APPRAISAL OF MISCHIEF RULE AND GOLDEN RULE

TAMIL NADU NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL

APPRAISAL OF MISCHIEF RULE AND GOLDEN RULE

SUBMITTED IN THE PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF B.COM. L.L.B (Hons.), SIXTH SEMESTER

Submitted to: PROF. B. Preetham Submitted by: Rohit Sharma

Course Faculty: Interpretation of Statutes Registration no: BCO140048

Course: B.COM.LLB (Hons.) Year: IIIrd, VI-Semester

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Contents
Chapter I................................................................................................................ 3

Introduction........................................................................................................... 3

Chapter II............................................................................................................... 6

Concept of Mischief and Golden Rule.....................................................................6

Chapter III............................................................................................................ 11

Judiciary on Mischief and Golden Rule.................................................................11

Chapter IV............................................................................................................ 21

Advantages and Disadvantages..........................................................................21

Chapter V............................................................................................................. 23

Conclusion........................................................................................................... 23

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Chapter I

Introduction``
Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is
understood.1 The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of
law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law. The purpose of the
interpretation of the statute is to unlock the locks put by the legislature. For such unlocking,
keys are to be found out. These keys may be termed as aids for interpretation and principles
of interpretation.

According to Gray,2 the process by which a judge constructs from words of a statute book, a
meaning which he either believes to be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to
attribute to it, is called interpretation.3

The conventional way of interpreting a statute is to seek the intention of its makers, 4 and
apply that to the facts of the case at hand. 5 An interpretation of the statutory provision which
defeats the intent and purpose for which the statute was enacted should be avoided. 6 Justice
Chakravarti made two observations in his behalf in the instant case Badsha Mia v Rajjab Ali7,

The primary object in interpreting a statute is always to discover the intention of the
legislature and in England the rules of interpretation, developed there , can be relied on to
aid the discovery because those whose task is to put the intention of the legislature into
language, fashion their language with those very rules in view. Since framers of statutes

1 State of Jammu and Kashmir v Thankur Ganga Singh, [1960] 2 SCR 346, P 351, per Subba Rao J.

2 Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, 2nd Edn., pp 176-78.

3 Salmond, Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., p 152.

4 Bhatia International v Bulk Trading SA & Anor , (2002) 4 SCC 318.

5 Ibid.

6 State of Kerala & Ors v Dr SG Sarvothama Prabhu, (2001)9 SCC 673.

7 AIR 1946 Cal 348, p 353.

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couch the enactments in accordance with the same rules as the judicial interpreter applies,
application of those rules in the analysis of a statute naturally brings up the intended
meaning to the surface. It is at least doubtful whether in a case of framers of Indian statutes
of the present times, especially of the provincial legislature, the same assumption can always
be made.

Interpretation is of two kinds grammatical and logical. Grammatical interpretation is

arrived at by reference to the laws of speech to the words used in the statute; in other words,
it regards only the verbal expression of the legislature. Logical interpretation gives effect to
the intention of the legislature by taking into account other circumstances permissible
according to the rules settled in this behalf. Proper construction is not satisfied by taking the
words as if they were self-contained phrases. So considered, the words do not yield the
meaning of a statute.8

According to Gray, grammatical interpretation is the application to a statute of the laws of

speech; logical interpretation calls for the comparison of the statute with other statutes and
with the whole system of law, and for the consideration of the time and circumstances in
which the statute was passed. It is the duty of the judiciary to ascertain the true legal meaning
of the words used by the legislature. A statute is the will of the legislature and the
fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, and that a statute is to
be expounded, according to the intent of them that made it. 9 The object of interpretation is to
find out the intention of the legislature.

The primary and foremost task of a court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention
of the legislature, actual or imputed. The words of the statute are to be construed so as to
ascertain the mind of the legislature from the natural and grammatical meaning of the words
which it has used. The essence of the Law, according to Salmond10 is,

When we read an Act of Parliament the first and fundamental point of note is that it is not
like reading a book or a newspaper. Legislative text must be read according to the principles

8 Romero v International Terminal Operating Co., 358 US 354, 3 L Ed 2d 368, 375.

9 Sussex Peerage 65 RR 11.

10 Supra note 3.

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and rules as decided upon by the judges and the statute itself. A special skill is required to
understand the meaning.

