/';-=09 )(8*=-0/']

11:58:55 AM
 viveri um

A JOURNAL FOR MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND

THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES
REVUE CONSACRE LA PHILOSOPHIE MDIVALE ET
LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE DU MOYEN GE
ZEITSCHRIFT FR PHILOSOPHIE UND GEISTES LEBEN
IM MITTELALTER

VOLUME 7, 1969

ory>

VAN GORCUM - ASSEN - NETHERLANDS

Reprinted with permission of

Van Gorcum, Assen by

SWETS & ZEITLINGER B.V.

LISSE - 1985

11:58:55 AM
VlVARIUm

A JOURNAL FOR MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND

THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES

editors C. J.de Vogel,(Utrecht) - J.Engels,

- L. M. de Rijk,(Nijmegen)
(Utrecht).
Secretary Board:Prof.L. M.deRijk,Sophiaweg
oftheEditorial 73,
Nijmegen, TheNetherlands.
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11:58:55 AM
CONTENTS OF VOLUME VII

ROGER E. FurtherEvidencefor the Irish Origin of Honorius

REYNOLDS Augustodunensis i
Ottawa

L. M. de rij K On The GenuineTextof Peterof Spain's Summqle

Nijmegen logicales III 8

j. ENGELS La Lettre-ddicace
de Bersuire
PierredesPrs ... 62
Utrecht

J. ENGELS Note Complmentaire

sur les ManuscritsBerchoriens
Utrech
t Worehester 73

STANLEY B. AlbertusMagnus and The Problemof Moral Virtue 81

CUNNINGHAM
Windsor
, Ontario

L. M. DE'RijK On The GenuineTextof Peterof Spain s Summule

Nijmegen logicales IV i2o

REVIEWS 79

BOOKS RECEIVED 79, 163

11:58:55 AM
 Further Evidence for the Irish Origin of
Honorius Augustodunensis

ROGER E. REYNOLDS

best known but most enigmatictwelfth-century pupil of Anselm

of
The Canterbury was Honorius Augustodunensis.Despite theimmensity
of his literarycorpus and its almost immediate popularity, this
disciple of Anselm chose to shroud the geographicalconnectionsin his
life with the mysterious'Augustodunensis.'. Since thereis no direct
reference in his writings to Autun, students of early scholasticism
have for the most part placed the 'Autun' in quotation marks and
have sought geographic localities far removed from Autun in which
to situate Honorius. Among the localities most often mentioned are
Anselm's school at Canterburyand the Schottenklosterat Regensburg.1
In one of the more recent books in which the career of Honorius
is treated,ProfessorR W. Southernarguesthatthereis no real evidence
to connect Honorius with eitherCanterburyor Regensburg.2Although
not denying^that Honorius may have been at either or both of these
places, Professor Southern proffersthe tantalizing suggestion that
Honorius may have been the last of the ancient and honorable line of
wanderingscholarmonksof Ireland. In support of his view Professor
Southern adduces informationgiven him by ProfessorAubrey Gwynn
showing that several of the doctrines found in the works of Honorius
bear strikingresemblanceto doctrinesfoundin Irishsources of his time.
ProfessorSouthernalso suggeststhat furtherexaminationmay turn up
other Irishisms.The purpose of this note is to bring to light another
Irishismin Honorius' work.
In one of his shorter tracts, the Sacramentarium seu de causis et
1 J.A. Endres,
HonoriusAugustodunensis: zurGeschichte
Beitrag desGeistigen
LebensimXIIJahrhundert
(Kempten andMunich: 1906),6-1; E. M.Sanibrd,
Honorius andScholasticus
, Presbyter , Speculum,
23(1948),397-42$; Honorius
R. Bauerreiss, vonCanterbury ) undKuno
(Augustodunensis /,derRaiten-
bucher,
Bischofvon (n 26-36),
Regensburg StudienundMitteilungen zurGeschichtedesBenedictiner
Ordens, SeealsoAppendix
67(1956),306-313. , below,
p. 7.
2 R.W.Southern,Saint andhisBiographer
Anselm (Cambridge: 1963),21$.SeealsoAppendix
, below,
P-7.
I

11:59:02 AM
 mjsticortuumdiviniin ecclesiaofficiiliber, Honorius presentsa
signifcatu
brief description of the various sacraments.1When he arrives at het
sacrament of orders, he, like many of his contemporarysentence
collectors, describesthe ecclesiasticalofficesby usingexcerptsfromthe
early medieval Ordinals of Christ,2 the writingsof Isidore of Seville,
and the Liberojpcialis of Amalariusof Metz.3 The Ordinals of Christ,
which had no establishedformin the Middle Ages, were brieflistsof the
ecclesiastical grades ordered according to a prearrangedsequence with
events in Christ's life attached as sanctions. During the early Middle
Ages the Ordinals, whose originscan be traced to patristictimes,*were
s
perpetuatedand popularized throughIrish sources.
To the time of Ivo of Chartres(f ca 1117) the two most popular
formsof the Ordinalsof Christwere the "AncientHibernianChronolog-
ical Version," as found in the famousBobbioMissal, and the "Hiberno-
Hispanic Hierarchical Version," found in the Irish canonical Collectio
Hibernensis:

Hibernian
[Ancient Chronological [Hiberno- Hierarchical
Hispanic Version]
Version]
Quandovel comodoinplebetdominus De gradibusin quibusChristus
adfuit.
septem in
gradibus eclesiam.
Primusgradusleturfuitquandoaperuit Ostiarius
fuit, ostiainferni.
quandoaperuit
lebrumisage proveteet dixit spiritus
domini
supervenit.
quandoeiecitseptemdemonia
quandoeiecet Exorcista
Secundusgradusexurcesta
dimoniam
septem ex maria
magdalene. de maria
magdalena.

1 PL172: 737-806. According toEndres, op.cit.,40,onlyV. ThalhoferinhisHandbuch derkatho-

lischen
Liturgik(Freiburg: 1883),72,hasdenied that
Honorius wastheauthoroftheSacramentarium.
2 PL172:79D-760A.
3 Thepassage with theincipit,"Ostiariuscumordinatur . . andtheexplicit, "... sedpro
qualitateoperum diversae mansiones" (Cap. xxiv; PL 172: 760A-D) extracts
contains from:
Isidore'sEtymologies (L. VII,c. 12; PL82: 290-293); perhaps thePs.-AlcuinianLiberdedivinis
(Cap.xxxvi
ojficiis ; PL101:1234-1236) orthe'Bede'Collectanea(PL94: 4);Amalarius* Liber
(L. II, cc. 7-14;J.M. Hanssens,
ojfcialis ed.,Amalarii , Opera
Episcopi Omnia
Liturgica , II, Liber
ocialis[Studie Testi, 139:Vatican: 1948],21^-236);andHonorius' ownGemma Animae (L. I,
c. 183; PI 172: 600).
4 A. Wilmart, Lesordres duChrist, Revuedessciences , 3 (1923),320-327;J.Crehan,
religieuses
TheSeven Orders ofChrist, Theological 19(19^8),81-93.
Studies,
s Thesources anddevelopment oftheOrdinals ofChristhavebeentreated extensivelyinR.E.
Reynolds, Sacred Ordersinthe
Early Middle
Ages: inthe
Shifts ofthe
Theology LowerandHigherEcclesiastical
Orders
from LatePatristic Through
Antiquity theEarlyMiddleAges intheOrdinals
asReflected ofChristand
RelatedLiterature(Ph.D. Thesis: Harvard University,Cambridge, Mass.:1968),61-19$.
2

11:59:02 AM
Terciusgradussubdiiaconatus
quandofecet Lectorquandoaperuit librum Esaiae.
diaquamvinum ingalilea.
Quartusgradusdiiacunatus quandolavit Subdiaconus,quandofecitvinum de aqua
pedesdixipolurum. in canagalileae.
Quintusgraduspresbeteratum quando Diaconus, quando lavitpedesdiscipulorum.
acepitpanem etbenedixithac seme-
fregit
ieteretcalecembenedixit.
Sextusgradus quandodixittulete Sacerdos,
ostiarios quandoaccepitpanemac fregit
vestriet elevamini
portasprincipis purte et benedixit.
rexgloriae.
etintroibit
purteeternales
Septemusgradusepiscopus quandoelevavit Episcopusfuit,quandoelevavit
'inanus
manus supercaputdixipolurum suorum et suas ad coelumet benedixitapostclis.2
eus.1
benedixit

The Ancient Hibernian Chronological Version was characterized

by the orderingof the ecclesiastical grades according to the historical
or scripturallydocumented sequence in which Christdischargedthem.
The grades in the Hiberno-Hispanic Hierarchical Version - for our
-
purposesthe more important were arrangedaccordingto the sequence
in which, at the time of the Ordinal's composition, clerics ideally or
actuallypassedfromgrade to grade.3The mostpatentdifferencebetween
the two sequences is the positionassignedto the hostiarius
. In the Ancient
Hibernian Chronological Version, he is listed immediatelybefore the
bishop, and n the Hiberno-HispanicHierarchical Version, he has been
demoted' to his proper hierarchicalstatus. Further,it is importantto
note the relative positions of the exorcist and lector. In the Ancient
Hibernian Chronological Version the lector precedes the exorcist,
probablybecause Christ'historically'fulfilledthegradesin thatsequence.
But in the Hiberno-HispanicHierarchicalVersion,the lector followsthe
exorcist. Unlike the Gallican and Roman sequence of lower orders,
4
typifiedin the Statutaecclesiaeantiqua and the intersticestexts of the
1 Paris
BNMSLat.13246, fol.293r-v. E. A. Lowe,ed.,TheBobbio Missal:AGallicanMass-Book
(MSParis Latin13246)(London: 1920),178.The"Ancient Hibernian Chronological of
Version"
thisnotecorrespondstoWilmart's 'A' recension.Cf.Wilmart, art.cit.,311-312.
2 Collectio L. VIII,c.l. Dieirische
Hibernensisy , ed.,H. Wasserschieben,
Kanonensammlung 2nded.,
(Leipzig:i88$),26. The"Hiberno-Hispanic Hierarchical
Version" corresponds to Wilmart's
'D' recension.
Cf.Wilmart, art.cit.,313.
3 On thedistinctionbetween theactual andidealecclesiastical
cursushonorum, cf.M. Andrieu,
Lesordres
mineurs dans
l'ancienritromain , Reveu dessciencesreligieuses,
g (1925),232-274;and
M. Andrieu,Lacarrire despapes
ecclsiastique , Revuedessciences 21(1947),90-120.
religieuses,
4 Statuta
ecclesiae , cc. 93-98;Ch.Munier,
antiqua ed.,LesStatuta
ecclesiae dition-tudes
antiqua:
(Paris:i960),96-99.
critiques
3

11:59:02 AM
Constitutum the apocryphalCounciloj 275 Bishops
Silvestri,1 ,2 and the Liber
,3
Ponticalis the exorcist of the Hiberno-Hispanic Hierarchical Version
has been placed lower than the lector, the same sequence as is foundin
the works of Isidore.4 Given the heavy use of Isidore in the Collectio
s
, this hierarchicalstructureis not surprising,
Hibernensis
From the seventh to the mid-eleventhcentury changes of two
kinds were occurringin the Ordinals of Christ. First, a few dominical
sanctionsand episodes attached to each grade were added. Second, and
of more importance,thereappeared a sequential innovationin the ninth
centuryin the Hiberno-HispanicHierarchical Version. The position of
the exorcistand lector was reversedto make themconformto the Galli-
can or Roman sequence.6 This new "Hiberno-Gallican Chronological
Version" together with the older Ancient Hibernian Chronological
Version and the Hiberno-Hispanic Hierarchical Version were, to the
time of Ivo, the most popular formsof the Ordinals of Christ.
With Ivo of Chartres a new battery of dominical sanctions and
episodeswas introducedinto the Ordinalsof Christ. In Ivo' s De excellentia
sacrorumordinumet de vita ordinandorum in synodohabitus7these new
sanctionswere attachedto the old Romano-Gallican sequence of grades,
includingthe acolyte, which Ivo had enumeratedand described in his
systematicdiscussion of orders. Isolated fromthe De excellentia the text
of the Ivonian Ordinal of Christreads:

1 PL8 : 838.
2 PL8 : 826.
3 L. Duchesne, ed.,Liber , I (Paris:1886),161,171-172,
Ponticalis 190.
*IntheDeecclesiasticis (L. II,cc. 10-1
ojficiis ; PL83 : 790-794), Isidoreliststhelower grades
according tothedescending sequence : subdeacon,lector, psalmist,exocist,acolyte, In
hostiarius.
(L. VII,c.xii,3-32; PL82 : 290-293),
theEtymologies Isidoreusestwosequences oflower grades.
Inthesimple listofgrades inL. VII,c.xii,3,thesequence is: hostiarius
, psalmist, exorcist,
lector,
acolyte, subdeacon.Inthemoreextended etymological treatment ofthelowerorders (L. VII,
c.xii,23-32),Isidorereturns tothesequence oftheDeecclesiasticis with
ojficiisy only theexorcist
andacolyte reversed.ThusinboththeDeecclesiasticis andtheetymological
ojficiis treatmentofthe
grades inEtymologies
, L. VII,c.xii,23-32, the'Hispanic' sequence isusedinwhich theexorcistis
listedina position lower
hierarchically thanthelector. Ontheunusual positionoftheacolyte in
Isidore'sworks, cf.W. Croce,Dieniederen Weihenundihre hierarchische
Wertung fr
, Zeitschrift
katholischeTheologie,70(1948),282f.
s Cf.H. Wasserschieben, op.cit.
, 3-27.
6 Cf.Leiden MSLat.Voss. Q119in40,fol.13ir.SeealsoAppendix , below, p. 7.
7 PL 162: 513-519. OntheIvonian authorship ofthissermon, cf.L. Fischer,Ivovon , der
Chartres
Erneuererder
vitacanonica inFestgabe
inFrankreich A.Knpfler : 1917),77; E. Amann
(Freiburg-i-Br.
andL. Guizard, dethologie
Dictionnaire , XV,2 (Paris:1950),
catholique col.3633; andR.Sprandel,
Ivovon und
Chartres seine inderKirchengeschichte
Stellung 1962),181.
(Stuttgart:
4

11:59:02 AM
 [IvonianVersion]
Haecofficia septem gradibus suntdistincta, quia
sanctaecclesiaseptiformis gratiae estmuere decorata.
Haecofficia inpropria persona Dominus noster ostendit
et ecclesiaesuaeexhibenda reliquit,utforma quae
praecesserat incapiterepraesentaretur incorpore.
(Ostiarius) Hoc officium Dominus noster nobisinitiavit
quandoflagello de funiculis factovendentes et ementes
de templo eiecitet cathedras nummulariorum evertit
lindeet ipseostiarius praetaxatus dixit:Egosumostium;
permesi quisintroierit, ingredietur et egredietur.
( Lector
) Hoc officium Dominus noster inpropria persona
ostendit, quandoinmedioseniorm librum Isaiaeprophetae
aperiens distincte ad intelligendum legit: Spiritus domini
superme, et caetera quae in eodem sequuntur capitulo.
(Exorcista) Hocofficio ususestDominus quandosaliva
suatetigit auressurdiet mutiet dixit: Epheta, quod
estadaperire.
(Acolytus) Hocofficium Dominus se haberetestatur, in
evangelio dicens : Egosumluxmundi ; quisequitur menon
ambulabit intenebris, sedhabebit lumenvitae.
(Subdiaconus) Hoc officio ususestDominus quandofacta
cenacumdiscipulis linteose praecinxit et mittens aquam
inpelvim pedesdiscipulorum lavitet linteoextersit.
(Diaconus)Hoc officio ususestDominus quandopostcenam
proprio ore et propriis manibus sacramenta confecta dispen-
savi et quandoapostolos dormientes ad orationem incitavit
dicens : Vigilate et orate,ne intretis in tentationem.
(Presbyter) Hoc officiousus est Dominus noster Iesus
Christus quandopostcenampanemetvinum incorpuset
sanguinem suumcommutavit et utinmemoriam suaepassionis
idemfacerent discipulis suis ordinavit. Hoc etiam mani-
festiuset excellentius officium implevit quando idem ipse
sacerdos et hostiaseipsum inaracrucispropter peccata
humani generis obtulit et perproprium sanguinem sancta
aeterna introiens caelestiaet terrestria pacificavit.

Thanks to the wide dispersion of the De excellentiaand its inclusion in

the De sacramentisof Hugh of Saint Victor1 and Peter Lombard's Senten-
tiae,2 the Ivonian Ordinal of Christ with its dominical sanctions and

1 P. III,cc.6-12;PL176: 423-430.
2 L. IV,dist.xxiv,cc. -11;Petrus Libri
Lombardus, , I andII (AdClaras
IVSententiarum Aquas:
1916),894-901.
S

11:59:02 AM
sequence of orders became dominant in high scholastic treatiseson
sacred orders.
During the period between the composition of Ivo's Ordinal of
of Hugh of Saint Victor,1
Christ and its inclusion in the De sacramentis
several Ordinals appeared in which pre-Ivonianand Ivoniancomponents
were mixed. One of these composite Ordinals is foundin the Sacramen-
tariumof Honorius:

[Honorius Augustodunensis]
Qui ordinanturChristo incorporantur.
sicutdicit:Egosumostium;
Ipsefuitostiarius,
permesi quisintroierit,huicostiariusaperit.
Exorcista
, extitit
quando daemonia expulit.
LectoreratquandoEsaiamlegerat.
Acolythus fueratquandolumen caecis et
reddebat
dixit:Egosumluxmundi.
Subdiaconus quandoaquasconvertit invinum.
Diaconus quandolavitpedesdiscipulorum.
Presbyter quandodeditcorpussuum.
Episcopus quandobenedixit eis.2

Given the popularityof Ivo' s De excellentiaand its Ordinal of Christ

in early twelfth-century sentence collections,3 it is not surprisingthat
two Ivoniancomponentswere added by Honorius, the Ego sumostiumof
and theEgosumluxmundiforthe acolyte. Moreover, thereis
thehostiarius
reflectedin the 'demonia' of the exorcist a traditionfound in the
Ordinal of Christused by the Norman Anonymous*and in the Lumen
caecis reddebatof the acolyte a tradition found in both the Norman
Anonymousand in the School of Laon.5
The most strikingfeature of Honorius' Ordinal of Christ is its

1 D. vandenEynde, etla datedescrits

surla succession
Essai deHuguesdeSaint-Victor
(Spicilegium
Athenaei
Pontificii 13: Rome:i960),100-103,
Antoniani, places oftheDesacramentis
thecomposition
between 1131and1137.Wilmart, art.cit.,319,dates ofHonorius'
thecomposition Sacramentarium
totheyears112^-i130.
2 PL172:79D-76OA.
3 E.g.,early
inthetwelfth
century theDeexcellentia Ivo'sname,
, without intheSententiae
appeared
A.Cf.Vat.Lat.4361, fol.114.V-120V.
Magisti
* Cambridge
CorpusChristi
CollegeMSLat.415,p. 119.
s Ibid:Oxford
Bodleian
LibraryMSLaud.Misc. citedinO. Lottin,
216, fol.134.ra, et
Psychologie
moraleauxXlleetXHIe V (Gembloux:
sicles, 1959),271.
6

11:59:02 AM
dependenceon the archaicHiberno-HispanicHierarchicalVersion,going
back to the CollectioHibernensis.With a few minorvariantsthe dominical
sanctionsfor the lector, subdeacon, and deacon are almost identical in
the Sacramentariumand the HibernianHierarchicalversions.Further,the
bishop's sanction in Honorius' Sacramentariummaywell be an abbreviation
of that found in the Hibernian versions. Finally, and most important,
Honorius uses the sequence of the lower orders foundin the Hiberno-
Hispanic Hierarchical Version with the lector listed hierarchically
superior to the exorcist. This archaism in the sequence of the grades
is extremelyunusual in a period in which almost all tracts on orders
had been structuredaround the Romano-Gallican sequence of lower
orders: hostiarius, lector, exorcist, and acolyte.
Certainly cannot be claimed that the older Hiberno-Hispanic
it
HierarchicalVersionhad expired by the late eleventhcentury.Copies of
the CollectioHibernensis with its ancient Ordinal of Christ continued to
be made in scriptoria throughoutEurope.1 Further,the ancientHiberno-
Hispanic Hierarchical Ordinal of Christ was reproduced as a separate
piece in many florilegia.2Nonetheless, the appearance of the ancient
formsof the IrishOrdinals of Christin the works of one of the twelfth-
centurymoderniis an anomaly worthyof notice. This Irishismin the
Sacramentarium is then, perhaps, another piece of evidence to bolster
Professor Southern's surmise concerning the Irish connections of
Anselm's most famousdisciple.
CarletonUniversity
Ottawa, Canada.
1 Cf.Wasserschieben,
op.cit.,ix-lxxvi. 2 E.g.Berne MSLat.702,fol.2v.
Brgerbibliothek

APPENDIX
ad p. i , n. 1: Ina thesis recentlydefended attheEcoledesChartes, theargument has
beenmadethatHonorius didindeedspendsometimeat Saint-Martin ofAutun andthat
thissojournaccounts forsomeofthepeculiarFrench notions
presented in Honorius'
works.Cf.Marie-Odile Garrigues,Honorius etla Summa
Augustodunensis Gloria, reported
in Positionsdesthses, coleNationaledesChartes(Paris:1967),39-46.
ad p. i, n. 2: Garrigues, op.cit.,40, surmisesthatHonoriusmaywellhavebeenborn
in Ireland, educated in Canterbury,andthenbecome'un europen du Xllesicle'in
hiswanderings on theContinent.
ad p. 4, n. 6: Ina forthcoming article intheHarvard Review
Theological , "AFlorilegium
on the Ecclesiastical Gradesin Clm19414: Testimony to Ninth-Century Clerical
Instruction," I shallbe describing a groupofninth-century Ordinalsof Christin the
Hiberno-Hispanic HierarchicalVersion.

11:59:02 AM
 On The Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's

Summule logicales

L. M. DE RIJK

III Two Redactions of a Commentaryupon the Summuleby Robertus

Anglicus*

his academic conference about a number of manuscriptswhich

In contain works of Peter of Spain1Msgr Grabmannpointed to a master
named Robertus Anglicusas a commentatorof the Summulelogicales.
Grabmannidentified2thismasterwith Robert Kilwardby,who is named
RobertusAnglicus , indeed, in the Chronicle of the Dominican Conventof
Bologna3 and in some manuscriptsas well4. However, thisidentification
seems to be far from certain. Both manuscripts(Vatican Library Vat.
Lat. 3049 and Todi, BibliotecaComunale , MS 54; see below) call the
author Robertus Anglicus without frater.Therefore one mightthinkof the
composition of these commentariesas havingtaken place at some date
before Robert Kilwardby's entrance into the Dominican Order. A
modern investigatorinto Kilwardby* s life and works, the late father
* Thefirstandsecond parts ofthisstudy appeared inthisJournal,6 (1968),pp.1-34and69-101 .
1 Martin Grabmann, Forschungen
Handschriftliche undFunde zudenPhilosophischen desPetrus
Schriften
, desspteren
Hispanus Papstes
JohannesXXI(f 1277)in: Sitzungsberichte derBayerischen
Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Philos. Hist.Abt.Jahrgang 1936,Heft 9, Mnchen 1936,pp.65-67.
2 Seeibid.
* Thischronicle edited inAnalecta OrdinisFratrum III6, (1898),notes
Praedicatorum fortheyear
1220:Hocannorecepti sunt Parisiis
(forParisius) adordinem pereumdem Reginaldum(= Regi-
naldofAngers), pauloantequam moreretur, Frater Robertus , quilegebat
Anglicus Parisiis
metaphy-
sicam,etnullus erateisimilis intheologicafacltate. Hicpostea fuit Forthisnoteand
Cardinalis.
astoRobert
itsreliability Kilwardby's entranceintotheDominican Order, seeEllen
M.F.Sommer-
Seckendorff, StudiesinTheLife ofRobert Kilwardby O.P.,Dissertationeshistoricae
(editedbythe
InstitutumHistoricum IT. Praedicatorum Romae Fase.VIII,Rome1937,p. 4.
ad. S. Sabinae),
4 e.g.inFlorence, Laurenziana, cod.PlutLXXI,29where Kilwardby'sCommentary onthePrior
isascribed
Analytics toRobertus Anglicus (!). InVenice,
Kiliurlu Biblioteca VI164(3085),
Marciana,
wefind (f.79vb):Explicit derelativis
tractatus secundum fratrem Robertm
Anglicumordinis
predicatorum.
GratiasDeo. I haveserious doubts onKilwardby's authority ofthistract.InOxford,Merton ,
College
MS292itisattributed toJohn ofSiccavilla
(f.94vtt), whileitisanonymous intheothermanuscripts
extant.Moreover, thereisaninteresting marginal noteinAssisi, MS158,f.52r:
Bibi.Antoniana
intractatuderelatione /.deSiccavillaplusdemateria ista.SeeA. G. LittleandF. Pelster,Oxford
y andTheologians
Theolog , Oxford 1934,p. 108,n. 3. - Recently I foundinSevilla(Biblioteca
Capitulary Colombina) a manuscript containing Kilwardby'sSophismata withthe
gramaticalia
contemporaneous explicit(io4vb):ExplicitSuma cum
gramaticalis argumentisRoberti (cod.
Anglici
--9,Xm-XIVS.)
8

11:59:12 AM
R.-M. Martin, suggested1that Robert took the Black Friars habit be-
tween 1240 and 1245. So Grabmann'sview thatour commentarieswere
writtenbetween 1248 and 1261 in the period when Robert Kilwardby
was activeas a professorin Parisand Oxford2is certainlyuntenable,since
in both manuscriptsour author is named magister , not frater. Robert
Kilwardby'sactivity as a magisterartium must be dated in the 122o's and
i2 3o,s. It is an unmistakablefact that, at that time, Peter of Spain's
work was not yet used in the Parisianand Oxford circles3.
So farthere seems to be no reason to identifyour magister Robertus
Anglicus with Robert Kilwardby O.P.
Grabmannonly dealt with the Vatican manuscriptVat. Lat. ^3049,
which contains a commentaryon Peter of Spain's Summulelogicales ,
called there compilatio supertractatus(f. 8irb). In a note (op. cit. p. 67,
n. 1) he referred to the Todi manuscript (Eibl, comunale , cod. 54)
which, according to the catalogue of L. Leonij (Todi, 1878, p. 24),
contains glosulecomposite a magistroRobertoAnglicoupon the Summule
logicales. Grabmann,who did not see the manuscript,knew only its
incipit(Cumdivinum auxiliumsittestePlatone ), and concluded4fromit that
the Vaticanand Todi manuscriptscontaintwo different works. However,
an analysisof both manuscriptswill show that our manuscriptscontain
two different redactionsof the same commentaryby one masterRobertus
Anglicuson Peter of Spain's Summule logicales.

i - The Commentaryas contained in Vat.Lat. 3049

This parchmentmanuscriptof the Vatican Librarymeasures 200 x 140
mm. and has 82 folios. It seems to date fromthe end of the thirteenth
or the beginningof the fourteenthcentury.Since our codex is partof the
old stock of the VaticaniLatini (containing the CodicesVaticaniLatini
i - 6000), it must have been in the Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana as
early as the sixteenthcentury. More informationabout its origin and
entranceinto the VaticanLibrarycannotbe givenso far.s The onlywork
containedin thismanuscriptis the commentaryon the Summule logicales.
1 R.-M.Martin,Quelques Matres
premiers dominicains
deParisetd*Oxford
etlasoi-disant
cole
dominicaine
(i 229-1279)
augustinienne in:Revuedessciences etthologiques
philosophiques 9 (1920),p. $66.
2 Grabmann,op.cit.,p. 66.
3 Argumentsinsupport ofthisviewwillbeadduced
ina later inthisseries.
study
4 op.cit.
yp. 67,n. i .
s MissProf.Anneliese Scrittore
Maier, intheVatican
Library,waskindenough togivemethis
information.

11:59:12 AM
 The work was writtenin two columns and opens, without giving the
author's name, with an extensiveprologue (i-1*15):1

Fonset origoomnium scientiarum a plenitudine totiussapientie duxitoriginem. Qui

estfonsluminis scientiarum,vitebonum, bonitassumme sapientie,plenitudo, eternitas,
Deusanteomniaprimus, luxincreata2 (increatura MS)omni (um)creator eternus, lux
cuinonestadditio3 veldiminution possibilis.Lux tui non est transmutados aut obum-
bratiovicissitudinis,
principium et finislucistotiusveritatis et bonitatis in omnibus
creaturis.
Luxautem6 istasuamspeciem irradiat inrationalescreaturas, perradium rectum videlicet
etoblicum. Receptionem autemistius luciseterne perradium rectum nullacreatura nisi
perinfusionem divinegratiepoteri t obtinere. Necesseestergonobisrationalibus creatu-
risut tamnobilisscientiedeveniamus ad notitiam aliqualem(et) receptionem istius
luminisperradiumobliquum nobistransmissam comprehendere. Qui quidemradius
essentiamrei directenon?potestostendere, sed per multamedia,quasipernubem
intuendo solem,intellectus humnus mole carnis8obpressus claritatem istamnuli(a-
ten)usnisipersimilitudinem poterit speculari.Ipsa tarnen anima rationalis converti tur
suprase memor quamiocundum etquamamenum sitilludverissimum bonum ab omni-
busdesideratum, a quo tantafuitexcellentia decorata(et) naturali appetitu in eius?
cognitionem desideratpervenire.
Cuiconsonai10 Philosophus principio Metaphysice vetheris dicensquodomneshomines
naturasciredesiderant.Adquamscientiam habendam ipsaanimafuitcreata, auctoritate
Augustiniin libro de differentia spiritus et anime dicentis quod anima rationalis ad
similitudinemtotiussapientie Dei factaomnium rerumin se geritsimili tudines, quasi
aptitudoanimenaturaliter ordinata estad sciendum. Quia quidemscientia cumipsa
animaob sui coniunctionem cumcorporeactualiter spoliatur, dolet admodumse
multiformiter
predictis denudari. Secundum quod dicit Boetius11 inLibro deconsolacene
philosophiede animaipsadicens :
irb nuncmembrorum conditanube
nonin totum estoblitasuisumma quam tenet singula .
perdens
Ex predictis
igiturpatetquod anima rationalisnubilo carnis opprimente divinesapientie
cognitionemseuplenitudinem inhacvitapervisionem siveperradium rectum apprehen-
dendominime poteritobtinere.Cuiusrei defectus a partenondivinesapientie sed

1 I wish
toexpressmysincere thanks forchecking
to MrC. H. J.M.Kneepkens thequotations
andforhisvaluable incorrecting
suggestions someclumsy readings.
manuscript
2 increaturaV.
3 adidicio
(!) V.
4 dominicioV.
5 transmutatacio
V.
6 + [dicitur].
7 directe
non]cognito nuncV
8 carnis]
crianis(?) V.
9 ineius]meusV.
1o consonaiVesont V.
11Boethius, V,III,22-24.
DeConsolatione ed.Peiper, MDCCCLXXI
Lipsiae p. 130r.22-24:Nunc
Membrorum conditanube.Nonintotum estoblita tenet
sui.Summamque singula
perdens.
IO

11:59:12 AM
 nostrepotiushumane conditionisexistit.Secundum quod dicit Algazeldecimosue
metaphysice quodquidquidest factum, factum est ob hoc ut possit esseperfctius.
AuctoritateetiamPlatonis suo :
lybro Thymey1 optimo ab inquitinvidia estista
relegata
utconvenienter cunctasibisimiliaefficivoluitproutnatura cuiusquebeatitudinis
potuit
essecapax.
Utigitur receptionem luminis
predicti irradiantem innostrasanimashabeamus creatura-
rumutiquecognitionem haberedebemus,ut per cognitionem ipsarum per radium
oblicum tamquam pereffectum intantam deveniamus incognitionem allacriter
creatoris
quoddebetessesummum acceptabile in hacvita, secundum quoddicitAugustinus2
quod tantedignitatis esthumana conditio quodnullum bonum potestei sufficere
preter
Summum. Hoc etiamauctoritate Tullii^libro suo de senectutehabetur:ob hoc,
inquit,ex altissimodeidomicilionobisanimus datusestutcelestium motuset ordins
contemplaremur et contemplando etiamsequeremur. Item.Etiamlibrosuode sompno
dicit*:illosliquetessesapientesqui totamentis acie supernacircumspecte rquirunt
et quesitasagaciadiligentiacomprehendunt. Necessaria est ergoscientiarationali
creature.

Next, the authoradds a shortdivisioscientiarum

(irb-va) :
Creatus fuitautemhomoin triplici perfectione: in summaiocunditate quoadcorpus
cedit; in summasapientia quoad animam, in summa bonitate quoad (quod ad MS)
utrumque. Sedperpeccatum primihominis cediditiamposteri tas.Inopposita predicto-
rumvaletin tristitia[m]contraprimm, <in>ignoran tia contrasecundum, in malitia
autemcontra tertium.
Verumtamen utab istishumana natura possetincommodis relevari,concessesuntsibi
f. iva artes,scientie,virtutes
et quibushomonaturaliter appetendo et crescatin
perficiatur
cognitionem deniqueperveniat creatoris.
Scientiaautemestautcreatoris, autcreature. Creatoris autemscientia nonhabetur in
vitaistanisipercreatur<ar>um cognitionem obliquoquidem radioacquisitam. Creatura-
rumautemscientie duplexestexitus[est]in esse,primus scilicetet secundus.Primus
quidem, ut habeturprincipioVeteris est
Metaphisices,per viam admirationis
; admirando,
inquit,presbiteriinEgiptoinceperunt ubiquephilosophari. Secundus veroexitusinesse
esttriplex.Autperviaminventionis instudium; etadhuneconfert maxime sensus
visus
etsichabuerunt ; qui
philosophi visusnobis differentias
rerum ostendit.Aut per doctri-
nam; etadhuncmaxime confert auditus,etsicscolares moderni. Autperinspirationem ;
et ad huncconfert maxime honesta munditia <que>intelligit deumutiqueproceteris
reverendo, et hocmodosanctiviri.
Scientiaautemrerumcreatarum duplexest.Que duplicem suppletdefectum humane
conditionis.Unaesta partecorporis, aliaveroa parteanime.Primavocatur mechanica,

1 Plato, 29E ed.Waszink

Timaeus (Plato
Latinus) : aboptimo
22.19-20 invidia
porro longerelegata
cuncta
est.Itaqueconsequenter suisimilia, cuiusque
prout natura essepoterai,
beatitudinis
capax
effici
voluit.
2 ubi?
3 Cicero:Cato , cap.21(77)ed.Wuilleumier
Maior (Bud), animus
Paris1961"estenim caelestis
exaltissumodomicilio etquasidemersus
depressus interram etc...
* Macrobius, inSomnium
Commentarti /,8, 3. ed.Willis
Leipzig1963.
s Arist. A,980a 22-23.
Metaph.
II

11:59:12 AM
 idestadulterina,que consistit
in operatione manuum, et huius<modi>.
ut Carpentaria
Etdicitur adulterina
quiaad modum filiiadulterini (?) sedexalienopatre1,
nona natura
sicutab artifice
forma inmateriam introducitur.
Aliaverovocaturscientialiberlis.Et suntseptem.Quarumtressuntde sermone,
reliqueveroquatuor suntde rebus.Primeautemtresconstituunt trivium (inicium
MS),
scilicetgramatica,
dyaletica,rethorica. Alievero quadrivium,scilicet
arismatica(!),
musica, astronomia.
geometria, Et dicuntur quiasolumeassolebant
liberales addiscere
velquiaa terrenis
filiiliberorum, curishominem librantetmundanis.

There follow some remarkson the position of logic in the framework

of the artes. It turnsout to be both dominaand ancilla (iva-vb):
Interautemseptem loycapotestessedomina etancilla.Estenimtanquam ancillainhoc
quoddeservit aliiset ministrat.
Sedesttanquam domina inquantum omnesaliasregendo
rgultetgubernat sineconductu. Omnesaliescientie claudicando procedunt tamquam
remigio destitute.Et ideoistavenerabilis loyca tanquam aliarum domina regularum per
1 se quidemet priuset nonsimulcumaliisipsam| diligenter est
utiqueample<c)tendo
ferventianimoappetendo. UndeAristotiles SextoMetaphisice: malum est,inquit,simul
scientiamquerereet modumsciendi,idestloycam et aliamseien tiam.Resautemsine
modo,ut ibidemscribi tur,parimi valet,quianullascientia sineloycaestquerenda ne
absquevaloreprocedat.UndeSeneca: quidyaleticam ygnorat ( !) nonaudeatsephiloso-
phum IdemTulliusetiam
profiteri. : sicutnavissinenautaatqueremigio destituta
descen-
dit in perditiones variasfluctibus in adversis, sic scientietempestate disputationis
multiformiter
periclitantur titubantes. IdemetiamCommentator Averrois:dyaletica,
inquit,estscientiarum sicut
scientia, manus estorganum organorum. Valetenimadalias
scientias
principaliterdyaletica
propter quatuor causas.Primaestquiadocetcognoscere
quidverum et quidfalsum. Secunda autemquiaprobat principia aliarumscientiarum si
ab aliquodenegentur. Tertiaest quia dat modumsciendiet argumentandi scientiis
cumomnesquodammodo
universis, scientiemodoarguendi utantur. Quartaestquiadat
exercitiumloquendi etea declarandi queaputhomines suntinmente alteriexprimendo.

, causa
The next lines discuss the well-known items of the causa efficiens
and
materialis, causanalis of i
logic (f. vb~2ra) :

Cyrcaquamtriaprincipaliter suntscienda.Primum estquidsitcausaefficiens loyce.

Secundum estde quo tractaturinloyca.Tercium estquisfinispropinquus.
<Circa>primum patetquoniam estcausaefficiens
Arystotiles loyce.Anteenimtempus
suumautparvum autnichilfuerat de istaartetractatum,sedipsesolusphilosophorum
subtilissimus
totamloycam etnaturalem scientiametmoralem sufficienter perDeigratiam
De quocommentator
adinvenit. Averrois tertiode Anima loquens sic: credoutnatura
formavitistumhominem utperipsumipsiusnature secretapossent relevari.
subtiliter
De secundo sic.Triasuntde quibusinscientia determinatur,scilicetsubiectum, partes
subiecti
et proprietatessubiecti.Subiectum autemin loycaestsillogismus (exsymilis
2ra MS),partesveroipsiussuntpropositiones et oratio.Proprietates autem partium sunt
et negatio
affirmatio et oppositio.

1 Todihas:nonexproprio sedexalieno.
patre See below,
p. 24.
I2

11:59:12 AM
De terciosic.Finisenimdyaletice
estcognitio
verietfalsiperaccidens
(?) loycus
princi-
considrt
paliter et verumet falsum.
De ipsisautemtribus predictis in sequentibus
patebit divinanobisgratiainspirante.

Then, our authorspeaks about the reason why Peter of Spain wrote his
Summule.Peter appears to have been one of quite a group of magisti
who
made a compendiumof the scientiaAristotilis (2ra):
Verum quiainlibrisAristotilis
estdyaleticatradita ideoratione
difficiliter, intelligentie
studuerunt
amplioris auctores
diversi temporis retromissifs]
quosdam librosseutractatus
inartehuiusmodi
introductores compilare, scientia
quibuscognitis Aristotilis
limpidius
De quorum
clarescat. numero fuitmagisterPetrus
Yspanus.Cuiustractatumadmaiorem
introductionemscolariumin artedyaletica compylantemad presensper Dei gfatiam
ad (ex
sum(p)simuslegendum diligendum MS).
Patetergoquesitcausaefficiens
huiuslibri,quodmagister
PetrusYspanus.Quiquorun-
damnobilium precibuscondescendens ad maiorem loyceedidithunc
intelligentiam
Etestcausaefficiens
tractatum. testeBoetioquodmovetet operatur ad hocutressit.

From the author's remarks it appears that Peter of Spain wrote his
Summule , (called tractatus , not summule ), at the request of a number of
noblemen ( quorundam nobiliumprecibuscondescendens ). I hope to return
to this phrase in a later part of this study. Our author's commentary
turnsout to be the writtenrecord of his lectures (cuiustractatum ....
adpresens per Dei ad
gratiamsumpsimus legendum) as
, mayappear also from
its divisioninto lectiones . (See below, p. 26 ff.).
Afterthe discussionof the causa materialisof this book (viz. Peter
of Spain's Summule logicales ), our author goes on to deal with fiveother
well-known items: causa materialis , causaJormalis9causanalis , titulus ,
and cui partiphilosophie supponatur (2ra_rb):
Causaveromaterialis estsillogismus consideratus inse etinsuispartibusetproprietati-
busearundem. Que autemistasunt,superius dictum est.Et (est)causamaterialisteste
eodemBoecioex quacumaliquofitaliquid.
Causaveroformalis estduplex : forma tractatus etforma tractandi( )i
Formaverotractandi idemestquodmodusagendi.Modusautemesttriplex, scilicet
; et istedaturperPriora;
diffinitivus divisivus; et istedaturperPosteriora;collectivus,
quandoscilicet probatur et inprobatur. Si autemsitexemplorum hocnonest
positivus,
deesse,seddebeneesse,lindeAristotiles : exempla ponimus nonutitasintsedutsentiat
hiisquia<d)discit. Etestcausaformalis quedatessereiet conservt reminesse.
Causaverofinalis esttriplex,scilicet(si MS)propinqua, remota etultima.Propinqua est
cognitioeorum que in hoc libro traduntur. Remota est facilior
cognitiolibrorum
Ultimaest perfectio
Aristotilis. animerationalis. Animaenimcreataest inperfecta,
autemvirtutibus
perfectibilis et scientiis.

1 Hereseveral
linesmust
havebeenomitted
byourscribe.
H

11:59:12 AM
f.2rb Quintum
estquidsittitulus
titulus autemtalisest: Incipiunt
(!). | Tytulus introductiones
Petri
Y
magisti spani.
Sextumestcuipartiphilosophie
supponatur quoniam sermocinali sycut( !) dyaletica.

The authorgives a divisionof the Summule and the titlesof the thirteen
chapters :
Isteveroliberdividiturin primadivisione in XII capitula.In primodeterminaturde
Insecundo
introductionibus. Intertiode predicamentis.
de predicabilibus. Inquartode
In quintode locis.In sextode supposi
sillogismis. tionibus.In septimo In
de fallaciis.
Innonodeampliationibus.
octavoderelativis. Indecimodeappellationibus.Inundcimo
In duodecimo
de restrictionibus. et ultimode distributionibus.

Accordinglythe commentarycontainsthe followingparts:

I De introductionibus ( 2rb-i9ra)
II De predicabilibus (i9ra-24va)
III De predicamentis (24va-3 3vb)
IV De sillogismis (33vb-37va)
V De locis (37va"44va)
VI De suppositionibus (^va-^ra )
VII Defallaciis (48ra~72vb)
VIII De relativis (72vb-74vb)
IX De ampliationibus (74vb-7ra)
X De appellationibus (7STa-76ra)
XI De restrictionibus (j6T&-jjT))
XII De distributionibus (77rb"81rb).

The commentaryends on f. 8irb_va. The explicitis rather confusing.

I give the finallines of our text as it is foundin our manuscript(compare
the text which is given by the Todi manuscript,below, p. 31):
Item.Notandum quodinfinitum unomododicitprivationem (!) extencionis
infinite
aliomododicitprivationem multiplicacionis fore.Primomodoestpassioquant
finite
tatiscontinue,secundomododistraete ( !).
Item.Notandum quodinfinitumestnomensimplex,scilicetquod est signum inponi-
unam,utdictum
tur(!) ad significandum est.
Finitaestistacompilaciosupratractans (!) a magistroroberto in conati
O qua
anglico
potest materiam explanandidaciomagisti petriyspani anno domini M ducentsimo
septimo mmaijterciadecimadiesoleexistente invire(8 1va)octavograduthauri. . .
FinitolibrositlausetgloriaChristo.

The large number of clumsy mistakesmade by our scribe (see all the
quoted texts) seems to prove conclusivelythathe did certainlynot excel
14

11:59:12 AM
in knowledge of logical matters and was not a skilfulcopyist either.
Fortunatelythe parallellous work in the Todi manuscriptis of some
help in enablingus to correct some of the scribe's errors1.
The remainingpartof the manuscript(8 1va-82v) is filledwithnotes
on severalmatters,writtenin different hands,partof whichare definitely
later than the hand that wrote our tract.
The two firstnotes discuss logical matters(8 1 va) :

(1) Notaquodpredicatio potestfieri

quatuormodis.Unoenimmodovereet proprie,
ut 'homo ; istapredicatio
estanimai1 estvera,quiagenuspredicatur de specie.Aliomodo
fitvereet nonproprie, ut *homoesthomo*
; istaestvera,sed nonpropria, quiaidem
predicaturde seipso.Terciomodofitproprieet nonvere,ut 4homo curri; istaest
proprie,quiaverbum adiectivum
predicaturde subiecto,
sednonvera,quiadubiunest
utrum homocurrat velnon.Quartomodofitnecproprie necvere,ut4homo 9
estasinus;
istanec estpropria nec vera,quia unaspeciespredicaturde alia specie,utasinusde
homine.

(2) Queritur
quarepropositio habettantum
kathegorica specieset nonplures
quatuor
nequepauciores etc.

The next note concernsmathematics(the circulatio

; 8 1va) :
In circulacione scilicetunitas,
triaconsiderante, et simplicitas.
integritas Unitas,quia
estunasolalinea.Integritas,
quiapropter nequepotest
integritatem consideraneius
principium quia nonfitex diversis
nequefinis.Simplicitas, lineis,sicutomnesalie
figure, sicuttriangulado, quadrangulacio,etsicde aliis , sedfitex unasolaet
linea.
simplici

hand continueswith a note on questio(8iva-82rb).

A somewhatdifferent

(3) Quoniamde artequestionum dictumproponimus

(?) brevi
tertractavimus
(?)
quidsitquestioet undedicatur
ostendere etc.

Folio 82v opens with a fragmentof a letterabout some liturgicalprivi-

leges of the Order of the Grey Friarsconcerningthe feastsof the Virgin
Mary, St. Francis, St. Anthony, St. Clara, as they were given and
guaranteedby Pope InnocentIV (1 243-^4) and his successorsAlexander
IV (12 4-61), Urban IV (1261-64), Clement IV (126^-68) and Gregory
X (1271-76).

1 Foranattempt ofourexplicity
ata correction seebelow,
pp.31-32.

11:59:12 AM
 2 - The manuscriptTodi, BibliotecaComunale54
This manuscript was described by L. Leonij in his catalogue of the
manuscripts nowadaysbelongingto theBibliotecaComunale1. His descrip-
is
tion all but useful.The manuscriptcertainlydates fromthe thirteenth
century,not from the fifteenth as Leonij says. It is on parchmentand
bound up in vellum and measures 280 x 210 mm. It contains 109 folios
written in two columns. Leonij did distinguishthe differentworks
which are contained in this manuscriptbut failed to give the correct
explicitof the commentaryon the Summule , which is the firstwork found
in our manuscript.
Actuallyour manuscriptconsistsof threeparts: a copy of Robertus
Anglicus' commentaryon the Summule in a redactiondifferent fromthat
found in Vat. Lat. 3049; some fragmentsand straynotes, and, finally,
an anonymouscommentaryon Aristotle's Topics.
Unfortunately the firstfoursquires of our manuscriptwere wrongly
bound. The correct order would be :
IT-I2V
37r"48v
2^.36V
i3r-24v ; next follow 49r etc. in the correct order.
The works mentionedabove occur in this way:
A. ff. i ra-$"6vb(middle of the column) the commentaryon the Summule
is found. It will be discussed below, pp. 22 ff.
B. ff. 6vb-6ovbcontain several fragmentsand notes:
i. The first fragmenthas apparently been taken from some
commentaryon a tract on fallacies. It is found from $6vb-7rband
opens as follows:
etdivisio
Compostilo etc. Primonotaquodcompositio diciturtribusmodis.Unomodo
compositio dicitur
componentis actio,aliomododicitur
propositionum componibilium
passio,tertiomodo diciturvocum dividendarumunio. Et sic sumi turhic. Similiter
divisiosumiturtribusmodis.Unomododicitur dividendsactio,aliomodopropositio-
numdivisibilium passio, tertio
modo vocum
dicitur supponendarum Etsic
( !) separatio.
sumitur hic. Sed notandum tribusmodissecundum
quod oratiopotestdiversifican
speciem.

The other lemmataare :

Hiishabitisetc
.
Quidam autem etc.
distinguunt
Unde sitetc.($7a)
licetdictum
1 Lorenzo Inventario
Leonij, dellaComunale
deicodici , Todi1878,p. 24.
diTodi
l6

11:59:12 AM
Secundusmodusetc
.
motivm
Principium etc.
Secundusmodusdivisionis
etc.
dictionem
Fallaciaextra etc.
communi
Visaratione paralogismorumaccidentis
etc.
Secundusmodus
figure :
(forfallacie)accidentis
etc.(7rb)
defallaciasecundum
Sequitur quidetsimpliciter
etc.

This fragmentends as follows (7rb):

Tertionotandum quodduplexestratioquaresecundumquidetsimpliciter
nonpossunt
facerediversas Unaratioquodsecundum
falladas. quidetsimpliciter
sehabentsicutpars
et totumet quiaparset totumnonfaciunt
diversa,
ergosecundum et
quid simpliciter
nonfaciuntdiversasfalladas.

The next fivelines of this column are blank.

These texts were not taken from Robertus Anglicus' commentary
on the seventhtractof the Summule(De Jallaciis). Apparentlytheywere
to be consideredas straynotes.
2. On 7va-vb two sets of ten medical questionsare found.They
run as follows:

(a) Primoqueritur
undeet qualiter nascunturcapilli
Itemquaresuntrotundi
Itemquarepilisemper crescunt
Itemex quocrescuntquarerectenoncrescunt ad modum segetis
Item(quare)nascunturdiversiscoloribus
Itemquarecalvescit
quidamet hoca parteante
Item<quare>quidam canescunt insenectuteet aliinon
Itemquarequidaminadolescentia canescunt
Itemquidsignificantquantitaspilorum supercilii
Itemquidsimiliter
qualitaspilorum superciliorum.
(b) Primode mulieribusqueritur quarenonsuntbarbate
Itemqueritur
quaremagisappetunt coitumpostpartum quamante
Itemquaremenstruam patiunturcumhomines nonpatiantur
Itemqueritur
de quomulieres nutriuntinfantesinuterosuo
Itemquidegeritvelquid<. ? .) gitin utromatris
Itemqueritur
quotsintet que que inpediunt conceptionem
Itemqueritur
quarepostcoitumleprosisubsequens efficitur nonautem
leprosus, mulier
Itemquareinfans
natusinoctavomensevivere nonpotest, cumpossitinseptimo
etnono
vivere
Item< >i.
Itemperquodforamen exitmenstruum.

1 Theninth
question wasomitted
presumably byourscribe,
asmay from
appear itsanswer
(f.j vb).
17

11:59:12 AM
The text of the firstquestion may be compared with a passus found in
Simon of Faversham'scommentaryon the Summule :
logicales1
f.7va:Adprimum dicendum quodvirestcalidior femina.NamutdicitYpocras(!),
calidiorfemina est
frigidior frigidissimo viro. Et hoctumex complexione tumex calore
testi
culorum. Undecircamaxillas apertiores habetporos.Feminaverofrigida est et
hmida. Ideostrictoshabetilloset ex humiditate inviscatos.
Sedunde(unumMS)est
quodvidemus quasdam mulieres Dicendum
barbatas. quodexspennate inmatricelocato
oreque eiusdem clauso.Si in dextrapacte consistt,
quiaex vicinitate
epatisestcalidior
fetusmeliori sanguine atquecalidonutritur et masculus Si autemin sinistra
efficitur.
est
parte,que frigidior, femina Si
efficitur. vero indextra etsi
parte, aliquantulum versus
sinistram,virmuliebris Sed(!) insinistra
efficitur. aliquantulumversusdextram,mulier
Istacalidior
efficitur.
virilis estceterismulieribus, minustarnen validaviris.Undebar-
bamhabet,sedminus viro.

The answer to the last question remindsus of Aristotle,whose name is

not mentioned,however:
f.7vb:Addecimum dicendum quodpernovem foramina
ipsiusmulieris
exit,scilicet
in speculum
peroculos.Undetalismulierrespiciens inficit
speculumsanguinemen-
Undepalmatergens
struoso. speculumremanetsanguinolentia2.

(3) Next follows a set of eleven astronomical and meteorological

questions (7vb-$8ra):
de creatione
Primoqueritur quaresuntcreate
stellarum
Secundo de pluvia
queritur
de nive
Itemqueritur
Itemquarepociusningitpocius(!) inhyeme quaminestate
Itemqueritur
de grandine
de tonitruo
Itemqueritur
Itemde choruscatione
Itemde fulmine
de yriquidest
Itemqueritur
Itemquareapparetin taliformaet subtotcoloribus
insuaappari
Itemquidsignificai tione.

(4) The next set of ten questions concerns the soul (g 8ra_rl)):
Primoqueriturde animaquidsit
Itemquotsuntanimespeciediffrentes
causatur
a quibusprincipiis
Itemqueritur
Itemqueritur
qualiterestanimain humano corpore
utrum
Itemqueritur animagaudeat quodnon
cumdicatAristo<ti)les
veltristetur,
1 ForSimon's seemySimon
text, (d. 1306)AsACommentator
ofFaversham I-VofThe
ofTheTracts
Summule, in: VIVARIUM6 (1968),[pp.69-101I,
p. 91.
2 Cp.Aristotle, , 4^9b 27.Cp.H. J.Drossaart
Deinsomniis Aristotelis
Lulofs, -
etDedivi
Deinsomniis
persomnum
natione 1947),pp.XXX-XXXIII.
(Leyden
18

11:59:12 AM
Itemqueritur utrumanimamoveatse de locoad locumnecaliter
Itemqueritur utrummundus habeatanimam necne
Itemqueritur datoquodsicquidpossitesseanimamundi
Itemqueritur utrumanimainprincipiositperfecta
quantumad substantiam
et virtutes
et scientias
Itemqueritur cumprimacausa,angelusetanimacognoscant, istetresdiffrant
qualiter
cognitiones.

($) The fourthset of questions is mainlydevoted to medical matters

(^grb-vb):
Primoqueriturqueet quotsintcausesompnii
Item,cumsemper recipiamusalimentm, quodestcausaaugmentandi,quarenonsemper
^
augmentamur
Item,cum mulier naturalitersit unde
frigida, est quod ferventior
viroestin libidine
Itemqueriturquecomplexio estmagiscongrua coitui
Itemquodtempus estmagiscongruum coitui
Itemquidestilludquodvidetur cadereadmodum stellede nocte
Itemquareilludnonfitde die
Itemqueriturquo tempore se debenthaberemeliushomines, inquopeius
Itemquidestilludquodsoletreprimere de nocte
Itemqueriturutrum aliquomodopossetcapivelsaltemimpediri.

Afterthe answerstwo more questions are found (^8va~vb):

Itemqueritur
undeestquodquedamanimaliavidentde nocte,de dieautemnon
Itemundeest quodexiensin obscuropotestvidereexeuntem in splendido,
et non
econverso.

(6) The next set of questions concerns physical and medical matters,
again (^8vb-69ra) :
Primoqueriturquarecumaliquisfremitat precaturdominum
Itemqueritur
quaremortuos abhominemus quosinvitadileximus
Itemqueriturquarenon(cumMS)aliquisinebriatur testiculis
positisin aquafrigida
Itemqueritur
quarecanities
inparteanteriori
contingitciciusquamina parteposteriori.
Itemqueritur
quaremulieres pregnantescoitum appetant,brutaverofugiant
Itemqueritur
quarecumlepussitfrigidus et sic<cus>,
tamcitucurrat
Itemqueritur
quarevasargenteum supraprunas plenumaquavelvinobulliensnoncalefit
Itemquarevaserepletoaquacalidavascalefit
absenteigne
Itemqueritur
quarepilusa mulierebibitusad mamillam veniat

Afterthe answersof these questions some more are added (8vb-9ra):

Itemqueritur
quarequedamanimalia
ruminant
Secundoquarehabent
quendam qui dicitur
folliculum, exta
, velrumen,
inquorecipitur
cibuspriusquam
intret cuiusmeatus
stomachum, estangustus.

19

11:59:12 AM
Itemqueritur quareequusredoxatus si totusexponiturradiislunenonmoritur. Si
autemradiuslunetangat perfenestramsiveperaliquodforamen, ulterius
(ulteraeius
MS)moritur.
Itemquarequedam animalia oreconcipiuntet orepariunt,
quedamperinferioraconci-
piuntetperinferiora
pariunt.
Itemqueriturquarebos quandosurgit priuslevetpedesposteriores quamanteriores
Itemqueriturquarepecoraprimo naresterre deponantquandocubant
Itemqueriturquarequisinsompno loquiturclamanslacrimatur
Itemqueriturquarequare( !) malenutrianturinfantes
a nutricibus
coituutentibus.
Itemquarepueripostenativitatemnonhabeant complementum utambulandi
actuum et
cumbrutahochabeant.
loquendi,

(7) Next there follows a set of questions on Aristotle's Physics(supra

; 9ra-6ova). This part opens as follows:
librumPhisicorum
QuestiosupralibrumPhisicorum.Utrum de naturalibus possitessescientia.
Scientiaest
eorumquesemper Sedresnaturales
suntetnecessaria. nonsuntsemper necnecessarie,
quiahabent queestinpoten
substantiam tiaad opposi ta,utmateria prima.
Ergoetc. < >.
Tuncqueritur libriPhisicorum
desubiecto utrum sitcorpus.Etarguitur quodnon,quia
idemnonpotestessesubiectum tociusetpartis. Sedcorpusmobileestsubiectum intota
scientia
naturali. non
Ergo potest esseunius partisscientienaturalis ut
subiectum, liber
Phisicorum.< ....).

etc. I give
On f. 9va the lemma is found: Innataestnobisvia cognoscendi
the opening lines (9va) :
Innataestnobisviacognoscendi
[Aristotle, A, 184a16]etc.Etqueritur
Physics utrum univer-
salesitpriussingulari.
Etvideturquod sit
universale prius, Particulare
simplicius.
quia'est
enimse habetperadditionem. Namadditcondi Item.Primum
tionesindividuantes. est
ida quononconverti Item.Quodestprincipium
turconsequentia. etcognoscendi
essendi
priusesteis. Universale
particularia, esthuiusmodi.
. . . etc.

The other lemmataare :

9va:Id quidem [184b 2g]
igitur
6ora:Substantiam
autem ) autqualitatem
(for:innitam
infinitum [185a 34-3$]
autpassionem
secundum
6ort):Innitum quodinfinitum estetc.[187b 7-8].
incognitum

Aftersome eightblank lines anothercontemporaryhand continueswith

three more questions (6ova-vb):
(a) Questioestutrum universale
sitensnature Etarguitur
velab intellectu. quodsic
quodsitensnature et hocsitilludquodpredicatur et in quidde rebus
substantialiter
extra etc.
(b) Queritur utrum universalia velincorporaba.
sintcorporalia Et arguiturquodsint
(!) sic: omnequodhabetesseincorporeum,
corporales estincorporeum; est
universale
; ergoetc
huiusmodi
20

11:59:12 AM
(c) Questioestutrum ipsauniversalia
sintin ipsissingularibus
(exuniversalibus
MS)
positavelextrasingularia
etab eisseparata.
Etarguiturprimo quodsint.Hocseparatum
quodhabetessein intellectu.
esta sensibilibus Universalia
sunthuiusmodi. Ergoetc.

C. A somewhat finerhand than the one responsible for the folios

i ra-0rbwrote the remainderof our manuscript.It certainlydates from
the thirteenthcentury,probablyfrom the firsthalf of the centuryand
containsa complete commentaryon Aristotle's Topics.This work opens
as follows:

Supposita divisione philosophiesciendum quodomnisloicaautestde sillogismo autde

partibus sillogismi.Si de sillogismo,sic estscientialibriPriorm , in quo determinai
Aristotilesde sillogismo exempli.
Si autemsitde partibus, autde partibus integralibus autde partibus Ethoc
subiectivis.
patet.Homoenimethabetpartes integrales, sicutmanusetpedesetaliamembra, sive
animam et corpus;habetiterum partessubiectivas, sicutsuntSoret Plato.Similiter
dicode sillogismo. Si sitergode partibus integralibus sillogismi, auteritde partibus
remo tisetincomplexis, autde partibus propinquis et complexis. Si de partibusremo tis
incomplexis, sicestliberPredicamentorum , inquodeterminai Aristotiles de terminissive
de decernpredi camentis,que suntpartesremotesillogismi. Si autemsitde partibus
propinquis et
sillogismicomplexis, sic est liber Peryermenias, in quodeterminai Aristoti-
lesdeenuntiatione. Queestparspropinqua sillogismi,proposi tioveroestparspropinqui-
or. Si autemsitde partibus subiectivis, sic estliberPosteriorum - , in quo determinai
Aristotilesde sillogismo demonstrativo et falsigrapho - , et liberThopicorum - in quo
determinai de sillogismodyaletico - , et liberElenchor um , in quo determinat de sillo-
gismosophistico; et hocintelligendum estde sillogismo peccante in forma. Istienim
sillogismisuntpartes subiecti
vesivespecies sillogismi incommuni sivesimpliciter<. . .) .
Titulusest: incipit liberThopicorum Aristotilis. DicitautemThopicorum ad differentiam
aliorum librorum, sicutad differentiamPriorm et Posteriorum etaliorum quoscomposuit
Aristotiles.Et dicitAristotilis
ad differentiam aliorum philosophorum qui Thopica com-
posuerunt, sicut Boecius,Themistius Grecus et Marcus Tullius Latinus, sicuttestatur
Boeciusin principio Thopicorumsuorum.

Folio f. 68vb is blank with the exception of the three firstlines. The
next folio (69r) opens with a new lemma: Sunt autemproblematum et
cetera.This is the opening line of Aristotle's TopicsB (= 108 b 34).
Bok III begins on f. 73va ; Book IV on f. jjTi) ; Book V on f. 8 2rb;
Book VI on f. 86rb; Book VII on f. 93rb; Book VIII on f. 9ra. The last
lemma is Ampliusunamorationem et cetera(f. io9ra); it is taken from
b
TopicsVIII, 163 34. The commentaryseems to be complete and ends as
follows (1 09va) :
Adultimum dicendumquodinPrior ibusdocebatactorexercitationes
circaconclusiones
specialeset ideoquoddictum fuitibi,estintelligendum
despecialibus
conclusionibus,
scilicetquodoportetscireorationesad conclusines
specialesque < >
2I

11:59:12 AM
incidimi Hic autemdicitidemde generalibus
in disputationibus. conclusionibus et
Namad universales
universalibus. oportethabereorationes
factasideo quia ad eas
continue
habundare estdifficile1.

