Bayan Muna vs Romulo

Facts:

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto
Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note No.
0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the terms of the non-
surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-03,
hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with and
accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note adverted to and put
in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect
what it refers to and defines as persons of the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.8 It is
reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security and defense partnership
between the two countries. As of May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been
effected by and between the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or former Government officials,
employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express
consent of the first Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any
purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or
expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any
international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the

Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that
person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the [USA]
to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by
the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established
by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party
notifies the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this
Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any allegation
arising, before the effective date of termination.

Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying

the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared
as without force and effect.

Issue:

Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally
recognized principles of international law.

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit.

Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture
being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.

Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized international

doctrines, practices, and jargonsis untenable. One of these is the doctrine of
incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law and
international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls into the
category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally accepted form
of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference
Guide) defines the term as follows:

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities

with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two
documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the
text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be
government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of
notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes,
to avoid the process of legislative approval.
In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive agreements have
been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive
agreement that becomes binding through executive action. On the other hand,
executive agreements concluded by the President sometimes take the form of
exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated
agreements or protocols. As former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis
B. Sayre observed in his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends
and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or
otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it viewed as
the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof
or as consent to be boundis a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding
international written contract among nations.

Francisco Jr vs Nagmamalasakit
FACTS:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by

Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice
"to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the
House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to
this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the
filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the
House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5)
of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation
of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was
not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions"
and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus
beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to
be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

Kilosbayan vs Guingona
Facts:

This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the
implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also
know as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of
serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated
Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.

Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the
executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners
have no standing to maintain the instant suit.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.

RULING:

As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality
in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on
locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even
association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute
actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of
various government agencies or instrumentalities.

As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in
question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor
should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the
intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself.
Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.

Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby
declared contrary to law and invalid.

Bayan vs Zamora
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the
possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of
conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998.
Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the
senate approved it by (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is
applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following
conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that,
what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least
two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

ISSUE:

Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution?

HELD:

Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military
bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a
limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with
regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes
required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find
nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed
or placed permanently in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty

Tanada vs Angara
Facts :

This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein
respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial
products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty
associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted
benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free
market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts
and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First
policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue :
Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO
agreement.

Held:

In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By
the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt
servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as
absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as
when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty
right under the concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid
exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable
is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement
is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be
the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of
economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading
and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is
isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed,
through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Commissioner of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading

FACTS:

EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic
into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and
forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank
Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate
the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and
Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of
the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The
issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The
Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.

HELD:

No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of
at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President
which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are
no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments
treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols.
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends
and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes
or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be
useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such,
concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those
entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign
governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade
agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not
treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes
of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the
Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income
tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial
relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks
and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional
authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to
the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with
respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded
independently of any legislation.

Adolfo vs CFI
Walang Makita ako na lang

Nicolas vs Romulo
Facts:

This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith & BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo. On
the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He
was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment.
Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the crime
was committed within the countrys jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty
between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith.
Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity
of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the
same way our senate ratified the VFA.

ISSUE:

Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.

HELD:

The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be
enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and
undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has
been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to
produce Smith before the court during the trial.

The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and
intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60
days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is
not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna
Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty,
military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through
implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its
provisions.

Pimentel Jr vs Office of the Exec Sec

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its
concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over
the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes
of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs
in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval of the signatory state.

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international
law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to
transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.
Issue:

Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to
the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission
to the U.N. even without the signature of the President.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held NO.

1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external
relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the
mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states
and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required
vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field
of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

Suplico vs Neda

SUPLICO vs NEDA G.R. No. 178830; July 14, 2008

FACTS: Triple petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for
the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction were filed and consolidated in the
SC. The prayers of the said petitions, among others, sought the annulment of the award
of the contract for the national broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation and
to enjoin any activity in connection with the said deal. On October 2, 2007, during a
meeting, Pres. GMA, acting in her official capacity informed Pres. Hu Jintao of China
that the Philippine Government had decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN project.
Later, the Solicitor General made a manifestation and motion stating that in an
Indorsement by the Legal Division of the DOTC, it has been informed that the Philippine
Government has decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project. That said, there is
no more justiciable controversy for the Court to resolve. The public respondents then
prayed that the present petitions be dismissed. The petitioners, in their respective
replies, argued that the Indorsement is self-serving and not a sufficient basis that the
deal has been permanently scrapped. Assuming arguendo that the petition has become
moot, the Court may still take cognizance thereof to educate the bench and the bar.
Further, because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised, the Court
should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness. The petitioners
ultimately contended the declarations made by officials belonging to the executive
branch on the

Philippine Governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project are self-
serving, hence, inadmissible

ISSUE:

WON the Court may take judicial notice of the acts of President GMA?