In the Court of Appeal in Allen v. Thorn Electrical IndustriesLtd.11, Winn L.J held that, the
court is therefore compelled to construe the section in the sense in which Parliament would
desire it to take effect, by giving the words their most stringent possible meaning. On the
contrary I think the right view is, and I understand always has been, that in such a case of
ambiguity, it is resolved in such a way as to make the statute less onerous for the general
public and so as to cause less interference, than the more stringent sense would, with such
rights and liberties as existing contractual obligations.

Interpretation is combination of different rules of interpretation and construction which

would result in proper understanding and provide the right approach towards the legislative
intent which they follow while formulation of the statute. The two important rules of
interpretation are Mischief and Golden Rule. They are not used hierarchy wise rather their
implementation comes into picture according to their specific purpose and requisites.
Mischief rule is approached when there is some mischief in statute and for ratification of that
wrong or mischief and to rediscover the right correct one. Whereas Golden rule comes into
picture when there is ambiguity, irrelevancy and more than one meaning is possible for a
specific word or phrase in question then it says either to choose the wider definition or
meaning or else choose by referring to the intent and objective of the legislature so that
purposive and correct approach would be taken and should be literal in meaning and also in
understanding.

11 (1968) 1 QB 487.

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Chapter II

Concept of Mischief and Golden Rule

Mischief Rule

Mischief rule is to be considered as one of the integral and indispensible rules as far as the
Interpretation of Statute is concerned. It is often referred to as the rule in Heydons Case12.
Counted as landmark judgment in the history of Mischief rule, was reported by Lord Coke
and decided by the Barons of the Exchequer in the 16th century laid down the following
rules:

That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general, is they penal or beneficial,
restrictive or enlarging of the common law; four things are to be considered

What was the common law before the passing of the Act?
What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
What remedy the Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
Commonwealth?
The true reasons for the remedy.

Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy.

12 (1854) EWHC Exch J36.

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Mischief rule is not a rule which is to be followed through the elimination rule method
instead it comes into picture when there is defect or mischief in statute which is unable to
resolve so in that case it is necessary to use Mischief rule to ratify and get it resolved.

In case of Parkin v. Norman13, application of Mischief rule and its scope was dealt. The court
decided that the Public Order Act 1936 was never designed to deal with homosexual behavior
in public toilets. The long title to the Act reads:

An Act to prohibit the wearing of uniforms in connation with political objects and the
maintenance by private persons of associations of military or similar characters; and to
make further provision for the preservation of public order on the occasion of public
processions and meetings and in public places.

After reading the long title of the Act it is sufficiently clear that it does not talk about the
homosexual behavior in public toilets therefore, there is no mischief at all. The purposes of
the Act and the mischief rule are, therefore, closely connected, and it is very genuine to look
at the long title.

Another example of the application of the mischief rule is found in the case of Ohison v.
Hylton14. The facts of the case are there was carpenter boarded train which was crowded and
subsequently another passenger objected and ended up on platform in a fight in which the
carpenter took one of his trade tool, a hammer and struck that man. He was charged under the
Prevention of Crime Act 1953. Lord Widgery, CJ, said, inter alia, This is a case in which the
mischief at which the statute is aimed appears to be very clear. Immediately prior to the
passing of the 1953 Act the criminal law was adequate to deal with the actual use of weapons
in the course of a criminal assault. Where it was lacking, however, was that the mere
carrying of offensive weapons was not an offence. The long title of the Act reads as follows:

An Act to prohibit the carrying of offensive weapons in public places without lawful
authority or reasonable excuse. Parliaments main objective and purpose behind that Act
was to have preventive measures against the carriage of offensive weapons in public places
but the scope goes far beyond the mischief aimed at, and in every case where an assault is
committed with a weapon and in a public place an offence under the 1953 Act can be charged

13 (1982) 2 All E.R. 583.

14 (1975) 2 All E.R. 490.

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in addition to the charge of assault. Therefore, finally it was considered that it will come
under the ambit of said Act also.

Mischief rule is considered to discover Parliaments intention and to give the judge more
discretion than any other rule as it allows him to effectively decide on legislators intent.
Originating from a 16th century case in the United Kingdom, its main aim is to determine the
mischief and defect that the statute in question has set out to remedy, and what ruling
would effectively implement this remedy. When material words are capable of bearing two or
more constructions the most firmly established rule for construction of such words of all
statutes in general is termed as Mischief Rule also known as purposive construction.

