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Technical Series:
Reliability, Maintenance and Asset Management
Whitepaper # V:
Criticality Analysis Methods
(Based on the Risk Assessment Process)
Authors:
**PhD. Carlos Parra Mrquez & PhD. Adolfo Crespo Mrquez
Dept. Industrial Management. University of Seville
School of Engineering, University of Seville, Spain
**Email: parrac37@yahoo.com
Editado por:
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Abril, 2017
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ABSTRACT
Criticality analysis techniques are tools that allow the identification and hierarchy of
the assets within a production system. In other words, the criticality analysis process
helps to determine the importance and consequences of potential failure events of
production systems within the operational context in which they perform. In the
following article, the most important theoretical aspects of the techniques of
hierarchical analysis of equipment (criticality analysis techniques) are explained. In
addition, some models and practical examples of application of these techniques of
prioritization in production assets are presented.
The term "critical" and the definition of criticality may have different
interpretations depending on the goal we are trying to rank. An analysis of criticality
aims to establish a method that will serve as an instrument of aid in the determination
of the prioritization of processes, systems and equipment of a complex production
process, allowing to subdivide elements into sections that can be handled in a
controlled and auditable manner. From this perspective, there is a great diversity of
possible criteria that allow to evaluate the criticality of an asset of production. The
reasons for prioritization may vary according to the opportunities and the needs of
the organization. Below are some common criteria used within the prioritization
processes:
operational flexibility (availability of alternate function or backup)
effect on the operational continuity / production capacity
effect on the quality of the product
effect on safety, environment and health
stoppage and maintenance costs
failure frequency / reliability
conditions of operation (temperature, pressure, flow rate, stream, speed)
flexibility / accessibility for inspection and maintenance
requirements / availability of resources for inspection and maintenance
availability of spare parts
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Figure 5.1. Process of maintenance management model (MMM) (Parra y Crespo 2015)
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In this first method (Crespo, 2007, Parra y Crespo, 2015) a technique that makes
reference to a purely qualitative analysis on the prioritization of production
equipment is presented. As we can see in Figure 5.2, the result of the process is a
classification of our equipments into three categories: A, B C, being the A equipment
the type equipment of higher priority.
To get to that final classification a sequential series of questions to the natural
teamwork formed in the company is performed for that purpose. The sequence marks
the importance facing each attribute discussed when establishing the priority of the
task force. Somehow, the order in the sequence marks the weight we give our
management to each attributes.
For each question there are three possible answers A, B, or C that help us to
characterize the equipment. For example:
The first question makes reference to the environment (E), an equipment could
be considered as category A, if a failure can cause the company to have to
resort to give notice to public authorities due to problems that could affect the
health of people and the environment (e.g.: A leak of ammonia). The
equipment would be category B if a failure causes contamination or affectation
that could be managed inside the company (for example, a leak of soda that is
controlled via the water network of the company). Finally an equipment could
be deemed category C if a failure does not produce any environmental
pollution.
The issues of security (S) are then considered. The assets of the category "A"
are those whose failure may cause accidents resulting in temporary or
permanent work absenteeism in the workplace. Category "B" active failures
could cause minor damage to the people at work, they do not produce
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absenteeism. Once again, category "C" assets are assets whose failure cannot
produce consequences related to the safety of people;
Quality (Q) is the next issue that must be assessed using the flowchart. The
procedure for this evaluation is very similar to the one we have already carried
out for the environmental evaluation of equipments. Quality failures can also
produce a significant external impact, or a very negative image of the company
in the market, as a failure is detected once the product reaches the end
customer (consumers in our case study). Category A is now engaged with
assets that could suffer this type of failure. Category "B" and "C" would be the
assets that, when not maintained properly, could suffer failures that produce
only an internal domestic consequence or that does not cause any impact,
respectively;
The working time of an asset (W) may also condition its criticality. In this case
study, the assets working three shifts will be of category "A". Assets with two
shifts will be under category "B". Finally, when production assets have a single
work shift in programmed per day, we will include them in category "C".
