PEOPLE v LAMAHANG
CRIMINAL
LAW
BOOK 1 (ARTICLES 1-99, RPC)
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA
PADILLA v. DIZON
(158 SCRA 127)
The respondent-judge has shown gross
ignorance of the law in holding that to
convict the accused for violation of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 i.e., smuggling of
foreign currency out of the country, the
prosecution must establish that the accused
had the criminal intent to violate the law. The
respondent ought to know that proof of
malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not
essential in offenses punished by special
laws, which are mala prohibita.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES
INTOD ET. AL. v CA
(215 SCRA 52)
G.R. No. 103119
Intod fired at Palangpangan's room,
although in reality, the latter was not present
in his room; thus, Intod failed to kill him. The
factual situation in the case at bar presents
an inherent impossibility of accomplishing
the crime. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient
to make the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended
acts even if completed, would not amount to a
crime.
PEOPLE v DOMASIAN
(219 SCRA 245)
The accused illegally detained a child and sent
a ransom note to the latter's parents, but the
child was rescued even before the ransom note
was received. The act cannot be considered an
impossible crime because there was no
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or
the employment of inadequate or ineffective
means, and the delivery of the ransom note
after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish
the offense, which had already been
consummated when the accused deprived the
child of his liberty.
STAGES OF EXECUTION
1
(91 Phil 703)
The accused was caught in the act of making
an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a
store, and succeeded in breaking one board
and in unfastening another from the wall. The
crime committed was not attempted robbery
but only attempted trespass to dwelling, since
based on the facts established, his intention
was to enter by means of force into the said
store against the will of its owner.
PEOPLE v PANCHO
(416 SCRA 506)
November 27, 2003
G.R. 136592-93
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the
Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when
the offender commences the commission of
rape directly by overt acts, but does not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce
the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. There is no attempted rape in this
case because the accused just dragged the
victim and held her feet, which are not indicative
of an intent or attempt to rape the victim.
PEOPLE v ORANDE
(415 SCRA 699)
November 12, 2003
G.R. No. 141724
The trial court convicted the accused of
frustrated rape due to the fact that the latter did
not succeed in inserting his penis in the victims
vagina. There is no such crime as frustrated
rape. Instead, the accused is guilty of
consummated rape since perfect penetration is
not essential for the consummation of rape.
VALENZUELA v PEOPLE
(525 SCRA 306)
The accused argued that he should only be
convicted of frustrated theft for taking cartons of
detergent from the supermarket since he was
immediately apprehended by the security
guard. Thus, was not able to freely dispose of
the said stolen articles. Theft cannot have a
frustrated stage and the accused is guilty of
consummated theft since he has obtained
possession over the stolen item and the
presumed inability of the offender to freely
dispose of the stolen property does not negate
the fact that the owners have already been
deprived of their right to possession upon the
completion of the taking. Unlawful taking is
deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing. The
ability of the offender to freely dispose of the
property stolen is not a constitutive element of
the crime of theft.
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
PEOPLE v RECONES, ET. AL.
(310 SCRA 809)
July 20, 1999
G. R. No. 129535
Three (3) accused were charged with murder.
The first one hit the victim repeatedly with a
stone marker, the second one pummeled the
victim with his fists while the third only watched
and acted as lookout in case others will try to
intervene. All of them, including the lookout, are
guilty of murder and are accountable for the
death of the victim on the principle that the act
of one is the act of all.
Proof of a previous agreement to commit a
felony is not necessary to establish conspiracy,
it being sufficient that the acts of the accused,
before, during, and after the commission of the
felony, demonstrate its existence.
PEOPLE v CANTUBA
(183 SCRA 289)
G. R. No. 79811
The accused was correctly convicted as a co-
conspirator. His knowledge of the plot to
assassinate the victim, the fact that he had
been ordered to scout for a man who could do
the job and his knowledge of the place, date
and time of the assault are sufficient to show
unity of purpose. At the very least, therefore,
he had to know the plot and decided to join the
execution. From the legal viewpoint,
conspiracy exists if, at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused had
the same purpose and were united in its
execution.
The degree of actual participation in the
commission of the crime is immaterial in
conspiracy.
CONTINUING CRIMES
PEOPLE v TUMLOS
(67 PHIL 320)
April 13, 1939
G.R. No. 46248
The theft of the thirteen (13) cows committed
by the defendant took place at the same time
and in the same place. Consequently, he
performed but one act. The fact that eight (8)
of the said cows belong to one owner and five
(5) to another does not make him criminally
liable for two (2) distinct offenses for the
reason that to be liable for two (2) distinct
offenses, the act must be divided into two (2).
In this case, the act is not susceptible of
division. The intention was likewise one,
namely, to take for the purpose of
2
appropriating or selling the thirteen (13) cows
which he found grazing in the same place.
