenceslao immediately left his residence and
moved to his fathers house, then to his sons house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and lastly to
Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental, where he was arrested. Appellant Ricardo did the same
thing. From his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, he transferred to his parents-in-
laws house, then he left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and thereafter, moved to Puting
Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, until he was arrested on 20 December 2001. If appellants were truly
innocent of the crime charged, they would not go into hiding rather they would face their accusers to
clear their names. Courts go by the biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but
the righteous are as bold as a lion."65

Appellants respective explanations regarding their flight fail to persuade this Court. It bears
emphasis that after the alleged strafing of appellant Wenceslaos house, all he did is to move from
one place to another instead of having it investigated by the authorities. Until now, the alleged
strafing of his house remains a mystery. If that strafing incident truly happened, he would be much
eager to know who caused it in order to penalize the author thereof. Appellant Ricardo, on the other
hand, was allegedly afraid of being persecuted for being one of the supporters of Mayor Tawan-
tawans political rival. His fear, however, was more imaginary than real. The aforesaid claim of
appellant Ricardo was uncorroborated, hence, cannot be given any considerable weight.

In light of the clear, positive and straightforward testimonies of prosecution witnesses, coupled with
their positive identification of appellants as among the perpetrators of the ambush, appellants
defense of denial and alibi cannot prosper.

As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot
prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellants
committed the crime.66 For alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It
is not enough to prove that appellants were somewhere else when the crime happened. They must
also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to
have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. 67 Unless
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving
of any weight in law.68 A mere denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-
serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.69

In this case, both appellants claimed that they were just in their respective houses in Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte, when the ambush incident happened and they have no involvement
whatsoever in the commission thereof.

To corroborate appellant Wenceslaos testimony, the defense presented Armida, Jeffrey and
Luzviminda, who are appellant Wenceslaos wife, nephew and niece, respectively. This Court,
however, cannot give credence to the testimonies of these defense witnesses. Being appellant
Wenceslaos relatives, their testimonies are rendered suspect because the formers relationship to
them makes it likely that they would freely perjure themselves for his sake. The defense of alibi may
not prosper if it is established mainly by the appellant himself and his relatives, and not by credible
persons.70 This Court further quote with conformity the observation made by the trial court, viz:

FURTHER, the testimonies of the above-named witnesses for herein appellant Wenceslao were
shattered by the testimony of Rudy, another witness for appellant Wenceslao, who categorically told
the Court that during the time he and his companions Jacob Pepito and a certain Romy were in the
house of appellant Wenceslao in the afternoon of 5 June 2001, there was no unusual incident that
took place, as well as no unusual incident that happened when they left the house of appellant
Wenceslao at about 2:45 in the afternoon.

The foregoing testimony of Rudy clearly imparts that the visit of Rudy and his companions to the
house of appellant Wenceslao, if any, happened on another date. This will be so because if appellant
Wenceslao and his closely related witnesses are telling the truth that Jacob Pepito, Rudy and Romy
were in the house of appellant Wenceslao talking about the said election returns during that fateful
afternoon, then definitely, Rudy should have had known of the ambush incident, said incident being
spreaded throughout or shall we say, "the talk of the town" that afternoon of 5 June 2001.
If the ambush incident occurred on the day Rudy and his companions visited appellant Wenceslao,
then, no doubt that Rudywill tell the Court about it. But his testimony was otherwise. 71 [Emphasis
supplied].

In the same breath, appellant Ricardos defense of denial and alibi cannot be given any evidentiary
value as it was unsubstantiated. Appellant Ricardo never presented any witness to support his claim
that he was simply inside their house attending to his wife and children during the time that the
ambush incident happened. This Court reiterates that mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law. Between the
categorical and positive assertions of the prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the
accused which are uncorroborated by reliable and independent evidence, the former indisputably
deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight. 72

Withal, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the scene of the crime in the
afternoon of 5 June 2001. As observed by the trial court and the appellate court, Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte, where both appellants reside, is only about seven (7) kilometers away
from San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush took place.73

All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that, indeed,
appellants were among the perpetrators of the ambush against Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group.
Prosecution witnesses categorical, positive and straightforward testimonies, coupled with their
positive identification of appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime, prevail over appellants
defense of bare denial and alibi.

As to the crime committed. The trial court, as well as the appellate court, convicted appellants of
double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder. This Court believes,
however, that appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two
(2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the
victims in this case were not the result of a single act but of several acts of the appellants, thus,
making Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code inapplicable.

Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-
tawan and his group with bullets discharged from their firearms when the said vehicle passed by San
Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, resulted in the death of two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan,
i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

xxxx
5. With evident premeditation. [Emphasis supplied].

Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the commission of the crime. Time and
again, this Court, in a plethora of cases, has consistently held that there is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make. There are two (2) conditions that must
concur for treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the employment of means of execution gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution
was deliberately and consciously adopted. "The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate
and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape."74

The deadly successive shots of the appellants and their co-accused did not allow the hapless
victims, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, any opportunity to put up a decent defense. The
attack was executed by appellants and their-co-accused in such a vicious manner as to make the
defense virtually impossible. Under the circumstances, it is very apparent that appellants had murder
in their hearts when they waylaid their unwary victims. 75 Thus, as to the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and
T/Sgt. Dacoco, appellants should be held liable for murder.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, cannot be appreciated as it is

deemed absorbed in treachery.76

Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident premeditation, the
circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated. To prove this aggravating circumstance, the
prosecution must show the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time,
between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow the
offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 77 None of these elements could be gathered
from the evidence on record.

As regards the victims Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito, although they
were injured during the ambush and were all hospitalized, except for Macasuba, it was not
mentioned that their injuries and wounds were mortal or fatal such that without the timely medical
assistance accorded to them, they would have died. 78 However, it does not necessarily follow that
the crimes committed against the aforenamed victims were simply less serious physical injuries.
Also, even though Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun did not sustain any injury during the ambush, it does
not mean that no crime has been committed against them. The latter were just fortunate enough not
to have sustained any injury on the occasion thereof. Since appellants were motivated by the same
intent to kill, thus, as to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito, Mayor Tawan-
tawan and Jun, appellants should be held guilty of attempted murder.

What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. Its resolution would determine whether the conviction of appellants must be for the
separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder or of the
complex crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder.
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which explicitly
states that:79

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. [Emphasis
supplied].

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and
in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed.
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime
proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of
the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule
governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that
when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 80

Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances present in this case
do not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.

From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding of the victims were
not the result of a single discharge of firearms by the appellants and their co-accused. To note,
appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two security escorts died while five (5) of them were
wounded and injured. The victims sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of their bodies.
Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more than
one gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims. As held in People v. Valdez, 81 each act by each
gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different
persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime. 82

Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but several individual and
distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not
apply for it speaks only of a "single act."

There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code despite the
fact that several acts were performed by several accused in the commission of the crime resulting to
the death and/or injuries to their victims.

In People v. Lawas,83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of their leader, Lawas,
simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. As a result, 50 persons died. It was there
held that the killing was the result of a single impulse as there was no intent on the part of the
accused to fire at each and every victim separately and distinctly from each other.

If the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense.
However, "single criminal impulse" was not the only consideration in applying Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code in the said case because there was therein no evidence at all showing the
identity or number of persons killed by each accused. There was also no conspiracy to perpetuate
the killing, thus, collective criminal responsibility could not be imputed upon the accused. Since it
was impossible to ascertain the number of persons killed by each of them, this Court was "forced" to
find all the accused guilty of only one offense of multiple homicide instead of holding each of them
responsible for 50 deaths.84

Significantly, there was no conspiracy in People v. Lawas. However, as this Court held in People v.
Remollino,85the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the general rule.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every
one of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them.
In the absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode
and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the
mortal wound, as each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the
act of all.86

The Information filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged conspiracy, among others.
Although the trial court did not directly state that a conspiracy existed, such may be inferred from the
concerted actions of the appellants and their co-accused, to wit: (1) appellants and their co-accused
brought Samuel to a waiting shed located on the left side of the road where the yellow pick-up
service vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group would pass; (2) appellants and their
co-accused, thereafter, assembled themselves on both sides of the road and surreptitiously waited
for the aforesaid yellow pick-up service vehicle; (3) the moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle
passed by the waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets thereon
resulting in the killing and wounding of the victims; (4) immediately, appellants and their co-accused
ran towards the house of Samuels aunt to get their bags and other stuff; (5) Samuel followed
appellants and their co-accused; and (6) appellants and their co-accused fled.

Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of the appellants and their
co-accused. Clearly, their acts were coordinated. They were synchronized in their approach to riddle
with bullets the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. They were motivated by a
single criminal impulse to kill the victims. Indubitably, conspiracy is implied when the accused
persons had a common purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or active
cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create
joint criminal responsibility.87

With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their co-accused had assumed
joint criminal responsibility the act of one is the act of all. The ascertainment of who among them
actually hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims already becomes immaterial. Collective
responsibility replaced individual responsibility. The Lawas doctrine, premised on the impossibility of
determining who killed whom, cannot, to repeat, be applied.
Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos,88 People v. Abella,89 People v. Garcia90 and People v.
Pincalin,91 this Court also applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code even though several acts
were performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.

In People v. De los Santos,92 a prison riot occurred for two consecutive days inside the national
penitentiary between the members of two gangs, i.e., Sigue-Sigue Sputnik and Oxo. As a result, nine
(9) inmates were killed. Fourteen (14) inmates were then convicted for the crime of multiple murder.
The existence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime was duly proven. There was, however,
no discussion why the accused were convicted of a complex crime instead of separate crimes.

In a similar case of People v. Abella, 93 involving the massacre of certain prisoners in the Davao Penal
Colony and a reprise of a similar riot that occurred in the national penitentiary on 16 February 1958
(subject of De los Santos), all the accused were also convicted for the complex crime of multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Conspiracy likewise attended the commission of the crime.
This Court applied the ruling in De los Santos and elucidated that the ruling in the said case is
predicated on the theory that "when for the attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an
offense, various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one offense," a complex
one. The Lawas doctrine was equally applied although conspiracy had been duly proven. This Court
then stated that where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose "their individual
acts in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act the act of execution giving rise
to a complex offense. The felonious agreement produces a sole and solidary liability: each
confederate forms but a part of a single being."94

People v. Garcia95 and People v. Pincalin96 have the same factual background as De los Santos and
Abella. They were the third and fourth cases, respectively, of prison riots resulting to the killing of
convicts by fellow convicts while inside the national penitentiary. In Garcia, the accused were
convicted for the complex crime of multiple murder and double attempted murder, while in Pincalin
the accused were convicted for the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. In both
cases, this Court found conspiracy to have attended the commission of the crime.

In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in Garcia and Pincalin, this Court, gave the same
justification as in Abella: that both cases were covered by the rule that "when for the attainment of a
single purpose, which constitutes an offense various acts are executed, such acts must be
considered as only one offense, a complex one." Correspondingly, "where a conspiracy animates
several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are
looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a complex offense. Various acts
committed under one criminal impulse may constitute a single complex offense. 97

We however found no intention by this Court to establish as doctrine, contrary to Lawas, that Article
48 is applicable even in cases where several acts were performed by the accused and conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime. In Pincalin, this Court has already clarified that: nonetheless,
this Court further held that "in other cases where several killings on the same occasion were
perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings
would be treated as separate offenses, as opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in some
decided cases."98
De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were exceptions to the general rule stated in
Article 48 which exceptions were drawn by the peculiar circumstance of the cases.

It may be mentioned that in People v. Sanidad, 99 this Court, once again, applied Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code although the circumstances of the case were not the same as in Lawas, De los
Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, where this Court departed from the general rule.

In Sanidad, suddenly and without a warning, several accused unleashed a volley of shots at the
jeepney boarded by the victims. Miraculously, all passengers, except Rolando Tugadi (Rolando),
survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries. Conspiracy attended the commission of the
crime. Accused were convicted for the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder. We
there held that the case comes within the purview of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Citing
Lawas and Abella, it was pronounced that although several independent acts were performed by the
accused, it was not possible to determine who among them actually killed Rolando; and that there
was no evidence that the accused intended to fire at each and every one of the victims separately
and distinctly from each other. On the premise that the evidence clearly shows a single criminal
impulse to kill Marlon Tugadis group as a whole, we repeated that where a conspiracy animates
several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are
looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense. 100

The reliance in Sanidad, on Lawas and Abella is incorrect.

The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin, thus: where several
killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be
applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses. Since in Sanidad, the
killings did not involve prisoners or it was not a case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners. As such,
Abella would not apply.

To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
because of the impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons killed by each accused. Since
conspiracy was not proven therein, joint criminal responsibility could not be attributed to the
accused. Each accused could not be held liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear
evidence showing the number of persons actually killed by each of them.

Proven conspiracy could have overcome the difficulty.

Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as though each one
performed the act of each one of the conspirators. Each one is criminally responsible for each one of
the deaths and injuries of the several victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the application of
Article 48. The applicability of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional
phrase "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies." This is not an original
reading of the law. In People v. Hon. Pineda, 101 the Court already recognized the "deeply rooted x x x
doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and
distinct crimes." As we observed in People v. Tabaco, 102 clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, this Court further stated in Hon. Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48,
x x x there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the
law."103

With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of
murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder.

As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed for the crime of
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
the penalty to be imposed upon appellants is reclusion perpetua for each count, pursuant to
paragraph 2, Article 63104 of the Revised Penal Code.105

Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. The penalty prescribed by law for
murder, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death, should be reduced by two degrees, conformably to Article
51106 of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph 2, Article 61, 107 in relation to Article 71 of the
Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is prision mayor. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the same should be imposed in its medium period pursuant to paragraph 1, Article
64108 of the Revised Penal Code. 109 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the case of
attempted murder, the maximum shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor, which is 8
years and 1 day to 10 years, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, the range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6
years. This Court, therefore, imposed upon the appellants the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each
count of attempted murder.

As to damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.110

Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the
deceased are entitled to be indemnified for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or
proof thereof. Moral damages like civil indemnity, is also mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
murder.111 Therefore, the trial court and the appellate court properly awarded civil indemnity in the
amount of P 50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of P 50,000.00 to the heirs of each
deceased victims.

Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, treachery may no longer be
considered as an aggravating circumstance since it was already taken as a qualifying circumstance
in the murder, and abuse of superior strength which would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary
damages was already absorbed in the treachery.112 However, in People v. Combate, 113 this Court still
awards exemplary damages despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance to deter similar
conduct and to serve as an example for public good. Thus, to deter future similar transgressions, the
Court finds that an award of P 30,000.00 as exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of each
deceased victims is proper.114 The said amount is in conformity with this Courts ruling in People v.
Gutierrez.115
Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to present the receipts covering the expenditures for
the wake, coffin, burial and other expenses for the death of the victims. In lieu thereof, temperate
damages may be recovered where it has been shown that the victims family suffered some
pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty as provided for under Article
2224 of the Civil Code.116 In this case, it cannot be denied that the heirs of the deceased victims
suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved with certainty. Thus, this Court
similarly awards P 25,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of each deceased victims. 117

The surviving victims, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito, are also entitled
to moral, temperate and exemplary damages.

Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the wounds inflicted upon the aforesaid
victims would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar
injuries.118 It is only justifiable to grant them moral damages in the amount of P 40,000.00 each in
conformity with this Courts ruling in People v. Mokammad. 119

The award of P 25,000.00 each as temperate damages to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC
Angni and Juanito is also in order. It is beyond doubt that these victims were hospitalized and spent
money for their medication. As to Macasuba, although he was not confined in a hospital, it cannot be
gainsaid that he also spent for the treatment of the minor injuries he sustained by reason of the
ambush. However, they all failed to present any receipt therefor. Nevertheless, it could not be denied
that they suffered pecuniary loss; thus, it is only prudent to award temperate damages in the amount
of P 25,000.00 to each of them.1wphi1

The award of exemplary damages is also in order. Thus, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC
Angni and Juanito are awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P 30,000.00 to conform to
current jurisprudence.120

This Court likewise affirms the award of P 50,000.00 for and as attorneys fees, as well as costs of
the suit, in favor of Mayor Tawan-tawan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246
dated 18 June 2008 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows: (1) appellants are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder thereby imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count; (2) appellants are also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7)
counts of attempted murder thereby imposing upon them the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each
count; (3) other than the civil indemnity and moral damages already awarded by the trial court and
the appellate court, appellants are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, exemplary and
temperate damages in the amount of P 30,000.00 and P 25,000.00, respectively, to the heirs of each
deceased victims; and (4) appellants are also directed to pay, jointly and severally, Macasuba,
Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito the amount of P 40,000.00 each as moral
damages, P 25,000.00 each as temperate damages and P 30,000.00 each as exemplary damages.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 199892 December 10, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR., Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated April 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 02816 denying the appeal of appellant Arturo Punzalan, Jr. of the Decision 2 dated March
21, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of fba, Zambales and affirming his conviction for the
complex crime of double murder with multiple attempted murder, with certain modifications on the
civil liability imposed on appellant.3

In August 2002, Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio Bacosa,
SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members of the
Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) at San
Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales. On August 10, 2002, at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they
went to the "All-in-One" Canteen to have some drink. Later, at around 10:00 in the evening, they
transferred to a nearby videoke bar, "Aquarius," where they continued their drinking session. Shortly
thereafter, a heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued regarding a flickering
light bulb inside "Aquarius."4 When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off ("Patayin ang
ilaw"), appellant who must have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosas statement
belligerently reacted asking, "Sinong papatayin?," thinking that SN1 Bacosas statement was
directed at him.5SN1 Cuya tried to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while SN1 Bundang apologized
to appellant in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant was still visibly angry, mumbling
unintelligible words and pounding his fist on the table. 6

To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave "Aquarius" and return to the NETC
camp. They walked in twos, namely, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo in the first group, followed by
the group of SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Cuya, and SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna in the last group, with
each group at one arms length distance from the other. 7 Along the way, they passed by the NETC
sentry gate which was being manned by SN1 Noel de Guzman and F1EN Alejandro Dimaala at that
time.8 SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna even stopped by to give the sentries some barbecue before
proceeding to follow their companions.9

Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN Dimaala
flagged down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van with plate number DRW 706. The
sentries approached the van and recognized appellant, who was reeking of liquor, as the driver.
Appellant angrily uttered, "kasi chief, gago ang mga yan!," while pointing toward the direction of the
navy personnels group. Even before he was given the go signal to proceed, appellant shifted gears
and sped away while uttering, "papatayin ko ang mga yan!"10 While F1EN Dimaala was writing the
vans plate number and details in the logbook, he suddenly heard a loud thud. Meanwhile, SN1 De
Guzman saw how the van sped away towards the camp and suddenly swerved to the right hitting
the group of the walking navy personnel prompting him to exclaim to F1EN Dimaala, "chief,
binangga ang tropa!" SN1 De Guzman then asked permission to go to the scene of the incident and
check on the navy personnel.11

When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa were thrown away
towards a grassy spot on the roadside. They momentarily lost consciousness. 12 When they came to,
they saw SN1 Duclayna lying motionless on the ground. 13 SN1 Cuya tried to resuscitate SN1
Duclayna, while SN1 Bacosa tried to chase the van.14

SN1 Domingo was not hit by the van as he was in the first group and was pushed away from the
path of the speeding van. He was able to see the vehicles plate number. He also tried to chase the
van with SN1 Bacosa but they turned around when the vehicle made a U-turn as they thought that it
would come back for them. The vehicle, however, sped away again when other people started to
arrive at the scene of the incident.15

SN1 De Guzman found SN1 Cuya administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on SN1
Duclayna. He also saw the misshapen body of SN1 Andal lying some 50 meters away, apparently
dragged there when the speeding van hit SN1 Andal. SN1 Cuya instructed SN1 De Guzman to get
an ambulance but the car of the officer on duty at that time arrived and they boarded SN1
Duclaynas body to the vehicle to be brought to the hospital. 16 The other injured navy personnel,
namely, SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, and SN1 Bundang, were brought to the infirmary for treatment. 17

Members of the local police soon arrived at the scene of the crime. Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1
Roberto Llorico, the police investigator, found the bloodied lifeless body of SN1 Andal lying on the
side of the road. SPO1 Llorico was informed that appellant was the suspect. Fortunately, one of the
responding officers was appellants neighbor and led SPO1 Llorico to appellants place where they
found appellant standing near his gate. Appellant appeared drunk and was reeking of alcohol. They
also saw the van parked inside the premises of appellants place. Its front bumper was damaged.
When they asked appellant why he ran over the navy personnel, he simply answered that he was
drunk. The police officers then invited appellant to the police station and brought the van with them. 18

A post mortem examination was conducted on the bodies of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna by Dr.
Jericho Cordero of Camp Crame Medical Division. Dr. Corderos findings were that the injuries
sustained by SN1 Andal were fatal and caused by a hard blunt object that hit his body. The force of
the impact was such that the internal organs like the kidneys, mesentery and spleen were also fatally
injured. SN1 Andal died of cardiorespiratory arrest as a result of massive blunt traumatic injuries to
the head, thorax and abdomen. On the other hand, SN1 Duclayna sustained fatal injuries to the
head and liver. The head and neck injuries were such that a lot of blood vessels were ruptured and
the fractures were embedded in the brain. The laceration on the liver, also a mortal injury, was a
blunt traumatic injury.19
As regards the other navy personnel, SN1 Cuya suffered lacerated wounds on the head and
different parts of the body for which he was confined at the infirmary for about eighteen (18)
days;20 SN1 Bacosa sustained injuries on his knee and left hand and stayed in the infirmary for a
day;21 and SN1 Bundang suffered injuries to his right foot. 22

Appellant was thereafter charged under an Information23 which reads as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of August 2002, at about 11:00 oclock in the evening, in Brgy. West
Dirita, Municipality of San Antonio, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in control of a Nissan Van
with plate no. DRW 706, did there and then wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, bump, overrun,
smash and hit from behind with the use of the said van, the following persons: Antonio Duclayna,
Arnulfo Andal, Evelio Bacosa, Danilo Cuya, Erlinger Bundang and Cesar Domingo, all members of
the Philippine [N]avy then assigned at the Naval Education and Training Command in San Antonio,
Zambales, thereby inflicting upon them the following physical injuries, to wit:

DANILO CUYA:

"Head Injury, grade 1 (Lacerated wound 5.0 cm, accipitoparietal area, (L) and lacerated wound,
Lower lip) 2 to VA"

EVELIO BACOSA:

"Multiple abrasion, wrist, volar surface (L), 2nd digit, abrasion, dorsun, (L) foot"

ERLINGER BUNDANG:

"Abrasion, medial maleolus, (R)"

ARNULFO ANDAL:

"Head Injury, Grade IV; (Depressed Fracture, Frontal: Lacerated wounds, 8.0 cm 3.0 cm. forehead,
and 5.0 cm parietal, (R);

Avulsion, medial aspect, upper arm to elbow, hip and enguinal area, (L);

Multiple abrasion, anterior and posterior chest, knees and (R) footsecondary to VA"

ANTONIO DUCLAYNA:

"Head Injury, Grade IV (Lacerated wound, Contusion, Hematoma (R) Parietal) secondary to VA"

which act of said accused directly caused the death of Arnulfo Andal and Antonio Duclayna, and in
so far as Danilo Cuya, Evelio Bacosa and Erlinger Bundang were concerned, said accused
performed all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless, did not produce said crime by reason of cause/s independent of his will, that is, by the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Danilo Cuya, Evelio Bacosa and Erlinger
Bundang, which prevented their death, and finally as to Cesar Domingo, said accused commenced
the commission of the acts constituting Murder directly by overt acts, but was not able to perform all
the acts of execution by reason of some cause other than accuseds own desistance, that is due to
the timely avoidance of the van driven by accused, and that the commission of the crimes was
attended with treachery, evident premeditation, cruelty and use of a motor vehicle, and by
deliberately and inhuman[ely] augmenting the suffering of the victim Arnulfo Andal, to the damage
and prejudice of Danilo Cuya, Evelio Bacosa, Erlinger Bundang and Cesar Domingo and the family
and heirs of the deceased Arnulfo Andang and Antonio Duclayna.

