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SPECIAL TORTS IN HUMAN RELATIONS dismissal of the complaint and for the court to adjudge

Valmonte liable on her counterclaim.

The trial court rendered its Decision on 21 August 2000,


dismissing Valmontes complaint for damages.
A. ABUSE OF RIGHTS
The Court of Appeals ruled differently.
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, ISSUE:
act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
RULING:

Contrary to the trial courts finding, we find sufficient evidence


on record tending to prove that petitioners imputations against
(1) SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner, vs. respondent was made with malice and in bad faith.
LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent.
G.R. No. 151866 September 9, 2004 Petitioners testimony was shorn of substance and consists
mainly of denials. She claimed not to have uttered the words
imputing the crime of theft to respondent or to have mentioned
FACTS: Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding the latters name to the authorities as the one responsible for
coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her the loss of her jewelry. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if
services for their church wedding on 10 October 1996. At unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and
Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony
arrived at Suite 326-A, several persons were already there of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
including the bride, the brides parents and relatives, the
make-up artist and his assistant, the official photographers,
and the fashion designer. Among those present was petitioner Respondent, however, has successfully refuted petitioners
Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to testimony. Quite credibly, she has narrated in great detail her
dress up for the occasion. distressing experience on that fateful day. She testified as to
how rudely she was treated by petitioner right after she
returned to the room. Petitioner immediately confronted her
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite and uttered the words "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.
carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts Nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw ang
from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila kumuha." Thereafter, her body was searched including her
Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She paid the bag and her car. Worse, during the reception, she was once
suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and went more asked by the hotel security to go to the ladies room and
back to the suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed she was again bodily searched.
the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner
allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang
ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka Serea Manding, a make-up artist, corroborated respondents
pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang testimony. She testified that petitioner confronted respondent
kumuha." Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search in the presence of all the people inside the suite accusing her
Valmontes bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room of being the only one who went out of the comfort room before
to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of the loss of the jewelry. Manding added that respondent was
jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper embarrassed because everybody else in the room thought she
bag were lost. The jewelry pieces consist of two (2) diamond was a thief.
rings, one (1) set of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace
with a total value of about one million pesos. The hotel To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
security was called in to help in the search. The bags and action, for a wrong inflicted by the defendant, and the damage
personal belongings of all the people inside the room were resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or
searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched, damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action.
interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the
evening. Later, police officers arrived and interviewed all
persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a
including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was being wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently,
interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on saying is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for
the words "Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto." Valmontes car the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil
which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral
the search yielded nothing. precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are
meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these
A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as
Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides
wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds relatives and guests that "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioners the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the letter. his due and observe honesty and good faith." To find the
Thus, on 20 February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be
against her before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised
City, Branch 268. In her complaint, Valmonte prayed that in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring
petitioner be ordered to pay actual, moral and exemplary another.14 When a right is exercised in a manner which
damages, as well as attorneys fees. discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal
wrong is committed for which the actor can be held
Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having uttered accountable.15 One is not allowed to exercise his right in a
words or done any act to confront or single out Valmonte manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another
during the investigation and claimed that everything that or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a
transpired after the theft incident was purely a police matter in person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate
which she had no participation. Petitioner prayed for the exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and
good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. The agreement was subsequently
(underscore by the digester, yes thats a word)
amended to include Capiz in the
territorial coverage and to make the
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the
provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which read, dealership agreement on a non-exclusive
thus: basis. In the course of the dealership
agreement, JII allegedly incurred a
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the deliveries, and SEACOM brought action
latter for the same.
to recover said amount plus interest and
attorney's fees.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals or good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the JII filed an Answer denying the obligation
damage.
and interposing a counterclaim for
damages representing unrealized profits
The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of
damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one when JII sold to the Farm System
commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act Development Corporation (FSDC) (21)
which though not constituting a transgression of positive law, units of Mitsubishi power tillers. In the
nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party
aggrieved. counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer
in Capiz, JII contracted to sell in 1977
In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against (24) units of Mitsubishi power tillers to a
respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her group of farmers to be financed by said
own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and corporation, which fact JII allegedly made
amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case,
she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos known to petitioner, but the latter taking
which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By advantage of said information and in bad
openly accusing respondent as the only person who went out faith, went directly to FSDC and dealt
of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all
the guests therein, and ordering that she be immediately with it and sold (21) units of said
bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as the tractors, thereby depriving JII of
thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of
the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of
unrealized profit of (P85,415.61).
proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an
act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible.
Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner
The trial court rendered its decision
which is contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness ordering JII to pay SEACOM the amount
and resolve to find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts (P18,843.85) representing its
toward respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith
for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to outstanding obligation. The trial court
prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the likewise granted JII's counterclaim for
provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she unrealized profits, and for moral and
should be held accountable.
exemplary damages and attorney' fees
as above quoted.

SEACOM appealed the decision on the


(2) SEA COMMERCIAL COMPANY,
counterclaim.
INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, JAMANDRE
INDUSTRIES, INC. and TIRSO The Court of Appeals held that while
JAMANDRE, respondents. G.R. No. there exists no agency relationship
122823 November 25, 1999 between SEACOM and JII, SEACOM is
liable for damages and unrealized profits
to JII.
FACTS: SEACOM is a corporation
engaged in the business of selling and
distributing agricultural machinery, ISSUE: Whether SEACOM acted in
products and equipment. On September bad faith when it competed with its
20, 1966, SEACOM and JII entered into a own dealer as regards the sale of
dealership agreement whereby SEACOM farm machineries to FSDC?
appointed JII as its exclusive dealer in
the City and Province of Iloilo. Tirso HELD: YES, SEACOM acted in bad faith
Jamandre executed a suretyship and is thus liable to JII.
agreement binding himself jointly and
severally with JII to pay for all obligations Both courts invoke as basis for the award
of JII to SEACOM. Article 19 of the Civil Code which reads
as follows:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the court that the SEACOM offered FSDC a
exercise of his rights and in the lower price than the price offered by JII
performance of his duties, act with to FSDC is supported by the evidence.
justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith. Clearly, the bad faith of SEACOM was
established. By appointing as a dealer of
The principle of abuse of rights stated in its agricultural equipment, SEACOM
the above article, departs from the recognized the role and undertaking of JII
classical theory that "he who uses a right to promote and sell said equipment.
injures no one". The modern tendency is Under the dealership agreement, JII was
to depart from the classical and to act as a middleman to sell SEACOM's
traditional theory, and to grant products, in its area of operations, i.e.
indemnity for damages in cases where Iloilo and Capiz provinces, to the
there is an abuse of rights, even when exclusion of other places, 16 to send its
the act is not illicit. men to Manila for training on repair,
servicing and installation of the items to
Art. 19 was intended to expand the be handled by it, and to comply with
concept of torts by granting adequate other personnel and vehicle
legal remedy for the untold number of requirements intended for the benefit of
moral wrongs which is impossible for the dealership. After being informed of
human foresight to provide specifically in the demonstrations JII had conducted to
statutory law. If mere fault or negligence promote the sales of SEACOM
in one's acts can make him liable for equipment, including the operations at
damages for injury caused thereby, with JII's expense conducted for five months,
more reason should abuse or bad faith and the approval of its facilities (service
make him liable. The absence of good and parts) by FSDC, 18 SEACOM
faith is essential to abuse of right. Good participated in the bidding for the said
faith is an honest intention to abstain equipment at a lower price, placing itself
from taking any unconscientious in direct competition with its own dealer.
advantage of another, even through the The actuations of SEACOM are tainted by
forms or technicalities of the law, bad faith.
together with an absence of all
information or belief of fact which would Even if the dealership agreement was
render the transaction unconscientious. amended to make it on a non-exclusive
In business relations, it means good faith basis, SEACOM may not exercise its right
as understood by men of affairs. unjustly or in a manner that is not in
keeping with honesty or good faith;
While Article 19 may have been intended otherwise it opens itself to liability under
as a mere declaration of the abuse of right rule embodied in
principle, the "cardinal law on human Article 19 of the Civil Code above-
conduct" expressed in said article has quoted. This provision, together with the
given rise to certain rules, e.g. that succeeding article on human relation,
where a person exercises his rights but was intended to embody certain basic
does so arbitrarily or unjustly or principles "that are to be observed for
performs his duties in a manner that is the rightful relationship between human
not in keeping with honesty and good being. and for the stability of the social
faith, he opens himself to liability. The order." What is sought to be written into
elements of an abuse of rights under the law is the pervading principle of
Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or equity and justice above strict legalism.
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.
(3) CITYTRUST BANKING
We find no cogent reason to overturn the CORPORATION (now Bank of the
factual finding of the two courts that Philippine Islands), petitioner, vs.
SEACOM joined the bidding for the sale ISAGANI C. VILLANUEVA, respondent.
of the farm equipment after it was G.R. No. 141011 July 19, 2001
informed that JII was already promoting
the sales of said equipment to the FSDC. ISAGANI C.
Moreover, the conclusion of the trial VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs.
CITYTRUST BANKING The said check was dishonored twice,
CORPORATION, respondent. G.R. No. first (23 June 1986) was due to
141028 July 19, 2001 (walay insufficiency of funds and disparity in the
discussion sa Art. 19) signature, and the second (after 3 days)
was due to insufficiency of funds and a
FACTS: Sometime in February 1984, stop-payment order Villanueva allegedly
Isagani Villanueva (VILLANUEVA) opened issued. Villanueva inquired, in the first
a savings account and a current account instance, about the said dishonor of his
with Citytrust Banking Corporation well-funded check to the Bank, and the
(BANK), with an automatic transfer Branchs Operations Manager Gamboa
arrangement. assured him that the check would be
honored after the sufficiency of the funds
was ascertained, and instructed him to
On 21 May 1986, Villanueva deposited advise his payee to re-deposit the check.
some money in his savings account with In the second time, he proceeded to the
the Banks Legaspi Village Branch in Branch, together with Chu, to personally
Makati (BRANCH). Realizing that he had inquire into the matter, and was told by
run out of blank checks, he requested a the Branch Manager Genuino that the
new checkbook from the Bank. He then reason for the dishonor of the check was
filled up a checkbook requisition slip that the account number assigned to his
(slip), except for his current account new checkbook was the account number
number which he could not remember. of another depositor also named "Isagani
He expressed his predicament to a Villanueva" but with a different middle
Banks customer service representative initial.
(CSR), who in turn assured him that she
could supply the information from their
account records. After signing the slip, Before he went to the Branch, Villanueva
he gave it to her. A CSR took the slip and first requested Lawrence Chin of Kingly
proceeded to check the Banks Commodities to give him until 5:30 p.m.
checkbook register. Upon seeing the that same day to make good his check.
name "Isagani Villanueva -- Account No. To resolve the matter, Genuino promised
33-00446-3", she (Rempillo) copied the to send to Kingly Commodities a
account number in the slip. managers check for P50,000 before 5:30
pm (deadline given). She also personally
called Kingly Commodities and explained
On 17 June 1986, Villanueva received the reason for the dishonor of the check.
from the BANK his requested checkbook.
On the same day, he immediately signed
Check No. 396701 bearing the amount of On 30 June 1986, Villanueva sent a
P50,000 payable to the order of Kingly letter to the BANK President, Jose
Commodities Traders and Multi Facundo, demanding indemnification for
Resources, Inc. (Kingly Commodities). He alleged losses and damages suffered by
thereafter delivered the check to Helen him as a result of the dishonor of his
Chu, his investment consultant at Kingly well-funded check. He demanded the
Commodities, with his express amount of P70,000 as indemnification for
instruction to use said check in placing a actual damages in the form of lost profits
trading order at Kingly Commodities and P2 Million for moral and other
future trading business as soon as a damages. On 10 July 1986, in answer,
favorable opportunity presented itself. Gregorio Anonas III, the BANKs Senior
Two days later, he received a call from Vice-President, apologized for the
Chu, informing him that she had already unfortunate oversight, but reminded
placed a trading order in his behalf and VILLANUEVA that the dishonor of his
delivered the check to Kingly check was due to his failure to state his
Commodities. The check was deposited current account number in his requisition
with the China Banking Corporation. The slip. He further stated that as soon as
next day, he deposited P31,600 in cash the mistake was discovered, the Bank
to his savings account to cover the full promptly sent a managers check to
amount of the check he issued. His Kingly Commodities before 5:30 p.m. on
deposits in both accounts totalled 26 June 1986 to avoid any damage the
P51,304.91. dishonor of the check might have
caused.
Failing to obtain from the BANK a The trial court dismissed the complaint
favorable action on his demand, and the compulsory counterclaim for
Villanueva filed on 27 August 1986 a lack of merit. Villanueva appealed to the
complaint for damages based on breach CA. The CA rule in favor of Villanueva but
of contract and/or quasi-delict before the only moral damages and attorneys fees
RTC of Makati. were awarded, and not for actual and
compensatory damages. Both parties
Villanueva alleged that the Bank appealed to the SC by way of petition for
breached its contractual obligation to review.
him as a depositor because of its
repeated dishonor of his valid and well- In its petition, the Bank ascribes to the
funded check. The breach arose from the CA as reversible errors its (1) reversal of
Banks gross negligence and culpable the court a quos decision; (2)
recklessness in supplying the wrong declaration that the proximate and
account number. As a consequence, he efficient cause of the injury allegedly
suffered and sustained (1) actual suffered by Villanueva was the Banks
damages consisting of loss of profits of processing of the checkbook and
at least P240,000, for he was not allowed assigning an erroneous account number,
to trade by Kingly Commodities; and (2) and not the negligent act of Villanueva in
P2 Million as moral damages because of leaving the checkbook requisition slip
the intolerable physical inconvenience, with the account number entry blank;
discomfort, extreme humiliation, and (3) award of moral damages and
indignities, etc., that he had borne attorneys fees despite the absence of a
before his peers and colleagues in the finding of bad faith on the part of the
firm, his trading partners, and the BANK.
officers of Kingly Commodities. He
prayed for an additional award of In his petition, Villanueva asserts that
P500,000 for exemplary damages, the CA erred in holding that his actual
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and losses in the amount of P234,059.04 was
costs of the suit. not sufficiently proved with reasonable
certainty. Had his fully-funded check not
However, the Bank alleged that been dishonored twice, his four trading
Villanueva suffered no actionable injury, orders with Kingly Commodities
much less damages, considering his consisting of two (2) open sell positions
blatant irresponsibility in not on 17 and 18 of June 1986 and two (2)
remembering his current account settle buy orders on 26 June 1986 would
number and in failing to bring his have earned him profits in the amount
checkbook re-order slip form on which he claimed. He emphatically maintains
his account number was inscribed when that the loss had been satisfactorily
he requested a new set of checks. His proved by the testimony of Chu, his
negligence in verifying the account investment consultant, as her testimony
number of the new set of checks issued was not controverted. Considering that
to him also contributed to the dishonor his claim for actual damages has been
of his check. It claimed that it acted in adequately established and that the
good faith when it twice dishonored the Bank committed gross negligence
check. It further asserted that amounting to bad faith, his concomitant
Villanuevas negligence was the demand for exemplary damages should
proximate cause of his self-proclaimed likewise be awarded.
injury; and the alleged losses and
damages could not likewise be deemed ISSUE: Whether the repeated
the natural and probable consequences dishonor of a check drawn against a
of the Banks breach of obligation, had well-funded account but bearing the
there been any. Finally, it claimed that account number of another
Villanueva acted with malice in filing the depositor with the same name and
case, and interposed counterclaims of surname as the drawer would
P500,000 as exemplary damages; entitle the drawer to compensatory
P250,000 as attorneys fees; and actual and moral damages and to
damages as may be determined by the attorneys fees.
court.
HELD: NO.
The issue of whether VILLANUEVA before his peers, trading partners and
suffered actual or compensatory officers of Kingly Commodities?" True, we
damages in the form of loss of profits is find that under the circumstances of this
factual. Both the lower courts have case, he might have suffered some form
ascertained that VILLANUEVA was unable of inconvenience and discomfort as a
to prove his demand for compensatory result of the dishonor of his check.
damages arising from loss. His evidence However, the same could not have been
thereon was found inadequate, so grave or intolerable as he attempts to
uncorroborated, speculative, hearsay portray or impress upon us.
and not the best evidence. Basic is the
jurisprudential principle that in Further, it is clear from the records that
determining actual damages, the court the Bank was able to remedy the caveat
cannot rely on mere assertions, of Kingly Commodities to Villanueva that
speculations, conjectures or guesswork his trading account would be closed at
but must depend on competent proof 5:30 pm on 26 June 1986. The Bank was
and on the best obtainable evidence of able to issue a managers check in favor
the actual amount of the loss. Actual of Kingly Commodities before the
damages cannot be presumed but must deadline. It was able to likewise explain
be duly proved with reasonable certainty. to Kingly Commodities the circumstances
surrounding the unfortunate situation.
Nonetheless, is Villanueva entitled to the Verily, the alleged embarrassment or
moral damages and attorneys fees inconvenience caused to Villanueva as a
granted by the CA? result of the incident was timely and
adequately contained, corrected,
Moral damages include physical mitigated, if not entirely eradicated.
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious Villanueva, thus, failed to support his
anxiety, besmirched reputation, claim for moral damages. In short, none
wounded feelings, moral shock, social of the circumstances mentioned in
humiliation, and similar injury. Although Article 2219 of the Civil Code exists to
incapable of pecuniary computation, sanction the award for moral damages.
moral damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate result of the The award of attorneys fees should
defendants wrongful act or likewise be deleted. The general rule is
omission. Thus, case law establishes the that attorneys fees cannot be recovered
requisites for the award of moral as part of damages because of the policy
damages, viz: (1) there must be an that no premium should be placed on the
injury, whether physical, mental or right to litigate. They are not to be
psychological, clearly sustained by the awarded every time a party wins a suit.
claimant; (2) there must be a culpable The power of the court to award
act or omission factually established; (3) attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the
the wrongful act or omission of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and
defendant is the proximate cause of the equitable justification. Even when a
injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) claimant is compelled to litigate with
the award of damages is predicated on third persons or to incur expenses to
any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of protect his rights, still attorneys fees
the Civil Code. may not be awarded where there is no
sufficient showing of bad faith in the
It is beyond cavil that Villanueva had parties persistence of a case other than
sufficient funds for the check. Had his an erroneous conviction of the
account number been correct, the check righteousness of his cause.
would not have been dishonored. Hence,
we can say that Villanuevas injury arose In view of the foregoing discussion, we
from the dishonor of his well-funded need not deliberate on the dispute as to
check. We have already ruled that the whether it was the Banks or Villanuevas
dishonor of the check does not entitle negligence which was the proximate
him to compensatory damages. But, cause of the latters injury because, in
could the dishonor result in his alleged the first place, he did not sustain any
"intolerable physical inconvenience and compensable injury. If any damage had
discomfort, extreme humiliation, been suffered at all, it could be
indignities, etc, which he had borne equivalent to damnum absque injuria,
i.e., damage without injury or damage or dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and
injury inflicted without injustice, or loss SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April
or damage without violation of a legal 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
right, or a wrong done to a man for
which the law provides no remedy.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals


B. ACTS & OMISSIONS CONTRARY TO MORALS
in CA-G.R. CV No. 40931 is hereby REVERSED,
and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. 14749 Article 20. Every person who, contrary
dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim is
to law, wilfully or negligently causes
hereby REINSTATED.
damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.

(4) NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY


Article 21. Any person who wilfully
LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES a.k.a causes loss or injury to another in
AMAY BISAYA, respondent. G.R. No. manner that is contrary to morals, good
154259 February 28, 2005 customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari
of the resolution and the decision of the Court of
Appeals whereby making the petitioners liable for
moral and exemplary damages. Amay Bisaya was
having a coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko when (5) ENRIQUE J. L. RUIZ and JOSE V.
an old friend, Dr. Filart, asked him to join the
HERRERA, in their behalf and as minority
party of the former manager of the said hotel, Mr.
Tsuruoka. When he was helping himself at the stockholders of the Allied Technologists,
buffet table, Ms. Lim approached him and said to Inc., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. THE
leave the party for it was intended for a number SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, COL.
of guests. Amay Bisaya claimed that he was NICOLAS JIMENEZ, Head of the Engineer
humiliated by the manner Ms. Lim asked him to
Group, Office of the Secretary of National
leave. He alleged that Ms. Lim asked him to leave
in a loud voice enough to be heard by the other Defense, THE FINANCE OFFICER of the
guests. He was accompanied by a Makati Department of National Defense, THE
policeman in leaving the penthouse. He was AUDITOR of the Dept. of National
more embarrassed when Dr. Filart denied that Defense, PABLO D. PANLILIO and ALLIED
she invited him on the said party.
TECHNOLOGISTS, INC., defendants-
appellees. G.R. No. L-15526 December
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Ms. Lim 28, 1963
constitutes an abuse of right to make the
petitioners liable for damages caused to
Amay Bisaya. FACTS: On September 11, 1950, a contract was executed
between the defendant Allied Technologists, Inc. (corporation,
for short), and the Republic of the Philippines, for the
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that any construction of the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Ruiz and
damage which Amay Bisaya might have suffered Herrera WERE (emphasis by the digester) stockholders and
through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right officers of the corporation. The construction of the hospital was
done within the bounds of propriety and good terminated in 1955. On August 20, 1954, and June 20, 1955,
Civil Cases Nos. 23778 and 26601, respectively, were filed by
faith, must be his to bear alone. same plaintiffs herein, making as parties-defendants in both
cases, the same defendants herein, the Secretary of National
It is unlikely to happen that Ms. Lim exposed him Defense, Col. Nicolas Jimenez (Engineer), the Finance
Officer, and the Auditor of the Dept. of National Defense,
to ridicule and shame because admittedly, Amay Pablo D. Panlilio and Allied Technologists, Inc. Civil Case No.
Bisaya stated that Ms. Lim was very close 23778 was dismissed by the CFI on October 12, 1954; and the
enough for him to kiss when she asked him to dismissal was affirmed by this Court on July 7, 1955, in G.R.
leave the party. It was intended to be heard only No. L-8638. Civil Case No. 26601 was also dismissed on
by Amay Bisaya. Nevertheless , his reaction to September 13, 1955. On appeal, this Court reversed the order
the request must have made the other guests of dismissal, under the impression that the real controversy
aware of what transpired between them. Since was confined merely between defendant Panlilio and plaintiffs
Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Amay Ruiz and Herrera over the 15% of the contract price, which
was retained by the Department of National Defense. The
Bisaya to leave the party for being a gate- retention of the 15% of the contract price in the sum of
crasher, neither she nor her employer be held P34,740.00 was made to answer for any claim or lien that
liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of might arise, in the course of the construction. The last case,
the Civil Code. however, was remanded to the court of origin, for further
proceedings. Panlilio and the corporation filed their amended
answers, stating that the amount retained by the Department
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of National Defense was already paid to defendant
filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden corporation, as sought for by the plaintiffs in their complaint. In
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals view of this development, the trial court invited the parties to a
dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution conference, in which the plaintiffs indicated their conformity, to
the dismissal of the complaint with respect to the retention of
the 15% of the contract price; but insisted upon the hearing of ET AL., defendants-appellees. G.R.
the second question, which sought the declaration and
recognition of plaintiffs Ruiz and Herrera, as two of the three No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
architects of the hospital. The trial court, nevertheless,
dismissed the complaint, for being already academic and
moot. Hence, this appeal by plaintiffs-appellants, who alleged FACTS: On 24 February 1948 in the
in their lone assignment of error that "the lower court University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
grievously erred in ordering the dismissal of the case, with where she was then enrolled as a second
costs against the plaintiffs".
year student of commerce, Vicenta
Escao, 27 years of age, exchanged
ISSUE:
marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32
years of age, an engineer, ex-army
RULING: The appeal has no merit.
officer and of undistinguished stock,
without the knowledge of her parents,
As appellants admitted, they no longer consider the Secretary
and other officials of the Department of National Defense, as before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises
parties-defendants in the case, said officials can no longer be Lavares.
compelled to recognize the appellants, Ruiz and Herrera, as
co-architects with appellee Panlilio of the Veterans Hospital.
And, as the amount retained by the Department on the A few weeks before their secret
contract price, which retention was authorized by the contract,
was, as sought by the appellants, already paid to the Allied
marriage, their engagement was broken;
Technologists, Inc., there is nothing more for the trial court to but they reconciled. This time they
decide, even without first ruling on the special defenses of planned to get married and then elope.
appellees Panlilio and the corporation.
To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had
brought some of her clothes to the room
There is a veiled insinuation that appellants, thesis would fall
under the provisions of the Rules on declaratory relief,
of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which
because appellants wanted merely a declaration of their rights was their usual trysting place.
in a contract in which they were interested. The trial court,
however, was correct in refusing to make such declaration,
because it was not necessary and proper under the A few weeks before their secret
circumstances (sec. 6, Rule 66). Appellants were not parties to marriage, their engagement was broken;
the construction agreement. The sole object the appeal is only
to secure for them a recognition, that they were allegedly the Vicenta returned the engagement ring
co-architects of Panlilio, in the construction of the hospital, so and accepted another suitor, Joseling
as to enhance their professional prestige and not to impair Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she
their standing. If this is the goal of appellants, a judicial
declaration to the effect would seem unnecessary. Let us pleaded for his return, and they
ponder over the thought that a brilliant professional enjoys the reconciled. This time they planned to get
respect and esteem of his fellowmen, even without any court married and then elope. To facilitate the
declaration of such fact, and that an incompetent one may
summon all the tribunals in the world, to proclaim his genius in elopement, Vicenta had brought some of
vain. her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in
St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual
But appellants invoke Article 21 of the Civil Code, which states trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight


Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public following their marriage, the elopement
policy shall compensate the latter for the damages. did not, however, materialize because
when Vicente went back to her classes
contending that the word "injury" in the said article, refers not after the marriage, her mother, who got
only to any indeterminate right or property, but also to honor or
credit (I Tolentino Civil Code, p. 67). It may be added,
wind of the intended nuptials, was
however, that this article also envisions a situation where a already waiting for her at the college.
person has a legal right, and such right is violated by another Vicenta was taken home where she
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy;
it presupposes losses or injuries, material or otherwise, which
admitted that she had already married
one may suffer as a result of said violation. The pleadings do Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were
not show that damages were ever asked or alleged, in surprised, because Pastor never asked
connection with this case, predicated upon the article
aforecited. And under the facts and circumstances obtaining in
for the hand of Vicente, and were
this case, one cannot plausibly sustain the contention that the disgusted because of the great scandal
failure or refusal to extend the recognition was an act contrary that the clandestine marriage would
to morals, good customs or public policy.
provoke.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the order appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against plaintiffs-appellants. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration
to validate what he believed to be an
invalid marriage, from the standpoint of
the Church, due to the lack of authority
from the Archbishop or the parish priest
(6) PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-
for the officiating chaplain to celebrate
appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAO,
the marriage. The recelebration did not
take place, because on 26 February 1948 against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents,
Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he
whose name he claims he does not charged with having dissuaded and
remember, a letter purportedly coming discouraged Vicenta from joining her
from San Carlos college students and husband, and alienating her affections,
disclosing an amorous relationship and against the Roman Catholic Church,
between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her decreed the annulment of the marriage,
father, and thereafter would not agree to and asked for legal separation and one
a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met million pesos in damages. Vicenta
that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and
Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta an equally valid marriage to her present
continued living with her parents while husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her
Pastor returned to his job in Manila. parents denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter's acts, and
She was not prevented by her parents counterclaimed for moral damages.
from communicating with Pastor but her
letters became less frequent as the days The appealed judgment did not decree a
passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds legal separation, but freed the plaintiff
were already estranged. from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife.
On 24 June 1950, without informing her
husband, she applied for a passport, ISSUES: 1. WON the court erred in
indicating in her application that she was not declaring legal separation and
single, that her purpose was to study, in not holding defendant Vicenta F.
and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and Escao liable for damages? YES, the
that she intended to return after two court erred and legl separation and
years. The application was approved, award for damages shall be issued.
and she left for the United States.
2. WON the court erred in not
On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified holding the defendant parents
complaint for divorce against the herein Mamerto Escano and the heirs of
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Doa Mena Escao liable for
Court of the State of Nevada in and for damages? NO, it did not err, the
the County of Washoe, on the ground of parents are not liable for damages.
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." On 21 October 1950, a 3. WON the court erred in holding
decree of divorce, "final and absolute", the plaintiff liable for and requiring
was issued in open court by the said him to pay the damages to the
tribunal. defendant parents on their
counterclaims? NO, it did not err
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed and Pastor Tenchavez is liable.
a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to
annul their daughter's marriage to HELD: On 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-
Pastor. On 10 September 1954, Vicenta appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the
sought papal dispensation of her defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escao,
marriage. were validly married to each other, from
the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married established by the record before us. Both
an American, Russell Leo Moran, in parties were then above the age of
Nevada. She now lives with him in majority, and otherwise qualified; and
California, and, by him, has begotten both consented to the marriage, which
children. She acquired American was performed by a Catholic priest (army
citizenship on 8 August 1958. chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
competent witnesses. It is nowhere
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had shown that said priest was not duly
initiated the proceedings at bar by a authorized under civil law to solemnize
complaint in the Court of First Instance of marriages.
Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956,
The chaplain's alleged lack of matter, in contrast to the preceding
ecclesiastical authorization from the legislation that admitted absolute
parish priest and the Ordinary, as divorce on grounds of adultery of the
required by Canon law, is irrelevant in wife or concubinage of the husband (Act
our civil law, not only because of the 2710). Instead of divorce, the present
separation of Church and State but also Civil Code only provides for legal
because Act 3613 of the Philippine separation, and, even in that case, it
Legislature. expressly prescribes that "the marriage
bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106,
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential subpar. 1).
requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and For the Philippine courts to recognize
consent. (Emphasis supplied) and give recognition or effect to a
foreign decree of absolute divorce
The actual authority of the solemnizing betiveen Filipino citizens could be a
officer was thus only a formal patent violation of the declared public
requirement, and, therefore, not policy of the state, specially in view of
essential to give the marriage civil the third paragraph of Article 17 of the
effects,3 and this is emphasized by Civil Code that prescribes the following:
section 27 of said marriage act, which
provided the following: Prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal have for their object public order, policy
requirements. No marriage shall be and good customs, shall not be rendered
declared invalid because of the absence ineffective by laws or judgments
of one or several of the formal promulgated, or by determinations or
requirements of this Act if, when it was conventions agreed upon in a foreign
performed, the spouses or one of them country.
believed in good faith that the person
who solemnized the marriage was From the preceding facts and
actually empowered to do so, and that considerations, there flows as a
the marriage was perfectly legal. necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and
It is equally clear from the record that second marriage are not entitled to
the valid marriage between Pastor recognition as valid; for her previous
Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be
subsisting and undissolved under declared to be existent and undissolved.
Philippine law, notwithstanding the It follows, likewise, that her refusal to
decree of absolute divorce that the wife perform her wifely duties, and her denial
sought and obtained. At the time the of consortium and her desertion of her
divorce decree was issued, Vicenta husband constitute in law a wrong
Escao, like her husband, was still a caused through her fault, for which the
Filipino citizen. She was then subject to husband is entitled to the corresponding
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil indemnity. Wherefore, her marriage and
Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is
386), already in force at the time, technically "intercourse with a person
expressly provided: not her husband" from the standpoint of
Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-
appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal
Laws relating to family rights and duties separation under our law, on the basis of
or to the status, condition and legal adultery".
capacity of persons are binding upon the
citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. There is no evidence that the parents of
Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided
and abetted her original suit for
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in annulment, or her subsequent divorce;
force, does not admit absolute divorce, she appears to have acted
quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact independently, and being of age, she
does not even use that term, to further was entitled to judge what was best for
emphasize its restrictive policy on the her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, Summing up, the Court rules:
certainly cannot be charged with
alienation of affections in the absence of (1) That a foreign divorce between
malice or unworthy motives, which have Filipino citizens, sought and decreed
not been shown, good faith being always after the effectivity of the present Civil
presumed until the contrary is proved. Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians and neither is the marriage contracted
or Kin. The law distinguishes between with another party by the divorced
the right of a parent to interest himself in consort, subsequently to the foreign
the marital affairs of his child and the decree of divorce, entitled to validity in
absence of rights in a stranger to the country;
intermeddle in such affairs. However,
such distinction between the liability of (2) That the remarriage of divorced wife
parents and that of strangers is only in and her co-habitation with a person
regard to what will justify interference. A other than the lawful husband entitle the
parent isliable for alienation of affections latter to a decree of legal separation
resulting from his own malicious conformably to Philippine law;
conduct, as where he wrongfully entices
his son or daughter to leave his or her
spouse, but he is not liable unless he (3) That the desertion and securing of an
acts maliciously, without justification and invalid divorce decree by one consort
from unworthy motives. He is not liable entitles the other to recover damages;
where he acts and advises his child in
good faith with respect to his child's (4) That an action for alienation of
marital relations in the interest of his affections against the parents of one
child as he sees it, the marriage of his consort does not lie in the absence of
child not terminating his right and liberty proof of malice or unworthy motives on
to interest himself in, and be extremely their part.
solicitous for, his child's welfare and
happiness, even where his conduct and WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal
advice suggest or result in the is hereby modified as follows;
separation of the spouses or the
obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor
where he acts under mistake or
Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
misinformation, or where his advice or
separation from defendant Vicenta F.
interference are indiscreet or
Escao;
unfortunate, although it has been held
that the parent is liable for
consequences resulting from (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee
recklessness. He may in good faith take Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant
his child into his home and afford him or Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
her protection and support, so long as he damages and attorneys' fees;
has not maliciously enticed his child
away, or does not maliciously entice or (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor
cause him or her to stay away, from his Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
or her spouse. This rule has more Escao and the estate of his wife, the
frequently been applied in the case of deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way
advice given to a married daughter, but of damages and attorneys' fees.
it is equally applicable in the case of
advice given to a son.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging (7) CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-


Vicenta's aged parents with racial or appellants, vs. ALFONSO
social discrimination and with having PE, defendant-appellee. G.R. No. L-
exerted efforts and pressured her to seek 17396 May 30, 1962
annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety,
FACTS: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and
entitling them to recover damages. sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24
years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married
man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar Defendant set up as a defense that the
and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the facts alleged therein, even if true, do not
town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with
his occupation. Lolita was staying with her
constitute a valid cause of action.
parents in the same town. Defendant was an
adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a The lower court dismissed the complaint.
collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of
such fact and the similarity in their family name,
Hence, the plaintiffs brought this case on
defendant became close to the plaintiffs who appeal before this Court.
regarded him as a member of their family.
Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the
ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff can claim
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her
to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two damages, basis of which is Article
eventually fell in love with each other and 21 NCC.
conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town
of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to
teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love HELD: YES.
notes with each other the contents of which
reveal not only their infatuation for each other There is no doubt that the claim of
but also the extent to which they had carried
their relationship. The rumors about their love plaintiffs for damages is based on the
affairs reached to Lolita's parents sometime in fact that defendant, being a married
1955, and since then defendant was forbidden man, carried on a love affair with Lolita
from going to their house and from seeing Lolita. Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a
The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings manner contrary to morals, good
against defendant who is a Chinese national. The
affair between defendant and Lolita continued customs and public policy. But in spite of
nonetheless. the fact that plaintiffs have clearly
established that the illicit affair between
defendant and Lolita caused great
Sometime in April 1957, Lolita was
damage to their name and reputation,
staying with her siblings at their
the trial court considered their complaint
residence at 54-B Espaa Extension, QC.
not actionable for the reason that they
On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared
failed to prove that defendant
from said house. Plaintiffs found a note
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win
inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, (small
Lolita's affection. Thus, the trial court
slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in
said: "In the absence of proof xxx, the
size), was in a handwriting to be that of
court may not presume that it was the
defendant's. In English it reads:
defendant who deliberately induced such
relationship. We cannot be unmindful of
Honey, suppose I leave here on the uncertainties and sometimes
Sunday night, and that's 13th of this inexplicable mysteries of the human
month and we will have a date on the emotions. It is a possibility that the
14th, that's Monday morning at 10 defendant and Lolita simply fell in love
a.m. with each other, not only without any
desire on their part, but also against
Reply their better judgment and in full
consciousness of what it will bring to
Love both of them. This is specially so with
respect to Lolita, being an unmarried
woman, falling in love with defendant
The disappearance of Lolita was reported who is a married man."
to the police and the NBI but up to the
present there is no news or trace of her
whereabouts. We disagree with this view. The
circumstances under which defendant
tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead,
The present action is based on Article 21 to any other conclusion than that it was
of the NCC which provides that Any he who, thru an ingenious scheme or
person who wilfully causes loss or injury trickery, seduced the latter to the extent
to another in a manner which is contrary of making her fall in love with him. This
to morals, good customs or public policy is shown by the fact that defendant
shall compensate the latter for the frequented the house of Lolita on the
damage. pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. Because of the
frequency of his visits to the latter's
family who was allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and ISSUE: Whether or not moral or exemplary
was considered as a member of her damages may be awarded in a breach of
promise to marry suit.
family, the two eventually fell in love
with each other and conducted
clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan HELD: A mere breach of promise to
but also in Boac where Lolita used to marry is not an actionable
teach in a barrio school. When the wrong. Howver, Wassmer has already
rumors about their illicit affairs reached made preparations for the wedding.
the knowledge of her parents, defendant Velezs failure to appear on the wedding
was forbidden from going to their house day is contrary to morals, good customs
and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs and public policy which is embodied on
even filed deportation proceedings Article 21 of the Civil Code. Under the
against defendant who is a Chinese law, the injured party is entitled to moral
national. Nevertheless, defendant damages as well as to exemplary
continued his love affairs with Lolita until damages because Velezs acted in
she disappeared from the parental wanton, reckless and oppressive manner
home. Indeed, no other conclusion can (Article 2232) in breaching his promise to
be drawn from this chain of events than marry Wassmer.
that defendant not only deliberately, but
through a clever strategy, succeeded in
winning the affection and love of Lolita to
the extent of having illicit relations with C. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
her. The wrong he has caused her and
her family is indeed immeasurable
Article 22. Every person who through
considering the fact that he is a married
an act of performance by another, or any
man. Verily, he has committed an injury
other means, acquires or comes into
to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to
possession of something at the expense
morals, good customs and public policy
of the latter without just or legal ground,
as contemplated in Article 21 of the NCC.
shall return the same to him.