PEOPLE v JARANILLA
(55 SCRA 563)
February 22, 1974
G.R. No. L-28547
The taking of the six fighting cocks from their
coop should be characterized as a single
offense of theft as the assumption is that the
accused were animated by a single criminal
impulse. The taking of the fighting cocks in the
same place and on the same occasion cannot
give rise to separate crimes of theft.
SANTIAGO v GARCHITORENA
(228 SCRA 214)
G.R. No. 109266
Public prosecutors filed thirty-two (32)
Amended Informations against Santiago for
violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by
giving "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of
the Alien Legalization Program. The thirty-two
(32) Amended Informations charged the
accused with what is known as delito
continuado or "continued crime" and hence,
there should only be one information to be filed
against Santiago. The concept of delito
continuado is applicable to crime penalized
under special laws.
ILAGAN v COURT OF APPEALS
(239 SCRA 575)
G.R. No. 110617
The series of acts committed against the seven
(7) lot buyers were not the product of a single
criminal intent. The misrepresentation or deceit
was employed against each lot buyer on
different dates and in separate places, hence,
they originated from separate criminal intents
and consequently resulted in separate felonies.
COMPOUND CRIMES
PEOPLE v CASTROMERO
(280 SCRA 421)
G.R. No. 118992
The rape victim jumped from a window of her
house to escape from the accused; as a result,
she suffered serious physical injuries
specifically a broken vertebra which required
medical attention and surgery for more than
ninety days. Here, the rape was complexed with
the crime of serious physical injuries, in
accordance with the settled principle that a
person who creates in anothers mind an
immediate sense of danger that causes the
latter to try to escape is responsible for
whatever injuries the other person may
consequently suffer.
PEOPLE v
COMADRE (431
SCRA 366)
June 8, 2004
G.R. No. 153559
The accused dropped a hand grenade inside a
house, killing one and causing 4 others to suffer
shrapnel wounds on their bodies. The accused
was found guilty of the complex crime of murder
with multiple attempted murder under Article 48,
and the penalty for the most serious crime
(murder) shall be imposed.
PEOPLE v MELECIO
ROBINOS (382
SCRA 581) May 29,
2002
G.R. No. 138453
The accused stabbed his pregnant wife with a
knife, causing the instantaneous death of the
latter and the fetus inside her womb. He was
convicted of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion, and the penalty to be
imposed on him should be that for the graver
offense which is parricide.
When a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed.
PEOPLE v BALOTOL
(84 Phil 289)
The accused stabbed the victim at the back with
the use of a bolo. The bolo pierced through the
victim's abdominal region which also wounded
another person, resulting to the death of both
victims. The crime committed was double
murder, defined and penalized in Article 248, in
relation to Article 48, of the Revised Penal
Code.
COMPLEX CRIME PROPER
PEOPLE v TALO
October 25, 2000
G.R. No. 125542
The accused forcibly took the victim from her
parents' house and, in a ricefield about 800
meters away, forced her to have sexual
intercourse with him. The accused was found
guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape, as the crime of forcible abduction
was a necessary means for committing the
crime of rape.
3
PEOPLE v
SABREDO (331
SCRA 663)
May 11, 2000
G.R. 126114
The accused, using a blade, forcibly took away
the victim from Cebu to Masbate, and
eventually raped her. The crime committed is
simple rape only since the information failed to
allege that the forcible taking of the victim was
done with lewd designs (an element of forcible
abduction). Hence, the crime of rape may
absorb forcible abduction.
PEOPLE v BARBAS
(60 PHIL 241)
The defendant, a public officer, altered the
duplicates of the cedulas by erasing the names
originally written on them and replacing the
same with new names for the purpose of selling
them to other people and misappropriating the
money. The falsification of public documents
was, therefore, the means which the defendant
availed himself of in committing the crime of
malversation.
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL
LIABILITY JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v ABRAZALDO
(397 SCRA 137)
While the accused admitted the commission of
the crime in order to preserve his own life, he
maintained that the victim accidentally stabbed
himself while they were grappling for the knife.
The justifying circumstance of selfdefense
cannot be appreciated considering the
accusedappellants flight from the crime scene,
his failure to inform the authorities of the
incident and his failure to surrender the knife to
the authorities. The aforesaid circumstances
are inconsistent with having a clean conscience
and, instead, indicate his culpability to the crime
charged.
PEOPLE v TAC-
AN (182 SCRA
601)
G.R. Nos. 76338-39
The accused killed the victim but claimed self-
defense. The victim previously uttered some
threatening words against him. Assuming that
the victim uttered those words, such utterances
cannot be regarded as the unlawful aggression
which is the first and most fundamental
requirement of self-defense, and such
statements could not reasonably inspire the
"well grounded and reasonable belief" claimed
by Renato that "he was in imminent danger of
death or bodily harm." PEOPLE v PATOTOY
 (261 SCRA 37)
G.R. No. 102058
The accused admitted to having killed the victim
but claims to have done so in self-defense. The
victim appeared to draw something from his
waist during their confrontation. The victim's
alleged act of drawing "something" from his
waist certainly is not the "unlawful aggression"
meant in the law that would justify a fatal strike
at him and no veritable physical force on the
part of the latter has been shown that could
have really endangered the life of the accused.