When arraigned, appellant maintained his innocence. 24

After pre-trial, trial ensued and the prosecution presented evidence to establish the facts stated
above.

In his defense, appellant testified that in the evening of August 10, 2002, he was drinking with Marvin
Acebeda and Romeo Eusantos at the "Aquarius" videoke bar. When he sang, the navy personnel
who were also inside the bar laughed at him as he was out of tune. He then stood up, paid his bills
and went out. After a while, Acebeda followed him and informed him that the navy personnel would
like to make peace with him. He went back inside the bar with Acebedo and approached the navy
personnel. When SN1 Bacosa appeared to reach out for appellants hand, appellant offered his hand
but SN1 Bacosa suddenly punched appellants right ear. To avoid further altercation, appellant left
the bar with Acebeda in tow. Appellant went home driving his van, with the spouses Romeo and
Alicia Eusantos who hitched a ride as passengers. When they passed by the sentry, somebody
threw stones at the van. When he alighted and inspected the vehicle, he saw that one of the
headlights was broken. Thereafter, he saw SN1 Bacosa and another man approaching him so he
went back inside the van but the duo boxed him repeatedly on his shoulder through the vans open
window. When he saw the four other navy personnel coming towards him, he accelerated the van.
During the whole incident, Romeo was asleep as he was very drunk while Alicia was seated at the
back of the van. Upon reaching appellants home, the spouses alighted from the van and proceeded
to their place. After 20 minutes, police officers arrived at appellants house and told him that he
bumped some people. Appellant went with the police officers to the police station where he was
investigated and detained.25

Appellants only other witness was Alicia Eusantos. She testified that she and her husband hitched a
ride with appellant in the evening of August 10, 2002. She did not notice any unusual incident from
the time they rode the vehicle until they alighted from it. She learned about the incident on the
following day only when her statement was taken by the police.26

After the parties have rested their respective cases, the RTC of Iba, Zambales found appellant guilty
and rendered a Decision dated March 21, 2007 with the following dispositive portion:

IN VIEW THEREOF, accused ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR. is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of Double Murder qualified by treachery with Attempted Murder attended by the
aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua.
For the death of SN1 Antonio Duclayna and SN1 Arnulfo Andal, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 each is
awarded to their heirs. This is in addition to the amount of moral damages at P50,000.00 each for
the emotional and mental sufferings, plus P12,095.00 to the heirs of Duclayna representing actual
damages.

Accused is likewise ordered to pay SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya and
SN1 Erlinger Bundang P30,000.00 each or an aggregate amount of P120,000.00 as indemnity for
their attempted murder.27

Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In his brief, 28 appellant claimed that the trial court
erred in not finding that he may not be held criminally liable as he merely acted in avoidance of
greater evil or injury, a justifying circumstance under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code. His act of increasing his vehicles speed was reasonable and justified as he was being
attacked by two men whose four companions were also approaching. He asserted that the attack
against him by the two navy personnel constituted actual and imminent danger to his life and limb.
The sight of the four approaching companions of his attackers "created in his mind a fear of greater
evil," prompting him to speed up his vehicle to avoid a greater evil or injury to himself. According to
appellant, if he accidentally hit the approaching navy men in the process, he could not be held
criminally liable therefor. The instinct of self-preservation would make one feel that his own safety is
of greater importance than that of another.29

Appellant further faulted the trial court in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. He
asserted that nothing in the records would show that he consciously or deliberately adopted the
means of execution. More importantly, treachery was not properly alleged in the Information. 30

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the People of the Philippines, refuted the
arguments of appellant and defended the correctness of the RTC Decision. In its brief, 31 the OSG
claimed that the trial court rightly rejected appellants defense of avoidance of greater evil or injury.
Appellants version of the events did not conform to the physical evidence and it was not consistent
with the testimony of his own witness.

The OSG also argued that treachery was appropriately appreciated by the trial court. The
Information was written in a way that sufficiently described treachery where "the unsuspecting
victims were walking towards their barracks and totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from
behind."32

After considering the respective arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision dated April 29, 2011 with the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is Denied. The assailed Decision, dated March 21, 2007, of the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-3492-I,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that Accused-Appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of
SN1 Antonio Duclayna and SN1 Arnulfo Andal civil indemnity of Php75,000, moral damages of
Php75,000, temperate damages of Php25,000 and exemplary damages of Php30,000. In addition to
the foregoing damages, Accused-Appellant is as well held liable to pay the heirs of SN1 Andal the
amount of Php2,172,270.21 to represent the amount of loss of earning capacity of SN1 Andal.
Accused-Appellant is likewise ordered to pay the surviving victims, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar
Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya and SN1 Erlinger Bundang, moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of Php40,000 and Php30,000, respectively. Award of temperate damages in the amount of
Php25,000 is proper in favor of SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bundang for the unsubstantiated
amount of pecuniary losses they suffered on account of the injuries they sustained. SN1 Cesar
Domingo, however, is not entitled to temperate damages.33

Hence, this appeal.

Both appellant and the OSG adopted the respective briefs they filed in the Court of Appeals. 34

Is appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder?

After a thorough review of the records of this case and the arguments of the parties, this Court
affirms appellants conviction.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the evidence presented and offered by the prosecution
credible and that the "prosecution witnesses had overwhelmingly proved beyond reasonable doubt
the culpability of the Accused-Appellant." 35 The Court of Appeals correctly observed that prosecution
witnesses F1EN Dimaala and SN1 De Guzman "positively identified accused-appellant as the one
who hit and ran over the victims."36 The Court of Appeals further found:

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, taken together, inevitably showed the criminal intent of
the Accused-Appellant to inflict harm on the victims. They testified on the incident in a clear, concise,
corroborative, and straightforward manner. Thus, their testimonies must prevail over the testimony
given by the Accused-Appellant which, on the other hand, was neither substantiated nor supported
by any evidence.

The prosecution witnesses testified that they actually saw how Accused-Appellant ran over the
victims who were walking inside the NETC camp on the night of August 10, 2002. Accused-
Appellant, who was driving his van from behind, suddenly bumped and ran over the victims. The
victims were thrown away, resulting in the instantaneous death of SN1 Duclayna and SN1 Andal and
causing injuries to the other victims.

xxxx

Accused-Appellants version of the crime, upon which the justifying circumstance of avoidance of
greater evil or injury is invoked, is baseless. This is because his assertions anent the existence of
the evil which he sought to be avoided [did] not actually exist as [they] neither conformed to the
evidence at hand nor [were] [they] consistent with the testimony of his own witness, Alicia Eusantos
x x x.

xxxx

Accused-Appellants own witness, Alicia Eusantos, not only failed to corroborate his claim but also
belied Accused-Appellants claim that he was attacked by the Philippine Navy personnel. Alicia
Eusantos categorically stated that she did not witness any unusual incident in the evening of August
10, 2002 while on board the Nissan Urvan Van driven by Accused-Appellant while they were cruising
the access road going to the NETC compound. Accused-Appellants claim, therefore, is more
imaginary than real. The justifying circumstance of Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury cannot be
invoked by the Accused-Appellant as the alleged evil sought to be avoided does not actually exist. 37

Moreover, whether or not petitioner acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury is a question of fact. It
is an issue which concerns doubt or difference arising as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts.38 In this connection, this Court declared in Martinez v. Court of Appeals39:

[T]he well-entrenched rule is that findings of fact of the trial court in the ascertainment of the
credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of the evidence on record affirmed, on appeal, by
the CA are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by the Court and in the absence of any
justifiable reason to deviate from the said findings.

This Court has combed through the records of this case and found no reason to deviate from the
findings of the trial and appellate courts. There is nothing that would indicate that the RTC and the
Court of Appeals "ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case." 40

Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke avoidance of
greater evil as a justifying circumstance, 41 the following requisites should be complied with:

(1) the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

(2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and

(3) there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals rejected appellants self-serving and uncorroborated claim of
avoidance of greater evil. The trial and appellate courts noted that even appellants own witness who
was in the van with appellant at the time of the incident contradicted appellants claim. Thus, the
RTC and the Court of Appeals concluded that the evil appellant claimed to avoid did not actually
exist. This Court agrees.