HELD:

The SC dismissed the petition. It held that It has no alternative but to take judicial notice
of the official act of the President. Under the Section 1 Rule 129, it is mandatory and the
Court has no alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of the President of
the Philippines, who heads the executive branch of our government. It is further
provided in the said rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the foregoing facts
without introduction of evidence. Since we consider the act of cancellation by President
Macapagal-Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting of October 2,
2007 with the Chinese President in China as an official act of the executive department,
the Court must take judicial notice of such official act without need of evidence.
Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the official
duty of the executive officials

of informing this Court of the governments decision not to continue with the ZTE
-NBN Project is also presumed to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the
contrary. The Court finds no factual or legal basis to disregard this disputable
presumption in the present instance.

Neri vs Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations

FACTS:

On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)

entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was
to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.

The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18,
2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power
brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he
admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo
about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner
refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:

Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

HELD:

The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and
abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the
case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is
because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such
as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications

privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power.

2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor

of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege
on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary
in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,
the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner
did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during
the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only
that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of
Article III provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

Bugnay Construction v. Laron Digest

Facts:
1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed for the
use of a city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed a case
to rescind the contract due to the failure of P&M to comply with the lease contract
conditions.

2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to the petitioner
Bugnay COnstruction for the establishment of a Magsaysay Market building. As a result,
respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City assailing the validity of the
lease contract between the petitioner and the city. Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M
Agro in the earlier case.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest

Held:

1. The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no
disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a private
party which will fund the planned construction of the market building.

PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:

Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.

GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the
REalignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said
allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives are the ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not
the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain
provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to
augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

RULING:

Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve
the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually
savings, and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures
to which said transfer to be made.

As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections
25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be
authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given
authority.

Gonzales vs COMELEC
FACTS:

This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez

and PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No.
1 and 3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the
following resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):

1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to

increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in
accordance with the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned
among several provinces and that each province shall have at least one (1) member.

2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution,

which will be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district,
to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November
1971.

3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to
authorize Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates
to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their
respective seats in Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and
3 be submitted, for approval by the people at the general elections on November 14,
1967. This act fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to
be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election.

Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the
said law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.
2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.

HELD:

1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this
provision that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general
election. The Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for ratification in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to
submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore
DENIED.

2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of
the action taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not
subject to review by the Court.

Daza v. Singson
FACTS:

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was
among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized,

resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this
development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and
giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives
consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein
respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from
the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission
on Appointments

HELD:

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as
follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of

the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.

The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the

Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance
from one political party to another.

The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant
to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.

Basco vs PAGCOR
Facts:

In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created
by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCORs operation was a success hence in 1978, PD
1399 was passed which expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983, PAGCORs charter was
updated through PD 1869. PAGCORs charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate
and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.
Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to

centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law.

Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal
protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.

Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it
legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are
outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.

Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like
Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is
concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the
franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well
as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of
the local autonomy principle.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.

HELD:

1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of

the equal protection is not clearly explained in Bascos petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA
983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized
under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable
laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of
the laws. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons
or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The equal protection
clause does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require
situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were
the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue
and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as
the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such
taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.

A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on
taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to
such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.

Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It
should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which
has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general
legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere
Local government.

This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.

LEVERIZA et al vs. IAC, Mobil oil and CAA

FACTS:

Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case:

Contract A a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and. Leveriza over a parcel of
land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years.

Contract B a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between Leveriza
and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000
square meters for 25 years; and
Contract C a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant CAA and plaintiff
Mobil Oil over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25
years.

There is no dispute among the parties that the subject matter of the three contracts of
lease above mentioned, Contract A, Contract B, and Contract C, is the same parcel of
land, with the noted difference that while in Contract A, the area leased is 4,502 square
meters, in Contract B and Contract C, the area has been reduced to 3,000 square
meters.