Hence, self-defense cannot exist in this case.
Without unlawful aggression, self-defense
cannot exist nor be an extenuating
circumstance.
PEOPLE VS.
GENEBLAZO
(361 SCRA 572)
July 20, 2001
G.R. No. 133580
Assuming that the version of the accused of the
incidents is true, that unlawful aggression
emanated from the victim and his companion by
throwing stones at him, the aggression ceased
to exist when the victim and his companion ran
away. There was no longer any real danger to
the life or personal safety of the accused. When
the perpetrator does not persist in his purpose
or when he discontinues his attitude to the
extent that the object of his attack is no longer
in peril, an act of aggression is not unlawful
aggression warranting selfdefense.
PEOPLE V. BAUTISTA
(424 SCRA 63)
February 27,
2004 G.R. No.
139530
There is no self-defense in this case because
even if the accused believed that the victim did
try to kill him when he saw him raise his bolo,
such aggression ceased when accused
succeeded in grabbing the bolo and he was not
hit by the stone hurled at him by the victim;
hence, the accused no longer faced any danger
to his life and limb. When an unlawful
aggression no longer exists, the one making a
defense has no right to kill or even injure the
former aggressor.
PEOPLE v ESCARLOS
(410 SCRA 463)
September 10, 2003
G.R. No. 148912
Even assuming arguendo that there was an
altercation before the stabbing incident and that
some danger did in fact exist, the imminence of
that danger had already ceased the moment the
accused disarmed the victim by seizing the
4
knife from the latter. After the accused had
successfully seized it, there was no longer any
unlawful aggression to speak of that would have
necessitated the need to kill the victim. Hence,
the accused became the unlawful aggressor
when he stabbed the victim.
PEOPLE v APOLINAR
C.A., 38 O.G. 2870
The accused, while looking over his land and
believing that the victim had stolen his palay,
shouted for the latter to stop, fired his gun in the
air and then at the victim, causing the latters
death. Defense of property is not of such
importance as the right to life and it can be
invoked only as a justifying circumstance when
it is coupled with an attack on the person of the
one entrusted with the said property.
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
PEOPLE v GENOSA
September 8,
2010 G.R. No.
135981
Marivic Genosa, charged with parricide for the
killing of her husband, anchored her defense on
the theory of battered woman syndrome (BWS),
which constituted a form of cumulative
provocation that broke down her psychological
resistance and self-control. The Court convicted
Genosa as the defense failed to establish all the
elements of self-defense arising from BWS: (1)
each of the phases of the cycle of violence must
be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and
her intimate partner; (2) the final acute battering
episode preceding the killing of the batterer
must have produced in the battered person's
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from
her batterer and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her life; (3)
at the time of the killing, the batterer must have
posed probable -- not necessarily immediate
and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based
on the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v DOMINGO
(580 SCRA 436)
The accused asserted that he was insane or
completely deprived of intelligence during the
commission of the crimes and presented the
results of a medical examination showing that
he was suffering from Schizophrenia. The
medical examination was taken four years after
the crimes were committed. The alleged
insanity of an accused should relate to the
period immediately before or at the very
moment the felony is committed, not at any time
thereafter. Medical findings of mental disorder
referring to a period after the time the crime was
committed will not exempt him from criminal
liability.
LLAVE v PEOPLE
(488 SCRA 376)
April 26, 2006
G.R. No. 166040
The accused (a minor), with methodical fashion,
dragged the resisting victim behind a pile of
hollow blocks to ensure that passersby would
not discover his acts. When he was discovered,
he hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest.
The Court ruled that he acted with discernment
when he had carnal knowledge with the victim.
Based on the circumstances, the minor knew
what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
circumstances included the gruesome nature of
the crime and the minors cunning and
shrewdness.
U.S. V. TANEDO
(15 PHIL 196)
The accused, while hunting fired a shot at wild
chickens; however, the slug recoiled and fatally
hit another man. A person who, while
performing a legal act with due care, causes
some injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it, is not criminally liable.
PEOPLE v
FALLORINA
(428 SCRA ___)
May 4, 2004
G.R. No. 137347
The accused claims that the victim's death was
caused by his gun accidentally going off. The
Court convicted him for the victim's death due to
his failure to prove with clear and convincing
evidence his defense of accident. The following
proved otherwise that the accused accidentally
shot the victim: (1) his refusal to answer
clarificatory questions of the prosecutor, which
casted doubt on his defense; (2) his refusal to
surrender himself and his firearm after the
shooting; and (3) other pieces of evidence
which belie his claim that the death of the victim
was accidental and that he was not negligent.