This commentaryon the Topicsis not one of the thirteenthcentury

commentarieshithertoknown (Boethius of Dacia, some master Elyas,
Henryof Brussels,Adenulfof Anagni,Angelusde Camerino, Radulphus
Brito,Simon of Faversham)2. It is not identicalwiththe Expositio
cuiusdam
Robertiin Topicaeither, seven books of which are found in a thirteenth
century manuscript of the Bibliotheca Nacional in Lisbon (Fundo
Alcobaa, cod. 175, olim 378).

3 - The Todi redaction of Robertus Anglicus' commentaryon the

Summule

Preceding the above-mentionedtexts Robert's commentaryon Peter

of Spain's Summule logicalesis found in our Todi manuscripton ft'.ira-
6vb3. The work opens with an exuberant prologue which has the
followingincipit: ( 1ra) :
Cumdivinum auxilium sittestePlatone in Thymeo* inprincipio cuiuslibet
operisinplo-
randum,quisicdicit: omnibus estquasimosetquedam religioeisquide maximisvelde
minimisquiddicturisunt,deitatem deprecantur inauxilium. Ethuicconsonat Boetius
De
consolations 5:
philosophie invocandus est,inquit, omnium rerum pater,preterquem nulla
ratione
fundatur exordium. Et ut dicitSenecaquodilliusambigenda suntbeneficia
de
cuiusmuere cunctaduxerunt originem. Et ideoin maioriexordioinvocarenomen
Altimissimidignum duxiutipsesuasumma bonitate
et ineffabili meoassitprincipio
et
processum in me exornet et me una inesse studentes in presenti consortio et
instruat
informetetipsequinullofineclauditur, laudabitur, nostrum inceptum iubeatconsumma-
ri.

In the next lines (ira-rb) our author goes out of his way to give quite
a number of quotations from Aristotle, Plato's Timaeus , Boethius'
De consolationephilosophie, Alanus de Insulis, Cicero, Tuscul. .,
Disputt
Calcicius, Isidorus of Sevilla, Isaac Israeli, St. Augustine. Then, he

1 Notetheerroneous readingoftheexplicit
byLeonij : . . . ideo continue
quiaeashabuere estdifficile.
Grabmann, referringtoa letter
ofAuguste wrote
Pelzer, : Des.Habere etdifficile;
continue seeop.cit.,
p. 67,n. i.
2 Forthese commentaries, seeM. Grabmann, Ungedruckte Lateinische zurAristotelischen
Kommentare
Topikausdem 13.Jahrhundert Geistesleben
in: Mittelalterliches III(Mnchen 1956),pp.142-157.
3 Seeabove, p. 16.
* Piatonis
Timaeus Volumen
, p. 20,6 in: PlatoLatinus: IVed.J.Waszink.
5 A. M.S. Boetii Philos.Consolationis III,VIII,97,ed.R. Peiper.
Liber
22

11:59:12 AM
 retums to his original point and goes on to give a divisioscientiarum

(jrb-va)
Hiisvisisad propositum redeamus. Quoniam dictum estquodhomoestex corporeet
animaconsti tutus,ingeniata estduplexscientia, ut perunamcorporis necessitas, per
alteramanimesublevetur. Illaqueestcorporis, medianica appellatur, iliaqueestanime,
liberlis
appellatur. Diciturmedianica quasimanu facta,quiade operibus manuum con-
siderata.Vel dicitur medianica quasimecha scientia veludmechus veladulter dicitur
quiad aliumthorum appropinquat, sicintellectus quandoad resistasvilessensibiles se
recurrat.Istaenimmedianica dividitur inarchitectoriam etusualem. < >.
Usualissuntsex: lanifcium, venatio, armatura, navigatio, rus,medicina. < >.
Tuncadliberalem accedamus. Liberlisdividitur inpracticam ettheoricam. Etdifferunt
istescientie modoprocedendi, quiapractica modo grosso (?) vel stip (?)
procedit et theorica percausas.Adhucdifferunt in fine,quiafinis practice estbonum
f.iva < ) et finis
theorice Veritas vitevelspeculatio. < ).
Practicadividitur inmonasticam, yoconomicam etpoliticam. Monastica estqueordinat
hominem adcognitionem sui; etdicitur a monos , quodestunum, etycos,quodestcustodia;
et hecdebeturmonachis et heremitis et hecdaturab Aristotile in Ethycis. Yconomica
diciturque docetpropriam familiam ordinare, lindeyconomus grece idem est quod
dispensatorlatine. Vel dicitur ab Yconomo, primo inventore huius scientie; et hec a
Tulliolibrosuo De Ojpciis enodatur. Politicanominatur que docetregerepopuloset
Undedicitur
civitates. a polis, quodestcivitas , velpluralitas; et hec traditur in legibus
et decretis.
Nuncautemad speculativam scientiam revertamur. De qua dicitAverroys in proemio
quodsupralibrum ediditPhisicorum1, quodhomodicitur equivocede homine habente
scientiam etnonhabente sicutdehomine veroetpieto.Sed,prohdolor,verbum Augus-
tini2verificatum estdicentis : adhucvenierunt tempora etveillisinquibuslegesilliterate
litteratas
scientias obscurabunt.
Speculativa scientiadividitur in scientiam de signiset scientiam de rebus.Scientia de
rebusdividitur inillastresmodossciendi quostangit Aristotiles sexto Metaphisice 3quando
dicit:tressuntmodisciendi,scilicetnaturalis, mathematicus et methaphisicus, quia
scientiade rebusautestde rebusin materia - et tuncestnaturalis - , autde rebus
abstractisa materia simpliciter - et tuncestmathematica - , autde rebusquesuntin
motuet materia, consideratis tamenpretermotum et materiam; et estmethaphisica.
Undemathesis grecequasiabstractio latinedicitur.
Scientianaturalis dividitur secundum divisionem sui subiecti.In naturali philosophia
subiectum estcorpusmobile.Undenatura ab Aristotile dicitur principium motuset
quietis.Autagit(ergoMS)de corpore mobilinoncontracto ad aliquam materiam; etsic
liberPhisicorum (priorm MS),quiCanon Naturalis Averroysnuncupatur. Si fitde corpore
mobilicontracto, autcontrahitur ad suumcausatum ; etsicestLiber CelietMundi inquo
determinatur de motibus corporum supracelestium, que incorruptibilia sunt.

1 Cfr.Aristotelis,
DePhysico
AudituLibri cumAverrois
octo variis
Cordubensis commen-
ineosdem
ed. Venetiis
tariis, apudJunctas1^62:H: (AntiquaTransi.): eiusestparsutilitatis
"Utilitas
scientie estinscientia
Etdeclaratum inoperationibus *.
etc*
voluntariis
speculativae. consyderante
2 ubi?
3 Cfr.Arist. E, 1025b 18- 1026a 32.
Metaph.
23

11:59:12 AM
Then he seems to make a freshstart ( i va) :
Duo suntdefectus inhomine1, sciliceta partecorporis et a parteanime,lindead sup-
plendum defectum a partecorporis suntinvente quedam artesmechanice, idestadulteri-
ne,quiasicutfilius dicituradulterinus qui nonestex proprio patresedex alieno,ita
artesmechanice dicuntur adulterinequianonsuntex natura sedex arte.Etsuntseptem,
scilicetlanifcium,armatura, agricultura, navigatio, venatio, medicina,et theatrica.
Lanifcium continet subse omnemmodumfaciendi vestes.Armatura continet subse
omnemmodumfaciendi arma.Agricultura continet sub se omnemmodumcolendi
agros.Navigatio continet subse omnemmodumnavigandi. Venatiocontinet subse
omnem modum venationis.Medicina continet subse omnem modum sanandi. Theatrica
continet omnem modum ludendi; etdicitura theatro
, quodestquidam locusRomedepu-
ttusad exercendum hastiludiciludici(!) etaliosludos.
Adsupplendum verodefectus a parteanimefuerunt invente quedamartesliberales. Et
suntseptem. Quarum tressuntde sermone etfaciunt trivium, scilicet
gramatica,dyale-
tica,rethorica. Aliequatuorsuntde rebuset faciunt quadrivium, scilicetarismetica,
geometria, musica et astronomia. Dicuntur autem liberales duabus de causis; primaquia
tantum filiiliberorum solebant easaddiscere ; secunda estquialibrant hominem a curis
secularibus.

He says he will confinehimselfto dialectics, but aftera few lines he

goes on to speak, again, about the scientiesermocinales
. It is self-evident
thatour text is much abbreviatedhere (ibid.)
Hic autemsolumde dyaletica esttractandum. Adhuiusergocognitionem [etJquatuor
suntinquirenda, scilicetque sitcausaefficiens,material
is,formalis,et finalis.
Causaefficiens est Aristotiles.Causamaterialis estargumentatio vel modusarguendi.
Causaformalis estmodusagendiet estquintuplex, scilicetdiffinitivus,
divisivus,proba-
tivus,inprobativus et exemplorum suppositivus. quiadocetdiffinire,
Diffinitivus, et sic
de aliis.Et estutilisad tria,scilicet
ad obviationes,quiadocetobviare;ad exercitium,
quiareddit hominem exercitatum adregulas aliaramartium quiaprobat illas< ).2
Adhuiusautem libricognitionem sexsuntinquirenda,scilicetcausaefficiens
etc. <. . . .>
Tresenimsuntscientie de sermone, scilicetgramatica,dyaletica,rethorica. Gramatica
estdecongruo etincongruo. Dyaleticade vero etfalso.Rethorica de ornato et inornato.
Ergosermocinali scientiesupponitur liberiste.

Next some notes on the definitionof philosophiaare intersered(ibid.) :

Hiisvisisdiffinitiones
aliquenotentur.
Philosophia multis
modisdiffinitur.
Primomodo
philosophiaestamor Alio
sapientie. modo philosophiaestsui abhomine,
ipsiuscognitio
idesthomocognoscendo secognoscitphilosophiam.Aliomodophilosophia
estdivinarum
ethumanaram etc.Inhacdiffinitione
duotangit: tangit
enimsubiectum philosophie
per
hocquoddicit:divinarum ethumanarum rerum
; tangitetiamcausamfinalem, quiabene
vivereestfinis
philosophie.
1 Forsuchtopics,seemypaper ontheTwelfth
Notes
: Some Century ofTheThree
Topic (Four)Human
Evils , Virtue
andofScience asTheir
, andTechniques Remedies
inVIVARIUMs (1967),pp.8-1g.
2 Hereseveral
linesmust byourscribe.
havebeenomitted

24

11:59:12 AM
 Et notandum quodphilosophiaalio mododiffnitur sic ab Augustino: est
philosophia
haberevitammundam et incontaminatam cognitionem verorumnon errante,alibi:
estcognitio
philosophia idestomnium
universi, rerum, inpresentisumma in
nobilitas,
futuro eterne
veracausafelicitatis estin anima.Duobusautemmodis
; cuiusdescriptio
autemdiffnitur
ab Ysidoro:primosic: philosophiaestdivinarum humanarumque cog-
nitioinquantum hominipossibileestprobabilisscientie;alibi:philosophia
estrerum
humanarum divinarumquecognitio cumratione
coniuncta benevivendi.
Etperhocquod
dicitcumratione
benevivendi
tangitcausamfinalem.

Without any transitoryformulaanother freshstart is made and what

follows seems to be a new introductionto the Summi/ie-commentary
( ! va- vb) :
Dicit Aristotiles in Metaphisica1 : omnecompositum ex duobusconstat, scilicetex
materia et forma,lindecuiuslibet rei naturalis perfectio est a forma. Quod nott
Aristotilesdicens:uniuscuiusque rei perfectio esta forma.Undetriplexestoperatio
(ordinarioMS)forme, scilicetordinare, compiere et disiungere. Cumergohomosit
f.i vb quoddam compositum generale, oportet | quod a sua forma habeat perficietcompleri,
abanima,
scilicet que est forma eius. Sed cum omne inperfectum habeat perficietanima
desenatasitinperfecta, uthabetur inlibroDeAnima2 secundum Philosophum dicentem :
animanataestveludtabularasainquanichildepingitur etinperfecta antequam perficia-
tur,oportet quodab aliquoperficiatur. Perficitur autemanimaduobus modis,scilicet
virtutibuset scientiis.Patetautemquodscientiis magisindigemus. Undevidendum est
quidsitscientia. Estergoscientia nobilispossessio animiquedistributa perpartes suscipit
incrementem et avarum dedignatur possessorem nisipublicetur citolabitur.Undescien-
dumquodquedam suntquedistributa minuuntur, utopestemporales ; aliasuntquedistri-
butanondiminuuntur sedsemper ineodemstaturemanent, utignis;aliasuntquedistri-
butaaugmentantur, utscientia, que quantomagisdistribui turtantomagis augmentatur.
Et hoc estquodtangit quando dicit: que distributa per partes suscipit incrementum.
Alitertraditur djffinitioquodscientia estordinatio depicta inanimaunitatis etdiversita-
tiscausatorum. Unitas autemetdiversitas causatorum ab
procedit unita(te) primecause,
queestDeus.Cumenimsecundum Boetium omnismultitudo procedat ab unitate, ergo
perlocuma coniugatis omniabonaprocedunt a bono; quaread cognitionem causatorum
necessariaestcognitio prime cause,queestDeus.SedcumipseDeussitinfinite bonitatis
etpotentie, intellectus humnus verofinitus etinfiniti adfinitum nullaestproportio, in-
tellectusnosternequitapprehendere ipsum Deum in sua virtute et essentia, oportet
quodpriuscognoscamus creaturas ipsas,ut percognitionem creaturarum tamquam a
posterioribus veniamus ad cognitionem Creatoris. Et illuddebet esse finistotius philoso-
phievelscientie.

The careless compositionof thisprologue appears the more clearlyfrom

the fact that in commentingupon the initial phrase of the Summuieour

1 Cfr.MetaphZ. n, i037a29-30.
2 Arist.
Deanima vol.IX.DeAnimae
III,42^31 ff.Cfr.Averroes 149K 4; Themistii
Beatitudine
DeAnima W.v. Moerbeke)
(transi. LiberV,p. 221,43.

11:59:12 AM
author again startswith the usual items, the four causes, the forma
, and the cui partiquestion:
its titulus
tractatus,
Dialetica est ars artiumetc. In principio cuiuslibet libriquatuor suntinquirenda,
scilicetquidsit causaefficiens, materialis, formalis, finalis. Causaefficiens est huius
operismagister Petrus Hyspanus. Causa materialis est duplex, scilicetsillogismus et
partes linde
sillogismi, sillogismus estcum dico : omne animal est substantia ; omnis homo
estanimal;ergoomnis<homo>estsubstantia. Partessillogismi sunttrespartesomne
animaletc.Et debemus scirequodpartessillogismi possunt tripliciter consideran : aut
sunt
inquantum propinque, inquantumaut sunt remote ; aute inquantum sunt remotissi-
me.Sedinquantum suntpropinque, sicsuntpropositiones etinquantum suntremote, sic
suntdieti ones.Sedinquantum suntremotissime, sicsuntsillabe.Proprietas sillogismiest
affirmatio et negatio.
Causaformalis estmodusvel forma tractandi et forma tractatus. Formatractandi est
quintuplex, scilicetdiffinitiva, divisiva,probativa, inprobativa, exemplorum positiva.
Perhocquoddicitexemplorum , tangit
positiva totumsillogismum et partessillogismi et
proprietates eius. Forma tractatusest divisio libri percapitula.
Causafnalis estutilitas et istaestquadruplex. Estquedamutilitas quod(que MS)dat
modum sciendiet iterinaliasscientias. Aliaestutilitas quod(que MS)datexercitium
( >. Tertiautilitas est quodprobatsuasregulaset nonalias,sicut
< ). Quartautilitas estquoddiscernit verum a falso.Etsicpatetquesit
causaefficiens, materialis formalis, fnalis.Ethocestingenerali et speciali.
Accedamus adformam tractatus.Undein principio cuiuslibet libresexsuntinquirenda,
scilicet
quesitcausaefficiens, quematerialis, queformalis, quefnalis, cuipartiphiloso-
phiesupponatur. Causaefficiens estmagister PetrusHyspanus. Causamaterialis triplex,
scilicetsillogismus, partessillogismi et proprietates partium sillogismi, sicutpriusfuit
dictum.Causaformalis estduplex:forma tractandi et forma tractatus. Formatractandi
estquintuplex, utdictum estsuperius. Formatractatus estdivisiolibripersuacapitula
velpersuaspartes.Causafnalis esttriplex : propinqua, remota etremotissima. <. . . .).
Tytulus talis est: Incipiunt tractatus Petri Cui
Magisti Hyspani. partiphilosophie suppona-
tur?Seiendesermocinali.

Next the lectioprimais given. It containsa divisiotextuswith a sententia

lectionisin generali, then a sententiain speciali, followed by a set of
I give the complete text o the firstlectio
notabiliaand a set of questiones.
vb-2rb);
Hocvisoad litteram accedamus. Undecumdivisiovaleatad tria,dividatur isteliberin
XII capitula.Undeprimum capitulumest introductionis.Et non dicituristeliber
introductoriustantum quoniametiamalii librisuntintroductorii, sed isteest magis
quiaperistum
introductorius, introducimurnosadalioslibros.Etistam magnam divisio-
nemobmittamus noscausabrevitatis
etaccipiamus minorem.
Undeisteprimus induaspartes.Inprimadiffinit
liberdividitur dyaleticam. In secunda
determinatde principiis incompletedyaletice.Secunda parsibi: Sonus. Ubi presens
Primaparsestpresentis
lectiofinietur. lectionis. in quatuor
Et dividitur partescausa
In primapartediffinit
brevitatis. dyaleticam.In secunda ponitconclusionem. In tertia
ponitethymologiam. In quartaostendita quo sit incepturus.Primaestin principio
26

11:59:12 AM
 lectionis.secunda ibi: Etideoinacquisitione . Tertiaibi: dyaletica dicitur a dya.Quartaibi:
Sedquiadisputatio.
Ethecestsententia lectionis ingenerali. In specialisicprocedit circapartem primam.
Dyaletica etc.Hicponuntur dueclausule.Primaestde arsartium , secunda de hocquod
dicit:ad omnium methodorum. Per hoc quoddicitarsartium dnottexcellentiam per
unamregulam, quia omnis genitivus pluralis reflexus super nominativm dnott excel-
lentiam, ut Deusdeorum , virgo virginum, arsartium. Veldicoarsartium perexcellentiam
nonquodsitnobilior aliisscientiis, sed quiaprebetmodum aliisscientiis vel deservit
f.2ra aliissciIentiis, sicutmanus dicitur organum non
organorumquia sit nobilior aliismembris,
sedquiadeservit aliismembris. Veldicitur arsartium quasidomina aliarum artium per
excellentiam eoquodomnibus aliisscientiis prebeat iter.Velsic: arsarcium idestforma
et luxaliarum artium, quiasicutluxillumint visibile, sicdyaletica illumint aliasartes.
Aliaestcumdicitadomnium methodorum etc.,idesthabetviamcognoscendi ad omnium,
idestad omnesaliasartes,lindeprincipium inloycaidemestquodregulaingramatica.
Methodus idemestquodbrevis viavelbrevis scientiavelbrevis ars.
Et hecestexplanatio primepartis.Incipit secunda. In quaponitconclusionem dicens :
postquam itaestquoddyaletica estarsartium perhocquoddicitcomplete cesstobiectio
que possetfieriab aliquo,quiapossetdicerealiquis: egovideoquodpriusacquirimus
gramaticam quamloycam;ergogramaticam priordebetessein acquisitione. Solvitur
hocperquandam distinctionem fieri
queposset quiaacquirere esse
potest complete vel
incomplete. Si loquarde acquisitione incomplete, dico quodgramatica debet(esse)c
prioracquiri.Si complete, sicdicoquoddyaletica estprior.
Posteasequitur illaparsinquaponitethymologiam. lindedifferentia estinterethymolo-
giamet interpretationem. Ethymologia estquandolatinm exponitur pergrecum vel
grecum perlatinm. Interpretado quandolatinm peraliudlatinm, utesthic: lapis
dicitur quasiledens pedem, lindedyaletica dicitur a dya , quodestduo, et(velMS)lexis ,
quod est ratio, scilicet opponentis et respondentis in disputatione.
Dicistuquoddyaletica nonpotest haberinisidisputando. Egovideoquodaliquishabeat
istamscientiam sinedisputatione quamvis habeatur (habeant MS) cumdisputatione.
Dico quodnonpossithaberepleneet perfecte.
Etitaestfinita tertia parsetincipit quarta.Inquaostendit a quositincepturus. Etdicit
sic: Sedquiadisputatio nonpossit haberi nisimediante sermone necsermo nisimediante voce
quiaomnis vox estsonusf ideo a sono a
tamquampriori est inchoandumy hocest incipiendum.
Finitaestsententia lectionis ingenerali et inspeciali.
Adevidentiam lectionis possumus aliquanotareet aliquadubitare.
Primum notabile estquodomniscognitio reiautfitperoperationem autperspeculatio-
nem.Si peroperationem, sichabemus artemvelfacultatem. Ethocdiversimode, quia
arsartatnosadsuasregulas. Aliomodoestfacultas quiareddit nosfaciles. Siperspecula-
tionem, hocesttripliciter. Autin comparatione ad doctorem ; sicestdoctrina. Autin
ad
comparationediscipulum ; et sic est disciplina. Aut in comparatione ad animam
rationalem ; sicestscientia ; ethoctriplex : autinhabendo respectum inseautabsolute
inse; sicestscientia. Si ad aliud,autadditcircaillamscientiam saporem;et sic est
sapientia;autadditamorem; sic estphilosophia, quiaphilosophus estamator sapientie.
lindeestobiectio:quicumque amatphilosophiam, estphilosophus; sedrusticus amat
philosophiam ; ergoestphilosophus.
Solutio.Differentia estinteramareet desiderare. Amareestcognitio(!)reihabite;
desiderare estcognitio reihabende.
Secundum notabile estquoddyaletica dicitur a dya, quodestduo,et logos , quodest
27

11:59:12 AM
 sermo, vellexis, quodestratio.Perhocquoddicitlogos , comprehendit istastresscientias,
scilicetgramaticam, dyaleticam, rethoricam, quia istetresscientie suntde sermone.
Perhocquoddicita dya, quodestduo,etlexis , quodestratio,ethocduobus modis : aut
discernitunumoppositum abalioopposito ; etsicsuntistetres: gramatica, dyaletica, re-
thorica.Autdiscernit verum a falso.Etsicestdyaletica solummodo.
Tertium notabile estquoddyaletica et loycapossunt dupliciterconsideran: autlargo
modo,autstricto modo.Si consideretur stricto modo,sic estliberTopicorum. Si largo
modo,sic estloyca,que comprehendit omneslibrosloycales.
Quartum estquodgramatica etloycapossunt consideran duobus modis : autinviadoctri-
ne,autin viascientie. Si in viadoctrine, sicdicoquodgramatica pecedit dyaleticam.
Si inviascientie, sicpecedit dyaletica.
Quintum est quod scientiapotesthabereduobusmodis:aut per infusionem; et sic
habuerunt sancti;autperinventionem; et hocdupliciter; autperinventionem, et sic
habuerunt philosophi ; aut perdoctrinam ; <et sic habemus) nos sequaces.
Sextum estquodphilosophia estdivinarum humanarumque rerum certacognitio iuncta
cumratione benevivendi. Aliomododicitur cognitio universi cuiusdescriptio anima
in
est <in>cpresenti, summa nobilitasinfuturo estcausasumme felicitatis.
Septimum notabileestquodab Augustino dyaletica sicdiffinitur
: dyaletica est scientia
que esurientes pascit,sicientes reficit, mutosloquifacit,linguas ballutiencium dirigit,
animam rationalem ad aliasscientias ordinat et disponit.
Octavum notabileest quodarsest collectiomultorum preceptorum ad unumfinem
tendentium. Aliter:arsestfinitum infinitatis compendium rationisinsigne miraculum,
quamsi perse consideres minimam invenies quantitatem( )!.
Nonum(octavum MS)notabile (est)quodtractatus estbrevisliberet utilisa doctorum
codicibus compilatus. Item.Introductio estbreviset apertademonstratio.
Decimum (decimus MS)estquoddyaletica potestduobusmodisconsideran. Unomodo
secundum quod est docens; et sic est scientia. Alio modo secundum quodestutens;
etsicestars.Item.Adhuc potest duobus modisconsideran. Autsecundum quoddeservit
aliisscientiis;et sic estancillaet vilior.Si consideretur secundum quoddatmodum
sciendiet informat cognitionem ad aliasscientias, sicestnobilior.

Queritur utrum dyaleticadebeatprecedere gramaticam.Etvideturquodsic.Viapecedit

idcuiusestvia. Seddyaletica estviaadaliasscientias( >; ergopece-
dit.Adidem.Dyaletica considrtverum etfalsum,gramaticuscongruum etincongruum.
Sedveritasetfalsitas exsignificatis,
oritur congruitasetincongruitas
exmodis significandi.
2rb Sed pecedit modum Ergoloycaprece| ditgramaticam.
significandi.
significatum
Sedcontra.Quodgramatica prcdt probo.Gramatica considrtgeneralia significata,
dyaleticaspecialia.Sedgenerale pecedit speciale.Ergogramaticapecedit dyaleticam.
Item.Littereetsillabesuntpartes gramatice, etorationes
dictiones loyce.Sedlittera et
sillabapreceduntdictionem et orationem. Ergo etc
.
Solutio.Gramaticaetloycapossunt dupliciterconsideran: autproutestinviadoctrine ;
et sic gramatica
pecedit dyaleticam. Si in viascientie, pecedit
dyaletica gramaticam.
Etsicsolvitur.
Aliaquestioestutrum dyaleticasitscientia.Etquodnonsitscientia probo.Si dyaletica
autessetperinventionem
essetscientia, autperdoctrinam. Quodnonsitperinventionem
patet,quiacontingeret ut aliquisesseta quo haberemus eam,et de ilio aliam;et sic
1 Thisdefinition
isincomplete Cp.Log.Mod.Ili,p. 17$.
inourmanuscript.
28

11:59:12 AM
essetprocedere in infinitum.Itemaliaratione.Omnisscientiasupponit suaprincipia;
Seddyaletica nonsupponit, immoprobat.Ergononestscientia. Item.Omneilludquod
transcendit aliamscientiam, nonestscientia.Sed dyaletica transcendit.Ergononest
scientiadyaleitica.
Solutio.Respondeo primoad primm. Quandotudicisquodomnisscientia autfitper
inventionem autperdoctrinam, duplexest scilicet
inventio, extraneaet per sensum. Si
extranea, sic concedoquoddyaletica nonsitscientia.
Si persensum, sic dicoquodest
scientia.
Ad secundum argumentum respondeo. Quandotu dicisquodomnisscientia supponit
sua principia, dico quod dyaletica potestduobusmodisconsideran:aut secundum
quodestdocens,etsicdicoquodsupponit suaprincipia.
Autsecundum quodestutens.
Etsicdicoquodnonsubponit sedprobat.
Ad tertium argumentum respondeo. Quandotu dicisquodtranscendit aliasa se; $ed
dyaleticatranscendit; ergoetc. Etestibidistributio
accommoda, ut *celum tangitomnia'
aliasa se. Sicdyaleticatranscenditaliasa se.

That the text of our commentaryis the result of lectures may appear
fromsuch clauses as ubifiniturlectiohodierna(2rb).
The order of the tractsis in the Todi manuscript:
Prologus:ira-rb
I De introductionibus: i rb-10rb
II Depredicabilibus : iorb-i2vband37ra~vb 1
III De sillogismis : 37vto-40ra
IV De locis : 40- 44
V De suppositionbus 44va-47rb
VI Depredicameli s 47rb-48vband2$ra-29ra
VII Defallaciis : 29^-36^ and13r-24r*>
VIII De relativis 24rb-vb and49ra-orb
IX De ampliationibus
etappellationibus: vto
orb-o
X De restrictionibus: ovb-2 va
XI De distributionibus : $2va-6vb.

A few remarksare called for. Althoughthe author speaks of a division

into twelve chapters,the tracts De ampliationibusand De appellationibus
are takentogetheras the ninthchapter,withthe resultthatinsteadof the
usual twelvechaptersthe finalnumberis eleven. This seemsto confirmthe
abbreviatorycharacterof this redactionof Robert's commentaryand fits
in well withtheratherclumsycompositionof theprologue,which can be
explained most plausiblyas the resultof a somewhathastycompilation2.
The firstcapitulumor liberis called introductions.The introductory
characterof the whole Summule is conceded by our author,but the first

1 Notice
theincorrect ofthefirst
binding four Seeabove,
squires. p. 16.
* Seeabove,
p. 2$.
29

11:59:12 AM
chapteris introductorypar excellence , he says,so thatit is given the title
De introductionibus . In thisconnectionit mustbe noticedthatthecomplete
work by Peter of Spain was not entitled Introductiones nor Summule
logicales , but Tractatus Magisti Petri Hyspani (ivb). In some commentaries
the titleIntroductiones is found, but thistitleis certainlyto be considered
as thatof the firstchapteronly. So in the wide-spreadthirteenthcentury
anonymouscommentaryOmneshomines1 , found in at least seven manu-
scripts2, we read : Titulus libri est iste: Introductiones maistriPetriYspani
(Nuremberg,Germ . Mus. cod. 27773, f. ioovb), and in the firstredaction
of Robert's commentary:Tytulusautem talis est: Incipiunt introductiones
magisti Petri Yspani(Vat. Lat. f.
3049, 2rt))3. That for Robert the correct
title of Peter's work is not introductiones but tractatusappears fromthe
explicitof the same manuscript(Vat. Lat. 3049, f. 8irb): Finita est ista
compilatio supertractans(for: tractatus)etc.4.
Furthermore,the unusualplace of De predicamentis (afterthe tractof
supposition) can be noticed. Then, the tract De jallaciis discusses the
so-called Fallaciemaiores , not the shortversionthatis foundin partof the
older manuscripts,such as Vat. Reg. Lat. 120g, which Bocheski used
forhis edition of Peter's Summule* .
The text of this redaction of Robert's commentaryoften differs
considerablyfromthatof the Rome redaction.The deviationsare indeed
so strikingthat one would be inclined to take them for two different
commentaries. The numerous similarities and parallellous passages
mightbe explained,in thatsupposition,as the resemblancesand parallells
between different authorsthatare quite usual in thatkindofcommentary.
However, one glance at the explicitof the Todi redaction sufficesto
know that we reallyhave to do with two redactionsof the same work.
As a matterof factthe work has two colophons in the Todi manuscript.
On f. $6V under the second column we read : Expliciunt glosulecomposite
a magistro R. Anglicosupertractatum magisti P. Hyspaniextracte a totalogyca
novaet veteri.DEO GRACIAS.
1 SeeGrabmann, undFunde
Forschungen
Handschriftliche , pp.67-69.
2 Munich, C.L.M. 4603;690$22.294;Paris, B.N.Nouv. Acq.lat.308;Nuremberg, Germanisches
Museum, cod.ly.yyz; Escorial,cod.Fol.III,26,andVienna, V.P.L.2389.
3 Grab mann wrongly tookthetitleintroductionesforthewhole book.Seetheintroduction tohis
editionofWilliam ofShyreswood's inlogicam
Introductiones (Sitzungsberichte Akade-
derBayerischen
miederWissenschaften, -Hist.
Phil. Klasse1937,Heft 10,Mnchen 1937,p. 16). Inmyviewthe
titleIntroductiones
forWilliam's work isnotcorrect either.
4 Seeabove, p. 14andbelow, pp.31-32.
5 Likemost ofthesupposed firstclassmanuscripts,themanuscript Vat.Keg.Lat.i2o$hasbeen
overestimated sofar.Itcontainssomeapparent Seemyfirst
interpolations. paperinthisseries
in
VIVARIUM 7 (1968),pp.1-34.
30

11:59:12 AM
 This colophon was writtenby our scribe under the firstpart of the
fragmenton fallacies following immediatelyafter our commentary1.
The commentaryitselfends as follows (^6vb) :
Item.Notandum uno mododicitprivationem
quod infinitum finite (!).
exceptionis
Alio mododicitprivationem finitemultinls or multiplicationis
(multitudinis ?; cfr.
Vat.Lat. 3049,f.8irb).Primomodoest passioquantitatiscontinue, secundomodo
Item.Notandum
discrete. quodnomen infinitum
estnomensimplex secundum quodest
signum et ad
inpositum imam
significandum rem, utdictumest.
Finitaestistacompilacio a magistro
supertractatus R. Anglico,in qua proutconari
circamateriam explanandi P. Hyspani.
potuitmagisti

In spite of the numerousstrikingdifferencesbetween the wordingof our

commentaries,we can safelyassume thatthe Rome and Todi manuscripts
present a double redaction of one master's commentaryon Peter of
Spain's Summulelogicales.
A strikingdifferencebetween both redactions,however, is thatin
the Todi redaction the explanatoryparts are much shorterthan in the
Rome redaction,and that the former,in order to elucidate the matter
dealt with, insertsmore questions and sophisms. This featureseems to
point to a later compositionof the Todi version2.

As to the clumsycolophon foundat the end of both redactions,the Todi

manuscriptsuffices,if necessaryat all, to show the incompetenceof the
scribe of the Rome manuscript,which actuallyhas supratractansinstead
of supertractatus , and conatiinstead of conari. However, the colophon
even in its Todi version still affordsplentyof difficulties.In Rome the
word proutwas apparentlyoverseen before conari. Todi, at the other
hand, readspotuitinsteadofpotest , which mightbe explainedas a hintfor
the priorityof the redactionof our commentaryas found in the Rome
manuscript3,and it has potuitafterthe phrasemateriam explanandi.Rome
omits circabeforemateriam. I would suppose thatthe clumsyword dacio
read in the Rome manuscriptbefore magistiPetriYspaniis the scribe's
misreadingfor an inserted circa, which he took fromthe margin and
put in on the wrong place. That he was a very unreliable copyistwe
have already seen. Both manuscriptshave explanandi . The gerunddoes
not fit in here; moreovera verbum is
nitum missing. I thinkwe have
to read somethinglike explanavit.
1 Seeabove,p. 30.
* beealsobelow,p. 44.
3 Forthispriority,
seealsobelow,
p.44.

31

11:59:12 AM
 With all due reservationI would propose to read the original
colophon as follows:
supertractatus
Finitaest istacompilacio RobertoAnglico.In qua prout
a magistro
conaripotestcircamateriam Petri
Magisti Yspani.
explanavit

The Rome manuscriptcontains a valuable addition about the date of

composition. Unfortunatelythe date proper must be considered as
corrupt, since the year 1207 is certainlywrong:
AnnoDominimillesimo ducentsimo maijterciadecimadie, sole
septimomen<se>
invire1
existente (81 va) octavo
graduthauri 2.

The date May 13 th, 1207 is impossible, since Peter of Spain's Summule
3
logicalescannot possiblyhave been writtenat so an earlydate . But how
to correctour text? Grabmann,who considered Robert Kilwardbyto be
the author of our commentary,proposed to supply quadragesimoor
quinquagesimo before septimo To my mind this is a quite arbitrary
encroachmentupon the manuscriptreading. From the palaeographical
point of view other conjectures would be more appropriate; e.g.
trecentesimo insteadof ducentsimo(our scribe may have had or read in his
text instead of ) ; or one may read septuagsimo instead of
septimo, or {septuagsimo) . In these cases we would have,respective-
septimo
ly, the dates 1 1
307, 270, and 1277 as the possible dates forthe compo-
sition of our text. The firstconjecture can be dismissed for other
reasons: our commentarymust have been writtenbefore thatby Simon
of Favershams,who died in 1306 and wrote probablyhis commentary
at some date about 1280 at the latest6.Thus, 1270 and 1277 are leftas
we have to establish
possible dates. In order to solve this question,
Robertus Anglicus' identityfirst.

1 Fora correction
ofthisword,seebelow, p. 33.
2 Seeabove,p. 14.
3 Itshould
benoticed theauthor
that diedin1277.Theearliest
possible would
dateoitheSummule
beinthe1220'sorearlier i23o's,I think.
4 Handschriftliche undFunde
Forschungen , p. 67,n. i.
Seebelow,pp. 40 ff.
6 SeeL. M. de Rijk,SimonofFarersham asa Commentator in VI-
l-Voj theaummule,
oj thetracts
VARIUM 6 (1968),[pp.69-101],p. 76.
32

11:59:12 AM
 4 - The identityof Robertus Anglicus
Several Mediaeval scholarswere called Robertus . As a matterof
Anglicus
fact Fabricius mentions a RobertusAnglicusin his Bibliothecamediae
aetatiSypublished in 1746 (VI, pp. 379-380; second edition, p. 13s1).
He was bishop of Olmutz in 1201 and is to be dismissed therefore.
Several other Mediaeval scholars were surnamedRobertus , e.a.
Anglicus
one Robertus OrfordiusO.P., a theologianwho was born at Erfortand
became masterof theologyat Oxford. He is alleged to have been one of
the stoutestdefendersof Thomas Aquinas. He cannotbe consideredhere
either.
Through the importantstudies of Paul Tannrywe know aout a
Robertus Anglicuswho wrote on mathematicaland astronomicalsubjects
at Montpellierin the firsthalfof the 1270V. Tanneryrightlyrejects an
identificationof this Robertus with Robert Grosseteste (d. 12^3) and
with Robert Kilwardby.The firstrejection is self-evidentbecause of the
date of Grosseteste's death (12^3). That our scholar cannot have been
Robert Kilwardbyeither, needs more adstruction.
Let we startwiththe colophonofsome ofthemanuscriptscontaining
Robertus Anglicus' Tractatusquadrantisor his Tractatusde sphera2.The
thirteenthcenturymanuscriptParis, B. N. Lat. 7392s gives as the explicit
of the Tractatusde speraJo. de Sacroboscoad glo (sas) RO (BERTI) Anglici
(ff. 2ra-43rb):
Finitaestistacompiladosupermateriam de speracelestiad maioremintroductionem
scolariumin MontePessulano studentium,
quemcomposuit MagisterRo. Anglicus
et
finivit inprimo
a.d. 1271 soleexistente gradutaurietscorpione inascendente.
existente
Explicittractatus
de spera(43rl>)*.
1 PaulTannery, duquadrant
Letraite dematreRobert
Angls XIIIe
(Montpellier, siclec.)Textelatin
e*
anciennetraduction grecquein: Noticesetextraits
desmanuscrits
dela Bibliothque
Nationale
etautre
ypublis
bibliothques parl'Acadmiedesinscriptions
etBelles-Lettres
35,2,Paris 1897,pp.61-639.
2 Thework wasedited andtranslated byLynn Thorndike, TheSphere
ofSacroboscoandItsCommen-
tators
(TheUniversity ofChicago Press1949),pp.143-246.
3 Tannery'sdate(XIVe sicle
) doesnotholdgoodforthesecond partofthemanuscript, sincethe
colophonofthetract onlogicitcontains gives1293asthedateofwriting. Forthismanuscript,
seeL. M.deRijk,OnTheGenuine TextofPeterofSpain'sSummule LogicalesI: General problems
concerningpossible inthemanuscripts,
interpolations in: VIVARIUM 6 (1968),[pp.1-34], pp.
24-33.
* Notf.43v,asissaidbyTannery. Thetextopens onf. 2ra(not:1vas Tannery hasit)with a
prologue:Tractatum De in
Spera quatuor capitula , dicentes
distinguimus inprimoquidsitspera
etc.containing
John deSacrobosco's text.Robert'sglossbeginsonf.2va:Unasciencia estnobilior
altera , autquiaestdenobiliori
dupliciter autquiacertiori
subiecto, modo Inter
procedit. aliasigitur
scientias
astronomia
intur (? for:invenitur tamquiaestdenobiliori
) dicinobilissima subiecto
, quoniam estde
celesti
corpore etincorruptibili
ingenerabili , quodestcorpusnobilissimum
, tumquiacertiorimodo ,
procedit
quoniamdemonstrative . . . etc.
procedit
33

11:59:12 AM
A similar colophon is found in Oxford, Bodleian Library, ms. Digby
48, f. 88r, with the exceptionof the date (here : 1272)1. Since one of the
2
manuscriptscontainingthe Tractatus quadrantishas as the date of writing
i 276s, we must take the year 1276 as its terminus antequem.
From this evidence the conclusion may be drawn that Robert
Anglicus, the author of a Tractatusquadrantisand a commentaryon the
well-knowntractDe spheraby Johnde Sacrobosco, taughtat Montpellier
about 1271-72. The questionariseswhetherthisauthormaybe identified
with Robert Kilwardby. Tannery seems to be right in rejecting this
identification* . Tannery's main argument was the apparent lack of
interest in mathematical and astronomical subjects on the part of
Kilwardby,since nothingin the lists of his extantwritingsindicatesany
special interest of that kind. Some fortyyears ago two scholars, M.
Alliaume5 and P. Humbert6, believed to be able to undermine this
argumentof Tannery's by pointing to certain treatises "de aritmetica ,
de geometria , de astronomiaRobertiKilwardby , priorisprovincialisJratrum
predicatorum in provinciaAngliefound,according to Laude' s catalogue, in
the public libraryof Bruges (cod. io). Humbert supposed that about
12407, soon after the founding of the University8,Kilwardby was
1 SeeJosiah CoxRussell, ofThirteenth
Writers CenturyEngland, London 1936,p. 129.TheMSSalzburg
SanktPeter, cod27.9,dating from 129$hasthesame butinstead
explicit ofMontpessulano: Parisius.
2 Cambridge, UniversityLibrary,MS1767.SeeTannery, op.cit.,p. 574.Thiscopy isascribed to
Io.deMontepessulano.Fortheincorrectness ofthisattribution,seeTannery, op.cit.,pp.S7-S7l
m; Sl*>
3 Itwasedited byTannery, op.cit.,pp.s93-639.
* Mrs.EllenM.F. Sommer-Seckendorff iscertainlywrong when inhebookonRobert Kilwardby
inThe
(Studies ofRobert
Life Kilwardby.OP.,Dissertationeshistoricae VIIIoftheInstitutum Historicum
FF.Predicatorum Romae ad S. Sabinae, Rome1937,p. 11)shewrites thatTannery "sought to
anidentity
establish between ourSchoolman (viz.Robert Kilwardby) anda certain
Robertus Anglicus
wholived andpursued hismathematical atMontpellier
investigations inthesixties
ofthecentury ..
Tannery considered thepossibilityofKilwardby havingcomposed boththese mathematical works,
but. . . theFrench authorpursued thematter nofurther". Infact Tannery clearlyrejected such
anidentification;seeop.cit.,p. 79: cette meparat
hypothse devoir tre
ecarte.
s M.Alliaume, Etudenomographique duquadrantdeRobert 1Anglais in:Annales delaSocit scienti-
fiquedeBruxelles 45 (1926),[pp.139-148], p. 140,n.4.
6 P. Humbert, Matre 1Anglais
Robert inVieIntellectuelle
4 (1932),t. XIV,pp.81-86.
7 Infact,a Robertus AnglicuswasatMontpellier in1240.SeeA.Germain, Cartulairedel'Universit
deMontpellier souslesauspices
, publi duConseil gnraldesFacults deMontpellier, I ( 1181-1400),
Montpellier 1890,p. 190,where a Robertus
Anglicusisamong thesubscribers ofa document dating
from 14and21January 1240andcontaining thecomplementary statutsoftheUniversity ofMont-
Desiderius
pellier: deValensa, frater Guillermus deConchis O.F.M.,Johannes Anglicus, Robertus
, Stephanus
Anglicus Rinna de Ronha, Johannes BonaFlandrensis, Felixde Tranbleto, Petrusde
Assura.Itshould benoticed that noneofthem signed asmagister.
8 Thisnotcorrect. Thefacultasmedicinae dates
from asearly as 1181,thefacultas iuris from about
thesame time, while thefacultas
artium certainlyexistedasearly as 1220.SeeH.Denifle, DieEnt-
derUniversitten
stehung desMittelalters
bis1400 , Berlin i88$,(reprint Graz19^6),pp.341-347.
Denifle
rightly thefact
stressed thatMontpellierwasastudium generale perconsuetudinem
, op.cit.,p.347).
34

11:59:12 AM
teaching at Montpellier and that he returned to England later, but
revisitedMontpellierin 1271, on the occasion of the General Chapter
of the Black Friarsheld there,and thatKilwardbytook thisopportunity
of publishingthe commentaryon De sphera.
Several points of Humbert's view need comment. First, Alliaume
and Humbert were misled by the inaccurate informationgiven in this
old catalogue, and failed to see that the treatisesfound in the Bruges
-
manuscriptare nothingbut parts of Kilwardby'streatiseDe ortuscienti
arum1.As a matterof fact this work contains some chapterson these
subjects which exhibit the usual level of knowledge any masterof arts
was required and supposed to possess in Kilwardby's days. Moreover, as
is rightlypointed out by Mrs. Sommer-Seckendorff,Kilwardby in
De ortuscientiarum expresses a pronounced mistrustof astrologywhich,
in so faras it deals withmeteorology,he allowes to be a science, although
as yettoo underdevelopedto be reliable, while thatwhichwas concerned
with the horoscope and divination,was stronglycondemned by him as
superstitionand magic.2 Therefore Tannery's argumentis still to be
considered as tellingagainstKilwardby'sauthorshipof the tractsunder
discussion and, accordingly,againstan identificationof Kilwardbyand
our Robertus Anglicus.
Secondly, we know that fromabout the middle of the 1240's, the
date of his assumingthe Black Friars' habit3, he had devoted himself
entirelyto theology,as is quite plausiblebecause of hisgeneralreputation
as a great theologian among his contemporaries,which he must have
gained before his election as Provincial in 12614. Well, how can it
possiblybe explained, in Humbert's view, thatcomingas a Provincialon
the General Chapter at Montpellier, about ten years after ending his
academic career devoted entirely,it seems, to theologianstudies from
about 1248 to 1261, Kilwardbysuddenlydecided to publish at Mont-
pellier a treatisehe must have alreadycomposed manyyearsbefore, ad
maiorem introductionem scolariumin Montepessulano
studentium? Why would
he have waited so long?*
One conclusion only can be drawn from our evidence: Robert
Kilwardbycannot be the author of the Tractatusquadrantisnor of the
commentaryon Sacrobosco's De sphera.
1 Seethemodern byA. dePoorter.
catalogue
2 op.cit.
y(seeabove, p. 8,n. 3),p. 13.
3 SeeSommer-Seckendorff, op.cit.,p. .
4 Seeibid.p. 6.
s Mrs.Sommer-Seckendorff is perfectly inrejecting
right Humbert's onthisground.
conjectures
Seeop.cit.p. 12.

IS

11:59:12 AM
 But who was Robertus Anglicus named as the author of these
treatises?Mrs. Sommer-Seckendorff believed1 that the question finds
an unexpected solution throughsome informationgiven by P. Glorieux
in his work on the thirteenthcenturytheologicalmastersof Paris. In his
article on John of St. Giles Glorieux notes among the works of this
masterlisted under gg: Tractatus , the incipitof which is
quadrantisveteris
identicalwith thatof the tractascribedto our master.RobertusAnglicus
(Geometrie due suntpartes)2.However, in the manuscriptsmentionedby
Glorieux our tract is either anonymousor ascribed to one Io. de Mon-
tepessulano (c.q. Io. Anglicus).As a matteroffactnone ofthe 38 manuscript
copies of this work so farknown3ascribesit to Johnof St. Giles (Johan-
nes de S. Egidio). As to the attributionto one Jo. de Montepessulano,
Tanneryhas convincinglyshown thatthe readingIo mustbe the resultof
a misreadingof ro. (for: Robertus)*.Therefore, Mrs. Sommer's thesis
must be rejected as disprovedby all manuscriptevidence.
To my mind, sound philologydemands to assume the existence of
one Robertus Anglicuswho taughtat Montpellier in the early 1270^ and
wrote a Tractatusquadrantisand a commentaryon Johnde Sacrobosco's
De sphera. An identificationof our Robert with any other author
hitherto known is not justifieds. Unfortunately,no master Robertus
Anglicus is mentioned in the documents concerningthe universityof
Montpellier6.There is mentionedone Robertus Anglicus , who, however,
is not called magister , in the University Cartularium edited by Germain,
for the year 12407. It is impossible so far to decide whetherhe is the
Robertus Anglicuswho is mentionedin the colophon of the commentary
of Johnof Sacrobosco as teachingat Montpellierin 127 1- 127 28. Tannery
(op. cit., pp. 585-585) suggeststhat Robert's knowledgeofthequadrant
follows that of William Anglicus (who is mainlyknown as a physician

1 op.cit.fpp.13-14.
2 Palmon Glorieux, desMatres
Rpertoire deParis
enthologie auXIIIe , Paris1933,
sicle nr.3,p. 53.
3 SeeTannery, op.cit.,pp.S7~S7S whomentions 3$ copies,andJosiah CoxRussell,op.cit.,
p. 129,whoaddsOxford, Bodleian Canon.
Library, Ital.1j (XIVs.)andLondon, British
Museum,
MS.Egerton 844.Tothese shouldbeaddedParis, B. N.Lat.ig2i.
4 Seeop.cit.ypp.SJO-S74- and^78-^79.
s Leaving thequestionofRobert's undecided
nationality Tannery supposed (op.cit.y
pp.$8o-$8i)
that hissurname stands
, possibly
Anglicus forAngls
, being thelangue d'ocorthographyforAnglicus
,
wasusual
justasLanglois inFrancia, inItaly.
andInglese
6 I recently atMontpellier
investigated allthedocuments mentioned byHenri SteininhisBiblio-
graphie descartulaires
gnrale fianai* deFrance
l'histoire
ourelatifs , Paris1907,s.v.Montpellier.
7 Seeabove, p. 34,n.7.
8 Seeabove, p. 34.
36

11:59:12 AM
and an astrologerand whose life is evidenced for the period 1219-30^,
so closely thatsome relationshipbetween them may be assumed2.
Russell believes3 that our Robert is apparentlythe author of a
translationof Alkinds De iudiciis.In fact one of the manuscriptcopies
of this translationbears the title: Alkindusde iudiciisex arabico latinus
Jactusper Robertm Anglicum an. dom. 12J2 However, the transcription
dates from the sixteenth century and the colophon runs: Finit liber
AlkinditranslatioRobertiAngligenede ch , which surnameis
apparentlyto be read as de Chebilor de Choelle , as it is read in some older
copies of the work, e.g. Oxford, Bodleian Library, Ashmole 209,
f. 266r ( Finit liber AlkinditranslatioRobertiAngligenede Chebil),'or
Ashmole 369, f. ioiv (datingfromas earlyas the thirteenthcentury)*.
In my view there is no reason to ascribe this work to our Robertus
Anglicus. On the contrary,the clear attributionof thiswork to an
author named RobertusAngligenade Chebil or de Choelle , or Robertof
Chester
, as he is named in a manuscript of the British Museum6,seems to
exclude an identification with our Robertus Anglicus.

The question mustbe answerednow whetherthe Robertus Anglicus, who

is the author of Tractatusquadrantis and the commentaryon John de
Sacrobosco's De sphera7may be also the author of the two redactionsof
the commentaryon Peter of Spain's Summule logicaleswhich we foundin

1 TheMSSevilla, Biblioteca Colombina

Capitulary f - i - lg hasthecolophon: astrologia
explicit
Werbillini
magisti (!), civis
Massiliensis, est
quianglicusnatione, medicus,
professione astronomus
appellatus,
compilata
peripsum anno domini1220(f.33r).
2 There isa treatise onSacrobosco'sDeSphera inCambridge, GonvilleandCaius , MS137,
College
ff.i-24 with thecolophon: Explicit
speramaistriRoberti clerici
venerabilis Lincol-
episcopi
confessoris
niensis
(seethecatalogue byJames,p. io).Russell (op.cit.,p. 130)rightly suggeststhatthis
master wasconfessor to Robert Grosseteste,bishop ofLincoln 1235-1 253,whowashimself
inthose
interested matters. However,thereseems tobenoreason toidentify ourRobertus Anglicus
withthismaster. Ifwereally aretoidentifyhimwith a Robertus
Anglicus, theonementioned inthe
Cartulariumin 1240cannot be considered,it seems, whileourRobertus wouldbe a
Anglicus
possiblecandidate. Everything I takesuchidentifications
considered, ashighly speculative.
3 op.cit.
yp. 129.
4 Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSAshmole179,part 4. Thesame text isfound inthecolophon ofthe
16th-17thcentury transcriptofthework inOxford, BodleianLibrary, Digby de
91f.86: Alkindus
deiudiciis
exarabico latinus perRobertm
/actus Anglicumanno Domini 1272.
5 Thesixteenth century copy 434,has(f.23v): Finit
Ashmole liberAlkindi translatio
Roberti
Angligene
c-h-o - e - 1- 1- e.
6 App.VI,f. io9v;seeLynn. Thorndike andPearlKibre, A Catalogue ofMediaeval
ofIncipits
Scientific
WritingsinLatin , CambridgeMass.1937,p. 102.
7 Thorndike (The Sphere ofSacrobosco
etc.).doesnotpayanyattention toRobert Anglicus'iden-
tity.
37

11:59:12 AM
the Vatican and Todi manuscripts.Three argumentscan be adduced in
favourof the identityof our author with the teacher of Montpellier.
First,the remarkablesimilarityof the colophon in both the Rome
and Todi redaction of the Summulecommentarywith that of the De
spheracommentaryas found in Paris, B. N. Lat. 7392 and Oxford,
Bodleian Library,Digbj 48 1. This correspondenceis the more noticeable
since this kind of colophon which is well-known, indeed, fromworks
discussingquadrivium subjects, is veryunusual in tractson grammaror
dialectics. Ifour surmiseabout the identityof our authorand the teacher
of Montpellier is correct, both conjectural correctionsof the Vatican
colophon (discussed above, p. 32) may be right, as both 1270 and
1277 fitin prettywell with the dates mentioned in the colophons of
Robert's commentaryon De sphera(1271 and 1272). On palaeographical
grounds the year 1270 ( septuagsimo instead of septimo)seems to be the
more preferable.
Secondly, the occurrence of several sets of medical, astronomical
and meteorologicalnotes added in the Todi manuscriptby the same hand
thatwrote our Summule commentary2 , is a reliable clue forthe scientific
interestof the school where that commentarywas writtenand used in
class*. Well, the firstschool to be considered in this regard is that of
Montpellier, where one Robertus Anglicus is reported to have been a
teacher in the 127o,s.
Thirdly,an importanthintfor the place of originof a commentary
on the Summule is oftento be foundin the example its authorgives in his
discussion of Exemplum in the tract De locis. Well, Robertus Anglicus
gives the names of cities and villages situatedin the South of France:
Vat.
Lat. 3049,f.38va_vb: Item.Notandum quod Aristotiles in eodemlibrodocet
reducere in
exemplum sillogismos duos et docet (38vb)ponereprimam partemexempli
loco maioris propositionis primisillogismiet ex conclusione prime(!) docetfacere
minorsecundi sillogismiet ex secunda partedocetsicfacere minorem :
uAratriatenses contra est
Avinionenses malum sed ajpmes(l)* contra ( !)
ajfmos
(!) pugnare
pugnareestmalum".
Aliussillogismus esttalis:
"Ajfmos(!) pugnare contra (!) estmalum
ajfimes sedArelatenses
pugnarecontra
Avinionenses
estmalum".

1 Seeabove,pp.14and31.
2 Seeabove,pp.17-21.
3 Forthiscommentary seeabove,
asa school-book, p. 29.
4 or:affiniesl

38

11:59:12 AM
Even ifwe bear in mindthe inaccuracyof the scribe1, thereis no denying
that he wrote the geographical names correctly in at least one case:
forthe inhabitantsof Arlesen Avinionenses
Arelatenses forthoseof Avignon.
But what about his Aratriatenses ? If we would consider
(or : Aratiatenses)
this as a scribal error for Arelatenses, his example of exemplum would
become useless, since an exemplum argumentation should contain three
termsat least; in our case : A pugnarecontraB malumest; ergoB pugnare
contraC malumest (c.q. ergoC pugnarecontraD malumest). But what is
or Aratiatenses
Aratriatenses to be taken for? Let us see what the Todi
redaction of our commentarytells about exemplum. Todi has wrongly
twice Aurelianenses of : ^
(inhabitants Orleans)
Com.,$4,f.4ovb:Posteadeterminai
Todi,Bibi. de aliaspecie,scilicetde exemplo,
et
dicit3quodquandounumparticulare probatur peraliudparticulareperaliquam simili-
tudinem repertaminipsis,tuncestexemplum. Verbigratiaait3:
contra
*Avi(ni)onenses Aurelianenses
pugnaremalumest
ergoAurelianensescontra
Avi(ni)onenses
pugnaremalumest*
.
Similitudoestaffinitas.
Seddifferentia estinteraffini
tatemet vicini
tatem, quiaaffini
tas
estinterea que nonsunteiusdem castri,sedvicinitasestinterea que suntin eadem
careria.4 sumitur
Similiter hic*particulare
'
largomodo.
Ethecestsententiahuiuslectionisingenerali et inspeciali.

Since three differenttermsare wanted, it is self-evidentthat the word

Aurelianensesis the resultof the scribe's misreadingin at least one case.
In any case, it is difficultto see how the inhabitantsof Orleans can be
called affinesfo those of Avignon. Therefore the conclusion must be
drawn - the correctnessof Avinionenses (for the usual Avenionenses
) taken
for granted - that Aurelianenses is our scribe's erroneous writingfor
the inhabitantsof two different cities or villagesnear Avignon.My guess
is that we might read Arausicenses (for the inhabitantsof Arausio =
Orange) and Arelatenses,the latter readingfindingsome supportfrom
the Rome manuscript.If my surmise is correct, our example opposes
two villagesnear Avignon,one to the northof thatcity,the other to the
south.

1 Seeabove, p. 31.
2 viz.Peter ofSpain,Summule , nr.5.0sted.Bochenski.
logicales
3 Asa matter offact many other names aregiven inourmanuscripts.
4 correria= via,sedillaproprie perquamcarrus transir adscriptores
Glossarium
(Ducange,
potest
mediaeetinmae , s.v.).From
latinitatis theevidence given theword
byDucange tohave
appears been
mainlyusedinSouthern France. Thesame word isusedoncemorebyourauthor.
InTodi,f.47rb
weread : dijnitur
siccanis
: estlatrans
incarrea.

39

11:59:12 AM
In conclusion, it maybe said thatit seems to be highlyprobable, indeed,
that the commentaryon Peter of Spain's Summulelogicaleswhich is
extant in two redactions, was writtenby the same Robertus Anglicus
whose Tractatusquadrantisand commentaryon Johnof Sacrobosco's De
spherahave been preservedin some manuscripts.He is mentionedin our
manuscriptsas havingtaughtat Montpellierin the early 127o's. That the
arts of the triviumwere taughtat Montpellier, which was especially
known for its facultyof medicine, may appear from the rules for
magistiet scolaresin gramaticaet logica apud Montepessulanum
(= Mont-
pellier) vel Montepessulanetum(= Montpelliret) studentes
, dating from
March 27th, 12421.
As a matterof factRobert's commentaryon the Summule mighthave
been written at some date before the 1270*8. A comparison of his
commentarywith thatof GuillelmusArnaldi(writtenbetween 1238-44)
seems to suggestan earlier date for the composition of Robert's com-
mentary. In this connection Robert's relation to William Anglicus
(c. 1219-30) and theoccurrenceofa RobertusAnglicusin theCartularium
forthe year 1240 seem to be of some importance2.

- Some furtherremarkson the contents of Robert's Commentaries

In this section some fragmentsare given which seem to be of some
importanceforthe location of the work. They have been takenfromthe
two redactionsof Robert's commentary.

I DE INTR0DUCTI0N1BUS*
Under the lemmaNomen est vox etc. the followingnote on signijicatum
specialeis found (Rome, va):
generaleand signicatum
Item.Notandum in nomine,
quodduplexestsignificatum scilicetgenerale
et speciale.
Generale, substantiam
ut significare et sic consideratur
cumqualitate, a gramatico.
habeat<istam>
Speciale,ut significare remvelillamrem.Et sic consideratura loyco.

1 SeeA. Germain, IV(July

op.cit.,p. 191.Ina bullaofPopeClement 31th,
126$)quedamdomus
vestra ofValmagne)
(viz.oftheCisterciensians deMontepessulano studium
, ubiviget scientie
lateralis
yp. 198).
(ibid,
2 Seeabove,p. 36.
3 Forsomeremarks ontheprologue, seeabove,pp.10ff.Forthecorrectnessofthistitle,see
above,p. 30andbelow,p. 47f.
40

11:59:12 AM
The later Todi versionhas the followingpassage (2va_vb):
Sed antequam ad litermaccedamus, (2vb)quedamvideamus extraliterm,quiaego
videoquodgramaticus diffinit
nomen unomodo,loycus aliomodo.Queritur ergoquesit
causa.
Solutio.Dicoquodgramaticus considrt
generalia modorum
significata sed
significando
loycusconsidrt specialia.Sed generalesignifcatum
nominissignificatsubstantiam
nominis et qualitatemmodorum fcandi
signi sicutaccidentia Specialevero
specialia.
nominis signifcatum istamremvelillam,ut ' homo
estsignificare *
hominem,
significat
1 hoc non debemusammirari si gramaticusdiffinit
lapis*significat
lapidem.Propter
nomen unomodo,loycus aliomodo,quiadiverso respectu t
inportan contrarietatem.

