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Prepared by:
M. Cullen Thompson, CFA
President & Chief Investment Officer
cullen.thompson@bienvillecapital.com
Blake Bennett
Analyst
blake.bennett@bienvillecapital.com
CONFIDENTIAL
Summary
Monetary policy in Japan is undergoing a monumental change. For the first time in Japans post-bubble era beginning in 1990, it appears
policymakers intend to drive real interest rates into negative territory. As a result, we believe the yen could continue to weaken and that
Japanese equities could be in the early stages of a powerful rally
On October 30, 2012 the Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance issued a joint statement entitled Measures Aimed at Overcoming Deflation,*
setting the stage for powerful easing, including what seems to be an explicit attempt to weaken the yen. On December 16th, 2012, Shinzo Abe
was elected Prime Minister with a mandate to end deflation (i.e. to reflate the Japanese economy)
Although Japan has struggled with a deflating economy for nearly two decades, the timing of these actions is not random. For a variety of
idiosyncratic, macro and geopolitical reasons, the Japanese economy is faltering. Partly as a result of a strong yen, industrial production and
business surveys have deteriorated, and the revenues of several national export champions have collapsed
Due to negligible growth and deflation, the level of nominal GDP in Japan remains well below previous highs (Slide 4), a dangerous
circumstance for an economy carrying the worlds largest sovereign debt burden. As history has proven, debt and deflation cannot coexist
In return for failing to reflate the Japanese economy, the Bank of Japan is on the verge of losing its independence. At the behest of Abe, it
seems likely the BOJ will confirm a new 2.0% inflation target on January 22nd. In April 2013, the BOJs hawkish Governor, Masaaki
Shirakawa, is set to retire, likely to be replaced with a far more dovish candidate (Slide 5)
In implementing monetary policy, the Bank of Japan is authorized to buy domestic and foreign assets, including equities and REITs (Slide 6).
Achieving the 2% inflation target will prove difficult as domestic deflationary pressures remain. Wages, specifically, are contracting (Slide
7). Hence policy will need to be highly aggressive
In recent years, although the BOJ has expanded its balance sheet (Slide 8), it has risen far less than other central banks since the financial
crisis began (Slide 9)
Regardless of whether the BOJ proves successful in achieving their inflation target, the expectation of aggressive policy can have a
meaningful impact on the yen and Japanese equities, which remain at low levels compared to previous highs (Slide 10 & 11). Recently,
equities have rallied and the yen has begun to weaken (Slide 12). But on a real, trade-weighted basis, the yen could fall another 20% before
reaching the levels of 2007
To be clear, the intention of the additional policy measures in Japan is to enlist the portfolio balance channelthat is, to drive real
interest rates negative, forcing Japanese savers out of cash and bonds and into riskier assets (i.e. equities). The Federal Reserve has attempted
this process twice recently: in 2003 and 2009 (Slide 13), both of which resulted in higher asset prices. By contrast, real interest rates in Japan
have remained positive, benefitting bondholders (Slide 14). High real rates also encourages saving over consumption
The 2003-2005 analog in Japan is interesting: monetary policy was aggressive, the BOJs balance sheet expanded by 25%, the yen weakened by
15% and Japanese equities rallied 125%. Of course this occurred during a period of global easing and reflation. In order to achieve todays
stated goals, the BOJ will need to be far more aggressive. For instance, in order to peg and maintain the Swiss Franc to the Euro at 1.20, the
Swiss National Bank has expanded its balance sheet by 100% since August 2011 * http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2012/k121030b.pdf
Summary
We believe the primary risk to this theme is lack of policy follow-throughthat is, policymakers fail to act to the degree they are
currently suggesting, as has occurred in the past. We currently believe this risk is minimal given the determined and coordinated
communications from policymakers, as well as key upcoming events (e.g. Upper House elections, etc.). However, lack of policy follow-
through would invalidate the theme
However, on a valuation basis, Japanese equities are relatively cheap (1.2x Price/Book versus 1.5x for other global indices) and yield 2.7%,
more than 3x the yield from Japanese government bonds
International mutual funds are also currently underweight Japanese equities. Goldman Sachs believes international mutual funds
allocation to Japan is 4% below benchmark (MSCI EAFE). If portfolio managers feel pressure to get to benchmark, some $60 billion could
flow into Japanese equities (in addition to the estimated $20 billion of recent inflows)