PEOPLE v AYAYA
(52 PHIL 354)
The accused, in order to prevent the door from
crushing her son's head, jabbed her husband
with her umbrella which later led to her
husband's death. The Court concluded that in
thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the
door in question, the accused did so to free her
son from the imminent danger of having his
head crushed or being strangled and if she
consequently caused her husband's injury, it
5
was by a mere accident, without any fault or
intention to cause it.
PEOPLE V. GENITA
(425 SCRA 343)
March 11, 2004
G.R. No. 126171
The appellant's claim that he "accidentally shot"
the two victims is incredible. In this case, it is
clear that the requisites of accident as an
exempting circumstance were not proven: (1)
appellant's manner of carrying his rifle negates
his claim of due care in the performance of an
act since he should have seen to it that its
safety lock was intact; (2) the fact that both
victims sustained more than one wound shows
that the shooting was not merely accidental; (3)
appellant manifested an unmistakable intent to
kill the victims when he reloaded his rifle after
his first unsuccessful attempt to kill them.
PEOPLE v
CASTILLO (526
SCRA 215)
June 29, 2007
G.R. No. 172695
Appellant contends that assuming he was the
one who killed his wife, the same was
accidental and not intentional. However, the
Court does not agree. By no stretch of
imagination could playing with or using a deadly
sling and arrow be considered as performing a
lawful act. Thus, on this ground alone,
appellants defense of accident must be struck
down because he was performing an unlawful
act during the incident.
PEOPLE v BANDIAN
(63 PHL 530)
September 30, 1936
G.R. No. 45186
The mother who went to the thicket to respond
to the call of nature but, instead, gave birth
therein is not criminally liable for infanticide for
leaving the child behind. She should not be
blamed for the act of abandonment because it
all happened by mere accident, she was
overcome by strong dizziness and extreme
debility (also considered as an insuperable
cause). Any person who acts and behaves
under such circumstances is exempted from
liability.
PEOPLE v MORENO
(77 PHIL 548)
The accused admitted to having killed the victim
but claimed that he should be exempted from
liability because he did so in obedience to an
order given him by Japanese officers of the
navy. The latter informed him that the victim
was one of those who were encountered by the
Japanese in a mountain and wounded a
Japanese soldier. The accused was held guilty
because the law provides that to be exempted
from criminal liability, it is not enough to prove
that the act was committed in obedience to an
order, it must also be established that the order
being followed is lawful.
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT
OF 2006
(R.A. NO. 9344); ALSO REFER TO CHILD
AND YOUTH
WELFARE CODE (P.D. 603, AS AMENDED)
VALCESAR ESTIOCA v
PEOPLE (556 SCRA
300) June 27, 2008
G.R. No. 173876
The accused was 14 years old at the time he
committed the robbery which occurred in 2001.
Although R.A. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006 took effect only on May 20,
2006, the said law should be given retroactive
effect in favor of the accused who was not
shown to be a habitual criminal (penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a
habitual criminal).Hence, the accused was
exempt from criminal liability.
JOEMAR ORTEGA v PEOPLE
(562 SCRA 450)
August 20, 2008
G.R. No. 151085
The accused was only 13 years old at the time
of the commission of the rape and under R.A.
No. 9344 (which was applied retroactively), he
is exempted from criminal liability. Section 64 of
the law further provides that cases of children
15 years old and below, at the time of the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate Local Social Welfare and
Development Officer (LSWDO).
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v JAURIGUE
(C.A. NO. 384)
The deceased placed his hand on the upper
portion of the woman's thigh without her
consent, which led to the woman stabbing the
neck of the deceased to defend her honor. The
means employed in the defense of her honor
was excessive and she cannot be declared
completely exempt from criminal liability.
However, the fact that she had acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense
committed against her a few moments before,
and upon such provocation as to produce
passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of
reason and self-control, should be considered
as mitigating circumstance in her favor.
6
U.S. v AMPAR
(37 Phil 201)
The accused, a 70-year old man, killed the
deceased for telling him, "Come here and I will
make roast pig of you." The offense which the
defendant was trying to vindicate would be
considered a mere trifle to the average person
but it was evidently a serious matter to be made
the butt of a joke for the old man. Hence, he
was given the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance.
PEOPLE v IGNAS
(412 SCRA 311)
September 30,
2003 G.R. No.
140514
The accused killed his wife's lover 2 weeks after
he discovered his wife's extramarital dalliance,
but the court did not consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation
because for the same to be well founded, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there
should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act
which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the
perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity.
The period of two weeks between the discovery
of his wifes extramarital dalliance and the killing
of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to
reflect and cool off.
PEOPLE v
BENITO (74
SCRA 271)
December 17, 1976
G.R. No. L-38091
The accused (who had a pending case with the
Civil Service) contended that the victim insulted
him when he (the victim) remarked that a thief
was loitering in the premises of the Civil Service
Commission and further argued that that remark
"was tantamount to kicking a man already down
and to rubbing salt into a raw wound" and that,
as it was made publicly and in a loud voice, he
was exposed to ridicule in the presence of his
officemates. Assuming that the remark was
directed at the accused, the Court did not apply
the mitigating circumstance of vindication for a
grave offense for the killing of the victim
because the accused had more than sufficient
time to suppress his emotion over said remark if
he ever did resent it.