The distinctionis found as early as in Nicholaus of Paris, Lambert'of

Auxerreand other authorsfromabout uo1.
There are some other importantnotes on the concepts congruitas ,
,
perjectioVeritas
, and modussignicandi(Rome $vb-6ra) :
Item.Notadifieren tiamintercongruitatem et incongrui tatem, perfectionem et inper-
fectionem, veri
tatem et falsi
tatem.
lindecongruitas et incongruitas estex debitavel indebita ordinatione dictionum vel
accidentium et modorum significandout *Sortes estalbus* . Et estincongruitas acciden-
tiumut *viralba*. Undehie potestfiericavillatio talis: nulladictioest incongrua
<cuius>accidentia subiecto conveniunt; sedcumdico: 'omni s Sorcurri
, istaconveniunt
inaccidentibus ; ergoestcongrua. Undenotandum quodnonsolumconvenientia acci-
dentium sufficitsed opportet 4 *
(!) quodibi sitdebitusmodussignificando quia omnis
estnomendividuum et ('Sor*)2individuum. Sed dividuum et individuum suntmodi
significandioppositi. Ideoetc.
Item.Perfectio etUnperfectio provenit ex debita<velindebita)0 ordinatione dictionum,
(scilicet)suppositum cumapposito, ut ' Sorlegit*
Item.Veritas et falsitasprovenit ex convenientia et disconvenienti a specialium signifi-
catorum, ut *(homo) estalbus *et *homoestasinus*. (...).
Item.Veritas etfalsitas habent triplexesse,scilicet inanima, inrebus,etinpropositione.
In animautin subiecto;in rebusut (6ra)in causa,quia,<ut>dicitAristotiles: aabeo
quodresestw3; inpropositione ut(etMS)insigno.

The Todi redactionof our glosses has a similar passage on these items
underthe lemma Oratioestvoxsignicativa.The differences, however,are
remarkable.The passage as given by our scribe is not only somewhat
negligent,but it also seems to be of a later date, since unlike the Rome

1 SeeJanPinborg,DieEntwicklung
derSprachtheorie
imMittelalter
, in: Beitrage der
zurGeschichte
undTheologie
Philosophie desMittelalters,
TexteundUntersuchungen,
Band42,Heft
2,Mnster-
Kopenhagen1967,pp.27and3.
2 corr.
RcexsubiecteR.
3 Categ.
$, 4 b 9-10.
41

11:59:12 AM
redaction, the Todi manuscriptmentionsthe modisignicandiessentielles
(3vb):
Notadifferentiam intracongrui tatemet perfectionem et veritatem,
quiacongruitasest
ex debitaconvenientia accidentium et modorum essentialium.
significandi Et dico
, quiaadiectivum
accidentium cumsubstantivo diciturconvenire ingenereet in numero
et in casu. Et dico modorum *
signicandi quia cumdico omnis
essentialium Sor' ibiest
adiectivum cum substantivoet convenientia
accidentium, sed tarnennoneritistemodus
quia'omnis'
essentialis,
significandi et *Sor' non.Quaremaledicitur
estdivisivum *omnis
Sor'. Perfectio
etiamvenitexdebitaconvenientia suppositi cumappositi,hocestnominis
cumverboexparteante.Etdicobenenominis cum verbo, quiaadhocquodoratioperfecta
sit,quatuor suntnecessaria: nomencumverboet debitus casusqui respondeatverbo
finitoet debitusnumerus et debitapersona.

The notion of Veritasis not discussedhere in the Todi version,but some

lines before. See below, pp. 46-47.
There is some discussion about the significativefunctionof the
nominaobliqua (Rome, 6ra) :
Queritur utrum nomenoblicum secundum dyaleticum sitnomen.Etostendo quodsic,
quoniam loycus considrt significatumspeciale dictionis; sedidemestsignificatum inrecto
etinoblico;ergosicutrectus1 estnomen, itaetoblicus1 debetessenomen.Item.Omne
nomen imponi tuia forma adsignificandum ; sedeadem2 forma2 rectum
significai 3sicutet
oblicum3; ergo etc. Item ad idem. Quod constituit veritatem cum verbo in oratione est
nomenquoaddyaleticum; sed nomenoblicum* est*huiusmodi, dicendosic: 4audio
leccionem1; ergonomen etc.
Solutio.Nomenpotestdupliciter (!) consideran: autquoadsignificationem generlem,
que est significare substantiam cum qualitate ; aut quoad significationem specialem, ut
4homo *vel aut modm acciden estaccidens
'/apis', quoad significandi talem, qui partis*,
utspeciesnominis, autquoadmodumsignificandi specialem qui estin recto,qui est
significare substantiam inratione causematerialis et inratione suppositi respectu actus.
Primis tribus modisnomen oblicum estnomen, etestnomen sicutrectus.Ultimomodo
solumrectum estnomen, quiasolumloycus appellainomina ad quod(for: que?) potest
reddere suppositum, tamen hoca parte(predicati) inratione principiivelessematerialis.
Cuiusmodi estrectus.
Adprimum argumentum dicendum quodquamvis inrectoetobliquositidemsignificatum
speciale, tamen nonestidemmodussignificandi specialis, utiampatuit.Adsecundum,
quodquamvis siteadem forma inrecto etobliquo, tamen diversimode sehabet, utdicton
est. Ad tertium dicendum estquodsic dicendo:4audioleccionem meam * ibi estVeritas
ratione recticasuspronominis intellecti in verbo,scilicethuiusquoddico4audio* , non
autemestVeritas a partepredicati.

1 se.casus.
2 eademformaisanablative
case.
3 sc.nomen. Thesewords
arenominative
cases.
4 estoblicumMS.
s Sc.orationis.

+2

11:59:12 AM
There is another interestingnote on the significativefunctionof the-
noun (6rb_va):
' ' aut
Item.Videtur quodnonomnenomen sitsignificativum
quoniamchimera rem
signifcat
extraanimam autinanima.Nonsignificai remextraanimam ; hocpatet.Nonsignifcat
<rem> inanima, quoniam dicitAristotilesquodnichilestinintellectu nisipriusfueritin
sensu.Sedchimera nonestinsensuetc.Ergo.Item.Cumdico'Cesar' tautsignificairem
extraanimam autinanima.Nonsignificai remextraanimam, quianonest.Itemnonest
inanima, quiailludquodestinanimaestsimilitudo reiextra.SedCesarnonest.Ergo.
Similitudoeiusnoneritinanima.Ergodicoquodomnenomen <ad)cplacitum.
significai
Adoppositum dicoquodchimera nonestinanimaetsignificai inanima.Sedquandotu
dicisquodnonestinabstractione <in>intellectu
: aliquidpotestesseinintellectuduobus
modis:autperreceptionem specierum autsinereceptione.Si primomodo,verum sst
quod nichilestinintellectu
etc. Sisecundo modo,sicnontenet.Adsecundum dicoquod
' non
4Cesar inanima, sedextra.Sednonvaletsi significet extraanimam
<rem>
significai
quodsignificetextrase. Ergoetc.

The same discussionis foundin the Todi redactionin a more condensed

form. Here it is preceded by a discussionof the indispensability
of the
nominis(Todi, 3ra):
inventio
Queritur utrum inventio nominis sitnecessaria. Et videtur quodnon,quiaPetrus Elye
dicitquodnomen estinven tumutsitsuppositum sivereddat naturaleverbi.Sedprono-
menetparticipium reddunt suppositum verbi.Ergoinventio nominis nonestnecessaria.
Contra.Priscianus dicitquodnomenestnobilius verboet ordina<t> ipsumprius.Sed
inventioverbiestnecessaria inarte.Ergoinventio nominis pociuseritnecessaria.
Solutio.Dicoadargumenta quodinventio nominis estnecessaria. Quandotudicisquod
pronomen etparticipium reddunt suppositum verbo, hoc est per naturam nominis.
Diciturautemin literaquodomne nomen etc. Sedquodaliquodnichilsignificai probo.
' estnomen.
' Chimera Sed' chimera ' nichil utprobabo.
signifcat, Ergoaliquodnomen nichil
Probado
signifcat. minoris. Si 'chimera' significaret aut
aliquid, significarei 'extraanimam,
autinanima.Sednonsignifcat hocnecillud,utprobabo.Ergoetc.Probatio. '
Chymera
nonsignifcat remextraanimam, quiachymera nichil est in rerum natura.Ergo non
remextraanimam.
signifcat Itemnonsignificai remque estinanima,quiadicitAris-
totiles:"nosnonintelligimus nisiverum";in Posterioribus dicit: "solumverorum est
Sedchimera
intellectus". nichilestinrerum natura neccumintellectu nostropossumus
chimrm. ' ' non
intelligere Ergo chymera signifcataliquid,et per consequens, nec
aliquid.Ad idem.Cesarnonest. Et estnomen.Sed 'Cesar'nonsignifcat aliquid,ut
probabo.Ergoetc.Probatio minoris. Illudquodnonest,nonsignificai aliquid.Sed
('Cesar')0nonest.Ergononsignificai aliquid'Cesar'. Ergovidetur quodaliquodnomen
nonsignificet ' '
aliquid.Adidem. Nichilestnomen.Sed 'nichil' ' Nichil
nonsignificai
' non aliquid.
Ergoaliquodnomen
' '
nonsignificet aliquidquodsignificet. aliquid.
significai
Probatio.Si nichilsignificaret nomensignificaret aliquid.Sed nichilet aliquidsunt
opposita.Ergounumsignificai oppositum alterius, quodestcontraAristotilem. Ergo
aliquodnomennonsignificai aliquid.Contra patetinlitera.
Solutio.Dicoquodomnenomen1 signifcataliquid.Adprimum quod'chimera' significai
1 omnenomen dicoquodMS.

43

11:59:12 AM
remqueestinanima etquandotudicisquodnonintelligimus nisiverum,dicendum quod
duplexest intellectus.Purus,et secundum talemnon intelligimusnisiverum;et
mixtus
intellectus cumfantasia, et secundum talemintelligimus
chimrm et multaalia
fueruntin natura. Et sic ' rem in anima.Ad
que numquam chymera1 significat ymaginatam
aliuddicendum estquod1Cesar* significat Cesarem. lindetudeberessicconcludere: id
quodnonestsignificataliquidesse;sedCesarnon '
est;ergoCesarnonest;ergo'Cesar'
'
aliquidesse.Quodconcedo;sed Cesarsignificat
nonsignificat Cesarem.Ad tertium
dicoquodquedamsuntnomina que significant per impositionem- et sic ' nichiV
non
- et quedamperprivationem,
significat et sic 'nichiV aliquid.
significat

Froma comparisonof the textsas foundin the Rome and Todi versionsit
is clear that the Todi manuscriptcontains a more elaborate form of
Robert's glosses on the Summule. There are in the Rome edition two
questions about the rle of the human intellect (anima) in forming
propositions(Rome, 6va_vb):
Item.Queritur quidsitcausaefficiens Dicendum
propositionis. quodanima,quiaanima
primo apprehenditaliquam remsimplicem, scilicet
hominem etaliasresdiversas, scilicet
animalet lapidem, et cogittet dlibrtutrumconveniat vel disconveniat. <Si con-
veniunt), sicfacit
propositionem affirmativamdicendosic: *homoestanimal ' Si discon-
veniunt, sicfacitpropositionem negativamdicendosic: *homo nonestlapis'
Item.Queritur utrum si animanonesset,<necesset)proposi tio. Et videturquodnon,
quiadestructa causadestrui Sedanimaestcausaefficiens
tureffectus. propositionis. Ergo
etc.Sedcontra. Positoquodanimanonsit,hecestvera:*anima nonest9.Sedhecestvera:
'anima nones. Ergoaliquapropositio eritquamvis animanonsit.
Dicendum breviterquod non estverum. Quare quianonessetali-(6vb)-quis qui pro-
nunciaret istam[animam] anima
scilicet nonest' Ergononvaletobiectio
propositionem,
falsa.

Under the lemmaVerbum est vox etc, (Rome, 6vb-7vb; Todi, 3ra-va)
are found. I quote a note
some more interestingnotes on significatio
occurringin the Rome redactionof our glosses (7ra) :
Item.Voxsignificare modis.Unomodovoxsignificativa
diciturtribus seipsam
significat ;
ergosignificat aliquid.Secundomodovoxsignificat ut 4baf' quia
se nichilsignificare
potestsignificarealiquidet nonaliquid.Tercioperimpositionem, ethoctribus modis.
Autpermodum rei,autremveram, autpermodum Si permodum
privationis. rei,sic
suntpartesindeclinabiles, ut prepositiones(propositiones MS), adverbia.<Si)csig-
nificent(!) rem veram, hoc dupliciter: significant successivam
aut rem autremper-
manentem. Si remsuccessivam, sicestverbujn.Si rempermanentem, sicestnomen.Si
permodum privationis,sicsuntnomina negativa,ut 'nemo 4
', nullus

are constituentsof a kindof functional

Thus the tresmodiperimpositionem
divisionof words:

44

11:59:12 AM
per impositionem:
a. per modum rei ->indeclinableparts
b. significansrem veram, viz. the formanature
a rem successivam -> verbum
rem permanentem-> nomen
c. per modum privationis-> negativenouns.
This division remarkablydiffersfrom that given as early as in the
premodisticperiod, e.g. by Robert Kilwardby1.This seems to be an
additional reason to take our Robertus Anglicusand Robert Kilwardby
as two different persons.
There is a note on the different
meaningsof tempus
in both version*:
Rome,7ra:Item.Tempusdicitur quinqumodis.Primoidemestquodtemperies, idest
aeris; undedicitur
dispositio : modoestclarum tempus.Aliomodotempus diffinitur
ab
Aristotile2:
tempus estmensura motus rerummutabilium.
Alio modo idem estquod
dictionis,
significatimi ut 'dies',4mensis
' Aliomodoidemestquodaccidens;et de tali
loquiturin hac parte.Todi , f.3rto
: Tertionotaquod tempusdiciturquadrupliciter.
Primoidemquoddispositio aeris.Secundoidemquodhabilitas Tertiomodo
faciendi.
idemquodmensura motus rerum mutabilium.Quartomodoidemquodquidam modus
nostras
intelligendi actionessubaliquadifferentia et sicsumitur
temporis; hic.

That the Rome version mentions five and the Todi version only four
meaningsof 'tempus'is, of course, not to be takenas an argumentto date
the Todi versionbefore the Rome version.
There is an interestingdiscussionof the notionsof truthand falsity:
Rome, 8ra_vb: Notaquodistaduo' verum1 et 'falsum'nonponuntur indiffinicione propo-
sitionstamquam partesprincipales,sedtamquam partes terminantespartes principales.
Etpropterea possunt sumiin diffinitione perdisiunctionem. Adhucquam visverumet
falsum inse considerata acciduntpropositioni, tamen ipsasu(m)pta subdisiunctione sunt
essentialia.
Questioestutrum propositioestveravelfalsa,sicutdicitur indiffinitionepropositionis.
Etostenditur quodomnispropositio sitvera.Sicscribitur inlibroDe animaquodsicut
intelligimus,siccomponimus. Sedsolusintellectus estverorum, uthabetur inPosteriori-
1 InPriscianum
maior em,MSCambridge Peterhouse
191, f.3ova"vb,SeeJan Pinborg, op.cit.,p. o.
2 NotinAristotle IV 11,219b 1).Mr.C. H. J.M.Kneepkens
(cfr.Physica waskindenough to
directmyattention toa similardefinition
oftimeusual inthetwelfth centurygrammarians. E.g.
PeterHelyas: estautem diffinitio
generalis temporishec:tempus estdimensio
more etmotus rerum
dicta
mutabilium; quiaomni
generalis, tempori convenit.(quoted from Arsenal
Paris, 711,f.67va).
Thisdijfinitio
generalis isofanearlier
certainly : seeGarlandus
date p. 2612-13
Dialecticat
Compotista,
ed.De Rijk: ... indiffinitionetemporis queesthec: tempusestcerta
etrationabilis
dinumeratio
more
etmotus mutabiliumrerum. Compare alsotheeleventh century grammar tract(glossonPriscian)
found inCologne, CathedralLibrary
(Dombibliothek) MS 201,f.31vb:Notasecundum quosdam
tempus significare
quantitatemrebusmutabilibus
adiacentem, queperminimam suipartem existere
perhibetur.. . . Hancautem temporisvarietatem exvariisactibusprocedentem (lacunaofa few
considerans
letters) estcerta
dixit:tempus dimensiorerumsecundummoram etmotum rerummutabilium.

4S

11:59:12 AM
 bus.Ergoomnispropositio estvera.Sedomnispropositio estcompositio. Ergoomnis
propositio estvera.(8rb).Item ad idem. Enset verum convertuntur. Sedomnis propositio
estens.Ergoetc.Itemad idem.Verumet falsum suntopposi ta. 'Nullam propositionem
' et 4omnem ' sunt
esseveram
esseveram propositionem opposita.Et si oppositum diciturde
to et
opposi proposi tum de proposito. Sed nullam propositionem esseveram estfalsum.
Ergoomnem propositionem esseveramestverum.Itemad idem.Aliquam propositio-
nemesseveram estverum. Ergonullam propositionem esseveram estfalsum. Etsi hoc,
ergo nullampropositionem esseveramestnonverum(veraMS). Sed 'nullum non et
4omne' omnem esseveram estverum corr
. ex vera
equipollent. Ergo propositionem ( MS).
Ergoomnispropositio estvera.
Solutio.Ad primaduo estdicendum quodargumenta procedunt de veroincomplexo
et de intellectu incomplexo, nonde intellectu complexo. Intellectusveroincomplexus
solusestverus(verorum ! MS)et enset verum convertuntur. Et sicpatet.Adtertium
dicendum quodistaregulaoppositum de oppositoetc. habetintelligi <de>uniformi tei
sumptis. Sedhecnonaccipiuntur hocmodo,quiainunaproposi tionesuntcomplexa etin
4 *et 4omnis'
aliaincomplexa. Ergoetc.Adultimum dicendum quod nullus non equipollent
quandononestibialiquaverbalis copulainteripsumsignum et negationem. Sicautem
nonestinproposito. Ergoetc.

Aftera note on sensus(on account of the definitionof oratioperfecta as

illa queperjectum sensum generai in animo auditoris) another note on verum and
falsumis given:
Rome, 8rb~va: Item.Notaquod4sensus ' diciturmultismodis.Unomodoidemestquodsig-
nificado ut 4ista dictiohabet . Aliomodoidemestquodvirtus
sensusJ
dictionis1, plures
apprehensiva ;de foris et dividiturinsensum particularem etcommunem ; sensusparticu-
larisest quintuplex, scilicetvisus,auditusetc.;sensuscommunis est qui iudicatde
speciebus receptis(receptivis MS)a sensuparticulars Aliomodoidemestquodperfecte
movetanimam ad aliquidhabendum velintelligendum velapprehendendum (apreplian-
dum!MS).Ethocmodosensusidemestquodperfectio et sicaccipitur
orationis, hie.
Etaliomodoidemestquodintellectus, ut 4istebenesenti.
Item.Notandum quod 'verum' et 'falsum' possunt dupliciterconsideran. Uno modo
verum etfalsum suntincomplexa ettuncestreientitas2 velnonentitas, utesselapidem
et nonesse.Veritas etfalsitascomplexa estinpropositione.
Item.Notaquodduplexest (8va) Veritas: quedampermodumaffectus, quedamper
modumconceptus. Veritasaffectus reperi in oratione
tur Veritas
optativa. conceptus
estduplex:auttamquam incausa,auttamquam in signo.Si tamquam in causa,si<c>
est Veritas in oratione infinit<iv)a, ut 'hominem esseanimaiestverum' . Si tamquam in
signo, hoc modo estin oratione indicativa. Sic accipiturhic.

In the Todi redaction the note on sensuspredeces those on verumand

falsum:
4 ' dicitur
Todi , 3va-vb: Quintonotaquod sensus modis.Primodicitur
multis
[mul](3vto)
virtus de foris.Aliomodoidemestquodintellectus,
apprehensiva utdicitPriscianus
:
1 i. e. meaning.
2 i.e. therealorconceptual
existenceofa thing.

46

11:59:12 AM
quodenimparatur sensibile, idestintelligibile. Aliomodoidemestquodsignificado. .
lindedicitgramaticus quod istadietio habet plures sensus,idest plurasignificata.Alio
modosensusidemest quodsententia, et sic sumitur hie, cumdicitperfection sensum
, idestperfectam
generai sententiam. Queritur utrum propositio sitveravelfalsa.Quodnon
sitveraprobo.Signum nonestidcuiusestsignum. Sedpropositio estsignum veritatis
et
falsitatis.
Ergopropositio non estvera. Ad idem. Dicit1 beatus Anshelmus: Veritasest
tudosolamenteperceptibilis.
recti SedVeritas estin solamente.Ergononestin pro-
position. Ergononestverapropositio. Itemadidem.Quandosubiectum et predicatum
nonsuntineodem,tuncnonestpropositio vera.Sedhic( !) subiectum propositionisestin
genere quantitatisethoc predicatum estin predicamento Quare
qualitatis. patetquodnon
suntineodemnecpropositio estvera.Itemad idem.Scribitur ab AristotileinlibroDe
anima"sicutcomponimus itaintelligimus". Itemab ipsoscribitur in libroPosteriorum
quod intellectus solum verorum <est>c.Est ergo omnis compositio vera.Sed ompis
propositio estcomposita. Ergoomnispropositio <est)cvera.
Ad istamquestionem respondeo. Quedampropositio <est)cvera,quedamfalsa.Ad
primum. Quando tu dicis etc.,
quodsignum respondeo quodpropositio nonestveranisi
in hoc quodestsignum veritatis.Et estibi propositio sive significativum
significativa
Adsecundum.
significati. Quandotu dicisquodVeritas estreetitudo,respondeo quod
Veritasestinmente utinsuosubiecto, inproposi tioneutinsuosigno.Adtertium. Quando
tudicisquodsubiectum etpredicatum etc., respondeo quodauctoritas sicestintelligenda
quodsubiectum et predicatum nonsuntin eodemvel essepossunt.Undequamvis
subiectum etpredicatum nonsintineodemgenere, tam<en> possunt esseineodem,quia
inanimaperintellectum.
Adargumenta queprobant quodpropositio sitvera,respondeo primo adprimum. Quan-
do tudicis: esseetverum dicoquodduplexestverum,
convertuntur, scilicetcomplexum et
incomplexum, ut esseuniusrei,idestuniusorationis; et de taliintellexit Aristotiles
quandodicitesseetesseverum convertuntur. Essecomplexum eritpropositionis etid non
convertitur. Quarepropositio potestesse veravel falsa.Ad idemrespondeo quod
duplexestintellects : intellectuspurusestdivinus et anglicus; de taliintellexitAris-
totiles
; intellectusmixtus velfantasticus,qui habet se indifferenterad utrumque, scilicet
ad verum et ad falsum ; et hocmodocompositio potestesseveravelfalsa2.

II DE PREDICABILI!}US
From the opening lines of this chapter it appears that the correct title
of the firstchapteris De introductionibus
, not De propositionibus3 and that
the whole work should not be given the title: Introductiones*. The text
runsas follows in both redactionsof Robert's glosses:
i9rb: Predicabileetc. Superius
Rome, determinavi
magister de introductionibus.
In
1 Devertitate
, cap.11,p. 191,11-21 ed.Schmitt.
2 Thisdiscussion
isimmediately followedbythenoteon thedifference
between , per-
congruitas
fection Seeabove,
andVeritas. p. 4$.
3 ThistitlewasgivenbyBocheski inhisedition.
Seeabove, pp.30and40.
47

11:59:12 AM
 parteistadeterminat
depredicabilibus ! MS).Ethecinduas1.Naminprima
(positionibus
determinat in secunda
ingenerali,
de predicabilibus in speciali.

f iora: Predicabile sumiturdupliciteretc. Superius

Todi auctordeterminavitin
primo capitulo Inhocsecundo
deintroductionibus. determinat
capitulo depredicabilibus.
lindeistudsecundum turinduaspartes.
dividi
capitulum Inprimaparteauctor
premittit
quedamutiliaad cognitionem In secunda
quinqupredicabilium. de ipsis.
prosequitur

In the Todi versionthereis a note on the phraseEccehomo

, immediately
afterthe divisiolectionisand before the notabilia:
Todi, iorb:Eccehomo utrum
. Queritur istalatinitas
sitcongrua velincongrua, etperfecta
velinperfecta.Adhocdicoquodestperfecta et congrua secundum intellectumet in-
et ad hie hoc verbum 4audi*vel
congrua inperfecta quantum sensum, quiaintelligitur
'videyquiacumdico: 4eccehomo'audiintelligitur
velvide: homo esthie. Quodsolutio non
vaieatprobo.Sicutsehabetadiectivumnominis adverbum, itasehabetadiectivum verbi
ad nomen.Sedadiectivum nominisnonhabetconstrui cumverbosinesuosubstantivo.
Ergo nec adiectivumverbi construi
poterit cum nomini sinesuosubstantivo.
Solutio.Dico quodquamvis verbum nonponatur, tamenintelligitur, ut dictumest.

It is self-evidentthat this discussion is out of place here. It seems to

belong to the firstchapter.Its occurrencegives some additionalevidence
for the negligentway our scribe compiled the text of Robert's second
version.
Robert distinguishesthreemeaningsof 'universale1 :
Rome , i9rb:Circaistamlectionem notandum quoduniversale dicitur multis modis.Uno
mododicitur reshabeas multas et
partes plures proprietatespartium; et sic in omni scientia
determinatur de universali. Aliomodosolasimilitudo reiqueestinanima ; etsicuniversale
estintendo quedam.Terciomododicitur forma communis predicabilisdemultis singula-
ribus,uthumni tas,et predicatur de Sorteet de Platone, et sicde aliis; et hocmodo
accipitur hic' universale
'. Etdiffinitur sic: universale estquedam forma animeabstracta a
singularibus per operationem intellectus agentis. Ita enim est via cognoscendi: primo
resapprehenditur a sensu, ettuncestsingulare ; posteacognoscitur ab intellectu median-
tibusaliisvirtutibus, etintellectus tuncintelligit aliquam communem formam repertam
inistoetinilio; illaforma sicreperta inmultis vocatur universale. Ethocestquoddicit
Boetiusin libroDe consolatione prime philosophie versusfinem2:"singulare est dum
sentitur, universale dum Et
intelligitur". intellige quod universale non est illa forma
communis multissingularibus solum sed quando illaforma communis a multisest abstrac-
taab intellectu; et tuncuniversale. Undeuniversale duplexhabetesse:insingularibus,
et istudestessemateriale; aliudinanima;et illudestformale. < . . . (i9v) . . . .)
Tertium notandum quodtriplex estuniversale. Estenimquoddam quodaptumnatum
estpredicari de pluribus, scilicetactu,uthomo . Estquoddam secundum potentiam, ut
fenix, quianon suntplures. Quoddam intellectu, ut soly sol
quia significai quandam formam

1 Sc.dividitur.
2 V,pr.s.

48

11:59:12 AM
que estaptanatapredicari si pluresessent,
de pluribus, nonsintpluresin
et quamvis
actunecinpotentia,convenit
tamen plures.
intelligere

The latternote is also foundin the Todi version (iorb). Both redactions
have a note on the twofold meaning of principium:principiumintra or
and principium
intrinsecus extraor extrinsecus.Both types are subdivided.
(Rome, i9va; Todi , iova). Todi has an interestingnote on the difference
between predicabile , predicatum , and predicamentum:
, iova: Quintonota quod differentia
Todi est interpredicabile,predicatum,et
predicamentum. Predicabileest quod est aptumpredicaride pluribusproutnon
ut homo.
poniturin oratione, Predicatumestquodactupredicatur et^ic
de pluribus
predicantur ut 'Soresthomo'.Predicamentum
in oratione, est coordinatio
multorum
lindesicutexercitus
utsubstantia,
predicabilium, essecoordinatio
regisdicitur multorum
sic
militum, predicamentum dicituressecoordinatiomultorum predicabilium.

Ill DE PREDICAMENTIS 1

Robert distinguishesfour ways of predication in the Rome version

(24vb):
Ad evidentiam huiuslectionis
notandum quodaliquidpotest predicari quatuor modis
:
autsecundum eandem naturam et eandem intentionem, et sicpureunivocata. Autnon
secundum eandemintentionem et nonnaturam et intentionem, et sicpureequivoca.
Autsecundum eandemintentionem et nonnaturam, ut quantitassecundum eandem
intentionem quiasecundum quodestgenus de tempore, de linea,de numero ;
predicatur
etiamsecundum diversamnaturam, quia de tempore secundum naturam de
instantis,
lineapernaturam permanentis,denumero pernaturam unitatis.Et id quodsic dicitur
demultis, partimestequivocum, partimunivocum, sedmagis univocum. Quartodicitur
aliquidde multissecundum eandemnaturam et nonsecundum eandem intentionem,ut
4sanum' dicitur de urina,et de cibo tamquam
de animali, de ostensivo de
(losivo)
urinatamquam de signo.Et id quod sic diciturde multis,partimest equivocum,
partim univocum.

The Todi version has a short note on the differencebetween equivocum

equivocansand equivocumequivocatum.
Todi ' ' scilicetequivocans
et
, f.47va:Secundonotaquod equivocum dicitur,
ut nomen 4 'dupliciter
canis suntistaque
Equivocans, hoc
equivocatum. [velanimal]Equivocata
comprehenduntursub istisduobus,ut animailatrabile,vel sydus,vel piseis(sic!)
marinus.

1 IntheTodiversion isthesixhone.Seeabove,
thischapter p. 29.
49

11:59:12 AM
This maybe compared with the thesisdefendedin the ArsMelidunathat
nouns are equivocantiaratherthan equivoca1.
A marginalnote added by a later hand at the foot of f. 26r gives the
well-known formula including all categories together: Hie suntomnia
decernpredicamenta : Virgiliusmagnuspoetafilius Maronisgramaticussedens
hodiein temploanfulatusdisputansfatigatus.
Under the lemma Hiis habitis (Bocheski, nr. 3.08 adnem) the
Rome versionhas two interestingnotes on substantia:
' 1 dicitur
Rome, 26va: Circaistamlectionemnotandum quod substantia quatuormodis.
Unomodomateria, aliomodoforma, tertiomodocompositum, quartomodoidemest
quodsubstantial accidens.Quinto2modoaccipitur hic secundum quodestunumde
camentis.
predi
Item.Notaquodsubstantia consideran
potesttripliciter : autsecundum subsistenciam,
autsecundum essenciam,autsecundum esse.Primomodoestprimasubstantia magis
quamsecunda.Secundomodosecundasubstantia
substantia estmagissubstantia
quam
prima.Tertiomodononestunamagissubstantia
substantia quamalia.Etprimomodo
loquiturhicMagisterinlitera.

Under the lemma Hiis visis dicendum (Bocheski, nr. 3.1 1) another
note on substantiais found in the Rome redaction of Robert's glosses:
Rome, 27ra: Circaistamlectionemnotandum quodsubstantia conside-
potestdupliciter
ran: autsecundum methaphisicumautsecundum loycum.Siprimomodo,sicsubstantia
predicaturequivoce.UndeAristotiles:"latent ingenere".Si secundum
equivocationes
aut
loycum, ergo quantum ad usum nature, aut quantumad proprietatem.Si primo
modo,sic substantia equivoce.Si secundomodo,non. Et sic accipitur
predicatur
hic,quamvis animai dicatur deanimali
equivoce veroetpicto,tarnensecundum quodest
genusaccipitursolum pro animali
vero.

From the division of the passage opening with the words Diciturautem
alterumalteriopponiquadrupliciter(Bocheski, nr. 3.32) it appears that
Robert already had the interpolationCaliditasautemin his text of the
Summule*. In the Rome redaction the divisio textusruns as follows:
Rome, 31ra-rb. Dicitur (ex dicaturMS) alterumalteri. Superius divisusfuitiste
in trespartes,scilicetin Antepredicamenta
tractatus* , Predicamento, .
et Postpredicamenta
Etdictode duabus dicendum
partibus Etdividiturhecparsinquinqu.
estdetertiaparte.
Namin primapartedeterminat de oppositione, in tertiade
in secundade prioritte,
inquartade motu,inquintade habere
simultaneitate, sivedehabitu.Ubipartesincipiant
patet.Prima
estpiesentis
lectionis. turinduas.Naminprima
Etdividi topposi
dividi tionem

1 SeeL. M.deRijk,Logica
Modernorum
II,p. 297.
2 Thefifthmode added
wasapparently later
on.
3 Forthisinterpolation,
seepartoneofthisseries, 6 (1968),pp.3-4.
VIVARIUM
4 viz.thechapter
Depredicamentis
.

11:59:12 AM
in suasspecies.Insecunda determinai de illisspeciebus.
Secundaibi: Contraria
sunt.Et
illa secundain tres.Namin primadeterminai de quartaspecie.In secundaremovet
dubium. de illaspecie.Primaincipitibi: Contraria
In tertiadeterminai sunt.Secunda
(31rb)ibi: Caliditas . Tertiaibi: Privative
nonest opposita.

In the Todi version, too, the Caliditas-passage is found (Todi, 27vb).

From this it appears, that this interpolationdates fromas early as the
i 27o,s.

IV DE SILLOGISMI

V DE LOCIS*
Thejcos-interpolation3is not foundin Robert's commentaries.I give the
divisiotextusas it is foundin the Rome version:
Rome, f. 38ra: Argumentation is quatuor sunt species.*Superius magister posuit
diffinitionem argumentations.In parteistaponiteiusdivisionem. Dividiturautemhec.
parsin quinqu.Namin primadividi t argumentationem in suasspecies.In secunda
determinai deunaspecie.Intertia dealia. In quartareducitentimema ad sillogismum.
In quintadeterminai de alia specie,scilicetde exemplo.Secundaincipit ibi: Inductio
est Quartaibi: Sciendum
. Tertiaibi: Entimema. quodomneentimema. Quintaibi: Exemplum.
Etsicpatetdivisiolectionis.

The same divisionof the text is foundin the Todiversion,f. 40 va.

The interestingexamplesgivenby Robert forexemplum have already
been discussedabove, pp. 38-39.

VI DE SUPPOSITIONIBUSs
I give the complete text of Robert's commentaryas it is found in the
Rome redactionof his glosses.

LECTIOPRIMA
Rome Eorumque dicuntur.Superius
, ff.44va-48ra: determinai terminis
Magisterde
1 IntheTodiversionthischapteristhethirdone.Seeabove,p. 29.
2 IntheTodiversionthischapteristhefourthone.Seeabove,p. 29.
3 Forthis seeL. M.deRijk,
interpolation, OnThe Genuine
Text
ofPeter Summule
ofSpain's I,
logicales
inVIVARIUM 6 1968,[pp.1-34],pp.2-3,andII VIVARIUM p. 100.
6, 1968,[pp.69-101],
4 nrs.g.03- .oyed.Bocheski.
s IntheTodiversionthischapteristhefifth
one.Seeabove,
p. 29.

11:59:12 AM
 et de propositionibus.In parteistadeterminai de proprietate terminorum, scilicetde
suppositionibus.Etdividitur hecparsinduas.Inprimapremittit quedamnecessaria ad
cognitionem suppositionum. In secunda determinai de subposi tionibus, ibi: Suppositio
. Primaintres.Inprimapremittit
est unamdivisionem. Insecunda diffinitibi: Suppositio
est.In tertiadividitsignificationem,ibi: Significations alia. Istaveroque incipitibi:
dividitur
Suppositio^ induas. In prima diffinitsupposi tionem. In secundadividit,<ibi):
Suppositionumalia communis. Prima in tres. In prima diffinitsuppositionem. In secunda
datdifferentiaminter(intercia MS)suppositionem etsignificationem, ibi: Differunt
autem.
In terciadiffinit
copulationem, ibi: Copulationum (!).
Et sicpatetdivisiolectionis.
Suppositioestacceptio, idestreceptabilitas, ab intellectu termini adiectivi et substantivi
maxime et precipue proaliquo,idestprosignificato. Similiter copulatio estacceptio,
idestacceptabilitas,ab intellectu termini adiectivi ad differentiam substantivi termini
proaliquo,'idest prosignificato.
Notaquod significano* diciturtribusmodis.Vel pro modosignificando Sic accipit
gramaticus.Alio modo prosignificato quodcumque sit sive res sive modus; sicsigna
et
Tercio
significant. modo pro re substantiali et predicabili, secundum quodresoppo-
niturad modum etad dispositionem. lindeexponesic: significado estrepresentatio rei
etpredicabili
f.44rbSubicibili<s> <s>mediante | similitudine abanimaapprensa, siveilla ressit
enscompletum siveincompletum.

<Notabilia)
Circaistamlectionem notandum ' diciturmultismodis.Uno modo
quod significatio'
idemestquodmodus Etsicaccipitur
significandi. a gramatico.Aliomodoidemestquod
Terciomodoidemestquodrepresentatio
ressignificata. reipervocem; ethecdupliciter :
autestrepresentatio reivere,autmodirerum ; primo modo accipiturhic ; secundomodo
non.
Secundo[modo]notandum ' f multismodisdicitur.Unomodoidemest
quod suppositio
quoddignitas. Sic est propositioaliqua(aliaMS)famosa in aliquascientia. Aliomodo
idemquodsubaliopositio (propositio MS)> sicut subiectum sub
ponitur predicato. Alio
modoidemestquodproaliopositio (positoMS).Ethocmodosumi turhic.
Tercionotandum
' homo
estquodterminus potestponiproaliosexmodis.'Autquandostatpro
voce,ut auditur' . Aut quandoprosignificato, utcumdicitur : homo estdig{n)issima
creaturarum1
creatura . Autquandostatprovoceet significatione, ut 'Aomo estnatura
'
Aliquando statproproprietate vocis,ut(homo estdissillabum1
Aliquando statproproprie-
tatesignificandisiveprointentione, ut 'homoestspecies' . Aliquando statprosupposito
ut 'homo curri.
significandi,

)
(Questio
Queriturutrumsignificado quodnon.Namsi essetaliquid,posset
sitaliquid.Etvidetur
per vocem Sed
representan. non potestper vocem tari.Ergononestaliquid.
represen
Probatio Unumopposi
minoris. torum nonpotestrepresentan
perreliquum.Sednomi-
uthabetur
nasunt[injfinita, inElends Finitum
, resveroinfinite. suntopposi-
etinfinitum
ta. Ergounumnonpoteritperreliquum etc.
representan,
Itemadidem.Quodestextraanimam (ameniamMS)tnon uniturcumeo (cumeo bisMS)

S1

11:59:12 AM
 quodestinanima.Sedvoxestextraanimam etspeciesreiestinanima.Ergovoxunit'xr
numquam speciei.Ergovideturquodsignificado nonsit.
Itemad idem.Signum et significatumdebenthabereremeiusdem nature in hocquod
/. 4rasignumestpermanens et significatum.| Sedvoxest (estestMS)restransitoria et non
permanens. Ergo vox non ali
poterit quid (aliudMS) significare.
Solutio.Dicendum quodsignificado est.Adprimum argumentum dicendum: cumdicit
"nomina
Aristotiles: suntfinita,
resveroinfinite", nondicitquodnominasuntfinita
sedrespectu
simpliciter, rerum, et ressuntinfinite respectunominum, hocestressunt
multopluresquamvocesvelnomina.Et propter hoc dicitquodoportet nomina esse
equivocautperunum nomen pluresresrepresententur. Etsidicasquodnonverum quod
nominasuntfinita,resveroinfinite respectu nominum quiaeademresrepresentatur per
pluranomina sinonima, - dicendum quod eadem res nonrepresenta[n]tur per plura
nomina, seddiverse proprietateseiusdem rei. Ut patetquod 4lapis* significai
proprie-
et '
tatemledentispedem petraproutpedeteritur.
Ad secundum similiterdicendum quod,licetvoxextraaninamnon possitunirirei
velspeciei,quiaestinanimarealiter, potesttarnen uniriintentionaliter,
ita quod sit
et nonrealis.
uniointentionalis
Adtercium dicendum quod,licetvoxeademsecundum naturamsittransitoria,tamen
eademinspecieremanet Ethocestquoddicit.
intransitoria.

LECTIOSECUNDA

Suppositionumalia communisetc. Superius actorposuitdiffinitionem (divisionem

ibi
MS)suppositionis,ponit divisionemeius.Et hec parsdi turinsexsecundum
vidi sex
quasponit.In primaponitprima,in secundasecundam,
divisiones et sic de aliis.
Secundaibi: Suppositionum Terciaibi: Suppositionum
communium. accidentalium.Quartaibi:
ibi:
Quinta Suppositionum
simplicium.
Suppositionum Sexta
personalium. ibi: Item.Suppositio-
num Primequatuor
confusarum. suntde presentilectione.Et sic patetdivisiolectionis.

<Notabilia
)
Notandum primoquodterminus extraorationem habetnaturale et
positus
etquierunt, ut ' homo ' suppositum
tuncsupponit proomnibus quisuntetquifuerunt persesumptus.
f.4rb
Terminus veroinoratione positushabetaccidentalemsuppositionem | et tuncsupponit
propresentibus, ut 'Ao/nocurri
, autprofuturis, ut 'homo eri, autpropreteritis, ut
'homo .
fuit* ' dicitur
Item.' Accidentale Unomodoidemestquodpotestadessevelabesse,
tripliciter.
ut albedohomini.Aliomodoestproprium, ut risibilehomini, et accidentale Sorti,
quiaprimoinesthomini. Aliomodoquodestperaliud.Ethocmodosumitur hic'sup-
accidentalis'
positio
Item.Inquolibet termino communi estforma duplex.Unaque convenit sibi,uthuma-
nitasconvenit singularibus.Et hoc facitsuppositionem simplicem. Undesupposi tio
fit
simplex quinqu modis: aut quando terminus supponit re
pro significata pro ut
ut'homo
(significato, estdignssima)
creaturarum ; autprovoce,ut 'homo
creatura* auditur1
;
aut(pro)proprietate vocis,ut 'homoestdissillabum1
; aut(pro)proprietate ut
significati,
'homoestspecies1
.
Notandum quodquandoaliquidpredicatur de aliquosubiecto nonin comparatione ad

53

11:59:12 AM
 aliquamsupposi tionem, tuncsubiectum habetsuppositionem simplicem. Ut'omnishomo
estanimai1. Etquandoponitur dictionem ut *tantum
homo curri
. Aut
post (exclusivam),
postistamdictionem 'aliud1,ut *lapisestaliudab homine1.
Item.Notaquodterminus in MS)positus autestadiectivus,
ut
'homoestalbus 1 etsichabet predicato (predicamento
: autsubstantivus.Ethoc :
; personalem suppositionem duplex
autestprimeimposi tionis,autsecunde.Si prime, sichabetpersonalem suppositionem,
ut 'homo estanimai.Si secunde,sic habetsimplicem, ut species,genus,ut 'homo est
,
species1'animal est .
genus1

)
( Questio
Videtur quodsubpositio accidentalisnullasit,quianullum accidentalemutatveltrans-
muttessentiale. Sed naturalis terminusest extraorationem, quia statpro omnibus
presentibus, tisetfuturis.
preteri Ergoingressus orationisnonvariabit suamnaturalem
suppositionem. Ergonon sitsuppositio vel
naturalis accidentalis.
Item.Omnissuppositio positio.Sed terminus
est substantialis extraorationem non
supponit proaliquo.Ergonaturalis suppositiononest.
4vaSolutio.
Adprimm dicoquodduplexestaccidentale, scilicetnatureetrationis.
| Dico
ergoquod accidentale<nature> nonvariat ut
essentiale, albedo hominis non variathomi-
nem,sedaliudaccidentale rationis,utingressustermini communis inorationem et tale
[non]variat essentiale
rationis insuppositionem naturalem.
Adaliuddicoquodterminus communis potestsupponere alicuidupliciter.
Autalicui
predicato; et sicnonestsuppositio Autpotestsupponere
naturalis. prosignificatosuo.
Ethecsuppositio naturalisestaliquid,quiailleterminus 'homo1 supponitprosuosignifi-
catoad quodimponitur ad significandum.Etsicpatetsolutio.
Ad aliudargumentum secundum quod vult fraterRogerius dato (for: Baco??)per
demonstrationem perquamipsedicebatsuppositionem naturalem nonesse,idemest
deceptus, quiasuppositio nonesttantum subaliquopositio, ymmo proaliopositio.
Etsic
sumiturhic.Etc.

LECTIOTERTIA
Item.Personaliumsuppositionum.Superius posuitactordivisiones suppositionis.
Hicponitalias.Ethecparsdividi turinduas.Inprimaponitprimam, insecunda secun-
dam,ibi: Confusarum Primadividitur
suppositionum. intres.Inprimaponitunamdivisio-
nemet explanat primum membrum. In secundaprobatprimm, deindesecundum
(suumMS). In tertiaexplanatsecundum membrum. Secunda ibi: Quod autem utraque
tertia
istarum; ibi: Confusa . Tuncsequitur
suppositio illaparsinquaponitsecundam divi-
sionem.Et dividitur in duas.In primaponitdivisionem. In secundareflectit se supra
illamutdestruat earnquoadalteram eiuspartem. Secunda ibi: Sedegocredo. Primacum
precedentibusestpresentslectionis.
Etdividiturinquatuor. Inprimaprobatsuamdi<vi)sionem. Insecunda determinai earn
quoadpropriam opinionem (oppositionem MS). In tertiaquoadopinionem aliquorum.
In quartaremo vetdubium, veldicas:respondet tacitequestioni. Secundaibi: Utcum
'omnis
f.4svidicitur: homo Tertiaibi: Cum
estanimai*. homo. ibi: Sednevideatur
unus'quisque Quarta
oppositum.
Hecdivisiolectionis.

S4

11:59:12 AM
 ( Notabilia
)
Notandum primm quodsignum universale affirmativum confundit terminm (tercium
MS) sibi inmediate adiunctum mobiliter et distributive.Exemplum de utroque ut 'omnis
homo estanimal; ergo SoretPlato' . Sedsi habeat'animal ' confusam
suppositionem inmobi-
' homo estanimal1
liter,ut omnis , nonsequitur:'ergohomo estanimal' .
Item.Signum universale negativum confundit terminm inmediate sibiadiunctum vel
mediate, mobiliter et distributive, ut inullus homo estasinus; ergo Sortes non est asinus nec
Plato'; etsimiliter subpredicato; 'ergoomnis homo nonestBrunellus' .
Item.Notandum quoddifferentia estintersuppositionem etreddere locutionem veram,
quiasuppositio dicitur ad
percomparationempredicatum quodpotestreddere locutio-
nem<veram> proaliquo.
Item.Notandum quod hec negatio'non'distribut terminm sequentem confuse et
mobiliter. '
Item.Videturquod 'homo'nonsupponit pro omni homine tam crrente quam non
crrente, quiadicitBoetius
' quodtalia(sunt)subiecta qualiasuntpremissa predicata.
Sedhocpredicatum currisolumfacitstaresubiectum procurrentibus. Ergosolum
statprocurrentibus.
Item.Si supponunt proomnihomine, idemessetdictum'homo curriet 'omnis homo
curri . Sedhocestfalsum, quiaunaestuniversalis et aliaindefinita [aliaindefinita] sive
particularis. Ergovidetur quodnonsupponat proomnibus hominibus.
Item.Materia semper sequiturcontradictiones forme. Sedsubiectum estlocomaterie,
predicatum loco forme. Ergosubiectum sequitur contradictiones predicati. Sedpredi-
catumsolumstatprocurrentibus et nonprocurrentibus. Sed stareproomnibus est
duobusmodis:autactuautpotentia. lindedicoquodquandodico'homo curri , et hic
f.46rastat'homo' proomnibus, nontarnen actusedpotentia. Sedcumdicitur'omnis homo'
pro omnibus cur(rentibus), tunc stat pro omnibus in actu secundum quoddicitur quod
ad hocsuntsignainventa utea que suntin potentia reducantur ad actum.Et sicpatet
solutio.
Ad secundum dico duodquandodico quod taliasuntsubiectaqualiapremissa sunt
predicata, quodid [quod]intelligitur
dico adveritatem orationis, quiaad hoc quodhec
sit,oportet quodhomoprimositinpotentia, secundo inactu.
Adaliuddicoquodsubiectum sequitur contradictiones predicati inquantum predicatur
etnoninaliisf talisestrelativa quiavocabula dubitatoria aliquid f nonlicetconfundere
terminm sibiadditum mobiliter, utsi dicerem:4tudubitas aliquid;ergotudubitas hoc',
nonvaletquiaibiessetfallacia figure dictionis.
Tertionotandum quoddifferentia est interin<de)finite sumptum, ut 'homo'sumitur
indefinite, et inter terminm in
positum propositione universali affirmativa, hoc est
dictum:differentia estintersuppositionem determinatam et confusam. Namisteter-
minus 'homo' indefinite su<m)ptus supponit proomnibus hominibus presentibus, preteri tis
et futuris. Cumautemponitur in propositione universali affirmativa, ut cum dicitur:
'omnis homo curri , modosupponit proistisquisuntmodoinactupropresentibus tantum.
Quartonotandum quodterminus in<de)finite su<m)ptus potest dupliciter consideran : aut
incomparado <ne>adsuasupposita - etsicdicoquodsupponit proomnibus quisuntvel
quifuerunt velerunt - ; autpotestcomparari ratione ad suumpredicatum ; et sicdico
quodsupponit proeisproquibusexigitpredicatum. Ut si dicam:'homo curri, 'homo'
supponit propresentibus tantum, lindenotaquodsignum additurtermino sic ut que
suntinpotentia reducantur ad actum.Sednotandum quodduplexestactus.Estenim
55

11:59:12 AM
46rbquidam essendi | etquidam supponendi. Actusessendi estquandoaliquidestactu.Actus
est
supponendi quandoaliquidsupponit actu ettarnen signanonreducunturj ea quesunt
inpotentia (inponitur MS)adactum essendi,quiasicreducuntur preterita etfutura. Quod
est inpossibile. Et sic propositio estfalsa:'omnis homo curri . Sed signareducunt ad
actumsupponendi.
* '
Notandum quod naturalediciturduobusmodis.Uno mododiciturnaturaquedam
visinsitarebusex similibus (eximilibet MS) similiaprocreare, ut talisdiciturvirtus
generativa. Aliomodoprincipium motuset quietisin seipso.Et hocdupliciter. Primo
mododicitur per materiam et formam et compositum. Alio modo H'citurper se et non
peraliud.Ethocmodosumi turhic.
Notandum quodintermino suntduo: significatum, utin ' curri , cursus
, et (con)signifi-
catum, ut in 'curri presens tempus. Sciendum ergoquod verbum non facitstareter-
minm in subiecto eiusdem pernaturam significati consignificati.hocestcausa
sed Et
quiaverbum predicatur et predicatumponiturloco forme et subiectum loco materie.
Sedmateria sequiturcontradictiones forme.
Notandum quodstarepro termino omniest duobusmodis.Autin potentia;et sic
poniturterminus indefinite
sumptus, utcumdicitur:*homo curri ; etsicdicitinlittera.
Autactu; etsicstatterminus inproposi tioneuniversali; etsecundum materiam istarum
signum universale affirmativum reducitad actum illaque fuerunt ad
inposita significandum
subtermino communi.

)
( Questio
Queritur utrum terminus inpredicato possitconfundi mobiliter ; utcumdico:
'omnishomo estanimai1 ' ' positus Et videtur
, utrumanimaipossitconfundi mobiliter. quodsic.
46vaEtauctor dicitquodnon.Etfaciotaleargumentum. | Admultiplicationem materie
' homosequitur
' estin
multiplicatioforme. Sedhomo estloco materie et animai locoforme, quia
'
subiecto,animar veroinpredicato et [et]' homo '
multiplicatur et confunditur; ergoet
Adidem.Natura
'animai'. (notaMS)individui et singulariset natura (nonMS)generis et
specieisuntopposite, quiaindividuum velsingulare predicaturdeunosolo,species veroet
genus[et]depluribus. Sedpredicari de unosoloetdepluribus suntopposita etpredicari
de pluribus nil aliudest (adestMS) quamstarepropluribus <etstarepropluribus)
nilaliudest(adestMS)quamconfundi. Ergocumdico: 'omnis homo estanimai ', isteter-
minus' animal'
(velMS)confunditur mobiliter. Adidem.Omneid quodpredicatur, aut
ut aut ut aut ut minus. Sed cum dico: 'omnishomo est animai
predicatur equale, maius, ,
isteterminus *animal' non utequalenecutminussed (utMS)predicatur ut
predicatur ' homo'
maius.Ergostatpropluribus quam . Sednil(aliud)eststarepropluribus quam
4 '
homoconfundit. ' animaV debetconfundi,
confundi.Etisteterminus Ergomultofortius
cumstetpropluribus quam'homo' .
'animal ' vel terminus
Solutio.Dico quod isteterminus in predicato posituspotest
dupliciterconsideran. Aut inquantum est loco forme etforma invariabilis estetsimplex,
secundum quodhabetur ab Aristotile SexPrincipiorum. Etquianullum simplex et (estMS)
invariabileest(etiamMS)divisibile, et sicdicoquodisteterminus 'animal' nonconfun-
ditur.Et sic nonvaletargumentum. Autpotest(patetMS) consideran terminus in
predicatopositus incomparatione adsubiectum in quofd]estsicutforma insuamateria ;
etsicaddivisionem materie sequitur divisio forme queestinmateria, sicutaddivisionem
lignisiquiturdivisioalbedinis et nigredinis velalterius colorisquiestinligno.Sicdico

11:59:12 AM
 ' ' Boetiidicentis:"taliaerunt
iuxtaverbum
quod animalpotest
confundi predicata
qualia
suntsubiecta".
Ethocestquoddicitactor.

LECTIO
QUARTA
Etne videaturoppositum.Superius posuit actorquasdam dubitationesdesuppositioni-
bus.Hicautemmovetunamdubitationem. Etdividitur hecparsinduas.Inprima posuit
con<tro)vers<i)am queestinteripsumetaliosmaistros. Insecunda ponitsuamopinio-
nem(oppositionem MS)propriam.Secunda ibi: Sedegocredo esse
impossibile . Hecinduas.
In primaponitunamopinionem. In secundacausamopinionis illorum;secundaibi:
Causam autempropterquammoventur.
Primain quatuor.In primaponitunamrationem ; in secundasecunda(m) ; in tertia
tertiam in
; quarta quartam.Secunda ibi: Item.Hoc idem Tertia
videtur. ibi: Totumaccidenta-
le. Quartaibi: Inest illa.
comparatio
Ethecestsententia ingenerali.
lectionis

lia)
(Notabi
Primonotandum estquarequiaesttamgeneralis multiplicatio,nonestgenus,quiadicit
Aristotiles in libroDe causis est
quodquantoaliquid communius, tantosimpli<ci)us.
Sedgenusestquoddam commune. est
Ergo simplex. Sed nullum simplex estdivisibile
sivemultiplicabile. Ergogenusnonestmultiplicabile. Etsicnonpotest habereconfusam
suppositionem.
Secundonotandum quodduplexestmultiplicatio. Quedamestuniversalitas ; et <hec)
multiplicitas benereperitur ingenere.Aliaestmultiplicatio, confusio veldistributioin
multa ; ethecnonestingenere, secundum quoddicitPorphirius quiasingulare divisivum
estuniusin multa, 5eduniversale estcollectiomultorum inunamnaturam.
Tertionotandum quodquedarrv-est predicatio per se et quedam peraccidens et quedam
secundum se. Secundum sediciturquando idquodaptum natum estpredicaripredicatur
ut 'cignusalbe, <per>accidens quando id quodaptumnatum estpredicari subicituret
econverso, ut *album estlignum'. Perse quandopredicatur universalevelsuperius ad |
F.47rainferiora,ut4homo estanimai.Secundum accidens econverso quandoinferius predicatur
de superiori, ut 1animaiesthomo', et secundum quodaliquidicunt, quandopredicatur
idemde se,ut'/io/no (esthomo).Etsi dicas:numquid?;dicitBoetius quodnullaest illa
in
predicatio qua idem de se.
predicatur Ergo contra quod tudicis,quiapropositioprout
estverissima, tamen pre<di>catio potest esseinpropria, quiadixitAugustinus: "nullaest
magis inpropria illaquandoidempredicatur dese".Similiter patetquodomnis predicatio
fitrationecommunitatis, uthabetur inTertioMetaphisice. Dicitsuperhocquodquando
predicatur quodnonestmagis commune, tuncestpredicatio inpropria.Verbigratia dicit
verequandoid<em)predicatur de se.
Item.Notandum quodlicetdicatur predicatio, tamen dicitincomplete quianatura gene-
risestquoddam aliquidcommune. Sedutdicitur in libroDe causisquodquantoaliquid
communius tantosimplicius, ergonatura generis estsimplex et talenonpotestmulti-
plican. Alia causa est quod natura generis estforma. Sed hominis forma, utdicitactor
SexPrincipiorum , estsimplex etindivisibilis.Ergononpoterit multiplican.Item.Nullum
quodestin ratione termini,estsimplex et indivisibile.Sed dicitBoetiusquodgenus

SI

11:59:12 AM
 potestessein ratione termini respectudiversarum specierum,sicutpunctus in medio
circuiirespectudiversarum linearum.
Item.Notandum quodduplexestmultiplicatio ; quedamquefitpersingulrem; et talis
numquam potestessein genere;quedamperplurlem numerum; et talispotestcon-
siderandupliciter, quia autgenusappellatur id quodest veregenuset talenonest
; aut
<genus> genus <est> idquod se habetfieri
permodum Et talispotestesse
generis.
genus.
Circaidemestnotandum de totoin quanti tatequiaesttotumquoddam in quantitate
completum, quando confunditur terminus communis mobilitervel
quandoest mobilis
. 47rbconfusiout cum[homocur]isteterminus 'homo'confunditur et potestfieri
mo|biliter
descensus subeo. Sic: 'omnis homo ergoSoretPlato
currit; ' Aliudesttotumin quanti-
tateincompletum, quandoterminus communis confunditurinmobiliter.
Undeestibi
totum in quantitateincompletum.

Quintonotandum quoddifferentia est intercommunitatem et multiplicationem

sive
confusionem,nam communi tasoriturex et
singularibus servatur
universalitas
secundum
, quia omnissingularitas
quod dicitactorSexPrincipiorum ab universal
itateprocedit.
veroprocedit
Multiplicitas ab universali in singulari,
et servatur est
quiamultiplicatio
uniusin multaveldicituniusomnisinmultasingularia divisio.

)
( Questio
Queritur utrum naturageneris sitgenus.Etvidetur
multiplicati quodsic. Cumdicitur :
f 'ile( !) alia
homines alium f, nonestaccidens hoc nequeequaleneque differentie.
Ergo
genus.Etestratioquamfacitactorinlittera hacibi: Estgenusmultiplicatum.Ergonatura
generis multiplicatiestgenus.
Item.DicitAristotiles in libroTopicorum quodad sustinendum utrum aliquidgenus
insitsubiecto alicuiconsiderandum estutrum insitaliquaspeciesei. Ponitexemplum: si
aliquis(aliquidMS)dicatquod(anima)movetur, videndum estutrum moveatur secun-
dumspeciemaliquammotus[animamovetur]. Ergovultquodgenuspredicatur per
ad
comparationeminferiora,specieset similiter. Et hocmodogenusmultiplicatur. Ergo
natura generis multiplicatiestgenus.
Item.Illadifferentia rationalisestcircasingulare et particulare.
Item.Omnequodpredicatur inquid,inplusse habet.
Solutio.Dicendum quodnatura generis multiplicati nonpotestmultiplican secundum
rem,sed secundum sermonem benepotestmultiplican. Undenumerus singulariset
pluralis nondifferunt secundum remnisisecundum modum quiaeademsuntsecundum
. 47vare(m),quiacumdicitur: 'istihomines'alius| estistehomoet aliusest1,et ille et sic de
singulis.
Adaliuddicoquodgenusinquantum genusnonpotestmultiplicari sed[genus]id quod
estgenusbenepotestmultiplicari. Etsicintelligitur Aristotiles
inTopicorum.
Ethocestquoddicit.

LECTIOQUINTA
Causa autem.Superiusdeterminavit
actoropinionem aliorum(aliquorumMS). Hie
autemdeterminai propriam.
opinionem turin quinqu.In primarepetit
Et hec dividi
* estanimai
etMS.

11:59:12 AM
 causamillorum. In secundadestruit illam.In tertiaprobatquoddamdictum.In quarta*
a(p)plicatsuam solutionem ad In
propositum. quinta destruit
quamdam di
visionem.
Secunda ibi: DicimusenimquodAristotiles.Tertiaibi: Uthomo constituitur
loyce .
loqueado
Quartaibi: Etsimiliter
. Quintaibi: Etpropterhocdestruimus
quamdamdivisionem
.
Ethecestdivisiolectionis et sententia ingenerali.

<Notabilia
)
Primum notabileestquodtriplex estcompositum. Quoddam estcompositum naturale,
quodconstatex veramateria et veraforma, ut homoconstatex corporeet anima.
Aliudestcompositum artis.Quodconstat ex veramateria etfictaforma,utymago, quia
habetverammateriam, utlignum, et habetformam ab arte.Aliudestcompositum ex
genereet Et
differentia. dicitur esse compositum rationis
; quod nonhabet veram materi-
amequeveram formam. Etde istocomposito loquimur inlittera
quandodicitur quod
homoconstituitur 4 1 4
ex animaliet rational^ loyceloquendo.
Secundonotandum quodforma rationalishabetessea forma quiaanimadicitur
naturali,
esseformanaturalis et humanitas est formarationis. lindehumanitas est eademin
omnibushominibus, sedanimanonesteademinomnibus hominibus. Etcausahuiusest
quiasupradiversaprincipia potestfundari unumprincipium, utpatetquiahomocon-
ex quatuor
stituitur elementis etquatuor elementa suntdiversa ettamen
principia homo
est verumsolumprincipium. Ita est similiterquod animesuntdiversein diversis
hominibus,sed tamenhumanitas in ipsissecundum quodestforma rationalis[ethec]
f.47vbeademest.Quoddicit| Boetius unius
quodparticipationes plures hominessuntunius
homo.

io)
(Quest
Queritur utrum predicatum multiplicetur multiplicato subiecto. Quodsic,probo.Dicit
actorSexPrincipiorum quodaccidens et quodei accidit unumsuntet vocataccidens ipsum
predicatum et quodaccidit ipsumsubiectum. Ergovultquodsubiectum et predicatum
suntidem.Item.Predicatum estlocoforme etsubiectum locomaterie. Sedexforma et
materia fitidem.Ergoex subiectoet predicato fitidem.Item.Dicit Commentator
superIX Metaphisice quodenset essesuntidem.Sed subiectum estenset predicatum
estesse.Ergosubiectum et predicatum suntidem.
Exististribusargumentis habeoquodsubiectum etpredicatum suntidem.Exhocarguo :
quandocumque aliquaduo sunteadem,ad confusionem et multiplicationem unius
sequitur multiplicatioalterius ; sedsubiectum et predicatum suntidem; ergoad multi-
plicationem subiecti sequitur multiplicatio predicati. Ergo videtur quodmultiplicetur
predicatum.
Solutio.Dicoquodduplexestpredicatum : accidentale etsubstantiate . Predicatumautem
accidentaleestidemcumsubiecto ' autem
secundum esse,ut homo estalbus1. Predicatum
substantiatedicituresse idemcumsubiectoper essentiam. Sed duplexest essentia,
scilicetcompleta et incompleta. Completa quandodiffinitio predicatur vel
de dififinito,
econverso, et quiadiffinitio et diffmitum suntidemperessentiam, sictuncpredicatum
estidemcumsubiecto, ut'/jo/do estanimai rationalemortale'. Autestessentia incompleta,
ut quandoaliquaparsdiffinitionis predicatur (ponitur MS) de dififinito,ut animaide
homine velrationale,ut' homo estanimaV vel(homo estrationale1. Etsicpatetquodaliquan-

S9

11:59:12 AM
 do subiectum et predicatimi suntidemsecundum esse,aliquandosecundum essentiam
completam, aliquando secundum essentiam incompletam.
Et <ad>argumenta patetsolutioquia 'predicatimi*potestdupliciterconsideran. Aut
secundum id quodest,et hocmodomultiplicatur subiecto
multiplicato quia intelligitur
insubiecto.Autpotest consideraninquantum idestinquantum
predicatum, estinratione
et hocmodononconfunditur
predicati, equemultiplicatur. Sicutpatet:albedo potest
consideran
dupliciter : aut secundum se,hocest secundum quamdam formam, et sicest|
48raindivisibilis
etinsimplici consistens
essentia ; autpotest
consideransecundum quodestin
subiecto,et sic ad divisionem materie vel subiectisequiturdivisioalbedinis. Et sic
eodemmodode predicato, utdictum est.