Golden Rule

Golden Rule of Interpretation of Statutes are one of best and integral rule according to which
until unless there is no absurdity and inconsistency occurs in the construction it is best to
adhere with the ordinary sense of meaning and still the problem persists then look into the
intention of the legislature and adhere to that construction for proper implementation.

Lord Wensleydale called it the Golden Rule and adopted it in Grey v Pearson15 and thereafter
it is usually known as Lord Wensleydales Golden Rule. This is another version of the golden
rule. His Lordship expressed himself thus:

I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe
universally adopted at least in the courts of law in Westminster Hall that in construing wills,
and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary
sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no
further.

It is an incredible rule in the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the
words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention
of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or

15 (1857) 6 HL 61, p 106,26 LJ Ch 473,p 481, Abbot v Middleton (1858) 11 ER 28 ,7 HLC 114 ,
115 ,per Lord Wensleydale.

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repugnance, in that case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such
inconvenience, but no further.

Jervis CJ, also described it as the golden rule while deciding the instant case he also defined
and expressed his thoughts over it in Matteson v Hart16

We must, therefore, in this case have recourse to what is called the golden rule of
construction, as applied to Acts of parliament, viz to give to the words used by the Legislature
their plain and natural meaning, unless it is manifest, from the general scope and intention of
the statute, injustice and absurdity would result from so construing them.

In other words ambiguity, inconsistency, incompleteness in literal interpretation leads

modification of language so as to avoid such inconvenience. In all such cases, the statute
becomes equivocal i.e., double meaning or questionable, suspicious or uncertain in nature.
Whenever the meaning of the word, phrase, expression or sentence is uncertain, it may be a
case of departing from the plain grammatical meaning, and there may be need for application
of golden rule.17

Crawford has discussed the various ways by which the meaning of statutes with regard to the
intention of the parliament is to be ascertained.18 He writes:

The first source from which the legislative intent is to be sought is the words of the statute.
Then an examination should be made of the context, and the subject matter and purpose of
the enactment. After the exhaustion of all intrinsic aids, if the legislative intent is still
obscure, it is proper for the court to consult the several extrinsic matters for further
assistance. And during the consideration of the- various sources of assistance, further help
may, of course, be found on the use of the numerous rules of construction.

Austin also expressed his opinion over the interpretation and divided the interpretative
process into three sub-processes:

finding the rule,

finding the intention of the legislature, and
16 (1854) 23 LJCP 108 ,p 144.

17 See also, Robert Wingram Crawford v. Richard Spooner, MIA 179 (PC).

18 Crawford, Statutory Construction, p 274.

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extending or restricting the statute so discovered to cover cases which should be

covered.

Whereas De Sloovere recommended the following steps for the Interpretation for Statutes:

finding or choosing the proper statutory provisions,

interpreting the statute law in its technical sense, and
applying the meaning so found, to the case in hand.

According to Odgers19 there are three methods of judicial approach to the construction of a
statute, namely:

the literal,
by employing the Golden Rule and
by considering the mischief that the statute was designed to obviate or prevent.

In the case of Vacher v London Society of Compositors20 is a landmark case in which all the
three methods were approached. The question there was whether under Sec.4(1) of Trade
Disputes Act 1906, any tortuous act by trade unions was protected or only such tortuous acts
as were committed in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. The House of Lords
took the former view and, in delivering their opinions, Lord Macnaughten adopted the
Golden Rule from Grey v Pearson21, Lord Atkinson followed the literal approach in the case
of Cooke v Charles A Vageler22, while Lord Moulton discussed the history of the statute and
applied the mischief method.

Maxwell says23 that the application of Golden Rule of Construction, and its limits, can be
seen in the area devoted to construction with reference to the consequences, and construction
to avoid inconvenience and injustice, and to prevent evasion. He illustrated the application of

19 Odgers, Construction of Deeds and Statutes, 2nd Edn, pp 289-90.

20 (1913) AC 107, p 117, per Lord Macnaughten, Lord Atkinson, Lord Moulton.

21 (1857) 6 HL Cas 61, 26 LTCh 473.

22 (1901) AC 102, p 107.

23 Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, 1985, pp.43-45.

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the rule in various cases relating to criminal, civil, labour, revenue taxation and
administration branches of law.

After discussing the above cases it is quite clear that Golden Rule is applicable when there is
absurdity in the construction of statute and when it is not possible to adhere to the ordinary
meaning of the statute then finally the modification is done to implement the correct meaning
and intention of the parliament.