Sometimes the extra work required for corrective maintenance of assets, on
average, can also be considered within this criterion. Assets that require a large
amount of overtime to be repaired would enter into category "A", and so on;
Delivery (D) is a criterion relating to the operational impact of a failure of the
asset. Category "A" assets now are those that produce a stoppage across the
factory when they fail. Category "B" assets can leave only one line of
production stopped when failing. Finally, assets that do not produce a
significant disruption of the production would be of the category "C";
Reliability (P) is introduced as a criterion also in the flowchart and is related to
the frequency of failure that can exist in an asset that is not properly
maintained. In our case study, we consider as category 'A' assets frequently
failing less than 5 h. Assets with frequencies greater than 5 h and less than 10 h
of failure will be included in the category "B". Finally, for asset failure
frequencies greater than 10 h, we could use the category "C". It is normal to
take into account a criterion of frequency that produces 20% of the assets
within the category "A", over 30% of B", while 50% would be in category "C".
Maintainability (M), or suitability of the asset to be maintained, is the last
criterion which must be taken into account. This criterion is related to the
mean time to repair a failure. Assets that require a repair of over 90 minutes
mean time are classified as "A". Between 45 and 90 minutes, they would be in
category "B". Finally those whose average service time is less than 45 minutes
would be within category "C".
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1: There are online reserve units, little times for repair and logistics
O Impact on the costs of maintenance (MC) (scale 1 - 2)
2: Costs of repairs, materials and workmanship exceeding $20,000
1: Costs of repairs, materials and workmanship of less than $20,000
O Impact on safety, hygiene and environment (SHE) (scale 1-8)
8: High risk of loss of life, serious damage to the health of the personnel
and/or large environmental incident (catastrophic) that exceed the
limits allowed
6: Moderate risk of loss of life, serious damage to health and/or
environmental incident of difficult restoration
3: Minimal risk of loss of life and affectation to health (recoverable in
the short term) and/or minor environmental incident (controllable),
spills and repeated leaks easy to contain
1: There is no risk of loss of life, or affectation to health, or
environmental damage
The weighted factors are selected during work meetings with the participation
of the various people involved in the operational context of the active study
(operations, maintenance, processes, safety and environment). Systems to be
prioritized are then selected and a brainstorm session is held during which values
corresponding to each factor that makes up the expression of total criticality by risk
(expression 3) are assigned to each team. To obtain the level of criticality of each
team/system, total values of each principal factors are taken: frequency and
consequences of failures and are put up on the criticality 4x4 matrix (see Figure 5.2).
The value of failure frequency is put up on the vertical axis and the value of
consequences is put up on the horizontal axis (the final result of the expression (2) is
taken: (IO x OF) + MC + SHE). The criticality matrix shown below allows us to rank the
systems in three areas (see Figure 5.3):
Non-critical Systems (NC) Area
Average Criticality Systems (SC) Area
Critical Systems (C) Area
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Equation 5.2 may vary depending on the considerations made by the company
for each installation in particular or specific temporary circumstances, so we get
different variations of the function of risk and hence the criticality matrix. See the
following example for off-shore installation of an oil company.
The following criticality model is taken as a reference in the MCR method designed for
offshore production assets in the Magallanes area, prepared by ENAP SIPETROL, see
technical report: ENAP SIPETROL, 2008 and Parra y Crespo, 2015). The proposed
model is based on the estimation of the risk factor through the following expressions:
Risk = FF x C (5.4)
Where:
FF = failure frequency (number of failures in a given time)
C = consequences of failures to safety, environment, quality,
production, etc. (now calculated according to equation 5.5)
C = (impact on safety and the environment (SHE) x 0.2) +
(Impact on quality (IC) x 0.2) +
(Impact on production (IP) x 0.2) +
(Impact due to low maintainability (BM) x 0.2) +
(Cost of maintenance (CM) x 0.2) (5.5)
Below are the weighted factors designed for the process of prioritization of the
frequency factors and consequences of failure:
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2: Repair cost including materials and HH, range between 10% and 24%
of the value of the equipment
1: Repair cost including materials and HH are below 10% of the value of
the equipment
The results of the evaluation of the above factors are presented in a criticality 5
x 5 matrix (see Figure 5.4), where the vertical axis is composed of five levels of failure
frequency , while the horizontal axis is composed of five levels of failure
consequences. The matrix is divided into four zones representing four levels of
criticality:
Zones of criticality:
L = Low criticality
M = Medium criticality
H = High criticality
VH = Very high criticality
Frequency 5 H VH VH VH VH
4 H H H H VH
3 M M M H VH
2 L L L M M
1 L L L M M
1 2 3 4 5
Consequences
The AHP methodology (Saaty, 1980, Saaty, 1990) is a powerful and flexible tool for
multicriteria decision-making, used in problems in which assessing both the qualitative
and the quantitative aspects are needed. The AHP technique helps analysts organize
critical aspects of a problem in a hierarchical structure similar to the structure of a
family tree, reducing complex decisions to a series of comparisons that allow
prioritization of different aspects (criteria) evaluated (Parra y Crespo, 2015). This
section proposes the use of the AHP technique to prioritize systems and optimize the
process of decision-making related to the maintenance of these systems, in other
words, within the process of maintenance management, we need to make decisions
that guide the financial, human and technological resources, in order to be able to
develop efficient maintenance plans , for which it is necessary to take into account the
level of criticality of different systems/equipment involved in the production process.