The Todi version of this chapter is more elaborate on several points,

especiallyin the introductorypart.

VII DE FALLACIIS1
This chaptergives glosses on the so-called Tractatus maiorum fallaciarum,
not on the shortertract which was edited by Bocheski as the seventh
chapterof the Summule logicales2.It is beyond all doubt that Robert had
the longer tract in his text of the Summule.The same holds good forall
the other thirteenthcenturycommentariesof the Summule . Hence the
conclusion must be drawn that those manuscriptswhich contain the
longer tracton fallaciesas the seventhpart of the Summule logicalesare
the better manuscripts.For that matterI have serious doubts whether
the shortertractas it is foundin Bochensks text (nrs 7.01-7.69) could
be considered as a work of Peter's hand. I shall returnto thisquestion
in the Introductionto my edition of the Summule.

VIII DE RELATIVIS
IX DE AMPLIATIONIBUS3
X DE APPELLATIONIBUS*
XI DE RESTRICTIONIBUSs
XII DE DISTRIBUTIONIBUS.6

1 IntheTodiversion, istheseventh
too,thischapter one.Seeabove, p. 29.
2 SeealsoL. M.deRijk,OnThe Text
Genuine ofPeter sSummule
ofSpain I inVIVARIUM
logicales 6
p. 3.
(1968),[pp.1-34],
3 IntheTodiversion
this iscombined
chapter withthat Thisseems
onappeilatio. tobeanadditional
hinttothelaterredaction Seeabove,
oftheTodiglosses. pp.31and44.
4 Seethepreceding
note.
s IntheTodiversionthischapteristhetenthone.Seeabovep. 29.
6 IntheTodiversionthischapter one.Seeabove,
istheeleventh p. 29.

60

11:59:12 AM
In one of the next issues of this Journalthe wide-spreadcommentaryof.
master Guillelmus Arnaldi, who taughtat Toulouse from 1238-1244,
will be discussed1.
To be continued

Nijmegen
Sophiaweg73

1 Unfortunately
misled insomeofourmanuscripts
indications
bycertain I havehitherto
supposed
this
that wasofthehand
commentary ofthefamous
physicianArnaldofVillanova.
SeeL. M.deRijk,
OnTheGenuine
TextofPeur s Summule
ofSpain* I, p. 34.
logicales
6l

11:59:12 AM
 La Lettre-ddicace de Bersuire Pierre des Prs

J. ENGELS

plusieursmanuscritsdu Reductorium moraleet dans l'dition des

Dans livresI-XIV par Claude Chevallon en i 21, le Prologue est prcd
d'une Lettre-ddicaceadressepar PierreBersuire son protecteur,
le cardinal Pierre des Prs1, laquelle a t assez nglige. Pannier2ne
l'a pas mentionnedu tout. Fassbinder3en a cit troisphrases.Samaran
en cite un fragment, maisla considrecomme faisantpartiedu Prologues.
En fait, cette Lettre-ddicace et le Prologue du Reductorium sont
deux textesdistincts.Cela ressort clairement de la dernire phrase la
de
Lettre-ddicace, o Bersuire dit: Quem igiturordinemhuius Reductorii
uideredelectat,sequentem collacionemperlegat. . .6, combine avec cette
autre phrase, crite en 135"97: . . quando collacionemseu prologm
Reductoriimeifeci, "Celui qui veut connatrela dispositiondes matires
dans le Reductorium , doit lire le Prologue ( collado) qui suit cette Lettre-
ddicace". Du reste, ces deux textes ont peut-tre mme t crits
des momentsdiffrents : le Prologue,lorsque Bersuirevenaitde terminer
le Reductorium; la Lettre-ddicace,lorsqu'il avait ensuite achev aussi le
Repertorium, du moins dans sa premireversion.
1 Pourle cardinal Pierre desPrs,vque voirCh.Samaran,
de Palestrina, Pierre
Bersuire
, Prieur
deSaint-loi deParis (120?-1362),aveclacollaboration
deJ.Monfrin, littraire
dansHistoire dela
France, t. 39 = 1962,pp.265-6etpassim.
2 L. Pannier, Notice Pierre
surlebndictin
biographique Bersuire de1Ecole
. . ., dansBibliothque des
Chartes, XXXIII = 1872,pp.325-64.
3 F. Fassbinder, DasLeben und dieWerkedesBenediktiners
Pierre
Beruire, I, Bonn,1917,p. 16,n. 3;
p. 17,n. i ; p. 21,n. 2.
* Op.cit. yp. 303.
s L'incipit delaLettre-ddicace inXristo
Reverendissimo acdomino
patri , domino Petro
dePratis ,
(infra
p. 70),manque dans sicomplte
lalistepourtant duReductorium
desincipit donneparF.Stegml-
ler,Repertoriumbiblicum mediiaevi(sigle:RBMA
), Madrid,IV = 1954,pp.236-41. Ilfautl'insrer
lap. 236,justedevant 6425Videtefquoniamnon mihi
solum laboravi...
Cetincipit manque aussidansL. Thorndike ACatalogue
andP. Kibre, ofInci ofMediaeval
pits Scientific
Writings in Latin,1 Cambridge (Mass.), 1937;2 London 1963, qui donnent pourtantceluidu
Prologue (col.772;col.1694)etceluideRed.I (col.192; col.411).
6 Voirplusloin,p. 72,lignes 17-8.
7 VoirVivarium III = 1965,p. 158,lignes 12-3.
62

11:59:20 AM
 Etantdonn Vimportancede la Lettre-ddicace pour le canon et la.
chronologiedes oeuvres latinesde Bersuired'une part,et d'autre part le
faitque Vimprimde Chevallon est pratiquementinaccessible, il a paru
utile d'en procurerici une dition critique.
La Lettre-ddicaceest actuellementatteste dans neuf manuscrits.
Des douze manuscritssignals par J. Monfrin1comme contenant le
premierlivre2du Reductor iumet qui de ce faitpourraiententreren ligne
de compte, il fauten liminer trois.
Le ms. Bale D. 11.23,comme le Dr. Max Burckhardt,conservateur
la Bibliothque universitaire,a bien voulu nous l'crire, ne contient
ni la Lettre-ddicaceni le Prologue. Il commence immdiatementpar
l'incipit du premier livre ( Deus quia propriespeculationis est). Le ms.
Paris, B. N. lat. 8864 (olim Suppl. latin io)* commence par explicate
ideoipm moralerepertori baptizos ; c'est que le premierfeuillet manque,
lequel a d contenirla premirepartie du Prologue de mme que, sans
doute, la Lettre-ddicace. Quant au ms. Worcester, Cathedral Chapter
LibraryQ.936, son cas est plus complexe.

1 Monfrin, pp.435-6,sousB. - Parle sigleMonfrin nousrenvoyons VAppendice.Manuscrits et

despp.434sqq.delamonographie
ditions deCh.Samaran, dont larfrencesetrouve lanote1de
la page62.
2 Antrieurement, F. Stegmller, RBMA , IV = 1954,p. 238,avaitnumr sixmanuscrits qui
taientcensscontenir lepremier livreduReductorium. Pourtant,onnepeutenretenir queleseul
ms.BleD.H.2,dont nousallons traiter.
Le ms.Cambridge, GonvilleandCaiusCollege56 ne contient pasRed.I-XV,maisXVI
(Monfrin, p. 440).
Lems.Cambridge, Pembroke College 197necontient pasRed. I-XV, maisXVI(manque chez
Monfrin, p. 440,maisvoirADescriptive Catalogue oftheManuscriptsintheLibrary ofPembroke
College,Cambridge, byM. R. James . . ., Cambridge, 1905,pp.183-4).
Lems.Oxford, Merton College 246necontient pasRed. I-XV,mais XVI(Monfrin, p.440).
Lems.Paris, B. N. lat.14412necontient pasRed.I-II,maisXII-XIII (Monfrin, p. 436).
Le ms.Paris, B. N. lat.16787necontient pasRed.I-XV,maisXV-XVI (Monfrin, p. 43s).
3Monfrin, p. 435;Stegmller, RBMA IV = i954>P238:"(script. 1430perCuonradum Lapic;
JohannisBurckardi capellanicapellaes. Antonii, Basileae; fratribus
legavit OP)f. 1-157:/-/K". -
L. Thorndike andP. Kibre, ACatalogue ofIncipits. . .2,London, 1963,col.411.
4 comportant317 ff.enparchemin, duXlVesicle, mutil dudbut, contenantRed. I-X,provenant
delaSainte-Chapelle dupalaisdeBourges, possesseur YtierdeMartreuil, arriv la Bibliothque
duroien1752,comme dondeschanoines deBourges LouisXV.Monfrin, p. 434,p. 436;L.
Delisle,BEC1856,p. 146(Commentarium Petri Berchorii, voluminaduo, itemducatalogue deBourges
de 1552),p. 158; Id.,BEC1862,p. 286;Id.,BEC1871,p. 20,p. 28; Id.,Cab.desMss. III,1881,
P. 420.
5 Dansl'ditionCologne, 1731,p. 1,col.2,deuxdernires lignes.
6 Pourlesmanuscrits de Worcester et l'histoire de la bibliothque, voirN.R. Ker,Medieval
ofGreat
Libraries Britain,AListofSurviving Books2,London, 1964,p. 205,Monasticon anglicanum . . .,
ed.W. Dugdale, London, 1817,I, pp.569-622, etL.H.Cottineau, Rpertoire
topo-bibliographique
desabbayesetprieurs,
vol.II,Mcon, 1939,col.3456-6.
<>3

11:59:20 AM
 Ce manuscrit, examin sur place et, ds 1898, signal par le
professeurH. Schenklde Graz1, a t dcriten 1906 dans le cataloguede
Floyeret Hamilton2.Entre 1941 et 1944, il a t examin par I. Atkins,
alors bibliothcaire du Chapitre, et le professeurKer^. En 1966, le
bibliothcaire actuel, G. C. B. Davies, et le doyen de Worcester,
R. L. P. Milburn, sur notre demande, ont bien voulu vrifiercertains
points. Il en ressort*que le ms. Q. 93, en 3^8 feuillets,partie en papier
et partie en vlin, du XVe sicle ( ineunte d'aprs Atkinset Ker) contient
- sauf - des disjectamembradu Reductorium.
peut-tre aux ff. 31 1-2
Malheureusement,il a beaucoup souffertde l'humidit, de sorte qu'un
quart environ du texte est devenu illisible. La couverture a disparu,
mais Ker* estime que la reliure est caractristiquepour Worcester.
Au point de vue palographique,M. Milburna crit ce qui suit: "f. 313-
3^8 is writtenin the same hand as f. 1-45 and f. 81-83. Halfwaythrough
f. 4 verso, the work is continuedin a contemporary(fifteenth century)
but much clearer hand". Les ff. 1-80 contiennentRed. XVI6, tronqu du
dbut. Puis suivent,jusqu'au f. 265, les livresXI-XIV ("fairlycomplete")
d'un Compendium naturalishistorie, c'est--dire encore du Reductorium.
L'incipit (f. 94v) l'explicit (f. 26$v) de Red.XIV, De naturemirabilibus
1 et
sont indiqus par des rubriques. Les ff.266-310 contiennentun Com-
mentarius in OuidiiMetamorphoses. Il s'agit de Red. XV ( Ovidiusmoralizatus
)
dans la dernire version P(aris), mais la plus grande partie du chapitre
liminaireDe Jormis gurisquedeorummanque, puisqu'il commence seule-
ment par Hic fitmentici . Les ff. 31 1-2 contiennent?Quedamdistinctiones.
Les ff. 313-58 enfin correspondent globalement aux livres I-IV du
Compendium naturalishistorieprcit, c'est--dire du Reductorium. Pour-

1 souslen4373delaBibliotheca patrm latinorum X,DieBibliotheken

Britannica Kathe-
derenglischen
dralen Worcester
), XVIII.
(Fortsetzung dans derPhil.
: Sitzungsberichte -Hist.ClassederK.Akademie der
Wissenschaften, 139.Band, Wien,1898,p. 72(cf.pp.44-5):uFerner: ch.s.XV.1. Compendium
historiaenaturalis. 2. Commentari usinOvidi i Metamorphoseonlibros".
2 J.K.Floyer andS. G. Hamilton, Catalogue ofManuscripts inthe
preserved Chapter ofWorcester
Library
Cathedral, Oxford, 1906,pp.i-6.
3 Catalogus librorum manuscriptorumbibliothecae , made
Wigorniensis in 1622-1623 byPatrickYoung,
Librarian toKing James /,editedwith anIntroduction byIvorAtkins andNeilR. Ker,Cambridge,
1944,p. 28,n.4; p. 39;p. 76.
4 cequipermet decorriger lanotice deMonfrin, p. 436.
s N. R. Ker,Medieval Libraries
. . .2,p. 215-.
6 Schenkl n'apassignal cetrait danssanotice dumanuscrit(voirplushaut, p. 64,note1);
c'estsansdoute parce qu'ilneretenait classischen
queles"patristischen, undsonst lite-
irgendwie
rarische wichtigen Stcke" (art.cit.,p. 4$).
7 VoirPetrus Berchorius, Reductorium morale XV:Ovidius
, liber , cap.i,DeJormis
moralizatus gurisque
deorum, textuse codice Brx. Bibi.Reg.863-9 critice
editus,Werkmateriaal (3)uitgegevendoorhet
InstituutvoorLaatLatijn derRijksuniversiteit Utrecht,1966,p. $1,ligne10d'enbas.
64

11:59:20 AM
tant,1' incipitdu f. 313 Angelusmalusesta Deo( !) uoluntateauersus
, qu'on
peut reconnatre au dbut de I, iii, De diabolo1,montreque le Prologue
et, partant, la Lettre-ddicace manquent ici. Thoriquement, il est
possible que la Lettre-ddicacese trouve quand mme ailleurs dans le
manuscrit,par suite d'un dplacementde feuilletpar exemple. Toujours
est-ilque l'tat du manuscritn'a pas permis M. Milburnde la retrouver.
M. Davies a estim avec raison qu'en tout tat de cause son utilitpour
rtablissementdu texte seraitngligeable. Nous avons donc cart aussi
ce ms. Worcester Q.932.

Les neuf manuscritscontenant la Lettre-ddicace sont numps

ci-dessous dans l'ordre alphabtique des noms de lieux de dpt, avec
toutes les informationsutiles. Celles-ci ont t puises aux notices^
succinctes de la bibliographie des manuscritsque Jacques Monfrina
tablie avec beaucoup de soin et pour laquelle il a sollicit des renseigne-
ments pistolaires indits. Nous les corrigeons le cas chant et les
compltons, soit d'aprs nos propres observationsfaitessur les repro-
ductions*des manuscrits,soit d'aprs les sources que nous indiquons.

i. CF: Le ms. Clermont-Ferrand,Bibi. mun. et univ. 101, olim 95,

233 papier, XVe sicle, contenant Lettre-ddicace (f. ir-2v),
v-
Prologue (ff. 2 1ov), Table des quatre premierslivres de la main de
F. de Sauzayo (ff. iov-nv), Red. I-IV (ff. 13r-233v). Provenance:
Bibliothque ds Dominicains de Clermont-Ferrand(1677). Manque
chez Montfaucon,H, pp. 135*3-6.
Monfrin,p. 435. - Cat. gn. desmss.desbibl. publiquesde France,
Dpartements, t. XIV, Clermont-Ferrand, par C. Couderc, Paris,
1890, p. 31.- Thorndikeand Kibre, A CatalogueofIncipits....
citentle ms. Clermont-Ferrand pour l'incipit du premierlivre
(*1937, col. 192; 2 196 3, col. 411), non pour la Lettre-
ddicace et le Prologue.
Pour le couvent des Dominicains de Clermont-Ferrand,voir
Couderc, pp. XXIV-XXV, et Dictionnaired'histoireet de
t. XII, Paris, 1953, col. 145 1.
gographieecclsiastiques,
1 Dansl'dition
Cologne,1731,p. 6,col.2.
2 Pource manuscritvoiraussinotreNote surlesmanuscrits
complmentaire berchoriens
deWorcester
,
plusloin,pp.73-8.
3 Monfrin,pp.43-6,sousB.
QueM.M.lesConservateurs demanuscrits quiontbienvoulumettre
ladisposition
del'Insti-
tuutvoorLaatLatijndesmicrofilms
oudesphotocopies,veuillent icil'expression
bientrouver de
notresincre
reconnaissance.

11:59:20 AM
 Ch. Samaran et R. Marichal, Cat. des mss. en criture
latine portantdes indicationsde date, de lieu ou de copiste
, t.
VI..., 1968, p. 16, insrentce ms. parmi les" Manuscrits
liminsou douteux", avec la remarque: 44Le copiste qui a
crit le premier cahier du ms. (ff. 1-12) et le dernier f. a
'
sign au f. iiv: Explicit tabula... F. N. de SauzayoV'
2. C: Le ms. Coblence, Staatsarchiv,GymnasialBibi., Abt. 701, nr.
20, ff. i9r"40r,papier, XVe sicle (aprs 1439), contenantLettre-
ddicace (f. i9ra-b), Prologue (ff. i 9rb-i61 va), puis (ff. i6iva-
40r) Red. I-IX, iii. Provenance: Dominicains de Coblence.
Monfrin,p. 43 (corrigerVIII en IX, iii). - RBMAIV, p. 243
place le manuscrit tortparmiceux du Repertorium . Le directeur
du Staatsarchiv,Graf Looz-Gorswarem, a bien voulu nous
crire notammentce qui suit:
"In dem handschriftlichen 4Index librorum manu
scriptorum,
"qui adservantur in bibliotheca gymnasii regii confluentii,
"primm compositus a. 1822, curis secundis elaboratus a.
"1831 et 1832 ab Ernesto Dronke' ist die Handschriftnicht
"beschrieben. Es heisst lediglich zu der heute als Nr. 2o
"gefhrtenHandschrift: 'i. Liber de SanctissimaTrinitate.
"2. Berchoriimorale reductorium' ....
"Die HandschriftAbt. 701 Nr. 20 g ist ein Papierkodex des
"i. Jhs(nach 1439) und stammtaus dem Koblenzer Domini-
kanerkloster. ber den 1. Teil (fol. ir-i4v) berichtet
"MartinGrabmann,Eine ungedrucktetheologischeSummaaus
"dem Jahre 1439, in Scholastik 27, 19^2, S. 68-76. Der 2.
"Teil (fol. i9r-40r) enthlt das Reductorium morale des
"Petrus Berchorius mit Widmung und Prolog (Videte
"quoniam), aber nur die Bcher 1 bis 8 einschliesslich.
"Inwieweit Buch 8 vollstndigabgeschrieben ist, kann hier
"nichtnachgeprft werden (Explicit : nam sicutdiciturin libro
"de naturaterre. Artikel: Angwillaunter pisces)".
Au desinit du manuscritcorrespond dans l'dition Cologne,
17 3 1, p. 23, col. i, lignes 3-4 du cap. iii: "in lib. de natura
rerum" ; c. le manuscritde Thomas de Cantimpr, Utrecht
710, f. ii4vb, lignes 2 et 3 d'en bas.
3. E: Le ms. Escurial e. III. 20, olim IV. L.. - III.F. 11, ff. ir-8ov,
parchemin, XlVe sicle, contenant Lettre-ddicace (f. ira-iva),
Prologue (ff. iva~4ra), Red. I-III, xv (De cibo); desinit (f. 8ov): per
66

11:59:20 AM
consequensmagisprocit, & medetur.Provenance: la librairie de Mateo
Dandolo Venise (cote CXLVIII); acquis en 1^73.
Monfrin,p. 435 (corriger cote et nombre de feuillets). - G.
Antolin, Catlogode los cdiceslatinosde la Real Bibliotecadel
Escorial, Madrid, t. II, 191 1, pp. 81-3; t. I, 1910, pp. XXVII-
XXVIII; t. V, 1923, p. 102.
Le desinit se lit dans l'dition Cologne, 1731, p. 72, col. 1,
lignes 34-f.

4. MC: Le ms. Mont-Cassin473, olim 202 et 935, 678 pages (pp. 08

et 678 en blanc), parchemin, XlVe-XVe sicles, contenant Lettre-
ddicace (pp. ia-2a), Prologue (pp. 2a-7a), puis Red. I-IX.
Monfrin,p. 436. - La cote se trouveaussi chez Montfaucon,I,
p. 229, col. i.-RBMAlW = 1954, p. 241 , le place tortpar-
mi les manuscrits de Red. XVI. - M. Inguanez, Codicum
casinensiummanuscriptorum , III, Mont-Cassin, 1940-1,
catalogus
p. 114.
A. Caravita,/ codicie le artia MonteCassino, t. I, Mont-Cassin,
1869, p. 368, datait le manuscritdu XlVe sicle. Cet auteur,
bien qu'il signale les rapportstroitsentre le Mont-Cassin et
Avignon, aprs que Jean XXII en 132 1 eut rig l'abbaye en
vch (p. 333), ne compte pourtantpas le ms. 473 parmiles
nombreuxmanuscritsen provenanced'Avignon.
C',est sans doute ce manuscritque se rapportel'Itemlib. de
proprietatibusrerummoraliz.primapars dans la liste des livres
donns l'abbaye par Henricus Thomacellus, abb de 1396-
1413 (M. Inguanez, Catalogi codicumcasinensium antiqui (saec.
V11I-XV), Mont-Cassin, 1941, p. 14).

. O: Le ms. Oxford, Bodl. Douce 177 (Madan 217^1), 458 ff.,

parchemin,XVe sicle, contenantLettre-ddicace(f. ira-iva), Prologue
(ff. iva-4va), Red. I-X (ff. 4va>4^8). Provenance inconnue. Donn
Douce par Roger Wilbraham.
Monfrin,p. 436. - CatalogueofthePrinted Booksand Manuscripts
bequeathed byFrancisDouce, Esq. to theBodleianLibrary
, Oxford,
1840, p. 30. - F. Madan, A SummaryCatalogueof Western
Manuscripts in theBodleianLibraryat Oxford. . . , IV {Collec-
tions receivedduringthefirst half of the 19th Century ), Nos.
16670-24330, Oxford, 1897, pp. 4-6.
6. Pj : Le ms. Paris, B. N. lat. 14276, 334 ff.,parchemin,XlVe sicle,

67

11:59:20 AM
contenant Lettre-ddicace (ff. ira-iva), Prologue (ff. iva-4vb), Red.
I-IX (ff. 4vb-334vb). Provenance: Saint-Victor (cote 310; 007 du
catalogue de Grandrue,B. N. lat. 14767, ff. i39v-i4or).
Monfrin,non insrp. 436, mais voir p. 434 et p. 43 lignes
4-. - RBMAIV = 19^4, p. 241, place ce ms. dubitativement,
mais tort,parmiles mss. de Red. XVI. - L. Delisle, Inventaire
des mss. latins de St-Victorconservs la Bibliothqueimpriale
sousles numros14232-15*75 dans C, XXX = 1869, p. 3
("Fin du XlVe s. Peint.").
C'est un des mss. copis ou acquis entre 1417 et 14^8 par les
soins de JohannesLa Masse, religieux,plus tardprieur et abb
de Saint-Victor (L. Delisle, Le cabinetdes manuscrits . . . , II,
Paris, 1874, p. 217; cf. A. Franklin, Histoire
gnralede Paris.
Les anciennesbibliothquesde Paris, t. I, Paris, 1867, p. 146).

7. P2: Le ms. Paris, B. N. lat. 16785, 292 ff., parchemin, XVe (?)
sicle, contenant Lettre-ddicace (f. ira-iva), Prologue (ff. iva-4ra),
Red. I-IX (ff. 4ra-292va). Provenance: Grands-Augustins de Paris, 44.
Monfrin,p. 435; p. 436. - RBMAIV = 1954, p. 241, place ce
ms. dubitativement,mais tort, parmi les mss. de Red. XVI.
- L. Delisle, Inventaire des mss.latinsde Notre-Dame et autres
fonds conservs la Bibliothque nationalesous les numros16719-
18613 , dans BEC, XXXI = 1870, p. 469 ("XV s. Peint.").
Ce ms. forme,avec les mss. 16686 et 16687, le seul exemplaire
manuscritcomplet connu du Reductorium en seize livres. Vu
que B. Haurau ( Mmoires de VInstitutnational de France, Aca-
dmiedes Inscriptions et belles-lettres
, t. XXX, Paris, 1883, p. go)
et Ch. Samaran (op. cit., p. 342) datentle ms. 16787 du XlVe
sicle, il y a tout lieu de rexaminerla date de cette srie.
C'est peut-tre cette srie de mss. du Reductoriumque
F augustiJacques Legrand a emprunt les exemplapour ses
sermons(voir E. Beltrn,JacquesLegrand(I1415) prdicateur ,
dans AnalectaAugustiniana XXX = 1967, p. 2o2, note 24).
8. Pgj: Le ms. Prague, Mus. Nat. 3147 (XII A 8), 172 ff.,parchemin,
miniatures, XIVe sicle, contenant Lettre-ddicace (f. ira-iva),
Prologue (ff. iva-4va), puis (ff.4va-i72) Red. I-IV, xxviii (De medico);
. Provenance: Couventdes Augustins
desinit: vel faciteri omniasupradicta
de Roudnice.
Monfrin,p. 436. - RBMAIV = 1954, p. 241 , le place dubitati-
vement, mais tort, parmi les manuscritsde Red. XVI. -
68

11:59:20 AM
 F. M. Bartos,SoupisRukopisu NrodnhoMuseav Praze[Catalogus
codicummanuscriptorum Musaei NationalisPratensis],II, Prague,
1927, p. 213 ("Primaparsreductorii moralisquinqu librorum" ;
le manuscrit est donc probablement mutil de la fin du
quatrimelivre et du cinquime).
Le desinitse lit dans l'dition Cologne, 1731, p. 10 1, col. 2,
ligne 46.

9. Pg2: Le ms. Prague, Mus. Nat. 3456 (XIV D 4), ff.2-141, parchemin,
dbut XVe sicle, contenant Lettre-ddicace (f. 2ra-2vb), Prorogue
(ff. 2vb-6va), Red. I-IV (ff. 6yb-i4i). Provenance: Eglise de Cesky-
Krumlov. Don de MagisterJaksso(f. 2r).
Monfrin, p. 436 (XlVe s.) - RBMAW = 1954, p. 241, le
place dubitativement,mais tort, parmi les manuscritsde
Red. XVI. Voir le catalogue de Bartoscit pour Pgj, pp. 298-9.

10. Ch: A ces neuf manuscrits,il faut ajouter le texte de la Lettre-

ddicace qu'on lit au f. Ira-b de l'dition du Reductorium
I-XIV imprime
par Claude Chevallon Paris en 121 :
"ReductoriimoralisfratrisPetri Berchoriilibriquatuordecim,perfectam
officiorumatque morum rationemac pene totam nature complectentes
historiam. . . VenumdaturParrisiis,apud Claudium Chevallon . . . -
A lafin: Parrisiis,apud Claudium Chevallon . . . anno Domini millesimo
-
quingentsimo vigesimoprimo. Parrisiis , i$2i. In-fol., car. goth.,
LV-365 ff., titre avec encadrementgrav sur bois, marques typogr.
de B. Rembolt sur le titreet de C. Chevallon la fin".
Nous citons le titre conformmentau Cataloguegnraldes
livresimprims de la Bibliothquenationale, Auteurs
, XI, Paris,
192^, col. ii 20 (Rs. D. 1226).
Monfrin, p. 444. - Thorndike and Kibre, A Catalogue of
Incipits. . . , citent l'dition Chevallon pour l'incipit du
premierlivre (1 1937, col. 192 ;2 1963, col. 41 1), non pour la
Lettre-ddicaceet le Prologue.

Le collationnementde ces dix tmoinsne sauraitaboutir un arbre

gnalogique des manuscrits,tantdonn que, pour ce petitfragmentdu
Reductorium, les fautescommunessont trop peu nombreuseset insuffisam-
ment caractristiques.Pourtant, la comparaison a permis de conclure
que C et Pg2sont dfectueuxet que, parmi les autres, Pgj est excellent,
suprieurnotamment P2. C'est donc Pgn c'est--dire le ms. Prague,
69

11:59:20 AM
Muse national 3147 (XII A8) que nous ditons ici, avec un apparat
critique rduit, et en corrigeantles fautesvidentes l'aide des autres
tmoins.

[f. i^a] [EPISTOLA DEDICATORIA]*1

Reuerendissimoin Xristo patri ac domino, domino [Petro]2 de Pratis,
dignaDei prouidenciaepiscopo Penestrino3ac sacrosancteRomaneeccle-
sie cardinali nec non ad presens uicecancellario domini nostri Pape,
fraterPetrus Berchorii, [pauper &]* peccator, monachus, seruitor &
familiariseiusdem, seipsum ad perpetuumfamulatum.
Quia, paterreuerendissime,iustumuidetur & congruum*,testesen-
tencia Salomonisa, quod is qui ficumseruat & irrigatquandoque loco &
-
temporepercipiatfructuseius et hoc ne fortesit sicut ille agricola qui
ficum habens in orto suo annis singulis ueniebat ad ipsam querens
fructum& non inueniens,quapropteripsam mandauitsuccidi & de orto
-
ipsiussubmouerib hinc est, pater & domine, quod cum iam diu est me
ficuminfructuosam&6 aridam, in agro & uiridario domus tue duxeris
transplantandum& diuersisgraciis & beneficiisirrigandum,sciens quod
plerumque arbores transplantacione proficiunt quodque quando7
Paulus plantat & Apollo rigatc,fructusuberioresproueniunt& succres-
cunt, dignum & congruum iudicaui fructus laborum meorum tibi
pandere ut sic de me arbore tua, quamquam infructuosaet sterili,possis
complacenciam aliquam reportare.
Tibi igitur, creatori & patri8 meo, intendo offerreuitem in qua
erunttres propagines. Quarum uvas in calice tuo comprimenstamquam
bonus Pharaonis^ pincerna1/d spero letificare cor tuume, quod erga
scienciasnon solum ciuiles & cannicas,sed eciam theologicas& morales
scio sollicitum& attentum11.Tres autem iste propaginestres sunt libri
* Letextea ttabli parMlleMaria S. vanderBiji,quia aussirassembl deladocu-
unepartie
mentation.
1 CFIncipit
prohemium moralis Reductorii
; * Pg.om.
C,E,MC,O,P,tit.om . ; P2Epistola;Pg1Prolo- s CF,O,P P2,Pg2 congrue.
gus.Incipit
prologus in reductorium Morale 6 diu- &]C factum me.
quodcomposuit frater P. Berchoriiordinis 7 CF,C,,O,P,,Pg2quandoque.
sancti
benedicti cancell.
; Pg2 reductorium8 creatori
: Incipit & patri]
Cpatri
etdomino.
Ch
morale; Epistola nuncupatoria. 9 tamquam bonus Com.
Pharaonis]
2 Pg,P. 10E,MC,Pg2piscerna; P2picerna.
3 CF,C,MC,0, P P2,Pgx, Pg2,Ch;E peie- 110, Pg2attenticum.
strino.
a Prov.XXVII, 18. b Luc.XIII,6-7. c Cf.i Cor.III,6. d Cf.Gen. XL,9-11.
XXVU,n.
e Cf.Prov.
70

11:59:20 AM
seu tres laborum meorum particule tibi uel nunc uel alias propinande,
scilicet MORALEREDUCTORIUM,MORALEREPERTO RIUM, que duo iam
tibi in presenti1expono, et consequentermorale directorium,2 quod
si uita comes fuerit3 offerretue maiestati propono. Amicus enim
evangelicuslicet sompnolentus& dormienslegitursuperuenientiamico
tres panes acomodasse8- ; mulier eciam euangelica tria farinesata [f. i rb]
legitur fermentasse b. Simili ergo modo ego inter amicos & seruitores
tuos pauperior, quamquam sompnolentus& negligenspossim dici, in
archiuo* librorumtuorum istos tres panes acomodo & pro turba Xristi
famelicarecreandacista triasata farine5fermento,& pro nutriendislacte
non solido cibod simplicibusqualescumque cibos ignaruspulmeniarius
confido uel compono. Et, ut verumfatear6,pulchrumdepingerehomi-
nem pictor fedus mille colorum conor generibus & tamquam fatuus
medicus7curare alios non meipsumecontra regulamracionis contendo.
Istos igitur8 tres panes istaque tria sata farine, id est istas tres
partculasrudis & simplicis doctrine rudimentis9rusticalibusa me rudi
ruditerpro rudibuspre rudit[at]e10,tua benigna(grata)11paternitasgrate
recipiat, & de me spina steriliqualescumque uvas & rosas forsitancolli-
2 3
gens', istospanes& farinamquos offero,ac1 si poma aurea de Esperidum1
silua colligeret,gratitudinetantasumat. Nec indignetureadem si parum
estquod offerotanto[patri]14, sed attendaipocius affectum quam manm15
& cogitet quod magis est pensanda offerentisuoluntas quam oblati
utilitas uel mayestas. Paupercula enim uidua16 que solum in erario
templi duo riinutaposuit, magisposuisse asseriturmultisaliis diuitibus
qui multamaiora [apponere17uidebanturS. Cum ergo sciat ueneranda
paternitas18tua quod profundafluuiorumscrutatushnon extiterimnec
Iordanis influxeritin os meum1 quodque Minerue non perforatuscus-
pidibus nec fontepotatus Pegaseo19, Apollinis20 monte bicipiti non
1 inpresenti]
Cinpresentibus; ,MCinpresen- 10C,P,; cet.rudite.
ciaram;Chimpresentiarum. 11Pg1add.
2 CF, ,0, Pj,P2,Pg2ductorium, Pro- 12C,MCy
sedvide PglyCh; cet.sic.
logam in Reductorium
, ed. ColoniaAgrippina,*3deEsperidum] Cdeaspidum ; Pg2desperidum.
I73I, p. 2yCol.lyl.3. 14 principl.
3 quod- fuerit] Com. C,,MCy 0, P,,P2,Chmagnum; Pg2mag-
4 C archana. nani.
s satafarine]
P,,Chinv. 16P,mulier.
6 Et- fatear]C uelutverius
dico. 17?Siproponere.
7 fatuus
medicus] Pg2status
modicus. 18uenerandap.]CFvenerenda Cpa-
paternitas;
CF,Pg2ergo. ternitas
reuerenda; ,MCreueranda paternitas.
9 C,Pgx ; cet.indumentis. CFyEyP2ypegaso ; Cpecum lac.; MCpegeleo
.
20C appollonis.
a Luc.XI,-8. b Mt.X DI,33. c Cf.Mt.XV,32-9. d Cf.Febr. V, 12. e Cf.Luc.IV,23.
f Cf.Mt.VII,16. g Marc. XE,41-4. h Cf.lobXXVffl, 11. i Cf.lobXL,18.

71

11:59:20 AM
dormiui, spero quod eadem a me eli[n]gui &1 inscio, Aristotilis2 pro-
posiciones, Tholomei3 consideraciones, S[o]cratis*sapienciam et Tullii
-
eloquenciam non requiret sed quia nouit quod deficienspondere,
numero & mensuraainuenior minus habens - si, cum sim paruulus^,
8
loquar ut paruulus6 & sapiam7ut paruulus /b,michi parce[tJo.
Igiturconfido in Domino quod hiis omnibus consideratisserenitas
tua, pie pater, labores meos non detestabitur10,sed pocius solita
benignitatequa mentes intuenciumallicis, solita caritate11qua muitos
amplexaris& reficis,solita humilitatequa nullumuilipendisaut despicis,
solita prudencie [f. iva] luminositate qua preterita, presencia12 8c
futurasollerterconsideraset respicis,solita iusticie equitate qua Grecis
& barbaris,sapientibus& insipientibusdebitoremcte reputans,cum sis
liber ab omnibus,seruumsingulorumte efficisd,munus modicum quod
tibipauper seruitoroffero- quod re ueranonestdignum13presenciatanti
-
patris non dedignabitur,sed pocius iuxta Cathoniselogium!*/egrata
beniuolencia persequetur1s .
Quem16 igitur17ordinemhuiusreductorii uideredelectat,sequen-
tem collacionem18/'perlegat que libri19ordinem manifestat ad laudem
scilicet & gloriamCreatoris,qui linguasinfancium20 facitdisertas21/& a
quo omnis sapiencia11& omne donum perfectumdesursumest1,qui est
benedictus in scula seculorum22.

1 elingui
&JCF,Pg%t om.;Celigo met; O,P,,P2 *3CF,P,,Pai. dignum;Es. dignum;Oi.indig-
tam;Pgleligui&. num;Pg2indignum.
2 C Aristotolis. *4CF,Pg2om.;0eulugium ; P,eulagium.
* C,Chptolomei; ETololomei; F, ,O, P,,P2,Pg2t persequar;MCprose-
P,,P2ptholomei. quitur.
Pglsacra
tis. 16C qui;MCquam.
s O,P2add.&. *7CFyC ergo.
6 loquarutparuulus]Cr,Pg2om. 18C prologm.
7 0, P,sapiencia. *9quelibri]C, P, quilibri;Oquiliber;Pgz
CF,O,P.,P2,Pg2paruulo. quodliber.
9 Pglparces. 20EyMCy OyP^j, C/iinfantinas.
10,OyP P2,Pg2detestabit. 21EyMCdisertinas; O ditas;P, desertas;
Pg2
qua- caritate]
P,om. deseruitinas.
12preterita, Pgx
presencia] ; cet.inv. 22C add.Amen.

a Cf.Sap.XI,2i. b Cf.i Cor.XIII,n. c Rom. I, 14. d I Cor.IX,19. e Disticha

Catonis,
I, 20:Exiguummunus
cumdettibipauper
amicus pito
acci yplene
placide memento
laudare (ed.M.Boas&
H. J.Botschuyver,
Amsterdam,1952,p. sg). f suprat
p. 62. g Sap.X,21. h Cf.EcciI, 1.
i lac.I, 17.

72

11:59:20 AM
 Note Complmentaire sur les Manuscrits
Berchoriens de Worcester

J. ENGELS

Le ms. Worcester, Cathedral Chapter LibraryQ.931 pose un problme

particulierconsistantdans sa relationavec un autre manuscritberchorien
de cette bibliothque, savoir le ms. F. 95 port disparu depuis 1821.
Lorsqu'en cette anne-l les manuscritsont t placs de nouveau dans
Tordre du cataloguede Hopkins (1697)2, on a constatl'absence du ms.
cot F[olio].9 chez Hopkins,mais la prsenced'un ms. Q[uarto].93, qui
n'tait pas signal dans ce catalogue, lequel s'arrte aprs Q.80.
A propos de la relationentreles mss. F. 95 et Q.93, le catalogue de
Floyer-Hamilton(1906)3 a mis trois opinions contradictoires:
1) A la p. 47, aprs la citation de l'item de Hopkins*: "F. 9 . Figurae
cummoralitate ", il est dit: "Reported as missingin
a Genesiad Apocalypsin
1821, and no longer in the library".
2) A la p. i, il est dit des ff. 1-80 du ms. Q.93: "This treatise is
probablywdiatremainsof F.9^, q.v.".
3) A la p. 173: "F.9. There seems, however, to be little doubt that
this volume is now Q.93".
Atkinset Ker5 fontseulementtat des opinions 1) et 3) de Floyer-
Hamilton. Ils se rallient 3), tant d'avis que le F. 95 doit tre identifi
avec le Q.936. En outre, ils estiment que ce manuscritest vis par
1' item 8 2 du cataloguedresspar Young en 16 22-3, et libell comme suit:

1VoirVivarium VII= 1969,p. 63.

2 W.Hopkins, Librorum Ecclesiae
Manuscriptorum Cathedralis niamCatalogus
apudVigor continent
codices
CCLII,imprim dansBernard, librorum
Catalogi manuscriptorumaeetHiberniae
Angli ,Oxford, 1697,II,i,
pp.16-22. - Surcecatalogue, voirCatalogus
Librorum Bibliothecae
Manuscriptorum , made
Wigorniensis
in1622-1623 byPatrieYoung, Librarian
toKing
James/,edited
withanIntroductionbyI. Atkinsand
NeilR. Ker,Cambridge, 1944,p. 1; pp.24-9.
3 J.K.Floyer andS. G.Hamilton, ofManuscripts
Catalogue inthe
preserved Chapter ofWorcester
Library
Cathedral, Oxford, 1906.
4 Bernard, op.cit.,p. 18,col.b.
* Ed.cit.yp. 28,note4; N. R. Ker,Medieval Libraries
ofGreat , AListofSurviving
Britain Books2,
London, 1964,p. 21g.
6 Ed. cit.,p. 7s; p. 76.

73

11:59:31 AM
"Figuraecummoralitate de Genesiusqueadnem apocalipsisanon.Jol. rec."1.
J'admets sans difficultque l'item 82 de Young et l'item F. 9^ de
Hopkins, presque identiques, se rapportentau mme manuscrit. Par
contre, l'identit in totodu Q.93 et du F. 9 g disparu me parat sujette
caution. Il est difficilede comprendre,du moins en jugerloin, comment
ce manuscrit,class par Young et par Hopkins parmi les in-folio,aurait
pu tre rang plus tard parmi les in-quarto. En outre, les items 82 de
Young et F. 9^ de Hopkins consistentdans un seul titre,tandisque, ds
qu'un manuscritcontientplusieurstraits,leurs catalogues le mention-
nent d'ordinaire expressment.
Cette dernireobjection ne s'applique pas l'opinion 2) de Floyer-
Hamilton: ce seraientseulementlesff.1-80 du Q.93 qui reprsenteraient
le F. 9. Ils auraientt relisplus tardavec les ff.8 1-3^8v, et l'ensemble
constitueraitl'actuel Q.93. La reliure ne pourrait alors dater d'avant
1697. Pourtant,la notice de Ker2 donne l'impressionqu'elle doit tre
plus ancienne. (Notons entreparenthsesque celui qui a faitexcuter la
reliurea d tre conscientque l'ensemble a pour auteurPierre Bersuire;
sinon commentaurait-ileu l'ide de relier une moralisationdes figures
bibliques avec un compendium d'histoire naturelle et un commentaire
des Mtamorphoses ?) Cette seconde opinion de Floyer-Hamilton n'est
gure compatible avec la rpartitiondes deux mains distinguespar
M. Milburn*. Finalement,le libell mme des itemsde YoungetHopkins:
Figuraecummoralitate. . . pour un manuscritdont 1'explicit (f. 8ov)
dclare expressment: ... et sic estnisxvilibrireductorii
moralis. . . ,
ne laisse pas de surprendre. D'autant plus que Young ajoute le qualificatif
anon[yme ]. On le voit, l'opinion 2) de Floyer-Hamiltonn'est pas non plus
sans reproche.
Il y a donc lieu d'examiner aussi l'opinion 1) de Floyer-Hamilton:
le ms. F. 9, qui n'aurait rien voir avec le Q.93, aurait simplement
disparu. Cela revient se poser la question suivante: N'y a-t-il pas
eu deux exemplaires de Red. XVI dans la bibliothque de Worcester,
qui tait celle d'un prieur bndictin jusqu' la Dissolution des
monastresen 1^38?
A cet gard, il importede remarquerqu'il y a encore aujourd'hui
Worcester, et depuis longtemps,un second exemplaire de Red. XIV
aussi bien que de Red. XV.

1 Ed.cit.,p. 39.
2 Op.cit.
, p. 21
3 Voirplushaut, p. 64.
74

11:59:31 AM
 Un exemplairede Red. XIV, De mundimirabilibus , - diffrent
de celui
du Q.931 - est contenudans le ms. mixte F. 19, dont nous n'avons pas pu
solliciter tempsun microfilm.Ce manuscritcomportantplus de 166 ff.,
du dbut du XVe sicle2, conserv Worcester ds environ 1oo3, a t
signalpar Young (item 24 1)4 et par Hopkins5. Plus rcemment,il a t
dcrit par H. Schenkl6 et dans Floyer-Hamilton7 . Ces derniers y ont
distingug traitsdiffrents,qui ont en commun de traiterd'une manire
ou d'une autre des vices et des vertus. Par contre, Hopkins n'a pas
signal le trait 2, tandisque pour Young le manuscritcontientun seul
traitd'thique8 Fasciculusmorm, qui porte le nom du trait5, mais qui
aurait empruntsa matireaux traits2, 3 et 4. C'est assez drputant,
mais on peut dblayerquelque peu le terrain.
Schenkl et Floyer-Hamiltonont not que le trait 2 (ff. 38-103)
porte comme titre De differentia venialiumet mortaliumet a comme
explicit : Tractatusvalde utilisde vitiis
et virtutibus.
Ce traitanonymea t
signaldepuis par le professeurMorton W. Bloomfield dans A Prelimi-
naryList of Incipitsof Latin Workson the Virtuesand Vices , mainlyof the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenthCenturies 9, mais sans information
nouvelle.
Schenklet Floyer-Hamiltonont ensuitenot que le trait4 (ff.13 1-
60) est intitul Liberqui diciturNich[o]l[ai'de Fumo. C'est une Tabula
moralis Alphabetica(Hopkins) avec l'incipit: Abiceredebemusfetorem
immundicie . Cette Table ne parat pas avoir t signale par Bloomfield.
Sur 1ertraitg (ff. 161 sqq.), nous sommes un peu mieux informs.
L'incipit: Anselmus de similitudinibus: sic est de cordehominispermet de
reconnatrece texte dans les numros68 et 1040 de Bloomfield10.Il s'agit
du Fasciculusmorum attribu Robert Silk (?) ou JohnSpicer (?), et
pour lequel Bloomfield a retrac une quinzaine de manuscrits.

1 Voirplushaut, p. 64.
2 AtkinsandKer,ed.cit.,p. $0.
3 Ker,op.cit.yp. 210;p. 2o,3 lignesd'enbas.
* AtkinsandKer,loc.cit.
s Bernard,op.cit.,p. 16.
6 Bibliotheca
patrm latinorum X, DieBibliotheken
Britannica derenglischen
Kathedralen
(Fortsetzung
),
XVIII
, Worcester
, dansSitzungsberichte
derPhil. Classe
-Hist. derK. Akademie derWissenschaften,
139.Band, Wien,1898,p. 46,n4291.
7 Op.cit.,p. 10.
8 Pourcettecatgorie de textes,voirH.-M.Rochis, latins
I. Florilges
spirituels.
Florilges dans
Dictionnaire
deSpiritualit, etPh.Delhaye,
V, 1964,coll.43^-60, mdivaux
II. Florilges ,
d'thique
quisuitimmdiatement (coll.460-7$).
9 Traditio
XI = 19g,p. 287,n225.
10Art.cit.,p. 271; pp.373-4.
7S

11:59:31 AM
 Le trait3 (ff. 104-30) est intituldans le manuscrit:Secundusliber
Eligii de mirabilibusmundi . Pourtant, l'incipit Quia Deus cotidiefacit
magnolia, cit par Schenkl et Floyer-Hamilton, est celui du Prologue de
Red. XIV1, et liberEligii sans doute une fautede transmissionpour liber
priorissanctiEligii "le livredu prieurde Saint-Eloi",i.e. Bersuire.C'est le
titre qu'on lit dans le ms. Oxford, Digby 206 de Red. XIV: Moralizatio
priorisS . Eligii de mirabilibusmundiy ii libb.2. Quant la divisionen deux
livres,Bersuireindique dans le Prologue*que Red. XIV consisteen deux
parties. La premire partie (cap. i-lviii)* prsente et moralise les
mirabiliadans Tordre alphabtiquedes rgionso ilsavaientt localiss;
la seconde partie (cap. lix-lxxv)ceux qui n'avaientpu tre localiss dans
une rgion dtermine. Secundusliber, dans le titredu trait 3, est donc
une erreur: il faudraitPrimusliber. Schenkl remarque que ce trait est
incomplet. Je ne sais s'il a observ que, comme le notentFloyer-Hamil-
ton, les ff. 127-30 ont t dplacs, le traits'arrtantau f. 124; les ff.
125-6 tant rest en blanc. Toujours est-il que Schenkl avait raison. La
suite du trait 3 se trouve dans le trait 1 (ff. 3-37) intitulTractatus de
mirabilibus mundiad moresapplicatisimutil du dbut. L'incipit, cit par
Schenkl: [ . . . ] bestiemelioressuntillis se lit en effetRed. XIV, lix*, c'est-
-diredans le premierchapitrede la seconde partie. Puis, Igniummirabilia
multasuntin natura 6 constituele dbut du
chapitrelxi?. Il n'y a donc plus
gure de doute que les traits 3 et 1 aient form l'origine un seul
manuscritde Red. XIV. L'examen du texte devra dcider s'il s'agit d'un
exemplaire complet ou lacuneux.
Le ms. F. 89, 166 ff.,de la findu XlVe sicle8 ou du dbut du XVe9,
provenant du Couvent des Dominicains de Worcester10, signalpar

1 VoirRepertorium aeri(RBMA
medii
biblicum ), IV = 1954,p. 237,n642$,xiv.- L'incipit
manque
chezBloomfield, quia seulement puutiliser RBMA I-III,19^0-1,desortequepourlesincipit de
Bersuire,il faut
toujours lalistepresque
recourir complte deRBMA IV,pp.236-41.C'estsans
douteparuneautre voiequ'ontrouve recueilli
isolment de Red.XVI,p. 282,n178
l'incipit
(cf.RBMA IV,p. 238,no6426,I).
2 VoirA. G. Little, Initia
operumlatinorum
quaesaeculis xiii.xiv.xv.attribuuntur
secundumordinem
i disposita
Alphabet , Manchester, 1904(= repr.NewYork1958),p. 191.Little ajoute,a tort,
[Ord.Min.]!. - L'incipitduXlVelivre auraitdtrerecueilli avecceluiduXVedans lanoticesur
dansVivarium
Little II = 1964,p. 87.
3 Edition Cologne, 1731,p. 64,col.2,ligne12d'enbasetsqq.
4 Inc.:Africa esttertia
generaliter pars cf.RBMA
orbis; , n642, xiv.
s Inc.:Circa humanam multa
naturam suntmirabilia
; cf.ibid.
6 EditionCologne, 1731,p. 608,col.i, ligne8 d'enbas.
7 Ibid.,
p. 616,col.i, ligne8 d'enbas.
8 Schenkl,artcit.,p. $3,n4318.Atkins andKer,ed.cit.,p. 39(84).
Ker,op.cit.,p. 21.
10Ker,op.cit.,p. 21$.

76

11:59:31 AM
Young (item 841) et par Hopkins2, dcrit dans Floyer-Hamilton*,
contientdeux traits. Le premiercommence par Abstinentia carodo[m]a-
tur. Il s'agit d'une Tabula supersacram Scripturam attribue Jacques de
Voragine, dont F. Stegmller* et surtout Morton W. Bloomfields
signalentplusieursautres manuscrits,tous anglaisou d'origine anglaise.
Le second trait (ff. 130-166), un commentairemoralisantdes Mtamor-
phoses , est attribudans le manuscrit JohnRidewall. Cette attribution
a t reprise par Young6, Hopkins?, Floyer-Hamilton8et Schenkt.
Toutefois,ces deux derniersayantcit l'incipit: A veritate quidemauditum
auertent;adfabulas autemconuertentur , Mario Esposito10a, en 19 1,conclu
avec raison qu'il s'agit en faitde Red. XV, Ovidiusmoralizatus.Pour le
moment, il nous suffitde prciser que c'est la version A(vignon).
Cette prsence, Worcester, d'un second exemplairede Red. XIV
et de Red. XV ne sauraittonner, si l'on est attentifau nombre et la
1
rpartitiondes manuscritsde Bersuire1 . Pour le Repertorium12 ynousavons
conserv une quinzaine de manuscrits
complets, ct de nombreux
manuscritspartiels^ ; cela montresa grandevogue,qu'il faudraexpliquer
un jour. Pour le Reductorium en revanche,nous n'avons conserv qu'un
seul exemplaire manuscritcomplet1*,avec peu de manuscritsdes livres
I-XIIPs. C'est que le Reductorium , en tant qu'encyclopdie, n'a pas pu
rivaliser srieusement avec le De Troprietatibus rerumde Barthlemy
l'Anglais (que Bersuire avait remani dans ses livres I-XIII), ni avec le
De naturi s rerumde Thomas de Cantimpr,ni avec le Speculum de Vincent
de Beauvais. Mais le sort des livres XIV-XVI, ajouts aprs coup par
Bersuire,a t diffrent.Ils ont eu, surtoutles livres XV et XVI, une

1 AtkinsandKer,loc.cit.
2 Bernard, op.cit.,p. 18.
3 Op.Cit.
yp. 4.
4 RBMA, III = i9i,p. 218,3998,i.
s Art. tp. 266,n2 (Bloomfield
cit. citele ms.F. 89).
6 Loc.cit.
7 Loc.cit.
8 Loc.cit.
9 Loc.cit.
10TheEnglish Historical , XXX= 191^,p. 469;pourcetarticle,
Review VI = 1968,
voirVivarium
pp.102-3.
11Voirla bibliographie tablieparJacquesMonfrin dansCh.Samaran,Pierre Prieur
Bersuire, de
Saint-loi
deParis (U290-1 362),Histoire
littraire , t. 39 = 1962,pp.434sqq.
dela France
" DansVivarium HI = 196^,p. 150,ligne11d'enhaut, unecoquillea substitu
Reductorium

Repertoriumqu'ilfallait.
13Monfrin, pp.441sqq.sousF.
*+Voirplushaut, p. 68.
*5Monfrin, pp.435^-6, sousB.

77

11:59:31 AM
vogue gale celle du Repertorium. Cela est prouv par le nombre de
manuscritsconservs. Monfrin1en signale dix pour le livre XIV, De
mundimirabilibus , auxquels il fautajouter notammentle ms. Worcester
F. 19 prcit2. Pour le livre XV, Ovidius moralizatus , nous avons
compt plus de soixante manuscrits, dont le relev pourra tre publi
sous peu3. Quant au livreXVI, FigureBibliemoralzate , Monfrin*en a dj
signal dix-sept manuscrits.
Dans ces circonstances,l'opinion 1) de Floyer-Hamilton- postulant
qu'il fautcompter Worcesteravec deux exemplairesaussi de Red. XVI :
Tun, F. 9 (Young 82), disparu entre 1697 et 1821; l'autre conserv
au dbut du Q.93 actuel - ne parat pas moins plausible que leurs
opinions 2) et 3). Un nouvel examen du ms. Q.93 malheureusementfort
endommag,qui tiendraitcompte aussi des donnes de l'histoirelittrai-
re, pourraitpeut-tretrancherdfinitivement la question.

Utrecht

Instituut
voorLaat Latijn

1 Monfrin, sousC.
pp.436-7,
2 etd'autres, souslenomsoitdeSolin,
maintenant
quipassent soitdeGervaise
deTilbury.
Telest
le casdums.Madrid, parL. Thorndike
Bibi.Nac.R. 79signal andP. Kibre,
A Catalogue
of
ofMediaeval
Incipits Scientific inLatin,2
Writings London,1963,col.1216.
3 Monfrin, unecinquantaine.
sousO,ena djsignal
pp.437-40,
4 Monfrin, sous.
pp.440-1,
78

11:59:31 AM
 Reviews

Mittellateinisches , hrsg.vonK. Langosch

Jahrbuch vonH. Dahlmann,
unterMitwirkung
W. vondenSteinen,
F. W. Lenz,C. Minis,A. nnerfors, IV = 1967
H. Walther,
(A. HennVerlag,Ratingen).
A partirde ce volume, le Mittellateinisches
Jahrbuch neparatplusenSelbstverlag chezson
diteurKarlLangosch Cologne,mais Ratingen chezl'A. HennVerlag, ce qui mani-
festela vitalitet le succsde cetannuaire. Il contientles articlesde fondsuivants:
P. Klopsch, Anonymitt undSelbstnennung mittellateinischer
Autoren (pp. 9-2$); K. Schrei-
ner,"Venus" und"Virginitas"- ZurSymbolik desSmaragds undzuseinen virtutes(pp.26-60);
K. Forstner, Eine deraugustinischenStillehre 61-71);
E. Glich,Die Bedeutung
Interpretation
frhmittelalterliche
derTropologia in deruEcbasis cuiusdam " (pp.
Captivi (pp. 72-90);
L. Gompf, w "
Treverensis "Carmen
Querela magisti (Dassogenannte Winrici") (pp. 91-121);
W. v. d. Steinen,DiePlanctus Abaelards - JephtasTochter(pp.122-144);W. Heckenbach
osb,ZurParodie beim (pp. 14$-154); K. Langosch, Zur desArchi-
Archipoeta " desuBittpredigtn
und"Beichte
poeta(pp.i SS-160); P. Klopsch, Zu"Kaiserhymnus" Archipoeta (pp.161-6);
idem,Acyrus (Archipoeta VII,11,2) (pp. 167-171);idem,Weiteres zurUberlieferung von
n
Pseudo-Ovidius"De vetula (pp. 171-2); P. von Moos,Die Trostschrift desVinzenz von
Beauvais
frLudwig IX( VorstudiezurMotiv- undGattungsgeschichtederconsolatio ) (pp. 173-
218); A. Sottili,
ZurBiographie GiuseppeBrivios undMaffeo Vegios(pp.219-242); A. nner-
fors,Die mittellateinische
Philologiein Schweden , EineUbersicht (pp. 243-^9).Suivent:
Besprechungen(pp. 260-301),Anzeigen (pp. 301-3)et Mitteilungen berForschungsarbeiten
(pp.303-4).
J.E.

Books Received

MEDIAEVALAND RENAISSANCE STUDIES; Editedby RichardHunt,Raymond

Lotte
Klibansky, Labowsky; Vol. VI; 1968TheWarburg Institute
UniversityofLondon.
MaryDickey,SomeCommentaries
Price: 3.0.0. Contents: on theDe inventioneand
AdHerennium oftheEleventhandEarlyTwelfth Centuries; A. B. Scott,ThePoemsof
HildebertOfLe Mans: A NewExamination OftheCanon; J.C. Jennings,TheOrigins of
The "ElementsSeries"oftheMiracles oftheVirgin;f E. Macrae,GeoffreyofAspall's
Commentaries onAristotle;J.I. Catto,New Lighton Thomas Docking O. F. M. ; f
V. Zoubov,Autourdes Quaestiones superGeometriam de
Euclidis Nicole Oresme;
L. Labowsky,AnUnknown TreatisebyTheodorus Gaza; L. Labowsky, AnAutograph
ofNiccoloPerotti InTheBiblioteca IndexofManuscripts.
Marciana.

79

11:59:40 AM
 Albertus Magnus and The Problem of Moral Virtue

STANLEY B. CUNNINGHAM

I. THE HISTORICAL SETTING

the intellectual upheaval that attended the appearance of

Within Greek philosophical literaturein the Latin West in the early
thirteenth century, a special problem was put for Christian
moralistswhen they were confrontedby the theoryof natural virtue
contained in the NicomacheanEthics of Aristotle. Not surprisingly,
Christian thinkershad been primarilyconcerned with supernaturally
endowed perfectionsthroughwhich man could hope to achieve beati-
tude. In thispreoccupation,however, theytendedto ignorethe question
and indeed the verypossibilityof virtue naturallyacquired. Albert the
Great (1206-1280) appears to have been one of the firstto respond
enthusiasticallyto the challenge of Aristotle'sEthics; and the originality
of his venturecan be gaugedby the extentto which in his own theoryhe
included the purelynaturaland human elementsof morality.Now as it
developed, the problem of naturalvirtuein manyways was allied to the
question of what constitutesthe moral characterof an agent's actions.
Earlier thinkers,to be sure, had come to see, thoughgradually,that a
numberof factorsare involved; but therewas both in theirtheoriesand
in their written presentationsa noticeable absence of cohesion and
unity.Albert's awarenessof theseproblemsand his responseto themare
evidentin one of his earlyworks. His contributionwas nothingless than
a methodicaltreatmentof a numberof moral distinctions,inheritedfrom
his predecessors, culminatingin a causal groundingof those natural
virtueswhich, in the career of moral speculationbeforehim, had been so
conspicuouslyignored.