U.S. V. HICKS
(14 PHIL 217)
The accused and the victim illicitly lived together
for 5 years. After they separated, the accused
killed the victim for living with another man. No
mitigating circumstance was considered in his
favor, not even the loss of reason and self-
control produced by jealousy as alleged by the
defense, inasmuch as the only causes which
mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of
self-control are those which originate from
legitimate feelings and not those which arise
from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
U.S. V. DELA CRUZ
March 29, 1912
G.R. No. L-7094
The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his
former lover upon discovering her in flagrante in
carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance. The accused was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance because in this case,
the impulse upon which defendant acted and
which naturally "produced passion and
obfuscation" was not that the woman declined
to have illicit relations with him but the sudden
revelation that she was untrue to him, and his
discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of
another.
PEOPLE v RABAO
(67 PHIL 255)
April 10, 1939
G.R. No. L-46530
The accused and his wife had a heated
argument because the wife wanted to give their
sick child a bath which was against the wishes
of the accused. The Court considered mitigating
circumstance in his favor since, although he
transgressed the law by an unjust attack on his
wife, the accused did not really have the
intention of committing so grave a crime as
parricide, and the quarrel that led to the
aggression had its origin from the natural and
justifiable desire of the accused, as a father, to
prevent his child, which was then ill, from being
given a bath.
PEOPLE v DAWATON
(389 SCRA 277)
September 17, 2002
G.R. No. 146247
In trying to avail of the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender, the accused argues that
he was not arrested but "fetched" as he
voluntarily went with the policemen when they
came for him. That he did not try to escape or
resist arrest after he was taken into custody by
the authorities did not amount to voluntary
surrender and it is also settled that voluntary
surrender cannot be appreciated where the
evidence adduced shows that it was the
authorities who came looking for the accused.
PEOPLE v VIERNES
(372 SCRA 231)
December 13, 2001
G.R. No. 136733
7
Going to the police station to clear his name
does not show any intent of the accused to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities. The
act of surrender must be spontaneous,
accompanied by an acknowledgment of guilt, or
an intention to save the authorities the trouble
and the expense that search and capture would
require.
PEOPLE v ABOLIDOR
(423 SCRA 260)
February 18, 2004
G.R. No. 147231
The accused surrendered to the authorities
more than one year after the incident in order to
disclaim responsibility for the killing of the
victim. The Court did not consider the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender because:
(1) the facts of the case do not show
repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor
intention to save the government the trouble
and expense necessarily incurred in his search
and capture; and (2) at the time of his
surrender, there was a pending warrant of
arrest against him.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v
CALISO (58
PHIL 283) July
1, 1933
G.R. No. L-37271
In the commission of the crime, the aggravating
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence was
present since the appellant was the domestic
servant of the family and was sometimes the
deceased child's "amah". The circumstance that
the crime had been committed in the dwelling of
the offended party which was considered by the
lower court as another aggravating
circumstance should be disregarded as both the
victim and the appellant were living in the same
house.
PEOPLE v LORA
(113 SCRA 366)
March 30, 1982
G.R. No. L-49430
The accused was charged for the crime of
serious illegal detention with murder for illegally
detaining a 3-year old child, and attacking the
same, which resulted to the child's death. There
are three aggravating circumstances in this
case, namely: (1) lack of respect due to the
tender age of the victim; (2) cruelty, for gagging
the victim's mouth with stockings thereby
causing slow suffocation; and (3) abuse of
confidence since the main duty of the accused
in the household was to take care of the minor
child.
PEOPLE v LAGUARDIA
 (148 SCRA 133)
February 27,
1987 G.R. No. L-
63243
The following aggravating circumstances were
present in this case of robbery with homicide:
(1) despoblado or uninhabited place since
evidence shows that the accused lay in wait for
the truck being driven by the victim at an
isolated portion of the highway, choosing that
particular spot where they could commit the
crime without disturbance or discovery and with
easy opportunity for escape; and (2) use of
motor vehicles because the conspirators took
the vehicle of the victim to facilitate their escape
and to prevent the other passengers from
reporting the offense to the authorities. The
following aggravating circumstances were
rejected: (1) nighttime because it was not
especially sought, as the victim's trip schedule
and not the discretion of the culprits determined
the time of its commission; (2) evident
premeditation because it is inherent in the crime
of robbery and was not proved in the
commission of the killing; and (3) treachery, as
there is no evidence of its employment since
none of the witnesses actually saw the
shooting.