Chapter III

Judiciary on Mischief and Golden Rule

This chapter will basically deal with the approach by the judiciary over a course of time
regarding both the rules. First the author will deal with the Mischief Rule, thereafter Golden
Rule. Both these rules of statutory interpretation trace their origin from common law
countries and not from India so might be possible there can be difference in applicability
therefore, same will examined with the help of different cases in which both rules has been
applied by the Judiciary.

Mischief Rule

In the case of Smith vs. Hughes24

The brief facts were that the defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon
Street, London, and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4, 1959,
24 [1960] 1 WLR 830.

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between 8.50 p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street, for the
purposes of prostitution, from a first-floor balcony. The defendants method of soliciting the
men was:

(i) to attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with some metal object
and by hissing at them as they passed in the street beneath her and

(ii) having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to come inside the
premises with such words as Would you like to come up here a little while? at the same time
as she indicated the correct door of the premises.

But she was booked under the Street Offences Act, 1959. But it was contended on behalf of
the defendant that the balcony was not in a Street within the meaning of section 1(1) of the
Street Offences Act, 1959, accordingly no offence had been committed. The sole question
here is whether in those circumstances the appellant was soliciting in a street or public
place. The words of Sec. 1(1) of the Act are read as: It shall be an offence for a common
prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purpose of prostitution.

Lord Parker CJ said held that,

it does not say there specifically that the person who is doing the soliciting must be in the
street. Equally it does not say that it is enough if the person who receives the solicitation or
to whom it is addressed is in the street. For my part, I approach the matter by considering
what the mischief is aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to
clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or
solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute
is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at a window,
or whether the window is shut or open or half open; in each case her solicitation is projected
to and addressed to somebody walking in the street. For my part, I am content to base my
decision on that ground and that ground alone. I think that the magistrate came to a correct
conclusion in each case, and that these appeals should be dismissed.

In the case of Royal College of Nursing vs. DHSS25

The Royal College of Nursing brought an action challenging the legality of the involvement
of nurses in carrying out abortions. The Offences against the Person Act 1861 makes it an

25 [1981] 2 WLR 279.

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offence for any person to carry out an abortion. The Abortion Act 1967 provided that it would
be an absolute defence for a medically registered practitioner (i.e. a doctor) to carry out
abortions provided certain conditions were satisfied.

The Court held that,

It was legal for nurses to carry out such abortions. The Act was aimed at doing away with
back street abortions where no medical care was available. The actions of the nurses were
therefore outside the mischief of the Act of 1861 and within the contemplate defence in the
1967 Act. Advances in medical science meant surgical abortions were largely replaced with
hormonal abortions and it was common for these to be administered by nurses.

In the case of Corkery vs. Carpenter26

The defendant was riding his bicycle whilst under the influence of alcohol. Sec.12 of the
Licensing Act, 1872 made it an offence to be drunk in charge of a carriage on the highway.

The Court in the instant case applied the mischief rule and held that,

riding a bicycle was within the mischief of the Act as the defendant represented a danger to
himself and other road users. According to Sec.12 of the Licensing Act 1872, a person found
drunk in charge of a carriage on the highway can be arrested without a warrant. A man was
arrested drunk in charge of a bicycle. According to the plain meaning rule a bike is not a
carriage. Under the Mischief rule the bicycle could constitute a carriage. The mischief the
Act was attempting to remedy was that of people being on the road on transport while drunk.
Therefore a bicycle could be classified as a carriage.

In the case of DPP vs. Bull27

A man was charged with an offence under Sec. 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959 which
makes it an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a public street or public
place for the purposes of prostitution. The magistrates found him not guilty on the grounds
that common prostitute only related to females and not males. The prosecution appealed by
way of case stated.

26 [1951] 1 KB 102.

27 (1995) QB 88.

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The court applied the mischief rule and said that the Act did apply only to females and also
observed that the word Prostitute is ambiguous vis, a vis., the Act was aimed at controlling
the behavior of only female prostitutes. And finally held that,

The Street Offences Act was introduced as a result of the work of the Wolfenden Report into
homosexuality and prostitution. The Report only referred to female prostitution and did not
mention male prostitutes.

After analyzing above judgments one can say that all the judicature looked into the remedy
concept of the Mischief Rule and the basic reason why it was formulated so that correct
approach must be facilitated by the Court to the citizens but they didnt looked into other
concepts or rules established in the Heydons case it seems they apply all the concept as per
the requirements and not at one go.