Moreover, appellant failed to satisfy the third requisite that there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, infliction of
damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not befall ones self may be justified
only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least possible prejudice to another. If there is another
way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no such other way
but the damage to another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to ones self, then such
course should be taken.

In this case, the road where the incident happened was wide, some 6 to 7 meters in width, 42 and the
place was well-lighted.43 Both sides of the road were unobstructed by trees, plants or
structures.44 Appellant was a driver by occupation.45 However, appellant himself testified that when
he shifted to the second gear and immediately stepped on the accelerator upon seeing the four navy
personnel approaching from in front of him, 46 he did not make any attempt to avoid hitting the
approaching navy personnel even though he had enough space to do so. He simply sped away
straight ahead, meeting the approaching navy personnel head on, totally unmindful if he might run
them over.47 He therefore miserably failed to resort to other practical and less harmful available
means of preventing the evil or injury he claimed to be avoiding.

The appreciation of treachery as a circumstance that qualified the killing of SN1 Duclayna and SN1
Andal and the attempted killing of the others is also correct. This Court agrees with the following
disquisition of the Court of Appeals:

We find that the RTC correctly appreciated the existence of treachery in the commission of the
offense. Treachery qualifies the killing to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense
which the offended party might make. The elements of treachery are: (1) the employment of means
of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.

Accused-Appellants act of running over the victims with his van from behind while the victims were
walking inside the NETC camp was a clear act of treachery. The victims were not given any warning
at all regarding the assault of the Accused-Appellant. The victims were surprised and were not able
to prepare and repel the treacherous assault of Accused-Appellant. The prosecution witnesses
testified that after they had flagged down Accused-Appellants van, the latter accelerated and upon
reaching the middle of the road, it suddenly swerved to the right hitting the victims who were startled
by the attack.

xxxx

A close review of the information would disclose that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
stated in ordinary and concise language and the said act was described in terms sufficient to enable
a layman to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enables the court to pronounce
proper judgment.

We quote pertinent portion of the information, which reads:

"x x x the said accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in control of a Nissan Van with plate No.
DRW 706, did then and there willfully and feloniously, bump, overrun, smash and hit from
behind with the use of said van, x x x."

Applying the Supreme Courts discussion in People vs. Batin, citing the case of Balitaan v. Court of
First Instance of Batangas, to wit:

"The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set forth in an Information is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. x x x.
It is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary to be
stated in order to render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general rule,
matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not
be averred. For instance, it is not necessary to show on the face of an information for forgery in what
manner a person is to be defrauded, as that is a matter of evidence at the trial.

We hold that the allegation of treachery in the Information is sufficient. Jurisprudence is

replete with cases wherein we found the allegation of treachery sufficient without any further
explanation as to the circumstances surrounding it."

Clearly, We find that the information is sufficient as it not merely indicated the term treachery therein
but also described the act itself constituting treachery. Such statement, without a doubt, provided the
supporting facts that constituted the offense, sufficiently alleging the qualifying circumstance of
treachery when it pointed out the statement, "smash and hit from behind." 48 (Emphases supplied;
citations omitted.)

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting
victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victims.49 The six navy personnel were walking by the roadside, on their way back to their camp.
They felt secure as they have just passed a sentry and were nearing their barracks. They were
totally unaware of the threat to their life as their backs were turned against the direction where
appellants speeding van came. They were therefore defenseless and posed no threat to appellant
when appellant mowed them down with his van, killing two of them, injuring three others and one
narrowly escaping injury or death. Beyond reasonable doubt, there was treachery in appellants act.
This was sufficiently alleged in the Information which not only expressly mentioned treachery as one
of the circumstances attending the crime but also described it in understandable language:

[T]he said accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in control of a Nissan Van with plate no. DRW
706, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, bump, overrun, smash and hit from
behind with the use of said van, the following persons: Antonio Duclayna, Arnulfo Andal, Evelio
Bacosa, Danilo Cuya, Erlinger Bundang and Cesar Domingo, x x x.50 (Emphasis supplied.)

Use of motor vehicle was also properly considered as an aggravating circumstance. Appellant
deliberately used the van he was driving to pursue the victims. Upon catching up with them,
appellant ran over them and mowed them down with the van, resulting to the death of SN1 Andal
and SN1 Duclayna and injuries to the others. 51Thereafter, he continued to speed away from the
scene of the incident. Without doubt, appellant used the van both as a means to commit a crime and
to flee the scene of the crime after he committed the felonious act.

The felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, double
murder with multiple attempted murder, is a complex crime contemplated under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act
of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the navy
personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an
attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo. 52 The crimes of murder
and attempted murder are both grave felonies 53 as the law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital
punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while attempted murder is punished by prision
mayor,54 an afflictive penalty.55

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, murder is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Article 6356 of the same Code provides that if the penalty prescribed is composed
of two indivisible penalties, as in the instant case, and there is an aggravating circumstance the
higher penalty should be imposed. Since use of vehicle can be considered as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance, treachery, by itself, being sufficient to qualify the killing, the proper
imposable penalty the higher sanction is death. However, in view of the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9346,57 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty for the killing of each of
the two victims is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.58 The penalty
of reclusion perpetua thus imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for the complex crime that
he committed is correct.

The awards of P75,000.00 civil indemnity and P75,000.00 moral damages to the respective heirs of
SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna are also proper. These awards, civil indemnity and moral damages,
are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the
fact of the commission of murder.59

Moreover, in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances, namely the qualifying circumstance
of treachery and the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, the award
of P30,000.00 exemplary damages to the respective heirs of the deceased victims is also
correct.60 In addition, it cannot be denied that the heirs of the deceased victims suffered pecuniary
loss although the exact amount was not proved with certainty. Thus, the award of P25,000.00
1wphi1

temperate damages to the heirs of each deceased victim is appropriate. 61

As it was proven that, at the time of his death, SN1 Andal had a monthly income of P13,245.55,62 the
grant ofP2,172,270.21 for loss of earning capacity is in order.63

As to the surviving victims, SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo, the Court of
Appeals correctly granted each of them P40,000 moral damages for the physical suffering, fright,
serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries caused to them by the incident. 64 And as the crime
was attended by aggravating circumstances, each of them was properly given P30,000 exemplary
damages.65
Finally, those who suffered injuries, namely, SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Bundang, were
correctly awardedP25,000 temperate damages each for the pecuniary loss they suffered for
hospitalization and/or medication, although no receipts were shown to support said loss. 66

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02816 affirming the conviction of appellant Arturo Punzalan, Jr. for
the complex crime of double murder with multiple attempted murder, imposing upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the following:

(a) To the respective heirs of SN1 Arnulfo Andal and SN1 Antonio Duclayna:

(i) P75,000.00 civil indemnity;

(ii) P75,000.00 moral damages;

(iii) P30,000.00 exemplary damages; and

(iv) P25,000.00 temperate damages;

(b) To the heirs of SN1 Andal, P2,172,270.21 for loss of earning capacity;

(c) To each of the surviving victims, SN1 Danilo Cuya, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Erlinger
Bundang and SN1 Cesar Domingo:

(i) P40,000.00 moral damages; and

(ii) P30,000.00 exemplary damages; and

(d) To SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Bundang, P25,000.00 temperate damages each
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 194629, April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE DULAY, AccusedAppellant.

DECISION

For review is the Decision1 dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR
H.C. No. 03584 which affirmed the Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 31, finding accusedappellant Dante Dulay
(Dulay) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder and Frustrated Murder.

The following are the antecedent facts:

[Dulay] entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment which reads as follows:
"That on or about 6:30 in the evening of December 30, 2002 in Ligaya, Aglipay, Quirino,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused by
using a grenade and by means of explosion, did then and there willfully and unlawfully and after
removing the safety pin of the said grenade, throw it at the house of Orlando Legaspi Sr.,
producing a land explosion and as a consequence[,] the shrapnels hit ORLANDO LEGASPI SR.
to [sic] the different parts of his body that caused his death.