This situation is not easy to solve, since there are a lot of factors involved that
generate great uncertainty in the process of systems/equipment prioritization, which
is why the application of the AHP technique can help to identify specifically the level
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The process of hierarchical analysis proposes for the following steps to be taken
(Saaty, 1980):
1. Define the criteria of decision in the form of hierarchical objectives. The
prioritization is divided into different levels: starting at the top with the
definition of the primary objective of the prioritization process, then the
intermediate levels (criteria and sub-criteria to evaluate) are defined and
finally the lowest level describes the alternatives to be compared.
2. Evaluate (weigh) different criteria, sub-criteria and alternatives according to
their respective importance in each level. Qualitative and quantitative criteria
can be compared using informal failure s to obtain weights and priorities. For
qualitative criteria, the AHP technique uses simple comparisons (pairwise) to
determine weights and evaluate them. In this way the analyst can concentrate
on only two criteria at the same time. In fact, the AHP technique is based on
the assumption that the analyst (decision maker) can more easily choose a
comparison value than an absolute value. Verbal values are moved to a scoring
scale (see table 1).
Later, in a matrix of values, a priority vector is calculated and used to
weigh (compare) the elements of the matrix. Saaty (1980,1990), showed
mathematically that the normalized autovector calculated from the matrix is
the best approach of evaluation of the analyzed criteria. In the case of
quantitative criteria, it is necessary to design a method of prioritization
enabling to consistently quantify the weight of each criterion to be analyzed
(Wind and Saaty, 1980).
Values Score
Same 1
2
Moderate 3
4
Strong 5
6
Very strong 7
8
Exteme 9
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3. The AHP technique allows the analyst to evaluate the congruence of the values
with the inconsistency ratio (IR). Before determining an inconsistency, it is
necessary to estimate the consistency index (CI) of an n x n matrix of values,
where CI is defined by:
max n
CI
n 1 (5.6)
Where max is the maximum autovalue of the matrix. In this way, IR is
defined by:
CI
I R
RI (5.7)
Where RI is the average random value of CI for an n x n matrix. RI values are
shown in table 5.2.
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RI 0 0 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35
Table 5.2. Values of RI for matrices of different orders (Saaty, 1980)
For this specific case, an AHP model was designed taking the proposed risk
assessment process by (Woodhouse, 2000) as a basis. In general terms, the AHP
model based on the concept of risk searches to rank based on importance an oil
installation equipments on which maintenance resources (human, economic, and
technological) will be directed. As a result, the proposed method will generate a list of
critical equipment according to the basic risk factors to be evaluated: failure
frequency, levels of detection or control of failures, levels of severity and costs of
failures within the operational context. On the other hand, it is important to clarify the
term "critical" and the definition of criticality, since these can have different
interpretations and will depend on the objective we are trying to rank. In our case in
particular, the prioritization of the equipments will enable us to direct maintenance
resources towards the equipments assessed as critical.
In Figure 5.5 is the general framework of model AHP developed to rank the
equipments within the FCC plant:
Prioritize equipment
according to their criticality
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Each step is then explained in the section above (II.4.1.), in order to implement
the proposed AHP model.