Article 23. Even when an act or event


causing damage to another's property
(8) BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, was not due to the fault or negligence of
vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-
appellant. the defendant, the latter shall be liable
for indemnity if through the act or event
he was benefited.
FACTS: In 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco
Velez arranged their marriage to be held on
September 4 of the same year. The bride-to-be
has been devoted with all the preparations for
their wedding. However, two days before their
marriage, Paking left a note that they must (9) VICENTE PEREZ, plaintiff-
postpone the marriage for his mother was appellee, vs. EUGENIO POMAR, Agentof
against it. A day before their wedding, Paking the Compaia General de
wrote again that the wedding shall push through.
Worse, Paking did not show up on their wedding
Tabacos, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-
day causing Wassmer to be publicly humiliated. 1299 November 16, 1903

The breach of promise to marry made by Velez FACTS: The petitioner Don Vicente Perez filed before the
Court of First Instance of Laguna a complaint asking the court
prompted Wassmer to file a civil suit against the
to determine the amount due to him for the services he
former. Velez never filed an answer, thus, rendered in the Tabacalera Company and that the defendant
awarding moral and exemplary damages to Eugenio Pomar be condemned to the payment of damages
Wassmer. amounting to $3,200, gold, together with the costs of suit. Prior
to this event, the petitioner was asked to be an English
interpreter between the defendant and the military authorities
Velez appealed on the court and stated that he and that after that incident, the petitioner continued to render
failed to attend the wedding day because of his services to the respondent and that he obtained passes
fortuitous events. He also insisted that he and accompanied Pomar upon his journeys to some of the
cannot be civilly liable for there is no law that towns in Province of Laguna( e.g conferences between the
acts upon the breach of promise to marry. He respondent and the colonel commanding the local garrison,
also contested the award of moral and exemplary conferences with Captain Lemen in the town of Pilar, major in
damages. command in Pagsanjan about the shipment of goods from
Manila) and that the plaintiff was assured by the respondent
that in every rendered service to the said company, there
would be such payment. Thus, caused him to abandon his
soap business and suffered damages in the sum of $3,200.
The defendant filed for dismissal of the complaint denying the
allegations stated by the petitioner. He also stated that Perez 'l. Second Hand AUTOMATICKET Machine
borrowed from time to time money amounting to $175 for his
soap business, that Perez purposes in accompanying him is to No. MG-31833;and
extend his business and mercantile relations, free
transportation, and that Perez had acted as interpreter of his
own free will without any offer of payment and therefore no '2. Cinema Projectors Complete,
legal relation between them existed. trademark SIMPLEX PEERLESS MAGNARC
NOS. 52625 and 62387' which items
ISSUE: WON the respondent is oblige to pay the were advertised for sale on March 2,
continued service rendered by the petitioner. 1963, copy of Notice of sale attached as
ANNEX 'B' to the Complaint;
HELD: YES. The Court decision is that the judgement should
be rendered against Don Eugenio Pomar for the payment to
the plaintiff of the sum of 200 Mexican pesos. 3. That Atty. Greg V. Pajarillo was
appointed on March 2, 1963 as Receiver
The Court ruled out that if there is a tacit and mutual consent of all the assets, properties and
as to the rendition of the services, the defendant is still obliged equipment of Paris Theatre, olwrated by
to pay such compensation to the petitioner even if there is no
written contract entered between the two parties on the basis Leo Enterprises, Inc. under Civil Case No.
of quasi-contract. When one party knowingly receives 50201 entitled Gregorio V. Pajarillo vs.
something for nothing, the courts may impose a quasi
contract. Under a quasi contract, neither party is originally
Leo Enterprises, Inc.;
intended to create an agreement. Instead, an arrangement is
imposed by a judge to rectify an occurrence of unjust
enrichment. On the services rendered by the petitioner in the
4. That the sale at public auction of the
province of Laguna, it follows that there was a bilateral above described properties was
obligation on the part of both parties because the defendant postponed and was later cancelled due
accepted the benefit of the service rendered by the petitioner
and that in turn the petitioner expected him to pay his rendition to thc representation of Atty. Greg V.
of service. Provided in Article 22 of the Civil Code, Every Pajarillo as Receiver of Paris Theatre
person who through an act of performance by another, or any operated by Leo Enterprises, Inc. in
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall which he undertook the 1anient of the
return the same to him. The fact that the defendant consented judgment rendered in favor of the
to accept an interpreter's services on various occasions, plaintiff against Leo Enterprises, Inc. as
rendered in his behalf and not considered as free, it is just
that he should pay the reasonable payment because it is well- Ier undertaking dated March 11, 1963,
known principle of law that no one should be permitted to copy of which is attached as ANNEX 'C'
enrich himself to the damage of another. to the complaint;

5. That on or about hie third of March,


1963, third-party defendant Pajarillo
(10) PACIFIC MERCHANDISING approached the third-party plaintiff and
CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee, applied for a surety bond in the amount
vs. CONSOLACION INSURANCE & of P5,000.00 to be rated in favor of the
SURETY CO., INC., defendant- abovenamed plaintiff in order to
appellee, G.R. No. L-30204 October guarantee to said plaintiff the payment
29, 1976 of obligations in its favor by the Leo
Enterprises, Inc.;
CONSOLACION INSURANCE &
SURETY CO., INC., third party 6. That the bond applied for was in fact
plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO V. executed in favor of the pIaintiff rith
PAJARILLO, third party defendant- third-party defendant Pajarillo as
appellant. principal and third-party plaintiff as
surety in the context of the allegations of
FACTS: 1. That on the 19th day of the preceding paragraph and a copy of
October, 1962, a Writ of Execution as the said bond is attached a ANNEX 'A' to
isstica Iy the Court of First Instance of the third party complaint;
Manila under Civil Case No. 49691,
entitled Pacific Merchandising 7. That to protect thirrd party plaintiff
Corporation vs. Leo Enterprises, Inc., a against damage and injury, the third
copy of the said Writ of Execution is party defendant Pajarillo executed in
attached as ANNEX Ato the complaint; favor of the former an INDEMNITY
AGREEMENT, copy of which is attached
2. That by virtue of the aforesaid Writ of as ANNEX 'B' to third party complaint;
Execution, the Sheriff of Manila levied tlie trms of which aie incorporated by
and attached the following: reference;
8. That the plaintiff received from hie aid The trial court predicated its judgment
principal, Greg V. Pajarillo the sum of on the following considerations: (1) Since
P2,000.00 leaving a balance of the unpaid claim represents the cost of
P2,562.88 still unpaid aside from interest certain materials used in the
at the rate of 1% per month and atto construction of the Paris Theatre, the
lnen s f cluiaient to 25% of tht amount possession of which reverted to Gregorio
due as provided for in said undertaking V. Pajarillo as owner of said property by
(ANNEX 'C' to tlie complaint); virtue of the judgment in Civil Case No.
50201, "it is only simple justice that
9. That on July 1, 1963, a decision was Pajarillo should pay for the said claim.
rendered tne court of First Instance of otherwise he would be enriching himself
Manila in Civil case No. 50201, copy of' by having the said building without
which is attached its ANNEX 'A' to paying plaintiff for the cost of certain
Answer to Third Party Complaint, by materials that went into its
virtue of which Greg V. Pajarillo, as said construction"; (2) "under Section 7 of
Received stololcl making payments to Rule 61 of the former Rules of Court, one
plaintiff; of the powers of a receiver i8 to pay
outstanding debts, and since the said
plaintiff's claim has been outstanding
10. That the said decision in Civl Case since August 27, 1962, if not before,
No. 50201 dated July 1, 1963 was Pajarillo should have paid the same long
appealed lix defendant Leo Enterprises, before the alleged termination of the
Inc. to the court of Appeals and that the receivership on July 1, 1963"; (3) the
records kere eleattd to the aid ApiIiat procedure outlined in Section 8 of the
court on August 27, 1963; Rule, namely, that whenever the court
"shall determine that the necessity for a
11. That on October 9, 1963, plaintiff's receiver no longer exists, it shall, after
counsel demanded from the said due notice to all interested parties and
principal, Greg V. Paiarillo, the payment hearing, settle the accounts of the
of the installments corresponding to the receiver, direct the delivery of the funds
months of May, June, July, August and and other property in his hands to the
September, 1963, which remain unpaid persons adjudged entitled to receive
in spite of said demand, copy of said them, and order the discharge of the
letter being, attached as ANNEX 'E' to receiver from further duty as such," has
the complaint; not been followed; and (4) when
Gregorio V. Pajarillo undertook to pay the
12. That the defendant was duly notified amount owed to plaintiff (Annex "C") and
of the demand made on the principal, executed the surety bond (Annex "D") in
Greg V. Pajarillo and in spite of said favor of plaintiff, he 4 6 stepped into the
notice the defendant has failed and shoes" of the dr Leo Enterprises, Inc., .4
refused to pay the unpaid obligation; and the properties of the said debtor
having all subsequently passed on to
Pajarillo, there is no reason, legal or
13. That on December 19, 1963,
otherwise, for relieving defendants of
plaintiff's counsel demanded from the
their said undertaking."
defendant the payment of the unpaid
obligation of the principal, Greg V.
Pajarillo but refused and failed to pay the From the foregoing judgment, third-party
same in spite of said demand; defendant Gregorio V. Pajarillo
interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. The aforesaid Appellate Court,
14. That when reminded by third-party
in turn certified the same to this Court on
plaintiff regarding his obligations in favor
the ground that there is no question of
of the plaintiff, the third-party defendant,
fact involved, but only one of law.
Greg V. Pajarillo replied that he no longer
was bound to pay because he had
ceased to be the receiver of Paris ISSUE: WON third party defendant-
Theatre operated by Leo Enterprises, Inc. appellant Gregorio V. Pajarillo is,
by virtue of the decision of the Court in under the facts and circumstances
Civil Case No. 50201 cited above, and for obtaining, liable to plaintiff for the
this reason, third- party plaintiff refused unpaid amount claimed.
to pay the demand of the plaintiff.
HELD: YES, he is liable. required by Section 8 of Rule 59 of the
Rules of Court.
A receiver is not an agent or
representative of any party to the action. Moreover, it will be recalled that the
He is an officer of the court exercising his obligation due the Pacific Merchandising
functions in the interest of neither Corporation represented the cost of
plaintiff nor defendant, but for the materials used in the construction of the
common benefit of all the parties in Paris Theatre. There can not be any
interest. He performs his duties "subject question that such improvements, in the
to the control of the Court," and every final analysis, redounded to the
question involved in the receivership advantage and personal profit of
may be determined by the court taking appellant Pajarillo because the judgment
cognizance of the receivership in Civil Case No. 50201, which was in
proceedings. Thus, "a receiver, strictly substance affirmed by the Appellate
speaking, has no right or power to make Court, ordered that the "possession of
any contract binding the property or fund the lands, building equipment, furniture,
in his custody or to pay out funds in his and accessories ..." of the theater be
hands without the authority or approval transferred to said appellant as owner
of the court . thereof.