That on the same occasion, said accused armed with the same grenade and by means of
explosion did then and there willfully and unlawfully threw the grenade after removing its safety
pin at the house of ORLANDO LEGASPI SR. causing loud explosion as the shrapnel of the
grenade hit ORLANDO LEGASPI, JR. Thus accused performed all the acts of execution that
would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but did not produce it because of timely
medical assistance rendered unto ORLANDO LEGASPI JR. which prevented his death.

Acts contrary to law.

The records reveal that in the evening of 30 December 2002 at around 6:30, Orlando Jr. (or
simply Junior ), a child about six years of age, was outside the kitchen of their house located in
Ligaya, Aglipay, Province of Quirino. His father, the late Orlando Sr., was also somewhere in the
yard and was asking Junior to hand him a chair. They had just finished dinner and were
intending to watch the television later.

Wondering why the dog was barking loudly, Mrs. Engracia Legaspi peeped from inside the
kitchen and noticed Dulays dog in the vicinity. She surmised that its master, [Dulay], was also
present. Juniors elder sister, Melanie went out to look for the dogleash to transfer the mutt to
another area.

Using the flashlight he was constantly prohibited from playing with, Junior directed a beam
towards the grassy area where he discovered [Dulay] whom he recognized because of the
characteristic mumps below his left ear. Melanie also saw [Dulay] as he was staring at Orlando
Sr. Their uncle Dante suddenly threw something that resembled a ball, towards the cemented
part of the yard. It turned out to be a grenade, and it landed about seven meters from where
Junior and his father were. [Dulay] then went away on his bicycle towards the direction of his
house, x x x.

When the grenade exploded, Junior was hurt in his pelvic area, while his father was fatally hit by
shrapnel, causing his death. Melanie rushed to the succor of her bloodied father, barely noticing
Junior who was likewise lying on the ground, but was still conscious and crying. Engracia
hollered for help from the neighborhood. Because of the firecrackers in that New Years Eve,
people did not readily render assistance, until they realized the intensity of the explosion that
shook the ground.

Police operatives who arrived at the crime scene instructed the assisting neighbors to locate the
grenade fragments. In the early morning of 31 December 2002, three of the male neighbors
continued the search and found a grenade safety lever, along with a tornout pair of rubber
shoes in the road near Dulays house. Examining the rubber shoes which turned out to belong
to the latter, the three men further recovered a grenade ring pin from inside the left shoe.

Orlando Sr. was rushed to the hospital but he expired shortly thereafter. His Certificate of
Death states that he died of cardiorespiratory arrest due to hemorrhagic shock due to
transection of the right kidney, perforation of the duodenum, pancreas and stomach due to
grenade blast injury.
[Dulays] alibi consists of his purported trip from the house of his uncle Onofre Dulay in Gamis to
his friend, Joel Ritualo in another barangay, Dibul. According to his story, he was Onofres
caretaker while the latter was in Manila. Since he had no electricity in Gamis, he went on a bike
to Ritualo to have his Motolite battery recharged. While waiting for the recharging to finish, he
went on a drinking spree with Ritualo and another man, Pepito Maluret, until around 7:30 p.m.
when he bid the two liquorcompanions goodbye. With the energized battery in tow, he left, but
Ritualo insisted on accompanying him to the road as he was already drunk. Not long afterwards,
Ritualo hailed the passenger jeepney that passed them which was driven by his uncle, witness
Robert Daileg.

In convicting Dulay, the trial court noted that Junior had no illmotive to testify falsely against his
uncle. Against the selfserving alibi of the appellant, the prosecution witnesses positively
identified the perpetrator because they were familiar with him, the court added. 3 (Citations
omitted)

The RTC found Dulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with
Attempted Murder. The dispositive portion of the RTC ruling is as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Court finds accused Dante
Dulay GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt with the complex crime of Murder with Attempted Murder
and is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpctua.

1. He is further ordered to pay the heirs Orlando Legaspi Sr., the sum of [P]50,000[.00] as civil
indemnity, and moral damages in the amount of [P]50,000.00[.]

2. Also he must pay [P]30,000[.00] pesos as moral damages to Orlando Legaspi, Jr.

3. [P]115,956[.00] as actual expenses/damage [s] for the hospitalization of the two victims,
namely: Orlando Legaspi, Sr., and Orlando Legaspi, Jr.

SO ORDERED[.]4

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction with modification. The fallo of the judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

challenged Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, the
accusedappellant is convicted of the complex crime of murder and
frustrated murder and is sentenced to suffer:

1)the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;

2) the award of actual damages in the amount of [P] 115,956.00 for the
hospital expenses of the two victims;
3) the award of civil indemnity for the death of Orlando Sr., in the
increased amount of [P]75,000.00;
4) the award of moral damages in the respective amounts of |P]75,000.00
and [P]55,000.00 for Orlando Senior and Junior; [and]
5) the award of exemplary damages in the amount of [P]30,000.00 each
for both Orlando Senior and Junior.

IT IS SO ORDERED.5
The CA held that pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of death which would have been
imposable is properly reduced to reclusion perpetua but the RTC erred in stating in the body of the
decision that Dulay was guilty as well of frustrated murder as charged in the Information with
respect to the bombinjured Orlando Legaspi, Jr. (Junior), and yet convicted him in the dispositive
part only of attempted murder. The prosecution was able to establish that all acts of execution, not
merely preparatory acts, were performed to produce the felony as a consequence, but Junior
nevertheless survived for reasons independent of the will of the perpetrator; that is, the timely
medical assistance to him.6

The records of this case were then elevated to this Court pursuant to CA Resolution 7 dated August 5,
2010, which gave due course to Dulays notice of appeal.

Our Ruling

"It is settled that this Court will not interfere with the trial courts assessment of the witnesses'
credibility, absent any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or
gravely abused its discretion, especially where, as in this case, such assessment is affirmed by the
CA. In the present case, we see no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings of the courts a
quo

Dulay averred that he was in Dibul, Saguday, Quirino, when the crime occurred. While defense
witness Robert Daileg (Daileg) testified that Dulay rode as a passenger in the formers jeepney from
Dibul to Gamis one night, Daileg cannot even remember the exact date when this occurred.
Consequently, Daileg cannot adequately support Dulays version of facts that the latter was
somewhere else that fateful night.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the
offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.9Since Dulay was not able to prove that he was in Dibul when the crime was committed,
both the CA and the RTC were correct in disregarding his alibi. Junior and Melanie, Juniors elder
sister, on the other hand, have both positively identified Dulay as the assailant. On this score, this
Court has held in a number of cases that denial and alibi are weak defenses, which cannot prevail
against positive identification.10

As regards the crime committed against Junior, the Court is in accord with the CAs conclusion that
Dulay is guilty of frustrated murder. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not
produced due to causes independent of the perpetrators will.

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, Dulay has performed all acts of execution in throwing the
grenade which could have caused Juniors death as a consequence, but because of immediate
medical assistance, a cause independent of Dulays will, Junior survived. 12

The Court thus affirms the CA decision, with modification on the awarded indemnities.

First, the Court retains the award by the CA of P75,000.00 as moral damages, exemplary damages
at P30,000.00 and civil indemnity at P75,000.00 to the heirs of Orlando Legaspi, Sr. (Orlando, Sr.) in
conformity with our ruling in People v. Barde.13 Next, the Court awards moral and exemplary
damages to Junior in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. Furthermore, the
Court upholds the CAs award of P115,956.00 as actual damages for the hospital expenses of both
Orlando Sr. and Junior. Lastly, the Court imposes an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the
award of civil indemnity and all damages from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. 14

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. CRH.C. No. 03584 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that accusedappellant Dante
Dulay is ordered: (a) to pay the heirs of Orlando Legaspi, Sr. the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) to pay
Orlando Legaspi, Jr., the amount ofP50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (c) to pay P115,956.00 as actual damages for the hospital expenses of both Orlando
Legaspi, Sr. and Orlando Legaspi, Jr. An interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on the
award of civil indemnity and all damages from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Amado M. Santiago, Jr. for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the
Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the
Resolution of said court promulgated on
March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner ( Rollo, pp.
2-35 and pp. 36-94).

