Commonlawandcivillaw

differences,reciprocalinfluences
andpointsofintersection

DominikLengeling

Lawfirms
PatrickSchindler/
Schleifenbaum&Adler

Toronto/Siegen
2008
 Contents

I.Introduction 3

II.Definitionsandhistory 4

1. Civillaw 4
2. Commonlaw 5
3. Hybridlegalsystems 5

III.Differencesbetweencommonlawundcivillaw 6

1. Sourcesoflaw 6
2. Principleofprecedentsanddoctrineofstaredecisis 7
3. Methodoflegalthinkingandfindingofjustice 10
4. Functionofdoctrine 12
5. Appointment/selectionofjudges 12
6. Proceduraldifferencesadversarialvs.inquisitorial/
proceedingspurposes 13

IV.Reciprocalinfluences 18

1. LegalsystemofScotland 18
2. TheEuropeanunification 20
3. Capitalmarketandinternationallawfirms 21
4. Maritimelaw 22
5. LegalsystemofLouisiana 23

V.Pointsofintersection 24

1. Internationalarbitration 24
2. UNIDROITPrinciplesofInternationalCommercial
Contracts 27
3. LegalsystemofQuebec 28

VI.Conclusions 30

BIBLIOGRAPHY 32
2
I.Introduction

Itistheintentionofthispapertogiveanintroductoryoverviewoftherelationship
betweentwoofthemostsignificantlegaltraditions,thecommonlawandthecivil
law.Suchacomparativeviewseemsparticularlyusefulinoureraofglobalization
with the interconnection of the markets and the accompanying necessity of
orienting legal advice towards other legal systems. The topic seems to be also
highlyrelevantbecauseoftheongoingprocessofEuropeanunification,whichalso
involvesacertaindegreeoflegalcoordinationoftheEnglishlegaltraditionwith
thatofcontinentalEurope.

Thispapermakesnoclaimtobecompletestudyofthetopic.Itsintentionisrather
toraise the awareness of readers who are familiar with one of these two legal
systems about the other system by giving examples of illustrative differences
betweenthemandalsobygivingexamplesofreciprocalinfluencesandpointsof
intersectionbetweenthem.

Thefirstlimitationofthispaperisthatitfocusesonlyoncommonlawandcivil
law.Ofcoursethereareothersignificantlegaltraditionsbesidesthetraditionsof
AngloAmerican common law and ContinentalEuropean civil law, such as an
African legal tradition of subSaharan countries, a fareast legal tradition
consistingofChinaandJapan,holdtogetherbytheConfuciantradition,aswellas
legal traditions that are influenced by religion, including for example Islamic,
JewishorHindulegalsystemsandalso,atleastuntilsomeyearsagoasocialistic
1
legaltradition. Furthermoreitshouldnotbeoverlooked,thatthereisnotonlyone
lawwithineachlegaltraditionforexampleeachContinentalEuropeancountry
whoselegalsystemisbasedoncivillaw,hasitsownlegalsystem,orinthecaseof
2
Switzerland,severallegalsystems,oneforeachcanton.

1 2
Brand,JuS2003,1082(1088);seealso:Tetley,MixedJurisdictionsPartI,III.2.(page4).
Demeyere,SchiedsVZ2003,247(247).
3
Asecondlimitationofthispaperisthatitislimitedtothesphereofprivatelaw.A
researchintheareasofcriminallawandpubliclawwouldgobeyondthescopeof
thepaper.

II.Definitionsandhistory

1.Civillaw

CivillawmaybedefinedasthatlegaltraditionwhichhasitsorigininRomanlaw,
ascodifiedintheCorpusJurisCivilisofJustinian,andassubsequentlydeveloped
3
mainlyinContinentalEurope.

ThecivillawlegaltraditionitselfcanbedividedfurtherintotheRomaniclaws,
influencedbyFrenchlaw,andtheGermanicfamilyoflaws,dominatedbyGerman
4
jurisprudence.

InparticulartheRomanlawsweremodeledonthegroundbreakingFrenchCode
Civilfrom1804(CodeNapoleon),whichconqueredEuropesrealmofideasasthe
5
Napoleonicarmiesconqueredthecountries.

AlsotheGermanCivilCodefrom1896(inforcesince1900)isaconsequenceof
6
themovementtowardcodifiedlawsinitiatedbytheCodeNapoleon.

Itistypicalofallcivillawsystemsthatthelawisalmostentirelycodified,highly
systemizedandstructuredandthatitreliesonbroad,generalprinciples,without
7
necessarilysettingoutthedetails.

3
Tetley,MixedJurisdictionsPartI,III.3.(page4).
4
Brand,JuS2003,1082(1088).
5
Brand,JuS2003,1082(1088).
6
Tetley,MixedJurisdictionsPartI,IV.3.(page7).
7
Tetley,MixedJurisdictionsPartI,III.3.(page4).
4
2.Commonlaw

th
Commonlawisthelegaltradition,whichevolvedinEnglandfromthe11
Century onwards. This legal tradition is the basis of private law not only for
Englandasitscountryoforigin,butalsoforWales,Ireland,almostallstatesofthe
USA(exceptfromLouisiana),mostpartofCanada(exceptfromQuebec)andfor
mostcountrieswhichreceivedthecommonlawtraditionasformercoloniesofthe
British Empire and in many cases preserved it as independent members of the
BritishCommonwealth,inpartsconnectedwithreligiouslawsorlocalhabitslike
8
inIndia,Pakistan,MalaysiaorJamaica.

Theprinciplesofcommonlaw appear forthe most partinreportedjudgments,

usuallyrenderedbyhighercourts,inrelationtospecificfactsituationsarisingin
dispute,whichcourtshaveadjudicated.Allinallcommonlawrulesseemtobe
morespecificanddetailedincomparisontocivillawrules.

3.Hybridlegalsystems

In addition there are legal systems, which cannot be related clearly to either
commonlaworcivillaw,socalledhybridlegalsystems.Inthoselegalsystemsthe
lawinforcederivesfrommorethanoneoftheselegaltraditions,forexample,
Scotland or Quebec, where the traditions of common law and civil law are
9
intertwined. Theseissueswillbedealtwithlateron.

8 9
Tetley,MixedJurisdictionsPartI,III.3.(page4);Brand,JuS2003,1082(1088).
Tetley,MixedJurisdictionsPartI,III.3.(page4);Brand,JuS2003,1082(1088).
5
III.Differencesbetweencommonlawandcivillaw

Oncloserexaminationitbecomesapparentthatitisbynomeanseasytofindany
definitedistinguishingfeaturesbetweencivillawandcommonlaw.Accordingly
somesuggesteddistinctivefeatures,someofwhich doinfactdistinguishthese
systems,willnowbeanalyzed.