The De bono
Albert's innovationsshow up most strikinglyin a relativelyearlywork
entitled De bono, written about 1240-1244 during his residence in
81

11:56:07 AM
Paris.1 It is worth remarkingthat at this time he was conversantwith
only fragmentsof the Nicomachean Ethics: the Ethicavetus
, comprisinga
a Greek-Latintranslationof Books II and III, the Ethicanova containing
a Greek-Latintranslationof Book I, and a few excerptsfromBooks VII
and VIII.2 The De bono, therefore,reveals only a partial knowledge of
Aristotle'sethics. It was also writtenearly in Albert's career, nor is it
his only or latest publicationin this field. Yet by contrastto this other
writingsit enjoys a numberof meritswhich make it a primarysource
for an appreciationof his own moral philosophyin its organic outlines.
Prior to the De bonoAlberthad undertakento write the Tractatus de
3
natura boni which remains unpublished to this day. The Tractatus ,
abandoned in considerabledisorderfarshortof its projected aims, is an
awkward and prematureattemptto erect a comprehensivesynthesisof
the naturaland supernaturalperfections.His experimentin thisdirection
was resumedwith greatersuccess in the De bono.The moral sections in
Books II-IV of Albert's Scriptasupersententias (writtenfrom 1245-1249),
while admittedlyprovidinga valuable source for this thought,standas
so many separated components of a comprehensive presentationof
theology. In the Scripta , Albert is not concentratingexclusivelyupon
morals alone, but rathercomposinga theological summaalong lines laid
down ninety years earlier by Peter the Lombard. Finally, Albert is
the author of two full-fledged commentarieson the Nicomachean Ethics
.*

1AlbertiMagniDebono (Opera Omnia , t. XXVIII), ed.H. Khle, C. Feckes, B. Geyer, W. Kbel

(MonasteriiWestfalorum inAedibus Aschendorff, 1951).Subsequent references tothetextofthe
Debono willbegiven inthisorder: tractate(inRoman numerals),question, article(both inArabic
numerals),argument oranswer to argument (e.g.,#,1 orad 1), page,line(when necessary).
Other worksbyAlbert arecitedintheBorgnet editionoftheOpera Omnia in38volumes (Paris:
Vives,1890-1899). Comments ofa critical andtechnical nature onthetextoftheDebono are
found intheProlegomena, pp.ix-xxv. Concerning possibledateswhen theDebono waswritten, the
mostplausible argument isofferedbyO. Lottin, etmorale
Psychologie auxXlleetXllle , t. VI,
sicles
273-284. Lottin'swork insixtomes (Gembloux [Belgique]:J.Duculot, 1948-1960) ishefeafter
citedasPEM.
2SeeA. Pelzer, Lesversionslatinesdesouvrages demorale conserves
sous lenom enusage
d'Aristote au
, RevueNo-Scolastique
Xlllesicle de Philosophie, XXXIII (1921), 316-341, 378-412. Seealso
O. Lottin,Saint leGrand
Albert etVthique Nicomaquef PEM> VI,31-331 . Additionalprecisions are
found inD. A.Callus,O. P.,The DateofGrosseteste's Translations
andCommentaries onPseudo-Dionysius
andtheNicomachean Ethics, Recherches dthologie ancienne etmdivale, XIV(1947),186-210.
3SeeF. Pelster, DerTractatus denatura boni.EinungedrucktesWerkausderFrhzeit AlbertsdesGrossen,
TheologischeQuartalschrift, CI (Tbingen, 1920),64-90.Also,O. Lottin, Ouvrages thologiquesde
saint leGrandy
Albert PEM , VI,237-242.
4 SeeL'thique
Nicomaque danslemoyen gelatin inL'thique Nicomaque: Introduction,Traduction
etCommentaire parR.A.Gauthier etJ.Y. Jolif, t.I (Louvain,Paris:1958), 74-8$.Earlierandno
lessimportant studiesonAlbert as commentator onAristotle'sEthics arefound in: A. Pelzer,
Lecours d'Albert
indit leGrand surla Morale Nicomaque recueilli
etrdig parS. Thomas d'Aquin,
82

11:56:07 AM
In works of this nature, however, the arrangementof the material is
not Albert's but Aristotle's. To put it in other words, neitherof these
commentariesnecessarilyreflectsthe controllingprinciplesof organiza-
tionaccordingto which Albertwould framehis own moral treatise.
By contrast, the De bono is neither a commentarynor part of a
theological summa . Though it is incomplete, what we have is the first
part of a projected synthesisof moral doctrine in which Albert devotes
himselfto an investigation of the naturalprinciplesof moralitypriorto an
examination of the supernaturalvirtues. Since he wrote in a form
inspired by the medieval academic disputation, Albert was free to
assemblehis materialaccordingto principlesof his own formulation^nd
choice. Indeed, in the earlyarticlesAlbertcarefullyestablishesa number
of broad metaphysicalprincipleswhich dictate both formaland material
aspects of his theory of virtue. Being an independentand exclusively
moral synthesis,the De bonois our best source for tracinghis theoryof
naturalvirtuein its consecutivedevelopment.
Briefly,the work opens with a metaphysicaldisquisition on the
'good' (;bonum , bonitas) and the physical good (bonumnaturae). The
implication,clearlystatedin one of Albert's later commentaries,is that
we cannot move into the area of moral goodness unless we firstunder-
standthe notionofgoodness.1Metaphysicsproperis followedbysections
dealing respectivelywith the causes of virtueand the natureof virtuein
general. The major and remainingpartof the De bonois composed of four
tractateseach of which deals with one of the cardinal virtues ( virtutes
cardinalesyvirtutes ) in thefollowingorder: fortitude,temperance,
politicae
prudence and justice. The finaltreatiseon justice containsa revolutionary
treatmentof naturallaw theory.2

Pre-Albertinian
Theories

The full significanceof Albert's theoryof humanvirtueas elaboratedin

the De bonostandsout againstthe backgroundof his contemporaryand
earlier writers. That history, as Dom Odon Lottin did so much to
demonstratein his monumental Psychologie et Morale aux Xlle et XUle
, was a richand highlyvariegatedcomplexus of interlockingthemes
sicles

RevueNo-Scolastique
de Philosophie,
XXIV(1922),333-361, 479-^20;P. G. Meersseman,
inOpera
Introduction Omnia B.Alberti
Magni0. P.,(Bruges,
1931),3-9,69-73.
1Paraphrasis
I, 2,cap.1,ed.Borgnet,
VII,17.
2SeeStanley
B. Cunningham, Albertus
Magnus onNatural
Law oftheHistory
, Journal ofIdeas,
no.4 (1967),479-502.
XXVffl,
83

11:56:07 AM
and tensions.For our purposes, two facetsof thathistoryare especially
relevant.There was firstof all a tendencyamong most writersto restrict
extensivelythe moral worth of human acts to the level of supernatural
virtueand merit. The second facetof this overall historyconcernsitself
with the developmentin theoriesabout the natureand numberof factors
contributingto the moral specificityof human acts.

A) Theproblemofmoralworth

Apropos of the firstproblem, Lottinhas remarkedtime and time again

that prior to St. Thomas Aquinas there was a conspicuous tendency
among medieval writers to confuse the moral goodness of acts with
supernaturalmerit.1 Underlyingthis confusionwas the implicationthat
the only kind of moral perfection is that which derives from a
divine infusion. That is, insteadof merit being visualizedas a property
resultingfromthe morallygood act, itwas confusedlymade thecondition.
Since these Christianmoralistsfavoured an almost exclusivelysuper-
natural perspective, there resulted theories of moral neutrality,so to
speak, at the natural level of human conduct. Now since the time of
Peter Abelard in the early twelfthcentury,the moral specificationof
human acts was, in varyingdegrees, explained by the agent's intention.
And as it developed, the only kind of good intentionwas one rooted in
charityand directedby faith.One mightnot be surprisedto discoverthis
attitude running through a theological literature which was largely
preoccupied with the principlescontributingto man's salvation.But the
resultcame to be thatlittleif any value was laid upon naturallyacquired
virtueswhich, by themselves,would admittedlybe insufficient to insure
supernaturalbeatitude. Seen throughthe highermedium of theological
virtues(faith,hope and charity),the naturalcardinalvirtues(fortitude,
temperance,prudence,justice) appeared to be little else thanessentially
incomplete and imperfect qualities. In short, they were not moral
virtues. In St. Albert's own time, this line of thoughtculminatesin a
theoryheld by some Franciscantheologians,notablyJohnof Rupella and
St. Bonaventure, who viewed the human act, taken at the level of
nature, as being essentiallyindifferenteven though it be a deliberated
act.2 Lottin insiststhatthisconfusionbetween moral goodnessand merit

1 "Onmaintint de la bont
quele facteur
toutefois avant
taitla charit;
morale saint
Thomas
couramment
Aquin,onconfondait morale
bont etmrite
surnaturel."
PEM, IV,480,Seealso
thereferences
givenbelowonpp.84n.2,8$n.i,86n.2.
a Ibid.
yII,488-489.
84

11:56:07 AM
arose in large measurefromfaultyorganization."The principalcause,of
this in the twelfthcentury",he writes, "was the inclusionoftreatments
on virtueinto a doctrineof grace.
The widespread confusion,diagnosed by Lottin, between natural
and supernaturalmoral perfectionsstems largely from a manual of
theology widely read at that time, the famed Sentencesof Peter the
Lombard.2 Published between the years 11^3-1158, the work is a
compilation of extracts gleaned from scripturaland patristic sources
to which are adjoined Peter's own commentsand explications. As to its
architectonicstructure,Peter follows a plan already adhered to in the
works of some of his immediatepredecessors,namely,the orderpi the
Apostolic Creed. In two differentplaces within this frameworkhe has
insertedmoral treatises: in Book II withinthe contextof sin, and in Book
III followingthe treatiseon Christ.Yet in eithersectionno room is made
fora treatmentof the naturalacquired virtuesas such. True, in Book III
followingthe chapteron charityand precedingthose on the giftsof the
Holy Spirit,Peter cursorilymentionsthe fourcardinalvirtues,but these
are clearlyconceived as divinelyinfusedperfections. 3 By the same token,
he steersclear of anyphilosophicalapproachto moral virtue.Indeed, not
only in referenceto this particularmatter,but throughoutthe entire
work, it has oftenbeen remarkedthat there is a noticeable absence of
the principles and precisions of philosophy*.Symptomaticof this at-
titudeis "a notionofvirtuewhichis plainlytheocentricand Augustinin".5
From passages in St. Augustine'sDe liberoarbitrio , the Lombard culls a
definitionofvirtuewhichis reallyPeter's own amalgamofSt. Augustine's
words and the Augustininidea of the gratuitous nature of grace:
bona qualitasmentis et qua nullusmale utitur
, qua rectevivitury , quam Deus
solusin homineopeiatur .6 The exclusivelydivine origin of virtue is even
more apparentwhen one of the Lombard's disciples, Peter of Poitiers,
supplies his own interpolation to the definitionin order to stress
1Lesvertusmorales sont-elles
acquises desvraies ? Larponse
vertus desthologiens dePierreAblard
saint
Thomas d'Aquin,Recherches dethologie ancienneetmdivale, XX(1953),38.
2PetriLombardi Libri , 2nded.(Quaracchi,
IVsententiarum 1916),2 vols.A helpful isgiven
analysis
byPhilippe Delhaye,Pierre
Lombard : savie samorale
, sesoeuvres, (Confrence Albert-le-
Grand, i960),
Inst.d'Etudes Montreal,
Mdivales, 1961.
3 Sent.
Ill,d. 33,cap.1,vol.2,697ff. Cf.O. Lottin, morales
Lesvertus , p. 19,n. 23;and
acquises
Ph.Delhaye, Pierre
Lombard
, 77-79.
4 See,forexample, Thomas Deman, O.P.,Aux delatheologie
origines morale Albert-le-
(Conference
Grand, 19^1),Inst.d'tudesMdivales, Montreal, 1951,pp.68-69;Ph.Delhaye, Pierre
Lombard,
pp.99-100.
5 Ph.Delhaye, Pierre
Lombard, p. 33.
6Sent.II,d. 27,cap. vol.I,446.Cf.St.Augustine, Delibero , II (47-^3).
arbitrio

85

11:56:07 AM
the moral inefficacyof man: Virtusigitur est qualitas mentisqua
, quam Deus in homineSINE HOMINE
, qua nemomale utitur
rectevivitur
operator.1
Commentingon the Lombard's definition,Lottin once again has
occasion to remindus of the subsequenttendencyin the twelfthcentury
to equate the goodness in human acts with supernaturalmerit.2 The
resultwas eitherto ignoreor to minimizethe value of naturalvirtue,and
to regardthe Christianperfectionof charityas the onlygenuinecause of
goodness.
That Peter the Lombard's Sentences could be so influentialin thisre-
spectbecomes evidentwhenwe stop to considerthata majorproportionof
speculative theological literaturein the next two centuriesconsistedof
works which, in varyingdegrees, were modelled upon the Sentences.
These writings, whether they be Scriptaor the later and more in-
dependentlywroughtsynthesesknown as Summaey tended to perpetuate
the originaldefectin Peter's Sentences. No one can deny, of course, that
therewas a progressiveincreasein the attentionand space givento moral
speculation. There were even new materialsinsertedinto the traditional
Lombardian framework.But the bits and pieces of each man's moral
theorygenerallyremained scatteredand disconnected. In the wake of
Peter the Lombard, then, the emergence of moral treatisesshowing a
logical consecutivenessand organizationwas slow to materialize.More-
over, in commentingupon this late appearance of systematizedmoral
treatises,Lottin also indicated the scarcityof any such treatmentsuntil
the thirdand fourthdecades of the thirteenthcentury.3As the earliest
and most noteworthyexperimentsin this directionhe cited the Summa
aurea of William of Auxerre (writtenabout 1220-122$) and Philip the
Chancellor's Summade bono(completed before 1236). Oddly enough he
did not mention St. Albert's De bono, yet the dates and authorscited
bring us almost to the eve of its composition. Up to this time, the
continuityof the Lombardian frameworkas well as the privileged
authorityof the Augustinindefinitionof virtuetendedto discourageany
positive recognitionof the naturaldimensionin morals.

of moralelements
B) Themultiplicity
In diagnosing the prevailing conception of moral worth prior to
1Sententi
arum libri latina
, III,c. i, Patrologia
quinqu PL)2ii, col.1041a.
(hereafter added.
Capitals
2PEM, IV,821.
3Ibid., IV,817-819.
III,S9S-S9&'*
86

11:56:07 AM
AlbertusMagnus,we have seen the positiongivenbymedievalthinkersto
their moral sections within the wider structure of their theological
synthesesand the effectthis had upon their theories of virtue. There
is still anotherdimensionto the historicalcontext, this time involving
attemptsmade both to identifyand to correlate the elements which
contributeto .the moral specificationof human acts. What factors,ele-
ments, or principlesare necessaryto constitutea morallygood action?
How manyare there?Assumingthatseveralare required, what are their
inter-relationshipsand interdependencies?
With respect to the identificationof these principles, there is a
pertinent passage in St. Albert's De bonowherein he states that in a
morally good act a pluralityof elements is required. He enlists the
authorityof Pseudo-Dionysiuswho says:
... in Chapter theDivineNames
IV of Concerning that'thegoodis constitutedbya
totalandsinglecause,butthateviloriginates
omnifariously'.Bythisit is understood
thatforthereality
ofvirtuetherearerequired all thecircumstances
together withthe
endharmonizing withtheactas it is brought
to bearuponits proportionate object.
Forevilandvice,however, thecorruption ofanyoneofthesebyitselfis sufficient.1

The same doctrine is reiterated in Book III of Albert's Scriptasuper

:
Sententias
It mustbe saidthatgoodandevilin actsarenotcausedin onlyonemanner, butthat
thegood,as Dionysius says,is causedbya totalcausethatis one.Thatis, in thecon-
ofthegoodactall thecircumstances
stitution andtheendandtheagent'sintention
mustcoincide.Jitiscausedonlywhenallofthesearesimultaneously
present inthemanner
wholewhichis madeup ofall itspartstakentogether
of an integral at once.Evil,
however, as Dionysiussays,derives thatis, fromthecorruption
omnifariously, ofany
part,justasanintegral
particular wholeisbrokenupwhenanyoneofitsparts isdestroyed.
Andso itis thatthereis nogoodactwithout a goodintention,butitis notmadegood
solelybythe intention.2

Throughout his lifetime,Albert seems to be quite consistentin this

regard. Supported by a statementof the Neo-Platonic author, Pseudo-
Dionysius, Albert insiststhat moral goodness, more specificallyvirtue,
derives only froma total synthesisof all the elementsinvolved, namely
circumstances,the agent's intention,the end, and the act itself. The
corruptionof any one of these constituentsvitiatesthe act. In the Sen-
, Albert admits that intention plays a major rle in the moral
tences
determinationof acts, but it is not the sole feature.
We have brieflyanticipated the Albertinianposition merely to
1I, 5, i, ad22,p. 74.SeealsoI, 3, 1,ad6,p. 38.
2InIISent. yd. 41,a. 2,sol.,ed.Borgnet,
XXVII,643a.
87

11:56:07 AM
indicateone standtakenin the historyof thisproblem. Prior to Albert's
arrival in Paris, however, this particular problem had been vexing
moralistsforover a century.Albert's words are certainlya farcry from
those written a centuryearlier by that intrepid figureof the twelfth
century,Peter Abelard. In his relativelyshort treatise entitled Ethics ,
or KnowThyself written about 1135-, Abelard distinguishesbetween an
external human act (opus) and the intentionwhich precedes it.1 The
term 'intention' connotes a determinationor consent of the will to
performan external action. That is, it is an internal act of the will
distinguishablefrom other natural undeliberated tendencies. Now,
externalacts in themselvesare morallyneutral: theirmoral goodness or
turpitudeaccrues to them solelyfromour interioract of consentwhich
precedes them.2 As long as consent is withheld,a dispositionto evil or
weaknesscannotbe called evil. On the contrary,ifweaknessis conquered
it serves as an occasion for merit. The pleasure accompanyinga sinful
act does not augmentits turpitude. As for the physicalact itself,it is
morally indifferent.Killing a man may be committedaccidentally,that
is without consent, in which case it could scarcely be called evil. In
short, the moralityof external acts is a borrowed one, and identical
with that of the intention. God does not weigh the thingswe do, but
ratherthe spiritin which we performthem.
As ifanticipatingfutureindictmentsof propoundinga radical moral
subjectivism,Abelard attemptsto place the moralityof intentionon a
more objective footing.It is not enough, he says, that one's intention
seemgood; it must reallybe good by conformingto God's will.3 Other-
wise, he observes, the acts of non-believerswould be good like ours,
since theytoo believed thattheirworks were pleasingto God.
Even after the condemnation of his theories at the Council of
Sens in 1140, Abelard still clung to his position. External acts are
morallyindifferent.4 He is prepared to admit that virtuesand vices are
essentiallygood and evil in themselves,but the relationshipof these to
the act itselfis farfrom clear.
1 "Cum itaquedicimus hominis
intentionem bonam, etopusilliusbonum, duoquidemdistinguimus,
intentionem scilicetac opus;unam tarnenbonitatem " - Petri
intentionis. Abaelardi seuliber
Ethica
dictusscito , cap.VII,PL178,6ob.Fora discussion
teipsum ofAbelard's seeO. Lottin,
position,
PEM , IV,310-314; II,421-422.
2 Ethica
, VII,col.6joa-c;XI,6gic.
3Ibid.yXII,653b.Both inhistheoryofthemoral goodness ofintentionandinhisconceptionof
virtue, Abelard ultimately himself
aligns withthetraditional theocentric- school.
Augustinin
Cf.J.Rohmer, Lanalitemoralechez desaint
lesthologiens Augustin DunsScot
(Paris:Vrin,
1939),
p. 37, n.40; O. Lottin, Les morales
vertus , loc.
acquises cit.y
p. ig.
Dialogus inter
philosophumyjudaeum PL178,1652b.
etchristianumt
88

11:56:07 AM
 It is too easy to brand Peter Abelard as a radical moral subjectivist
and to let it standat that. What is oftenoverlooked is thathis position
stemsfroma reactionto legalisticmoral doctrine.1In the penitentialand
canonical literatureof the times, it was common practice to codifyacts
accordingto theirconformity or opposition to law. In oppositionto this
excessive legalistic objectivism, Abelard had emphasized the rle of
individualintention,but to such a degree that he had seriouslyunder-
mined all objective basis for morality.2
In the next hundredyearsand more, the doctrine of intentionran
a torturouscourse due in large measure to the initial imprecisionof its
vocabulary.3 Sufficeit to say that with few exceptions later moralists
were prepared to recognize the primacy of intention in the moral
determinationof humanacts. The problem was not so much this, how-
ever, as to supplement Abelardo simplistic theory of intentionwith
other moral principleswhich would ground the moralityof acts upon a
solid and objective footing.It was this search, originallysparkedby the
Abelardian crisis, which partly accounts for the growth of moral
speculationin the next centuryand a half. Effortswere made to define
moralityin termsof certainrationallydiscerniblefeaturesin the human
act itself; and early overtures to a philosophical approach to virtue
representone facet of this doctrinal evolution.4 In additionto the dis-
coveryand enlistmentof new principles,of course, there still remained
the problemofintegrating theminto a logicallyconsecutiveand cohesive
account.
A firstsignificant step in the post-Abelardianmovementis foundin
Peter the Lombard's Sentences . Peter enlists no less an authoritythan
St. Augustineto confirmhis thesisthat certainacts are intrinsicallybad
and thatno degree of good will or intentioncan erase theirturpitude.s
This stand constitutesa positive reaction to the Abelardianthesis. End,
or intention,is not the sole determinantof morality.Independentlyofit,
some acts are evil in theirveryconstitution( perse mala, persepeccata);
that is, theyare objectivelyevil. Intention,the Lombard admits,deter-

1SeeO. Lottin, PEM , IV,478-479.

2Ibid.
yp. 313.
3SeeO. Lottin, Vintention dePierre
morale Lombard saint
Thomas, PEM, IV, 309-486;also,Le
dela moralit
problme intrinsque saint
d'Ablard Thomas , PEM,
d'Aquin II,421-465.
4SeePh.Delhaye, La placedel'thique
parmi lesdisciplines au Xllesicle
scientifiques , Miscellanea
moraliainhonorem Eximii Domini ArthurJansen,(Louvain:E. Nauwelaerts,1948),I, 29-44.
Also,O. Lottin, La dfinition , PEM,III, 103-115",
philosophique 149-150;idem, Lesvertusmorales
loc.cit.,pp.19-24.
acquises,
5Libri
IVSent.,II,d.40,c. 1,vol.I, 520-522.
89

11:56:07 AM
mines the other kinds of external acts. An act inherentlygood, for
instance,may be vitiatedby a bad intent.
Moreover, in speaking about acts, differentlevels or kinds of
goodness are discernible.1 All actions are ontologicallygood in their
verynature (essentiasui).2 Unlike Abelard, the Lombard feels that some
acts may also be classifiedas objectivelygood. Feeding the hungry,for
instance, in addition to possessing ontological goodness, is what he
calls generebonus9 because it belongs to that class or genus called works
of mercy.3 This generic goodness, thoughsomewhatbroad and indeter-
minate, is independentof the intention; it is objective. Nevertheless,it
is still inferiorto the perfectlygood act which, in additionto possessing
the goodness of essence and its class, issues froma good intentionand is
directed to a good end.
The end which Peter the Lombard has in mind is supernatural,
namely charity or God. 4 On the other hand, rather than refuse all
goodness to the actions of non-Christianswho lack faithand charity,
he allows for a goodness of intentionat the purely naturallevel.s The
extensionof the notion of the good will allow forthis,he says. Without
contradictingit, he refers, to one theory which says that operations
aimed at the alleviation of natural wants and the welfare of one's
relativesor neighborsare morallygood. The statement,however, reads
in a spiritof concession. To account for moral goodness in acts, Peter
reasonsmainlywithina supernaturalperspective.
By partiallyextending the notion of goodness beyond the rigid
limits imposed on it by Abelard, the Lombard indicated certain lines
along which subsequent theories of the morality of acts evolved.
Henceforth,moral speculationwas characterizedbyanalysesofadditional
elements which, over and above intention, contribute to the moral

1 w.. . auctoritatum etrationibus

testimoniis eorundem traditionemmunivimus, quidicunt, omnes
actusessentia sui,idest,inquantum sunt,essebonos,quosdam veroinquantum inordinatae fiunt,
peccata esse.Addunt quosdam
quoque, nontantum sedetiamgenere
essentia, bonosesse,utreficere
esurientem, quiactus estdegenereoperum misericordiae
; quosdam vero actus
absoluteacperfecte
bonos dicunt,quosnonsolum velgenus,
essentia sedetiam causaetfiniscommendant, utsunt illi
quiexvolntate bonaproveniuntetbonum finemmetiuntur."- Ibid.,
d. 36,p. 04."Item etaliter
probant omnem actum interiorem
velexteriorem,inquantum est,essebonum." - Ibid., d. 35,
cap.3,p. 494.
2Thereis considerable intheLombard
ambiguity s doctrineat thispoint.Whenhesaysthat
nare
"omnes actus goodintheir very being,doeshemean toinclude, orimplicitly
exclude, those
actswhich are"per semala", 1
sepeccata"
"per
3 Cp.below, p. 97.
4 Ibid.
yd. 38,cap.1,p. 09.
5Ibid., d.41,cap.2,pp.^24-^25^.
90

11:56:07 AM
specificationof acts.1 In the writingsof one of the Lombard's disciples,
for instance,a new and importantdimensionwas added. Circumstances ,
said Peter of Poitiers, in some way influencethe characterof our acts
and must be taken into consideration.2The point was only mentioned
in passing; it received no furtherdevelopment. But the formula"bonum
ex circumstantial continuedto reappaeroftenin laterwriterseven though
its rle was never clearly defined. One must wait until St. Albert's
De bonofor the firstfull-fledged treatiseon circumstances.
By the early decades of the thirteenthcenturyit was not uncommon
for writers to discern several levels or moments of goodness in the
human act. The followingformulaeappear with increasingfrequency:
bonumnaturaeor bonumnaturalereferringto the physicalrealityof the
act; bonumin genere , bonumex circumstantia , bonumvirtutispoliticae, and
- bonumgratiae.The formula
finallythe goodness of supernaturalgrace
bonumin genere , since the time of Peter the Lombard,generallysignified
the objective goodnessof a class of actions. Albert's immediatepredeces-
sor, Philip the Chancellor, through an ingenious application of the
hylomorphictheory,interpretedit to mean a naturalfittingness between
an act (say, feeding)and its object (a hungryman).3 Yet its statusas a
moral or non-moralfeaturewas leftambiguous.*
This evolvingawarenessof the multiplicityof elementsinvolvedin
the moralityof humanactions may by taken as an index of the develop-
ment in moral theory at this time. And yet, at the same time, this
complexityin the data of the problem was scarcelyattendedby anykind
of apparentcohesiveness.Amidstthis pluralityof factors,some kind of
intelligiblesynthesiswas wanting.This in turnwould presupposeclearly
definedrelationshipsbetween the various elements involved. In short,
there was need for systematicintegration.Albert's De bonowas written
in responseto this need.

1SeeO. Lottin, Leproblme

delamoralit , PEM
intrinsque , II,421-465.
2 "Utrum autem voluntasmaius peccatum sitquamactusveleconverso nonpotest simpliciter
determinan. Inquibusdam enim maiuspeccatum estvoluntas, inquibusdam actus.Attendendae
enimsunt omnes circumstantiae
: a quoscilicetaliquidfiat,ana laicoana sacerdote,etquolocoet
quotempore, ethuiusmodi." - Sententiae
Petri liber
Pictaviensis II, cap.14,4; ed. P. S. Moore,
J.N.Garvin, M.Dulong, PublicationsinMediaeval StudiesXI(Notre Dame, Indiana,
1950),p. 93.
3 "Etest
dicendum quodgenusaccipiturhieexconiunctione forme actuscum materia Reficere
actus.
enimdicitformam quamdam, esurientem dicitmateriam, ettarnen trahitur bonumexconiunctione
huiusadaliud." - quotedbyO. Lottin, PEM , III,441,11.106-109. Because ofthisnewmeaning
giventoit,theformula "bonum ingenere"remains untranslatablewithout a greatdealofcircum-
locution.
4 Fortextswhere Philip
juxtaposes thebonum morale tobonum ingenere, seeO. Lottin,PEMy II,
43911 9-17> "Lesvertusmorales loc.cit.,31, n.66.
acquises",
91

11:56:07 AM
 il. Albert's metaphysics of the good
It would exceed the scope of thispaper to attempta thoroughanalysisof
Albert's metaphysicsof the good even as containedin the De bono.There
are, however, three salient metaphysicalthemeswhich must be kept in
mind since theydeterminehis theoryof virtue.

A) Goodness
and Appetition
In the opening article of the De bono where in Albert reports three
definitionsof the good, he creditsAvicennawith definingthe good as the
"undividednessof act frompotency" (.indivisioactusa potentia).1Through-
out these early articles, Albert identifiesthe notions of perfectionand
completion (actus,complementum ) with thatof the good. This is apparent
in the definitionimputed to Avicenna which is clearly an attempt to
express the absolute without enlistingsomethingyet more ultimate.
Though seeminglynegative,the definitionaffirms a positive reality,the
nature of the good in itself, this being a unity between any kind of
potency or avidityand its correspondingperfection(actus). The ac
in question,however, does not standsimplyforthe operationperformed
by some being, nor for the fulfilment which is added to thatsame being
by its substantialform. The notion of perfectionhere is ratherone of
fulfilment and completionwhich accrues to a thingfromthe attainment
of its end.2 The allegedlyAvicenniandefinition,then,trulyexpressesthe
proper nature (propriaratio) of goodness, namely,an identitywith end
(indivisionis) .3
All things,frominanimatebodies to intellectualagents,desire the
good at proportionatelevels of appetite. On the one hand, there is
'perfectappetite*which is alwaysaccompaniedby some formofcognition
or apprehension. There is also 'natural appetite' which is universally
presentin all beings, and
. . . whichis nothing
elsethantheaptitude andinclination
ofthatwhich
isinpotency
towards Thisis in all things,
perfection. andbythisis meantwhatis said,'thatthe
goodis whatall things
desire*,justas thePhilosopher
attheendofBookI ofthePhysics
says matter
that form
desires as the female
the maleandevilthegood.4

1Thisdefinition as suchis notfoundinAvicenna.It seems to haveoriginated withPhilip

the
Chancellor whointurn attributed
ittoAristotle.
Cf.Debono , p. i, n. 13.
2I, i, i, ad 11,p. 6.
31,1,gtsol.,p.10,i. i. "Bonm autemestcondiciofinisutfinis.n- I, 1,7,ad2, 14,1.87.
p.
a. . . bonum super ensaddit ad
relationemfinem. . - I, 1,10, sol., p. 20,1.47.
4 I, i, i, ad i, p. 4.

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11:56:07 AM
The desire for the good among some thingsmay be no more than the
inclination of the imperfect towards perfection, but this entitative
willingnessis rooted in all beings. At the heartof each and everynature
is a desire for goodness. Correlatively, it is the very quintessence of
the good to be desired, ifnot cognitivelyand actively,at least according
to this innatepropensity.1Onlygoodness can be desired, or at least that
which is apprehendedas being good (in rationeboniut hune).2
God is theprimum or summum bonum.All createdgoods, even though
standing as certain in
perfections themselves,are nonethelessdefective
in comparisonto God who is the source of all goodness.Theirgoodness
owes its presence to an inux of perfectionfrom the supreme good;
and the universaldesire inherentin all thingsis simplya desire for this
influxof perfection.3 Or to put it anotherway - and thistime Albertis
consciously exploiting the Neo-Platonic doctrines of St. Augustine
and Pseudo-Dionysius- all thingsare good by participation in the sense
that the firstgood or exemplar is reflected(relucet)in created goods.*
Exemplarismtells us the mode of presence. Albertrejectsanyattemptto
visualize this participationas a direct sharingin the nature itselfof the
supreme good. Rather, participationis taken to mean that each thing,
possessingas it does a certainfiniteand particularinstanceof goodness,is
somehow reducible to the efficacyof the primum bonumas the cause of
this goodness. As a particularinstance ( ratioparticularis
) of goodness, it
only mirrors the supreme goodness. What is reallypossessed is created
goodness ( ratio boni creati
), and this as particularized in individuals
s
throughtheirdifferencesand matter.

B) TheanalogicalNatureof Goodness
and Appetition

In no way, then, can goodness as some sort of common naturebe predi-

cated univocally of an infiniteGod and the universeof finitecreatures.
On the contrary,to explain the unityin goodness between the summum
bonumand creatures, as well as among created goods themselves,the
principle of analogyis introducedby Albert, more preciselythat type
of analogywhich is called a communityof proportionality :

1Ibid.tad 14,p. 7.
2Ibid., ad p. g.
3I, i, i, ad2,p. 4. Inplaceofcreatam(1.69),readincreatam.
4I i> 2,pp.7-8.
5Ibid. Seealso,ad2.
, adi, p. 8, 11.34-36.
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11:56:07 AM
To thefourth it mustbe saidthatthatgoodwhichall things
objection desireis notre-
ducibleto onespeciesor to onegenus,butto a community ofproportionalityin such
wisethata distinction
obtainsbetween and
proportion proportionality . . . And so wesay
andcommensuration
thattheproportionality ofall possibles
inrelationto a perfecting
endisone,andtheendofallthings inthisproportionality
isone,andsotooistheappetite
whichinclinestotheend.1
It mustbe saidthatthereis a communityofproportionality,
as wasestablished earlier,
whichis reducedto thethird modeofanalogy.Foralthough thereis notoneendwhich
everygoodattainsas itsfulfilment,
nevertheless
thereis oneendbeyond theorderof
creationto whicheverygood inclines toits
according power. And thisend is thehighest
good.Other goodsarenot good unless
theyderivefromit andtend back to it.2

All creatures, in desiring their own particular perfections,are really

moving towards a perfectingend which, by a communityof proportion-
ality,is one. This is the same as sayingthateverythinghas some kindof
naturalinclinationtowardsgoodness. More thanonce, Albertpoints to
the writingsof Pseudo-Dionysiuswho has said that,correspondingto the
differentlevels of nature and appetition discernible in the universe,
there results a hierarchyof degrees in which perfectionis shared by
creatures.3 Intellectualand rational beings desire the good knowingly;
sentientcreaturesreveal a desireforthe good in theirsensibleappetites;
other livingthingswithoutsense, desire the good by theirinnateurge to
live; and finally,inanimatecreatures tend to the good in their mere
inclinationto participatein being.4 All this is to say that creatures,by
a movement commensuratelyone, desire an end which is also pro-
portionatelyone : goodness. Now, we have alreadyseen thatthe absolute
instanceof goodnessis God, the summum bonum.Even thoughall creatures
do not actuallyattainto Him as theircomplementum , neverthelessHe is the
absolute end, beyondthe order of creation,towardswhichall of creation
is drawn according to diverse specific powers and natures. What
creaturesachieve on this naturallevel, of course, is not a part of God,
but rathera certaininstanceof created goodness.
The principle of analogy and the doctrines of Pseudo-Dionysius
coalesce in Albers explanationof the relationshipbetween creatures
and God. The resultis a universeconceived in Neo-Platonicfashionas a

1I, i, i, ad4,p. .Concerning useofanalogy,

Albert's seeHampus Between
TheAnalogy
Lyttkens,
GodandtheWorld 19^2),1^3-163.
(Uppsala,
2I, 1,4,sol.,p. 10.
31, i, 2, sol.,p. 8. Cf.Dionysius(trans.
Joannes De divinis
Saracenus), , 1, 20, in
nominibus
Dionisiaca, I (ed.Ph.Chevallier:
Paris,1937),247-248.
4 Dionysius, Dedir.nom.
IV,#16, Thistextisquoted
, I, 168-169.
Dionisiaca inI, 1,6,
byAlbert
sol.,p. i2.
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11:56:07 AM
hierarchyof beingswhich derive from,and are tendingback towards,an
infinitegood. Each thingdesires and sharesin goodnessaccordingto the
level of its natureand powers. Our generalconcept of the good is broad
enough to accommodate everyinstanceof the good, both finiteand in-
finite,since predicationis made analogicallyin each case.
By enlistingthe principleof analogy,Alberthas bestowed upon the
notion of goodness a flexibilityand unitywhich hithertowas missingin
pre-Albertinianthinkers. Application of the principle ensures the
reduction of all the various degrees and kinds of goodness to a more
overall intelligibleunity. Moreover, what has been said of the good in
general will be no less applicable to the elementsof moral goodness
proper: all these in some way will connote a perfectionand an "un-
dividednessof act frompotency". Each of them,in view of thisanalogical
similitude,has a certainintelligiblesettingwithinthe more comprehen-
sive notion of bonum .
The notion of the innate appetency for perfection in creatures
dovetailswith the Albertiniandoctrineof being. Everycreated being in
some way is a compositionof potencyand act. Hence, it is not entirely
destituteof goodness, but only relativelyso.1 Yet if each thingpossesses
a certain degree of perfection,it still remainssusceptibleto additional
increments. Reiterating the conceptions of the Liberde causis, Albert
accrues to createdthings
saysthatstabilityin being ( xio et permanenti)
through an influx of the good.2 When they have incorporated the
desired perfection,beingsare perfectedin theirverynature.
The terms'influx', 'participation',and 'information'all conveythe
same idea. For Albert, goodness is scarcely a remote ideal or standard
which creaturesmerelyimitate. Rather,it is seen as a perfectiveelement
which has been incorporated and shared in by the creature. As an
interiorizedperfection,inheringintimatelywithinthe thing,it consum-
mates a correspondingpotency or need therebyfulfillingthe created
nature in its very being. This is why the Avicenniandefinitionof the
good, "the undividednessof act frompotency",most trulycharacterizes
the quintessenceof goodness.

C) Casual Explanationof theGoodness

of Creatures
The problem of the relationshipbetween created being and the good
does not end here. In Article Seven of the firstQuestion in the De bono,
1I, i, i, ad8 ( = ad7andad8),pp.-6
; ad3,pp.4-5.
2Ibid., ad2,p.4.
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11:56:07 AM
Albert boldly confrontsthe classic dilemma voiced by Boethiusin his
De hebdomadibus.1 In this tractate,Boethiushad raised the question how
naturesor substances,fromthe veryfactthattheyexist, are good, since
theycan scarcelybe called absolute goods. If, as St. Albert has already
done, we are preparedto admit thateach and everybeing is not entirely
devoid of goodness, but only relativelyso, would this not lead us to
equate the being of creatures (esse) with their goodness ( bonumesse)?
In thisarticle Albertundertakesto clear up thisdilemma.
Boethius had urged that the substantialbeing of creaturesmay be
called good since it derivesfromand participatesin the Prime Good in
whom goodnessand beingare identical.The solutionofferedbyBoethius,
Albert admits, is imperfect and obscure'.2 To clarifyBoethius' answer
one must invoke a theoryof causes.3 In a vocabularyhighlyredolent of
Avicenna, Albert begins by observing that nothing can exist ( esse in
ejfectu)except by a cause since the effectowes its whole being to an
antecedent cause. Now the four Aristoteliancauses - form, matter,
final cause or end, and efficientor agent cause - fall conveniently
into two groupingsor arrangements.Form and matter,which we may
also designateas act and potencyor quo estand quodestrespectively,are
intrinsicprinciplesor constituentcauses of a being. The end and efficient
causes are its extrinsic causes. These combinations coincide in the
productionof being. The end or finalcause exists in the agent cause as
that which is intended ( per intentionem) ; the form exists potentially
in the matter ( per potentiam).The final cause is the highestof all the
causes; it is the 'cause of causes'. Though completely unmoved and
immobile in itself,it neverthelessmoves all the other causes. As that
which is desired, it effectsmotion in the efficientcause, and thisin turn
induces the material principle or 'that which is' to receive the form.
With thishierarchicalarrangementof the causes, Albertfeelspreparedto
interpret the relationshipbetween the being of creatures and their
goodness. The being is giventhemby the efficientcause which moves the
matterto the receptionofform.The goodness,on theotherhand,derives
from the end which moves the efficientcause as an object of desire
and intention. According to their absolute and abstractconsideration,
the being and goodness of creatures, therefore,cannot be equated.
1Quomodo ineoquod
substantiae sint cum
sint
bonae nonsint bona
substantialia byH. F*
, ed.andtrans,
Stewart andE. K. Rand(LoebClassical cited
1953),pp.38-53.Generally
Library, asDehebdoma-
dibus.
2I, i, 7,p. 14,1.2.Cf.Dehebdomadibus
, pp.46-48.
31,i, 7,p. 14,il. 37ff.Foranargument Albert's
against final seeI, 1,1,#13,
position, p. 4, 11.
jff.
96

11:56:07 AM
They may be identifiedonly throughmutual inherencein one and the
same subject or supposit. Goodness and being, or ifyou will, nature,are
not identicalalthoughin realitytheyare inseparable.1
It seems obvious, therefore,thatfor Albertany explanationof the
good and its reference to being merely in terms of the traditional
doctrineof participationdoes not suffice.All thisdoes is to indicatethe
kindor typeof presence. Over and above this, one must explain, why,
and how, such a presence by participationis effected,i.e., a causal
explanationand knowledge of the good is required. To account for the
origin of goodness in creatures, then, one mustgroundhis explanation
on the four ultimate causes of Aristotle.This solutionto the Boethian
dilemma becomes a significantmethodologicalprinciple. When Albert
comes to treatof moral goodness, its variouselementswill be systemati-
cally integratedaccording to this hierarchyof Aristoteliancauses.

III. THE CAUSES OF MORAL VIRTUE

In the Tractatusde natura boni, Albert had commenced his moral dis-
quisitionproperby pointingout a certaindisjunctionbetween the order
of nature and the human moral order.2 Some thingsare not caused by
human beings such as the created thingsin this world; other things,
however, are caused by us, namelyour voluntaryacts of which we are
the masters.Now just as in naturethere is one primarything- matter-
which serves as the subject for additional forms,so too in our moral
voluntaryactions there is a primarysubject in potencyto furthermoral
specificationswhich is called bonumin genere .3 The bonumin genere ,
Albertadds, is simplythe humanact broughtto bear upon itsproportion-
ate object: actussolussupermateriamdebitam . For instance, the act of
a
feeding hungryman, abstracting from those particularcircumstances
of time and place which surroundthe act, maybe called bonumin genere A
Bonumin genere , therefore,designatesthe firstmoment of goodness in
the order of morality,and it is subject to furtherincrementsof moral
perfection.
At the correspondingpoint in the De bono, that is, immediately
after the short disquisition on bonumnaturale , Albert commences his
1Cf.Paraphrasis VII,26.
, II,cap.6,ed.Borgnet,
2Thepassageinquestion isquoted oftheDebono
bytheeditors , p. 29,n.42.
3Weshall retaintheLatin bonum
formula ingenere.
Suchobvious
renditions
as'general'
or'generic
or'goodness
goodness', inkind'would
bemeaningless
inthepresentcontext,andlonger
qualified
forceusintocircumlocutions.
4 Cp.above,p. 90.
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11:56:07 AM
moral section by distinguishing between the two main orders of moral
and i 1
goodness: bonumconsuetudinis supernaturalgrace.1 Consuetudo or
4consuetudinalis' - terms found in the Ethica vetus- were
employed by
mediaeval writers to designate moral virtues acquired at the level of
nature. For Albert too theyconnote moral excellence won throughthe
repetitionof acts.2 In this treatise, bonumconsuetudinis comprises three
levels or types of moral perfection: bonumin genere , the moral deter-
minationsof circumstance ( bonumex circumstantia ), and virtue ( bonum
virtutis politicae). These divisions are taken over by Albert. Earlierwriters
had coined these formulae, and tradition sanctioned them. There is no
attemptat this point to justifythe classificationby explicitlyinvokinga
hierarchyof potencies and correspondingdegrees of perfectionsuch
as Philip the Chancellorhad done, but it is evidentthatthissame scheme
is operativehere as well.3
These first three degrees of perfection are natural, rationally
discernibleelementsin the moralityof acts whose investigationlogically
precedes the order of divinelyinfusedgoodness. A numberof statements
in the De bonoclearlyindicate thatan elaborate studyof the perfections
of the supernaturalorder would follow as part of the De bonoA The De
bono, then,heraldsa noticeable departurefromthe traditionalprocedure
adhered to in mediaeval treatises: there is to be a treatmentof natural
virtueoutside the contextof grace and precedinga disquisitionupon the
supernaturalvirtues. This is possible because the De bono is a work
patternedindependentlyof the Sentences of Peter the Lombard. We may
thereforeanticipatea treatmentof the acquired virtuesmore consonant
with theirnaturalstatus.
Indeed, all throughthiswork Albertappears to be cognizantof the
differencebetween the two moral orders. For instance,bonumin genere ,
he tells us, is still immediatelysusceptible to the more specificmoral
determinationsof virtue.s This latter superadded determinationis still
in potency to merit. Moral specificity,therefore,is alreadydiscernible
on the naturallevel, and prior to the order of merit. Grace, in turn,
1I, 2,p. 28,II. I I-l6.
2 ". . . consuetudo estactus
multiplicatussecundum tempus... - I, 4, 2,p. 46,11.46-47.
3Inhislater Summa , I, tr.4,qu.26,memb.
theologica 1,art.1 (De multiplication
boni.Etpenes
quidsumatur?), ed.Borgnet, XXXI, 231b,thereisa defence
ofthisclassification resembling
closely
thatofPhilip theChancellor, andarrangedaccording tothedifferentkinds ofpotentiae.
"Bonum
nis "elevatum naturae . Theprior
rationalis" levels
ofgoodness a
are"adjuvant!
gratiae super
facultatem
potentiam infacltate naturae Fora textindicating
rationalis." PhiliptheChancellor'sschema,see
O. Lottin, VEM , II,439,11.9-17.
*SeeProlegomena #1, pp.xb-xia.
5I, 2,4,adg,p. 30.

98

11:56:07 AM
the conditionof merit, neitherdestroysnor dispenseswith nature,but
rather,as its 'most connatural*excellence, raises it to its higheststate
of perfection.1

actions
A) Themoralstatusofrational, voluntaiy
Bonumin genereis clearlyincluded into the moral order. Even thoughits
status as a moral factor was not always clear among pre-Albertinian
scholars, these same authors from the time of Peter the Lombard
generally regarded it as the firstconsideration in any discussion of
morality.Now, in Albert's treatise, the firstarticle in the specifically
moral section is devoted to an analysisof bonumin genere.In spiteofthis,
however, Albert admits that the absolutelyfirstconsiderationin moral
speculation is not really the bonumin genere , but the voluntaryact
abstractlyconsidered as such :
Theabsolutelyfirst
thinginmorals, however,isthatwhichissusceptible
tothecondition
whichisvirtue,
ofpraise, orthecondition ofblame,whichisvice,andthisis thevolun-
taryactbrought tobearuponitsobjectfollowing Forthisactis
choiceanddeliberation.
to eitherofthecontraries,
susceptible andequallyso. Bonum ingenere
, however, does
notsignifytheabsolutely first in morals,butrather
principle somethingorderedto
oneofthecontraries, thatis,to thegoodofvirtue.2
Here we have a precision which seems to be absent from the earlier
Tractatus.The voluntaryact as such, a deliberated act bearing upon a
definite object, is an abstraction distinguishablefrom the bonumin
genere . It is the act seen as being equallysusceptibleto the conditionsof
good or evil. Bonumin genereis reallythe same act, but now as havinga
certainordinationor determinationto subsequentmoral goodness.
Does this mean that the voluntaryact is morallyindifferent? The
is
question explicitly raised in Article Seven of Question Two : "Whether
in voluntaryacts thereis anythingindifferent such thatit be neithergood
nor evil in genereor concretely(in specie)?"3This is indeed a perplexing
problem in the moral philosophy of Albertus Magnus, and a certain
imprecisionin his writingsmakes it difficult forus to arriveat a definite
solution. When he explicitlyraises this question in Article Seven, he
seems to have in mindthe concrete individualact. In the last text quoted
from Article Four, wherein the voluntaryact is depicted as being
equally susceptibleto eithergood or evil, he was speakingof actionsin a
1IV,i, gyad12,p. 241,i i.4ff;
V,2,2,ad4,p. 28$.
2I, 2,4,sol.,p. 29.
3I, 2,7,p. 33,11.6^-67.

99

11:56:07 AM
 general and abstract manner. Abstractlyconceived, the voluntaryact
could be viewed both as the absolutelyfirstmomentin the moral order,
as well as morallyindifferent in itselfsince it is equally open to good or
evil.
The openingargumentsofArticleSevenprecedingAlbert'sown mag-
isterialresolutionmentiontwo possible kindsofmorallyindifferent acts:
the vain or futile act ( vanum), and the useless or idle act (otiosum).A
definitionof the vain act Albert takesfromAristotle'sPhysics : it is that
which is a means to some end, but which fallsshortof thatend.2 Now,
thatwhich is vain is condemnedby Holy Scripture(Psalms 4, 3) wherein
it is written"Why do you love vanityand seek afterlying?"; and so this
kindofindifferent act ranksamongthoseacts whichare sinful.The defini-
tion of the idle act is taken from St. Gregory the Great's Moralia:
"the idle is that which lacks the character of rightfulnecessity or
dutifulservice".3 It is also condemned as sinful in the Gospel of St.
Matthew (12, 36) when Christstates"thatof everyidle word men speak,
they shall give account on the day of judgment". On the basis of Holy
Scripture,then, it would seem that these so-called morallyindifferent
acts in effectare evil acts.
Albert the Great does not seem entirelyopposed to this line of
reasoning.In his reply, he begins with a distinctionbetween the theo-
4
logian's position, and thatof the moral philosopher. Accordingto the
Christiantheologian,no deliberatedvoluntaryact is morallyindifferent
because he knows that all our actions should issue fromcharity,thatis,
from a love of God. Charity,an infusedperfectionby which we incline
to God, is a universalvirtue ( virtus. . . generalemovens ) movingus to the
s
acts of all other virtues. The moral philosopher, on the other hand,
philosophizingbeyond the pale of faithand Scripture,is ignorantof any
such universal virtue presiding over the economy of the moral life.
He knows only of a specificnumberof acquired virtues,each of which
has a definedand limitedmoral influence.At this level, then, it appears
thatindifferent naturalacts are possible, indifferent because theylack the
informationof charity.

1Thismight explaintheapparent inParaphrasis

contradiction , I, 6,ed.Borgnet, VII,14: "Bonm
autem quodnihilestdebonomoris, etsubquoomnebonm moris comprehenditur, estactus
quiadpropriam
voluntarius materiamexratione determinatur."Cf.below, p. 106n. i .
2I, 2,7,p. 34,il. 12-13.Cf.Aristotle, , II,6, i97b2-27.
Physics
3 "SeddicitGregorius,quod'otiosumest,quodcaret ratione
iustaenecessitatis
autpiaeutilitatis'.
- I, 2,7,p. 33,11. 79-80.Cf.Sancii
Gregorii
Magni Moraliumlib.VII,c. 17,n. 8;PL7^,800c.
I, 2,7,sol.,p. 34.
5 Cf.IV,i, 2,ad 23,p. 227.
IOO

11:56:07 AM
 Accordingto St. Albert,then,the testimonyof Holy Scriptureadds
a new dimension to the moralityof acts of which the philosopher is
unmindful,and thisis the referencewhich all humanactions, externalas
well as internal, have to God. "Not everythingfutile", continues
Albert, "is condemnedby the moral philosopher,but everything futileis
"
condemned by the theologian ;* and so at one point, he classes the
futilewith the evil.2
The idle act, as definedby St. Gregory,is also an indifferent act,
and it too is condemnedby the Christiantheologian.Butin directcontrast
to certain contemporaryFranciscanauthors, notably John of Rupella,
Albert in Article Seven goes on to show what the otiosumis not. Now,
as Lottin has pointed out, the Franciscanthinkersof thistime regarded
3
anyact directed to a naturalend as morallyneutral. This is particularly
of
evidentin the writingsof John Rupella who had said that those acts
whichare aimed at the dailynecessitiesof living,such as nourishingone's
self,are neithergood nor bad ; theyare indifferent.* In oppositionto this
attitude, Albert goes on to state that any act directed to the alleviation
of our own naturalexigenciesor the pressingneeds of othersdoes indeed
have the"characterof rightful necessity"(ratioiustaenecessitatis), and so is
not indifferent.These purely natural exigencies arise from the daily
necessitiesof life and the toil of labor. Hence the activitiesof eating,
drinking,sleeping, are not indifferent since theyprocede fromnatural
necessities; theyfallwithinthe moralorder. This applies also to the com-
fortsof peace and rest, conversation,strolling,singingand play, which
dispel the tedium and fatigueof labor. For support Albert appeals to a
passagein the Nicomachean Ethicsin which Aristotletreatsof wittinessor
urbanity(eutrapelia) as a virtue.s
There is anotherveryimportantdimensionto this problem of the
moralityof acts. Everydeliberated action is good or bad:

are donewithout
... we saythatmanythings andtheseareneither
deliberation in-
norbad,norgoodbecausetheydo notfallintothesphereof morality.
different,
1 "Praeterea, nonomne vanum abethico,
vituperatur sedomne vanum a theologo."
vituperatur
-I, 2,7,p. 34,il. 36-37.
2Seebelow, footnote #76.
3PEM , II,488-486.
4 "Indifferensdicoquod,secundum sedictum,nonsonatinbonm velmalum inmoribus;ethic
similiterattendendus utireetloqui.Sienim
estfinis; malum
propter finem malefitetmale
fiat,
appetitur.Siveropropter bonum,bene.Siveropropter
finem
naturalem,utsiappetocommedere
propter necessitatem sustentationis
solum, necvituperabile;
nonestlaudabile proptereaest
indifferens."- from theSummadevitiis byO. Lottin,
, quoted PEM> II,470,n. 2.
5 Nic.Ethics
, II,7, iio8a23-27.
IOI

11:56:07 AM
Whatever are donewithdeliberation,
things aregoodor bad,according
however, as
) is calledevil.1
act(vanum
thefutile

Here Albertis pointingout the keyprincipleof rationalethics: reason is

the indispensable condition of morality, while a non-rationalact is
simplynon-moral,thatis, neithergood, bad, nor indifferent. But as far
as we can gatherfromhis words, the futileaction is stilla deliberatedor
rationalact. It is also an indifferent
act whose fullsignificanceescapes the
moral philosopher,but which the theologianrecognizesand so classifies
among evil acts. In the realm of natural ethics, then, it is possible to
have a concrete deliberated, but indifferent,act. The principle that
naturalreason is thatwhich essentiallyconstitutesan act as moral is not
accepted unconditionallyby Albert. In the final analysis, the rle of
reason is found wanting; unlike the universalvirtue of charity,it does
not universallyinitiatethe moral characterof all our naturalacts, and so
must be supplementedby the data of the theologian.
Concerningthe moralityof acts, then, Albert's theorybetraysnot
only a certain ambiguity,but also a qualifiedacceptance of the rle of
reason as an adequate determinerof moral specificity.At the same time,
it is importantto note that Albert is attemptingto validate and em-
phasize, to a greater extent than any of his predecessors, the purely
rational and natural factors in the morality of acts. Every naturally
virtuous act is a morally good act. Every rationalact is a moral act
(with the added stipulationthatfutileor idle acts are evil).2 In relation
to his predecessorsand contemporaries,Albert's position representsan
advance. At the same time, he falls short of St. Thomas for whom all
rational acts are ipsofacto moral.3 Lottin has aptly characterized St.
Albert's position as a "mi-chemin sur la voie d'une moralestrictement
naturelle"<

B) Thematerialcauseof virtue:bonumin genere

Like the absolute considerationof the voluntaryact, bonumin genereis
also an abstraction.It signifiesthis same human act not as being in a
state of absolute indterminationor equal liabilityto good or evil, but
1 u.. . dicimusquodmulta sinedeliberatione
fiunt etillanonsunt necbonavelmala,
indifferentia
eoquodnonsunt ingenere
moris.
Quaecumque autem cumdeliberatione bonavelmala
fiunt, sunt,
secundum quodvanum dicitur
malum." - I, 2, 7,ad 1,p. 34.
2Ouruseoftheterm ofcourse,
"moral", isintended tomean goodnrbad,andisopposed
tothe
non-moral orindifferent.
3Seebelow, p. 106.
PEM , II,489.
I02

11:56:07 AM
more positivelyas having an inclination or disposition to the good.
Albert calls it a ifirstpotency' to the good.1 He also refersto bonumin
i '
genereas the 'matter' and the materiacircaquam which, over and above
the concept of matter,includes as well a certainreferenceto the end of
the act.2 At the same time, it is the 'firstsubject' which receives and
supportsthe added determinationsof circumstanceand virtue.3
It seems obvious, then, that not unlike Philip the Chancellor,
Albert is conceiving bonumin genereas the material cause of virtue.*
To the standardizeddescriptionof bonumin genere- actussolussuper
- Albert adds a new
debitammateriam precision which is helpfulto the
modern reader who is apt to findthe term ' debitum9 both strangeand
* 9
misleading. At this point in the thirteenth century, debitum had a
strong juridified ring arisingfromits traditionalassociations with the
notionsof law, right( ius) and a legalisticconception of justice. Albert,
however,underthe influenceof Philip the Chancellor's interpretation of
bonumin geneie, uses the termin a meta-juridical sense: and he warnsus
thatin this context the notion of debitum is not to be taken in a specific
sense as the debitum iustitiae.sThe main purpose of these earlyquestions
in the De bonois to renderan intelligibleaccountofthenatureand genesis
of moral virtue. Hence, if the debitum in question were the debitum iuris
which derivesfromjustice (as yet uninvestigated),we would be caught
in a circular argumentby tryingto invoke a special virtue in order to
account forvirtuein general. No, the debitum here connotesa naturaland
rightproportion between the act and its correspondingmaterialobject:
for instance, feedinga hungryperson, or teachingan ignorantperson,
or consoling a sorrowful person. It is a proportion between two
natures,as it were. Hence, as the firstdegreeofmoralgoodnessfounded
on a proportion,bonumin genereappears as a true instanceof the tran-
scendentalgood which, we recall, analogicallyembraces all instancesof
goodness througha communityof proportionality.Conversely,malum
in generesignifiesa privationof this proportion.
In the historyprevious to Albert, the formulabonumin genereis
characterizedby a certain ambivalence.6Sometimes it was viewed as a
1I, 2,4,ad i, p. 29.
2I, 2,4,passim, pp.28-30.
3Ibid.
yad4,p. 30;art.6,sol.,p. 32.
4Thefollowing sample statements
fromtheSumma debono indicate
thecontinuity
between
Philip's
thoughtandAlbert's: "Adquoddicendum quodbonum ingenere dicit
materiam
puram ...
proprie
Eoautem quodcausa materialis estadfinalem,
ordinata bonum
requiritur ingenere bonum
tamquam
materialeadaliudbonum." - Ms.Padua
, Antonianum
#156,fol.3rb, 4va.
5I, 2,4,ad8,pp.29-30. Concerningthedebitum
iustitiae
, seeV,3,2,ad7,p. 297.
6 SeeO. Lottin, PEM, II,464-46$.
I03

11:56:07 AM
positive perfection,the firstin a series of moral perfections.On the
other hand, it was given an almost entirelyindifferent statusin which
it was regarded as equally liable to corruptionby subsequent circum-
stances.1 Both themesare still discerniblein the De bono. The bonumin
geneie is a firstpotency, matter and subject with respect to specific
moral goodness. It is the act seen as havinga dispositionto goodness in
the same way that matterhas a dispositionto form. Albert also admits
that it can be specifiedand vitiated by circumstances.2However, this
possibilityof change in the moralityof an act by circumstances,from
bonumin genereto malumin specie, does not constituteits essence: it is
more of an accidentalproperty.The true essence of bonumin geneieis its
inherentdisposition or proclivityto goodness - ad bonummagisquam
ad malum.The indifference is a by-product,so to speak, of the relatively
indeterminatemoral status of bonumin genere . What is essentiallyin-
different is the voluntaryact abstractlyconceived.