On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of
the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).

On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R.
No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to
harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section
10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on
January 13, 1992.

On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which
motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is
a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)

On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a
pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars
(Rollo, pp. 43-44).

On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the
arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).

On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The
motion stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or
legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored
aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens,
she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.

On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R.

No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) to reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending
before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the motion for the bill of
particulars).

At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated
categorically that they would file only one amended information against petitioner.

However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to

admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).

On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March
11, 1993, denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).

On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32
Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days
from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended Informations was set
for
April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).

Hence, the filing of the instant petition.

Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated March
25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case
until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the
resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended
Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).

Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice

The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication of is
letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the validity of
the information filed
against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the
conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits in judgment on
the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).

The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the July 22,
1992 issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-
departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a "perverse morality" of
the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:

I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis
Garchitorena who would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a
Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. Some of the most
perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and returned to these shores
without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the peccadilloes
of this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused of is kindergarten stuff.
The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for stopping Miriam but I contend
this is the kind of perverse morality we can do without (Rollo, p. 156).

The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable, reads
as follows:

(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of her
intention to travel, whether the Regional Trial Court where she is charged with
soliciting donations from people transacting with her office at Immigration or before
the Sandiganbayan where she is charged with having favored unqualified aliens with
the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even the Supreme Court where
her petition is still pending (Rollo, p. 158).

In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena

that petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens
with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."

The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. Said
Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus:

That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of
aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive
Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the
same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted
benefits and advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official and
administrative functions of said accused (Rollo, p. 36).

It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the
Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as uncalled
for. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the
Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception,
have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the charge
against petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would have been no occasion for the letter had
Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan.

Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the Sandiganbayan
sits in three divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity among the three members is
mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character
of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).

Re: Claim of denial of due process

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of
the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense was
allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information was filed only on May 9, 1991
and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there
indeed was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of
the legal and factual issues involved therein.

In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because
of the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original information came to
the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of
the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The
investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of
petitioner herself the investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but
on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft
resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the
hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the
Ombudsman in March 1991.

We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No.
16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R.
No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary
investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. a piece-meal
presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.

Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation
adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor
children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31,
1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the
informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information
(People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion
that:

(1) She was a public officer;

 (2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
official functions."

The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019.

The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that
petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that
the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons qualified for legalization of stay, are
matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.

Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue
injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.

In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:

The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of
Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving any private party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of the offense of
"causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by petitioners although there may
be instances where both elements concur.

Re: Delito continuado

Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public
prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the
Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also noted
that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the
splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of justice, we therefore
proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said plant, which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in
her petition.

We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and
hence, there should only be one information to be file against her.

The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and
sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."

In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the
concept ofdelito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law difficult as it is to define
and more difficult to apply.

According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed
during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose,
which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same
instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).

According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality
there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,
1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).

Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).

Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following
cases:

(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused
at the same time and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320
[1939] ).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop
and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v.
De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he
collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees
shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). The
collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees
for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal
impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).

On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:

(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19
to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa,
113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on two different occasions.

(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications
to conceal said offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations
and falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to
embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938] ).

(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the
collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving
the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73
SCRA 77 [1976] ).

(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from
customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68
SCRA 308 [1975]).

The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied
to crimes penalized under special laws,
e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up
claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws,
unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may
be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.

The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or
separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as
shown by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.

The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of
several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place
constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under
which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine
that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many
distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).

The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different
criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same
"occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW
1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).

An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting
a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed
that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused
may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act
that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy
such privilege.

The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in
violation of a law Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done
on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.

The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except
that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the
name of the individual whose stay was legalized.

At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they
would file only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As
stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):

On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded categorically
that the accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago consists of one violation of the
law represented by the approval of the applications of 32 foreign nationals for
availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization Program. In this respect, and responding
directly to the concerns of the accused through counsel, the prosecution is
categorical that there will not be 32 accusations but only one . . . (Rollo, p. 59).

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of
time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the
application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as
when the approval was embodied in the same document.

Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the
Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13,
1992 stated as follows:

. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to
the government is concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact of
the violation of the law itself but because of the adverse effect on the stability and
security of the country in granting citizenship to those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal
Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of
the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos.
18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e.,
No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED
insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ROBERTO QUIACHON

GR. NO. 170236 August 31, 2006

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape committed as follows:

On or about May 12, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one Rowena Quiachon y Reyes, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute
minor, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.[1]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 120929-H. At his arraignment, appellant, duly
assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Rowel Quiachon, 11-year old son of appellant;
Rowena Quiachon, the victim and appellants daughter; Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani; and SPO2
Noel Y. Venus.
Rowel testified that he is appellants son. He averred, however, that he no longer wanted to use his
fathers surname describing him as masama for raping his (Rowels) sister Rowena. Rowel
recounted that he used to sleep in the same bedroom occupied by his father, sister and youngest
sibling. Rowel slept beside his youngest sibling while their father, appellant, and Rowena slept
together in one bed.

On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his sister Rowena and they were
covered by a blanket or kumot. His fathers buttocks were moving up and down, and Rowel could
hear Rowena crying. He could not do anything, however, because he was afraid of their father.
Rowel remained in the room but the following morning, he, forthwith, told his mothers sister
Carmelita Mateo, whom he called Ate Lita, about what he had witnessed. Together, Carmelita and
Rowel went to the police to report what had transpired. During the police investigation, Rowel
executed a sworn statement in Tagalog and signed it using the surname Mateo.[2]

Rowena, through sign language, testified that her father had sexual intercourse with her and even
touched her breasts against her will. She was
only eight years old at the time. She cried when she was asked if she was hurt by what appellant did
to her. She consistently declared that she does not love her father and wants him to be punished for
what he did to her.[3]

Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani of the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital Health
Services testified that she received a letter request from the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct an
examination on Rowena. While she was about to proceed with the forensic interview, she noticed
that Rowena was deaf and mute, hence, could not verbally communicate her ordeal. Dr. Guialani
proceeded to conduct a physical examination and, based thereon, she submitted her medico-legal
report.

Dr. Guialani, as indicated in her report, found that Rowena had a contusion hematoma on her left
cheek, which was compatible with her claim that she was slapped by her father. Rowena also had
an ecchymosis or kissmark at the antero-lateral border of her left breast as well as ano-genital
injuries suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.

Dr. Guialani explained that although the external genitalia did not show any sign of sexual abuse,
when it was opened up, the following were discovered: markedly hyperemic urethra and peri-
hymenal area with fossa navicularis and markedly hyperemic perineum, markedly hyperemic urethra
layer up to the peri-hymenal margin up to the posterior hymenal notch with attenuation. Further, the
labia was very red all throughout, with hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale navicular fossa and a
very red perineum.[4] All these, according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible with the recent chronic
penetrating trauma and recent injury which could have happened a day before the examination. She
pointed out that the hymenal attenuation sustained by Rowena was almost in the 6 oclock notch.[5]

For its part, the defense presented the lone testimony of appellant Roberto Quiachon.
He testified that, on May 13, 2001, he was invited to the barangay hall by their barangay chairman.
He did not know then the reason for the invitation. At the barangay hall, he was surprised to see the
two sisters of his deceased live-in partner and his two children. He was shocked to learn that his
daughter Rowena had accused him of raping her. Thereafter, he was taken to the Karangalan Police
Station. He suffered hypertension and was brought to the hospital. When he recovered, he was
taken to the Pasig City Police Station and, thereafter, to jail.

Appellant claimed that Rowena is not deaf but only has a minor speech handicap. He denied raping
Rowena and alleged that Virginia Moraleda and Carmelita Mateo, both sisters of his deceased
common-law wife, held a grudge against him because he abandoned his family and was not able to
support them. His common-law wife died of cancer and her relatives were allegedly all interested in
his house and other properties. The said house was being leased and they were the ones getting
the rental income. Further, the nephew of his deceased partner was sending financial support of
US$100 a month for his child.