1.Sourcesoflaw

Oneofthebestknowndistinguishingfeaturesmaybetheparticularsourceoflaw.
There is a widespread view that the two systems can be distinguished by the
assertionthatcommonlawismerelyjudgemadecaselaw,whilecodifiedlawis
theonlysourceoflawofcivillaw.Madewithsuchabsolutenessthisdistinction
hasneverbeencorrect.

Ontheonehandcodifiedlawdoesnotmerelyexistincommonlaw,butisevenof
a certain importance. In some areas of law codified law is even traditionally
10
constitutive, e.g. in the area of antitrust. Thus common law states have also
codifiedlaws,whichderivefromalegislativeprocessandwhichcourtshaveto
11
considerintheirjudgmentsaswellandbesideexistingjudgemadeprecedents.

OntheotherhandsomeoftheContinentalEuropeanlegalsystemsareasoflaware
entirely case law, e.g. French law of torts. In addition, also in civil law legal
systemstheincreasingnumbersofhighcourtdecisionsoverlaythecodifiedlaw
12
moreandmore. Moreoveritisremarkablethattherearesomelegalsystems,
whicharerelatedtraditionallytocivillaw,butwhichalsoasatraditionhaveno
classicalcodesasmostofthecivillawlegalsystemshave.Asexamplesmaybe
10
Brand,JuS2003,1082(1089).
11
Handschug,EinfhrungindaskanadischeRecht,marginalnumber35(page14).

12 Brand,JuS2003,1082(1089).
6
mentionedScotland,whoselegalsystemishoweverinfluencedmoreandmoreby
commonlawandthereforemaybetterbequalifiedashybridlegalsystem;another
13
exampleisSouthAfrica.

Despitethisprevalentviewitisclearthatinbothlegaltraditionscodesdoexistand
areappliedbypractitioners,butthatthesecodesdifferintheirstyle:

While civil law codes and statutes are mostly concise and do not provide
definitionsbutstateprinciplesinbroad,generalphrases,commonlawcodifying
statutesprovidedetaileddefinitionsandeachrulesetsoutlengthyenumerationsof
14
specificapplicationsorexceptions.

2.Principleofprecedentsanddoctrineofstaredecisis

Asanotherdistinctivefeaturetheprincipleofprecedentsmaybeconsidered,i.e.
themethodofcommonlawtoanalyzepreviouscourtdecisions,tofindageneral
principleineachofthemandtotransfertheseprinciplestoacurrentdisputethat
needstobedecided.Socivillawjudgesmaybeprimarilyboundtocodesand
reason,whilecommonlawjudgesaresubjecttothesocalleddoctrineof stare
decisis andthusinthefirstinstanceareboundbyprecedentsrenderedbyhigher
courts.Accordingtothat,commonlawhasamorehierarchicalstructure.

Firstofall,toestablishsomeunderstanding,thedoctrineofstaredecisisshouldbe
explained very briefly. Stare decisis is an abbreviation of the sentence stare
15
decisisetnonquietamovere,i.e.:sticktodecisions.

Thedoctrineofstaredecisishastwocomponents,averticalandahorizontalone.
The vertical component says that judges of lower courts are strictly bound to
precedentdecisionsofhighercourts,evenifthelowercourtconsidersthedecision
13
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartI,III.3.(page4)andPartI,IV4.(page7).
14
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartI,V.8.(page16).

15 Lundmark,JuS2000,546(548).
7
 16
isnotright. However,theinferiorjudgesarefreetoexpresstheiropinionthat
theyconsiderthebindingprecedentaswrongandtheycanalsosuggestanappeal.
Accordingtothehorizontalcomponentofthedoctrineofstaredecisis,precedents
arebindingnotonlyforlowercourts,butalsoforcurrentdecisionsofthecourtthat
renderedtheprecedent,whereasalthoughthejudgesareboundtotheresultofthe
17
precedent,theydonothavetosticktothereasonsgivenintheprecedentcase.

Acourtdecisionisaprecedentifitshouldbeleadingforallfuturecases;this
impliesthatthecourtdecisioncontainsanabstractguideline,whichiscalledits
18
rationaleandthatthisrationalecanbeascertainedbyothercourtsandscholars.

Aprecedentisbindinguntilitisoverruledbyadecisionofahighercourtoruntilit
isoverriddenthroughastatute.Ahighercourtcanalsoreconsiderandoverruleits
19
ownpreviousdecision.

Itisremarkableatleastrespectingtheverticalcomponentofthedoctrineofstare
decisis thatnowrittenrulecanbefoundinanycommonlawcountry, which
20
orders or enforces the binding effect of precedents. Only British judges are
21
nowadaysboundtodecisionsoftheEuropeanCourtofJusticebylaw.

Butalsothisdistinctivefeatureisnotdefinite.Ontheonehandcommonlawjudges
donothavetoapplyaprecedent,iftheypointoutthattheallegedprecedentis
significantly different from the current case and therefore is not binding. This
processofpointingoutthenonapplicationofaprecedentiscalleddistinguishing
andcanbemainlybasedontworeasons:

16
Lundmark,JuS2000,546(547).
17
Lundmark,JuS2000,546(548).
18
Handschug,EinfhrungindaskanadischeRecht,marginalnumber31(page13).
19
Handschug,EinfhrungindaskanadischeRecht,marginalnumber31(page13).
20
Lundmark,JuS2000,546(547).
21 Lundmark,JuS2000,546(547),referringtoEuropeanCommunitiesAct1972,Kap.68,2(1).
8
First,theredoesnotexistanysimilaritybetweenthecurrentcaseandtheprecedent
case,e.g.becausetheprecedentisaboutanotherareaoflawandthejudgedenies
ananalogy.

Second,thejudgesatisfieshimselfthatevenifhehaddecidedtheprecedentcase
andhaddecidedsimilarlytotheactualprecedentdecisionheis,accordingto
logic,notforcedtomakeanotherdecisionashelikestodonow,e.g.becauseit
turnsoutthatthefactsofthecasesaresignificantlydifferent.

