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12. Bakhtins core argument is that meaning is, in essence, dialogic and all meaning is relational.
Therefore, it is impossible to consider one Self as a Self, and to become self-conscious, if one
does not reveal ones Self to the Other, through the Other and with the help of the Other
(Bakhtin 1984: 287, see Guillaume 2002a: para. 21). Without the Others presence the Self
does not exist and have any meaning on its own since it cannot be defined (Holquist 2002: 36).
Dialogism thus provides an epistemologically sound way to establish a semantic network
between the Self and the Other (Guillaume 2002a: para. 22). Identity is then seen as constructed
and reconstructed reflexively, through the Selfs relations with the Others. From a Bakhtinian
perspective, the world is not only seen through the time/space of the Self but at the same time
through the time/space of the Other (Holquist 2002: 35).
13. Todorov defines a three level analysis of the Other. In the first, the axiological level, a value
judgment concerning the Other is made: the other is good or bad. The second, praxeological
level, involves positioning and distancing in relation to the Other. At this level, Todorov argues
that the self embraces the others values, identifies the Other with itself and imposes its own
image on him. Todorov argues that in the third, the epistemic level, the Other could either be
known or not I know or am ignorant of the others identity (p. 185).
14. Other possible configurations of the alterity of the Other also exist; non-adversary and more
positively identified Otherness may also have a constitutive role in the construction of collective
identities (see Rumelili 2004). The degree of difference from the Self may also vary, as Levinas
(1989) argues, there exists more than one Other, differing in their ontological distance to the Self,
but the same in their Otherness (see Neumann 1999). Identification with the Other, as Wendt
(1994) argues is a continuum from negative to positive from conceiving the other as anathema
to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self (p. 386). Thus, the images of the Other
might be perceived as a continuum, a long-abominated enemy could turn into an ally, an
extension of the Self, over time.
CDA sees discourse language use in speech and writing as a form of social practice.
Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a
particular discursive event and the situation(s), institutions(s) and social structure(s)
which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. To put the
same point in a different way, discourse is socially constitutiveas well as socially shaped:
it constitutes situations, objective knowledge, and the social identities of and
relationships between people and groups of people. (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 258)
Through focusing on how power is exercised in discourse, and the use of language as a form of
social practice, CDA theorists see this analysis as engaged in political process. Fairclough (1995)
stresses that mainly in discourse that consent is achieved, ideologies are transmitted, and
practices, meanings, values and identities are taught and learned (p. 219). In modern
democracies power is exercised on a discursive level principally (Crawshaw & Tusting 2000:
28). Therefore, in contemporary society, it is essential to understand the various ways in which
power relations are imposed and exercized in language (Fairclough 1992: 168). Within this
ideological framework, CDA has sought to uncover the ideologies encoded in discourse, to
expose the manner in which talk and texts support socially destructive ideologies such as
racism and nationalism (Crawshaw & Tusting 2000: 27).
2-3. As with CDA, DHA does not involve the application of a single, specific method and in
fact, has no specific methods associated with it; it adopts any methods that help it realize
its aims. While it includes linguistic analysis in its methodology, DHA is more than a
branch of linguistics. It involves a pluralist approach, often referred to as triangulation,
as a means of eliminating political or other bias. Any effective DHA study will be
interdisciplinary and multi- methodological, and will draw on the approaches of anthropology,
philosophy, psychology, and social and cultural studies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, p. 35). It will
demonstrate the ways in which language functions in the constitution and dissemination of
knowledge and ideologies, in the organization of institutions, and in the acquisition, spread and
maintenance of power.
DHA takes into account intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances,
texts, genres and discourses, as well as social variables and contexts, the history and
archaeology of organizations, and the processes of text production, reception and
consumption (Baker et al. 2008, pp. 279f.). Analysts are particularly concerned with the
circumstances under which a text or body of texts has been produced, which specific linguistic
choices have been made, and why. Researchers therefore look outside the corpora under
investigation for relevant dictionary definitions, official documents and correspondence, and
contemporary newspaper reports (Baker et al., p. 296). Significantly, DHA takes account of
absences as well as presences in the data under examination, seeing the absence of a
discourse feature as potentially significant for example irony and humour, which are
generally believed to be absent from patriotic and chauvinistic discourse. Following on
from this, it is also relevant to note the presence of a discourse feature that one expects to be
absent.