C) TheFormalCauseof Virtue
: Circumstances.
In the historyof moral speculationin the Middle Ages, Albert's Tractatus
de natura boni seems to have been the firstknown instance in which
a distinctivetreatmentis given to the rle of circumstances. 3 Question
three of TractatusI in the De bono is devoted to the same analysis.The
inclusion of these treatiseswithin the Tractatusand the De bonois an
innovation. No longer is bonumex circumstantia just a formulamentioned
in passing,one whose own statusas a moral factor,and whose relation-
ship to the other moral factors,remainsin obscurity.On the contrary,
Albert's recognitionof theirfunctionas a necessarycause in the genesis
of virtuehas finallypromptedthe inclusionof a treatiseon the circum-
stances withinthe wider scheme of a naturalethic.
In this section of the De bono, Albert relies heavilyupon passages
from Cicero's De inventione and the De dijjerentiis topicisof Boethius.4
All the circumstancesenumeratedby Cicero, writesAlbert,are reducible
1See,forinstance, Debono, I, 2,4, #1, p. 28.
2I, 2,gysol.,p.31. Onemajor problem here isthat ofpredication
sincethere canbeanopposition
between thegenus ofanact(say, bonum) andthespecies See,ibid.,11. 3-34.Albert
(malum). attempts
to answer thisdifficultymoreexplicitly inInII Sent., d. 40,art.1,ad3,ed.Borgnet, XXVII,
62$b.
3 Regardingthedoctrine ofcircumstances inclassical writers
(e.g.,Aristotle, Boethius,
Cicero,
John Damascene) andthereference made tothem bythemedieval seeO. Lottin,
moralists,- PEM,
IV,SOS-SIJ-
SeeDebonot I, 3,2,pp.39-42. Cf.Deinventione, I, ch.24-27,
nn.34-41 ; ed.HMHubbell (Loeb
Classical
Library, i9SS)>pp.68-80.
104

11:56:07 AM
to seven main headings: agent or person (quis), the nature of the act,
or whatwas done in the performanceof the act (quid), intention,motive,
or reasonforthe act (cur),the time (quando),the place (ubi), the manner
of performance(quomodo),and finallythe means or instrumentsinvolved
(quibusauxiliis).This enumeration,in effect,is a convenientabbreviation
of Cicero's long catalogue made by Boethius, and used and commented
upon by Albert.1 The Universal Doctor, of course, would know the
six major circumstanceslisted by Aristotle in Book III of the Nico-
macheanEthicswhich partially coincide with the seven headings just
listed2; but in the presentsection, Albertseems to preferthe testimony
of Cicero and Boethius.
4
A better name for circumstances,Albert points out, is singularia
because the moral philosopher is primarilyconcerned with concrete
actions which are immersedin individuatingconditions,and not simply
withproblematicor rhetoricalquestions.3 Indeed, Albertinsistsupon the
'
differencebetween circumstancesand singulars'.* Strictlyspeaking,
circumstancesare universalor generalconsiderationswhich are extrinsic
to the act, and which give rise to the rhetoricalsyllogismand question.
'Singulars',on the otherhand, are numericallyparticularizeddifferences
which characterize, and attach to, each and any act. One is universal
and extrinsicto the act; the other is real and, as we shall now see, in-
trinsicto the act's morality.Nevertheless,in deferenceto traditionand
'
forthe sake of convenience, Albert continuesto use the term circum-
'
stances' when what he reallymeans is singulars'.
Circumstancesinformour acts with the being of moral goodness
(honestum) ). They do not constitutethe ontological
or evil ( vituperabile
nature of the act as such, but they do confer upon it a moral being.
Hence, although extrinsic to the act as such, they are nevertheless
intrinsiccomponentsof its morality:

To thefirst argument, therefore,we saythatthesequalifying principles(talia)do not

givebeingtotheactinasmuch as itis anact,butrather theygiveitbeinginasmuch as it
is goodor evil.Andforthisreason, although theyareextrinsic
totheact,theyarenot,
however, extrinsic
tomoralgoodness orevil.s
. . . givebeingto virtue
. . . circumstances andtheyareintrinsic to virtue. . .6
1Cf.Boethius, Dedijjerentiis , IV,PL64,1212D,io^D.
topicis
2 Nic.Ethics , III, i, 111ia 2-6.Cf.comments byR.A.Gauthier, , t. II
Nicomaque
L'thique
(Louvain, Paris:19^9),18-186.
3I, 3, i, ad4,ad,p. 38;I, 4, 4,ad p. $6.
4I, 3, i, ad i, p. 38,il. 33-38
; I, 4, 4,ad4, p. 56.
s I, 3, i, ad i, p. 38.
6Ibid.yad3,p. 38.
ioS

11:56:07 AM
It is clear that St. Albert draws a line between the act conceived as a
psychologicalentity,and its moral accidents, so to speak.1 Moralityis
somethingsuperimposed,a qualitytacked on to the natureof an external
act. It does not permeatethe act as in St. Thomas forwhom the 'human
ac is throughand througha 'moral act'.2 At this crucial point, then,
Albert, not unlike many earlier and contemporarythinkers,seems to
regardthe physicaland substantialcore of a humanact as being essentially
infra-moral.The point is worthyof note if only to indicate one more
instancein the enduringhistoryof the fact-value distinction.
The 'circumstance*quid, however, raises some difficulty.Inasmuch
as it designatesthe kind or natureof the act performed(e.g., adultery,
homicide), then surelyit must connote the very 'substance of the ac?
In his replies to thisobjection, Albertdoes not altogetherdeny thatthis
one circumstanceconnotes the essence or physicalsubtrateof an act.3
But this connotationis secondaryand minimal. He emphasizesthe fact
thatwhat quid reallydesignatesis the moralspeciesof the act, thatis, the
act (together with its material object) as enveloped in, and specified
by, circumstances.It primarilypoints up the moral characterof an act
which is constituted by circumstances. Albert appears unwilling to
allow quid any more than an oblique significationof the physical act
itself.
Good and evil, therefore,accrue to the agent and to his behaviour
not so much fromthe act as such, but fromthe mannerin which the act
is performed.Circumstancesare modesor waysofactingwhichinformthe
act with its moral character:

The beingofmoralgoodness, moreover, derives

fromthemanner (in whichtheact
isperformed) thanfrom
rather insucha waythatallthecircumstances
theactitself may
be called'themanner'. inBookII oftheEthics
Andthisis madeclearbyAristotle where
hesaysthat'we arenotjustandtemperatebecauseweperform justandtemperateacts,
butbecauseweactasjustandtemperate do (utiustietcasti)'
persons .4

1 "... actus secundum senonponit potentiam inmoribus, sedefficitur

extramores; etideonon
primm ingenere est,sedextra genus."- InII Sent.,
d. 36,K,art.6,ad3,ed.Borgnet, XXVII,
S922L.Ind. 40,A,art.1,p. 624a,theproblem isexplicity "Utrum
raised, bonum etmalum sunt
differentiae actionis
constitutivae inmoribus?"
voluntarie Thefirst
objection
suggests thatbonum
andmalum areformae oftheact.Albert,
substantiales onthecontrary, favors
anaccidental moral
character: "Dicendum quodbonitasetmalitiaaccidunt actioni."
2 Cf.O. Lottin, PEMy Leslments
II, 482-488; dela moralit
desacteschez
saint
Thomas ,
d'Aquin
Revue No-ScolastiquedePhilosophie,XXIV(1922),394-398.
3I, 3,i, adi, p. 38; art.2,ad9,p.41.
4'Ibid.
, art.i, ad 1,p. 38.Ethicavtus
, ed.Marchesi, p. IV,11.25-26(Nic.Ethics
, II,3, iio^b
7-9):"Iustus autem etcastus estnon,quihecoperatur utiustietcasti
sedetquisicoperatur,
operantur."
I06

11:56:07 AM
Albert cites Aristotlewho says that it is not simplythe performanceof
just and temperateacts which make us to be so, but ratherour acting
in the mannerof those who are just and temperate.The ut of ut iustiet
castiin this text signifiesthe mode of circumstance,and not the habitus
of virtue itself.1 Obviously, I do not act already with the virtues of
justice and temperancesince it is precisely these which we are in the
process of tryingto account for. Virtues, at this point, are not the
conditionsof good acts, but the resultof morallygood acts.
Circumstances, then, inform our actions with moral specificity
when they actualize the potency towards goodness (i.e., the bonum
in genere) which is in these acts. Indeed, it becomes apparentthatAlbert
envisagescircumstancesin the rle of formalcauses of an act's morality.
This formulahas actuallybeen suggestedin the opening argumentsof
Article One: ". . .it does not seem thatthese should be called circum-
stances,but ratherformsof the act . . . Therefore,it seems thatcircum-
stancesconstitutethe act as a formalcause".2 Albertdoes not dismissthis
proposal. His only rejoinder is that these circumstancesare not the
intrinsiccauses of the physicalact as such, but of its moral character.3
That is, theyare the formaland intrinsiccauses of naturalvirtue.
In describingcircumstancesas the 'modes' or 'forms' of our acts,
Albert has followed out a line of reasoningsuggestedby the vocabulary
of Philip the Chancellor.4 Moreover, for Albert, the element of cur,
the agent's intention,is included withinthe catalogueof circumstances.s
It is thatfor the sake of which the deed is performed,and so a cause of
that operation. Now, in the De bono, Albert really raises the problem
of intentiononly once; this is in the answer to an objection, and so the
treatmentis very brief and incomplete.6 He mentions two kinds of
intention. First, there is a 'simple intention' which sets up an end,
but which does not take into account the qualityof the means, or of the
end itself, or the proportion between the means and the end. This,
Albert says, is a 'foolish intention' (intentiostuha). The other kind of
intentionis one informedand directed by faith.This is the theological
1I, 4, 2,ad 14,p. go.
2 u.. . nonvidentur debere dicicircumstantiae, sedpotius formaeactus."--I, 3, 1, #1,p. 37.
"Ergo videtur,quodcircumstantiae actum
faciant utcausa - ibid.y
formalis." #3.
3Seeabove, p. 39.Also,III,1, 1, ad20,p. 120.
4Summa debono, Ms.Padua
, Anton. 1^6,fol.4vb:". . . causa huicenim
formalis, bonum
assimilatur
excircumstantia quaeestforma velmodus actionis."
5 "Similiter'cur'dicitintentionem agentis..." - I, 4, 4, #3,p. 54,1. 44. "'Cur'autem dicit
causam, etdicitBoethius, quod'ea estuniuscuiusque facticausa,propterquamfactum est',ut
parentem occidit,utsolushaereditatem possideret."- I, 3, 2,p. 39,11. 80-83.
6 I, 3,2,ad 10,p. 42; #10, pp.40-41.
I07

11:56:07 AM
notionof intentionprevalentin Albert's time, and whose inspirationwas
Scriptural.The objection itselfrefersto a passage fromSt. Matthew's
Gospel (12,35*): "The good man from his good treasure brings forth
good things".The treasureof a man's heart, continuesthe objection, is
his intention,and it is this which determinesthe moral qualityof acts,
and which God will judge. Albert, moreover, must certainlyhave had
in mind the divinely orientated intention of which St. Paul speaks
( Romans, 14, 23): "forall thatis not fromfaithis sin".1
Is no other kind of intentionconceivable? The issue at stake once
again, of course, is the realityand degree of naturalmoral goodness in
the moral philosophy of Albertus Magnus. Does Albert admit to an
intentionwhich, thoughnot informedby faith,is neverthelessable to
assessthe value of some end and the relationshipof the means to the end?
Surely the fact that thinkers of antiquity recognized and used this
circumstance cur, which Albert himself has equated with the term
'intention', would suggest that in spite of an absence of positive re-
cognitionby Albert of a purelynaturalintentionin thepresentpassage,
he does not in his own mind exclude the possibility.Yet, with special
reference to this passage, Lottin believes this is absent fromAlbert's
thought.2
The brevityof thisparticularpassagewould seem to reflecthesitancy
on the part of Albert himself. Nevertheless, this same brevity is
significantin its implications.For a complete analysisof his theoryof
intention,Albert refersus to another work, namely to Book II of his
ScriptasuperSententias. This would seem to indicatethatin his mind the
theological notion of intention,one informedby charityand faith,is
out of place in the present discussion. The circumstancesare formal
causes of virtue. To invoke an intentioninformedby faithand charity
would nullifythe purpose at hand: namely,to renderan account of the
genesis of naturalvirtue. Then too, in a later section of the De bono, he
makes the statementthat the naturalvirtuesmay be distinguishedfrom
the theological perfectionson the basis of naturallyand supernaturally
orientatedintentions. 3 It seems clear, then, thatsome understanding of

1St.Paul'stext isquoted intheDebono

later , p. 276,11.31-32.
2 Lesvertus
morales , Recherches
acquises dethologie etmdivale,
ancienne XX(19^3),33.
3 V,4 (Deiustitia ), 2,p. 301,11. 66-70.Inhiscommentary
speciali ontheSentences,headmits toa
naturalintention: "Adaliuddicendum, quodtaliactionesuntduaeactionesmorales, licetunasit
: etquoad
naturaliter diversassuipartesabintentionediversimode
informatur: estenim inmoribus
intentio movens:
principaliter et cumibisuntduaeintentiones, suntduomoventia, etad duo
moventia [readabduobus moventibus]
sequuntur - InII Sent
duaeactiones." ., d. 40,D, art.1,
ad ed.Borgnet, XXVII, 637a.
I08

11:56:07 AM
a naturalintentionis operative in the moral philosophyof St. Albert,
a naturalintentionexpressed by the term cur.
Must all the circumstancescoincide in the formationof virtue,or
does one sufficewithout the others? In answer to this problem, Albert
leaves no doubt thatall the circumstancesare involved, althoughone or
more of them may play a prediminantrle.1 At this point he credits
Aristotleand Pseudo-Dionysiuswith the followingdoctrine: "virtusest
ex una totaet sola causa, vitiumautemomnifariam" . Virtue resultsfroma
total convergenceof all the elements or causes involved, whereas the
corruptionof any one of these sufficesto account forevil. The wording
of this statementis not only a curious amalgam of statementsby two
differentauthors; there is also a distortionin vocabulary.2Dionysius
had said that the good ( bonum ) is characterized by a wholeness or
completeness with respect to its causes. This is consonantwith Albert's
own general conception of the good as a virtualwhole. In the present
context he ties it down to virtue which is a specifickind of goodness.
In Albert's mind, then, virtue presupposes a convergence of all the
circumstances.
Up to this point, Albert has analyzedthe intrinsiccauses of virtue;
and the account is structuredin terms of the principles enunciatedin
the preliminarymetaphysicaldiscourse. Both circumstancesand bonum
in genereare analogical varietiesof goodness. Bonumin genere , resulting
from a fusingof two relativelyindeterminateprinciples, namely, an
action and its proportionateobject, is a natural instance of the good.
In theirreal and concrete setting,circumstancesinhere in the bonumin
genereas in their subject. The same kind of affinitywhich generally
unites act to its correlativepotency obtains here as well. As formalor
modal elementsproportionedto the potency of the act, circumstances
endow it with moral specificity.The goodness which resultsfromthis
'indivision' is the specificgoodness of virtue.
At the same time, we should not forgetthatthese two factorshave
been treatedas abstractions. Since theyare distinguishableaspects of the
moralact, we are justifiedin abstractingthemfromtheirproperconcrete

1I, 3, i, ad6,p. 38.I,syi, ad22,p. 74,11. 22-24.

2Theformulation ofthisprinciple,usually byAlbert
attributed toDionysiusalone,is really
an
amalgam ofAristotelianandDionysianvocabulary,althoughthethought
is genuinelyDionysian.
Thecomplete statement ofthePseudo-Dionysius runs: "Bonumexunaettotaestcausa, malum
autem ex multis - De div
et particularibus." . nom.,
IV,trans. Saracenus,
Johannes ,
Dionysiaca
I (ed.Ph.Chevallier), 298-299. Theother halfofAlbert's isfound
quotation intheEthicavetusy
ed.Marchesi, p. VI, , II, ,1106b3^): "Boniquidem
1. 26 (Nic.Ethics enimsimpliciter, mali
autem omnifariam. w

I09

11:56:07 AM
settingin order to give each a separate and distinctconsideration. In
reality,however, theyexist only as integratedcomponentsof the indivi-
dual act.
'
D) The Matter9of Virtue
In his general metaphysicsof the good, Albert had made it clear that
any account of the genesis of goodness must also include efficientand
finalcausation. The finalcause, as an object of desire, moves the efficient
cause which, in turn, moves the matter to a reception of forms.
Question Four of Tractatus I which is devoted to an analysisof the efficient
causes of virtue shows clearly that Albert is faithfully adheringto this
principle. Article One of this same question, however, contains a
discussionof what is called the ' materiavirtutis' Having alreadytreated
of the bonumin generewhich is described in termsof 'matter', one might
be surprisedto see the same termand problemscroppingup again. As it
turnsout, however, the formula'materiavirtutis 9 its
in presentcontextis
a far more comprehensivenotion than that used to describe bonumin
genere. Furthermore,thisarticlehas been promptedby certainstatements
in the Ethicsof Aristotlein which it is said thatacquired virtuehas to do
with pleasure ( voluptas
, delectationes) and pain (tristitia).1If such is the
case, then virtue should be situated and studied in referenceto these
connaturalpassions. But since theyare reallythe proper domain (materia)
of fortitudeand temperance,this would seem to limit the definitionof
moral virtueto only these two, therebyexcludingat one blow prudence
and justice fromthe moral order.2 Some sort of clarificationis wanting.
In the formula' materiavirtutis1, not one, but severaldistinguishable
factorsare welded together. Some understandingof the complexities
involved is given by those texts in the De bonowhich most significantly
contain some allusion to the term materia ' It is found to embrace (a)
the materiadebita, better still, the act itselftaken at the level of bonum
in genere.Yet over and above this, it also includes referenceto (b) the
agent's intentionand the end, and (c) man's appetitivepowers together
with theirconcomitantfeelingsof pleasure and pain.3 At the same time,
1 "Circa voluptatesenimettristitias estconsuetudinalis - Ethica
virtus." vetus
, ed. Marchesi,
p.
III,li. 11-i2. "Dicoautem consuetudinem. Hecenim estcircapassiones - ibid.,
etoperationes."
p. VI,II. 11-12.
2Thisistheargument proposed inI, 4, 1,#2,p. 44.
3Ibid.fsol.,pp.44-45.MAd aliuddicendum, quodinveritate finis
in moribusincluditur
inma-
teria..." - II, 2, 3, ad 3, p. 102."Adtertium dicendum, etvitiadifferunt
quodvirtutes per
materiam, quaeestfinis - I, ,2,ad 3, p. 77. "Adaliuddicendum,
intentionis." quodmateria,
quaetantum estmateria, nondistinguit virtutes
velvitia,sedmateria,quaeestfinis
potentiae,
I IO

11:56:07 AM
materiavirtutis is reallysomethingcompletelyindividualized: theconcrete
act immersed in, and clothed by, all its moral circumstances,factors,
and concomitants,and brought to bear upon a proportionateobject.
The formula'materiacircaquam9 is employedas an equivalent.
In the solution to Article One, Albert explains that all acts and
powers of the soul are differentiated by theircorrespondingobjects. This
is no less true of virtuousactions. The proximateobject of the moral act
is its movingcause or terminus(movens, finis), and what this does is to
specify the indeterminate movement of the will pervadinganyparticular
act. The element of finality - the most decisive featurein morality-
prevails over this entire network. Necessarily, bare matter without
referenceto an end would failto adequatelydifferentiate humanacts and
1 9
their proportionatequalities. In this way, the terms 'obiectum9 , finis ,
'
'opus', 'materia9,and materiacircaquam9are all intendedto convey the
same functionof determinationand specification.1In mostcases, theend
or terminusis simply the operation itselfas virtuous; in the case of
justice, it is a result (opertm)distinctfromthe operation.2 Regardless
of the type, it belongs to the very nature of these objective ends to
essentiallydeterminethe kind of virtuein each concrete act.3
Now, our external acts are performedthroughbodily organs,and
at the same time theyare accompaniedby affections or feelings(passiones)
of pleasure and pain. These acts and their concomitantsensationsissue
directly from the sensible soul, that is, from the irascible and con-
cupiscible powers of man's soul. Hence, Albert agrees that virtue may
'
be situated circapassiones9 and ' circadelectationeset tristitias9
. But at the
same time, such statementstaken simply as theystandwould not ade-
quately define the provinceof virtuesince theyignorethe other factors
involved, and especially a referenceto the primaryfactorof the final
cause.* Over and above the mere notion of passion,as we have seen, one
musttake into account the end or object of these appetitivepowers, and
indeed the entire complexus, as signifiedby the term 'materia9 . Hence,
because the specificationof natural moral virtues is not arrived at
merelyby their referenceto the passions, then by speakinganalogically

sicutestappetitus velpars ; finis

appetitus eniminmoralibus forma
potissima est,utdicit
Socrates."
- Ill,4, 3, ad 3, p. 192."Sedmateria circaquamfrequenter estprincipium
cognoscendirem,
praecipue inactibus
animae, inquibusmateria nontantum estmateria,
sedetiam - I, 2,
finis."
4,sol.,p. 29,Seealso,III,2,2,ad1, p. 137; II,2,4,ad6,p. log.
1II,i, 3,ad i, p. 90,i. 89-p.91,1.2;ad2,p. 91.
2 V,4, 7,sol.,p. 306.
3I, 4, 2,sol.,p. 49,il. 42-46;ibid., ad i,p. 0,1. 70.
4 I, 4, i, ad8,p. 46; I, Syi, ad22,p. 74,11.42-47.
Ill

11:56:07 AM
 ) we may say that prudence and justice are also referableto
(idifferente!
them.1
Matterof
virtue', therefore,is a comprehensiveformulaintended
to circumscribevirtue in its real and concrete setting. It is, to put it
simply,a comprehensiveview of the virtuousact in all its moralrelations.
Instead of connoting merely one aspect or facet of the moral act, it
signifiesrathera totalityof factorsor complexus. Now, it is from its
nature as an integratedwhole or complexus, and not fromthis or that
particularelement, that the humap act receives its moral specification,
i.e., virtue. In this way virtue reflectsthe conditionof totalitywhich
characterizesthe Pseudo-Dionysiantheoryof the good :

. . . andblessed
DionysiusagreesinChapterFourofConcerning theDivine
Names insaying
that'thegoodisconstituted cause,buteviloriginates
bya totalandsingle omnifariously'
Bythisit is understoodthatfortherealityofvirtuetherearerequired all thecircum-
stances with
together theend harmonizingwiththe actas it is brought bearuponits
to
proportionate object.Forevilandvice,however, theresuffices thecorruptionofany
oneofthesebyitself.2

The formationof virtueentailsall the circumstancesand the end which

are proportionedto the act. This is consonant with the statementof
Pseudo-Dionysius, and so falls perfectlyin line with the Albertinian
visionof the good as somethingwhole and complete.

Causesof Virtue
E) TheEfficient

By situatingthe virtuousact in a much wider context, Article One has

shown that the formationof moral goodness rests upon a pluralityof
convergingelements: the act itself,end, circumstances,the powers of
man's soul, and the accompanyingaffectionsof pleasure and pain.
The account of the genesisof virtueup to thispoint, however, has dealt
onlywithtwo intrinsiccauses. A complete examinationmustalso include
the active or efficientcauses of morality, and the final cause. The
followingseven articles of Question Four are devoted to an analysisof
the efficientcauses of virtue. In dealing with thisproblem as well as the
notions of free choice, voluntariness,and deliberation, Albert relies
heavily upon the Ethicsof Aristotle. The integrationof this material
worked out at thisparticularpoint in the De bonois reallyan innovation.
In the traditionalAugustininconception of virtue with its emphasis

1I, 4, i, ad2,p. 4g.

2I, 5, i, ad22,p. 74,il. 19-2
g.
Ill

11:56:07 AM
upon the exclusivelydivine origin of virtue,no such causal explanation
was really called for. St. Albert, however, is concerned with virtue
acquired throughour own natural acts, and so the inclusion of these
considerationswithinhis generaldoctrineof virtueis both necessaryand
consistent.
Five positionsare suggestedin Article Two which would call for a
direct supernaturalinterventionto explain the cause of naturalvirtue.1
In his answer to the question raised, however, Albert outlines the
naturalsettingand originof moral virtue.2It is directlyand immediately
caused by the exercise of human acts (ab opere).Within our naturelies
an innate power or abilityto develop these perfections.The capacityis
innate, not the full-fledgedvirtue itselfwhich must be cultivatedby a
repetitionof acts.3 In the solution to Article Two, he goes on to say
thatthispurelynaturalabilityto generatevirtuecannot be conceived as
somethingpurely material and passive. Over and above this, one must
k
distinguishits active and immaterialcomponents: rightchoice (eligentia
recta) which is combinationof rightreason (rectaratio) and will. Right
reason, Albert tells us, consistsin the correct discernmentof the mean
to be observedin our operations.In otherwords, our inherentcapability
to performvirtuousacts ultimatelystemsfromour facultiesof reasonand
will. Hence, he concludes, natureis not onlya materialor passivecause,
but in some way it is also the efficientcau1 of virtue.
Albertgoes on to saythatthe efficient cause of virtueis the operation
seen in its dynamicactivity(in agere) and not simplyin its physicalbeing
(in esse) since thissubstratumis reallyoutside the moral order/ A help-
ful analogyis that of manual labourerswho develop those special limbs
they use in their work to greater and strongerproportionsthanother
men. So too in the case of virtue; its most efficaciouscause (potissima
causa) will be that immediate power of the soul which is called into
play. Operations by their very nature issue in virtue. On the other
hand, the bare performanceof actions withouta conscious attendanceto
the particularconditionsor circumstancesinvolvedwould not reallybe
an immediateefficientcause of virtue.s At most it could only be called
a remote cause. As we shall see, such actionswould, to a certainextent,
be involuntaryby reason of this ignorance. Hence, just as the formal

1I, 4, 2, #!-#,p. 47.

2Ibid. ysol.,andad i-ad4, p. 49.
3Ibid. yad6,p. 49,11.74-78.
4 Seeabove, pp.100n.i, 106n.i
s I, 4, 2,ad 14,p. so.

"3

11:56:07 AM
cause of virtue requires and presupposes the materialcause, so too the
operation as the efficientcause of virtue, if it is to be an adequate and
directcause of the virtuousact, entailstheformalcause ofcircumstances.
Virtue is describedas being a 'potential whole'.1 Now, in any such
whole no one part completelyconstitutesthe whole. Rather, the first
part or component is necessarilypresupposed by a second, and so on.
It is, as Albert says, in potency to subsequent augmentation: semper
priormater ialis ad sequentem . Hence, in the generationof virtue many
distinctacts are required. From the firstoperationa certain disposition
accrues to the soul and likewise this disposition is in potency to the
superimpositionof a second, and so on. In itself,a dispositionlacks the
stabilityand permanence of a virtuous habit.2 It is easily displaced
(jacile mobile). But by a process of moral metamorphosis,so to speak,
many successive dispositionsare welded into a habit. No definiteand
exact number of operationscan be assignedto thiscumulativedevelop-
ment.
So much for the proximate efficientcause of virtue. In Albert's
attemptto circumscribethis notion of efficientcause operative in the
moral order, the next step is to ascertain the remoteefficientcauses.
Such causes are remotebecause, as in the case ofvoluntariness or delibera-
tion, they precede the exercise of the final human operation which
itselfimmediately issues in the formationof In
virtue. his introductory
prefaceto this section, Albert observes that, sincehumanoperationsare
voluntary,then it behooves us to analyze this notion of voluntariness.3
This can be throwninto reliefby startingwith negativeconsiderations,
thatis, by contrastingit to thatwhich is involuntary.ArticlesThree and
Four, therefore,deal with the involuntary;Article Five establishesthe
positivenatureof voluntariness.
In the ensuingdiscussion, Albert relies heavilyupon the doctrine
of Aristotle. There are two kinds of involuntariness.Some acts are
involuntaryby reason of an external violence or compulsion worked
upon the agent.* Other acts are involuntarythroughignorance.s The
1Ibid. as a "potential
yart.3, ad 9, p. go; ibid.,ad i.Virtue whole" (totum ) is a
potestativum
recurring theme throughout theDebono. Whiletoocomplex inthispaper,
toinvestigate itis
worth remarkingthatthisnotionconforms toAlbert's
conception oftheontological ofthe
structure
naturalgood(bonum SeeI, 2,art.1and2,pp.22-27.
naturae). Asapplied
tovirtue, of
theprinciple
thetotum isintended
potestativum toshowthat themoral lifeisprogressive
andthat
thevirtues
are
moral organisms.
2I, 4, 3,ad10,p. so,
3Tr.I, qu.4, p. o,11.79-89.
4 Ibid.
yart.3, pp.f1-53.
5Ibid.yart.4, pp.S4--S7-
II4

11:56:07 AM
ignorance in question is of the circumstances conditioning the act.
This may also be called 'ignorance of the fac (ignorantiafacti) according
as the deed ( factum ) is taken in its real and concrete setting,and as
includingthe particularcircumstancesin which it is immersed.1Once
again, then, knowledge of all the circumstancesis an indispensable
conditionof the voluntaryact.
By this contrastto the kindsof involuntariness,Albert is now able
to establishpositivelythe natureof a voluntaryact.2 Two conditionsare
involved: first,the movingprincipleof the act mustbe withinthe agent
himself,and in this way it escapes the impedimentsof the act which is
exteriorlycoerced. Secondly, the agent must be aware of the particular
circumstancesof the action, and in thisway it is opposed to involuntari-
ness throughignorance.
The second section given over to a studyof the remote causes of
virtue, includes another three articles in which special considerationis
devoted to the nature of choice ( prohaeresis , eligentia ), deliberation
( consilium ), and the difference between these and will. Since we are
primarily concerned with virtue which is a species of the good, consider-
ations about will and voluntarinessin general are insufficient. We must
know more in detail about the catenation,as it were, of the individual
acts which precede the formationof virtue. Voluntarygoodness ( bonum
voluntarium), which is the object of the will, lacks determination; it
is the good as such, the good absolutelyconceived abstractingfromany
particular type or instance.3 The particular acts of deliberation and
choice which immediatelyissue in virtuous operations also have this
good ultimatelyas their end, but not as their immediate and proper
object. Rather, theyare directlyordered to particularinstancesof the
good, i.e., the means to the end. Moreover, in the case of deliberation,
we cannot say just any means, but ratherthose means whose usefulness
are open to question.* Still, we cannot even say all debatable means,
but more precisely those which we discern by reason as being helpful
in the attainmentof the end. We then desire what has been ascertained
as useful.
Choice, then, is not simplya power belonging exclusivelyto the
will, just as the will compenetrateswith reason, so too the element of
reason or intellectis indispensableto choice.5
1Ibid. yad9,ad 10.p. j.
2I,4, , adi, p. 8. Etilica ed.Marchesi,
vetus, p.XIII,11. io-ii (Nic.Ethics
, III,3, 111ia 22-23):
". . . voluntariumvidebitur
essecuiusprincipium inseipsocognoscente singula[Debono ed.,p. i,
inquibus
n. 64: singularia], operatio."
3I, 4, 8,sol.,p. 6. 4I, 4, 6, sol,,p. 61. 5Ibid.
yad,ad10,p. 61.
11S

11:56:07 AM
 A final and necessary characteristicof choice is that we be the
4
masters of these actions: actus quorumnos dominisumus'l In all our
moral acts we are sufficientagents. In this respect, however, one must
distinguish between acts and their resultanthabits.2 Aristotle, writes
Albert,has said thatwe are the mastersof our individualoperationsfrom
the beginning of the act to its completion. As to the habit or virtue
generatedby these acts, however, the same is not entirelytrue. We are
the mastersof habitsat theirinception. But since it is impossibleforus
to ascertainjust how much of a contributioneach operationmakes to the
formationof a habit, then we are to a certain extent 4involuntary'in
their possession.

F) TheFinal Causeoj Virtue

: Happiness

Hitherto, Albert has discussed the material,formaland efficientcauses

of virtue. Even thoughthereare indicationsthata treatmentof the final
cause of virtuewas to be included in the De bono, no distinctquestionor
treatisedealing with this mode of causalityis to be found.3The notion
offinis,however, appears oftenenough in this moral treatise,and so we
are able to arrive at some understandingof the meaningswhich Albert
gives to this term.
In his preliminarymetaphysicsof the good, Alberthad argued that
the good analyticallyincludes a referenceto end: of its very nature,
the good is that which is desired. The notion of end, therefore,is
necessarilyanalogical or, if you will, as flexible and relative a notion
as the good itself.Within any particularorder or perspective,it always
connotes that which is ultimatelywilled or desired.* In general, writes
Albert, one can distinguishtwo kinds of final causes: a proximate or
immediateend which is intendedin one act, and the remoteor ultimate
end intendedin all, or in a series of acts.s This is true both of the order
of natureas well as of the moral order. In the latter,the proximateend
or object would be that complexus known as the ' matterof virtue' or
materiacirca quam, the human act seen in all its dynamic complexity,

1I, y6,sol.,p. 6i, i. 30.Seealso,I, 4, 2, #12,

p. 48.Aristotle himself
writes: "Operationum
quidem enim abinitio adfinem
usque domini - Ethica
sumus." vetus p. XVIII,1. 26
, ed.Marchesi,
(Nic.Ethics , III,8, 1114b31-32).
JohnDamascene isalsoquoted asthesource ofthisstatement:
I, S*7, p. 62,il. f6ff.
2I, 4, 8,ad,pp.65-66.
3Seebelow, p. 117n. 3.
4 ". . . finis
appellaturultimum inquocumque
volitum . . - I, 4, 7,ad13,p. 64.
5I, 4, i, sol.,pp.44-45.
116

11:56:07 AM
whichspecifiesand differentiates thevariousvirtuesand vices. The remote
end, which is not intendedmerelyin one act or in one virtue, is man's
finalend: happinessor beatitude.
Another distinction, partially overlapping the first, is that of
'end of the ac ( finisoperis ) and 'end of the agent' (finisoperantis).1 'End
of the act' signifiesthe immediateobject of a particularaction. In the
case of bonumin genere , it would be the proportionateobject ( debita
materia ) of the act in question. In some cases, such as adultery,an act is
malumin genere , and regardlessof the agent's intentionort)ther circum-
stances it can never be made because the 'end of the act' is itself
' End of the good on the other
somethingevil. agent', hand, obviouslydesig-
nates the agent's motive or intention. In contrastto 'end of the act',
it usually connotes a more ultimategoal. Virtue, according to Albert,
maybe regardedeitheras the 'end of the act' or the 'end of the agent'
dependingupon which way we choose to look at it.2
Since thereis no questionor section in the De bonodevoted to man's
last end, it is difficult to reconstructadequatelyAlberts' thoughton this
point. Like the earlier Tractatus de naturaboni, the De bonowas to include
such a treatment.The Preface to Question Four clearly proposes this
move: aftera detailed analysisof the naturalvirtues,we are to expect a
"3
disquisitionupon "theend and perfectionof virtuewhich is happiness.
Both works,however, were abandonedin an incompletestateand so fall
short of this proposed endeavor. Consequentely,in the De bonowe are
leftwith only a few scatteredand cursoryremarksabout this.
Whether we choose to call it happiness ( felicitas ) or something
else, Albert says in one text, is not our present concern.* Apparently
precisionsin doctrine and terminologywere to be made later on. Inas-
much as it is the end, it is the absolute good ( bonumhonestum ), and so
something desired for its own sake. There are several statements, how-
ever, in which Albert distinguishes between happiness( felicitas) as that
to which the virtues are essentiallyordered, and 'eternal beatitude'
- man's -
supernaturaldestiny which is not possible withoutgrace and
s
meritoriousworks. Felicitasviae, on the other hand, is another phrase
used by Albert which seems to connote that kind of happiness known
or experiencedby non-Christianthinkers( philosophi ) who philosophized
withoutthe benefitof faith,and who lacked grace.
1I, 2,6,ad6, p. 33.
2I, i, ad2-ad,3,p. 72.
3h 4, p. 43il - 3--
* II, i, , sol.,p. 94,li. 36-39.
5I, 4, 7, #13, p. 63; III,i, i, ad31,p. 121.
II7

11:56:07 AM
 There are additional texts in the De bonowhich point to a funda-
mental relationshipobtainingbetween the virtuesand this concept of
happiness.1Happiness, we read, is a perfectionbut a dynamicperfection
(actus) of the soul which is consequent upon the possession of all the
perfectedvirtues. The presence of one complete and perfectedvirtue
does not suffice,but rather the possession of each and every natural
virtueis requiredin the attainmentofhappiness.In thisrespect,prudence
plays an important rle. With reference to happiness, Albert says
that it enjoys"a 'more excellent ac because it guides us to the primum
bonum , God, whereinthe greatesthappinessis found.2Nevertheless,not
just prudence, but all the virtues, are essentially ordered to, and
consummatedin, happiness.Happiness,then,is trulythe end and perfec-
tion of naturalvirtuesin relationto which theystandas so manyneces-
sarysteps or means.
The texts seem to show that Albert understood quite well the
Aristotelianidea of eudaimoniathroughand in the virtuouslife; but for
all this, the De bonogives only a sketchyidea about the finalend of man.
In spite of this reticence, however, a significantfeatureof Albert's
thoughtcomes to light. It concernshis method of procedure. Happiness
is that in which the virtues culminate. As so many necessarysteps or
meansin the acquisitionofhappiness,theirtreatmentwould seem logical-
ly enough to precede the analysisof happiness.

IV CONCLUSION
At this point Albert's account of the genesis of natural moral virtue
terminates.The next question, Question V of TractatusI, rounds out
general moral considerationswith an enquiryinto the essence of virtue
in general. The preceding articles, beginningwith bonumin genereand
ending with the passages on choice and deliberation, are clearly an
attemptto render an intelligibleaccount of the origin of the humanly
acquired virtues. This undertakingis an innovation. The Augustinin
definitionof virtue which attributedall moral excellence to a divine
infusionmade such an enquiryseem superfluous.St. Albert, however,
distinguishesbetween the order of acquired perfectionsand those which
are divinelyinfused; and since the formeraccrue to man throughhis own
agency,an investigationinto theiroriginis in order.
In his account, Albert draws upon an establishedvocabulary; and
1III, 3,ad8,p. 209,il. 29-30;IV,i, 4, ad7,p. 234,11.86-89; 2,ad 2,p. 80.
2IV,i, 2,ad 16,p. 226.Prudence - ibid.,
parsfelicitatis"
is "essentialis ad 19,p. 226,I. 91.
118

11:56:07 AM
yet his concern for methodological rigor can be seen in his program
to interpretand to integratethese inherited distinctionsin terms of
principlesenunciatedin his preliminarymetaphysicsof the good. Thus,
bonumin genereis a firstinstance of goodness grounded in the natural
proportion between an act and its object. Viewed in this light, it
enjoys a certain unity,but it still remains in potency to furthercom-
pletion and actualizationthroughthe formaldeterminationsof circum-
stances. The resulting goodness is that of virtue which, as Albert
demonstratesin later sections of the De bono, manifestsitselfin various
modalities. In this way, bonumin genere , circumstancesand, of course,
virtue,are established as genuinethoughanalogicalvarietiesof goodness.
The enquiry,moreover, is causal, and in this way conformsto the
principle establishedearlier by Albert that any enquiry into goodness
must be framed in terms of the four Aristotelian causes. Elements
traditionallyincluded in moral treatises fall into this framework.
Bonumin genereand circumstancesemerge as the intrinsic causes of
virtue. Incomplete expressionsof this doctrine, to be sure, are found
in Philip the Chancellor, but the consecutive and unifiedelaboration
of this theory originateswith Albert himself. For the firsttime too,
room is made fora briefbut distinctivetreatmentof the rle of circum-
stances. A new treatiseis also devoted to the efficientcause of virtue.
Here the inspirationis quite evidentlyAristotelian,and Albert relies
heavilyupon the doctrineand vocabularyof the fragmentary versionsof
the Nichomachean Ethics.Th incompletionof the De bonorobs us of a
more thoroughtreatmentof the finalcause of virtue.
This whole section, indeed, exemplifiesthe naturalistand humanist
strainsin Albert's ethical theory. Critical of a univocally theocentric
conception of moral worth, Albert attempted to enlarge the area of
humanmoral efficacyby makingman the responsibleagent in the gener-
ation of his own naturalexcellences. Though a certainunresolvedgap is
noticeable in his conceptionof the physicalstructureof the humanact in
relationto its moral determinations,it is still true to say thatfor Albert
nature, throughits human potentialities,becomes a real and significant
cause of moral values.

of Windsor
University ,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada.

119

11:56:07 AM
 On The Genuine Text of Peter
of Spain's

Summule
logicales
L. M. DE RIJK

IV The LecturaTractatuum by Guillelmus Arnaldi, Master of Arts at

Toulouse (i 23-44). With a Note on the Date of Lambertof Auxerre's
Summule*

i - The Manuscripts
It has been Msgr. Grabmann'sgreat merit to have found an important
numberof commentarieson Peter of Spain's so-called Summule ,
logicales
partlydatingfromas earlyas the thirteenthcentury1 . Unfortunatelyhe
failedto finda similarwork, of a ratherearlydate indeed, whichhas been
handed down to us in no less than six manuscripts.Only two of them
give the correct name of the author. I found the most precious copy
of this work during my visit to the Biblioteca Provincialat Tarragona
(Spain) in October 19682. It is numberedCod. 27 and was described by
Jos Lpez de Toro in his catalogue*:
Cod. 27 (s.n.): GuillermoArnaldi:
Glosas
sobre
lostratados
dePedro Vit.$o hoj.
Hispano.
letr.franc,sincubiertas. XIV.

Presumably,the date is to be correctedintos. XIII, probablyabout 1280.

The codex consists of 2 folios. Arnaldi's commentaryis found on
ff. ir-ir. Folios iv and 2r contain a set of logical notes writtenby
a later hand thanthatwhich wrote the commentary.The firstnote runs
as follows:
Dicitactor debet
quoddialetica esseprior
omnibus Contra
scientiis. : iliascientia
debet
esse
prior
queprimoadicitur sed
(/); gramatica primoadicitur
; ergo eritprior.
gramatica
Arnaldi's commentaryhas the followingincipit:

* Thepreceding ofthisstudy
parts appearedinthisJournal
6 (1968),pp.1-34;69-101,and
7 (1969),PP-8-61.
1SeehisHandschriftliche andFunde
Forschungen zudenphilosophischen desPetrus
Schriften des
Hispanusy
spteren XXI(f 1277)in:Sitzungsberichte
Johannes
Papstes derPhilos.
-Hist. derBayer-
Abteilung
Akademie
ischen zuMnchen,
derWissenschaften 1936Heft
9 [137pp.].
2I want
toexpress mysincere
thankstoMrFernando Director
Conde, oftheBiblioteca
Provincial
whowaskind
atTarragona, enoughtogivemealltheinformation
andcooperation
I needed.
3Contribucin dela Biblioteca
al conocimiento Provincial
deTarragona
, Tarragona :
1936,pp.148-191
delosmanuscritos.
Relacin
I 20

11:56:15 AM
f. ira: SicutdicitPhilosophus
intertioDe Anima
, triplexestactusrationis
seuoperatio
intellectus,quodidemest.Primus actusestsimplices aprehendere,
quiditates ut quid
esthomo,quidestanimal. Secundusestcomponere illassimplices
quiditates
apreensas( !).
Tertius estdecurrerea magisnotisad minusnota1.
It ends as follows ($i rb) :
Nuncautemcontinuum estin potentia in infinitum
divisibile et estin potensia
(!) ad
actumpermixtum Et
potensie. ideoad purum actum et ideonon estfrustra
quamvisad
purumactumnonreducatur,sedsicutestinpotensia ad actumpermixtum potensie,ita
debetreduciad actumpermixtum potensie,scilicetquodadhuchabeas(!) potentiam
dividendi
ininfinitum.
XPSlaudetur operisquiafinis
habetur
iste
Explicit sit
liber, scritor
(!) crimine
liber.

Then the explicitis read:

Expliciuntglosulesupratractatus
magistiPetriYspanide ordinepredi
catorum(!).
quasglosulascomposuit
magister arnaldi
guillermus toloseinartibus.
regens //etdictek
glosulesuntbernardi oes(?), quasipsemet
demarroncules scripsit.
The same hand wrote two other colophons:

Hie liberestscriptus sitbenedictus

qui scripsit
Tresdigitiscribunt
necceteramembra quiescunt.
NonvideatChristumquidquis(!) furabitur
istum.
Tonifibroli
irodatur
(!) graciastocri.Amen.

A somewhatlater hand added the incomplete note :

glosulesupratractatus
Expliciunt petriyspanide ordinepredicatorum
magisti (!).
quasglosulas
compilavit
Anothercopy is foundin the same libraryunder nr. 23 (47). This codex
is anonymousand contains72 folios. It dates fromabout 1260. Only the
commentaryon the firstseven treatisesis given. (The text breaks off
in the discussion of the fallacysecundum petitionem
principii.) Afterthe
explicit(. . . in eo quod sit ydemptitasconstructions) a laterhand added :
Istalecturatractatuum estftatris Bernardide Muoncula(l) quam emita Jratre
bg vilardel octosolidis.So this codex apparentlybelonged to one frater
Bernardus,who bought it froma companion and afterwardsfortunately
made a complete copy himself,which has been preserved in cod. 27.
This copy was made from a manuscriptwhich belonged to a family
differentfromthat of all our other copies, as may appear fromthe fact
2Forthecomplete textoftheintroductory seebelow,
part, pp.130-134.
I 2I

11:56:15 AM
that MS Tarragonalj containsa divisiogeneralisof Peter's text which is
failingin all the other copies.1
Both manuscriptsoriginally formed part of the library of the
Cistercian monasterySantes Creus, near Tarragona. For that matter,
the codices 1-169 of the Biblioteca Provincial at Tarragona all come
fromSantes Creus and were writtenforthe greaterpart in the South of
France.2

A third copy is found in the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid under nr

1070. This fourteenthcenturymanuscripthas been described in the
printed catalogue3. Our work is here entitled (f.3r) : Questiones super
sumulaslogicalesPetri Yspani. It opens (f.3ra) with Ut vultphilosophus
in tertiode anima and ends (f. i i6rb) with the same words as Tarragona
27:... ita debetreduciad actumpermixtum , scilicetquod adhuc
potentie
habeat potentiamdividendiin infinitum . The next two lines have been
erased. The colophon runsas follows:
LAUSTIBISIT CHRISTEQUONIAMLIBEREXPLICITISTE
EST <DE IURE>CMAGISTI
GUILLERMI
THEOBALDI
CUI DEBET<QUI>cMAGISNOMENCLERICIQUIAZIBALDI.

It is ratherenigmatic,indeed. This much seems to be certain,that

Theobaldimaybe takenas a scribal errorforArnaldi.

A fourthcopy has been preserved as cod. 1077 in the libraryof the

Muse Calvet at Avignon.It seems to date fromabout the middle of the
thirteenthcentury and consists of 2 folios. The incipitand explicit
are the same as those of Tarragona27 (except for the opening word ut
). According to the catalogue* the original colophon
instead of sicut
was found: ista lecturaest composita
a magistroG. Arnaldi. These words
are now partlyerased and a nineteenthcenturyhand wrote: ista lectura
estcomposita G. On the top of f. 1r is read procommuni
a magistro biblioteca
Fratrum PredicatorumAvenionensium
.

I found a fifthcopy in the Vatican Library, Vat. Lat. 3022. This copy,
too, was written about the middle of the thirteenth century.
1Seebelow,p. 131f.
2SeeJ.Domnguez Bordona, dela Biblioteca
Manuscritos Pblica
deTarragona.
Extracto
deBoletn
AosLlII-LIV
Argueolgico Tarragona.
(19^3-^4).
3Inventario
general dela Biblioteca
demanuscritos Nacional
III,Madrid1957.
4 Catalogue
gnral desbibliothques
desmanuscrits deFrance
publiques , Dpartements
(Octavo
series),
XXVII(1894;byL.-H.Labande).
122

11:56:15 AM
On folio 2r of this codex a number of straynotes and scribal exercises
is found, while f.2v contains two astronomicaldrawings. A later hand
wrote between them in big capitals: VILANOVA. Unfortunately
misled by this name and the erasure in MS. Avignon 1077 and un-
acquainted with the Tarragona copy I supposed that this commentary
was of the hand of the famousphysicianArnaldof Vilanova1. However,
the copy foundin Tarragonaputs the authorshipof Guillelmus Arnaldi
beyondall doubt.

On f.2v the possessor's mark is found2: pertinetreverendomagistro

Jacoboegidij magistro sacripalacij. Jacobus Egidii (= Jaime Gil) was a
Spanish Black Friar. This fiftheenth centurytheologian was sub-lector
of the conventof Barcelona in 1426 and lector in 1434. He had obtained
his master's degree in theologyat Montpellier. In 1436 he was given a
chair of theologyat the Cathedralschool of Tortosa.3 As is known, this
codex belonged to the Ancientstock of the Vatican manuscriptsentered
into this librarybefore 1600. The Spanishoriginof its fifteenth century
possessor would make us thinkthat it came from the North of Spain,
but Jaime's stayin Montpellierseems to make its French originno less
possible. I thinkit most probable thatlike the Tarragonamanuscriptsit
was written in the South of France and brought into the Dominican
Conventof Barcelonaat a ratherearlydate.
The work is complete here and found on ff. 3ra-83va. The same
hand added the colophon: Hie liberestscriptus.qui scripsitsit benedictus.
Laus tibisit Christe
, quoniamliberexplicitiste. Aftersome eightblank lines
the same hand goes on with the firstpages of a treatiseoftheliberalarts
in the formof a divisioscientiarum. I give the openinglines:

<U>tvultPhilosophus inprincipio
suemetaphisice,omneshomines natura sciredeside-
Istapropositio
ranti. potestmultisrationibus
declarari.
Primosic.Omneimperfectum apptit Sedhomoinprimasuicreatione
perfici. estquid
imperfectum, et eius perfectio
est scientia.
Ergoomneshomines appetunt scientiam
Maiorpatetper Philosophum
naturaliter. PrimoPhisicorum, ubi dicitquod modus
apptitformam sicutturpepulcrum et muliervirum.Minorpatetper Philosophum
PrimoDe anima , quidicitquodanimainprimasuicreatione esttamquam tabularasain
qua nichildepictum autemscientiis
est,perficitur et virtutibus.

1SeeL. M.deRijk, OnTheGenuineText

ofPeter s Summule
ofSpain1 VIVARIUM
logicales, 6 (1968)
[pp.1-34],
p. 34.
2I owethisinformation to thekindness
ofProfessor
Anneliese
MaieroftheVatican
Library.
3SeeR.Creytens O.P.,Lescritsde GilO.P.in:Archivm
Jacques Fratrum 10(1940),
Praedicatorum
[pp.i8-168],
p. i^8.
123

11:56:15 AM
So seven rationesare given. The anonymousauthor begins the proper
work by invokingGod's assistance (83vb-84ra) :
Sedquiasecundum actorem De causis
in eiusnarratione omneslingue,
deficiunt ideode
eiuslaudibussupersedeo
quoadpresens, ipsumhumiliter ut
explorandoper sui bonitatem
ineffabilem in mediodirigat,
nostroassitprincipio, ad finemincepti(84)operis
me producat.
laudabiliter Divinoigiturimploratoauxilioad philosophie
congitionem
accedamus.
aliqualiter
There is a set of interestingdefinitionsofphilosophia(84) :
Diffiniturautemphilosophia (scientiaMS)quandoque <sub>nomine 'scientie'
subnomine 4 ' et 'metodi'quandoque
'artis
',
sapientie quandoque ,
'philosophie'quandoque ; quandoque
' doctrine* .
, quandoque 'discipline'
AbYsidorosicdiffinitur: philosophia esthumanarum divinarumque certacognitio cum
ordinevivendi coniuncta. Ab Ysaacsic diffinitur1:philosophia est assimilatiohominis
operibus creatoris et amorsapientie cumcognitione eiusdem.Vel magistraliter sic:
philosophia estarborarduissima, cuiusradixestamarssima, fructus veroeiusdulcissimus ;
et quiradieis amari tudinem abhorruerit, de fructusdulcedine nongustabit.
Subnomine'scientie' sic diffinitura Macrobio:scientia estnobilispossessio animi,per
quamnobisthesaurus sacrispenetralibus mentis ignascitur, affectus eternedilectionis
acquiritur, hocest:per quammensdiescitin tenebris, oculuscordisdeliciosus anime
<para)2disus, hecin celestem terrenum, in inmortalem mortalem, caducum hominem in
deumdeificemutationis actoritate convertit. Magistraliter sic diffinitur:scientiaest
nobilispossessioanime,que distributa per partessuscipitincrementum et avarum
dedignata MS) nisi
(designate possessorem puplicetur (!) citoelabitur.
Subnomine 'sapientie' sicdiffinitura Boetio; scientiaesteorumque veresuntsiveque
substantiam inpermutabilem sortiuntur certacomprehensio veritatis.
Subnomine 'artis'sicdiffinitur a Tullio:arsest(collectio)preceptorum ad unumfinem
tendentium. Sed magistraliter sic: ars est infinitatis finitum compendium, rationis
insignemiraculum, imperiosum natureconsilium, quamsi perconsideres minimam
inveniesquantitatem, si veroad subiecta(substantia MS) applicesmaximam invenies
potestatem.
Subnomine 'doctrine'sicdiffinitur: doctrina estquidamhabitus ab oredoctoris progre-
diensconsimilem habitm derelinquens in animo auditoris. Sed disciplina esthabitus
derelictusinanimoauditoris ex doctrinadoctoris.
Visisistisdicamusde methodo.lindemethodus est brevisvia errores devi<t)anset
tates
obliqui derelinquens.

Then follows an extensive divisiophilosophie

, which abruptlyends at
the end of f. 84vb.

The sixth copy of Guillelmus Arnaldi's commentaryon the Summule

has been preservedin cod. 999 of the Bibliothque de la Ville at Bor-
1Cp.,however, Isaac'sdefinition
quotedbyDominicus Dedivisione
Gundissalinus, philosophie
p. 6: philosophia
ed.Baur, hominis
estassimilado creatoris
operibus secundum
virtutem
humanitatis.
2 Hereis a littleholein theparchment.

124

11:56:15 AM
deaux1. This anonymouscopy is complete and occupies ff.ira-7va.
It has the explicit ita debetreduciad actumpotencie
, scilicetquod
adhuc habeas (!) potenciamdividendiinnitum(!) et terminatur lectura
tractatuum. The same hand added:
VIRGOFECUNDATALAUDETURET INTEMERATA
NAMMEAPRINCIPIA
IUVITCOMPLEREMARIA.

Anotherlater hand added :

Angelequi meusescustospietate metibiconcessum

superna ( ?)servatuereguberna
me
sittibicurameimichiprospere
cunctastia( ?)

There are two notes added by the respectiveowners:

isteliberestpetri( + rasura) qynatiinffronssadesio.
Isteliberestmeifratris Johannis traversi0quemrealiter
emia dominopetroJohannis
etad effitum
servientis ( !) S. pretiumsolvi. *

All these manuscriptswere writtenin the South of France and show the
characteristicsof the scriptoriaof thatregion.

2 - The author
No doubt, this LecturaTractatuum was writtenby a Guillelmus
, or Guiller-
mus, Arnaldiwho taughtthe liberal artsat Toulouse.2 As a matterof fact
I founda teacherof thatname in a numberof documentsconcerningthe
county of Toulouse. Magister Guillelmus (or Willelmus) Arnaldi is
mentionedas archidiaconus or Lantariior Lantarum
Lantarensis ( Lantawas a
parish at the East of Toulouse) and as a master of Toulouse during
i 238-44. In the Cartularium of RaymondVII, preservedin Paris,Archives
nationalesJ.J. i 9, he is mentionedseveral timesas a subscriber(I quote
fromthe copy Paris, B.N. Lat. 6009):

1238:MagisterW. Arnaldi
archidiaconus
Lantarensis,
(p. 344).
1242:MagisterW. Arnaldi
archidiaconus
Lantarii,
(p. 264).
1242:MagisterW. Arnaldi
archidiaconus
Lantarensis,
(p. 359).
i aprii1243:Magister
Guillelmus
Arnaldi
Archidiaconus (p. 216).
Lantarum,
1244:MagisterW. Arnaldi
archidiaconus (p. 211).
Lantarii,

The same documents are found in the Cartularium

of the Counts of

1Seethecatalogue
(Catalogue
gnral desbibliothques
desmanuscrits deFrance.
publiques Dpartments.
(Octavo XXIII(1894,byJ.Couderc).
series),
2Seeabove,
p. 121.
12S

11:56:15 AM
Toulouse, preserved in Aix-en-Provence,Bibliothque Mjanes, cod.
631 (671). Our entries are found on f. 44 v (1244); f. 3r (1242);
f. 63V (1238); f. 66r (1242).
That our authortaughtat the younguniversityof Toulouse appears
froma letter of a number of mastersof that universitywho informthe
Papal Legate Guy, bishop of Sora, that Count Raymond of Toulouse
had paid them their salariesin due time. Among the subscribersis our
Guillelmus:

(letterdatedFebruary4, 1239)... magisterSicardus,canonicus et

Narbonensis,
magisterG. Arnaldi,
archidiaconus de eademUniversi
Lantarensis, tatemagisti.1
Since we have good reasonsto assume thatthisletterconcernsa payment
of salaries in arrearsfor the years 1235-3j2 Arnaldi's mastershipcan be
dated back up to 1235.
So Guillelmus Arnaldi's stayat Toulouse is well evidenced for the
years 1235-44. From the latteryear onwards his name does not occur a
single time in the Toulouse documents^. The possibilityis not to be
excluded that our Guillelmus Arnaldi became bishop of Carcassonne
in 1248. As a matterof fact this bishop, named Guillelmus , had
Arnaldi
been archidiaconus , as appars fromthe comparisonof
ecclesiaeCarcassonae
two documentsfrom 1248, published in Gallia Christiana :
VI, Instrumenta
, col. 4^0 B: . . . Juravitprodomino inanimam
episcopo eiusGuillelmus
Radulfi archidiaconus majorecclesiaeCarcassonnae. Fideiusserunt proeo
nihilominus
Guillelmus Arnaldiarchidiaconus ejus et
ecclesiae R. sacrista
. . . Pro capitulovero
juravitidemGuillelmus Arnaldi archidicaconus etfidejussit
proeo dominus episcopusante
dictus.
VI, col. 8868: Ex archidicono, nonmajori,Guillelmo occurrit episcopus anno1248
menseaugusto, quo probavit cum Consilio excambium
capituli factum a senescalCar-
cassonae jussuLudovici regis. . .
However, it is not certainthatbishop GuillelmusArnaldi,who had been
archidiaconus beforeand is to be distinguishedfroma Guillelmus archidia-
conusmaior, was our Guillelmus Arnaldi who taughtthe liberal arts in
Toulouse and whose stayat Toulouse is evidenced forthe years 1235-44.
For that matterthe name Arnalduswas quite frequentin the South of
1See MarcelFournier, Lesstatuts desuniversits
etprivilges leur
depuis
franaises jusqu
fondation en
1789I (Universits
d'Orlans,
d'Angers,deToulouse),
p. 447.
2SeeHeinrich O.P.,DieEntstehung
Denifle derUniversitten bis14OO.
desMittelalters Berlin1885"
Graz1956),
(reprint pp.232-233.
2I haveinvestigated
allthedocuments concerningthirteenth
century which
Toulouse havebeen
preservedin Paris,ToulouseandAix-en-Provence.Foran enumerationofthesedocuments,
seeHenriStein, descartulaires
gnrale
Bibliographie franais Vhistoire
ourelatifs deFrance
(Manuelsde
IV),Paris1907,pp.^28-^32.
historique
bibliographie
126

11:56:15 AM
France (and the North of Spain), indeed, and so was that of Guillelmus
Arnaldi. Thus in the second document mentioned above a Guillelmus
ArnaldiGuitand a GuillelmusArnaldiMilossaare found among the sub-
scribers. If your Guillelmus Arnaldi is to be identifiedwith the bishop
of Carcassonne (August 1248 - September 4th, i2)1 we know the
exact date of his death2.

3 - Other logical works by Guillelmus Arnaldi

Anothermanuscriptof the Muse Calvet, cod. 1089, datingfromthe end
of the thirteenthcentury,contains commentarieson the works of the
logica vetus.At the end of the Perihermeneiascommentarythe explicit
is found (f. 49 ra) : Explicitscriptumsuperlogicm(!) veterem edituma
magistro G Ar. No doubt, GAr. standsfor Guillelmo Arnaldi. As a matter
of fact there followsa commentaryon De sexprincipiisof ps.-Gilbertde
de la Porre (ff. ora-6vb) with the explicit : Explicitscriptum *
magisti
Vitalissuperlogicamveterem , where Vitalishas been writtenin rasuraand
originallywas followed by the letters Ar. The commentaryon De sex
principiisseems to belong to the corpuscopied before.
This scriptum superlogicamveterem opens with a commentaryon
Porphyry'sIsagoge, introduced by a divisioscientiarum(ira-iorb):
Ira: SicutdicitPhilosophusin tertioDe Anima noster
intellectus estquolibet
privatus
(quodlibet MS)intelligibili MS)inactu,sedestinpotentia
(intelligibile adintelli-
passiva
gendum quodlibet Et hocpotestsic declarari.
intelligibile. Namintellectusnosterper
differentiamse habetad quodlibet et neutrum
intelligibile sibideterminat;quiaqua
rationesibiunumdeterminaret,eademratione etreliquum,scilicet
omniaalia.Quodest
impossibile.
iorb:Aliimultis modisexponunt, sedita (inMS)planius est.Inhocenimterminatur
sententialectionis
etperconsequens tertiusliber.LaudeturDeus.Incipit
liberPredica-
mentorum.
The second part is a commentaryon Aristotle'sCategories
(iorb-2vb).
It has the followingincipit:
iorb:Equivoca Isteliberdividitur
dicuntur. in trespartes,scilicetin Antepredicamenta
et
Predicamentaet Postpredicamenta Tertia:Dicitur
. Secundaibi: Singulum. autem.Primain
tres,quiain Predicamentissunttria.Estenimibi moduspredicandi, ordo.
substantia,
Etsecundum hochabettrespartes. . .
2vb.... Adaliudpatetsolutio.In hocenimterminatur sententia huiuslibri.Deus
laudetur.IncipitliberPeriermenias.
1Forthisbishop,seeGallia
Christiana
VI,860-1028;
Appendix,411-475.
2Thereisalsoa Guillelmus
ArnaldiO.P.,whowasaninquisitor
anddiedMay29,1242atAvignonet
(HauteGaronne).SeeUlysse
Chevalier, dessources
Rpertoire dumoyen
historiques ge.Bio-bibliographie
NewYorki960)I, col.1929.
(reprint
127

11:56:15 AM
The thirdpart containsa commentaryon ?erihermeneias(2vb-49ra):
2rb:Primum oportet Primum
constituere. oportetconsti
tuereetc. Secundum quod]vult
Philosophus estoperatio
tertioDe anima,triplex Unaestsimplicium
intellectus. quidi-
tatumapprehensio, secundaapprehensarum Tertiaest discursus
compositio. ad con-
clusionem. De his que pertine<n)tad primam operationem,scilicetde simplicibus
quiditatibus, determinaturLibro De hisautemqueadsecundam,
Predicamentorum. deter-
minate* libroisto.De hisautemquead tertiam,pertotamlogicam novam.Etsicpatet
quodisteliberinmediate debetordinaripostLibrumPredicamentorum.
Ideocontinuatur
sic. (49ra).

Next nine lines are foundof a text which opens as follows (49 ra):

Secundum tertioDe animaobiectum

Philosophum intellectus
est(See below,p. 128).

Folio 49 rb is blank and f. 49 v containsonly the wordsformaestcompo-

situm etc. and two drawings. On f. ora the same hand that wrote the
foregoingtreatises, goes on with a commentaryon De sex principiis
(^ora-6^vb) :
ora: Forma etc.Secundum
estcompositioni Philosophum Primo
Posteriorum
etetiaminprinci-
scirearbitramur
pioPhisicorum unumquodque cumeiuscausascognoscimus. Causeautem,
ut vultibidemPhilosophus, suntquatuor,scilicetefficiens
et finalis
et materialis
et
Huiusautemlibricausaefficiens
formalis. Quidam
ignoratur. dicuntquod fuit
Aristotiles
utvideturin modoprocedendi. AliiautemdicuntquidfuitAlpharabius,commentator
Aliidicunt
LibriDecausis. quodGuilabertusPorretanus.Sedde causanonestmagnavis,
namquecumque nonminus
scientia
( !) fecerit, valet(usqueMS)1.

The greater part of these texts are also found in another manuscript
of the Muse Calvet at Avignon, cod. 1078. It dates from about the
same time as cod. 1089 and the copy is anonymous:
j ra.^ra; theIsagoge
commentary, without thegeneral prologuewhich isfound inAvignon
1089,ff.Ira-2rl).
7ra.!8rb;thecommentary ontheCategories
i8va-36va: thecommentary onthePerihermeneias.
36va-37^13 ; Secundum Philosophum tertioDe anima obiectum intellectusestuniversale.
Sedprobatur quodintellectus
possitintelligeresingulare.Namcumintellectus iudicat
differentiam interaliquo duo, utrumque illorumintelligit. Cum igiturintellectus
iudicetdifferentiam interuniversaleet particulare,oportet quodutrumque intelligat.
Namipseintellectus iudicat interuniversale et particulare
et singulare. Quarein-
telligit
singulare.
1Another Mediaeval about
opinion theauthor oftheLiberdesexprincipiis
, isfoundinCod.313 of
f. 13o1".
ofInnsbruck,
theUniversittsbibliothek SeeM. Grabmann, Mittelalterliches III
Geistesleben
(Mnchen 19^6),pp.83-84.Fora plausible ofGilbert
explanation ofPoitiersas thesupposed
author, intheintroduction
seeL. Minio-Paluello tohiseditionofthework in:Aristoteles
Latinus
uLiber
vocatum sexprincipiorum"
I, 7: Anonymi vulgo
Fragmentm pp.XLIII-LV.
, Praefatio,
128

11:56:15 AM
 in tertioDe anima.Htdicitquoduniversale
AdhocsolvitPhilosophus et
potestintelligi
sed
singulare, differenti
modo. Nam ut
universale per quamdam lineamrectam, sed
utperlineamreflexam1
singulare ...
This text ends as follows (3 7 rt)):
Ultimonotaquodgeneratio nonestmotus
proprie sedmutatio . . . Sicgeneratio
nonest
motussedmutatio. Et hicterminan istiuslibri.Incipit(erased
turquestiones ) libersex
( These
principiorum. wordsina different liberPeryarmenias.
hand).Explicit Incipitliber
SexPrincipiorum( these
wordsin the
same hand wrote
that thetexts).
thecommentary
37va-49vb: on Desexprincipiis.