Andinadditionalsoajudgmenthavingbeendecidedperincuriamdoesnothaveto
be followed as precedent. Literally translated as through want of care, per
incuriamreferstoajudgmentofacourtwhichhasbeendecidedwithoutreference
toastatutoryprovisionorearlierdecisionwhichwouldhavebeenrelevantand
binding.Thesignificanceofajudgmenthavingbeendecidedperincuriamisthatit
doesnotthenhavetobefollowedasprecedent.Eventhoughsuchajudgmentisa
rare exception, lower courts are free to depart from an earlier judgment of a
22
superiorcourtwherethatearlierjudgmentwasdecidedperincuriam.

Ontheotherhandthecourtsincivillawcountriesatleastfeeltheyareboundby
23
the decisions of the higher courts as well. And in addition, for instance in
Germanyexceptfortheabovementionedfactthatallcourtsofthecountriesof
theEuropeanUnionareboundtothedecisionsoftheEuropeanCourtofJusticeby
law,thereisacodifiedrulethatalldecisionsofthehighestGermancourt,the
FederalConstitutionalCourt(Bundesverfassungsgericht),arebinding.According
to paragraph 31 subsection I of the Federal Constitutional Court Code
(Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz)alldecisionsoftheFederalConstitutionalCourt
arebindingforallGermanfederalandprovincialconstitutionalbodiesandforall
courts and authorities. Although the German Federal Constitutional Court itself
limitstheimportanceofthisrulebystatingthatonlythebasicprinciplesof
22
Lundmark,JuS2000,546(547).

23 Brand,JuS2003,1082(1089).
9
itsdecisionsarebinding,therulestillgoesbeyondanycommonlawcountryas
muchasitisacodifiedruleaboutthebindingeffectofahighcourtdecisionfor
24
lowercourts.

Thusitisnotentirelycorrecttoassumethatcommonlawjudgesarestrictlybound
totheauthorityofhighercourtswhilecivillawjudgesareonlyboundtocodesand
reason.

3.Methodoflegalthinkingandfindingofjustice

Thetruedifferencebetweencommonlawandcivillawmaybeseenratherintheir
25
differentmethodsoflegalthinkingandtheirdifferentapproachinfindingjustice.

Commonlawisdominatedbyfocusingoneachsinglecase,socalledreasoning
from case to case. Generalizations or principles are only developed through
decidingsinglecases.Inthisrespecttheprincipleofprecedentsistrulytypicalfor
commonlaw.Thecentralroleincommonlawisplayedbythejudge,whothinks
and decides historically, concretely, goes by facts and without any noticeable
26
dogmaticconceptualconstruct.

Incontrastcivillawthinkingmeanstodevelopabstractprinciplesregardlessof
singlecasesandtoapplytheseabstractprinciplestothefactsofthecasebya
processofsubsuming.Thusincivillawtheabstractrule,whoseapplicabilityto
everysinglecasehastobechecked,takesthecenterstage.Thismethodrequires
anticipating and solving of problems prior to their appearance, while common
lawyersareratherinapositiontowaitandseeandreacttotheproblemswhen
24
Lundmark,JuS2000,546(548).

25 Brand, JuS 2003, 1082 (1089); Handschug, Einfhrung in das kanadische Recht, marginal
number34(page14).
26 Brand,JuS2003,1082(1089).
10
 27
theyappear. Thereforeitdoesnotsurprisethatincivillawthedogmatic,abstract
28
andnormbasedthinkingscholardominatesratherthanthejudge.
Soincivillawitisdoctrineincludingthecodifiersreportsaboutthelegislative
process that has priority over jurisprudence while in common law it is the
29
oppositewayaround.

Thisphenomenonofdifferentprioritiesmaybeexplainedbythedifferentrolesof
30
legislature in both systems. Particularly the Continental European civil law
countriestookoverMontesquieustheoryofseparationofpowers,wherebyitisthe
functionofthelegislaturetomakelawsandthecourtsfunctiontoapplythese
laws.Bycontrastitisthejudgemadelawmadebyprecedentsthatisthebasis
andthecoreoflawincommonlaw.

Thehistoricexplanationforthisdevelopmentofthejudgesascentralinstitutionin
common law may be that the judges style of acting could be retained over
centuriesmoreorlessunchanged,becauseinEnglandapowerful,guildorganized
andallinallequallyeducatedlawyerclasscouldholditsgroundduetoEnglands
31
easy geographic position as an island. On the politically and legally divided
Europeancontinentsuchasimilarpowerfulclassofjudgesandlawyerscouldnot
arisesothatscholars,unitedinfollowingRomanlaw,couldachievepriorityin
32
legalthinking.

Havingpresentedthedifferenceinthemethodoflegalthinkingandfindingjustice
aspossiblymostbasicdifferencebetweencommonlawandcivillaw,additional
differencesbetweenthetwotraditionsshouldbepointedout,differenceswhichare
particularlysignificantforlegalpractice.

27
Brand,JuS2003,1082(1089).
28
Brand,JuS2003,1082(1089).
29
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartI,V.1.(page15).
30
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartI,V.1.(page15).
31
Brand,JuS2003,1082(1089).
32 Brand,JuS2003,1082(1089).
11
4.Functionofdoctrine

Firstofallitisalogicalconsequencethatdoctrinehasdifferentfunctionsinthe
twotraditions.

While it is the function of doctrine in civil law to provide all practitioners,

includingthecourts,withaguidelineforhandlinganddecidingofspecificfuture
casesbydevelopingbasicrulesandprinciplesfromthenumerouslegaltreatises
andtosomeextentalsofromcases,itistherathermodestfunctionofdoctrinein
commonlawtofinddifferencesandsimilaritiesindecidedcasesandtoextract
33
specificrulesfromdecidedcases.

5.Appointment/selectionofjudges

Becauseoftheimportantroleofjudgesincommonlaw,namelytodecidewhatis
the law, judges in the common law countries, particularly judges ofthe higher
courts, are typically selected and appointed only from among experienced
34
practicinglawyers.

Bycontrastitmaysurprisecommonlawyerswhentellingthemthatitisquiteusual
in civil law to appoint young highly skilled but inexperienced graduates to
judgeships.Althoughitis,forinstanceinGermany,wellestablishedpracticeto
give recently appointed judges the opportunity to gain practical experience by
servingatthebeginningoftheircareerinachamberwithtwoexperiencedjudges,
itisalsonotunusualforrecentlyappointedjudgestodecidecasesinlowercourts
assolejudgesimmediatelyaftertheirappointment.InadditioninGermanythere
areruleswhichprovideanagelimitforappointingofjudges.Theremaybesome
exceptionsfortheserules,butingeneraltheagelimitisabout35years,depending

33
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartI,V.2.(page15).