In the case at bar, appellant Pajarillo As the trial court aptly observed "... it is
does not dispute the fact that he never only simple justice that Pajarillo should
secured the court's approal of either the pay for the said claim, otherwise he
agreement of March 11, 1963, with would be enriching himself without
Pacific Merchandising Corporation or of paying plaintiff for the cost of certain
his Indemnity Agreement with the materials that went into its
Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. construction. ... It is argLicd however,
on March 14, 1963, in consideration of that he did so only as a receiver of Leo
the performance bond submitted by the Pajarillo by virtue of the judgment in Civil
latter to Pacific Merchandising Case No. 50201 all of the properties of
Corporation to guarantee the payment of Leo Enterprises, Inc. passed on to
the obligation. As the person to whom Pajarillo by virtue of the judgment in Civil
the possession of the theater and its Case No. %201 ...". This Roman Law
equipment was awarded by the court in principle of "Nemo Cum alterious
Civil Case No. 50201, it was certainly to detrimento locupletari protest" is
his personal profit and advantage that embodied in Article 22 (Human
the sale at public auction of the Relations), 14 and Articles 2142 to 2175
liquipment of the theater was prevented (QuasiContracts) of the New Civil Code.
by his execution of the aforesaid Long before the enactment of this Code,
agreement and submission of the afore- however, the principle of unjust
mentioned bond. In order to bind the enrichment which is basic in every legal
property or fund in his hands as receiver, system, was already expressly
he should have applied for and obtained recognized in this jurisdiction.
from the court authority to enter into the
aforesaid contract. Unauthorized
contracts of a receiver do not bind the
court in charge of receivership. They are
the receiver's own contracts and are not (11) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
recognized by the courts as contracts of REVENUE, petitioner, vs. FIREMAN'S
the receivership. Consequently, the FUND INSURANCE COMPANY and the
aforesaid agreement and undertaking COURT OF TAX
entered into by appellant Pajarillo not APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-
having been approved or authorized by 30644 March 9, 1987
the receivership court should, therefore,
be considered as his personal Private respondent is a resident foreign
undertaking or obligation. Certainly, if insurance corporation organized under
such agreements were known by the the laws of the US, authorized and duly
receivership court, it would not have licensed to do business in the
terminated the receivership without due Philippines. It is a member of the
notice to the judgment creditor as American Foreign Insurance Association.
FACTS: From January, 1952 to or to such other paper as may be
December, 1958, herein private indicated by law or regulations as the
respondent Fireman's Fund Insurance proper recipient of the stamp, and by
Company entered into various insurance the subsequent cancellation of same,
contracts involving casualty, fire and such cancellation to be accomplished
marine risks, for which the corresponding by writing, stamping, or perforating
insurance policies were issued. From the date of the cancellation across
1952 to 1956, documentary stamps were the face of each stamp in such
bought and affixed to the monthly manner that part of the writing,
statements of policies issues; and from impression, or perforation shall be on
1957 to 1958 documentary stamps were the stamp itself and part on the
bought and affixed to the corresponding paper to which it is
pages of the policy register, not on the attached; Provided, That if the
insurance policies issued. In 1959, cancellation is accomplished by
respondent company discovered that its writing or stamping the date of
monthly statements of business and cancellation, a hole sufficiently large
policy register were lost. The loss was to be visible to the naked eye shall be
reported to the Building Administration punched, cut or perforated on both
of Ayala Building and the NBI. Herein the stamp and the document either
petitioner CIR was also informed of such by the use of a hand punch, knife,
loss by respondent company. After perforating machine, scissors, or any
investigation, petitioner's examiner other cutting instrument; but if the
ascertained that respondent company cancellation is accomplished by
failed to affix the required documentary perforating the date of cancellation,
stamps to the insurance policies issued no other hole need be made on the
by it and failed to preserve its stamp. (Now Sec. 249.)
accounting records within the time
prescribed by the Revenue Code. As a see SEC. 210 (Now. Sec. 222); SEC.
consequence, petitioner assessed and 232, (220) (As amended by PD 1457);
demanded from the insurance company (Rev. Regs. No. 26); SEC. 237; SEC.
the payment of documentary stamp 221 (Now Sec. 233); SEC. 239 (Now
taxes for the years 1952 to 1958 Sec. 250).
(P79,806.87) plus compromise penalties,
a total of P81,406.87.
As correctly pointed out by respondent
CTA, documentary tax is deemed paid
Respondent company contested the by: (a) the purchase of documentary
assessment. After petitioner denied the stamps; (b) affixture of documentary
protest, respondent company appealed stamps to the document or instrument
to the CTA. Respondent court reversed taxed or to such other paper as may be
the decision of the CIR. Hence, this indicated by law or regulations; and (c)
petition. cancellation of the stamps as required by
law.
ISSUE: W/N there is an unjust
enrichment on the part of the CIR in It will be observed however, that the
requiring the respondent company over-riding purpose of these provisions of
to pay again the documentary law is the collection of taxes. The three
stamps it has actually purchased, steps above-mentioned are but the
affixed and cancelled. means to that end. Thus, the purchase of
the stamps is the form of payment
HELD: YES. The petition is devoid of made; the affixture thereof on the
merit. document or instrument taxed is to
insure that the corresponding tax has
The relevant provisions of the NIRC been paid for such document, while the
provide: cancellation of the stamps is to obviate
the possibility that said stamps will be
reused for similar documents for similar
SEC. 237. Payment of documentary purposes.
stamp tax. Documentary stamp
taxes shall be paid by the purchase
and affixture of documentary stamps In the case at bar, there appears to be
to the document or instrument taxed no dispute on the fact that the
documentary stamps corresponding to There appears to be no question that the
the various policies were purchased and purpose of imposing documentary stamp
paid for by the respondent Company. taxes is to raise revenue and the
Neither is there any argument that the corresponding amount has already been
same were cancelled as required by law. paid by respondent and has actually
In fact such were the findings of become part of the revenue of the
petitioner's examiner Amando Melgar government. In the same manner, it is
who stated x x x that it has, since July, evident that the affixture of the stamps
1959, been using a "HASLER" franking on documents not authorized by law is
machine, Model F88, which stamps the not attended by bad faith as the practice
documentary stamps on the duplicates was adopted from the authority granted
of the policies issued. Prior to the to Wise & Company, one of respondent's
acquisition of the said machine, the general agents. Indeed, petitioner
company buys its stamps by allowing argued that such authority was not given
the Manager to issue a Manager's check to respondent company specifically, but
drawn against the National City Bank of under the general principle of agency,
New York and payable to the City where the acts of the agents bind the
Treasurer of Manila. It was also found out principal, the conclusion is inescapable
that during this period (1952 to 1958), that the justification for the acts of the
the total purchases of documentary agents may also be claimed for the acts
stamps amounted to P77,837.67, while of the principal itself.
the value of the used stamps lost
amounted to P65,901.11. x x x The Be that as it may, there is no justification
taxpayer was found to be negligent in for the government which has already
the preservation and keeping of its realized the revenue which is the object
records. Although the loss was found by of the imposition of subject stamp tax, to
the company's private investigator was require the payment of the same tax for
not an "Inside Job," still the company the same documents. Enshrined in our
should be held liable for its negligence, x basic legal principles is the time honored
x x. doctrine that no person shall unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another.
Such findings were confirmed by the It goes without saying that the
Memorandum of the Acting CIR Jose government is not exempted from the
Lingad to the Chief, Business Tax application of this doctrine (Ramie
Division. Later, respondent CTA correctly Textiles, Inc. v. Mathay Sr. [1979]).
observed that the purchase of
documentary stamps and their being
affixed to the monthly statements of
business and policy registers were also
(12) VELAYO VS SHELL
admitted by counsel for the Government.
FACTS: Prior to 1948, Commercial
Thus, all investigations made by the Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to
petitioner show the same factual findings Shell Company. CAL offered its C-54
that respondent company purchased plane as payment to Shell Company (the
documentary stamps for the various plane was in California) but Shell at that
policies it has issued for the period in time declined as it thought CALI had
question although it has attached the sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948
same on documents not authorized by however, CALI was going bankrupt so it
law. called upon an informal meeting of its
creditors. In that meeting, the creditors
It is a general rule in the interpretation of agreed to appoint representatives to a
statutes levying taxes or duties, that in working committee that would determine
case of doubt, such statutes are to be the order of preference as to how each
construed most strongly against the creditor should be paid. They also agreed
government and in favor of the subjects not to file suit against CALI but CALI did
or citizens, because burdens are not to reserve that it will file insolvency
be imposed, nor presumed to be proceedings should its assets be not
imposed beyond what statutes expressly enough to pay them up. Shell Company
and clearly import (Manila Railroad Co. v. was represented by a certain Fitzgerald
Collector of Customs [1929]). to the three man working committee.
Later, the working committee convened said insolvent's property depriving the latter and
to discuss how CALIs asset should be the Assignee that was latter appointed, of the
opportunity to recover said plane.
divided amongst the creditors but while
such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a
telegraph message to Shell USA advising Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil
Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides the
the latter that Shell Philippines is following:
assigning its credit to Shell USA in the
amount of $79k, thereby effectively
"Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his
collecting almost all if not the entire rights and in the performances of his duties, act
indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. with justice, give everyone his due and observe
Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI honesty and good faith".
has a C-54 plane is California and so
Shell USA petitioned before a California It may be said that this article only contains a
court to have the plane be the subject of mere declaration of principles and while such
a writ of attachment which was granted. statement may be is essentially correct, yet We
find that such declaration is implemented by
Article 21 and sequence of the same Chapter
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI which prescribe the following:
were unaware of the assignment of
credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell "Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
USA and they went on to approve the injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
sale of CALIs asset to the Philippine morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage".
Airlines. In September 1948, the other
creditors learned of the assignment
made by Shell. This prompted these Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which
compels the return of a thing acquired 'without
other creditors to file their own just or legal grounds'. This provision embodies
complaint of attachment against CALIs the doctrine that no person should unjustly
assets. CALI then filed for insolvency enrich himself at the expense of another, which
proceedings to protect its assets in the has been one of the mainstays of every legal
Philippines from being attached. Alfredo system for centuries. It is most needful that this
ancient principle be clearly and specifically
Velayos appointment as CALIs assignee consecrated in the Civil Code to the end that in
was approved in lieu of the insolvency cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no one may
proceeding. In order for him to recover unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of
the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a another.
writ of injunction against Shell
Philippines in order for the latter to Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as
restrain Shell USA from proceeding with to provide that:
the attachment and in the alternative
that judgment be awarded in favor of "Even if an act or event causing damage
CALI for damages double the amount of to another's property was not due to the
the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not fault or negligence of the defendant, the
recovered. Shell Company argued it is latter shall be liable for indemnity if
not liable for damages because there is through the act or event he was
nothing in the law which prohibits a benefited." with much more reason the
company from assigning its credit, it Defendant should be liable for indemnity
being a common practice. for acts it committed in bad faith and
with betrayal of confidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable
for damages considering that it did
not violate any law.
D. JUDICIAL VIGILANCE
RULING:

Article 24. In all contractual, property


PROVISIONS ON HUMAN RELATIONS INTENDED or other relations, when one of the
AS CATCH-ALL PROVISIONS FOR ANY WRONG FOR
WHICH NO SPECIFIC REMEDY IS PROVIDED FOR parties is at a disadvantage on account
BY LAW. of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age
Defendant schemed and effected the transfer to or other handicap, the courts must be
its sister corporation in the United States, where vigilant for his protection.
CALI's plane C- 54 was. By that swift and
unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of
E. THOUGHTLESS EXTRAVAGANCE final advice is pending upon my submission of supporting
ownership papers.

Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of
expenses for pleasure or display during advertising received the letter. He stopped publication of the
a period of acute public want or advertisement. contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his
apologies but no rectification or apology was published.
emergency may be stopped by order of
the courts at the instance of any
February 20, 1969: Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis
government or private charitable Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000.
institution.
March 10: t. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest
mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be
published in the Manila Times.

F. RIGHT TO PRIVACY March 18, 1969: new advertisement with the Arcadio family
and their real house was published in the Manila Times but
there was no apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of
Article 26. Every person shall respect the error.
the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other March 29: Aramil filed his complaint for damages.
persons. The following and similar acts,
though they may not constitute a April 15, 1969: St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the
criminal offense, shall produce a cause Manila Times a "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4
of action for damages, prevention and by 3 inches.

other relief:
trial court: awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages,
P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees.
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's
residence; St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of
sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his
income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month.
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy.
private life or family relations of another;
CA: Affirmed - St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-
delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code.
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be
alienated from his friends;
ISSUE: WON St. Louis Realty should be held liable under
Art. 21 and 26.
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on
account of his religious beliefs, lowly HELD: YES. Affirmed.
station in life, place of birth, physical
defect, or other personal condition. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up
the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated
publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never
made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just
contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

(13) ST. LOUIS REALTY


Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was
APPEALS and CONRADO J. renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased
ARAMIL, respondents. G.R. No. L-46061 it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and
unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and
November 14, 1984 mental anguish.

FACTS: St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the


permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of
Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December
15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 an advertisement with the
heading "WHERE THE HEART IS". (14) JEROME CASTRO, Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Doctor Aramil wrote to St. Louis Realty about the mistake and Respondent. G.R. No. 180832 July
stating how it has affected his professional and personal 23, 2008
integrity as he has invited in several occasions numerous
medical colleagues, medical students and friends to my
house. Because of it, he received sly remarks although in light FACTS: On November 11, 2002, Reedley
vein as "it looks like your house," "how much are you renting International School (RIS) dismissed
from the Arcadios?" "like your wife portrayed in the papers as
belonging to another husband," etc., have resulted in no little Tans son, Justin Albert (then a Grade 12
mental anguish on my part. He I have referred the matter to student), for violating the terms of his
the Legal Panel of the Philippine Medical Association and their disciplinary probation. Upon Tans
request, RIS reconsidered its decision but On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
imposed "non-appealable" conditions affirmed the factual findings of the MeTC.
such as excluding Justin Albert from However, in view of the animosity
participating in the graduation between the parties, it found petitioner
ceremonies. guilty only of slight oral defamation.

Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the On April 19, 2007, the Office of the
Department of Education (Dep-Ed) for Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition
violation of the Manual of Regulation of for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA)
Private Schools, Education Act of 1982 assailing the decision of the RTC. It
and Article 19 of the Civil Code against contended that the RTC acted with grave
RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his abuse of discretion when it downgraded
son was undertaken with malice, bad petitioners offense to slight oral
faith and evident premeditation. After defamation. The RTC allegedly
investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS misappreciated the antecedents which
code violation point system allowed the provoked petitioner to utter the allegedly
summary imposition of unreasonable defamatory statement against Tan.
sanctions (which had no basis in fact and
in law). The system therefore violated The CA found that the RTC committed
due process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified grave abuse of discretion when it
it. misapprehended the totality of the
circumstances and found petitioner
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the guilty only of slight oral defamation.
Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin Thus, the CA reinstated the MeTC
Albert without any condition. Thus, he decision.
was able to graduate from RIS and
participate in the commencement ISSUES: WON double jeopardy has
ceremonies held on March 30, 2003. attached when the RTC acquitted
him? YES, double jeopardy has
After the graduation ceremonies, Tan attached.
met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent at
RIS. In the course of their conversation, WON may be held liable for
Tan intimated that he was contemplating damages? YES.
a suit against the officers of RIS in their
personal capacities, including petitioner
who was the assistant headmaster. HELD: But No person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. This constitutional mandate is
Ching telephoned petitioner sometime echoed in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the
the first week of April and told him that Rules of Court.
Tan was planning to sue the officers of
RIS in their personal capacities. Before
they hung up, petitioner told Ching: Under this provision, double jeopardy
occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2)
before a competent court (3) after
Okay, you too, take care and be careful arraignment (4) when a valid plea has
talking to [Tan], thats dangerous. been entered and (5) when the accused
was acquitted or convicted or the case
Ching then called Tan and informed him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
that petitioner said "talking to him was without the express consent of the
dangerous." accused. Thus, an acquittal, whether
ordered by the trial or appellate court, is
Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave final and unappealable on the ground of
oral defamation in the Office of the City double jeopardy.
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against
petitioner. The only exception is when the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion or,
the MeTC found petitioner guilty beyond as we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,
reasonable doubt of grave oral when there was mistrial. In such
defamation. instances, the OSG can assail the said
judgment in a petition for certiorari
establishing that the State was deprived Article 27. Any person suffering
of a fair opportunity to prosecute and material or moral loss because a public
prove its case. servant or employee refuses or neglects,
without just cause, to perform his official
What the OSG therefore questioned were duty may file an action for damages and
errors of judgment (or those involving other relief against the latter, without
misappreciation of evidence or errors of prejudice to any disciplinary
law). However, a court, in a petition for administrative action that may be taken.
certiorari, cannot review the public
respondents evaluation of the evidence
and factual findings. Errors of judgment
cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as (15) THE HON. EXPEDITO B. PILAR, in his
a writ of certiorari can only correct errors capacity as Vice-Mayor and concurrently
of jurisdiction (or those involving the presiding officer protempore of the
commission of grave abuse of Sanguniang Bayan of Dasol,
Pangasinan, Petitioner, v. THE SANGUNIANG
discretion). BAYAN OF DASOL, PANGASINAN, composed
of the HON. LODOVICO ESPINOSA, Municipal
Because the OSG did not raise errors of Mayor and presiding officer of said body
and the following members of that body:
jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking HON. AVELINO N. NACAR, HON. LUZ B.
cognizance of its petition and, worse, in JIMENEZ, HON. GERARDO B. RIVERA, HON.
reviewing the factual findings of the RTC. JUAN M. BONUS, HON. APOLONIO G.
We therefore reinstate the RTC decision ABELLA, HON. ABRAHAM BALAOING, HON.
so as not to offend the constitutional JAIME ABELLA, HON. LAURENTINO
BALAOING, HON. MA. LINDA BUSTRIA, HON.
prohibition against double jeopardy. CEFERINO QUINITIO, HON. ELIFAS VIDAL,
and MR. VICTORIANO BUAGA, Municipal
At most, petitioner could have been Treasurer of Dasol,
Pangasinan, Respondents. [G.R. No. 63216.
liable for damages under Article 26 of March 12, 1984.]
the Civil Code :
AQUINO, J., concurring:
Article 26. Every person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of 1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES;
mind of his neighbors and other persons. RESPONDENT MAYOR IN CASE AT BAR
The following and similar acts, though PERSONALLY LIABLE THEREFORE; BASIS. As
they may not constitute a criminal respondent mayor acted in bad faith in not
offense, shall produce a cause of action performing his legal duty to appropriate the
requisite amount for the payment of petitioners
for damages, prevention and other relief: salaries, he becomes personally liable for
damages. The governing law is found in article
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be 27 of the Civil Code which makes a public servant
or employee liable for damages for his refusal or
alienated from his friends; neglect, without just cause, to perform his official
duty (Javellana v. Tayo, 116 Phil. 1342, where a
Petitioner is reminded that, as an municipal mayor was adjudged liable to pay P100
as moral damages and P100 as attorneys fees
educator, he is supposed to be a role for failure to sign the payrolls for the per diems
model for the youth. As such, he should of certain councilors). Article 2219(10) of the Civil
always act with justice, give everyone Code allows moral damages in an action under
his due and observe honesty and good article 27. x x x
faith.
FACTS: Petitioner was elected vice mayor of
Dasol, Pangasinan in 1980 local elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby Elected with him were Lodovico Espinosa as the
GRANTED. The resolution of the Court of municipal mayor and the following members of
Appeals in are REVERSED and SET the Sanguniang Bayan (SB).
ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court is REINSTATED. Petitioner Jerome On March 4, 1980, the SB adopted Resolution No.
Castro is ACQUITTED of slight oral 1 which increased the salaries of the mayor and
defamation as defined and penalized in municipal treasurer to P18,636.00 and
Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code. P16,044.00 per annum respectively. The said
resolution did not provide for an increase in
salary of the vice mayor despite the fact that
such position is entitled to an annual salary of
P16,044.00 (Circular No. 9-A).

G. DERELICTION OF DUTY
Petitioner questioned the failure of the SB to authority in an arbitrary manner when he vetoed
appropriate an amount for the payment of his the resolution since there exists sufficient
salary. He wrote letters to the proper authorities municipal funds from which the salary of the
complaining about the matter and asking that petitioner could be paid. Respondent Mayors
something should be done to correct it. The refusal, neglect or omission in complying with the
proper provincial and national officials endorsed directives of the Provincial Budget Officer and the
compliance with Circular 9-A of the Joint Director of the Bureau of Local Government that
Commission on Local Government and Personnel the salary of the petitioner be provided for and
Administration in giving the revised rate of salary paid the prescribed salary rate, is reckless and
for petitioner. In fact, the mayor was sent a letter oppressive, hence, by way of example or
by the Executive Secretary of the Commission correction for the public good, respondent Mayor
advising him that the Municipality should pay the is liable personally to the petitioner for
Vice-Mayor the salary due him equivalent to that exemplary or corrective damages (P5,000.00).
of the Municipal Treasurer per Circular No. 15.
Petitioner is likewise entitled to actual damages
On December 12, 1980, the SB enacted a and costs of litigation which We reduce from
resolution appropriating the amount of P500.00 P13,643.50 to P5,000.00 and for mental anguish,
per month as the salary of the petitioner. This serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock,
amount was increased to P774.00 per month in social humiliation and similar injury, We hold that
December, 1981. petitioner is entitled to P5,000.00 as moral
damages.
On October 26, 1982, the SB enacted a
resolution appropriating the amount of All the above sums as damages including
P15,144.00 as payment of the unpaid salaries of attorneys fees in the amount of
the petitioner from January 1, 1981 to December
31, 1982. The resolution was vetoed by the
P5,000.00 shall be paid personally by
respondent mayor resulting into the filing by the respondent Mayor Lodovico Espinosa
petitioner of this petition for a writ of mandamus from his private funds.
on February 16, 1983.

Respondents alleged that the petition is now


moot and academic because on April 20, 1983,
the SB enacted an appropriation ordinance which (16) PHIL. MATCH CO., LTD., vs. CITY OF
among others appropriated an amount of CEBU & JESUS ZABATE (Acting City Treasurer)
P29,985.00 as payment of salary differentials of G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978
the petitioner pursuant to the Supplemental
Budget No. 3 Gen. Fund, C.Y. 1983. FACTS: Petitioner, engaged in manufacturing of
matches, assails the legality of the tax which the
ISSUE: W/N the respondent Mayor is liable. city treasure collected on out-of-town deliveries
of matches by virtue of the city ordinance which
taxes good stored and/or sold within the city. The
HELD: YES. company sought refund of the sales tax and for
damages against the city treasurer for not
Petitioner admitted that at the time he submitted following the advise of the city fiscal, as legal
his memorandum, he has been fully paid of his adviser of the city, that all out-of-town deliveries
salaries as provided for by BP 51 and of matches are not subject to sales tax. The trial
implemented by Circular No. 9-A of the Joint court dismissed the complaint against the city
Commission for Local Government and Personnel treasurer.
Administration. Since petitioners claim for
salaries has already been provided for and paid, ISSUE: WON the city treasurer can be held
the case has become moot and academic. liable for damages under Art. 27 of the CC.

Nevertheless, We find and rule that petitioner is RULING: YES.


entitled to damages and attorneys fees because
the facts show that petitioner was forced to
litigate in order to claim his lawful salary which Article 27 of the Civil Code provides that "any
was unduly denied him for three (3) years and person suffering material or moral lose because a
that the Mayor acted in gross and evident bad public servant or employee refuses or neglects,
faith in refusing to satisfy petitioners plainly without just cause, to perform his official duty
valid, just and demandable claim. (Article 2208, may file an action for damages and other relief
(2) and (5), NCC). against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be
taken." Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or
That respondent Hon. Mayor alone should be omission of a public official is attributable to
held liable and responsible for the miserable malice or inexcusable negligence. In the case at
plight of the petitioner is clear. Respondent bar, the records clearly show that the city
Mayor vetoed without just cause on October 26, treasurer honestly believed that he was justified
1982 the Resolution of the SB appropriating the under the ordinance to collect taxes. The fiscals
salary of the petitioner. While "to veto or not to opinion on the legality of such or any other
veto involves the exercise of discretion", ordinance is merely advisory and has no binding
respondent Mayor, however, exceeded his effects.
As a rule, Where an officer is invested FACTS: The accused in this case is
with discretion in matters brought before charged with "unfair competition," as
him and when so acting he is usually defined and penalized in Act No. 666 of
given immunity from liability to persons the Philippine Commission.
who may be injured as the result or an
erroneous or mistaken decision, provided For many years, A. S. Watson, and Co.,
the acts complained of are done within limited, a corporation duly organized
the scope of the officer's authority and under the laws of Great Britain and
without malice, or corruption. It has been registered in the Mercantile Register of
held previously by the SC that an the Philippine Islands, was extensively
erroneous interpretation of an ordinance engaged in the city of Manila and the
does not constitute nor does it amount Philippine Islands in the business of
to bad faith that would entitle an manufacturing and selling soda water,
aggrieved party to an award for lemonade, ginger ale, and other aerated
damages Cabungcal vs. Cordovan 120 waters.
Phil. 667).
On August 14, 1903, the said A. S.
Watson and Co., Limited, registered with
the Bureau of Patents, Copyrights, and
H. UNFAIR COMPETITION Trade marks of the Philippine Islands a
trade mark consisting of the words "A. S.
Watson and Company, Limited," together
Article 28. Unfair competition in with the figure of a unicorn and dragon
agricultural, commercial or industrial on either side of a Chinese pagoda,
enterprises or in labor through the use of which had been adopted and
force, intimidation, deceit, machination appropriated by said A. S. Watson and
or any other unjust, oppressive or Co., Limited. as their trade mark for
highhanded method shall give rise to a many years prior to its registry.
right of action by the person who
thereby suffers damage.
The soda water, lemonade, and other
aerated waters manufactured by A. S.
Watson and Co., Limited were sold in
bottles, specially made for the purpose,
(17) THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. with their trade mark blown on the side
VICENTE MANUEL, Defendant-Appellant. [G.R.
No. L-1999. December 27, 1906. ]
in large raised letters and figures, these
letters and figures being so strikingly
and prominently displayed that they
SYLLABUS
forcibly attract the attention of the eye
and arouse the sense of touch on the
1. TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE NAMES; UNFAIR
COMPETITION. The true test of unfair competition is most superficial examination. On these
whether certain goods have been intentionally clothed with an bottles labels were pasted also bearing
appearance which is likely to deceive the ordinary purchases the said trade mark, and in addition the
exercising ordinary care, and not whether a certain limited
class of purchasers with special knowledge not possessed by name of the particular variety of aerated
the ordinary purchases could avoid mistake by the exercise of water contained therein.
this special knowledge.

Per TORRES, J., dissenting:


In September, 1903, the defendant,
Vicente Manuel, manufactured and sold
a number of bottles of aerated waters in
2. ID.; ID. In order to maintain an action for unfair
competition under section 7 of Act No. 666, it is necessary that bottles identical in form and appearance
the intent on the part of the competitor to deceive the public with those used by A. S. Watson and Co.,
shall be proven beyond any doubt.
Limited, with the trade mark of that firm
blown on the side in the same manner in
3. ID.; ID. It being proven that the accused had acquired
bottles, with the mark incrusted in the glass, a long time before
which it is blown on their bottles, there
Watson & Co. had registered the said mark in accordance with being no reasonable doubt that the
the said act, and taking into consideration the fact that the bottles used by the defendant were
registration provided for the use of the mark for carbonated
waters (aguas gaseosas), and not for the use of marked
bottles which had been formerly used by
bottles, and the fact that the accused was accustomed to put A. S. Watson and Co., Limited in their
his own labels on the bottles containing the various classes of business as manufacturers and vendors
waters sold by him, it can not be said that he has violated the
law and committed the alleged offense.
of aerated waters. On the bottles sold by
the defendant there were pasted labels
with his name and the kind of aerated sufficient to protect from mistake the
water contained therein, the printed ordinary purchaser who is unacquainted
matter contained in these labels being with the English language, unless he
different from that contained in the took the extraordinary precaution of
bottles sold by A. S. Watson and Co., having with him a sample of the label of
Limited, and the general appearance of A. S. Watson and Co., Limited, with which
the respective labels not being strikingly to make a direct comparison, on each
similar or dissimilar, though a occasion when he bought a bottle of
comparative examination develops a aerated water; by far the most striking
number of points of difference in size, and noticeable characteristics of the
shape, and color. It does not expressly bottles of aerated waters sold by A. S.
appear on either label whether the name Watson and Co., Limited, is the evidence
printed thereon is that of the blown on the side, upon seeing which the
manufacturer of the aerated water ordinary purchaser might well be
contained therein or that of a dealer excused from a too careful scrutiny of
engaged in the business of buying and the wording of the much less noticeable
selling such waters. and less easily remembered label,
printed in a language known to but a
The evidence tended to prove that the small percentage of the residents in
aerated waters sold by S. Watson and Manila and the Philippine Islands.
Co., Limited, have a wide reputation for
excellence of the Philippine Islands, and The true test of unfair competition is
that great care and attention to detail whether certain goods have been
are exercised in their manufacture, with clothed with an appearance which is
a view to the production of a wholesome likely to deceive the ordinary purchaser
and pleasant beverage, and that to this exercising ordinary care, and not
end distilled water is used exclusively in whether a certain limited class of
their preparation; and there is evidence purchasers with special knowledge not
in the record which tends to prove that possess by the ordinary purchaser could
the aerated waters sold by the avoid mistake by the exercise of this
defendant were unwholesome and of special knowledge.
inferior quality, and that distilled water
had been used in their manufacture. It being proven that the accused had
acquired bottles, with the mark incrusted
On this evidence the trial court convicted in the glass, a long time before Watson &
the accused of "unfair competition," and Co. had registered the said mark in
sentenced him to pay a fine of $50, gold, accordance with the said act, and taking
and the costs of the trial, and to into consideration the fact that the
subsidiary imprisonment in case of registration provided for the use of the
insolvency and nonpayment of the fine. mark for carbonated waters, and not for
the use of marked bottles, and the fact
ISSUE: WON there was unfair that the accused was accustomed to put
competition. his own labels on the bottles containing
the various classes of waters sold by
HELD: YES. him, it cannot be said that he has
violated the law and committed the
alleged offense.
Counsel for defendant insist that the use
of different labels pasted on the bottles
forbids the inference of an intent to
device the public or defraud A. S. Watson
and Co., Limited, but an ocular I.
examination of the labels and the device
blown on the bottles does not sustain his Article 29. When the accused in a
contention; for while it is true that a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
cautious purchaser who was acquainted ground that his guilt has not been
with the English language need not have proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
been deceived if he took the pains to action for damages for the same act or
read the printed matter on the label, omission may be instituted. Such action
nevertheless the difference in the requires only a preponderance of
general appearance of the labels is not evidence. Upon motion of the defendant,
the court may require the plaintiff to file (1) day in each of the cases, and to pay
a bond to answer for damages in case private respondent P167,150.00 as civil
the complaint should be found to be indemnity.
malicious.
The Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No.
If in a criminal case the judgment of 36376 rendered the assailed Decision
acquittal is based upon reasonable insofar as it sustained the appeal of
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the private respondent on the civil aspect
absence of any declaration to that and ordering petitioner to pay private
effect, it may be inferred from the text respondent P335,000.00 representing
of the decision whether or not the the aggregate face value of the four (4)
acquittal is due to that ground. checks indorsed by petitioner plus legal
interest from the notice of dishonor.