In the case of Sodra Devi vs. Commr. Of Income Tax28

By Sec. 16(3) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, in computing the total income of any
individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included so much of the income of a
wife or minor child of such individual as arises indirectly or directly. The contention raised
was that the word any individual and such individual do include males only or females
also.

The Court observed that,

the legislature was guilty of using an ambiguous term. There is no knowing with certainly as
to whether the legislature meant to enact these provisions with reference only to a male of the
species using the words any individual or such individual in the narrower sense of the
term indicated above or intended to include within the connotation of the words any
individual or such individual also a female of the species. Holding the words any
individual and such individual as restricted in their connotation to mean only the male of
the species.

The Court observed the reason behind the same was,

the evil which was sought to be remedied was the only resulting from the widespread
practice of husbands entering into nominal partnerships with their wives, and fathers

28 1957 AIR 832, 1958 SCR 1.

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admitting their minor children to the benefits of the partnerships of which they were
members. This evil was sought to be remedied by the Income Tax Act. The only intention of
the legislature in doing so was to include the income derived by the wife or a minor child, in
the computation of the total income of the male assesses, the husband or the father as the
case may be for the purpose of the assessment.

In the case of RMDC v. UOI29

In the instant case, definition of prize competition under Sec. 2 (d) of the Prize Competition
Act, 1955, was held to be inclusive of only those instances in which no substantive skill is
involved. Thus, those prize competitions in which some skill was required were exempt from
the definition of prize competition under Sec. 2 (d) of the said Act. Hence, in the instant case,
the Supreme Court has applied the Heydons Rule in order to suppress the mischief was
intended to be remedied, as against the literal rule which could have covered prize
competitions where no substantial degree of skill was required for success.

In the case of Bengal immunity co. v State of Bihar30

In Indian context the rule was best explained in the instant case. The appellant company is an
incorporated company carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling various sera,
vaccines, biological products and medicines. Its registered head office is at Calcutta and its
laboratory and factory are at Baranagar in the district of 24 Perganas in West Bengal. It is
registered as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act and its registered number is
S.L. 683A. Its products have extensive sales throughout the territory and abroad. The goods
are dispatched from Calcutta by rail, steamer or air against orders accepted by the appellant
company in Calcutta. The appellant company has neither any agent nor manager in Bihar and
nor an office, godown or laboratory in that State. On the 24th October, 1951 the Assistant
Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Bihar wrote a letter to the appellant company which
conclude saying that if they dont register there will be necessary action against them.

The principal question is whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by the
appellant company and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and manner mentioned

29 AIR 1957 SC 628.

30 AIR 1955 SC 661.

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in its petition is leviable by the State of Bihar and also raises a question of construction of
Article 286 of the Constitution.

It was decided that,

Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 in so far as it purports to tax sales or purchases that take place in
the course of inter-State trade or commerce, is unconstitutional, illegal and void. The Act
imposes tax on subjects divisible in their nature but does not exclude in express terms
subjects exempted by the Constitution. In such a situation the Act need not be declared
wholly ultra vires and void. Until Parliament by law provides otherwise, the State of Bihar do
forbear and abstain from imposing sales tax on out-of-State dealers in respect of sales or
purchases that have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce even though
the goods have been delivered as a direct result of such sales or purchases for consumption
in Bihar. The State must pay the costs of the appellant in this Court and in the court below.

After analyzing the above Indian cases one thing is clear that Indian Judiciary has not only
identified the mischief and the main of the legislature of remedies while construction of
statutes but also took care of the cases in which the statute is contradictory of Constitution
and then by applying the mischief rule they construed them as unconstitutional. Therefore,
not a big diversion can be noted in English and Common law Courts in application of
Mischief Rule with respect to the Indian Judiciary but in India the judiciary might sometime
look into intrinsic aids like Constitution which is to be the grund norm in India.

Golden Rule

In Free Lanka Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ranasinghe31, a Statute made it felony to break from
prison. Held it would not apply to a prisoner who escaped while the prison was on fire. Since
his act was, not to recover liberty, but to save his life. Similarly a statute which made an act
criminal in unqualified terms was understood as not applying where the act done was
excusable or justifiable on grounds generally recognized by law. If in the instant case literal
meaning would have been considered then the act of saving his life would also be under the
ambit of act and would be a crime as per the Act but the ordinary meaning will lead to
absurdity therefore, by applying the golden rule they did some modification and exempted his
act which reasonably excusable due to unforeseeable circumstances.