34 Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartI,V.10.(page17).
12
onthelawsofthefederalstates,whichhavetobeapplied.Itisalmostneverthe
casethatsomeoneasyoungas35isappointedajudgeincommonlawcountries.

6.Proceduraldifferencesadversarialvs.inquisitorial/proceedingspurposes

In what follows, more differences will be described, particularly respecting the

conductofcases.

Courtproceedingsincommonlawmaybedescribedatleastinprivatelawas
strictlyadversarial.

Inthissystemtheattorneysareresponsibleforpresentingthefactsofthecase,the
positionsofeachpartyandthelegalviewsincludingallrelevantprecedents.Inan
ideal common law procedure the judge has the function only to manage the
proceeding,toreviewallfactsofthecaseandlegalviewspresentedtohimand
finallytodecidethecaseonthatbasis,orwhenthecaseistriedbyajudgeandjury,
tosumuptheevidenceandthelegalprinciplesfortheassistanceofthejury.

Thus,astheproceedingdependsmainly,atleastintheory,onthebehaviorandthe
skillsoftheattorneysitisnotsurprisingthatintheEnglishlegalsystemdifferent
categoriesofattorneysexisttothisday,namelybarristersandsolicitors.

Thetermbarrister meanssimplya lawyerwhoseonlyfunctionislitigation

representationofclientsbeforeacourtorfurnishingofopinionsaboutchancesof
35
successofaplannedlawsuit.

Incontrarytothatthelessspecializedsolicitoristheclientsfirstcontactpoint.
Hisfunctionsareapartfromlitigation,forwhichhehiresabarristeravarietyof
36
legalactions,forinstancetransferoftitle,marriagelawordraftingofwills.

This distinction between barrister and solicitor emphasizes the importance of

attorneysinlitigationintheadversarialsystem.
35
Handschug,EinfhrungindaskanadischeRecht,marginalnumber291(page98).

36 Handschug,EinfhrungindaskanadischeRecht,marginalnumber291(page98).
13
However, this distinction between barrister and solicitor does not exist in all
commonlawcountriesoris,likeinCanada,nowadaysmerelyahistoricalmatter
without practical consequence. Although in Canada there is still a distinction
betweenbarristerandsolicitor,eachmemberofabarassociationofoneofthe
Canadianprovincesisallowedtopracticebothasbarristerandassolicitorwithout
37
any limitations. In practice, however, the distinction between a lawyer who
engagesprimarilyincourtappearancesandgivingopinionsandtransactionlawyers
isnormalinlargecommercialcentres,ifnotinsmallcommunities.

Indeedthecivilproceedingsincivillawaredependingontheparties(respectively
theirattorneys)preferences,too,butjudgeshaveamuchmoreactiveparttoplay
thanjudgesincommonlaw.Thatiswhycivillawproceedings

apartfrompublicandcriminalproceedingsmaybedescribedasinquisitorialin
contrastwithcommonlawproceedings.Thuscivillawjudgeshavemanyfunctions
whichincommonlawtheattorneysareresponsiblefor.

Forinstanceincivillawthejudgeisgenerallyresponsiblefortheoralquestioning
ofthewitnessesintakingevidence.Therebythejudgeasksthewitnessesaboutthe
factualissuesofthecase,whichareallegedandpresentedbytheattorneysintheir
pleadingsandwhichwereofferedfortheevidence.Theattorneysthennormally
38
haveonlytheopportunitytoraiseadditionalquestions.

Incommonlawthepartiesrespectivelytheirattorneysareobligedtobringinall
relevant evidence. This includes taking of evidence by questioning the parties
own witnesses and also questioning the witnesses brought forward by the
39
opponent.

37
Handschug,EinfhrungindaskanadischeRecht,marginalnumber29(page99).
38
Wirth,SchiedsVZ2003,9(14).

39 Wirth,SchiedsVZ2003,9(14).
14
Amethodofquestioningwitnessesbyattorneysasdescribedisunknowntocivil
lawandiscalledcrossexamination.Therebybothpartiescalltheirwitnesses
andexpertwitnesses.Thepartywhichcallsawitnesshastherighttoquestionthis
witness first. Because the answers of this own witness will in most cases be
favorableforthepartythatbroughtitforward,afterwardstheopponenthasthe
40
right to question the other partys witness. It is particularly respecting this
matterofcrossexaminationbyattorneysthatthecivillawproceedings,where,as
explained,generallyonlythejudgequestionsthewitnessesandexpertwitnesses,
differsignificantlyfromcommonlawproceedings.

Having said that, another significant difference between adversarial and

inquisitorial system is the manner in which they deal with experts. While in
commonlaw,asexplainedabove,eachpartycanbringforwardandquestionits
ownexpertandthejudgeonlyhastodecidewhichexpertismoreconvincing,in
civillawitisthejudgewhoinmostcasesappointstheexpert,oftenasolewitness,
41
andthenacceptshisopinion.

Thedifferentapproachofthetwotraditionsisalsomanifestedinthematterof
recognitionofforeignlaw.

Incommonlawonlythepartiesareresponsibleforpleadingtheapplicabilityof
foreignlaw.Therebyforeignlawincommonlawproceedingsisnotseenaslaw,
butasanissueoffact,whichneedstobeproven.Thepartywhichpleadsforeign
lawthenconsequentlyhastocarrytheburdenofproof.Ifthatpartydoesnotbring
forwardanyevidenceoriftheevidencefails,onlydomesticlawisappliedbythe
courtonthetheorythatifforeignlawisnotprovedtobedifferentfromdomestic
42
law,thenitispresumedtobethesame.

40
Linhart,EnglischeRechtssprache,page52.
41
VonderRecke,SchiedsVZ2007,44(44).

42 Schiemann,EuR2003,17(18).
15
Incontrast,forthecivillawjudgeitisgenerallycompulsorytofindandapply
foreign law according to the principle iura novit curia (the judge knows the
43
law).

Anotherbasicdifferencebetweencommonlawandcivillawisthepurposeofthe
proceeding.

Toexpressitwithperhapsexaggeratedsimplicity,proceduralrulesincommonlaw
putthepartiesinapositionwheretheyareabletofindoutthefactsofthecaseso
thattheycanpresentthesefactstothejudge,respectivelyinsomecasestoajury,
44
andmakeitpossibleforthejudgeorthejurytomaketherightdecision.
Needlesstosay,therightdecisiondependsoneachpartysownview.