PEOPLE v ZETA
(549 SCRA 541)
March 27, 2008
G.R. No. 178541
The span of thirty minutes or half an hour from
the time the accused showed their
determination to kill the victim (2:00 in the
morning of 28 October 1995) up to the time the
accused shot to death the victim (2:15-2:30 in
the morning of 28 October 1995) could not have
afforded them full opportunity for meditation and
reflection on the consequences of the crime
they committed. The Court held that the lapse
of thirty minutes between the determination to
commit a crime and the execution thereof is
insufficient for a full meditation on the
consequences of the act. Hence, the
aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated in this
case.
ACCESSORIES
PEOPLE v ORTIZ AND ZAUSA
(55 PHIL 993)
August 27, 1986
G.R. No. L-3507
Ortiz and Zausa were charged with conspiracy
to kill the victim but Ortiz contends that he
should be acquitted because he did not take
part in the attack. The Court ruled that Ortiz
cannot be convicted either as principal or as
accessory, for it has been shown that there was
neither plan nor agreement between him and
8
Zausa to commit the crime, and that he took no
part in the latter's attack with the spear.
VINO v PEOPLE
(178 SCRA 626)
October 19, 1989
G.R. No. 84163
The information was correct. An accused can be
validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory
under an information charging him as a
principal. Also, the trial of an accessory can
proceed without awaiting the result of the
separate charge against the principal for the
corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice and accessory are distinct from
each other.
PEOPLE v
FERNANDEZ
(183 SCRA 511)
March 22, 1990
G.R. No. L-62116
The accused entered the bathroom together
with accused Fernandez. In the bathroom, the
latter tied a piece of cloth around the victims
neck while accused Conrado held her hands
placing them behind her body. Thereafter, they
raped the victim one after the other. Hence ,the
Court was correct in imposing on each of the
accused of the penalty corresponding to two
crimes of rape because each of them (accused)
cooperated in the commission of the rape
perpetrated by the others, by acts without which
it would not have been accomplished.
PEOPLE v
CASTILLO (17
SCRA 721) July
26, 1966
G.R. No. L-19238
After his son had fatally hacked the victim with a
bolo and was about to strike the victim a second
time, the accused shouted: "You kill him." The
accused is not guilty as principal by inducement
because in determining whether the utterances
of an accused are sufficient to make him guilty
as co-principal by inducement, it must appear
that the inducement was of such nature and
was made in such a way as to become the
determining cause of the crime and that such
inducement was uttered with the intention of
producing the result.
PEOPLE v DUMANCAS
(320 SCRA 584)
December 13, 1999
G.R. No. 13352728
The accused cannot be held guilty as principal
by inducement when she told the policemen to
"take care of the two" victims, who were later
killed by the said policemen. There are 2 ways
of directly inducing another to commit a crime,
namely: (i) by giving a price, or offering reward
or promise, and (ii) by using words of command
and in this case, there is no evidence that the
accused offered any price or reward should
they kill the victims, nor can the remark of the
accused be deemed as a command required by
law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a
principal by inducement.
CARINO v PEOPLE
(7 SCRA 900)
April 30, 1963
G.R. No. L-14752
The accused cannot be held guilty as an
accomplice in the crime of rebellion through his
acts of sending or furnishing cigarettes and food
supplies to a famous Huk, as well as changing
$6,000 to Philippine money or in helping Huks
to open accounts (which were said to be part of
his functions as an employee of a bank). These
acts by themselves do not and cannot carry or
prove any criminal intent of helping the Huks in
committing the crime of insurrection or rebellion
and they cannot be said to constitute acts of
cooperation in the execution of the act of
overthrowing the government.
PEOPLE v DELA CERNA
(21 SCRA 569)
October 30, 1967
G.R. No. L-20911
The accused furnished the gun that was used to
kill the victim Casiano, however, he cannot be
held liable as an accomplice because he merely
conspired with the principal to kill another
victim, Rafael. The accused here was not aware
that the principal would use the gun to kill
Casiano. Hence, for other acts done outside the
contemplation of the co-conspirators or which
are not the necessary and logical
consequences of the intended crime, only the
actual perpetrators are liable.
DURATION OF PENALTIES
PEOPLE v maximum shall not be less than 4 years 2
ALVARADO
(275 SCRA 727)
July 21, 1997
G.R. No. 117402
The Supreme Court reiterated the ruling in
People v. Lucas, January 9, 1995, where it was
clarified that Although Section 17 of R.A. No.
7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion
perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1)
day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification
as an indivisible penalty. Reclusion perpetua,
therefore, retains its nature as having no
minimum, medium and maximum periods and is
imposed in its entirety regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
9
may have attended the commission of the
crime.
PEOPLE v
MANTALABA
(654 SCRA 188)
July 20, 2011
G.R. No. 186227
The privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority was appreciated in fixing the penalty
necessarily reducing the penalty from reclusion
perpetua to reclusion temporal, which is one
degree lower. The ISLAW is also applicable in
the present case because the penalty which
has been originally an indivisible penalty
(reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is
inapplicable, became a divisible penalty
(reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of
the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. Hence, the minimum penalty should be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree
which is prision mayor and the maximum
penalty shall be taken from the medium period
of reclusion temporal.