31 (1964) AC 541.

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In the case of Luke v. R.R.C32, Lord Reid said:

An intention to produce unreasonable result is not to be imputed a statute if there is some

other construction available. Where to apply words literally would defeat the obvious
intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result we must do some
violence to the words and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational
construction. Though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges, but a problem
may arise where more than one meaning arc available through the words of the statute, that
meaning should be chosen which is reasonable and rational.

In R. v. London Justices33, Section 105 of the Highways Act, 1835 gave an appeal to any
person who though himself aggrieved by any order, conviction, judgment or determination of
a justice under the Act.

It was held that this provision will not to apply to an informant who complained of an
acquittal on a charge of obstructing of highway, for if it did, the person acquitted would be
liable to be twice vexed for the same offence. Court added that if they would chose the
ordinary meaning and go by that informant will also come under the ambit of provision and
judiciary had to deal with plethora of cases against a person(s) just because of the ordinary
meaning. Therefore, by applying golden rule of construction and choosing the rational and
reasonable meaning as per the intention of statute.

In Inland Revenue Commissioner v. J.B. Hodge & Co. (Glasgow) Ltd. 34, it was held that,
Where possible, a construction should be adopted which will facilitate the smooth working
of the scheme of legislation established by the Act, which will avoid producing or prolonging
artificiality in the law and which will not produce anomalous results. Where two possible
constructions present, the more reasonable one is to be chosen.

In Gill v. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd.35, Lord Reid said that,

32 (1963) AC 557.

33 (1890) 25 QBD 357.

34 (1961) 1 WLR 92.

35 (1963) 1 WLR 929.

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Beneficial laws are addressed to practical people, and ought to be construed in the light of
practical consideration, rather than a meticulous comparison of the language of their
various provisions. If the language is capable of more than one interpretation, we ought to
discard the more natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that
interpretation which leads to a reasonably practical result.

Aforementioned cases conclude that Golden Rule of Interpretation basically relies on

reasonable construction as per the circumstances and need. If the ordinary meaning will do
the requisite justice then there is no need to look for anything more but when there are more
than one ordinary meaning then the most reasonable and rational one would be considered.

In the case of Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore36, the Supreme Court held
that the expression landless person used in Sec. 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953
which made provision for grant of land to landless persons, was limited to landless
laborers. A landless labour is he who is engaged in agriculture but having no agricultural
land. The Court further said that any landless person did not include a landless businessman
residing in a city. The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan movement, which
aimed at distribution of land to landless labourers who were verged in agriculture. A
businessman, though landless cannot claim the benefit of the Act.

In Lee v. Knapp,37 Section 77 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 provided that a driver
causing accident shall stop after the accident, the interpretation of the word stop was in
question. In this case, the driver of the motor vehicle stopped for a moment after causing an
accident and then ran away. Applying the golden rule the Court held that the driver had not
fulfilled the requirement of the section, as he had not stopped for a reasonable period so as to
enable interested persons to make necessary inquires from him about the accident at the spot
of accident.

In the case of Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar38 in construing Section 6 of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958, the Supreme Court laid down that, the crucial date on which the age
of the offender had to be determined is not the date of offence, but the date on which the

36 AIR 1981 SC 1656

37 (1966) 3 AH ER 961.

38 AIR 1963 SC 1088: (1963) Supp 2 SCR 745.

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sentence is pronounced by the trial court. An accused who on the date of offence was below
21 years of age but on the date on which the judgment pronounced, if he was above 21 years,
he is not entitled to the benefit of the statute. This conclusion reached having regard to the
object of the Act. The object of the Statute is to prevent the turning of the youthful offenders
into criminals by their association with the hardened criminals of mature age within the
walls of the prison. An accused below 21 years is entitled to the benefit of the Act by sending
him under the supervision of the probation officer instead of jail.

In the case of Narendra Kiadivalapa v. Manikrao Patil,39 Section 23 of the Representation of

People Act, 1951, which permitted inclusion of the name in the electoral roll till the last
date for nomination for an election in the concerned constituency, has been construed.
Section 33 (1) of the R.P. Act, 1951 specifies that the nomination papers shall be presented
between the hours of 11O clock in the forenoon and 30 clock in the afternoon. Reading
these provisions together in the light of the object behind them, the Supreme Court construed
the words last date in section 23 as last hour of the last date of nomination under
Section 33 (1) of the Act.