Proceduralrulesincivillawfocusratheronsettlementofthedispute.Thisalso
explainsthepartieslimitedroleinpresentingevidence.Incivillawitisallabout
findingoutthemostlikelyversionofthefactsofthecase.Soitismoreorless
acceptedthatsometimesdecisionsmaybenotright,thatis,arenotbasedonthe
45
absolutetruth.

Incivillawitisusualthatinafirstproceduralstepthepartiespresentthecase
extensivelyinwriting,thatmeansthepartiessubstantiatealltherelevantfactsof
thecase,bringforwardtheneededevidencefortheirallegations(offerevidence)
and give reasons for their pleadings. Then, after some correspondence mainly
betweenthetwopartiesbutwithinvolvementofthecourt,atrialtakesplacebefore
thecourt,inwhichthejudgescheckalltheevidenceofferedbythepartiesand
concludebygivingadecision.

43
Schiemann,EuR2003,17(17);Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartII,VII.5.(pages4and5).
44
Wirth,SchiedsVZ2003,9(10).

45 Wirth,SchiedsVZ2003,9(10).
16
Forcommonlawproceedingsitistypicalthatfirstofallthepartiescollectallthe
evidenceinan in many cases very extensive pretrialdiscovery whichincludes
46
gainingaccesstotheopponentsfiles. Notuntilthenthecaseispresentedbefore
thecourtinanorallyheldtrialinwhichthepartiespresentalltheproceduralmatter
47
tothejudge.

Thepretrial,whichisfollowedbytheactualtrial,startsbysubmittingarelatively
shortstatement,calledapretrialmemorandum,ofwhatcanbeprovedattrial.The
purposeofthepretrialistobringtogetherallavailableevidencethatcouldsupport
48
theclaim,andismainlycarriedoutbythepartiesattorneys. Thepurposeofthe
pretrialhearingistoensurethatthepartiesarereadyfortrial,toadvisetheparties
what result might be expected from the evidence referred in the pretrial
memorandumand,sometimes,tomediateasettlement.

Thequestionofhowtodealwiththedeliveryofdocumentsisamajordifference
betweenthetwosystems.Whileincivillaweachpartygenerallyhastoproveits
claimwithitsowndocuments,thatmeanswithdocumentsinitspossession,and
whileitisarareexception,ifajudgefollowsapartysdemandandordersthatthe
opponent has to deliver documents, the parties in common law have the right
duringthepretrialdiscovery,soevenbeforetheyhavetogivefullreasonsfortheir
claim,togetbroadaccesstoallrelevantdocumentswhichareinpossessionofthe
49
opponent. Firstlythedeliverycanberequesteddirectly,withoutinvolvingthe
court,fromtheopponent.Therequesteddocumentsdonothavetobespecifiedin
detail,abroadcategorizationissufficient.Thedeliveryofalldocuments,which

46
Wirth,SchiedsVZ2003,9(10).
47
Wirth,SchiedsVZ2003,9(10).
48
Bhmer,NJW1990,3049(3052).

49 Wirth,SchiedsVZ2003,9(11).
17
arerelevanttothecaseor,accordingtoUSlawabouttakingtheevidence,which
50
evenmayleadtothediscoveryofnewevidenceisobligatory.

Thecommonlawapproachofdeliveryofdocumentsmayallowclaims,forwhich
the plaintiff actually does not have sufficient evidence for a claim and rather
attemptstoestablishhisinitialallegations(inhisstatementofclaim)onlythrough
evidenceprovidedbythedefendant.Thusthisapproachcanresultinaformofself
51
incriminationofthedefendant. Itcanalsoleadtowhatcommonlawlawyerscall
fishingexpeditions,inwhichapartyhopesbygainingaccesstotheopponents
documents,toestablishaclaim.

IV.Reciprocalinfluences

Nowthatsomeofthedifferencesbetweenthetwolegalsystems,commonlawand
civillaw,havebeenillustrated,admittedlyinanunavoidablyselectivemanner,the
reciprocalinfluenceswhichthetwosystemshaveexertedoneachotherwillbe
discussed.

1.LegalsystemofScotland

Aspreviouslymentioned,thelegalsystemofScotlandcanbedescribedashybrid.
Currently,thissystemcannotbedefinitelyattributedtocivilorcommonlaw.This
isduetothefactthat,duringthecourseofcenturies,theScottishlegalsystemwas
52
exposedtovariousinfluences.Theseinfluenceswillbeoutlinedbriefly.

50
Wirth,SchiedsVZ2003,9(12).
51
Demeyere,SchiedsVZ2003,247(250).

52 Toallthissee:Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartI,IV.4.(pages79).
18
Firstly,feudalismbroughttoScotlandfromEnglandandalsotheRomanCatholic
Church (Canon) law, among others, can be considered the most important
influencesonthelawofScotland.

SubsequenttothedeceaseofKingRoberttheBrucein1329,thesocalledDark
Age began for the law of Scotland which resulted from political conflicts,
economicaldifficultiesandweakgovernment.Duringthattime,Scotlandadopteda
multitudeofFrenchinstitutions,andmanyScottishlegalprofessionalsweretrained
inFrance.Duringthisperiod,theScottishlegalsystemdevelopeditsnatureascivil
lawsystemcomparabletocontinentalEuropeanlegalsystems.

After the foundation of the Scottish Parliament and, in 1532, of the Court of
SessionasSupremeCourtofScotland,thephaseofreceptionofRomanlaw,which
lasteduntiltheconclusionoftheNapoleonicwars,tookplaceinScotland.During
this phase, a multitude of Scottish legal professionals studied at the most
recommended European universities from distinguished continentalEuropean
jurists.Consequently,variouscivilianrulesandprincipleswereintegratedintothe
Scottishlegalsystem.

BeginningwiththeunionoftheScottishandEnglishparliamentintheyear1707
which meant the abolition of the Scottish parliament, as well as with the
establishmentoftheHouseofLords,astheultimatecourtofappealforScottish,as
wellasEnglish,civilproceedings,theEnglishcommonlawgainedinfluenceonthe
Scottishlawsystem,whichuptothispointwasprimarilycharacterizedbycivil
law. The English common law displaced the Roman law as the hitherto most
importantexternalinfluence;thedoctrineofprecedentscharacteristicforcommon
law was accepted and Scottish legal professionals did not any longer focus on
continentalEuropean cases or legal scholars, but instead on those of England.
Beyondthat,thisstillenduringprocessisenhancedbythefactthatitiseasierfor

19
Scottish legal professionals, due to the language, to follow the English legal
developmentthantheContinentalEuropean.

Hence,aremarkableinfluenceofcommonlawoncivilcanalsobeobservedin
Scotland.