Petitioner filed a motion for


(18) REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA, reconsideration of the Decision. On 19
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS March 1997 the Court of Appeals issued
and RAMON SUA, respondents. G.R. a Resolution and ruled that private
No. 128927 September 14, 1999 respondent could not recover twice on
the same checks. Since he had collected
P125,000.00 as civil indemnity in Crim.
FACTS: REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA Cases Nos. 8733 and 8734, this amount
appeals to us through this petition for should be deducted from the sum total
review the Decision of the Court of of the civil indemnity due him arising
Appeals which acquitted her of the crime from the estafa cases against petitioner.
of estafa but held her liable nonetheless The appellate court then corrected its
for the value of the checks she indorsed previous award, which was erroneously
in favor of private respondent Ramon placed, at P335,000,00, to P335,150,00
Sua. as the sum total of the amounts of the
four (4) checks involved. Deducting the
On several occasions petitioner amount of P125,000.00 already collected
Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store by private respondent.
owner, purchased from Monrico Mart
certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, ISSUE: Whether respondent CA
and paid for them with 4 checks issued committed reversible error in
by one Arturo de Guzman. requiring petitioner to pay civil
indemnity to private respondent
These checks were signed at the back by after the trial court had acquitted of
petitioner. When presented for payment her of the criminal charges. NO, the
the checks were dishonored because the CA did not commit an error in
drawer's account was already closed. requiring petitioner to pay.
Private respondent Ramon Sua informed
Arturo de Guzman and petitioner about HELD: Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of
the dishonor but both failed to pay the the Rules of Court, as amended,
value of the checks. Hence, four (4) specifically provides: "Extinction of the
charges of estafa were filed against penal action does not carry with it
petitioner. extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceed from a declaration in
Arturo de Guzman was charged with two a final judgment that the fact from which
(2) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. the civil might arise did not exist."

On 27 December 1989 the court a quo 2 The judgment of acquittal extinguishes


acquitted petitioner of all the charges of the liability of the accused for damages
estafa but did not rule on whether she only when it includes a declaration that
could be held civilly liable for the checks the fact from which the civil liability
she indorsed to private respondent. The might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
trial court found Arturo de Guzman guilty liability is not extinguished by acquittal
of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on two (2) where: (a) the acquittal is based on
counts and sentenced him to suffer reasonable doubt; (b) where the court
imprisonment of six (6) months and one expressly declares that the liability of the
accused is not criminal but only civil in The dismissal of the criminal cases
nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is against petitioner did not erase her civil
not derived from or based on the liability since the dismissal was due to
criminal act of which the accused is insufficiency of evidence and not from a
acquitted. Thus, under Art. 29 of the Civil declaration from the court that the fact
Code from which the civil action might arise
did not exist. An accused acquitted of
When the accused in a criminal estafa may be nevertheless be held
prosecution is acquitted on the ground civilly liable where the facts established
that his guilt has not been proved by the evidence so warrant. The accused
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action should be adjudged liable for the unpaid
for damages for the same act or value of the checks signed by her in
omission may be instituted. Such action favor of the complainant.
requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, The rationale behind the award of civil
the court may require the plaintiff to file indemnity despite a judgment of
a bond to answer for damages in case acquittal when evidence is sufficient to
the complaint should be found to be sustain the award was explained by the
malicious. Code Commission in connection with Art.
29 of the Civil Code, to wit:
In a criminal case where the judgment of
acquittal is based upon reasonable The old rule that the acquittal of the
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the accused in a criminal case also releases
absence of any declaration to that effect, him from civil liability is one of the most
it may be inferred from the text of the serious flaws in the Philippine legal
decision whether or not acquittal is due system. It has given rise to numberless
to that ground. instances of miscarriage of justice, where
the acquittal was due to a reasonable
Based on the above findings of the trial doubt in the mind of the court as to the
court, the exoneration of petitioner of guilt of the accused. The reasoning
the charges of estafa was based on the followed is that inasmuch as the civil
failure of the prosecution to present responsibility is derived from the criminal
sufficient evidence showing conspiracy offense, when the latter is not proved,
between her and the other accused civil liability cannot be demanded.
Arturo de Guzman in defrauding private
respondent. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
We affirm the findings of the Court of 22 January 1996 as amended by its
Appeals that despite the conflicting Resolution dated 19 March 1997 ordering
versions of the parties, it is undisputed petitioner Remedios Nota Sapiera to pay
that the four (4) checks issued by de the private respondent Ramon Sua the
Guzman were signed by petitioner at the remaining amount of P210,150.00 as
back without any indication as to how civil liability, is AFFIRMED.
she should be bound thereby and,
therefore, she is deemed to be an
indorser thereof. The Negotiable
Instruments Law clearly provides (19) EDGAR SADIO, petitioner, vs.
Hon. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
Sec. 17. Construction where instrument ANTIQUE, BRANCH 10, SIXTH
is ambiguous. Where the language of JUDICIAL REGION, San Jose, Antique,
the instrument is ambiguous, or there and BONIFACIO SANZ
are admissions therein, the following MACEDA, respondents. G.R. No.
rules of construction apply: . . . . (f) 94143 September 24, 1991 (walay
Where a signature is so placed upon the discussion sa Art. 29)
instrument that it is not clear in what
capacity the person making the same FACTS: Acting on a complaint to enjoin
intended to sign, he is deemed an the operation of the small town lottery
indorser. by the Province of Antique, the PCSO, the
Molitor Management Corporation and
herein petitioner Edgar Sadio, Judge 4. An order approving a notice of appeal
Maceda of the RTC Antique declared such can no longer be withdrawn.
lottery illegal and ordered MOLITOR and
Sadio in solidum to pay PCSO and the ISSUE: W/N petitioner is correct.
Province of Antique damages in the (ibutang lang nako tanang issue in case)
amount of P25,000,000.00.
HELD: NO. The petition must fail on all
On the basis of this order, Sadio filed counts.
before the MTC Antique, a criminal
complaint against Judge Maceda for
issuance of an unjust interlocutory order On the first issue, the pertinent provision
in violation of Article 206 of the RPC. is Section 6, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:

On March 27, Judge Ma. Monina Misajon


dismissed the complaint, holding that Sec. 6. Order to answer. If the
the challenged order of March 16, 1990, petition is sufficient in form and
clearly showed, contrary to the substance to justify such process, the
allegations of the complainant, that he court in which it is filed, or a judge
was accorded every opportunity to thereof, shall issue an order requiring
present his side before the order was the defendant or defendants to
issued. answer the petition within ten (10)
days from the receipt of a copy
thereof. Such order shall be served on
His motion for reconsideration having the defendants in such manner as the
been denied, Sadio filed a notice of court may direct, together with a
appeal, which was approved. However, copy of the petition, and to that effect
the judge issued an amendatory order the petitioner shag file sufficient
recalling the original order and copies thereof.
withdrawing her earlier approval of the
notice of appeal. Her reason was that the
offended party had no standing to The very first clause of this section
appeal from the dismissal of a criminal requires that the petition be sufficient in
complaint, this being the prerogative of form and substance before further action
the prosecutor. may be taken thereon by the court.
Lacking such sufficiency, as determined
by the court itself, the petition may be
Sadio's reaction was to file a petition for dismissed outright. It cannot be
certiorari and mandamus to reverse overstressed that the court is not obliged
Judge Misajons order of May 16, 1990. to waste its time on inadequate
This was dismiss by Judge Marvie R. pleadings that can only burden its docket
Abraham-Singson of the RTC Antique, for and impair the orderly administration of
insufficiency in form and substance. His justice. We ourselves have given short
MR was also denied. shrift to many a petition for non-
compliance with the procedural
The petitioner now comes to this Court requisites, for being uninteligible or
on certiorari, alleging that: clearly without legal basis, or for some
other similar shortcoming.
1. Judge Abraham-Singson could
not motu proprio dismiss the petition for As correctly noted by Judge Singson, a
certiorari and mandamus; certified true copy of the order of May
16, 1990, was not attached to the
2. Under the rule on summary procedure, petition, in disregard of the express
Judge Misajon could not legally dismiss requirement of Rule 65, Section 1, of the
the criminal complaint without the Rules of Court. That deficiency was by
counter-affidavit of the accused, itself alone adequate ground for
dismissal. Additionally, the petition
merely confined itself to a recital of the
3. The offended party in a criminal material facts and dates, followed by the
case has a right to appeal if the legal conclusion that Judge Misajon
case is dismissed; and committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the said order. No argument was
adduced, no jurisprudence cited, no law with the dismissal of the criminal charge.
or Rule of Court invoked to support that This averment is subject to qualification.
conclusion. It is clear that the petition
was also insufficient in substance and for The Court has held that acquittal in a
that additional if no less important criminal case does not bar continuation
reason deserved to be dismissed. of the civil case connected therewith
where: (1) the acquittal is based on
On the second issue, the applicable rule reasonable doubt; (2) the decision
is Section 10 of the Rule on Summary contains a declaration that the liability of
Procedure, reading as follows: the accused is not criminal but only
civil; or (3) the civil liability is not derived
Sec. 10. Duty of the court. On the from or based on the criminal act of
basis of the complaint or information which the accused is acquitted.
and the affidavits accompanying the
same, the court shall make a The case at bar does not come under
preliminary determination whether to any of the above exceptions. The
dismiss the case outright for being petitioner's criminal complaint alleged
patently without basis or merit, or to that Judge Maceda had issued the
require further proceeding to be interlocutory order in violation of Sadio's
taken. In the latter case, the court right to due process under Article III,
may set the case for immediate Section 1, of the Constitution. Judge
arraignment of an accused under Misajon declared in her order dismissing
custody, and if he pleads, may render the charge that Sadio was in fact given
judgment forthwith. If he pleads not the opportunity to be heard and offered
guilty, and in all other cases, the testimonial and documentary evidence,
court shall issue an order which (Judge Maceda) considered in
accompanied by copies of all issuing his order of March 16, 1990." In
affidavits submitted by complainant, finding that the petitioner had not been
directing the defendants to appear denied due process, Judge Misajon in
and submit his counter-affidavits and effect completely exonerated Judge
those of his witnesses at a specified Maceda and thus also extinguished the
date not later than ten (10) days from civil action connected with the criminal
receipt thereof. case.

While it is true that Judge Maceda did not In this situation, the petitioner could not
submit his counter-affidavit as required have, as a mere complaining witness,
in the order of Judge Misajon dated appealed the dismissal of the criminal
March 23, 1990, Judge Misajon declared action even on its civil aspect only. The
in her order dismissing the criminal civil action was deemed dismissed with
complaint that she had received and the criminal action. The criminal aspect
considered the order of Judge Maceda of the order could have been appealed
dated March 23, 1990, in Civil Case No. since double jeopardy had not yet
2405, entitled "Rolly R. Mijares v. attached because the accused had not
Province of Antique, et al." She treated yet been arraigned. But only the
this as the respondent judge's counter- prosecutor could have done this because
affidavit required in the aforecited rule. he had complete direction and control of
We agree that this was sufficient the prosecution of the case, as we have
compliance with the said rule. Judge held in several cases. No appeal having
Maceda's defense against the criminal been filed by him, the order of dismissal
charge was after all embodied in that became final and unappealable after the
order and it would have been a useless lapse of the reglementary 15-day period.
formality to simply reproduce it as a
counter-affidavit. The above ruling renders the fourth issue
irrelevant or moot. Not having the right
On the third issue, the petitioner's to appeal, the petitioner cannot invoke
contention is that since he had not his notice of appeal on April 27, 1990, or
waived or reserved his right to file the protest the withdrawal of its approval by
civil action arising from the criminal Judge Misajon on May 16, 1990. The
charge, his right to appeal from the civil notice of appeal should not have been
aspect of the case was not extinguished approved in the first place, and the recall
of the order of May 16, 1990, was issued ISSUE: May the petitioner still file for civil action?
only to rectify the error. The rectification
was a valid act. In any event, neither the HELD: YES.
notice of appeal nor its initial approval
would have been effectual because of Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.13 Such civil liability may
the petitioner's lack of legal standing to consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and
prosecute the appeal. indemnification of consequential damages. When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three
We do not deal here with the merits of notable exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly
the order of Judge Maceda dated March waives the right to recover damages from the
accused; second, when the offended party reserves his right
16, 1990, declaring the small town to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in
lottery conducted in the Province of order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his
Antique illegal and enjoining its cause; and third, when the injured party actually exercises the
right to maintain a private suit against the offender by
continued operation. That order is still instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
under motions for reconsideration that
remain unresolved to date. It is not Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a
challenged in this petition. We here limit separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by
ourselves to the issues raised in the Sibayan. On account of this reservation the MCTC did not
make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.
proceedings at bar as above discussed Although there were allegations of negligence on the part of
and resolved, and only to those issues. Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean
that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on
quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended
party has the choice between an action to enforce liability
(20) arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an
action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise


to 2 separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender,i.e. (1)
civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC; and
(21) SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA (2)independent civil liabilities (a) not arising from an act or
C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA omission complained of as a felony,e.g., culpa contractual or
LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
LEONARDO FERRER, Petitioners, vs. HON. intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana
NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured
of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M party is granted a right to file an action independent and
SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION distinct from the criminal proceedings.
COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q.
RONDARIS, President/Chairman, Respondent. While the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005 prescribed, petitioners can still pursue the remaining avenue
opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause
of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the
DECISION action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action
to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the
latter action had been expressly reserved.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to felony ,final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily
answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to liable if the commission of the crime was in discharge of the
be malicious. duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the
RPC operates the controlling force to obviate the possibility of
the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text
of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.