In the collective manuscriptRipoll, Santa Maria 109 in the Archivo

General de la Corona de Aragn in Barcelona a commentaryon the
PriorAnalyticsis foundon ff. i8ir-2 28v2. It opens as follows:
18ira Secundum in SecundoMetaphysice
quodvultPhilosophus absurdum estsimul
quererescientiamet modumsciendi.Nam in acquisi tioneseiendequod modus
sciendiprcdt.Omnesenimscientie
modosciendiutuntur. Et ideooportuitquod
essetdemodosciendi communis
aliqua Et
scientia. illacommunisscientia logical*
dicitur

The work is complete and ends on f. 228vb:

sententia
Etinhocterminetur lectionis
etperconsequens totius
expositio libripriorm
AveMariagratia
Aristotitilis. plenadominus
tecum,benedictus. glosetotius
Expliciunt
Aristotilis
libripriorm secundum GmA1.

At the top of the firstpage (f. 18 1r) a somewhat later hand wrote:
glosetotiuslibri priormG Ai Garcia read GuillelmiAlberti. Grabmann
rejected this readingand attributed*the work to Guillelmus de Sancto
Amore, to whom the next work (a commentaryon the Posterior Analytics)
is ascribed*. However, G. A1 cannot possibly stand for G. de Sancto
Amore.Therefore I propose to read GuillelmiArnaldi. It should be
noticed that a similar abbreviation ( G.Ar.) is used in the manuscript
Avignon1089.

1Incod.1089,f.49rathetextbreaks off
here.
2Seethecatalogue made byZacharias Patrm
inBibliotheca
Garcia Latinorum II i, pp.
Hispaniensis
9-60, in: Sitzungsberichte
derkaiserlichen
AkademiederWissenschafteninWien,Phil. -Hist.
Klasse169,2(191^).Thispartofthemanuscript dates
from aboutthemiddleofthethirteenth
century.
*Fortherestoftheincipit, seeM. Grabmann,Mittelalterliche
lateinische und
Aristotelesbersetzungen
in Handschriften
Aristoteleskommentare Bibliotheken
spanischer , in: Sitzungsberichte
derBayerischen
Akademie derWissenschaften,
Philos. undHist.Klasse
-Philol. 1928,s (Mnchen1928)p. 6.
opcit.,pp.ss-63.
5Thiscommentary isattributed
byourmanuscripttoWilliam ofSaint
Amour onlybya later ad-
scriptionatthetopoff.229r,whiletheattribution
ofthepreceding work toG.Ai, atthetop
added
off. 228r,isbasedontheexplicit
ofthework Itseems
itself. tobequitepossible
thatthecommen-
taryonthePosterior tomaster
, too,belongs
Analytics G.A*(= Guillelmus Arnaldi).
129

11:56:15 AM
 Thus we possess also a commentaryon the PriorAnalytics(and
possibly one on the PosteriorAnalytics
, too,1) from the hand of our
masterGuillelmusArnaldi.

4 - Analysisof the Lecturatractatuum

The MS Taragonaij (see above, p. 120 f.) seemsto be our bestmanuscript.
To be sure it has a number of omissions, due to haplology,but is free
frominterpolations2.I give the text of the firstlectioafterthis codex:
jra-vb;SicutdicitPhilosophus in tertioDe anima , triplexest actusrationis seu
operatio quodidemest.Primus
intellectus, actusestsimplices quiditatesapprehendere,
ut quidesthomo,quidestanimal.Secundum estcomponere illassimplices quiditates
apprehensas. Tertius est decurrere a magis notisad minus nota. Adprimum ordinatur
Liber Predicamentorum ; ad secundum LiberPeryarmenias ; ad tertiam totalogica
nova.Etsictotalogicaestcircailiumtriplicem actumrationis.
SedquiaPhilosophus in dictislibrisillamsubdifficultatetradiditet obscure, isteactor
magister petrushispanusut iuvenibus esset
facilior aditus,quasiomnia quePhilosophus in
dictislibrispermodum artistradidit, permodum doctrine inbrevi etutilisummulacom-
pilavi. Etsicpatetcausaefficiens huiuslibriquiafuitmagister P. Hispanus*, quiasimi-
literpluresaliifecerunt troctatus.
Causamaterialis intotalogicaestsillogismus velmodussciendi.
Causaformalis sicutinaliislibrisestduplex, scilicetforma tractatus et forma tractandi.
Formatractatus estdivisio libripercapitula etcapitulorum perpartes diminutas.Forma
tractandiidemestquodmodusagendi.Qui estquintuplex, scilicetdiffinitivus,
divisivus,
probativus, inprobativuset exemplorum Et isteultimus
positivus. nonestnecessarius
propter scientiam,sed solum propter addiscentes.
1Seethepreceding note.I found ina thirteenth century Munich manuscript (C.L.M . 14.412) a
Scriptum Arnoldi superquatuorlibrosveteris (seetheexplicity
artis f. 36ra). It contains (ira-9ra) a
gloss commentary ontheIsagoge : Sicut
(Inc. dicit inTertio
Aritstotiles De anima intellectus noster
possibilisestsicut tabularasainquanichil estdepictum, possibilisautem depingi). InCateg. (9ra-
22ra;Inc.:Intellectus nosterad cognitionem incognitidevenit tribus operationibus. Prima est
entium simplicium simpliciter apprehensorum unumordinare ad alterum. Secunda estunum
componere cumaltero. Tertia estsecundum discursum rationis
exunoinferre alterum.) InDesex
princ. (22rb-rb); a fragmentonly, which wasadded byanother hand.(Inc.:Forma estcompositioni.
Inprincipio huius libritriadicenda sunt.Primum estquidestilludquodlogica inquirit. Secundum
estquomodo illudquoddocetur perlogicam, dividatur.Tertium estquomodo logica ipsadividatur
secundum quodcomparatur ad reslogica).Finally, a commentary onPerihermeneias (23ra-36ra)
Inc.: Quiautdictum estcircaprincipium libriPredicamentorum auctoritate Aristotilis insecundo
De anima, triplex estoperatio unaqueestindivisibilium
intellectus, intelligentia quaintellectus
apprehendit uniuscuiusque reiessentiam in seipsa,aliaperquamcomponit et dividit Simplicia
apprehensa, et tertiasecundum quamdiscurrit ab aliquo,utabaliquibus notis adcognitionem
ignotorum. - Thesamehandgives(ff.37ra-48rb) another commentary onDesexprinc. , which
opens asfollows: Sicutdicitexpositor super maius volumen iuniores
Priscianir . . . veterum sunt
sicut nanicoorti superhumeros gigantm. Forthistopos, seeEdouard Jeauneau: "Nani gigantm
humeris Essai
insidentes". deBernard
d'interprtation in:VIVARIUM
deChartres g (1967),pp.79-99.
2TheMSAvignon 1077,too,isquite reliable,butitisdamaged bydamp stains.
3 A contemporary hadadded:deordine fratrum .
predicatorum
130

11:56:15 AM
 Causafinalis
estduplex,scilicetfinis
intraet finis
extra.Finisintraestcognitio
eorum
que traduntur in hoc libro. Finisextraest triplex,scilicetpropinquus remotus
et ultimus;propinquus:cognitiologices; remotus:cognitiototiusphilosophie;
ultimus
: beatitudo
anime,ad quamomnesfinaliter scientie
reducuntur.
us?Incipiunt
Quistitul tractatus
magistip. hispani.
Cuipartiphilosophie
supponatur patet,quiarationali.
His visisaccedendum est ad formam tractatus. Isteautemliber<non)cdividitur in
proemium et tractatum. Nonenimenarraiin generali illa que posteadicturus estin
speciali.Seddividitur primasuidivisione inpartes duas.Namprimodiffinit dialeticam.
Secundo ponit ordinem respectu dicendorum. Secunda ibi : Sed quiadisputatio.Prima in
tres.Namprimodiffinit dialeticam, secundoex iliadiffinitione concludit corrolarium,
tertioponitethimologiam vocabuli.Secunda ibi: Etideo.Tertia:Dicitur autem dyaletica.
Hec estdivisiolectionis in speciali.Sed in generali potest dividi in septemcapitula.
Primm vocatur Deintroductionibus , secundum Depredicabilibus , tertium Depredicamentis,
quartumDe sillogismis , quintumDe locis , sextumDe fallaciis , septimumDe
et ampliationibus.
restrictionibus Secundaparsincipitibi: Predicabile. Tertia:Ad
*
cognoscendumpredicameli Quarta ta. : Propositio est oratio. Quinta : Ratio
multipliciterdicitur.Sexta: Eorumque dicuntur.Septima:Dispositio. Hec
sitdivisio.
Adprimam partem sicprocedit diffiniensdialeticam. Sednotaquoddifferunt dialetica
et logica.Namdyaletica ex probabilibus et ex communibus habetarguere in qualibet
scientiavel in facltate. Et ideo dicitPhilosophus in QuartoMethaphysice quod
circaidemlaborant dyaleticus et methafisicus et sophista, quiacircaens.lindeensest
subiectum dialetice.Etitadyaletica determinatur a Philosopho inlibroTopicorum. Sed
logicadicitur inquantum traditcognitionem sillogismi; et esttradita a Philosopho in
omnibuslibrislogicalibus.Est enimcommunis ad dyaleticum et demonstrativum
sillogismum.
Diffinitergodyaleticam dicens : dyaleticaestarsartium, idestdenumero septem artium.
Vel: arsartium perexcellentiam, quia est nobilior aliiscumsitde acturationis quiest
nobilioraliis, dyaletica, inquam, habens viam ad principia omnium methodorum,
irt)idestomnium | scientiarum specialium. Methodus enimunomodobrevis via,aliomodo
brevisscientia.
Et ideo. Hic concludit corrolarium. Quia verumest quod dyaletica habetviamad
principia omnium scientiarum et alie scientieerunttamquam terminus, ideocumvia
sitpriortermino vieetlogicasitviaetaliescientie tamquam terminus vieinacquisitione
aliarum, sequitur quoddyaletica debetesseprioromnibus aliis.
Dicitur autem dyaletica. Hic ponitetimologiam dicensquod dyaletica dicitura
'dya' quodestduoet logos , quodestsermo , vellexisratio;quasiduorum sermo velratio
,
scilicetopponentis et respondentis in disputatione. Et estintelligendum : duorum vel
secundum remvelsecundum rationem. Namidempotestesseopponens et respondens
sibiipsi.Etsictunenonsuntduorealiter sedsoluminmodo.
Notaquodistanomina, scilicet'scientia', 'sapientia''philosophia* , 'facultas
' differunt
ab hiis: 'ars','methodus*, 'doctrina' . Namprimaquatuor
'disciplina' nominant habitm
absolute anime, aliaveronominant illumhabitm incomparai ionead opus.Primaetiam
quatuorinvicem differunt. Namsapientia additsaporem suprascientiam, philosophia
amorem, facultas facilitatem (facultatem MS). Similiter alia quatuordifferunt. Nam
doctrina dicitur arsproutestindoctore, disciplina proutestindiscipulis, et methodus

11:56:15 AM
rationebrevitatis. Commentator enimsupraibrumPosteriorum1 ponitdifferentiam
intermethodum etfacultatem. Etdicitquodmethodus appropriatur quadruvio, facultas
verotrivio.Quadruvium faciunt isteartes:arismetica, musica, geometria etastronomia.
Trivium vero:gramatica, logica,retorica.
Queritur quia dicit actor quoddialetica estarsartium, <utrum)c dialeticasitarsvel
scientia etiamscientiarum. Et videtur quodnonomnisarstenditad unumfinem, ut
dicitTullius:arsestcollectiomultorum preceptorum ad unumfinem tendentium. Sed
dyaletica nontendit adunumfinem, immoadtres,scilicet adexercitationes, obviationes
etphilosophie disciplinas,utdicitPhilosophus tertioTopicorum. Ergodyaletica nonest
ars.
Preterea. De contingentibus inquantum contingentia nonest scientia.Sed probabilia
sunthuiusmodi. De quibusestdyaletica. Ergo non est scientia. MaiorpatetperBoetium
inprimoArismetice, quidicitquodscientia esteorum queveresuntsivequesubstantiam
inpermutabilem sortiuntur certacomprehensio veritatis.Minorpatetquodprobabile sit
Nam
contingens. probabile dicitur sub formidine (?) ad suum oppositum quiapotest
esseetnonessesicutcontingentia.
Preterea. Nullascientia estex falsis.Seddyaletica procedit aliquando ex falsis.Ergonon
est scientia.MaiorpatetperAristotilem libroPosteriorum, qui vult quod falsum non
s<c)itur,quianonest.Minor patetsimiliterperipsumOctavoTopicorum, quidicitquod
nichilprohibet quedamfalsaesseprobabiliora quibusdam veris.Etsicdyaletica eritex
falsis,cum falsa esse
possint probabilia.
Oppositum patetperPhilosophum etperrationem. De omnieo estscientia quodhabet
subiectum et parteset proprietates considerandas de subiecto.Seddyaletica esthuius-
modi.Habetenimsubiectum sillogismum et similiter habetproprietates etpartes tam
materiales quam formales. Ergo estscientia.
Preterea.De omnieo est scientiacircaquod contingit recteagereet errare.Sed
dyaletica esthuiusmodi, utde se patet.Ergoestscientia.
Ad hoc dicendum quodistaquestiopotestesseduplexet queritutrumdyaletica sit
scientia.Nampotestquerere(utrumid quod docetcausaset principia sillogismi
dyaletici,sitscientia velfaciat scientiam. Velpotestquerere)2 utrum habitusgenera tus
persillogismum dyaleticum sit scientia.Si autem queratur ad
quantum primum, dico
quod estscientiadyaletica et est etiamnecessaria namdocetcognitionem sillogismi
dialeticiper principia infallibilia.Namacceptisduabuspropositionibus probabilibus
debitomododispositis in figura et in modoinfallibiliter habetur sillogismus dialeticus.
Si autemloquamur quantum ad secundum, scilicetquantum ad habitm generatum per
sillogismum, dicoquodnonestscientia quiapotest esseconclusio sillogismidialeticifalsa,
utpatethie:
'omnis mater diligit
Medea estmater
ergoMedea .
diligit'
Nonenimestfides deconclusione sedsolumopiniopropter probabilitatem premissarum.
Hocestquodsoletdiciquodestdyaletica docensetillaestscientia ; etestdialetica utens
et illanonestscientia. Ethocidemestsicutprimomodo.
Adargumenta dicendum. Adprimum cumdicit:omnisars.tendit ad unumfinem, dico
quod verum est ad)
(quantum principlem. Sed minus principales esse
possunt plures.
1Allother have:
manuscripts quidamSed commentator librum
supra Elenchorum.
2Supplied from theother manuscripts.
132

11:56:15 AM
 lindedyaletica primomododietahabetunumfinem principlem, scilicetcognitionem
sillogismi dyaleticiproutestutensopinionem ; illeautem, scilicetexercitatio etobviatio
ysuntminus
etc. principales.
iva Ad aliud. Quandotu dicis: ex contingentibus inquantum contingentia | non est
scientia; sedprobabilia suntcontingentia, - dicendum quodlicetprobabilia in se et
absolutesintcontingentia, tarnen ad sillogismum dyaleticum sunt naturalia;quiahis
positisnecessario ponitur dyaleticus sillogismus.
Adaliud.Cumdieimus : nullascientia estexfalsis, certeintelligitur : perfalsaprincipia.
Sedtarnen habitus bene
ageneratus potest esse falsus. Ut patet.Cognitio enimsophistice
scientietraditur in libroElencorum per principia infallibilia. Nam positoprincipio
motivodefectus equivocationis ponitur equivocado.Et his duobuscognitis cognosci-
turnaturaequivocationis. Abitus ageneratus persillogismum equivocationis esterror.
Similiter est de dyaletico sillogismo quod habitusageneratus per ipsumpotestesse
falsus,tamen cognitio sillogismidyaletici semper necessaria et infallibilis.
Dicitactorquoddyaletica estarsartium.Videtur hie maledicere.DicitAristotiles
TertioTopicorum : quodpersuperhabundantiam dicitur, unisoliconvenit. Sedgramatica
estarsartium, ut dicitAugustinus : qua clausaomnesclauduntur et qua apertaomnes
aperiuntur. Nonergologicaestarsartium.
Dicendum quodgramatica potestdiciarsartium perexcellentiam et etiamdyaletica, >
tamendiversis respectibus. Quia sicut vides de
quod quolibet confessore cantatur:
nonestinventus similisilli",quiaquilibetexcellebat aliosin aliquaprerogativa seu
proprietate quam habebat itaquod non alii,- similiter quelibet scientia excedit alias
in aliquaproprietate quamhabetitaquodnonalie. Ut logicaexceditaliasquiaestde
acturationis, quiestnobilior aliis;etgramatica quantum ad modum construendi; etsic
dealiis.Etsicpatetquomodo dyaletica estarsartium.
Adargumentum patetsolutio.Cumdicitur:"quodpersuperhabundantiam dicitur, uni
soliconvenit", dicoquodverum estineademproprietate, sedindiversis proprietatibus
potest convenire pluribus, sicuttuvidesquodpulchritudo etfortitudo possunt convenire
unisecundum diversas proprietates. Idem enim potest esse pulcerrimus fortissimus.
Similiter unascientia potestaliamexcedere quantum adunamproprietatem etaliaipsam
quantum adaliamproprietatem.
Dicit actorquoddyaletica habetviamad principia omnium methodorum, idestscienti-
arum.Contra. Ipsa estmethodus. Ergoipsa habet viam ad se. Quod falsum est.
Ad hoc solvitur unomodoquodhic est distributio accommoda, ita quodestsensus
quodhabetviamad principia aliarum scientiarum omnium a se; sicuthic: ' Deuscreavit
omnia1yidestomnia a se.Sedhecsolutiononvalet,quianullaestdistributio accommoda.
Namqui omne dicitnichilexcludit, namdicide omniestquandonichilestsumere sub
'
subiectode quo nondicaturpredicatus. Undede virtute locutionis sequitur:Deus
creavitomnia; ergocreavitseipsum1. Etpropter hocsolvitur aliter,secundum quodprimo
dicebatur.
Differentia estintermethodum et facultatem, quiamethodus appropriatur quadruvio,
facultasverotrivio.Etideointelligit : dyaletica habetviamadprincipia omnium metho-
dorum,idestscientiarum specialium, idestquadruvialium. Sed dyaletica nonestqua-
druvialis, sedcommunis; ideononvaletobiectio.
Dicitactorquod in acquisitione scientiarum dyaletica debetesseprior.Contra.Prius
addiscimus gramaticam quamlogicam. Ergogramatica debetesseprior.
Adhoc solvitur multismodis.(Quidamsolvunt quod 'prius'diciturduobusmodis)1,
1Supplied from theother manuscripts.
US

11:56:15 AM
i vb scilicet
viaoriginisetvianobilita
| tis.Etdicunt quodgramatica diciturpriorviaoriginis,
sed logicaestpriorvianobilitatis. Tarnen istasolutionichilvalet,quiavisum estquod
uno modovia nobilitatis gramatica est prior,scilicetin aliquaproprietate. Propter
quodsolvitur ita.Quiainmediatedixerat quod(dyaletica habetviamadprincipia omnium
methodorum, idestscientiarum specialium, ideo concluditquod)1 in acquisitione
scientiarum,dyaleticadebetessepriorscilicetspecialium. Gramatica enimnonestde
illisspecialibus,sedestcommunis. Quarenonvalet.
Alitertarnensolvitursic.Duplexestgramatica, scilicetteorica
etpositiva,lindegrama-
tica positivabene priusaddiscitur quamlogica. Tamentheorica, que consistit in
principiis gramatice, idestin modissignificando illa nonpotestperfecte s(c)irisine
logica.Et sic in acquisitione
scientiarum dyaleticadebetesseprior.Et cumtu obicis
quodprius addiscitur verum
gramatica, estpositivam, nontamentheoricam.

The divisioin generaliof the whole work as it is givenin thismanuscript,

is not foundin the other manuscripts.Unlike the other commentators,
e.g. Robert Anglicus2, Guillelmus Arnaldi seems to divide Peter of
Spaing tractatusinto seven capitula(f. i ra) :

I De introductionibus
II Depredicabilibus
III Depredicamentis
IV De sillo
gismis
V De locis
VI Defallaciis
VII De restrictionibus
etampliationibus.

However, when givingthe incipitsof these chapters,our authormentions

for the sixth chapter the opening words of our tract on supposition
(eorum que dicuntur, see ed. Bocheski, nr. 6.01). The opening
word of the seventh chapter as given by our author ( Dispositio ) must
probably be read as ,
Disputatio the opening word of the so-called
Fallaciae maiores. I give the chaptersas theyare discussedin MS Tarragona1 .
I De introductionibus : ira.3ra
II Depredicabilibus : 3ra3-6va
III De predicamentis : 6va4-i3va
IV De sillogismis : I3va-i6va
V De locis : 16.21vas
VI De suppositionibus : 2iva6-2ra
VII Defallaciis : 2ra7-43rb
etcetera
VIII De relatione (!) : 43rb8-end.
1Suppliedfromtheother manuscripts.
2Seethepreceding article(quoted below,p. 136n. 1),p. 14(where istobereadinstead
twelve
ofthirteen).
3Hieincipit depredicabilibus. 6Hicincipit
capitulum desuppositionibus.
capitulum
4 Hieincipit de
capitulum predicamentis. 7Hicincipit defallaciis.
5Istasufficiunt
decapitulo. 8Hicincipit etcetera(l).
derelatione

I34

11:56:15 AM
On f. 45 rb the discussionof the relativaaccidentiumends with the phrase:
hecestsententialectionis.On the next line is read :

actordeterminavit
Personalissubpostioetc. Superius de subposi relationi-
tionibus,
bus,quesuntdueproprietates
terminorum.Hiedeterminat dealiisproprietatibus,
utde
restrictionibus Et quia restrictio
et ampliationibus. et ampliatio habentesse circa
personalemsubpositionem, diffinitionem
incidentaliter personalissubpositionis
repetit
quamsuperius uthabeat
posuerat, sicde quointendit.

In factthissection (45rb-45vb) deals with ampliatio.Then a freshstartis

made :

Ampliatio(to be correctedintoAppellano
) est etc.S<uperius>
a<ctor> d(eterminavit)
de ampliatione.
Hie prosequitur
de appellatone et restrictione.
Et sic suntduepartes
in lectione.Secunda:Restrictio.
principales

So the firstpart of this lectio (45^-46 ra) discusses our tractatusXI,

the second part (46ra-rb) our nrs ii.oi-n .03. The nextlectio (46rb-va
deals withour nrs11.04-1 1. 10. Next followa lectioon our nrs 11. 11-11. 17
(46va-47ra) and a lectioon our nrs 11. 18-11.23 (47ra~rb)- The ^ast
lectionesdiscuss distributio: 47rb-48ra (our nrs 12.01-1 2.08) ; 48ra-va
(our nrs 12.09-1 2. 19); 48va-49ra (our nrs 12.20-12.25); 49fa-va
(our nrs 12.26-12.33); 49va-vb (our nrs 12.34-12.40); 49vb_^0rb
(our nrs 12.41- 12.50) ; 5orb-vb (our nrs 12.51- 12.54), and finally
ovb-irb (our nrs 12.55-12.58).
It is noticeable, indeed, that from 43 rb onwards our manuscript
no longeradds such titlesas : hie incipitcapitulumde . . . This should be
seen in connection with the fact that the last addition of this kind was
(43 rb): hie incipitde relationeet cetera(!)
As is easily seen, this general division of the Summulewould yield
eight chapters,not seven, as has been announced in the prologue. For
that matter this part of the prologue, which is not foundin any of our
other manuscripts,is also remarkablein that it calls the sixth chapter
De Jallaciis but gives as its incipitthe phrase Eorumque dicuntur , being
the opening words of the tract on supposition, which is, in fact, the
sixth chapter in all good manuscriptsof the Summulelogicales. The
solutionof thisproblem seems to be thatour author considersthe tract
on suppositionas a kind of preliminarypart of De fallaciis, as appears
from the opening sentence of the chapter on supposition, as given in
MS Tarragona27 (f. 2iva-vb):

Eorumque dicunturetc. Superius Hieprose-

actorde locisdyaleticis.
determinavit

ji S

11:56:15 AM
quitur Setquiasuppositio
desophisticis. valetad cognitionem quarumdam ut
fallaciarum,
fallacie ideoactorantequam
accidentis, determinet de locisso (2ivb)phisticis,
idestde
determinai
fallaciis, primode subpositionibus,
licetinferius,
ubiderelationeetamplia-
moneet aliisproprietatibusterminorumdeterminat, deberetdeterminare,cumsub-
positiositsimiliter terminorum.
quedamproprietas

Thus we have a good explanationforthe factthatArnaldicalls Defallaciis

the sixth chapter and gives, at the same time, the phrase eorum que
dicuntur as its incipit .
Besides, in the enumerationof the incipitsthose of the chapters
De relativi s, De ampliationibus , De appellationibus , De resti ictionibus,
and De distributionibus are failing,while the incipitof the seventhand last
chapter mentioned by Arnaldi ( Dispositiofor: Disputatici)is that of the
tracton fallacies(Inc. disputatio est actus sillogisticus).
It seems to me thatthe generaldivisionof the Summule logicalesas it
is given in MS Tarragona27, f. 1r, can onlypartiallybe explained in this
way. To be sure, in Arnaldi's divisionof the Summule our chaptersVIII-
XII (ed. Bocheski,nrs. 8.01-12.^8), which deal with the propertiesof
term other than supposition,are no more than appendixes to the tract
on supposition.Besides, the textof thisdivisiogeneralisis stillinconsistent
in that it mentions De fallaciis as the sixth chapter firstand gives the
word Disputatioas the opening word of the seventhchapterdiscussing
the propertiesof termother thansuppositionafterwards.
Therefore I am inclined to consider the text of this part of the
prologue as it has been handed down in MS Taragona27, to be corrupt.
The corruption might have started by the copyiss misreadingof VII
insteadof XII. If so, the misreadingmusthave been followed by a heavy
reshuffling of the tracts.This much is certainthatwe have no reason to
doubt the correctnessof the usual division of Peter's Summule logicales
into twelve chapters1.
On account of the interpolationCaliditas. . . etc. which occurs in
nearlyall our manuscriptsof the Summule logicales(nr. 3.3 2)2, it should
be noticed that it is found as early as in Arnaldi's commentaryon the
Summule . I give his gloss on the passage (nr. 3.32 ed. Bocheski) after
MS Taragonalj (f. i2ra):

1Compare e.g.thecommentary ofRobert SeeL. M. de Rijk,OnTheGenuine

Anglicus. Text
of
Peter
ofSpains Summule IIITwoRedactions
logicales, ofa Commentary upontheSummuleby
Robertus
Anglicus in:VIVARIUM 7 (1969),pp.8-61.
2Forthisinterpolation,
seethefirst ofthisseries
article : OnTheGenuineText
ofPeter s
ofSpain*
Summule I General
logicales, Problems concerning
possible intheManuscripts
interpolations in:
VIVARIUM, 6 (1968),[pp.1-34],
pp.3-4.
136

11:56:15 AM
Dicituralterumalteriopponi etc. Superius actordeterminavitdeantepredicamentis
In hacparteintendit
et predicamentis. determinarede postpredicamentis. Et dividitur
in quinqusecundum quinqupostpredicamenta. Primode opposi tione,secundode
priori,tertiode simul,quartode motu,quintode habere.Secunda:Prius.Tertia:
Simul.Quarta:Motus.Quinta:Habere. Primeduesuntpresents lectionis.
Quarum prima induasdividitur.
Namprimodividit oppositionem ; secundo de membris
prosequitur. ibi): Queautem
(Secunda Ethecintres.Primoexcusat
sunt. sedediffinitione
relati
vorum;secundoostendit que suntcontraria;tertioque suntprivative opposi ta.
Secunda:Contraria.Tertia:Privative Secundaistarum
opposita. dividitur in duas.Primo
diffinit Secundoremovet
contraria. dubium.Secunda:Caliditas.
Sequiturilla parsPrius.Et habetduas.Primoponitquatuormodospriorisusitatos.
Secundo ponitunumnonusitatum. Secunda:Preter
hosautem.Prima inquatuorsecundum
quatuor modospriorisquosponit.Ubipartesinsipiant(!) patet.
Hecestdivisio.

The followinggloss is devoted to the Caliditas-

passage (i 2va) :
Quiaactordicitquodcaliditas
nonestinigneutaccidens insubiectosedsicutsubstantiale
in eo cuiusest substantiale,
ideo queritur utrumhabeatveritatem. Et videturqud
non.Namomnisoperadoesta forma et propriaoperatioa formapropria [operatioa
propriaforma] et Sed
substantiali. calefacere
est a forma.Et (est) propriaoperatio
a forma
ignis.Ergoegreditur Sednonegreditur
substantiali. abaliaforma nisia caliditate.
estforma
Ergocaliditas substantialis
ipsiusignis.

There appear to be quite a numberof other objections againstthis view

of the (supposed) author and, accordingly,it is to be rejected (ibid.) :

Dicendum breviterquodcaliditasestin igneutaccidensin subiectoet nonsicutsub-

stantiale
ineo cuiusestsubstantiale.
EthocdicitAverois supralibrum Phisicorum
Patetideoquodcaliditas estinignesicutaccidens
insubiecto et (non)1utsubstantiale,
nisitarnen actor2,quod sit substantiale,
intelligat idestconsequens substantiam,ut
risibile
(visibileMS) consequiturhominissubstantiam. Et ita potestexcusariquod
actorintelligit
substantiale substantiam.
idest:consequens

Robert Anglicus^ has quite a differentsolution of the problem. He

' 9
distinguishestwo meaningsof the term ignis :
Vat.Lat. 3049,f. 3iva: Solutio.Dicendum quodignispotestdupliciter consideran.
Autinsuiessentia, inMetaphisica
proutscilicet est;etsiccaliditas
estformaaccidentalis
ignis.Autsecundum quodignisestagensinmateria;et sicestforma essentialis,
quod
ignisnonpotestageresinecalore;calorestibiforma essentialis
et hocmodoestignis
resnaturalis.
Primomodorecedunt actoritates
et argumenta.
1Supplied
from theothermanuscripts.
2 Whowassupposed tohave
hadjusttoopposite
view("Caliditas
autemnonestinigneutaccidens
insubiecto,
sedsicut ineocuius
substantiale estsubstantiale".
Forthetextofthis see
interpolation
Summule , ed.Bocheski,
logicales p. 33,n. 19.
3Forhisglosses,
seethepreceding
article inthisJournal
ofthisseries, 7 (1969),pp.8-61.
137

11:56:15 AM
This solutionhas been furtherelaboratedin the Todi versionof Robert's
glosses:
Todicod. 4,f. 28ra:Sedsciendum estcircalitteramquodduplexestmateria ignis,
scilicetexquaetinqua.Exqua,utmateria prima velchaos,lindeantecreationem mundi
elementa erantmixta sicutessetfarina
etaquaetpostea divisafuerunt; etillaconfusio
in
elementis vocatur primamateria a philosophis.
Aliaestmateria ignisinqua,scilicetinquaagitignis.Etiniliaestutinsubiecto. Ethec
estsententia huiuspartis.
Ibid.f. 28rb:. . . Ideonotandum quodignispotest consideran.
dupliciter Autsecundum
eiusessentiam estinigneutaccidentalis.
; etsiccaliditas Autsecundum eiusoperationem ;
etsiccaliditas estinigneessentialis.Etsicsumiturhie.
Two conclusions may be drawn. First, both Guillelmus Arnaldi and
Robert Anglicus found the interpolationCaliditas in their text of the
Summule.Second, their discussionsof the passage and their solutionsof
the problem seem to be entirelyindependentfromeach other.
The glosses devoted by Simon of Faversham1to our interpolation
are interesting.In the elaborate (and interpolated?)redactionpresented
by MS. Mnchen C.L.M. 14.697, a rather extensive discussion of this
passage is found (f. 3va):
Item.Notacircahocquodauctordicitquodcaliditas sitignisubstantial
et de essentia
hocreprobatum
ignis, esta PhilosophoinlibroDesensuetdesensato.
Item.Philosophus in
dicitquodforme
Predicamentis substantiali
nichilsitcontrarium.
Si igitur
caloressetde
essentiaignis,cumfrigidum sit contrarium calido,ergosequeretur quodsubstantia
haberetcontrarium.Quodfalsum est.Ergoilludex quo sequitur.Hocautem fuitillud
quoddicebatur ignis.Adidem
quodcaloressetde essentia Item
The objections are still without refutation.However, in the original
version of his glosses, found in MS Padua, Bibl. Antoniana,Scajff,
' 429,
Simon of Favershamis wise enough to make short work of the whole
a), which he rightlytakes as an interpolation:
passage ( ista tota litter
Padua,Bibl.Anton.Scajf.429, f. i8rb:Caliditas.Quicquidactordicat,istaopinio
reprobatur <a Commentatore) supralibrum etsensato.
(De) sensu Etistamtotamlitteram
usqueibi: Private( !) oppositaquidam librihabent.Melius
autem estutnonhabeatur,
quianonfuitde intentione necipseearn
auctoris composuit.2
So we see thatSimon rejects thispassage on good groundsjust as he did
with anotherspuriouspassage in his text of the Sumule J
1ForhisglossesontheSummule, seethesecond articleofthisseries
inthisJournal,6 (1968),
pp.69-101.- RecentlyI founda fourth,
complete copyof Simon's glossesin theBiblioteca
Ambrosianaat Milan,cod.F. $6 Sup.(79fols.).Itis anonymousanddatesfrom thefifteenth
century.
2Thediscussion
ofthis
passage inourthird
isfailing copy ofSimon's B.N.Lat.16.126.
Paris,
glosses,
3Forthispassage,
seeoursecondarticle inthisJournal,
ofthisseries, 6 (1968),p. 100.

138

11:56:15 AM
In the fifthtract (De locis) a discussionof thejcos-passage1is not found.
That Guillelmus Arnaldidid not read it in his text of the Summule , may
appear from his divisiotextus (f. i6va):
Et dividitur in duas: primodeterminat de argumento, secundode locis. Secunda:
Argumentum autem. Primain duas.Namquia hic debetponerehoc nomen4ratio ' in
diffinitione neprocedat '
hocnomenratio* . Secundo
argumenti, perequivocadistinguit
eligitilludmembrum de quointendit.Secunda:Ethocultimo modo. Hecsecunda induas.
Namprimoeligitilludmembrum de quo intendit i
et diffinit ', secundo
argumentum
dividit.Secunda Prima
: Argumentationis. induas.Primodiffinitargumentumetmedium et
argumentationem, secundoassignat interilla. Secunda:Differ.
differentiam Sequitur
Ethabetduas.Primodividit(diffinit
iIle pars: Argumentationis. MS),secundomembra
declarat. Secunda:Dijfnitio dataest
sillogismi prius. Ethec intres.Namprimoexcusando
se de sillogismo determinatde inductione,secundode entimemate, tertiode exemplo.
Secunda:Entimema. Tertia:Exemplum. Secundahabetduas.Primodiffinit entimema.
Secundo docetreducere ad sillogismum.Secunda:Sciendumautem.
Hecestdivisio lectionis.

In the discussion, too, it appears that Guillelmus Arnaldi did not find
thejcos-passage in his text:
f. i6vb: Consequenter diffinit
entimema. Et dicitquodentimema estsillogismus
in-
perfectus,idestoratioinqua.... inferturconclusio ut.... Inistaargumen-
festinata,
tationintelligitur
hecpropositio homo
: 'omnis estanimaV
. Etnonponitur quiasiponeretur
esset
perfectus sillogismus. Et statimdocet
ipsum reducere
ad sillogismum.
Arnaldi's discussion of exemplum
is interestingbecause of its couleur
locale:
f i7ra:Consequenter actordeterminat
de exemplo.Etdicitquodexemplum estquando
perunumparticulare probaturaliudparticulare
per similitudinemrepertamin ipsis.
Utsi dicam: ' Narbonenses
contraCarcasonenses
pucnare( /)malum est
; ergoTolosanos
contra
Nascones(!) pugnaremalumest.EthicperilludparticulareNarbonenses Carcas
contra (on)-
ensesprobatur aliudparticulare contra
Tolosanos Nascones, perilludsimilerepertum in
ipsis,quodestaffines
contraaffines.
The MSS Avignon1077, Bordeaux999, Madrid 1070 and Vat. Lat. 3022
have Occytanosinstead of Nascones, while MS Tarragona23 in a rather
shortredactionof the passagehas : TolosanoscontraVascones
and Bigterranos
)
(and BigterrensescontraBearnenses (f. 89r.) This much is certain, that
Arnaldi's example refersto the South of France2. One need not wonder
1Forthispassage,
seeourfirst ofthisseries,
article inthisJournal,
6 (1968),pp.2-3.
2TheTolosani ofToulouse,
aretheinhabitants theNarbonensesthose
ofNarbonne,
theCarcasonenses
those
ofCarcasonne, theVascones
thoseofNavarra andpartofBiscaja, thoseof
theBiterrenses
andtheBearnenses
Bziers, thoseofBeam.It is possiblethatforBigorranos
oneshould read:
ofBigorre,
(inhabitants
Bigorreanos nearBeam).Compare thegeographical
names givenbythe
anonymous commentaryfoundin Paris,
B. N. Lat.667^,f.33vb.Thiscommentarywillbedis-
inthenext
cussed issue.
139

11:56:15 AM
 about this, indeed, since Guillelmus Arnaldi was regensin artibusat
Toulouse.

I give the complete textof Arnaldi's glosseson the tractDe suppositionibus

(afterT = Tarragona27, ff.2iva-2ra).
f. 21va Hieincipit desuppositionibus
capitulum
< LECTIOPRIMA)
Eorumque dicunturetc. Superius determinavit actorde locisdyaleticis. Hieprose-
de Sed
quitur sophisticis. quiasupposi tiovalet ad cognitionem quarundam fallaciarum,
2ivbutfallacie accidentis, ideoactorantequam deteiminaret de locisso | phisticis, idestde
determinat
fallaciis, primo desubposi tionibus,licetinferius ubiderelatione etampliatione
et aliisproprietatibus terminorum determinat deberetdeterminare, cum subpositio
sitsimiliter quedam proprietas terminorum. Sed, utvisum est, quia valet adcognitionem
quarundam fallaciarum, ideoprimodeterminat de subpositionibus.
Et dividitur in duas.Primoactorpremi ttitquoddam preambulum ad suumprincipale
intentum. Secundo prosequitur de intento.Secunda. Subpositio debes(debetMS)
est.Et
s<c)ireque suntistapreambula que ponitantequam determinet de intento.Namcum
cuilibetdicibilinondebeatur subpositio, sedsolumdicibiliincomplexo, oportuit quod
divideret dicibilead accipiendum dicibileincomplexum. Item.Subpositio nondebetur
cuilibetdicibili incomplexo seddicibili quiestterminus significansrempredicamentalem,
et ideoposuitsecundam divisionem. Et quiasimiliter suppositio presubponit significa-
tionem, ideoactordiffinit significationem. Etsicpatetqualiter istasuntpreambula.
Primahabetduas.Namprimoponitunamdivisionem; secundosubdividi t alterum
membrum. Secunda:Terminorum autem incomplexorum. Et hec secundain duas: nam
primodividit illudmembrum ; secundo quiafecerat mentionem designificatione, diffinit
eam.Secunda:Significatio. Hecinduas:primodiffinit illudmembrum; secundo dividit.
Secunda : Significations. Primainduas: primodiffinit significationem ; secundo concludit
corrollarium velobicitquedam.Secunda:Quare cum omnis res.
Sequitur illapars: Significations.Ethabetduas: primo dividit (diffinit
MS)significationem ;
secundo perillamdivisionem duomembra subpositionis accipitquibusnomina assignat
velinponit. Secunda:Nomina vero substantiva.
ilia
Sequitur pars:Subpositio. Et habet duas: primodiffinit subpositionem ; (secundo
copulationem. SecundaCopulatio. Primain duas. Primodiffinit subpositionem)1;
secundo ponitdifferentiam inter subpositionem etsignificationem. Secunda: differunt.
Hec sitdivisio.
Ad primam partem sic procedit secundum quodnotabatur dividendo.
Ad evidentiam eorumque hiedicuntur, intelligendum estquodactorad cognitionem
subpositionum premittit primam divisionem ad significandum quodsubpositio solum
debeturincomplexo. Secundam divisionem ponitad significandum quod subpositio
solumdebetur ei quodremsignificai, et nondispositionem rei.Ideodividit terminm
incomplexum per decern predicamenta, ut visum est. Quia subpositio presupponit
significationem, ideodiffinitsignificationem. Et dividit significationem quiapenesduas
1Supplied theother
from manuscripts.
140

11:56:15 AM
 ifferentiassignificationis duomodisignificationis accipiuntur. Namei quodpermodum
perse stantis significai,debetur subponere. Ei vero quod per modum adiacentis, copulare.
Ulterius notandum quod'subpositio* diciturmultismodis.Unoenimmododicitur sub-
positioacceptiopropositionis tamquam proveraet probata;et hoc modosubpositio
accipitur in disputationibus, et vocaturalio modoypotesis' et sic nonaccipitur hic
. Alio modosumitur 4 ' alicuius subaltero
'subpositio* subpositio positio , secundum quod
subiectum dicitur ponisub predicato et inferi ussubsuosuperiori, uthomo subanimali 1;
et sic nonsumitur hic 4subpositio Tertiomododicitursubpositio acceptio termini
communis prore significata peripsum;et sicsumitur hic1subpositio1 .
Adprimam partem igitur lectionis dividit dicibileuteligatincomplexum, dicensquod
cum ut 4homo curri
eorumque dicuntur quedam dicuntur complexione, ; quedamsine
complexione, ut 4homo * 4
perse vel curri . Sed quiacuilibetincomplexo nondebetur
subpositio, ideosubdividit (subponi t MS)alterum membrum et dicitquodterminorum
incomplexorum aut
unusquisque significat substantiam aut quantitatem, et sic de aliis.
Et talidebetur subpositio qui talem rem significat.
Etstatim actordiffinit significationem, quiafecerat mentionem quandodicitdutsignificat.
Et dicitquodsignificado prouthic sumitur, estrepresentatio (interpretado MS) per
vocemsecundum placitum. (Et dicitsecundum placitum ) ad removendum significationem
naturalem. Etstatim cumdicit: quare cum omnis resconcludit exdiffinitione significationis
corollarium. Dictum estquodsignificado estpervocemrepresentatio ; exhocconcludit:
cumomnisressituniversalis velparticularis, oportet quodilledictiones quenonsigni-
ficantremuniversalem velparticularem, ut'omnis''nullus' , etconsimilia, etfigmenta non
4
significant aliquidprouthic sumitursignificat io' et ita quodnonsinttermini. Nam
quilibetterminus habetsignificare aliquam remuniversalem velparticularem, etsinon
sinttermini, quodeissubpositio nondebeatur. linde4omnis ' et 4nullus *et talia
signanon
sunttermini.
Consequenter actordividitsignificationem. Et dicitquod significationis alia est rei
2Ira substantive ; etistafitpernomina substantiva, ut'homo'aliareiadiective etistafit| per
nomina adiectiva velperverba,ut4albus *vel'curri .
Et statim removet dubium. Namaliquisdubitaret quaredicit: significationis alia estrei
substantivenonautemdicit:aliasubstantiva , aliaadiectiva. lindedicitquodsubstantivatio
etadiectivatio suntquidammodi,idestquedamaccidentia, ipsarum rerum qui(!) signi-
ficante*, et nonsuntmodi,idestdispositiones seuaccidentia, ipsius significationis (dis-
positionsMS).Namsignificado de se estquoddam accidens.Et siipsedixisset : signifi-
cationisaliasubstantiva, aliaadiectiva, videretur quodsubstantivatio etadiectivatio essent
modi,etdispositiones significationis,quodnonestverum. Ideoaddenotandum quodnon
suntdispositiones significationis, sed ipsarum rerum,dicit:significationis alia estrei
, alia reisubstantive
adiective et nondicit:aliasubstantivay alia adiectiva.
Consequenter ex istadivisione accipitduomembra. Quibusnomina imponit. Et dicit
quod nomina substantiva dicuntur subponere sed nomina adiectiva et verba dicuntur
copulare.Et notaquodnominasubstantiva dicuntur subponere significatum suum,et
ipsi(isitMS)verbo,sednomina adiectiva dicuntur copulare significatum suumethocsuo
substantivo.
de subpositione diffiniendo Et dicitquodsubpositio
Consequenter prosequitur 4 ipsam.
estacceptio termini substantiviproaliquo.Etilludproaliquo1 multis
4homo
modispotest esse.
Unomodoproaliquoidestprointentione que est in anima, ut estspecies7.Alio modo

1Subanimali] T
substantialiter
141

11:56:15 AM
proaliquoidestprosignificato relatoad subposita, ut 1homo curri . Aliomodoproaliquo
idestpromodosignificandi, '
ut homo estnomen'. Aliomodoproaliquoidestprovoce,ut
'homoestdissilabum1
. Etintellige quodde virtute locutionis terminus ubicumque ponatur
suum sed de
subponit significatum, possibilitate intellectus seutermini potest aliquando
redderelocutionem veram provoce,aliquando promodisignificandi etc.
Consequenter ponitdifferentiam intersubpositionem et significationem et dicitquod
differuntsuppositio et significado, namsignificado habetesseperinpositionem vocis
ad significandum, sed subpositio estacceptiotermini iamsignificantis proaliquare.
Lindepriusestsignificado quamsubpositio, quiasignificado estipsiusvocis,sed sub-
positioest termini agregati ex significato et voce. Et istadifferunt quod unumest
priusaltero,linde sicut vides quodprius homo accipitpennam, posteascribit cumilla,
et priuselevathomobaculum, posteapercutit cumilio, itapriusimponit vocemad
significandumetposteautitur ipsavoceproaliquare; etistaestsubpositio.
Deindediffinit copulationem dicensquodcopulatio estacceptiotermini adiectivipro
et sicut itahie hoc est * '1 multis modis.[Uno
aliquo superius quod pro aliquo glosatur
modoproaliquoidestprointentione, ut 'album estaccidens1. Aliomodoproaliquo , idest
prosuppositis,ut *album curri. Alio modo pro modosignificandi, ut 'album estnomen .
Aliomodoproaliquoidestprovoce,ut 'album estdissillabum ']2.
Etinhocterminatur lectio.
)
( Questiones
( Utrum rem
voxsignificai que est in anima vel extraanimam velutrumque )
Circaistudcapitulum quiasubpositio3 presubponit3 significationemet significado est
ipsiusvocis, ideo queriturutrum vox significet rem extra animam vel passionem que
estin animavelutrumque. Et videtur quodsignificet passionem que estinanima,per
Philosophum libroPeryarmenias <qui>dicitquodvocessuntnotepassionum que sunt
inanima.Ergoetc.
Item.Arguode nominecommuni. Nomencommune remuniversalem.
significai Et
universale habetessein anima.Ergonomensignificai remque estin anima.Preterea.
Idemsignificai terminusreexistenteetnonexistente, namde eodemconstituit intellec-
tum.Sedrenonexistente nonestdicendum quodsignificetrem, cum res non sit.Ergo
videtur quodvoxnonsignificet remextrasedinanima.
Oppositum patetper intentionem Aristotilis PrimoElencorum. Dicit enimquod
nominibus pro rebus utimur.Ergo voces significantipsasres.Preterea.Loquivolumus de
ipsisrebusaliquando. Ergooportetquodvocessignificent ipsasres.EthocdicitBoetius et
Alanus4 quodin rebusquasvidithumanuni* genus* nomen imposuit.Item.Ostendendo
4 '
quodvoxnullomodosignificet passionem queestinanima- namista: homo estanimai
essetfalsa, quiaistapassiononestilla; etsicnonessetveranisiprorebus ; quareoportet
quodsignificent remextra.Etsi tudicasquodsignificai utrumque, hocestfalsum, quia
tuncessetdarepropositionem que essetveravelfalsainsimul, estlhomo curri veraest
prorebus,sedfalsaestin hoc quodcurrere nonattribuitur hominipropassione. Et sic
eritveraetfalsa.Quodestinconveniens et inpossibile,quodverum etfalsum inmediate
dividunt enuntiationem.
1proaliquo] other T
MSS.superius
2notinT
3subpositio other
presubponit MSS; presubposito T
4Avalanus T
5other MSS;quodutimur T

142

11:56:15 AM
 De istaquestione dicendum breviter,relictisaliisopinionibus, quodvoxinponi turad
22rbsignificandumremet similitudinem sivepas| sionem rei,quodidemest.Namvoxnon
remnisiprout(priusMS)intelligitur.
significai (Intelligiturautem)1 persuamsimilitu-
dinemetnon2perse,utdicitur TertioDeanima. Ergovoxsignificai remnonperse sed
persuamsimilitudinem. Sednonsignificai voxistaduo,scilicet remetsimilitudinem
rei,
utplurasedutunum, namubicumque unum propteralterum tamen
utrobique unumest.
Et ideocumnonsignificet similitudinem nisipropter rem,totumsignificatum est.Et
itaargumenta perhocsolutasunt.Namilla(que)probant passionem
quodsignificent que
estinanima, verum est,sednonsolum ; illaqueprobant quodsignificentrem,verum est
sednonsolum.
Adaliud.Quandoprobasquodvoxnullomodosignificet passionem
' . Dico que estin anima,
dicendum est: tudicisquodistaestfalsa : 4/i
omo estanimal quod non.Namintellec-
ts (non)iudicatidemptitatem in similitudinibus que suntin anima,sedin rebusper
ipsas.Et itautrumque
similitudines significant.Adargumentum perquodprobasquod
utrumque, scilicet
reset similitudo
rei, non possuntsignifican, dicoquodimmo.Ettuar-
guisquodtuncsequeretur quodeadem(pro)positio sitveraetfalsa.Dicoquodnon,quia
istaduoproutfaciunt
voxsignificat unumperrepresentationem etnoniudicaturpropo-
sito veraequefalsapenesidemptitatem veldiversitatem ipsarumpassionum,[et]sed
ipsarumrerum secundum quodvisum est.Etestsolutio.

( Utrum revoxremaneat
destructa >
signicativa
Queriturutrumdestructa re vox remaneat Et videtur
significativa. primoquod re
destructa vox nonsit significativa,per auctoritatem Boetiiin finelibri. Divisionum;
qui dicit quod si res subiectanon sit, vox significativa esse desistit.Item.
et significan
Essereiet intelligi se habent perordinem itaquodpriusest esse,postea
posteasignifican.
intelligi, Sed re destructa nonremanet esserei. Ergononpotest
non
Quare poterit
intelligi. significan. Et sic re destructanon estvoxsignificativa.
Oppositum tamen arguitur,
quia significare estintellectum constitue
re.Seddestructa re
ipsavoxdeeodem constituitintellectum. Ergo destructarepotest remanere significativa.
Undevox ista4Petrus ' tunecorrupto ilioquodsignifi-
quesignificataliquemhominem,
cat,adhucde eodemconstituit intellectum etsicidemsignificabit.
Ad hancquestionem dicendum breviter quod idem(illudMS) significat terminus re
destructasicutprius.Undevoxinponitur ad significandumrem(absolute et nonsub
aliquadifferentia
temporis. Namnoninponitur ad significandum rem)3essenequead
significandumremnonessesedad significandum remcuiacciditetquodsitactuvelnon
sit.Etideodestructare (vox)significativaremanet idemsicutprius.Namde
etsignificat
eodemconstituitintellectum. Ethocetiamapparet per AristotileminPostpredicamentis,
qui dicitquodin contradictionibus siveressintsivenonsint,semper unavera,altera
falsa.Ethocnonessetsi nonsignificaret terminus re destructa.Quarepatetquodidem
redestructa.
significat
AdBoetium dicendum quodintelligitsicquodsi nullares(sit)subiecta*, idestsinonsit
aliquaresque pervocemsignificetur, iliavoxnonestsignificativa, ut' buf 4
', baf'. Alio

1Supplied
fromtheotherMSS.
2etnonother
MSS; voxT
3Supplied
fromtheotherMSS.
4 Substantia
T
143

11:56:15 AM
 modosolvitur sicquodsi nonsitressubiecta1 inanimavelinre extra,voxdesinit esse
significativa.
Adaliudquandodicisquodpriusestessereiquamintelligi etsignificali,dicendum quod
licetsitpriusessereiquaminintellectu vel<in)significando, tamen unumessenonest
aliud2.Etideopotestremanere unumcorrupto alio,utcorrupto esseactualireipostest
remanere esseinintellectu et insignificando, quia,utvisumest,hocessenonestillud
esse.Etsicpatetsolutio questionis.
( Utrum istaacceptio sitab intellectu
)
Quiadicit actor est
quodsubpositio acceptiotermini, queritur a quo^sitistaacceptio,
utrumsitab intellectu. Videtur quodnon,quia accidit termino quodaccipiatur ab
intellectu. Et si subpositio essetab intellectu, acciderettermino quod subponeret.
Hocautemestfalsum, quiasubpositio estproprietas essentialistermini substantivi4.
Oppositum tamenarguitur sic. A quo aliquishabetsuamsignificationem, ab eodem
habetsuamsubpositionem. Sed terminus suamsignificationem habetab intellectu.
Ergoetsubpositionem.
De istaquestione suntopiniones. Quidam sicsolvunt etdicunt quodduplex estsubpositio.
Quedamenimestde virtute sermonis, secundum quod terminus subponit suumsignifi-
catum.Aliaest subpositio de possibilitate* termini. Mododicuntquod quantum ad
suppositionem quehabetur de possibilitate termini estistadiffinitio quodsubpositio est
acceptio(termini) ab intellectu. Sedquantum ad subpositionem que estde virtute ser-
monis,que dicitur subpositio naturalis,nondaturilladiifinicio subpositionis, quiade
natura suahabetsubponere etnonab intellectu.
Et dicendum quodhoc nonvidetur benedictum,quia secundum hoc diffinitiosub-
positionisnon essetcommunis que dicta est.Et tamen estcommunis cuilibet
subpositioni .
Secundo modomaledicunt istiquisicdicunt, quiacumdicitur perhocquodterminus
accipiatur ab intellectu quodsic subponat cuiusoppositum estverum.Namperhoc
quod sie sie
subponit aeeipitur ab intellectu. Et ideo dicendum quia diffinitiosub-
positionis estcompetens. Debetsie intelligi: subpositio estacceptiotermini ab intel-
lectu,idestsubpositio estproprietas termini proquoaeeipitur ipseterminus, idestaptus
natusaeeipiquantum de se estab intellectu. Undedicendum quod terminus estvox
inposita ad significandum et per rationem significandi quam habet in se formaliter
dicitur significare.Et sic ipsitermino sineaeeeptione ab intellectu debetur significado
22vaetI subpositio. Undecausaprxima subpositionisipseterminus
est persuumsignificatum.
Ad argumenta in oppositum dicendum. Quandotu probasquodab intellectu habent
subpositionem: namab intellectu habetsignificationem suam;ergosubpositionem, -
dicendumquod ab intellectuinponenteterminus suum habet effectum, idest
rationem significandi.Et istomodoet subpositio est,sedtamenformaliter de se habet
vox significativa quodsignificet; sie et quod subponat de se habetpostquam est in-
ad
posita significandum, etappellatur terminus. Et sie de natura sua subponit.
LECTIO SECUNDA
Subpositionumalia communis,etc. Superius actordeterminavit de subpositione
1substantialis
T
2adT
3a quoother MSS ; anT
4termino substantivoT
sbonitate T

144

11:56:15 AM
 Hicprosequitur
diffinitive. divisive.Etdividitur in duas.Namprimoactordividit sub-
positionem percommunem etdiscretam, etdeclarat membra. Secundo subdividit alterum
membrum. Secunda:Suppositionum communium. Hec secundain duas. Primodividit
communem subpositionem per naturalem etaccidentalem, etdeclarat membra. Secundo
subdividit alterummembrum. Secunda:Accidentalium subpositionum. Hec secundain
duas.Primodividit accidentalem subpositionem persimplicem et personalem. Secundo
declaratmembra. Secunda:Simplex <Ethecsecunda
subpositio. induas.Primm declarat
primm membrum. Secundo aliud. Secunda ibi: Personalissubpositio)I. Prima in duas.
Primodiffinit simplicem suppositionem. Secundodividit.Secunda:Item.Subpositionum
simplicium.Hecsecunda intres.Primodividit simplicem subpositionem pertriamembra.
Secundo probat terminm habere simplicem suppositionem quantum tertium
ad mem-
brum, idestpostdictionem exceptivam. Tertioprobat quantum adsecundum membrum.
Secunda:Undenonsequitur: omne animal preterhominem. Tertia:Quodautem terminusin
illa
Sequitur pars
predicato. : Personalis.Et habetduas. Primo diffinitearn. Secundo dividit.
Secunda:Item. Personalium. Ethecinduas.Primodividit personalem perdeterminatam
etconfusam. Secundo declarat membra. Secunda:Determinata subpositio. Ethecin duas.
Primodeclarat unummembrum. Secundoreliquum. Secunda:Confusa subpositio. Ubi
lectioterminatur. Primain duas.Primodiffinit determinatam subpositionem. Secundo
probatdiffinitionem beneesseassignatam. Secunda:Quodautem utraque illarum. Hecest
divisio.
Adprimam partem sicprocedit. Dividitsubpositionem dicensquodsubpositionum alia
communis, aliadiscreta. Communis subpositio dicitur quando fitperterminm com-
munem, ut'homo '. Discreta dicitur quefitperterminm discretum, ut 'Sor'.
Debesintelligere quod terminus potestdupliciter consideran : aut secundum se prout
estquedamres,autsecundum suamsignificationem proutestsignum. Si consideretur
primo modo,hec potestessevel secundum sui totalitatem et sic sumitur dicendo:
'omnishomo esttotum inquantitate' velpromodosignificandi essentiali,ut'homo estnomen'
ut '/jomo estnominativi ' vel
casus ' ' vel
vel accidentali, provoce,ut homo estvox (pro)
proprietate vocis,utihomo estdissillabum'
Nuncautemdesubpositione istomodononintendimus. Sedde subpositione termini que
estsecundum suamsignificationem intendimus inhacparte.Etsecundum hocdividitur
hicsubpositio.
Ulteriusnotandum quoddiversitas subpositionis quamtradidit actor,hicnonaccipitur
eiusquodterminus sed a eius
subponit, parte proquo subponit et locutionem reddit
veram.Quodsubpositio nonvarietur a parteeiusquodsubponit terminus, patet,quia
terminus subponit prosignificato etidemsignificai ubicumque ponatur, siveinoratione
siveextraorationem. Sicpatetquoddiversitas non
subpositionis accipitur a parteeius
quodsubponit terminus, seddiversificatur subpositio secundum diversas causasveritatis.
Ut lhomo estspecies' verificatur 'homo curriprosubpositis. Et sicsunt
prointentione;
diversesubpositiones secundum diversos modosverificandi locutiones.Patetigitur
que (quod MS)subpositio dividatur, quiailla[m]quamhabetterminus secundum signi-
ficationem. Etpatetquoddiversitas seudivisio nonaccipitur a parteilliusquodsubponit
terminus, idesta partesignificati, seda parteverificandi locutionem.
Deindedividit communem subpositionem. Et dicitquodcommunis alianaturalis, alia
accidentalis.Declaratmembra. Et dicitquodnaturalis subpositio estacceptioteimini
communis proomnibus illisproquibusaptusnatusestparticipan, ut'Ao/no' perseprout
1Supplied theother
from MSS.

11:56:15 AM
 nonponiturin oratione, subponi t proomnibus qui suntvelfuerent vel erunt.Modo
notaquodnaturalis subpositio estacceptio termini communis proforma communi, idest
pro significato; quodsignificatum habet esse in subpositis. Subposita autem dicuntur
termini quiparticipant, idestrationem accipiunt termini, quiaparticipare estparticipantis
rationem sumere, ut dicitur libroThopicorum. Nuncautemtamexistentia quam non
existentia subposita (significata MS) insuosignificato includunt formam termini, ut' Anti-
' et 'Cesar'insuo
christus includunt huiusnominis
significato1 significata 'homo', quiaad |
.22vbsignificandum hominem suntinposita. Sicigitur patetquodquilibet terminus communis,
ut'homo' ysubponit denatura insubpositione proforma communi quesalvatur insuissub-
positis, siveillasubposita sunt actu existentia sive non,solum2 in
quod significando existt.
Namactualis existentia rerum nichilfacitad veritatem orationis. NamdataquodCesar
nonsithecestvera:' Cesar esthomo'. Etpropter hocnonsequitur:'ergoCesar est'
Tuncdeclarat quid sit accidentalis est
subpositio: acceptio termini communis prohis
proquibusexigi t adiunctum, ut 'homo curri subponit pro presentibuss,
4homo cucurrit'
'homo curret'profuturis.
propreteritis, 4
Etnota,quodvisum estsuperius, quodcumdicitur:homo curri , cum'homo' ubicumque
ponatursuumsignificatum subponat et 'homo'non significet magispresentes quam
futuros velpretritos, ideohicnonsubponit solumpropresentibus. Sedtarnen hocest
verum.Et ita intelligit actorquod significatur starepro presentibus, idestpro illis
redditlocutionem veram,et cumhoc nonexcluditquinstetproaliis.Similiter hic:
'homo (cu)currit'etsimiliter infuturo.
Deindedividit accidentalem subpositionem, dicensquodaccidentalium subpositionum
alia simplex, aliapersonalis. Et declarat membra. Et primoquidsitsimplex.Et dicit
quodsimplex subpositio estacceptiotermini communis prore universali significata per
ipsum,ut 'homo estspecies' vel 'animalestgenus',et sic de aliis.linde (notandum)*,
utmeliores dicunt, quodterminus habetsimplicem subpositionem quandoscatproin-
tentione que estinanima.Namresnonhabetnisiduplexesse,scilicet inanimaetinre
extra.Et quandostatpro essequodhabetin anima,tuncestsubpositio simplex, ut
'homo . Similiter
estspecies' dicitur personalis quando stat terminus re
pro extra, ut 'homo
curri.lindesi dicatur:'Sorestindividuum' potestdiciquodibihabeatsimplicem sub-
positionem, cumstetprointentione queestinanima.Ettuarguis quodquandoaliqua
duo ex oppositodistinguuntur, inpossibile est quod illudquod continetur sub uno
contineatur sub alio. Et subpositio dividitur per communem et discretam, et sicillud
quodcontinetur subcommuni nonpoterit contineri subdiscreta. Sedsimplex continetur
subcommuni quiasubaccidentali. Ergononcontinetur subdiscreta. Dicendum sustinendo
quod dictum est quod si dicatur: 'Sor estindividuum' , ibi est simplex subpositio. Nam
sicutaccidentalis dividitur per simplicem et personalem, itasubpositio discretapotest
dividiin simplicem, ut 'Sorestindividuum' , et personalem, ut 'Sorcurri .
Etadargumenta dicendum quodprima divisio per communem et discretam nonestdata
ex parterei,sedpotiusex partevocis.Et ideoquantum ad illudpenesquoddividitur
illudquodcontinetur subuno,noncontinetur subalio.Etitaquiapenesresnondividun-
tur,potestistadivisopersimplicem et personalem utriquecompetere tamcommuni
quamdiscrete.