Within the DHA model, thematic, strategic and linguistic dimensions of discourse are analysed:
Van Leeuwen, Theo (2008). Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis.
Oxford University Press.
24. There is no neat t between sociological and linguistic categories, and if critical discourse
analysis, e.g., in investigating agency, ties itself too closely to speci c linguistic operations or
categories, many relevant instances of agency might be overlooked. One cannot, it seems, have it
both ways with language. Either theory and method are formally neat but semantically messy (as
in the dictionary: one form, many meanings), or they are semantically neat but formally messy
(as in the thesaurus: one concept, many possible realizations). Linguists tend toward preserving
the unity of formal categories. I will try here for the opposite approach.
35-36. The difference can be observed, for instance, in the way that social actors are represented
by different sectors of the press. In middle-class-oriented newspapers, government agents and
experts tend to be referred to speci cally, and ordinary people generically: the point of identi
cation, the world in which ones speci cs exist, is here not the world of the governed, but the
world of the governors, the generals. In working-class-oriented newspapers, on the other
hand, ordinary people are frequently referred to speci cally. The following two examples
illustrate the difference. They deal with the same topic and the articles from which they were
taken appeared on the same day, their news value deriving from the same statement by
Australias minister for sport and recreation. The rst comes from the Sydney Morning Herald, a
middle-class-oriented newspaper, the second from the Daily Telegraph, a working-class-oriented
newspaper:
Primeri : Sekira javne rei
tamara skrozza http://www.vreme.co.rs/cms/view.php?id=1248303
Primer za kategorizaciju
:
14.03.2017. 12:54
" . .
, ", .
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ci/story/1/politika/2664574/vucic-obican-narod-mi-ne-bi-nista-
dobacivao-u-sarajevu.html
Van Dijk,Teun A. (2002). Political discourse and political cognition. In Politics as text and talk :
analytic approaches to political discourse / edited by Paul Chilton, Christina Schner. John
Amsterdam/Philadelphia : Benjamins Publishing Company. 203-237.
232-233. The use of specific lexical variants may also have very different framing effects on
the activation of political attitudes and ideologies, and hence on the construction of event
models. Elites may thus use specific terms in policy or media discourse in order to influence
public opinion. For instance, defining affirmative action as unfair advantage or as reverse
discrimination, triggers a host of cognitive representations and strategies, and especially racist
attitudes and ideologies, that result in a more negative opinion about affirmative action (Kinder
and Sanders 1990).
Many properties of style and rhetoric, however, are not expressions of underlying opinions
or structures of models or political representations, but monitored by the various categories of
context models. Certain terms are prototypical for the domain of politics, and the choice of
formal words, such as indigenous and influx in Sir Johns speech indexes the formality of the
parliamentary speech and the session of this House of Commons. Participant roles and
identities, for instance in parliamentary debates, are multiply indexed by pronouns (we;
Us vs. Them), forms of address (honourable, friend) and politeness strategies, while at
the same time expressing forms of political or social inclusion or exclusion.
Similarly, speech acts and rhetorical questions may be employed in order to express or confirm
political identity and relationships. For instance, Sir Johns direct address of the Labour Party
in lines 610, is monitored by the underlying political roles of the participants, viz., as
government and opposition parties, and as a means to accuse the opposition not to care about the
future of the country. All this is part of Sir Johns definition of the current political context of his
speech, and hence appears in his context model and also surfaces in his speech, strategically, by
self-representing Tories as being concerned, and the opposition as callous, if not as undemocratic
(while not listening to ordinary people, who should be their main constituents).
233-234. Similarly, political discourse is seldom just personal, although it should not be
forgotten that the converse is also true: It is not only social or political, but as individual text and
talk also embodies individual characteristics. Only a cognitive theory is able to spell out this
interface between the social and the personal, namely through the relations between episodic
mental models and other personal representations, on the one hand, and the socially shared
political representations of groups, on the other hand. Political groups or institutions are
thus defined not only socio-politically in terms of sets of interacting actors or collectivities
and their interactions, but also socio-cognitively in terms of their shared knowledge, attitudes,
ideologies, norms and values. In other words, political discourse can only be adequately
described and explained when we spell out the socio-cognitive interface that relates it to the
socially shared political representations that control political actions, processes and systems.
Fetzer, Anita (2002). Put bluntly, you have something of a credibility problem. In Politics as
text and talk : analytic approaches to political discourse / edited by Paul Chilton, Christina
Schner. John Amsterdam/Philadelphia : Benjamins Publishing Company. 173-201.