Japans debt-to-GDP ratio is above 200%. Therefore, higher interest rates in Japan could be highly destabilizing. Today policymakers are
undergoing a delicate balancing act: attempting to increase inflation and inflation expectations so that investors reallocate savings to riskier
assets without causing nominal bond yields to rise. We are unsure of whether they can achieve this and continue to expect significant stress in
the JGB market at some point. However, at the moment our focus has been to attempt to profit from a weakening yen and rising Japanese
equities
To be sure, these events have significant implications for the global economy. To weaken the yen, the BOJ needs to buy foreign assets, and
given the size of the purchases required, the likely candidates would be US Dollar and Euro-denominated assets. Neither the US, nor Europe
prefer to see a meaningful appreciation of their currencies
A materially weaker yen also complicates the necessary global rebalancing process: the US and parts of Europei.e. current account deficit
countriesneed to move towards trade balance to achieve sustainable growth (i.e. a weaker USD and euro relative to some peers). By
contrast, the surplus countries, notably China, Japan and Germanythe worlds 2nd, 3rd, and 4th largest economiesneed to engineer more
domestic demand, relying less on exports, or external demand, for growth. A policy-induced shift back towards export-led growth by the
surplus countries would only rekindle the global imbalances that erupted in 2008
Having virtually exhausted its ability to grow through investment, China is unlikely to sit idle as Japan weakens the yen, stealing external
demand in the process
Recently, the yen has weakened by nearly 20% versus the Korean won, one of Japans primary competitors, threatening Korean exports, which
represent 50% of its economy
In sum, aggressive actions by the BOJ could escalate into a full-fledged currency war. Investors should be monitoring these events
closely
In nominal terms, economic activity in Japan is below the level of the mid-1990s, representing a potential disaster
for a country with Japans growing debt burden and declining population
530,000
520,000
510,000
500,000
490,000
480,000
470,000
460,000
450,000
Mar-94 Mar-96 Mar-98 Mar-00 Mar-02 Mar-04 Mar-06 Mar-08 Mar-10 Mar-12
Therefore, the newly-elected Abe administration has embarked on a national mandate to generate inflation and
higher nominal GDP growth. As a consequence, the Bank of Japans independence appears to be in jeopardy
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said Sunday that his government will set a medium-term 2 percent inflation target
with the Bank of Japan in a joint statement expected later this month to help shore up the recession-hit economy.
"What will be important is properly including the price goal of 2 percent," Abe said during a program on NHK in
his latest move to pressure the central bank to be more aggressive in combatting the country's chronic deflation
ahead of its next monetary policy meeting on Jan. 21 and 22.
Abe said the BOJ's current goal of 1 percent inflation lacks "strong determination" and that the government and
central bank will come up with "a definite goal and write that it will be 2 percent."
Abe claimed the new target needs to be achieved under a medium-term scenario rather than a long-term one or
financial markets "will not react."
The prime minister said he believes the next BOJ governor, who will replace Masaaki Shirakawa when his tenure
ends in April, should be someone who can take "bold monetary steps and is in line with our points."
To generate higher inflation and a weaker yen, the Bank of Japan will have to be highly aggressive. Fortunately it
has a lot of options at its disposal, more so than other central banks
Eligible Assets to Purchase Federal Reserve European Central Bank Bank of England Bank of Japan
Government Bonds
(International)
Mortgage-Backed Securities
(RMBS)
Equities
Commercial Paper
REITs
Source: Bank of Japan; Federal Reserve; ECB; BOE; Jefferies; Bienville Capital Management, LLC
Wages continue to deflate, depressing domestic inflation and suggesting the 2% inflation target will be difficult to
achieve. To engineer both inflation and growth for its export-oriented economy, policymakers are focusing on the
trade channel, i.e. a weaker yen. However imports represent less than 20% of Japans economy, meaning the inflation
from imports, which includes natural resources, would have to overwhelm the entrenched domestic deflation without
harming consumption
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
Mar-91 Mar-94 Mar-97 Mar-00 Mar-03 Mar-06 Mar-09 Mar-12
-2.0
-4.0
-6.0
-8.0
Although the Bank of Japans balance sheet has been expanding over the past few years
170,000
160,000
150,000
140,000
130,000
120,000
110,000
100,000
90,000
Aug-06 Aug-07 Aug-08 Aug-09 Aug-10 Aug-11 Aug-12
its aggressiveness pails in comparison to other central banks since the onset of the financial crisis.