It is important to note, for a clear understanding of the issues involved, that it appears
that defendant CAA as LESSOR, leased the same parcel of land, for durations of time
that overlapped to two lessees, to wit: (1) Leveriza and Mobil Oil, and the latter, as
LESSEE, leased the same parcel of land from two lessors, to wit: (1) Leveriza and (2)
CAA for durations of time that also overlapped.

Leveriza, the lessee in Contract A and the lessor in Contract B, is now deceased. This is
the reason why her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are sued. For purposes of brevity,
these defendants shall be referred to hereinafter as Defendants Leveriza.

Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the
ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has already been
cancelled by the defendant CAA and maintains that Contract C with the defendant CAA
is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the
present litigation is concerned.

Defendants Leverizas claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never
been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between
plaintiff and defendant CAA which should be declared void.

CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by
Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A because of the violation
committed by Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to plaintiff by virtue of Contract B
without the consent of CAA. CAA further asserts that Contract C not having been
approved by the Director of Public Works and Communications is not valid.

After trial, the lower courts rendered judgment:

1. Declaring Contract A as having been validly cancelled on June 28, 1966, and has
therefore ceased to have any effect as of that date;

2. Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased to have any effect as of June 28, 1966
because of the cancellation of Contract A;

3. Declaring that Contract C was validly entered into on June 1, 1968, and that it is still
valid and subsisting;
CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that because the lot lease was properly
registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only the President of the
Philippines or an officer duly designated by him who could execute the lease contract
pursuant to Sec. 567 of the Revised Administrative Code; that the Airport General
Manager has no authority to cancel Contract A, the contract entered into between the
CAA and Leveriza, and that Contract C between the CAA and Mobil was void for not
having been approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Said
motion was however denied.

On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence this petition
for Review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

There is no dispute that Contract A at the time of its execution was a valid contract.
The issue therefore is whether or not said contract is still subsisting after its
cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed by petitioners with Mobil Oil
(CONTRACT B) without the consent of CAA and the execution of another contract of
lease between CAA and Mobil Oil (CONTRACT C)

The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground for the cancellation of Contract
A

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals
appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.

YES

Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee
specifically for the purpose of operating and managing a gasoline station by the latter,
to serve vehicles going in and out of the airport.

As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased premises,
the provision of paragraph 7 of said Contract reads in full:

7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises but in
such eventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be secured. In any
event, such transfer of rights shall have to respect the terms and conditions of this
agreement.

Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned terms and
conditions of the contract. Said paragraph reads:
8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms and
conditions herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this contract by the
Party of the First Part without need of judicial demand.

It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease
(Contract B) with Mobil Oil without the consent of CAA (lessor). The cancellation of the
contract was made in a letter by Jurado, Airport General Manager of CAA addressed to
Rosario Leveriza.

Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such cancellation, claiming
that the Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the cancellation. They
maintain that it is only the (1)Secretary of Public Works and Communications, acting for
the President, or by delegation of power, the (2)Director of CCA who could validly
cancel the contract. Petitioners argue that cancelling or setting aside a contract
approved by the Secretary is, in effect, repealing an act of the Secretary which is
beyond the authority of the Administrator.

Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions under which such revocation or
cancellation may be made, have already been specifically provided for in Contract A
which has already been approved by the Department Head, It is evident that in the
implementation of aforesaid contract, the approval of said Department Head is no
longer necessary if not redundant

Sto Domingo vs Angeles

Facts:
Petitioner REYES was the Chief of the Service Bureau of the San
Juan Police Department. For alleged repeated disobedience of
REYES, respondent SAN PASCUAL, as Chief of Police, obtained
authority from petitioner Mayor Sto. Domingo to reassign REYES to
the administrative division. The Mayor later reassigned the latter to
his office. Thereafter, upon learning that REYES still had a key to the
door of the office where the police records were located, SAN
PASCUAL issued a memorandum order for REYES to return the key.
REYES allegedly refused to acknowledge receipt of the order and to
return the key. When asked to explain. REYES stated that he did not
have a key belonging to the police department. SAN PASCUAL found
the explanation unsatisfactory, believing that even if the key had
been ordered by REYES at his personal expense, it should have
been surrendered. SAN PASCUAL then suspended REYES for ten
days for refusal to acknowledge the memorandum order, and ten
days for refusal to return the key, in the exercise of his disciplinary
jurisdiction pursuant to section 15 of Republic Act No.4864