188-189. In the European and Anglo-American socio-cultural contexts politicians are generally
expected to be better and thus act better than ordinary people. They are expected to be
faultless, perfect citizens, who do not only preach what they practise, but also practise
what they preach. In other words, the private and public domains of politicians are
expected to be coherent as individual systems and coherent within themselves. From an
ideology viewpoint, both private and public domains must be guided by a common leitmotif and
by other identical macro principles. Frequently, a politicians failure is caused by a lack of
coherence, i.e. by inconsistencies in the interface of private and public domains. However,
coherent private and public domains do not seem to be a necessary requirement for other public
figures, such as journalists or musicians. But how is credibility interactionally organized?
How is it referred to in political discourse? Is a lack of credibility only caused by
inconsistencies in the interface of public and private domains, or are there other possible
sources? And do politicians have to be credible only, or do they also have to be sincere?
Sacks, Harvey (1984), On doing: being ordinary , In J. M. Atkinson and J. Heritage (eds),
Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 413429.
414. This brings me to the central sorts of assertions I want to make. Whatever you may think
about what it is to be an ordinary person in the world, an initial shift is not think of
"an ordinary person" as some person, but as somebody having as one's job, as one's constant
preoccupation, doing "being ordinary." It is not that somebody is ordinary; it is perhaps that that
is what one's business is, and it takes work, as any other business does. If you just extend
the analogy of what you obviously think of as work - as whatever it is that takes analytic,
intellectual, emotional energy - then you will be able to see that all sorts of nominalized
things, for example, personal characteristics and the like, are jobs that are done, that took
some kind of effort, training, and so on.
415. So I am not going to be talking about an ordinary person as this or that person, or as some
average; that is, as a nonexceptional person on some statistical basis, but as something that is the
way somebody constitutes oneself, and, in effect, a job that persons and the people around
them may be coordinatively engaged in, to achieve that each of them, together, are
ordinary persons.
A core question is, how do people go about doing "being an ordinary person"? In the first
instance, the answer is easy. Among the ways you go about doing "being an ordinary person"
is to spend your time in usual ways, having usual thoughts, usual interests, so that all you
have to do to be an ordinary person in the evening is turn on the TV set. Now, the trick is to see
that it is not that it happens that you are doing what lots of ordinary people are doing, but that
you know that the way to do "having a usual evening," for anybody, is to do that. It is not
that you happen to decide, gee, I'll watch TV tonight, but that you are making a job of, and
finding an answer to, how to do "being ordinary" tonight. (And some people, as a matter
of kicks, could say, "Let's do 'being ordinary' tonight. We'll watch TV, eat popcorn," etc.
Something they know is being done at the same time by millions of others around.) So one
part of the job is that you have to know what anybody/ everybody is doing; doing ordinarily.
Further, you have to have that available to do. There are people who do not have that available to
do, and who specifically cannot be ordinary.
Reisigl, Martin - Ruth Wodak (2001). Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of racism and
anti-Semitism. London : Routledge.
31. And we adopt several of Teun van Dijks concepts and categories (e.g. the notions of
positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation), but place no emphasis on his
sociocognitivism, the latter being incompatible with the hermeneutic basis of our model.
Moreover, our assumptions of the relationship of influence between different social groups and
strata within a specific society are less monocausal and unidirectional than those of van Dijk, for
we do not want to overemphasise a top-down causality of opinionmaking and manipulation
(i.e. a manipulative impact from the allegedly homogenous elite on the allegedly
homogenous masses of ordinary people).
31-32. In our view and we have already emphasised this in the second section of chapter 1,
How to explain racism the complexities of modern societies can only be grasped by a
model of multicausal, mutual influences between different groups of persons within a specific
society. That is to say: if we take, for example, politicians as specific and not at all homogeneous
groups of elites, then they are best seen both as shapers of specific public opinions and interests
and as seismographs that reflect and react to the atmospheric anticipation of changes in public
opinion and on the articulation of changing interests of specific social groups and affected
parties.
Hall, Stuart. 1997. The spectacle of the Other. In Representation: cultural representations
and signifying practices, Stuart Hall (ed.), 223291. London: Sage.
Le, Elisabeth (2006). The Spiral of Anti-Other Rhetoric: Discourses of identity and the
international media echo. Amsterdam /Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.