The influence concerning English and Scottish law, however, is not solely
unilateral. As demonstrated before, the House of Lords became the highest
authorityforScottishcivilproceedings.

Certainly,thismeansabiginfluenceofcommonlawonScottishlawinitiallybeing
civilian.Thisinfluence,however,mustnotbeoverestimatedsincealsoaScottish
presence exists within the House of Lords. Many Scottish judges have been
appointedtotheHouseofLordsandhaveinfluencedEnglishlawbyreasoning
fromEuropeancivillawwhendecidingcases.Thiscircumstancehastheresultthat
alsotheinfluenceofScottishLaw,andthroughit,civillaw,canbeobservedinthe
53
HouseofLords.

2.TheEuropeanunification

Another,probablymoreimportantsectorwherecivillawinfluencescommonlaw,
istheEuropeanunificationinwhichEngland(UK)hasparticipatedsince1973.
Thereby,England(UK),justlikeanyothermemberoftheEuropeanUnion,is
obligatedtoimplementguidelinesoftheEU,whosestylemaybecharacterized
54
ratherascivilian. Consequently,Englishcourtsarealsoobligatedtorespectand
toimplementthejurisdictionoftheEuropeanCourtofJustice.

53
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartII,XIV.3.(page17).

54 Brand,JuS2003,1082(1090).
20
Inthiscontext,onecansaythattheEuropeanCommunityLawundtherebythe
EuropeanCourtofJusticeasSupremeCourtcanberatherattributedtocivillaw
than to common law, due to the prevalence of continentalEuropean countries
withintheEuropeanUnion.

The same can be said for the European Convention on Human Rights and the
jurisdiction of the European Court for Human Rights. By having ratified and
incorporatedtheConvention,England(UK)hasopenedanotheravenueforcivil
55
lawtoinfluenceEnglishlaw.

The consequence of all of this is that through the process of the European
unification and theconsequent needofEnglish legal professionalstodealwith
Europeanlaw,theirinterestinthecontinentalEuropeanlegalsystemcharacterized
bycivillaw,andespeciallyinlegalsystemsofFranceandGermany,hasbeen
56
awakened.

3.Capitalmarketandinternationallawfirms

Thecapitalmarketandalsolargeinternationallawfirmsarethemselvessignificant
57
forcesbywhichcommonlawbringsinfluencesoncivillaw.

Thiscomesaboutbecausetoanimportantextent,thosedraftingcontractsinthe
course of international business are large AngloAmerican law firms. Those
contractsdifferfromcivillawcontractsinsofarasthecommonlawcommercial
contractsaremoreextensivecomparedtothelatter.Thisisreasonedbythefact
that contracts in civil law do not require provisions that are already applicable
accordingtocodifiedlaw.Merelydeviationsfromandexceptionsofthecodified

55
Schiemann,EuR2003,17(20/21).
56
Schiemann,EuR2003,17(34/35).

57 Brand,JuS2003,1082(1090).
21
law of course alongside to the essentialia negotii that are in any case to be
stipulatedneedtoberegulatedbycontract.

Unlikecivillaw,itisthepracticeincommonlawdrafting,duetoitsparticularities,
tomakeverydetailedprovisions.BecauseoftheapparentprevalenceofAnglo
American big law firms, contracts drafted by common lawyers are adopted as
standardwithinEuropeanbusinesslaw.Thedetailednatureofthesecommercial
contractsarisestoacertainextentfromthefactthatsuchcontractsineffectstate
thelegalrelationshipbetweenthepartieswheregoverninglegalsystemsdonot
provide for the necessary detail and in this respect they go beyond the law
establishedbyanycountryslegalsystem.Itfollowsfromthisthatwhencross
bordertransactionsareinvolved,thesecomplex,detailedcontractsarethebasisfor
thedealingsoftheparties,evenwhenoneormoreofthepartiesisbasedinacivil
law country. This leads to the adoption of AngloAmerican (economic legal)
systemmodelsonpartsofcontinentalEuropeancivillaw.

4.Maritimelaw

Anotherexampleoftheinfluenceofcommonlawonareasofthecivillawisthe
Maritimelaw.Maritimelawisahybridlegalsystemonitsownexistinginalllegal
systems,initiallyarisingfromcivillaw.Inthelatter,atleast200years,however,
Maritimelaw,andinparticular,marineinsurance,hasbeeninfluencedsignificantly
58
bycommonlawprinciplesandalterationsandbenefitedfromit.

58
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartI,III.8.(page5).
22
5.LegalsystemofLouisiana

BesidesScotland,thereisanothercountrytraditionallycharacterizedbycivillaw
thatisnowevenmorethanScotlandinfluencedanddominatedbycommonlaw,
59
namelytheUSfederalstateLouisiana.

AfterLouisianabecameaFrenchcolonyintheyear1731,Frenchlaw,basedonthe
CivilCode,wasinforce.AftersomeyearsfollowingthecessionofLouisianato
Spain in the year 1763, Spanish law, also based on civil law, was introduced.
DirectlyafterrecessiontoFrance,theUSAtookpossessionofLouisianainthe
year1803.Thefactthat,opposedbytheeffortsofmanyAmericans,thecivillaw
tradition has been continued is shown by the Louisiana Civil Code from 1825
whichwasstronglyorientedtowardstheFrenchCodeCivilandwhichwasalso
publishedin,atthattime,officialnationallanguagesFrenchandEnglish.Anew
civilcodewasdeclaredintheyear1870.Thiscodewasnowcomposedonlyin
English but did not fundamentally alter the former Civil Code other than the
incorporationofsomenewprovisionsincludingtheabolitionofslavery.

Today,Frenchhasdisappearedcompletelyfromthecourts,thelaw,and,aswell,
fromlegalliterature.MostofthelegalprofessionalsinLouisianaarenotableto
speak French andconsequentlycan scarcelybe expected to resorttothe initial
Frenchlegaltraditionoftheircountry.Combinedwiththegainingsuperimposition
ofUSfederallaw,commonlawincreasinglydisplacesthecivillawtradition.This
isalsoillustratedbythefactthatalthoughinLouisianaitselfjudgesarerequiredto
proveknowledgeofboth,commonlawaswellasofcivillaw,thisrequirementis
notinsistedon.Asaresult,shouldacasefromLouisianarequiredtobedecided
accordingtocivillawendupbeforetheUSSupremeCourt,itwillbedecidedonly

59
Toallthissee:Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartI,IV.7.(pages12/13);PartII,XIV.1.(c),(page13).
23
bycommonlawjudges,unlikeScottishcasesintheHouseofLords,wherethe
60
presenceofajudgetrainedinScottishlawisguaranteed.