In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P.40, Sales Tax
was fixed at two percent of the turnover in the case of cooked food under section 3A of the
U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. The appellant firm engaged in the business of biscuit manufacture
and sale. Whether biscuits though intended for human consumption can be construed as
cooked food and liable to be taxed as per the notification issued under the said provision.

The Court held that, if an expression is capable of a wider meaning, the question whether
the wider or narrower meaning should be accepted depends on the context of the statute.
Here biscuit was not covered within the words cooked food. However, where the precise
words used are plain and unambiguous the court is bound to construe them in their ordinary
sense and not to limit plain words in an Act of Parliament by consideration of policy which
has to be decided not by court but by Parliament itself.

39 AIR 1977 SC 2171.

40 AIR 1981 SC 1656.

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In Tirath Singh vs. Bachitter Singh41 the appellant argued that it was obligatory under Section
99 (1) (a) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951 for the tribunal to record names of
all persons who had been guilty of corrupt practices including parties and non-parties to the
petition and that under the proviso, notice should be given to all persons named under Section
99(1) (a) (ii). He being a party to the petition was, therefore, entitled to a fresh notice.
Supreme Court said that such an interpretation will lead to an absurdity and held that the
proviso along with clause (b) thereto and the setting of the section pointed out that notice is
contemplated only against non- parties to the petition.

In the case of Grundi vs. Great Boulder Proprietary Cold Mines Ltd.,42 Lord Greene M.R.
said, Although absurdity or non-absurdity of one conclusion as capered with another may
be and very often is, of assistance to the court in choosing between two possible meanings of
ambiguous words. The Golden Rule of Construction is a doctrine, which must be applied with
great care, remembering that judges may be fallible in this question of absurdity and in any
event it must not be applied so as to result in twisting language into a meaning, which it
cannot bear. It is a doctrine which must not be used to re-write the language in a way
different from that in which it was originally framed.

In India there are several good examples where the Supreme Court or High Courts have
applied the Golden Construction of Statutes. Certain confusion one may face when it appears
that even for literal or sometimes also obtain the place or properties of mischief rule as the
Court look into the aim of the statue and despite they dont look into remedial character
instead they take aim, reasonableness and rational like characters into consideration which
sometime resembles with the Mischief and Literal Rule. But this diverged behavior in the
application of rule by Judiciary is seen in India only not in Common law countries. As golden
rule initially starts with the search of literal meaning of the provision, and if there is
unequivocal meaning, plain and natural and no repugnancy, uncertainty of absurdity appears,
apply the meaning. But when there is possibility of more than one meaning, we have to go
further to avoid the inconvenience by even modifying the language by addition, rejection or
substitution of words so as to make meaning accurate expounding of intention of the
legislature.43

41 (1976) 3 S.C.R. 160.

42 1948 1 All ER 21.

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Chapter IV

Advantages and Disadvantages

With every rule there come advantages and disadvantages:

Mischief Rule

43 Kafaltiya A.B., Interpretatation of Statutes, Universal Law Publishing, 2008 ,pp 52.

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Advantages:

The Law Commission sees it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as
opposed to the Golden or Literal Rules.
It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing.
Closes loopholes.
Allows the law to develop and adapt to changing needs.

Disadvantages:

It is seen to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when common
law was the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not established.
It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be
undemocratic.
Creates a crime after the event example Smith v Hughes, Elliot v Grey thus infringing
the rule of law.
Gives judges a law making role infringing the separation of powers and Judges can
bring their own views, sense of morality and prejudices to a case example Smith v
Hughes, DPP v Bull.

Golden Rule

Advantages:

Drafting errors in statutes can be corrected immediately.

It allows the court to make sensible decisions after reading the whole objective and
intentional history available regarding that statute.
It respects the authority of parliament because it only allows wording to be altered in
very limited situations where the outcome would be absurd or repugnant.
By avoiding absurdities and injustices, the golden rule puts parliaments true intentions
into force, closes loopholes and avoids the need to produce new legislation.

Disadvantages:

Judges can technically change the law by changing the meaning of words in statutes.
They can, potentially infringing the separation of powers between legal and
legislature.
The Golden Rule wont help if there is no absurdity in the statute.