PEOPLE v ESCARES
(102 PHIL 677)
December 23, 1957
G.R. Nos. L-11128-33
It should be noted that the imposable penalty in
each of the six cases where appellant pleaded
guilty in accordance with paragraph 5, Article
294, of the Revised Penal Code, is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period, which should be
applied in its minimum period in view of the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, not
offset by any aggravating circumstance, or from
4 years 2 months and 1 day to 6 years one
month and 10 days. In applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant
should be sentenced for each crime to an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which
shall not be less than 4 months and 1 day of
arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, and the
months and 1 day of prision correccional nor
more than 6 years 1 month and 10 days of
prision mayor. The trial court; however,
committed an error in applying the proper
penalty by using the threefold rule. Hence, the
penalty imposed upon appellant by the trial
court should be modified in the sense that he
should suffer in each of the six cases an
indeterminate penalty of not less than 4 months
and 1 day of arresto mayor and not more than 4
years 2 months and 1 day of prision
correccional, plus the corresponding accessory
penalties provided for by law.
MEJORADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
(151 SCRA 399)
June 30, 1987
 G.R. Nos. L-51065-72
The Sandiganbayan imposed eight penalties for
the eight informations (for violating Section 3E
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) filed
against the accused. The penalties totaled to
fifty-six years and eight days of imprisonment
which the accused impugns as contrary to the
three-fold rule and insists that the duration of
the aggregate penalties should not exceed forty
(40) years. The accused is mistaken in his
application of the three-fold rule as set forth in
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code since this
article is to be taken into account not in the
imposition of the penalty but in connection with
the service of the sentence imposed. It merely
provides that the prisoner cannot be made to
serve more than three times the most severe of
these penalties the maximum of which is forty
years.
PEOPLE v ALFREDO BON
(506 SCRA 168)
October 30, 2006
G.R. No. 166401
In view of the statutory disallowance of the
death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346,
"death," as provided in Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code shall no longer form part of the
equation in the graduation of penalties. In the
case of the accused, the determination of his
penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned
not from two degrees lower than death, but two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua.
Therefore, the maximum term of his penalty
shall no longer be reclusion temporal but prision
mayor.
PROBATION LAW
FRANCISCO v CA
(243 SCRA 384)
April 6, 1995
G.R. No. 108747
The accused who was found guilty by the MeTC
of grave oral defamation in 4 of the 5 cases filed
against him and sentenced to a prison term of 1
year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of
prision correccional in each crime committed
appealed his case before the RTC but
eventually applied for probation. The Court, in
ruling that the accused is no longer eligible for
probation, listed the following reasons: (1) Sec.
4 of the Probation Law clearly mandates that
"no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction;" (2) the penalties imposed by the
MeTC were already probationable, hence, there
was no need to appeal if only to reduce the
penalties to within the probationable period
(multiple prison terms should not be added up);
(3) the accused appealed to the RTC not to
10
reduce or even correct the penalties imposed
by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence; (4)
the application for probation was filed way
beyond the period allowed by law, in this case
was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of
petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost two
months after (his) receipt of the Decision" of the
RTC.
SORIANO v CA
(304 SCRA 231)
March 4, 1999
G.R. No. 123936
Petitioner, whose probation was revoked since
he was not able to comply with one of the
conditions of probation which is to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount of P98,560.00,
asserts that his non-compliance was due to his
poor financial condition and that his enjoyment
of probation should not be made to depend on
the satisfaction of his civil liability. The Supreme
Court, in ruling that the revocation of probation
was lawful and proper, held that his continued
refusal to submit a program of payment creates
the impression that he wants to completely
avoid paying his civil liability and that the
conditions of probation must be satisfied in
order that the purposes of probation be fulfilled,
which include promoting the correction and
rehabilitation of an offender by providing him
with individualized treatment, and providing an
opportunity for the reformation of a penitent
offender which might be less probable if he
were to serve a prison sentence.
TOLENTINO v JUDGE ALCONCEL
(121 SCRA 92)
Petitioner Tolentino, who pleaded not guilty to
the charge of violation of Section 4 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, changed his plea of not
guilty to the lesser offense of illegal possession
of marijuana, which Judge Alconcel allowed,
sentencing petitioner to imprisonment of 6
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months plus
fines. The Supreme Court, in upholding the
decision of Judge Alconcel to deny Tolentino's
subsequent application for probation on the
ground that "probation will depreciate the
seriousness of the offense committed", held that
the potentiality of the offender to reform is not
the sole or primordial factor that should be
considered and that the demands of justice and
public interest must be observed in the grant or
denial of an application for probation.
CABATINGAN v SANDIGANBAYAN
(102 SCRA 187)
January 22, 1981
G.R. No. L-55333
Sandiganbayan, in denying the application for
probation by the petitioner, merely relied on a
report of the probation officer which in itself,
was mostly hearsay, and did not give the
petitioner a chance to be heard before it issued
its resolution denying the application for
probation. The Supreme Court held that
respondent court appears to have wholly relied
on the probation report and did not make its
own determination as to whether or not
probation would serve the ends of justice and
the best interest of the public and the applicant.