1insuosignificato
other
MSS; significando
T
2solvit
T.
3presenti T
huius
* Supplied theother
from MSS.

146

11:56:15 AM
 Deindedivid.it simplicem subpositi onem,dicensquod simplicis subpositionis aliaest
termini communis 4
positiinsubiecto, ut'/io/no estspecies1 , animal estgenus', etsicdealiis;
aliaesttermini communis positiinpredicato affirmato, ut (omnis homo estanimai' . Vult
4 '
actorquod animalhabeatibi simplicem tamen non est
subpositionem. Quod verum,
ut statim videbitur. Aliaesttermini communis positi post dictionem exceptivam, ut
4omne animal hominem estirrationale '. (Ibi vultactorsimpliciter 4 '
preter quod *hominem '
habeatsimplicem subpositionem.probatEt istud membrum, scilicet quod le hominem
habeatsimplicem subpositionem. Namnonsequitur:'omne animalpreter hominem est
irrationale
)x; ergoomneanimalpreter hunehominem'. Sedestibi procesus a simplici ad
personalem, sicuthic: lhomo estspecies ; ergoaliquishomo'.
breviter 4
Dicendum
4 ' quodcumdicitursic: omne animal preter hominem estirrationale ',
le hominem nonhabetsimplicem subpositionem quianonstatprointentione queest in
anima.Et ad argumentum actorisdicendum 4
quodverumestquodnonsequitur:omne
animalpreter hominem estirrationale ; ergo preter hunc hominem' , sednonesthuiuscausaquod
procedatur a simplici adpersonalem, sedquiaproceditur a maiori subpositioni ad mino-
4 hominem' sedcumdicitur4preter hunc
rem,quiacumdicitur:preter (nonrestringitur,
hominem')2 iam habet minorem subpositionem, quia habet restrictam.
Deindeprobat actorsecundum membrum, scilicetquodterminus communis positusin
predicato affirmato habeatsimplicem subpositionem. Namcumdiciturita: omnium
oppositorum eadem estdisciplina' , dicitactorquodhecpropositio estfalsanisiisteterminus
4 ' haberet non est
disciplinasimplicem subpositionem, quia aliquaparticularis disciplinas |
23raque sit omnium oppositorum, nammedicina est(solum)saniet egri,et si(c) de aliis.
Itadicitactor.Sedtamen dicendum cumdicitur : omnium oppositorum eadem estdisciplina' ,
4omnis
ibi 'disciplina' habetpersonalem subpositionem, et homo est animai ', ibi
4animai' habet et nonsimplicem. Et sic de consimilibus.
personalem
4omnis subpositionem 4 '
Probatio quod homo estanimai' , ibi animaihabeat personalem. Namcumdicitur:
4omnishomo estanimai estquodle 4homo ' habet 4 '
', planum personalem. Ergole animai
oportet quodhabeat,quiaaliterpropositio essetfalsa.Namhomononestanimai prout
estgenus, sedproutestresextra.Etsicsubponet pro reextra.Quarehabebit personalem
subpositionem. Item.Si le 4animai ' cumdicimushic: 4omnis homo estanimai ' vel in
consimilibus haberet simplicem subpositionem, sequeretur quodin omnibonosillo-
gismoinprimomodo4 primefigure essetfallacia accidentis ex variatione medii.Quodest
falsum. Namdicendoomne animal estsubstantia ' ibile 4animai ' habet etsi in
4omnis ' haberet personalem
predicato in minori dicendo homo est animai simplicem, esset variatio
mediiet fallacia accidentis. Et hoc estfalsum. Quaremanifestum estquodterminus
communis positusin predicato affirmato habetpersonalem subpositionem et nonsim-
plicem.
Preterea.Eandemsuppositionem habetterminus in convertente et in conversa.Et
universalis affirmativa convertitur inparticularem, utvultAristotiles in libroPriorm,
ut 1omnis homo estanimai; ergoquoddam animai est homo' . Sed manifestum estquodinista
hocquodest4animai ' habet
particulari personalem subpositionem. Ergoprimahabebat
personalem in ilio predicato affirmato. (Et hoc est verumquod terminus communis
in non habet 4 '
positus predicato affirmato)* simplicem subpositionem accipiendo simplicem
proutterminus subponi t prointentione queestinanima.
1Supplied from theother MSS.
2Supplied from theother MSS.
3DiscretaT.
4 Supplied
from theother MSS.

147

11:56:15 AM
 Sed alii accipiuntaliter1simplicem subpositionem' et dicuntquod quandoterminus
communis statpronatura communi et nonproaliquosubposito determinato, sedpro
natura communi que tantum habetesseinsubpositis, tunchabetsimplicem. Etsicacci-
* ' verumest communis in predicato
piendosimplicem quodterminus affirmatopositus
habetsimplicem. Sedsicnondicimus proprie sed stat
simplicem, quando pio intentione
que est in anima.Et sic loquendononhabetsimplicem. Et cumdiciturquod non
sequitur: 'omnis homoestanimai ; ergohocanimai1 , concedo.Sednonestcausa,utdictum
est,quodsitprocessus a simplici adpersonalem seda maiori subpositione adminorem.
Etadaliudquandoactordicitquodcumdicitur:*omnium oppositorumesteadem disciplina
4 ' haberet
quod hec essetfalsa(ni)sihoc quodest disciplina simplicem subpositionem
dicendum quodimmo(estveraetnonhabetsimplicem, immo)1 habetpersonalem etnon
estsensus, utactordicit,quodaliquaparticularis unasitomnium oppositorum, quiale
4 ' licetstet nonstattamenprounaparticulari
disciplina proparticularibus disciplinis,
disciplina determinate. Sedestsensus4oppositorum eadem '
estdisciplina (sic: saniet egri
eademestdisciplina)2, utmedicina; etcongrui etincongrui, utgramatica, etsicdealiis.
Consequenter diffinit
personalem. Et dicitquodpersonalis subpositio estacceptioter-
minicommunis prosuisinferioribus, ut 4homo curri.Et statim dividit istam(et dicit
quodpersonalis dividiturper determinatam et confusam. Tunc declarat quesitdetermi-
nataet dicitquod determinata diciturquamhabetterminus communis sumptus>3
indefinite vel cumsignoparticulari, ut homo currivel *quidam homo curri.Etvides
quoddicitur subpositiodeterminata quando potest reddere locutionem veram determinate
prounovelpropluribus, ut 4homo curri. Undeipsestatim declaratdiffinitionem deter-
minate subpositionis,scilicetquodterminus indefinite sumptus velcumsignoparticulari
habeatdeterminatam. Undedicitquodinistis:'homo curri 4 homo currietsicde
, quidam
aliisle 'homo' subponit tamprocurrentibus quam non currentibus,tamen reddit locutio-
nemveram procrrente. Namaliudestsubponere, aliudestlocutionem veram reddere.
Utpatetquiaibi 4homo curri proomnibus hominibus subponit,sedsolumprocrrente
redditlocutionem veram.
Consequenter probatactorperaliamrationem quodterminus indefinite sumptus habeat
determinatam subpositionem, quia, utdicitactor,si dicatur:4animal estSor',4animal est
Plato' et sic de non animai est omnishomo' immoestibifallacia
singulis, sequitur:'ergo
dictionis procedendo a pluribus determinatis ad unamdeterminatam in conclusione.
4
Etsicle animaV habetdeterminatam Etestterminus indefinite
subpositionem. sumptus.
Ergosumptus indefinitehabetdeterminatam subpositionem.
Inhocterminatur sententia
lectionis.
)
( Questiones
Circahanclectionem sunt Est
plura querenda. querendum de virtute huiuspropositionis
4homoestspecies'
.
4hominis'
( Utrum velhabens
quiditas nomine
quiditatem signicetur)
23rbEtprimoqueritur 4
nominehominis
quidsignificetur ', utrum quiditas | velhabensquidi-
tatem.Etsicde quolibet alionomine Etarguitur
aggregati. quod illudquodsignificatur
nomine 4hominis ' nonsit tantum. Namquicquid nomine 4
quiditas significatur humanitatis'
nomine 4hominis
' et Cuiusdeclaratio est 4homo ' de
significatur plus. .quia predicatur
1Suppliedfrom theother MSS.
2Suppliedfrom theother MSS.
3Suppliedfrom theother MSS.
148

11:56:15 AM
 4humanitas ' autemnon.Hoc autemnonesset
subpositis, (ni)siplussignificaretur (no-
4hominis ' 4humanita . Sednon nisihabens humanitatem.
mine) quam (ti)s' significatur plus
4hominis ' ethabens
Ergonomine 4Homo significatur
' et *humanitas quiditas
' sunt quiditatem.
Preterea. sicutconcretum etabstractum. Quodpatet.Namin
genere4 substantie concretum de subpositis predicatur, abstractum vero (non).Et sicse
habenthomo' et 4humanitas '
quod 4/iomo' predicatur de subpositis, 4humanitas ' non.Etita
4homo' estconcretum. Sedconcretum abstractum.
' significaiplusquam Quarepatetquod
nomine 4hominis et habensquiditatem.
significatur quiditas
In oppositum arguitur. Diffinitum et diffinitio idemsignificant. Sedpartesdiffinitionis
suntforme, ut diciturSextoMethaphysice. Nuncautemhabensquiditatem nonest
forma sed videtur nomine 4hominis ' non
nequepars forme, subpositum. Quare quod
significetur habensquiditatem. Preterea.Quod significatur nomineestunumperse:
aliterex partibus diffinitionibus nonfaceret unumvere.Sed ex subposito et quiditate
nonfitunumperse. Namsubpositum est extraintellectum quiditatis. Ergovidetur
quod 4/i
omo' non significet habens quiditatem.
Dicuntquidamquodidemsignificatur nomine4hominis ' et 4 sed aliteret
humanitatis'
nomine 4 hominis ' est in sed nomine
aliter,quia significatur quiditasprout subpositis,
4humanitatis' cumintentione ad subposita. Sed hoc nonvidetur esseverum,quiaqui
intelligitaliterquamsitinre,falsum intelligit.Similiter significansmodoopposito quam
competat nature, falsum significai. Ideocumhumanitas nonhabeat essenisiinsubpositis,
nonpotestcumprecisione subposi torumsignifican nisifalsomodo.Et tamennonest
dicerequod humanitas falsomodosignificetur, dicendo4/iec humanitas ; (ergo)etc.'
4 ' nonnisi in suppositis,
Undesi diceretur quod humanitas significaihumanitatem non
tamen per modum qui' repugnet esse in subpositis, verum esset.Sed tunc non posset dari
causaquare4humanitas de subiecto nonpredicatur. Quarepatetquodnonbenedicerent
4homo ' et 4humanits ' idem sedaliteret aliter.
quod significant
' solum
Et ideo dicendumquod 4humanitas quiditatem significai, sed 4homo '
plus
4habens humanitatem Adcuiusevidentiam inseparatis
significaiquam 4 ' et 4 intelligendum quod
a materia nondiffer quiditas quodquidest' idest'habens quiditatem*. Nam(ad)omne
illuci
adquodpertinet quiditas, pertinet quodquidest,quiaineisnonestmateria. Etideo
dicitPhilosophus Septimo Methaphysice in
quod separatis a materia unumquodqueilludest
quod est per essentiam suam.Undein illisconcretum de abstracto predicatur, ut
4intellectusestintellectualitas' . Inhabentibus autemmateriam differt etquodquidest
quiditas
propter diversitatem materie adformam. Namadaliquidpertinet quodquidestadquod
nonpertinet quiditas. Namquodquidestpertinet ad subpositum etde subposito predi-
catur, quiditas autem non.Etsicpatet(quod)quodquidestincludit subpositum. Preterea.
Homoestconcretum substantie, humanitas estabstractum. Ergocumconcretum significet
plusquamsuumabstractum et hocnonestnisihabens quiditatem, manifestum estquod
4/omo'nonsignificai solumquiditatem sedhabens quiditatem.
Hiisvisisdicendum ad argumenta. Adprimum, cumdicitquodidemsignificai nomen
quoddiffinitio, verum est.(Cum)arguis quoddiffinitio nonsignificet nisihabens quidi-
tatem, dicoquodymo.Et(cum)tuprobasquodnon,quiadicitur Septimo Mathephysice
quodpartesdiffinitionis suntforme, dicendum quodintelligit quodsuntforme, idest
habent modum forme, quiasicutforma datesse,itapartes quesuntgenuset
diffinitionis,
differentia, dantessesuisinferioribus.
Adaliuddicendum quodex quiditate ethabente quiditatem1 fitunum peressentiam sicut

1exhumanitate
etquiditate
T.

149

11:56:15 AM
 exmateria etforma. Namhabens quiditatem nonhabetaliquidinactupreter quiditatem.
Etlicethabenshumanitatem nonsitde intellectu quiditatis, ex hocnonarguitur quin
fiatunumperessentiam '
es illis.Na, rationale * extraintellectum 'animalis* est,tamen
exanimali etrationali fitunumperesse(ntiam), uthomo.
istius 'homo estspecies
(De virtute propositions *)
Queritur de virtute istiuspropositionis : 'homo estspecies*. Etvidetur quodsitfalsa,nam
simplex de composito nonpredicatur. Sedspeciesestquidsimplex, homoverocom-
positum. Ergohecestfalsa : 'homo estspecies* . Item.Abstractum siveseparatum nonpotest
de separato vereaffirmative Sed
predicari. species separatumest ab homine, quiaestin
anima, homoauteminre extra.Quarepatetquodhecestfalsa:'homo estspecies*.
Sedcontra.Probatio quodsitvera.De quocumque predicatur diffinitio,et diffinitum.
Seddiffinitio speciei1 que est: quodpredicatur 1 depluribus differentibusnumero , predicatur
23va de homine, nam| homopotest predicari de pluribus differentibus numero. Ergospecies
potestpredicari de pluribus differentibus numero,(quia) de homine.Quareilia est
vera:lhomo estspecies*
.
Adhancquestionem dicendum quodintellectus nosterestvirtus passiva.Ideooportet
quodab aliquoextrnseco moveatur ad intelligendum. Nuncautemressuntque se
faciunt intelligi per sui speciem.Et sic per speciesrerumintellectus redditur actu
intelligens. Nam res intellecte non sunt in anima, sed species rerum. Et hoc estquod
dicitPhilosophus TertioDe animaquodlapisnonestin animasedspecieslapidis.Et
preterea. Patetquodresnonsitinanima.Namsicutdicit(Philosophus) Tertio De anima
quod sicut se habet sensus ad sensibile, ita intellectus ad intelligibile.Nunc autem color
nonestinoculo,sedspeciescolors.Ergonecintelligibile estinintellectu, sedspecies
Ex hisiampatetquodspeciesse habetad intellectum
intelligibilis. nonsecundum quod
intellectum estproprie, sedsicutintellectus redditur Et
intelligens.hecspeciesvocatur
similitudo rerum. Ethecde renonpredicatur. Namhecestfalsa:'resestsimilitudo sua*;
namseparatum nonpredicatur de separato. Et de iliamalequidemdicere tur'homo est
', quia
species homo non est similitudo sua. Alio modo dicitur speciesquepredicatur de
pluribus differentibus numero ineo quodquid.Etitaspeciesinre,utresipsaab intel-
lectuconcipitur. Namcumsitinipsanatura humana reperire utintelligatur perspeciem
que est in anima ; cum considerei istam speciemet considerei talemnaturam quesolet
in
reperiri subpositis per materiam differentibus, illirei sic intellecte tribuit rationem
speciei; etsicde aliissuomodo.Etsicpatetquodspeciesab animafactaestab ipsare.
Et ideode ipsapredica turdicendo'homo estspecies*. (Et sic patetquodipsaestvera:
'homoestspecies*). EthocestquoddicitAverois supraPrimm De anima quodintellectus
agensfacituniversalitatem inrebus,et hocest:reiintellecte abanimatribuit intellectus
essespeciem velgenus,et sicde aliis.Et intelligit quodspeciesnonestquidsimplex,
ymoestagregatum exresubiecta etintentione. Etideoderepotest predicari suomodo,
sicutaccidensconcretum de subiecto.Ulterius notaquodsicutnatura rei que estin
particularibus, uthomoestin intellectu nonintelligendo particularia, >icessespeciem
(r)ei
competit que est in particularibus, non tamen secundum quod estin particularibus.
Etitapatetquodistaestvera:'homo estspecies* et quomodoverificata*.
Adiliaque probant quodsitfalsa,dicendum. Adprimum. Cumdicitur:"simplex de
non
composito predicatur", concedo, linde visum est quodsp'ecies prout est similitudo
rei que estin anima,nonpredicatur. Sed proutpredicatur quidcompositum est,ut
1subponitur T
predicari
150

11:56:15 AM
 visumestiam.Et resextra;subiecta
tarnenintentioni.Adaliudsimiliter
patetsolutio
quod nonpredicaturseparatum quiailla similitudo
de separato, estnon
que separata
utpatuit.Etresistanonestseparata.
sedrespredicatur
predicatur,
Ethecsufficiant.
LECTIO TERTIA
Confusasubpositioetc. Superius actordeclaravit unummembrum personalis sub-
positionis,scilicet de determinata subpositione. Hic prosequitur de alio membro, idest
de confusa. Et habetduas.PrimodifHnit, secundodividit.Secunda:Item.Confusarum.
Hec secundain duas.Primodividitet declaratmembra. Secundoreprobat alterum
membrum divisionis. Secunda : Sedergo credo. Prima induas.Primo facitquod dictum est.
Secundoremovet dubiumsivesolvitquamdam contrarietatem que videtursequiex
dictis.Secunda:Sednevideatur opposition . Primain duas.Primodividit confusam sub-
positionem. Secundo assignat differentiam inter membra innuendo aliam di
visionem
confuse Secunda:Unde isteterminus 'homo *.Hecsitdivisio1.
subpositionis.
In primapartediffnit confusam subposi tionem. Et dicitquodconfusa subpositio est
acceptio termini communis propluribus ' mediante signo universali.Et glosapropluribus
idestproomnibus contentis subtermino, ut omnis homo estanimai*: ibi 'homo* statpro
quolibet subposito mediante iliosigno'omnis*.
Consequenter dividitconfusam subpositionem. Etdicitquodconfusarum aliaestconfusa
necessitate velmodi est et modus nam 1omnis* est etmodus, idest
signi (idem signum , signum
determinatio) ; alia est confusa [non] necessitate rei. Et declaratmembra. (Ut cum
dicitur:'omnis homo estanimai1)2 isteterminus 'homo* necessitate huiussigni1omnis*
confundi tur,idestdistribui tur,pro quolibetsuo supposito. Similiter cumunicuique
hominisua insitanimai itas, necessitate rei iste terminus 'animai* confunditur
pro
totanimalibus proquothominibus 'homo*. (Similiter cumunicuique homini suainsit
essentia,necessitate rei iste terminus'est* confunditur pro tot essentiispro
quot hominibus 'homo*>3. Et sic declaravit membra.Consequenter ipse assignat
differentiam intermembra innuendo aliamdivisionem confuse subpositionis. Et dicit
' isteterminus 'homo * dicitur confuse et
quodhic: omnis homo estanimai* subponere
mobiliter et distributive, confuse et distributive tenetur
quia ' pro quolibet homine,
sed mobiliter pro tantoquia licetfaceredescensum, ut omnis homo ; ergoSor; ergo
Plato, etsicde singulis*. Dicituristeterminus 'animal* teneridistributive et confuse,
quia statpro subpositis, sed non mobiliter, immo bene inmobiliter quia nonlicet
fieridescensum subeo. Namnonsequitur:'omnis homo estanimai*; ergo hocanimai*.
23vbI Sedestibiprocessus a simplici ad personalem, sicuthic: 'homo estdignssima creatura-
rum ; ergoaliquis homo*, vel: 'rosa est pulcherrima ;
florumergoaliqua rosa*. Sed protanto
differunt quiainistisestsimplex suppositio a partesubiecti, sedin illa: 'omnis homo est
animai* a partepredicati. Et itainnuit hieactorunamdivisionem quamposteadestruet
quodconfusarum subpositionum aliaestconfusa inmobilis, aliamobilis.
Sedvidetis quod actordicithicquodsuperius dixerat, scilicetquodhic: 'omnis homo est
animal *'animal *habet cuiusoppositum estprobatum
simplicem subpositionem, superius
et est verum.Similiter hic actorinnuitquod hic: ' homo estdignssima creaturarum*,
1TheMSSBordeaux 999,Vat.Lat.3022,andMadrid 1070have:Hecestdivisio lectionisusque ad
illampartem: Sedegocredo. Etibiterminetur lectionostra. Avignon 1077has:Hecestdivisio
lectionis.
2Supplied from theother MSS.
3Supplied from theother MSS.

l51

11:56:15 AM
'/}
omo'habetsimplicem subpositionem. Et hoc similitei estfalsum. Si verum estillud
quod superius est dictum, scilicetquod terminus habeat1 simplicem subpositionem
quandostatpro esse quod est in anima.Namhie: 'homoestdignssima creaturarum
'homo1 nonstatproessequodhabetinanima, sedproessequodhabetinreextra.Ethoc
patetperexpositorem supralibrum Periarmenias, quidicitquodnature humane accepte
ab intellectucompetit aliquod predicatum nonproessequodhabetinanima,sedinre
4 '
extra,sicuthic: homo (est)dignssima creaturarum illudpredicatum competit nature
humane apprehense ab intellectu tantum2 pro essequodhabetin re extra.Quare patet
quodnonhabet simplicem suppositionem sedpersonalem. Nampossumus dicere: 4homo est
dignssimacreaturarum; ergoaliquishomo'. Namsensusistiuspropositionis estquod non
est aliquishomoquinsitnobilior aliiscreaturis omnibus. NamdicitAristotiles Tertio
Topicorum si
quod optimus homo est melior et
optimoequo, simplicit^ homo est
meliorequo,quia dicitibidemquodin unoquoque(genere)estreperire unamper-
fectionem. Sed perfectio est nobiliorin hominequamin aliiscreaturis, quia habet
animamintellectivam. Et ideohomoestnobilior omnibus aliiscreaturis. Et sic patet
quod 'homo'habet hic personalem suppositionem. Similiter hic: 4rosaestpulcherrima
4rosa' habet Et 4
orum'<quod personalem suppositionem.sequiturrosaestpulcherrima
orum)* ; ergoaliquarosa '. Namsensusestquodnonestaliquarosaquinsit pulcrior
aliisfloribus,et statibi 4rosa '
proessequodhabetin re extraet nonin anima.Et sic
habetpersonalem suppositionem etnonsimplicem.
Consequenter actor removet dubium seu quandamcontrari etatem incidentem ex
Nam dixit modo actor cum dicitur: lomnis homo est animai le 4animaV
predictis. quod ',
habetsimplicem subpositionem. Et superius in principio lectionis dixitquodhabebat
confusam. Et isteduesuntopposite et nonpossunt starein eodem.Namconfusa sub
personali continetur et et sunt
personalis simplex opposite. videtur quod sint duo
ineodemcumdicitur:4omnis homo estanimai ' si le 4Ergo
animai ' habet et
opposita 4 simplicem
confusam. Ad hoc ipsesolvit.Et dicitquodle animal1 potestdupliciter consideran.
Unomodosecundum quodstatpronatura generis incommuni. Etsicsimplicem habet.
Aliomodosecundum quodistanatura iammultiplicatur persubposita, etsichabetcon-
fusam etnonmobilem sedinmobilem. Undedicitactorquodconfusa etinmobilis bene
potest stare cum simplici secundum diversa, idest secundum diversos respectus. Sed
confusa mobilis(non)potest starecumsimplici necsecundum idemnecsecundum diversa,
idestnec unorespectu nec diversis respectibus. Et itasolvitactor.Tarnen secundum
veritatem iam videtisquod le 4animal ' non habet
simplicem subpositionem, ymo
personalem, et nonconfusam, ut diceturinferius ab actore,ymohabetbenedeter-
minatam.
>
<Questiones
Circahanclectionem de
potestqueri precedenti lectione,quiaactordixitquod non
4animalest
sequitur: Sor,animalestPlatoetsic dealiis animal
; ergo estomnis 's, sedest
homo
processus a pluribus
determinatis
subpositionibus adunamdeterminatam. Etideopossunt
hicduoqueri.Primm, utrum processus a pluribusdeterminatisad unamdeterminatam
faciatfallaciam dictionis.
Secundum de virtutehuius: 4animalestomnis homo'
figure f
quamnegat actor.De primoqueretur infallaciafigure Seddesecundo
dictionis. queritur
hic:
1habebat T. 2tarnenMSS. 3similiter
T.
4 Suppliedfromtheother MSS.
5omnis homo estanimalT.
1S2

11:56:15 AM
 Utrum estomnis homo '
(hec)sitvera:'animal
Etprimo arguitur quodsitfalsa1, perAristotilem libroPeriarmenias. Quidicitquodnulla
estiliain qua universale sumptum universaliter predicatur ; et glosatur : nullaesty idest
falsa.Sedhicestinpredicto, dicendo:1animal estomnishomo' . Quarevidetur essefalsa.
Preterea. Arguitur sic: 4animal estomnis homo ' nullum
; animal estomnis homo'
; ergo animal
nonestanimal' . Conclusio estfalsaetinpossibilis. Ergoaliquapremissarum. Nonminor;
quodpatetperinductionem in singulis, quiaasinusnonestomnishomoet homonon
estomnishomo.Quaremaiorestfalsa;scilicetista: 4animal estomnis homo' . Preterea.
4 estomnis estomnis homo' etsi aliquodanimal
Sequituranimal homo; ergoaliquod animal est
omnishomo,ergoSorvel Platoestomnishomo.Sedhoc estfalsum. Ergo et prima,
4 sic. Hec estvera:| 4omnis
24rascilicethec: aimalestomnis homo'.
4
In oppositum arguitur
homo estanimal' , ergoest hec: animalestomnis homo'namsignificatum termini non
mutatur nequemodussignificandi per hoc quod ponitur in subiectovel predicato.
Etsicvidetur quodsitvera.
Adistamquestionem dicendum quodsimpliciter estvera.Namsicutanimaicompetit
hominipro quolibetsubposito hominis, sic homopro quolibetsubposito competit
animalipro (quibusdam suissubpositis)2. Et ideo sicutistaestvera: 1omnis homo est
animai 4 ' et .
', itaet ista: animai estomnis homo qui dubitat de una, dubitai de alia,linde
1 estSor,ergoanimai estPlato,et sicdealiis.
sequitur:animai estomnis homo ; ergoanimai
Quaresimpliciter3 primaestvera,scilicet hec: 'animal estomnis homo'. Ethocintelligas
le 4omnis '4 teneatur distributive. Nam si teneatur manifeste
positoquod collective,
essetfalsa.
Adargumenta que probant ipsamessefalsam dicendum. Etprimoad primm. Quando
dicitPhilosophus quod ilia estnulla in qua universale sumptum universaliter predicatur,
dicendum quodipseintelligit quandopredicatum estinplusquamsubiectum, ut 4homo
estomne animal' . Sedsipredicatum nonsitinplus,beneestvera,lindeetiamistaestvera:
4homo estomnis homo ' et sicde consimilibus.
Ad aliud.Cumarguispersillogismum ex oppositis:uianimaiestomnis homo; nullum
animal est omnis homo; ergo animai non estanimai' , (conclusio estfalsa",concedo;"ergo
aliqua premissarum", et etiamconcedo;et tu dicis: "ergononminor,scilicetista:
4nullum animalestomnis dicoquodymominorestfalsa,hecscilicet:4nullum
homo')*;
animalestomnis homo'.Et tu probasper inductionem; dico quod tu non probas
sufficienter, immoarguisab insufficienti. Namdebesinducere:4homo nonestomnis
homo'. Et tuncestfalsa.Namvisumestquodhecestvera:4homo estomnis homo'. Etsic
4
patetquodhecestfalsa:nullum animal estomnis
4animai
homo'.
Adaliudpatetsolutio.Cumdicis: sequitur estomnis homo ; ergoaliquod animai est
omnis homo' , concedo;et si: aliquodanimaiestomnishomo;ergoSorvelPlatoet sic
dealiis,certeverum 4
estsubdisiunctione
4 Sor quodestvera: ergoSorvelPlatosubdisiunctione
estomnis homo' ; sed non sequitur:ergo est omnis homo' , (sedsubdisiunctione bene
4 SorvelPlato et sic de aliisest omnis Et sic est vera:
sequitur:
4animai ergo , homo')6. patetquod
estomnis homo' .

1fallacia
T.
2rasura
inTsupplied
fromtheother
MSS.
3similiter
T.
4animal
T
5Supplied
from
theother
MSS.
*Supplied
from
theother
MSS.

lS 3

11:56:15 AM
 LECTIO QUARTA
Sed ego credo etc.Superius actorposuitunamdivisionem confuse subpositionis. Hic
destruit illamdivisionem quantum ad alterum membrum. Et tur
dividi in duas. Primo
destruit illudmembrum perquatuor rationes. Secundo solvitad rationem perquamipsi
movebantur. Secunda:Causaautem1. Primain quatuor secundum quatuor rationes. Se-
cunda:Item.Hocidem videtur.Tertia:Item. Totum Quarta:Item.
universale. Comparatio ilia.
Primain duas.Primoenimdeclarat minorem. Secundoponitmaiorem. Secunda:Sed
natura generis. Hecestdivisiolectionis intra.
f
Ad (primam) partem sic procedit.Dixitsuperius quodcumdicitur:omnis homo est
animaV , isteterminus lanimaV habetconfusam subpositionem inmobilem. Mododestruit
hocetdicitactorquod2noncreditquodterminus inpredicai positus habeat confusam
subpositionem mobilem nec inmobilem. Et hoc
probat perquatuor rationes. Prima est
talis. Naturagenerismultiplicata mobiliter vel inmobiliter nonestgenus.Sed cum
dicitur:'omnis homo estanimal ', ibipredicatur genus.Ergononpotest confundi mobiliter
velinmobiliter. Etsicilleterminus 4animal' non habetconfusam mobilem
subpositionem
necinmobilem. Inhacrati onesicprocedit quodprimo declarat minorem, scilicet hanc
'
quod: omnis homo estanimaV predicatur genus.Nam,utdicitPorphirius, omnequodde
aliopredicatur, autestmaiusautminus autequale.Sedhic: 4omnis homo estanimal ' non
predicatur equale.Ergomaius.Sed nonaccidentale. Ergoessentiale. Ergogenusvel
differentia. Sednonpredicatur ibi differentia. Ergogenus.Sedposteaponitmaiorem,
quandodicit:Sed*natura generis etc. Consequenter probatactorpersecundam que*
non differ a primanisiquiaalio modoprobatminorem, lindesimiliter formabitis
rationem : natura generis multiplicata mobiliter velinmobiliter nonestgenus ; sedomnis
homoest animal;ibi predicatur genus;ergononpotestmultiplican6; mobiliter vel
inmobiliter. Et minorem declarat in littera alio modoquamprius,scilicetquodhic
predicatur genus.Quia,ut vultAristotiles in PrimoTopicorum, omnequodde alio
predicatur autpredicatur conversim, autnonconversim. Si conversim, autestdiffinitio,
autproprium. Sinonconversimi, autcaditindiffinitione, autnon.Sinon, sicestaccidens.
Sisic,autestgenus veldifferentia. Sed1omnis homo estanimal' ibinon differen-
predicatur ' non
tia.Ergogenus.Etsicminor estdeclarata. Etvidequodverum estquodibi*animai
habetconfusam subpositionem nec mobilem nec inmobilem, quia, utdicet actor inferius,
etbeneomnisconfusa subpositio estnecessitate signi.Etsignum positum a partesubiecti
nonpotestdistribuere terminm (positum) a partepredicati. Nonenimpotest attingere
predicatum;
24.ri) de signointelligas afirmativo. Namsignum | universale negativum bene
distribuii predicatum virtute negationis. Sed cum actor dicit quod natura generis
multiplicata mobiliter velinmobiliter nonestgenus,si ipseintelligat de natura generis
proutestintentio queestinanima, sicverum estquod(non)multiplicatur persubposita.
Sed natura generis prout est res, ut animai , benemultiplicatur persubposita, quiain
subposi tishabetesse.
4
Consequenter probat peraliamrationem quod omnis homo estanimaV , ibiisteterminus
1TheotherMSS.add:ubilectio
terminatur.
2quodactorT
3questione
T
*siT
5quodT
6predicari
T
7estpropriumT

lS4-

11:56:15 AM
'animal' nonhabeatconfusam mobiliter Totumin quantitate et
nequeinmobiliter.
totumuniversale <exopposita distinguuntur. Et esttotumin quantitate)1 duplex,ut
dicitactor.Estenimquoddam totum inquantitate completum etperfectum, utquando
terminus confunditur mobiliter. Est aliudincompletum, ut quandoconfunditur in-
mobiliter. Et sivesitcompletum siveincompletum, estoppositum totiuniversale, ut
vultactor.Etduoopposita nonpossunt stareineodem.Sedhic: 'omnis homo estanimal' ,
animalesttotumuniversale, cumsitgenus.Et sic nonesttotumin quantitate. Et ita
nonconfunditur mobiliter nec inmobiliter, quiasi mobiliter confundere tur,totumin
quantitateperfectum esset.Si veroinmobiliter, essettotum inquantitate incompletum.
Sednullum istorum potestesse.Ergo2etc.
Sed in hoc quoddicitactorquodest quoddamtotumin quantitate incompletum et
inperfectum, nonbenedicit.Namomnetotuminquantitate perfectum estetcompletum,
quiatotumin quantitate esttotumuniversale (sumptum) universaliter, idestterminus
communis cumsignouniversali. Etitaestibidicide omni.Sed,utdicitAristotiles libro
Priorm, dicide omniestquandonichilestsumeresubsubiecto de quo nondicatur
predicatum. Ergooportet quodomnetotuminquantitate sitperfectum et completum.
Etsemper signum universale quidquid mobiliter
distribuit, distribuit. Unde omnesiste
suntfalsede virtute locutionis: 1omnis muliertimetinpartu ' et 1omnis homo inmari*.
timet
Etsicpatetquodomnetotum inquantitate completum et perfectum est.
' '
Consequenter ponitquartam3 rationem ad probandum quodle animalnonhabetcon-
fusammobiliter nequeinmobiliter. Et dicitquod comparado illa secundum (quam)
inferiorareducuntur adsuperius diversa estabillasecundum quamsuperius* reducitur ad
inferioras.Etitacumsintdiverse comparationes, nonpoterunt simulesseineodem.Sed
in hac: 4omnis homo estanimai''animaistatibi in comparatione prima,scilicetprout
inferiora6reducuntur in superius, namstatpronatura in communi. Ergononstabit in
secunda comparatione, scilicetproutsuperius reducitur in idest
inferiora, multiplicatur
perea. Etsie patetquodnonpoterit multiplican isteterminus 'animal'in hac: 'omnis
homo estanimal'.Quarenonhabebit confusam subpositionem mobiliter necinmobiliter.
<Etistaargumenta concedimus. Dicitactoretverum dicit:quod4animal ' nonconfundi-
turmobiliter necinmobiliter)?. Etinhocterminatur sententia lectionis.

(Questiones)
( Utrum
terminus
possit provoce
subponere )
'
Queritur utrumterminus possitsubponere provoce,dicendohomo estvox'.Arguitur
quodsic,per intentionem in
Aristotilis Elenchis. Dicit enim quod albumestnomen
etreset dicitquodnomenestvox.Etita*album '
potestsumiprovoce.Preterea. Dicit
PhilosophuslibroPeriarmenias
quod cursus
' estnomen et curriestverbum.Etverbum
est vox. Ergoetc. In oppositum arguitur. Quandocumque aliquidest indifferens
ad
aliquaplura,ipsum coartatumadalterum tantum tenetur
pro ilioad quodestcohartatum.
Ergovox quandosumitur anteinpositionem ad quodeumque
indifferens significatum
1Suppliedfrom theother
MSS.
2genus T
3quandam T
4 inferius
T
5superiora
T
6superiora
T
7 Supplied
from theother
MSS.

*ss

11:56:15 AM
 representandum <vel>ad seipsam, ipsacoartata ad significatimi solumtenebitur prore
Etideononpoterit
significata. teneri pro voce.Quareestfalsa:' homo estvox' . Etsicde
similibus.Maiormanifesta est.Namcum'animal ' indifferens sitadrationale etirrationale,
quando contrahitur per 'rationale', iam removetur ibi differentia ad (ir)rationale. Minor
patetde se quodvox (anteinpositionem) ad significandum estdifferens ut accipiatur
provocevelprosignificato. Ergoetc.
Ad hancquestionem dicendum quodde virtute locutionis (terminus nonpotestsub-
ponere provoce,ymodevirtute locutionis)1 Kecestfalsa4homo estvox '. Adhocdeclaran-
dumaccipioduaspositiones2. Quarum primaestquodvoxex quoestinposita ad signi-
ficandum ubicumque ponatur suum
subponit significatum. Secunda positio estquodquan-
do aliquodpredicatum attribuitur subiecto, si rpugnt ei quodperterminm signifi-
estfalsa.Tuncergodicendum 'homo estvox '
catur,propositio perprimam positionem
sensusest: ressignificata 4
nominehominis ' estvox.Sedpersecundam positionem, quando
predicatum rpugnt subiecto, est falsa. (Sic ergopatetperquamviamistapropositio
estfalsa.Namex quo ratiosignificandi attributa estvociactualiter et representat suum
significatum, exhoctollitur acceptio provoce,quiaperrationem significandi representat
aliquidcui Vox'rpugnt, scilicetresipsa.Namressignificata nonestvox. Et forte
aliquisargueret contrahoc. Namposterior acceptionondebettollere3 priorem.Ergo
cumanteinpositionem voxpossetaccipiproseipsa,posterior acceptio, idestprosig-
non
nificato, aufertprimam quin adhuc possit accipipro voce. Dicendum quod immo potest
tollere cumposterior Ut hic. Cum 'homo ' sitindifferens
priorem, repugnet prime. patet
24vaad nigrum | etalbum* antequam sitalbus,ipsofactoalbononestindifferens ad nigrum.
Etpriorfuitacceptio inhomine utpossetaccipiproalbovelpronigroquamquodesset
actualiteralbus.Et tarnen istaacceptioposterior aufert primam, cumsitei opposita.
Similiterhoc patetin continuo. Namcontinuum (est) in potentia ad divisionem in
infinitum.Etperposterius utinforma turforma carnis.Etperistamposteriorem accep-
tionemtollitur prior.Namcontinuum licetinquantum continuum sit divisibile in
infinitum,tarnen proutinformatur forma carnis, nonestpossibiledividiin infinitum.
NamdicitPhilosophus libroPhisicorum quodestdareminimam carnem. Ergosimiliter
inproposito. Cumvoxanteinpositionem sitindifferens ad representandum seipsam vel
aliudextrase, cumei tributa estratiosignificandi ab inponente ad significandum rem
actualiterproqua rpugnt voci,cumressignificata nonsitvox,exhocestquodprima
non stare '
acceptiopotesttollis, scilicet quod potest provoce.Sic eritistafalsa6:homo
estvox'.
'
Sedaliquisforte diceret quodhecestvera homo estvox' , quiavoxnonsolumse habetin
rationesignidesignantis aliquid extra terminm, sed nominaiaggregatum ex voceet
significatione.Et ita est vera per accidens. Nam attribuitur aggregato pro altera parte
aggregati.Et itaredditur locutioveraperaccidens. SicutpatetperAristotilem Quinto
Phisicorum ponentem talespropositiones esseveras : 'homo sanatur '
quia Coraxsanatur, et
'homo * ' essetvera acci-
videquiaoculus.Etitadiceret aliquisquodista: homo estvox per
dens.Sedhocnonpoteststare,quiatunchecessetfalsa:'homo estanimai' , si aggregatum
ex voceet significatione predicaretur de alio aggregato ex voce et significato et attri-
1Suppliedfrom theother MSS.
2propositiones MSS.
3intelligere
T
4nigrum T
5copulariT
6fallacia
T

1^6

11:56:15 AM
 bueretur illisubiecto cumproalteraparteaggregati repugnarei predicatum subiecto,
scilicetprovoce.Namhecvox'homo' nonesthecvox'animal '. Etsic essetfalsahec:
4homo estanimai.Et si aliquisdicatquidimmoveraperaccidens,quia predicatum
rationepartisverificatur de aggregato, hoc nonpotesthabereveritatem. Namsi hoc
essetverum, hecpropositio redderetur vera: 'homo albusesthomo . Ethocestfalsum.
niger'
hec estfalsa'homo estvox ' de virtute ut visumest. Et
Quarepatetquod locutionis,
ut ' homoest et
dissillabum' 'homo est nomen de virtute locutionister-
consimiles, , quia
minus solumsubponit proilioquodsignificat etnonprovocenecpromodosignificando
Adargumenta dicendum. QuodAristotiles
"4 '
ponitistas: albumestnomen, et 4curriest
verbum ", dicendum quod omnes istede virtute locutionissunt sed
false, de possibilitate
possunt verifican etc.
LECTIO QUINTA
Causa autemetc. Superius actordestruxit perquatuor rationes quamdam divisionem
datamab antiquis. Hic removet causamperquamipsimovebantur quod terminus in
predicato positushabebatconfusam subpositionem inmobilem. Et ostendit quodnon
postest haberemobilem nequeinmobilem. Etsiedestruxit istam divisionem quamlaten-
terposuerat, scilicetquodaliaestconfusa mobilis, aliainmobilis. Inhacparte vultremo-
verecausamperquamipsidicebant terminm in predicato positum habereconfusam
subpositionem et ponebant illamdivisionem.
Et petestdividiin partestres.Primorepetitcausameorumper quammovebantur.
Secundocausamdestruit. Tertioex ipsa infertdestruetionem cuiusdam divisionis
precedentis. Secunda: Dicimus enim (quod) in hoc.Tertia: Et propter hoc dicemus. Secunda
istarum dividitur in duas.Primoadducitquoddamsimileper quod destruit causam
eorum.Secundoapplicaiilludsimilead propositum. Secunda:Similiter inproposito.
Hecsecunda induas.Primoenimdestruit adistum terminm *animal1 . Secundo
' quantum ' '
quantum ad hoc verbum es l. Secunda: Similiter hoc verbum est .
Et illaparsPropter hocdestruimus dividitur in tres2.Primodestruit illadivisionem. Se-
cundoprobat quoddam subpositum. Tertioinfert corrolarium. Secundo:Quiahumanitas.
Tertia:Etpropter hocsignum sivemodus. Hecestdivisio.
Ad primam sic
partem procedit. Repetit causamprimoperquamdicebant quodter-
minusin predicato positushaberetconfusam subpositionem, ut destruat causam.Et
dicitquodcausaperquamipsimovebantur facilisestad solvendum. Et repetit illam
causam : ipsi dicebant quod' cum unicuique homini insit sua animalitas et essentia,
hocnomen'animai 'homo'
necessario
4 '
tenebitur prototanimalibus proquot
'
hominibus
'
etsimiliter hocverbumestprototessentiis proquothominibus homo . Etistadicebant
istam causam iste terminus *animal' et isteterminus ' homo '
propter quia habe<re)nt
confusam inmobilem subpositionem. Et statimintendit destruere istamcausam.Et
adducitquoddamsimile.Et dicit:quod in hoc argumento nullaest apparentia. Et
vb in hoc ut cum dicimus 'omnis homo est
24 intellige: ar|gumento quodsequitur: albus',
'omnishomo sithominem essequinsitanimal, necesseestquod
t cuminpossibile
estniger'
intelligantur totanimalitates quothumanitates, et tamenfatuum essedicerequodilla
multitudo animalitatum sit ibi ex parteistiuspredicati quod est 'albus'vel 'niger' .
Immodicitactorquod 'homo',logiceloquendoet nonnaturaliter, constituitur ex
' et 'rationali'.
animali Etsic'homo' inse includit 'animai'.Admultiplicationem hominis

1quantum
adistum
terminm T
homo
2duasT
157

11:56:15 AM
sequitur multiplicado1 animalitatis, cumdicitur:*omnis homo estalbus*
. Etillamultitudo
animalitatum nonestibiexpartepredicati, sedquia'homo' inse includit 'animal'.
Modoapplicatad propositum. Et dicitquodsimiliter estin proposito. Cumdicimus
'omnis ' '
homo estanimai ', hic homomultiplicatur et confunditur, et ad multitudinem
hominis sequitur multitudo animalitatum. Sedillamultitudo nonestab istopredicato
' ' sed ab ilio animali in homine.lindeibi 'animai '
quod est animai 4animaV quod intelligitur
predicatur et intelligitur in subiecto.Et illud non
quodpredicatur multiplicatur
sed illudquodintelligitur in homine.Ut patethic: 'omne animairationale mortale est
animai' hic 'animai ' etilludnon sedilludquodpositum estin
; predicatur multiplicatur,
subiectomultiplicatur. Similiter dicitipse de hoc verbo'est'quodnonconfunditur
mobiliter nec inmobiliter. Namverumest quod ad multitudinem hominis sequitur
multitudo essentiarum. Sed hoc dixitactor:habebatde se ipsumsubiectum, scilicet
'homo', antequam existeret inoratione.
Sic igiturestdestructa illa divisioque dicebatquodalia eratconfusa mobilitei, alia
inmobiliter, quia nullaest inmobilis. Nam visum estquod cum dicitur: 'omnis homo est
animai', le 'animai'necle 'est'nonhabebant confusam, utipsiponebant, necmobilem
necinmobilem. Etpropter hocdestruit actorquamdam divisionem precedentem etdicit
hanc,scilicet : aliamobilis, aliainmobilis, etqueprecedebat hanc.Dicendum quod illarum
quedamest confusa necessitate signivel modi,et quedamnecessitate rei. Destruit
modoistamquodnullaestconfusa necessitate rei immoomnisconfusa estnecessitate
' '
signi.Sicut hic dicitactor, omne animal rationale mortale
est animal', le animalin
ibi
subiectoconfunditur virtute signi,similiter hic: 'omnis homo estanimai'virtute signi
'animai'quodintelligitur inhomine confunditur prototanimalibus quotsunthomines.
Etpropter hocdicitquod,naturaliter loquendo, totsuntanimalitates quothumanitates.
Etdicitactor'naturaliter , nam
loquendo' logiceloquendo eadem esthumanitas inomnibus
sicutidemhomoin communi estin omnibus et intellige
quodlogiceloquendo eadem
esthumanitas in omnibus, verumesteademin specie,sedin numero nonesteadem,
sicutnecSornecPlatoinnumero nonsuntidem.Etdeclarat similiterloquendo (natura-
liter)qualiter nonesteademhumanitas inmeetinte. Namsicutanimameaestdiversa a
tua,itahumanitas meaque estperanimam meam,estdiversa abhumanitate tua.Etita
dicitactor:confundendo 'hominem' universale confundit 'animai'
signum quodintelligitur
ineo, quod<est>contractum adhominem. Etsicomnisconfusa subpositio estnecessitate
signi.
( Questiones
)
(Utrum terminus adiectivus
possit )
subponere
Queriturutrumterminus adiectivus
possitsubponere. Et videturquodnon.Quodhabet
rationem nonhabetrationem
inherendi subponendi.Sedadiectivum permodum
significai
inherendi.Ergoadiectivum nonsubponit. Item.Regulaestin gramatica quodnullum
adiectivum Ergoetc.Item.Quodnonhabetrationem
subponit. nonsubponit.
materie,
Sedadiectivanonhaben t rationemmaterie. Ergoetc. Probatiominoris.Proprium est
formeinherere,ut(dicit)Alanus.Sedadiectiva inherent.Ergohabent rationem forme.
Etsicpatetquodnonhabent rationem materie.Preterea.Que suntdiverse non
species,
habenteandemproprietatem. Sed adiectivum et substantivum suntoppositespecies
nominis.Ergonon communicant eandemproprietatem. ed substantivasubponunt.
nonsubponunt.
Ergoadiectiva
1multitudo
T

158

11:56:15 AM
 In oppositum tarnen arguitur.Subpositio debeturtermino, lindeterminus est. Sed
terminusadiectivus estetiamterminus. Ergo terminus adiectivus poterit subponere.
Quidamdixerunt de istaquestionequodadiectiva nonsubponunt, sedcopulant. Sedex
dictiseorumostenditur eis quod subponat adiectivum. Namipsibenedicuntquod
subpositioestacceptiotermini ab intellectu. Ergoproeo subponi t terminus pro quo
etid quodaccipitur
accipitur ab intellectusubponit. Sedterminus accidentalis accipitur
ab intellectuproforma accidentali.
Ergohabent concedere1 quodadiectiva subponant.
Ethocestverum.
Et dicuntquidamquodsubponit respectu forme orationiset nonrespectu intellectus.
tarnen facta inoppositum ' ' multismodis
Intelligendum propterargumenta quod subpositio
25radicitur.Uno mododicitursubponere quod significai inesse2 | subportantis actum.
Et sicaccipitur a gramatico et nona logico.Et sic manifestum estquodadiectiva non
4
Aliomododicitursubpositio ' idemquodypotesis, sicutdicitur in
possuntsubponere. ' '
: et unum", quodita ibi sumitur
disputatione egoarguam; ' subponam
' ab intellectu
subpositiopro
ypotesi.Aliomododicitur subpositioacceptioipsiustermini proaliquo.
Etsicaccipitur a logico.Etsicadiectiva possunt subponere.
Etperhocpatetsolutio adprima triaargumenta queprobant quodadiectivum nonpossit
de
subponere subpositione gramaticali.Et de iliabene concedo. Sed ad ultimum dicendum
quodilludprobatquod<adiectivum> aliquomodononpossitsubponere quiadiverse
speciesnonhabent eandem proprietatem ; sedadiectivum etsubstantivum suntopposite
speciesnominis ; ergo non habebunt eandem proprietatem - , dicendum quodopposite
speciesnonhabent eandem proprietatem propriam, sedbeneeandem proprietatem com-
munem possunt habere.Undehomo et asinus habent eandemproprietatem communem
quodsentiunt. Etsubponere estproprietas communis.

From this treatise,just as from the introductorysection of the whole

commentary(see above, pp. 130-134) it clearlyappears that Guillelmus
Arnaldi and Robert Anglicus apparently did not know each other's
work on the subject. Thereforeit is impossibleto establishthe chrono-
logical order of the commentariesby Robert Anglicus and Guillelmus
Arnaldi.
The remainingtreatises(De relativis , De appellatio-
, De ampliationibus
nibus, De restrictionibusand De distributionibus
) do not need discussing
here.
In one of the forthcomingissues of thisjournal I hope to conclude
this series of articles on the genuine text of Peter of Spain's Summule
logicaleswith a discussionof some anonymousthirteenthcenturycom-
mentarieson the Summule . Besides, some general conclusions will be
drawn on account of the texts of Peter's work these commentators
apparentlyhad at their elbows.
1Subponere
T
2other
MSS.; in[o]ratione
T
1S9

11:56:15 AM
 A NoteOnTheDdteOfLambert
ofAuxerre*
s Summule
A number ofresemblances found between theusualtextofPeterofSpain'sSummule and
thatofLambert ofAuxerre' s treatiseofthesametitlehadfrequently raisedthequestion
oftheinterdependence ofthesetexts.As is known,Konstant Michalski defended the
thesisofthelargedependence ofPeterofSpainuponLambert ofAuxerre 1. Asa matter
offactMichalski hadto workuponinterpolated textsofbothworksandthetextual
resemblances alludedto bythePolishMediaeval istdisappear forthegreater partwhen
theauthentic textsareconsidered. Grabmann heldtheinverse opinionandespecially
pointedto theopening wordsof Lambert's work:Ut noviartium auditores plenius
ea
intelligantque in summulis edocentur. . . etc.andsawanallusion to thetitleofPeter's
Summule logicales in thesewords.2However,theoriginal titleof Peter'sworkwas
Tractatus, notSummule , aswasfrequently shown inourpreceding articles. Thequestion of
whether or notLambert wasreallyinfluenced byPeter'sworkseemsto be farmore
complicated. Itwillnotbe discussed here.
A different question is thatofthechronologic orderofPeter'sandLambert's works.
Itssolution is important fortheproblem ofintei dependence, evenifit is notdecisive,
sincepriority ofoneworkto theotherdoesnotimplythelatter' s dependence upon
theformer.
As to Peter'swork,fromtheexistence ofa commentary on it whichdatesfromas
earlyas the i 's
240 (see our articleon Guillelmus Arnaldi) the conclusion mustbedrawn
thatPeterofSpaincannothavewritten hisSummule logicales (or better : Tractatus)after
i 240.
Lambert ofAuxerre is commonly supposed to havewritten hisSummule* before125-3.
As is known,Berhard Geyer found in a Padua manuscript ( Biblioteca Universitaria
,
cod. 647)thefollowing colophon attheendofa copyofLambert's Summule ;4
Expliciunt summule editein francia a quodamfratre de ordinepredicatorum, qui
vocaturfrater lambertus et posteafuitpenitentiarius dominipape,sed quando
composuit fuitmagister legisnavarre, qui estsepultus in domofratrum ad
parisius
sanctum Jacobum.
Geyerhasconcluded from thiscolophon thatLambert mostprobably wrotehisSummule
inPariswhenhewastheteacher ofTheobald II ofNavarra before thelatter followedhis
father TheobaldI on thethrone of Navarra in 12^3. However, Geyerseemsto have
misinterpreted thecolophonon severalpoints.As a matter of factit contains four
points :
1K. Michalski, Lescourants Oxford
philosophiques et Parispendant leXlVe sicle
, Cracovia 1921,
p.
2 M. Grabmann, HandschriftlicheForschungen undFunde zu denphilosophischen Schrien desPetrus
Hispanusydesspteren PapstesJohannesXXI(f 1277)in:Sitzunsgber. derBayer. Akad. d.Wissensch.
Phil.-Hist.Abt.1936,Heft 9,pp.41-42.
3Thework consistsofeleven chapters: (2) Depredicabilibus
(1) Deintroductionibusy , (3) Deargumen-
tation , (4) Delocis
sillogistica (g)Delocis
dialeticis, , (6) Desuppositionibusy
sophisticis (7) Deappella-
tane, (8) Derestrictioney (9) Deampliatione, (10)Dedistributionibus, (11) Derelatione. Somelater
manuscripts ofthework givea tractDepredicamentis, butthisiscertainly aninterpolation consist-
ingofthetextofPeter ofSpain'stract ofthesametitletogether withinterspersed comments.
4 Thepagesofthisfourteenth century manuscript arenotnumbered. It consists oftwoparts:
(1) thetextofPeter ofSpain's Summule (pp.1-98)and(2) Lambert's Summule (pp.3-163).The
colophon isfound onp. i63battheend,after some blanklines.
160

11:56:15 AM
(1) Lambert editedhisSummule in Francia (Paris>
(2) Lambert wasafterwards penitentiary ofthePope
(3) whencomposing theSummule he wastheteacher oftheKingofNavarra
(4) he was buried in the Cloister of Saint Jacquesin Paris.
Someobservations canbe made.First, wearetoldthatLambert editedhisworkinParis,
not,as Geyerassumed, thathe wrote it there.Secondly, he wroteit in behalf ofhis
teaching theKingofNavarra , nottheCount ofChampagne , as theTheobalds werecalled
before their accession totheNavarra throne, ortheCount ofRosnai, as Henry I ofNavarra
(1270-74)was calledbefore hisaccession. Thisdistinction seemsthemoreimportant,
sincetheauthor ofourcolophon appears tohavehada soundsenseofchronology, asmay
be seenfrom hisdistinction between thecomposition andtheedition oftheworkand
from hisexplicit information thatLambert waspenitentiary ofthePopeafter theedition
ofhisSummule . Besides, a specialpointseemsto be madeofthefactthatLambert had
beentheteacher ofno lessa personthana King.
Theobald I doesnotseemto deserve ourconsideration inthisrespect, sincehe became
Kingof Navarra whenhe was alreadyin his thirty fourth year(May7, 1234)1and
therefore is notlikelyto havebeen,as a king,a pupilofLambert's. Henry I (theFat)
ofNavarra (December1270-July1274)wasa younger sonofTheobald I, whogot a
daughter in 1271,so thathisbeinga pupilofLambert's whenhe wasalready kingis
notveryplausible either.
The onlypersonforwhomall datafitin extremely wellis Theobald II. He musthave
beenbornin1240sinceheistoldtohavesucceeded hisfather Theobald I afterthelatter's
death(July12^3)undertheguardianship ofhismother of
Margaret Bourbon, whenhe
wasinhisthirteenth year2. He married Isabella,whowasbornon March2, 1242as a
daughter ofKingLouisIX ofFrance,beforeJuly21, i2$*.He wasanointed kingin
127whenhe wasseventeen yearsold. Thisyoungking(whowasat thetimeofhis
accession onlytwelveyearsofage)is quitelikelyto havebeenLambert's Royalpupil,
nodoubtattheCourt(atPamplona, or,morelikely, at Troyes).
So we havethefollowing datesforLambert's Summule.Theworkwaswritten atTroyes
(orPamplona), not in Paris,between 12^3 and 1257 when the king was anointed andis
likelytohavefinished hisstudies.Itwaspublished afterwards inParis,whenLambert wasa
member oftheDominican Convent there,before he becamepenitentiary ofthePope.
Unfortunately we do notknowso farwhichPopemadehimhispenitentiary. He might
havebeena PopeofFrenchorigin,e.g. UrbanIV (1261-64;Jacques Pantaleon) or,
moreprobably, Innocent V (1276; PeterofTarentaise O.P.), whohadbeenhimself
a member oftheSaintJacques Convent in Parisfrom12-64and 1267-69.So the
compositionof Lambert's Summule may be dated between 12^3-^7(atTroyes orPamplona)
anditspublication between 12j and1276,mostlikely about1260(inParis).No doubt

1Hewasborn some timeafterhisfather's

death(onMay24,1201)atTroyes.
2SeeNouvelle biographie
gnrale lestemps
depuis lesplusreculs aveclesrenseigne-
jusqu'1850-60,
ments et l'indication
bibliographiques dessources consulter,
publie parMMFirmin Didot
Frres sousla direction
de M. le Dr. Hoefer.Vol.45 Paris1866(reprintCopenhague1969),
s.v.ThibautV. - Ulysse
Chevalier'sn1250seems tobea misprint.
(U. Chevalier, des
Rpertoire
sources dumoyen
historiques II,(Reprint
ge.Bio-Bibliographie NewYork1969),col.4452).
3Forthedates,seeStammtafeln zurGeschichte
derEuropischen
Staaten
(Europische
Stammtafeln).
II Dieauszerdeutschen
StaatenvonWilhelm KarlPrinz vonIsenburg,
Marburg 42and43,
i960,Tafel
which, however,wronglygives1237asTheobald's birth-year.
161

11:56:15 AM
 inwhichit wasedited,as mayappearfrom
wehavetheworkinthelaterredaction the
inwhichevery
incipit allusion 1
to theRoyalpupilis missing.

1AsfarasI know thework isextantineleven : Paris

manuscripts B.N. Lat.7392; 13.966; 13.967;
16.617;Nouv. Acq.lat.827;Troyes, Eibl.Municipale
cod.2401;Lamballe (nowinParis, Bibl.
Nat.),cod.i ; Semur, cod.2; Padua,
Bibl.Municipale Bibl.Univ.cod.647;Erfurt Amplon. Oct.66
(wronglyascribed toWaltherBurley), andPrague,Univ.Libr.cod.893(with thecommentary of
JohnofPrague). theTracts
Besides, III,IVandVandparts oftheTractsI, IIarefound inMonte-
Archivio
cassino, cod.362VV.- Anedition
dellaBadiay ofthework wasannounced in 1963by
Franco
Professor AlessiooftheUniversity ofMilan.(SeeBulletin
dela Socitnurnationale
pour
dela Philosophie
l'Etude Mdivale s (1963),p. 11 C 36).Ashewaskind
[S.I.E.P.M.], enough to
informme(letter ofMarch 18,1968)thework wasprintingthen.Asfara I know ithasnotyet
beenpublished.
To be continued
Nijmegen
Sophiaweg73

Books Received

YvesF. - A. Giraud,
LafabledeDaphne, essaisuruntypedemtamorphose dansla
vgtale
et danslesartsjusqu'la findu XVllesicle
littrature , (Histoiredes ides,et critique
- vol.92), 574pp. + 12plates,Droz,Genve,1968;prijsZw. Fr. 68.00.
littraire
BibliaSacraiuxtavulgtmversionem
, adiuvantibus /. Gribomont
B. Fischer, , H. F. D.
, W.Thiele
Sparks etbrevi
, recensuit instruxit
apparatu R. Weber, 1 vol. Wrtembergische
Bibelanstalt, 1969;prijsD.M. 6.00.
Stuttgart,
JamesA. Mhler,S. J., TheBeginning
OfEternal
Life.TheDynamic
FaithofThomas
Aquinas andInterpretation
, Origins , 144pp. Philosophical NewYork,1968.
Library,
162

11:56:15 AM