V.Pointsofintersection

1.Internationalarbitration

Oneofthesignificantareaswherecommonlawandcivillawcurrentlyconvergeis
internationalcommercialarbitration.

Thereasonsforpartiestoagreethatadisputeuponacontractshallbesettledbya
privatelyappointedarbitratorinsteadofstatecourtaremainlythefollowing:

Intheeventadisputeissubjecttoastatejurisdiction,itisverylikelythatthe
disputewillnotbesettledbyonejudgmentbutwillinvolveseveraljurisdictions.
Besideshighcosts,thisalsomeansasignificantexpenditureoftimefortheparties
which can be a remarkable disadvantage in the modern course of business.
Especiallyincommonlaw,thediscoveryproceedingspreviouslyreferredtocan
escalateintocostintensiveaswellastimeconsumingproceedings.

Anadditionaladvantageofarbitrationisthat,unlikecourtproceedings,thematter
ofthedisputeisconfidentlyinthesensethatitisnotaccessibletothepublic.

Inadditionitisuptothepartiestoagreeonrulesforthearbitration.Thismeans,
inter alia, they can agree in advance, on which amount documents shall be
disclosedandalso,ofcoursetheplaceofarbitration,thearbitrator,thelanguageof
the case and in particular the rules of procedure need to be agreed upon.
Particularlyatthispointthereisadirectclashbetweencommonandcivillaw
60
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartII,XIV.3.(pages16/17).
24
within the field of international arbitration, if one party belongs to a different
systemthantheother.

Itis obviousthat eachparty tends to choose the legal system and the rulesof
61
procedureitisfamiliarwith. Since,ingeneral,acompromisebetweenbothlegal
systemsneedstobefound,debatesbetweendifferentlegalsystemsareinevitable
62
andmayresultinapartyquestioningthemeritsofitsownsystem.

In this sense, international arbitration presents an important interface between

commonandcivillaw.

The linking of common and civil law, however, goes beyond what has been
describedabove.Thereisamultitudeofinternationalagreementsprovidingrules
withrelationtointernationalarbitration.Inthiscontextthemostsignificantand
notablearethesocalledNewYorkConvention(ConventionontheRecognition
andEnforcementofForeignArbitralAwards)from1958,initiatedbytheUnited
Nations,ineffectsinceJune1959,aswellastheUNCITRAL(UnitedNations
CommissioninInternationalTradeLaw,foundedbytheGeneralAssemblyofthe
UNin1996topromotetheprogressiveharmonizationandunificationofthelawof
internationaltrade)ArbitrationRulesfrom1976andtheUNCITRALModelLaw
63
onInternationalCommercialArbitrationfrom1985.

Insofar as the actual procedure of an international arbitration is concerned, the

Ruleson theTakingofEvidenceinInternationalCommercialArbitration (IBA
RulesofEvidence)whichweresetbytheInternationalBarAssociation(IBA)in
1999shouldbementioned.Theserulespresentasuccessfulattempttocombinethe
bestpartsofcommonandcivillawandtoharmonizethem,toacertaindegree,

61
Wirth,SchiedsVZ2003,9(10).
62
Demeyere,SchiedsVZ2003,247(248/249).

63 GuilhermedaSilvaJr.,ArbitrationandtheInternationalTradeField,2006,pages1113;
Short/Fullerton,CommercialLitigation:OutoftheCourts,CommercialLitigation2008,page12.
25
 64
inregardtorulesofevidence. Furthershouldbeacknowledgedthatpractitioners
considertheIBARulesofEvidenceasuccessfulcompromiseofbothlawsystems
65
andapplythemincreasinglyinthefieldofinternationalarbitration.

HowfartheIBARulesofEvidenceareacceptedisprovedbythefactthatthese
rulesinitiallyconsideredascompromiseforproceedingsbetweencommonlaw
partiesontheonehandandcivillawpartiesontheotherhandareappliedmore
andmoreinarbitrationproceedingsinwhichalltheparticipantsbelongonlyto
66
civillawsystems. Onepossiblereasonforthisphenomenonmaybethatcommon
lawproceduresandtheroleofthejudgeincommonlawcorrespondmorewiththe
purpose of arbitration and the role of the arbitrator than do the nature of civil
proceedingsandtheroleofjudgesincivillaw.

Inarbitrationproceedings,thepurposeoftheproceeding is morea questionof

findingthetruththansettlementofthedispute.Itisimportanttorememberthat
international arbitration agreements frequently provide for prior compulsory
mediation.Ifthepartiesareunabletocomposetheirdifferenceswiththeassistance
ofaneutralmediator,thenthepurposeofarbitrationisnottotrytobringthem
togetherbuttodecidewhoshouldprevailandtowhatextent.

The parties to arbitration will more likely accept the arbitrator as an impartial
persontodecidewhoshouldprevailifthearbitratordoesnotinterfereactivelyin
the proceedings and behaves in a somewhat reserved manner, as common law
67
judges typically do. Finally, the purpose of finding the truth as opposed to
settlement of the dispute is also important, because the arbitrators decision
cannotbecorrectedaseasilyasincourtproceedings,whereoftenanappealis
68
possibleandthedecisionatfirstinstancecanbecontrolledbyahighercourt.

64
Demeyere,SchiedsVZ2003,247(248).
65
Demeyere,SchiedsVZ2003,247(249).
66
Wirth,SchiedsVZ2003,9(13).
67
Wirth,SchiedsVZ2003,9(14).

68 Wirth,SchiedsVZ2003,9(11).
26
Ofcourseacivillawarbitratorwillapplycommonlawprinciplesonlyifthisis
moreeffectivetohimandhewillfollowcivillawrulesfortherest.

Thustheareaofinternationalcommercialarbitrationisnotmerelyaplaceofclash
andconfrontationbetweencommonlawandcivillawbutactuallyalsoarealpoint
ofintersectionwherecommonlawandcivillawarefusedtogethertoacertain
degree.