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Table 5.5. Scale enabling to define the failure frequency criterion (FF)
Failure detection criterion (FD). The failure detection criterion is related to the
systems of protection, control and warning available to detect the occurrence
of failures safely. For the definition of the level of failure detection of each
alternative (System) to be evaluated it is necessary to collect information on all
aspects of instrumentation, control and protection existing in each one of the
systems to be evaluated. Table 5.6 presents the different levels of detection of
available failures.
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Failure detection
FD Level definition
(control) level
10 Absolutely Equipment is not inspected nor controlled.
uncertain Failure events are not detected
9
8
7 Low Control is reduced to visual inspection of the
equipment
6
5 Moderate Equipment is statistically controlled and
inspected. One inspection point. (25%
automated inspection)
4
3 High Equipment is statistically controlled and
inspected. Two inspection points (75%
automated inspection)
2 Very high Equipment is statistically controlled and
inspected. Total inspection (100% automated
inspection)
1 Totally controlled Equipment is statistically controlled and
inspected. Total inspection and permanent test
equipment calibration (100% automated
inspection)
Table 5.6. Scale enabling to define the failure detection criterion (FD)
Failure severity criterion (FS). The failure severity criterion is related to the
impact of failures on security, the environment and operations. For the
definition of the failure severity criterion, it is necessary to know what the
effects that failures can produce are once they occur within a specific
operational context. Table 5.7 presents the different levels of severity of
available failures.
Failure Severity
FS Level definition
level
10 Dangerously high Failures may cause loss of human life
9 Failures may create complications with existing laws
and regulations
8 Failures producing function loss and inoperable
equipment
7 High Failures causing important decrease in customer
satisfaction
6 Failures impacting a production subsystem
decreasing service quality
5 Low Failures causing efficiency loss and customer
complaint
4 Failures that can be avoided with minimal
modifications and with low service impact
3 Very low Failures creating small inefficiencies to the customer
that the same customer could correct
2 Failures difficult to be recognized by the customer
and whose effects are not significant for the process
1 Non-existent Failures that cannot be detected by the customer and
not impacting process efficiency
Table 5.7. Scale enabling to define the failure severity criterion (FS)
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Costs of failure criterion (CF). The costs of failure criterion is related to the
possible economic consequences of failures on security, the environment and
operations. For the definition of the criterion of severity of failures, it is
necessary to estimate the costs that can result in failures once they occur
within a specific operational context. Table 5.8 presents the different levels of
severity of available failures.
Results of the evaluation of the alternatives (systems) for each selected criterion.
Following are the results of the assessment of the 8 systems of the plant of
FCC, based on each one of the four criteria explained above (frequency of
failure occurrence (FF), failure detection (FD), failure severity (FS) and costs of
failures (CF)).
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Step 3. Based on the prioritization values obtained for each one of the criteria (table
5.9), we proceed to sort systems by level of importance (from most to least) for each 4
criteria evaluated. Following are the results of prioritization by level of importance
obtained from the "Expert Choice" software:
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Criteria FF Criticality
Systems FF
(FF/Total)
Power retriever train (Tr1-A) 6 0.25
Pressure control valves (Vr1-A/B) 5 0,208333333
Boiler (Ca1-A) 3 0.125
Third stage separator (Sp1-A/B) 3 0.125
Reactor (Ra1-A) 2 0,083333333
Regenerator (kg1-A) 2 0,083333333
Wet gas compressor (Cg1-A) 2 0,083333333
Pre-heat train (Th1-A/B/C) 1 0,041666667
Total 24
Table 5.10. Prioritization by failure frequency of occurrence criterion (FF)
Criteria FD Criticality FD
(FD/Total)
Systems
Pre-heat train (Th1-A/B/C) 0,24242424
8