REYES thereafter filed a sworn complaint with the Police

Commission (POLCOM) on September 13, 1968 2 and a sworn
statement on October 3, 1968 3charging SAN PASCUAL with
oppression and Grave Misconduct. On October 12, 1968, the
POLCOM referred the complaint to the Board of Investigators of San
Juan for appropriate action at the same time advising SAN PASCUAL
of the referral. 4 On October 21, 1968, the Board recommended to
the Mayor the suspension of SAN PASCUAL 5 in view of the gravity
of the charges and considering that the complainant (REYES) was
under the supervision of SAN PASCUAL. However, on October 22,
1968, the Chairman of the Board recalled said recommendation in
order to give SAN PASCUAL a chance to answer charge. 6San
Pascual has alleged that the Mayor did not withdraw the order
suspending him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

On October 24, 1968, SAN PASCUAL filed a Complaint with

Preliminary Injunction before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch IV (Civil Case No. Q-12528), presided by
respondent Judge de los Angeles against Mayor Sto. Domingo, the
members of the Board of Investigators of San Juan, the Chairman
and Commissioner of the POLCOM, and REYES. SAN PASCUAL
alleged that the complaint filed against him before the POLCOM was
capricious and without factual and legal basis and prayed for
damages as well as for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the
oppressive exercise of authority by defendants therein and to
restrain them from proceeding with the administrative investigation,
and/or preventively suspending SAN

Additionally, SAN PASCUAL raised the question of legality and

constitutionality of the procedure laid down in Republic Act No. 4864
7and the creation of the Police Commission thereunder, which he
claimed was in conflict with the Decentralization Law, or Republic
Act No. 5185, and contended that the latter law should
On November 8, 1968, respondent Judge granted the Writ prayed
for.

Issue:

Whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of

respondent Judge in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction

Ruling:

The Police Act of 1966 was enacted "to achieve and attain a higher
degree of efficiency in the organization, and operation of local police
agencies with the end in view that peace and order may be
maintained more effectively and the laws enforced with more
impartiality." A declared objective of that Act is "to place the local
police service on a professional level." 12
chanrobles virtual law library

virtual law library

Preventive suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative

investigation. It is not a punishment. If after such investigation, the
charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty
of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed
from office. This is the penalty. For this reason, there is nothing
improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him
are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his
innocence.

The Decentralization Act does not vest any specific power in the
Commissioner of Civil Service in addition to what has been granted
by the Civil Service Law. For it is essentially a mere restatement of
the rule that the suspension or removal of civil service employees in
general "shall be subject to the provisions of civil service law, rules
and relimations." Under that law, by the terms of Section 16 (i), the
power of the Civil Service Commission 'to have final authority to
pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent
officers and employees in the competitive or classified service ...' is
qualified by the phrase "except as otherwise provided by law." As
regards members of local police forces, there is such a statute, the
Police Act of 1966 which confers such disciplinary power in the
Police Commission.

DE JESUS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo, defeated candidate of the
Nacionalista Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon
filed with the COMELEC a complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then
COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the 1978 Election Code. Asst.
Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan
prosecutors, conducted an investigation. A prima facie case against petitioner for
violation of section 89 and sub-sections [x] and [mm] of Section 178 of the Election
Code of 1978 was found to exist. The following information, was filed before the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the
Tanodbayan nor the Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try
the offense. In its opposition, the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayans exclusive
authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
to try and decide the charges against petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan have the power to investigate,
prosecute, and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office.

Held:

The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing the power to enforce and administer
all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to investigate
and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and
honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will
of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus
seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. From a
careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We
perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan,
of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public
officers in relation to their office, as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical
bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first
instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.

WIL WILHEMSEN, INC., doing business under the name and style of Barber Lines and
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
TOMAS BALUYUT, doing business under the name and style of Derham Bonded
Warehouse, defendant-appellee.

Wala din ako na lang

ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION

FACTS:

Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas
province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-
elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his
oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which
declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared
elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec
9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before
the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was
filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the
Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as
regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction.
RULING:

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created
by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by Ynsua.