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There are no real guidelines as to when it can be used and what seems to be absurd to
one judge may not be to another. This means a cases outcome is decided upon the
judge, rather than the law.
It only allows judges to change the wording of statutes in very limited circumstances.
Absurdity is a concept no less vague and indefinite than plain meaning: you cannot
reconcile the cases upon it. It is infinitely more susceptible to the influence of
personal prejudice. The result is that in ultimate analysis the golden rule does allow
a court to make quite openly exceptions which are based not on the social policy
behind the Act, not even on the total effect of the words used by the legislature, but
purely on the social and political views of the men who happen to be sitting on the
case.

Chapter V

Conclusion
As it can be seen from the case, mischief rule can be applied differently by different judges. It
is mainly about the discretion and understanding of the person applying it. Though, it as a far
more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as opposed to the Golden or Literal rules. It usually
avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing but it also seen to be out of date as it has been in

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use since the 16th century, when common law was the primary source of law and
parliamentary supremacy was not established. It gives too much power to the unelected
judiciary which is argued to be undemocratic. In the 16th century, the judiciary would often
draft acts on behalf of the king and were therefore well qualified in what mischief the act was
meant to remedy. This is not often the case in modern legal systems. The rule can make the
law uncertain, susceptible to the slippery slope. Therefore, Purposive interpretation was
introduced as a form of replacement for the mischief rule, the plain meaning rule and the
golden rule to determine cases. The purposive approach is an approach to statutory and
constitutional interpretation under which common law courts interpret an enactment in light
of the purpose for which it was enacted.

It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the meaning of an Act when the meaning can be
fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction would lead to an
absurdity while another will give effect to what common sense would show, as obviously
intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected even if the
same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed
differently. Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the courts sometimes even to modify the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words, if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can
be avoided.44

The Court should not be astute to defeat the provision of the Act whose meaning is, on the
face of it, reasonably plain. Of course, this does not mean that an Act or any part of it can be
recast. It must be possible to spell the meaning contended for, out of the words actually
used.45

Unless the words are without meaning or absurd, it would be safe to give words their natural
meaning because the framer is presumed to use the language which conveys the intention 46
and it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to give effect
to the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give them their ordinary

44 See the Speech of Lordship Wensleydab in Grey v. Pearson [1857] 6 H.L.C. 61.

45 See also, Shamarac v. Parulkarv. Distt. Magistrate, Thana 1952 SCR 863.

46 See also, Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer AIR 1989 SC 505.

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meaning leads to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety or
justice entertained by the Court.47

Finally it seems like both rules comprises of some criticism with their approach and
applicability. Judiciary needs to be very careful with the scope and applicability of these rules
because ultimately if anything goes wrong in judgment the innocent people have to suffer a
lot and that to because of unclear applicability and absolute power in the hand of judges on
whose mood and mind everything depends.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

47 See also, State of Rajasthan v. Mrs. Leela Jain AIR 1965 SC 1296.

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Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer AIR 1989 SC 505.

State of Rajasthan v. Mrs. Leela Jain AIR 1965 SC 1296.
Grey v. Pearson [1857] 6 H.L.C. 61.
Shamarac v. Parulkarv. Distt. Magistrate, Thana 1952 SCR 863.
Grundi vs. Great Boulder Proprietary Cold Mines Ltd, 1948 1 All ER 21.
Tirath Singh vs. Bachitter Singh, (1976) 3 S.C.R. 160.
State of Jammu and Kashmir v Thankur Ganga Singh, [1960] 2 SCR 346, P 351.
Bhatia International v Bulk Trading SA & Anor , (2002) 4 SCC 318.
State of Kerala & Ors v Dr SG Sarvothama Prabhu, (2001)9 SCC 673.
Romero v International Terminal Operating Co., 358 US 354, 3 L Ed 2d 368, 375.
Abbot v Middleton (1858) 11 ER 28 ,7 HLC 114 ,115

Secondary Sources
Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law, (2nd Edn)., pp 176-78.
Salmond, Interpretation of Statutes, (11th Edn., )p 152.
Sussex Peerage 65 RR 11.
Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, (10th Edition, 1985), pp.43-45.
P.St. J. Langan, Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, LexisNexis, (12th Edition
2014).
Ammia Dhanda, N S Bindras Interpretation of Statutes, LexisNexis, (11 th Edition,
2014).
Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes, Eastern Book Company, (5th Edition, 2014).

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