Regenerator (kg1-A) 6 0,18181818
Boiler (Ca1-A) 6 0,18181818
Pressure control valves (Vr1-A/B) 5 0,15151515
Third stage separator(Sp1-A/B) 2 0,06060606
wet gas compressor (Cg1-A) 2 0,06060606
Reactor (Ra1-A) 2 0,06060606
Power retriever train (Tr1-A) 2 0,06060606
Total 33
Table 5.11. Prioritization by failure detection criterion (FD)
Criteria FS Criticality FS
(FS/Total)
Systems
Reactor (Ra1-A) 10 0,20408163
Power retriever train (Tr1-A) 9 0,18367347
Boiler (Ca1-A) 9 0,18367347
Pressure control valves (Vr1-A/B) 6 0,12244898
Regenerator (kg1-A) 6 0,12244898
Wet gas compressor (Cg1-A) 5 0,10204082
Pre-heat train (Th1-A/B/C) 2 0,04081633
Third stage separator (Sp1-A/B) 2 0,04081633
Total 49
Table 5.12. Prioritization by failure severity criterion (FS)
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Criteria CF Criticality CF
(CF/Total)
Systems
Reactor (Ra1-A) 10
0.2
Power retriever train (Tr1-A) 8 0.16
Boiler (Ca1-A) 8 0.16
Regenerator (kg1-A) 7 0.14
wet gas compressor (Cg1-A) 6 0.12
Pressure control valves (Vr1-A/B) 4 0.08
Third stage separator (Sp1-A/B) 4 0.008
Pre-heat Train (Th1-A/B/C) 3 0.06
Total 50
Table 5.13. Prioritization by cost of failure criterion (CF)
Step 4. The (IR) estimation and prioritization of criteria were performed with the
computer tool called 'Expert Choice'. Following are the results:
Step 5. We proceed to quantify the final prioritization, based on the valuation made to
each one of the criteria (local/total) evaluated in steps 2, 3 and 4 for each system
evaluated (tables 5.9 and 5.14). Subsequently, the results are ordered by level of
importance (ranking) from greater to lesser. Following are the results of the
prioritization and the final ranking obtained with the computer tool called 'Expert
Choice':
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The results obtained with the designed AHP model (table 16), show a big
difference with the existing levels of qualitative prioritization (table 3). The following
table presents a comparison between the prioritization obtained with AHP method
and existing qualitative prioritization:
In general terms, the system evaluated with the AHP model which had the
biggest change of level of prioritization, was the power retriever train, that went from
position 4 (qualitative prioritization) to position 1 (AHP prioritization), i.e. it became
the most critical system at the FCC plant. Other systems such as the boiler and control
valves also increased their levels of prioritization in comparison with the original
(qualitative) prioritization. Systems like the reactor, the regenerator and the wet gas
compressor decreased their levels of prioritization places going from positions 1, 2 and
3 to positions 3, 5 and 6; respectively. Finally, the third stage separator and preheat
train systems kept the same levels of prioritization in both evaluations. The results of
the prioritization carried out a 8 FCC plant systems, will allow more efficient decisions
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and with a lesser degree of uncertainty in the activities of allocation and distribution
of human, technical and financial resources within the maintenance and operation
processes, helping to maximize the profitability of the products produced in the
refinery study FCC plant. In annex II at the end of this book, an article is included
related as prioritization models, referred to as: Proposal of a method of prioritizing
of stock in the area of the maintenance called: PR- C&V (prioritization of spare parts
by criticality and economic value).
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Authors:
PhD. MSc. Eng. Carlos Parra Mrquez (Venezuela)
PhD. MSc. Eng. Adolfo Crespo Mrquez (Espaa)
E-mails: parrac@ingecon.net.in, adolfo@etsi.us.es
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http://www.confiabilidadoperacional.com/
INGEMAN
Asociacin para el Desarrollo de la Ingeniera de Mantenimiento, sede en la
Escuela Superior de Ingenieros de la Universidad de Sevilla, Espaa
www.ingeman.net
Certificacin ICOGAM
Miami, Florida, 6 al 8 de Diciembre del 2017
https://app.box.com/s/83tyjazjpuixs4fgnaenfo28nvg9v2n2
Diplomado ICOGAM: Ingeniera de Confiabilidad Operacional, Gestin de Activos y Mantenimiento,
Miami, Florida, 6 al 8 de Diciembre 2017
https://app.box.com/s/83tyjazjpuixs4fgnaenfo28nvg9v2n2
Diplomado ICOGAM: Ingeniera de Confiabilidad Operacional, Gestin de Activos y Mantenimiento,
Miami, Florida, 6 al 8 de Diciembre 2017
https://app.box.com/s/83tyjazjpuixs4fgnaenfo28nvg9v2n2