FACTS: In April 1994, Viron Transit driver Sibayan was J.


charged with reckless imprudence resulting to multiple
homicide and multiple physical injuries for which Sibayan was
eventually convicted in December 1998. As there was a Article 31. When the civil action is
reservation to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of based on an obligation not arising from
civil liability was made by the MCTC. In October 2000 Santos
filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan and Rondaris, the act or omission complained of as a
the president and chairman of Viron Transit. Viron Transit felony, such civil action may proceed
moved for the dismissal of the complaint citing, among others, independently of the criminal
prescription alleging that actions based on quasi delict
prescribe in 4 years from the accrual of the cause of action. proceedings and regardless of the result
of the latter.
After the acquittal of Arceo the
Provincial Fiscal filed Civil Case No. V-
(22) THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 3339 for the recovery of the total sum of
(CAPIZ AGRICULTURAL AND FISHERY P13,790.71 which represented the
SCHOOL), petitioner, vs. HON. SILVESTRE accountability of Arceo due to his
BR. BELLO, Presiding Judge of Branch II, failure to issue official receipts and to
Court of First Instance of Capiz and immediately deposit said funds with the
ROMEO A. ARCEO, respondents. G.R. National Treasury, and instead spent the
No. L-34906 January 27, 1983 said funds or disbursed them without
complying with the requirements
applicable to disbursements of public
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, in funds, with intent to defraud the
behalf of the Capiz Agricultural and government. Arceo through counsel,
Fishery School, takes his appeal from an filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in
order of the respondent Court of First the said civil case alleging, among
Instance of Capiz dismissing Civil Case others, that the petitioner, as plaintiff
No. V-3339 which it filed against private therein, had no cause of action against
respondent Romeo A. Arceo for the him inasmuch as "the cause of action
recovery of the amount representing his had been decided in a prior judgment."
alleged liability to the government in
connection with his employment as
Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Arceo relies on the provision of Section
said school. 3(c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
which reads as follows:
Private respondent Arceo in his
aforementioned capacity, was charged in (c) Extinction of the penal action does
Criminal Case No. CCC-XI-39 for not carry with it extinction of the civil,
malversation of public funds in the unless the extinction proceeds from a
amount of P6,619.34 which he declaration in a final judgment that the
supposedly failed to produce or to make fact from which the civil might arise did
proper accounting thereof after repeated not exist. In other cases, the person
demands. After due trial, the respondent entitled to the civil action may institute it
court rendered a decision acquitting in the jurisdiction and in the manner
Arceo. provided by law against the person who
may be liable for restitution of the thing
and reparation or indemnity for the
It ruled that the undisputed facts spread damage suffered.
before the court clearly and
unmistakably show lack of criminal
intent on accused's part in not issuing ISSUE: WON the acquittal of Arceo in
official receipts for his collections and the criminal case bars the filing of the
disbursements; absence of proof that the civil action against him? NO, the
accused benefited personally from his acquittal is not a bar to the civil action.
disbursements nor has it been shown
that he was inexcusably negligent in the HELD: We uphold the stand of the
administration of public funds and petitioner. An examination of the
properties entrusted to his care; nor has decision in the criminal case reveals
it been shown and proven that the these findings of the respondent court:
government suffered damage or
prejudice as the accused's 1. All the foregoing expenses and
disbursements were for the benefit of disbursements were never overthrown
the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery by the prosecution. All that the
School; that the funds claimed to be government prosecutor tried to show
missing in the amount of P6,619.34 is was this the whole of what the accused
not really missing for the accused did in disbursing the funds covered by
demonstrated that said amounts were the vales, chits, cash invoices, etc., etc.,
spent for and in the interest of the Capiz were not in accordance with auditing
Agricultural and Fishery School as shown rules and regulations. There is no doubt
by the numerous chits, vouchers, vales, about this. The accused practically
etc., presented in Court. brushed aside and ignored all guidelines
enunciated by the General Auditing
Office regarding disbursement of sought to be recovered in the civil action
government funds. totalled P13,790.70.

2. From what has been shown by the The latter amount included the five
accused, his failure to record his items involved in the criminal action, as
collections, was for a good purpose and well as the additional sum of P7,170.31
not to defraud the government. He kept representing the income of the school
the cash collections in his possession in from its various projects for which the
order that he may have the ready accused failed to issue official receipts.
amount to spend for emergency needs of At least insofar as the recovery of the
the school This might be against the aforesaid amount is concerned,
instructions to him or offensive to rules therefore, the private respondent cannot
and regulations of the General Auditing place in defense his acquittal in the
Office but it is patent that criminal intent criminal action which did not involve said
cannot be inferred from such actuation. amount.

3. As the Court looks at the matter WHEREFORE, the order of the


before it, the evidence of the prosecution respondent court dismissing Civil Case
is not enough to establish the guilt of the No.V-3339 is hereby REVERSED and SET
accused as it opens an avenue leading to ASIDE. The motion to dismiss filed by the
a belief that the accused might be private respondent shall be deemed
innocent. The evidence presented by the DENIED.
State did not remove the possibility that
Romeo Arceo might not be guilty of the
offense charged.
(23) HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG,
4. According to the respondent court SR., petitioners, vs. HONORABLE
itself, it was admitted by Arceo that he FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA,
did not post his collections in his books PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.
of account nor deposited them with the and ROMEO VILLA Y
National Treasury as required by the CUNANAN, respondents. G.R. No. L-
rules and regulations. Worse, he 50959 July 23, 1980
disbursed them without prior approval of
the Auditor.
FACTS: On September 25, 1974, the
petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr.,
Hence, the decision did not absolve namely: Crisanta Salazar, Pedro Tayag,
Arceo or free him from responsibility Jr., Renato Tayag, Gabriel Tayag, Corazon
insofar as his accountability as Cashier Tayag and Rodolfo Tayag, filed with the
and Disbursing Officer is concerned. The CFI Tarlac, presided over by the
acquittal, in the words of the trial court, respondent Judge, a complaint for
was because "The evidence of the damages (civil case) against the private
prosecution is not enough to establish respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
the guilt of the accused as it opens an Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan, alleging
avenue leading to a belief that the that in the afternoon of September 2,
accused might be innocent." Indeed, the 1974, while Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on
dispositive portion of the decision in the a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at
criminal case did not state that the facts Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac on his way
upon which his responsibility as an home, he was bumped and hit by a
accountable officer is based were non- Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No.
existent. Instead it expressly and 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74,
categorically declares that his acquittal driven by Romeo Villa, as a result of
was upon the finding that "the evidence which he sustained injuries which caused
of the prosecution was not sufficient to his instantaneous death.
establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
The private respondents filed a motion to
suspend the trial dated April 30, 1975,
It is also to be noted that while the on the ground that the criminal
subject-matter of the malversation case case against the driver of the bus Romeo
was the amount of P6,619.34, the sum Villa was still pending in said court, and
that Section 3, Rule Ill of the Revised felony in a criminal case, but one based
Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of on an obligation arising from other
the civil action until the criminal action is sources, like quasi delict.
terminated. The respondent Judge
granted the motion, and consequently, In the case at bar, the allegations of the
suspended the hearing of Civil Case. complaint clearly show that petitioners'
cause of action was based upon a quasi
On October 25, 1977, the respondent delict. Thus, the complaint alleged
Judge rendered a decision in the Criminal among others:
Case acquitting the accused Romeo Villa
of the crime of homicide on the ground xxxxxxxxx
of reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the
private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the Civil Case on the ground that 4. That on September 2, 1974, at
the petitioners have no cause of action about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon at
against them the driver of the bus Sitio Pag-asa, Bo. San Rafael Tarlac,
having been acquitted in the criminal Tarlac, along MacArthur Highway and
action. The petitioners opposed the while riding on a bicycle on his way
motions alleging that their cause of home to Bo. San Sebastian, Tarlac,
action is not based on crime but Tarlac, Pedro Tayag, Sr. was bumped
on quasi-delict. and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus
bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No.
YL 604 PUB '74 and as result of which
The respondent Judge dismissed the he sustained physical injuries which
complaint in the Civil Case. The cause his instantaneous death and
petitioners moved to the bicycle he was riding on was
reconsider; however, the same was damaged and destroyed;
denied by respondent Judge. Hence, this
petition for certiorari, to annul and set
aside the order of respondent Judge 5. That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ...
dated April 13, 1977, claiming that the was at the time of the accident being
respondent Judge acted without or in driven by defendant Romeo Villa y
excess of his jurisdiction and for with Cunanan in a faster and greater
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the speed than what was reasonable and
disputed order, and that there is no proper and in a gray negligent,
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in careless, reckless and imprudent
the ordinary course of law except thru manner, without due regards to
the present petition. injuries to persons and damage to
properties and in violation of traffic
rules and regulations;
ISSUE: W/N the respondent Judge
acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse 6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit
of discretion in dismissing Civil Case Bus Lines Inc. has failed to exercise
No. 5114. the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and
supervision of its employees,
HELD: YES. The petition is meritorious. particularly defendant Romeo Villa y
Cunanan otherwise the accident in
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides: question which resulted in the death
of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his
Art. 31. When the civil action is based property would not have occurred.
on an obligation not arising from the
act or commission complained of as a xxxxxxxxx
felony. such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal All the essential averments for a quasi
proceedings and regardless of the delictual action are present, namely: (1)
result of the latter. an act or omission constituting fault or
negligence on the part of private
Evidently, the above quoted provision of respondent; (2) damage caused by the
the CC refers to a civil action based, not said act or commission; (3) direct causal
on the act or omission charged as a relation between the damage and the
act or commission; and (4) no pre- K. VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
existing contractual relation between the RIGHTS
parties.
Article 32. Any public officer or
In the case of Elcano vs. Hill, this Court employee, or any private individual, who
held that: directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or
... a separate civil action lies against impairs any of the following rights and
the offender in a criminal act, liberties of another person shall be liable
whether or not he is criminality to the latter for damages:
prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended (1) Freedom of religion;
party is not snowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to receiver (2) Freedom of speech;
damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to
the bigger award of the two, (3) Freedom to write for the press or to
assuming the awards made in the maintain a periodical publication;
two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal
in Par. (e), Section 3, Rule III, refers detention;
exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, (5) Freedom of suffrage;
whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only
(6) The right against deprivation of
and not as a crime is not
property without due process of law;
extinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not (7) The right to a just compensation
been committed by the accused. when private property is taken for public
Briefly stated, We here hold, in use;
reiteration of Garcia that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and (8) The right to the equal protection of
negligent acts which may be the laws;
punishable by law.
(9) The right to be secure in one's
The petitioners' cause of action being person, house, papers, and effects
based on a quasi delict the acquittal of against unreasonable searches and
the driver, private respondent Romeo seizures;
Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal
Case No. 836 is not a bar to the (10) The liberty of abode and of
prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for changing the same;
damages based on quasi-delict.
(11) The privacy of communication and
In the light of the foregoing, We hold that correspondence;
respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. (12) The right to become a member of
5114. associations or societies for purposes
not contrary to law;
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal
should be, as it is hereby set aside, and (13) The right to take part in a
the case is remanded to the lower court peaceable assembly to petition the
for further proceedings, with costs Government for redress of grievances;
against the private respondents.
(14) The right to be a free from
involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against


excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard
by himself and counsel, to be informed
of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to


be a witness against one's self, or from
being forced to confess guilt, or from
being induced by a promise of immunity
or reward to make such confession,
except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or


cruel and unusual punishment, unless
the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not
been judicially declared unconstitutional;
and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this


article, whether or not the defendant's
act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right
to commence an entirely separate and
distinct civil action for damages, and for
other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted),
and may be proved by a preponderance
of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral


damages. Exemplary damages may also
be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not


demandable from a judge unless his act
or omission constitutes a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.

(24)

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