According to appellant, even before the death of his common-law wife, his son Rowel was already
hostile to him because he was closer to his daughters. He disclaimed any knowledge of any reason
why his children, Rowel and Rowena, accused him of a very serious offense.[6]

After consideration of the respective evidence of the prosecution and defense, the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, rendered its Decision[7] dated September 9, 2003, finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles
266-A and B[8] of the Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, including its accessory penalties, and to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages, P100,000.00
as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The case was automatically elevated to this Court by reason of the death penalty imposed on
appellant. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[10] the case was transferred and
referred to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Upon review, the CA rendered its Decision[11] dated August 25, 2005, affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court. In affirming appellants conviction, the CA held that there was no
justification to make a finding contrary to that of the trial court with respect to the credibility of the
witnesses. The CA particularly pointed out that the trial court, after having meticulously observed
the prosecution witness Rowel and complainant Rowena, had declared that their narration palpably
bears the earmarks of truth and is in accord with the material points involved. When the testimony of
a rape victim is simple and straightforward, unshaken by rigid cross-examination, and unflawed by an
inconsistency or contradiction as in the present case, the same must be given full faith and
credit.[12]

Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of Rowel and Rowena recounting the bestial act
perpetrated by appellant on the latter were corroborated by physical evidence as presented by Dr.
Guialani in her medico-legal report.

On the other hand, the CA noted that appellant could only proffer a bare denial. On this matter, it
applied the salutary rule that denial is not looked upon with favor by the court as it is capable of easy
fabrication. Consequently, the CA held that appellants bare denial could not overcome the
categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, including Rowena, the victim herself.

The CA believed that Rowena could not possibly invent a charge so grave as rape against her father
because it is very unlikely for any young woman in her right mind to fabricate a story of defloration
against her own father, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, and subject herself to the
trauma and scandal of public trial, put to shame not only herself but her whole family as well unless
she was motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.[13]

In sum, the CA found that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of qualified rape and in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon him. In the Pre-Trial
Order dated September 10, 2001, the prosecution and the defense agreed on the following
stipulation of facts:

1. The minority of the victim who is eight (8) years old;

2. That the accused is the father of the victim; and

3. The victim is a deaf-mute.[14]

According to the CA, the qualifying circumstances of the victims minority and her relationship to the
offender were alleged in the Information and were duly proved during trial. These circumstances,
i.e., minority of the victim and her relationship to appellant, are special qualifying circumstances in
the crime of rape that warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.

The CA, however, modified the trial courts decision with respect to the damages awarded to conform
to prevailing jurisprudence. The decretal portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated September 9, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 159, in Criminal Case No. 120929-H finding the accused-appellant Roberto Quiachon y
Bayona guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape and imposing upon him the DEATH penalty
is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim,
Rowena Quiachon, the amount of P75,000 as civil indemnity; P75,000 as moral damages; and
P25,000 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October 15, 2004, amending Section
13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, let the entire records of this case be
elevated to the Supreme Court for review.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.[15]

In this Courts Resolution dated December 13, 2005, the parties were required to submit their
respective supplemental briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it would no longer
be filing a supplemental brief. Similarly, appellant, through the Public Attorneys Office, manifested
that he would no longer file a supplemental brief.

After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court affirms the conviction of appellant.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by three (3) well-entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are
usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[16]
Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination concerning the crime of rape is the
credibility of complainants testimony.[17]

Likewise, it is well settled that when it comes to the issue of credibility of witnesses, the trial court is
in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying.[18]

In this case, as correctly found by the CA, there is nothing on the record that would impel this Court
to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual
findings of the trial court unless these were reached arbitrarily or when the trial court misunderstood
or misapplied some facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case.[19]

In convicting the appellant, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of Rowel and
Rowena. The trial court observed that Rowel and Rowena never wavered in their assertion that
accused sexually abused Rowena. Their narration palpably bears the earmarks of truth and is in
accord with the material points involved.[20] Further, the trial court accorded great evidentiary
weight to Rowenas testimony. It justifiably did
so as it characterized her testimony to be simple, straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-
examination, and unflawed by inconsistency or contradiction.[21]
Significantly, Rowel and Rowenas respective testimonies were corroborated by Dr. Guialanis
medico-legal report:[22]

--------------------------------------
PERTINENT PHYSICAL Contusion hematoma about 3x4 cm noted at the
FINDINGS/PHYSICAL left mandibular area of the left cheek compatible
INJURIES with the disclosed slapping of the cheek by her father;
2x2 cm ecchymosis (kissmark) noted at
the antero-lateral border of the left breast
--------------------------------------
ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION
--------------------------------------
EXTERNAL GENITALIA Tanner 2
Pubic hair none
Labia majora no evident sign of injury at the time of
examination
Labia minora no evident sign of injury at the time of
examination
--------------------------------------
URETHA AND
PERIURETHRAL AREA Markedly hyperemic urethra meatus and
periurethral area.
--------------------------------------
PERIHYMENAL AREA
AND
FOSSA NAVICULARIS Markedly hyperemic perihymenal area, and pale
fossa navicularis
--------------------------------------
HYMEN Tanner 2
Annular hymen; hymenal notch noted at 5 oclock with
attenuation of the hymenal rim
from 5 oclock to 7 oclock; very hyperemic hymen
--------------------------------------
PERINEUM Hyperemic perineum
--------------------------------------
DISCHARGE Whitish, foul-smelling discharge, minimal in amount noted
--------------------------------------
IE AND SPECULUM
EXAM Not indicated
--------------------------------------
ANAL EXAMINATION No evident sign of injury at the time of examination;
--------------------------------------
 REMARKS
--------------------------------------
FORENSIC EVIDENCE
COLLECTED None
--------------------------------------
LABORATORY
EXAMINATION Requested a) Urinalysis
b) Gram Stain of Vaginal smear
--------------------------------------
IMPRESSIONS
--------------------------------------

No verbal disclosure of sexual abuse (pt is a deaf-mute)

For referral to NCMH for evaluation of developmental stage and competence to appear in court.

Presence of contusion hematoma on the Left Cheek (slapmark) and ecchymosis on the antero-
lateral border of the left breast show clear evidence of Physical Abuse.

Ano-genital findings suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.

--------------------------------------

Dr. Guialani explained during her testimony that the foregoing findings were consistent with
Rowenas claim of sexual abuse. Specifically, her internal genitalia showed signs of sexual abuse
such as: markedly hyperemic urethra and peri-hymenal area with fossa navicularis, markedly
hyperemic perineum, markedly hyperemic urethra layer up to the peri-hymenal margin up to the
posterior hymenal notch with attenuation. Further, Rowenas labia was very red all throughout, with
hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale navicular fossa and a very red perineum.[23] All these,
according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible with the recent chronic penetrating trauma and recent
injury which could have happened a day before the examination. She pointed out that the hymenal
attenuation sustained by Rowena was almost in the 6 oclock notch.[24] Dr. Guialani, likewise,
confirmed that Rowena was deaf and mute.

Viewed against the damning evidence of the prosecution, appellants simple denial of the charge
against him must necessarily fail. The defense of denial is inherently weak. A mere denial, just like
alibi, constitutes a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.[25]

All told, the trial court and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of raping his daughter Rowena
pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The special qualifying circumstances of the
victims minority and her relationship to appellant, which were properly alleged in the Information and
their existence duly admitted by the defense on stipulation of facts during pre-trial,[26] warrant the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death on appellant.

However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346[27] on June 24, 2006 prohibiting
the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in
accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads:

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in
criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to
accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides as follows:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62
of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.[28]

However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that
persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole.

With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence,[29]
correctly awarded the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime
is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00 as moral
damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an
award of moral damages even without proof thereof, and; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in light
of the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A.
No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in
People v. Victor,[30] the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty
but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended
the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time
but also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity.

Notwithstanding the abolition of the death penalty under R.A. No. 9364, the Court has resolved, as it
hereby resolves, to maintain the award of P75,000.00 for rape committed or effectively qualified by
any of the circumstances under which the death penalty would have been imposed prior to R.A. No.
9346.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated August 25, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
finding appellant Roberto Quiachon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty of death meted on the appellant is reduced to
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.

SO ORDERED.