450
SNB: +326%
400
BOE: +306%
350
FED: +214%
300
250
ECB: +134%
200
BOJ: +48%
150
100
50
Jan-08 Apr-08 Jul-08 Oct-08 Jan-09 Apr-09 Jul-09 Oct-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-10 Oct-10 Jan-11 Apr-11 Jul-11 Oct-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 Jul-12 Oct-12
The Nikkei remains more than 70% below 1989s bubble highs
45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
Nov-86 Nov-91 Nov-96 Nov-01 Nov-06 Nov-11
and 40% below 2007s levels. By contrast, thanks to aggressive monetary stimulus which drove real rates
negative, US equities are approaching all-time highs.
20,000 1600
1500
18,000
1400
16,000
1300
1200
14,000
1100
12,000
1000
10,000 900
800
8,000
700
6,000 600
Oct-00 Oct-01 Oct-02 Oct-03 Oct-04 Oct-05 Oct-06 Oct-07 Oct-08 Oct-09 Oct-10 Oct-11 Oct-12
The dollar-yen exchange rate has broken a long-term trend and appears to be moving towards 100, a level that
would please both Japanese policymakers and export-oriented companies
Japanese Yen
(Spot)
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
Jan-05 Jul-06 Jan-08 Jul-09 Jan-11 Jul-12
On a real, trade-weighted basis, which accounts for the deflation of wages in Japan, the yen could fall another 20%
before reaching the lows of 2007
Japanese Yen
(Real Effective Trade-Weighted Exchange Rate)
160
140
120
100
80
60
Dec-94 Jun-96 Dec-97 Jun-99 Dec-00 Jun-02 Dec-03 Jun-05 Dec-06 Jun-08 Dec-09 Jun-11 Dec-12
Negative real interest rates in the US have caused significant rallies in risk assets (i.e. the portfolio balance
channel). In 2003, both equities and real estate rallied. In 2009, negative real interest rates and QE have caused
equities to rally again
4.00% 1600
+102%
+117% 1500
3.00%
1400
2.00%
1300
1.00%
1200
0.00% 1100
Mar-00 Sep-01 Mar-03 Sep-04 Mar-06 Sep-07 Mar-09 Sep-10 Mar-12
1000
-1.00%
900
-2.00%
800
-3.00%
700
-4.00% 600
By contrast, real interest rates in Japan have remained largely positive, encouraging savers to place the vast savings
in cash and Japanese government bonds (JGBs). If inflation rose, real rates would turn negative, inspiring savers to
move out on the risk spectrum
3.00%
2.00%
0.00%
Mar-00 Sep-01 Mar-03 Sep-04 Mar-06 Sep-07 Mar-09 Sep-10 Mar-12
-1.00%
whereas
real rates in
the US are
-2.00% negative
-3.00%
-4.00%
During the last material monetary easing (i.e. 2003 2005), which did coincide with a global reflation effort, the
Bank of Japans assets expanded by 25%, which helped to weaken the yen by 15%
160,000
+25%
150,000
140,000
130,000
120,000
110,000
100,000
Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06
while the Nikkei rallied by over 100% (before declining 60% during the financial crisis).
Nikkei 225
(Index)
20,000
18,000
+130%
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
Oct-00 Oct-01 Oct-02 Oct-03 Oct-04 Oct-05 Oct-06 Oct-07 Oct-08 Oct-09 Oct-10 Oct-11 Oct-12
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