2.UNIDROITPrinciplesofInternationalCommercialContracts

Besidesinternationalcommercialarbitrationanotherimportantpointofintersection
betweencommonlawandcivillawaretheUNIDROIT(InternationalInstitutefor
theUnificationofPrivateLaw)PrinciplesofInternationalCommercialContracts
andtheirscomments.Thefirstversionofthiscompilationwasfinishedin1994
after several years of labor by a working group comprising some of the most
respectedspecialistsincontractlawandinternationaltradelawfromthedifferent
69
legaltraditionsofcommonlaw,civillawandtheSocialistlegalsystem. The
drafters took account of both common law and civilian principles and
70
codifications. In2004asecondextendedversionofUNIDROITPrinciplesof
InternationalCommercialContractswaspublished.Thepurposeofthecompilation
isclearlysetforthattheoutsetofthetext,whichisthesameinbothversions
exceptoffewamendments:

ThesePrinciplessetforthgeneralrulesforinternationalcommercialcontracts.
Theyshallbeappliedwhenthepartieshaveagreedthattheircontractbegoverned
bythem.

69
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartII,VIII.2.(page7).

70 Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartII,VIII.2.(page7).
27
Theymaybeappliedwhenthepartieshaveagreedthattheircontractbegoverned
bygeneralprinciplesoflaw,thelexmercatoriaorthelike.

Theymaybeappliedwhenthepartieshavenotchosenanylawtogoverntheir
contract.

Theymaybeusedtointerpretorsupplementinternationaluniformlawinstruments.

Theymaybeusedtointerpretorsupplementdomesticlaw.
71
Theymayserveasamodelfornationalandinternationallegislators.

Asexplainedintheoutset,theUNIDROITPrinciplesofInternationalCommercial
Contractsmaybeseenasamodernlexmercatoria,oratleastasapartofit,andare
in fact increasingly accepted by practitioners as a guideline and applied as a
72
substantiverestatementofsupranationalcommercialnorms. Insofartheserules,
developedbyspecialistsofdifferentlegaltraditionsandsystems,areaparticular
pointofintersectionbetweencommonlawandcivillaw.

3.LegalsystemofQuebec

Finally,aslastexampleofapointofintersectionbetweencommonlawandcivil
lawthelegalsysteminQuebecmaybementioned.

Due to its history as a former French colony, private law in Quebec is to be

qualified as civilian. However, in other areas of law, like constitutional law or
criminallaw,Quebechas,liketherestofCanadainallareasoflaw,atypical
73
common law legal system. This brings about a clash of legal traditions to a
certaindegree,but,asmentionedatthebeginningofthispaper,constitutionallaw
andcriminallawlieoutsidethescopeofthisarticle.

71
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter2004.pdf
72
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartII,XV.(page17).

73 Handschug,EinfhrungindaskanadischeRecht,marginalnumber202(page72).
28
 st
TheCodeCivilduBasCanadacameintoforceonAugust1 1866andreflectedto
74
agreatextendtheFrenchCodeCivilof1804respectingitsstructureandstyle.
Thenin1991thewholeofthepresentCodeCivilduQuebecwasenactedandcame
st 75
intoforceonJanuary1 1994. Thislawisanew,modernizedcivilcodethattook
theinfluenceofseveralEnglishprinciplesandinstitutionsintoaccount,whilestill
76
respectingthebasicstructureandterminologyofciviliancodification.

RemarkableinthiscontextistheprobablyuniqueinitiativeofCanadatoreconcile
commonlaw,whichisvalidinallotherCanadianprovincesandterritoriesexcept
fromQuebecandwhichdominatesalsoCanadianfederallawmoreandmore,with
Quebecscivillawbystatute.Soin1998theCanadianfederalMinisterofJustice
introducedBillC50,entitledFederalLawCivilLawHarmonizationAct,No.1
intheCanadianparliament.ItisthemajorpurposeoftheBill,accordingtothe
th
NewsReleasere.BillC50,releasedJune12 1998,toensurethatallexisting
federallegislationthatdealswithprivatelawintegratestheterminology,concepts
77
andinstitutionsofQuebeccivillaw.

Thereforein2001twonewrulesofinterpretationwereamendedtotheCanadian
Interpretation ActbecauseofBill C50. Thesenewsections 8.1 and8.2of the
78
CanadianInterpretationActreadasfollows:

8.1 Both the common law and the civil law are equally authoritative and
recognizedsourcesofthelawofpropertyandcivilrightsinCanadaand,unless
otherwiseprovidedbylaw,ifininterpretinganenactmentitisnecessarytoreferto
aprovince'srules,principlesorconceptsformingpartofthelawofpropertyand
civilrights,referencemustbemadetotherules,principlesandconceptsinforcein
theprovinceatthetimetheenactmentisbeingapplied.
74
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartI,IV.6.(page11).
75
Handschug,EinfhrungindaskanadischeRecht,marginalnumber195(page70).
76
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartI,IV.6.(page12).
77
Tetley,MixedJurisdictions,PartII,IX.(pages8/9).

78 http://canada.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/bj/harm/Index.html
29
8.2Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,whenanenactmentcontainsbothcivillaw
andcommonlawterminology,orterminologythathasadifferentmeaninginthe
civil law and the common law, the civil law terminology or meaning is to be
adoptedintheProvinceofQuebecandthecommonlawterminologyormeaningis
tobeadoptedintheotherprovinces.

ThisCanadianinitiativeintheharmonizationofthecommonlawandthecivillaw,
in a manner designed to respect the essence and genius of each system, is a
particularpointofintersectionbetweenbothofthebiglegaltraditionsandmight
wellbeofinteresttoothermixedjurisdictionsaroundtheworld,notatleasttothe
EuropeanUnion.

VI.Conclusions

This paper has introduced and compared the two important legal traditions of
commonlawandcivillawinanoverviewmanner.

Asoneofthemostsignificantdifferencestheessentialdifferentmethodsoflegal
thinkingwerepointedout:

Whilecommonlawfocusesoneachsinglecase(reasoningfromcasetocase),itis
rather the civil law approach to find justice by abstract, beforehand defined
principles.

Furthermorevariousprocessrelated differencesbetweenbothsystemswere
mentionedandexplained.Mostofthedifferencesarebasedonthefactthatcivil
proceedingsincommonlawareratheradversarialandthatthoseincivillaware
ratherinquisitorial.
30
Alsoitwaspointedoutthatbothlegaltraditionsinfluenceeachother,forinstance
intheScottishlegalsystemorinconnectionwiththeEuropeanunification.

Finally, international commercial arbitration, the UNIDROIT Principles of

International Commercial Contracts and also Canadas exemplary initiative in
harmonizingcommonlawandcivillawwereidentifiedasremarkablepointsof
intersectionbetweenbothlegaltraditions.

DominikLengeling

Lawfirms
PATRICKSCHINDLER,Toronto/
SCHLEIFENBAUM&ADLER,Siegen

31
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