It was not enough for the respondent court to
deny petitioner's application solely on the report
that she was involved in "maisiao" and that she
was facing another preliminary investigation for
the "additional shortage" of the funds of which
she had already pleaded guilty.
BALA v JUDGE MARTINEZ
(181 SCRA 459)
January 29, 1990
G.R. No. L-67301
Petitioner violated the terms and conditions of
his probation but contends that there was no
valid reason for its revocation since his
probation period had already terminated on
August 10, 1983 (although no order of final
discharge was issued as the probation officer
had not yet submitted his final report). The
Supreme Court, in holding that the probation is
revocable before the final discharge of the
probationer by the court, held that: (1) the
expiration of the probation period alone does
not automatically terminate probation; (2)
nowhere in the provisions of the probation law
can be found the ipso facto termination of
probation; (3) probation is not coterminous with
its period; (4) there must first be issued by the
court of an order of final discharge based on the
report and recommendation of the probation
officer and only from such issuance can the
case of the probationer be deemed terminated.
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT
OF 2006
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344)
PEOPLE v SARCIA
(599 SCRA 20)
September 10, 2009
G.R. No. 169641
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below
18 years old is charged, accused with, or may
have committed a serious offense, and may
have acted with discernment, then the child
could be recommended by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by
the
Local Council for the Protection of Children
(LCPC), or by Office of Juvenile Welfare and
Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding;
but the welfare, best interests, and restoration
of the child should still be a primordial or
primary consideration. In this case, since the
11
accusedappellant is about 31 years of age, the
suspension of sentence has become moot and
academic but he is still entitled to confinement
in agricultural camps and other training facilities
under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344.
PEOPLE v HERMIE
JACINTO (645
SCRA 590) March
16, 2011
G.R. No. 182239
The benefits of a suspended sentence can no
longer apply to appellant who is now 25 years
old since the suspension of sentence lasts only
until the child in conflict with the law reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
However, the offender shall be entitled to the
right of restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with Republic Act
No. 9344 in order that he/she will have the
chance to live a normal life and become a
productive member of the community. Thus,
appellant may be confined in an agricultural
camp or any other training facility in accordance
with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
PADUA v PEOPLE
(559 SCRA 519)
July 23, 2008
G.R. No. 168546
The suspension of sentence under Section 38
of R.A. No. 9344 could no longer be
retroactively applied for petitioners benefit as
Section 38 provides that once a child under 18
years of age is found guilty of the offense
charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment
of conviction, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence.
Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that
once the child reaches 18 years of age, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the
child, order execution of sentence, or extend
the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum
age of 21 years. However, since petitioner has
already reached 21 years of age or over, he
could no longer be considered a child for
purposes of applying Rep. Act No. 9344.
REMIENDO v PEOPLE
(603 SCRA 274)
October 9, 2009
G.R. No. 184874
The accused, being above 15 and under 18
years of age at the time of the rape, and having
acted with discernment, claimed for the benefits
of R.A. No. 9344 in view of Section 40, which
provides that "if the child in conflict with the law
has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence
for a certain period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years."
However, the application of Section 40 is
rendered moot and academic since the
accused was already 22 years old and could no
longer be considered a child for the purposes of
applying R.A. No. 9344.
MODIFICATION AND EXTINCTION OF
CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
DAMASCO v
LAQUI (166
SCRA 214)
September 30, 1988
G.R. No. 81381
The petitioner was charged with the crime of
grave threats (the crime was committed on 8
July 1987 and the information was filed only on
17 September 1987 or after the lapse of 71
days), but was only found guilty by the court of
light threats (with a prescriptive period of 2
months or 60 days). The Supreme Court, in
agreeing with petitioner's contention that he
cannot be convicted of light threats since it had
already prescribed, held that where an accused
has been found to have committed a lesser
offense includible with the graver offense
charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser
offense if it has already prescribed. To hold
otherwise would be to sanction a circumvention
of the law on prescription by the simple
expedient of accusing the defendant of the
graver offense.
YAPDIANGCO v
BUENCAMINO (122
SCRA 713) June 24,
1983
G.R. No. L-28841
On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed an
information for slight physical injuries (with a
prescriptive period of 60 days) allegedly
committed by the petitioner on December 2,
1964. Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the
criminal prosecution on the ground that the
information having been filed on the sixty first
day following the commission of the offense, the
sixty days prescriptive period had lapsed. The
Supreme Court (in disagreeing with the lower
court's denial of the motion to quash due to the
fact that the 60th day fell on a Sunday and
considering the rule that when the last day for
the filing of a pleading falls on a Sunday, the
12
same may be filed on the next succeeding
business day) held that "where the sixtieth and
last day to file an information falls on a Sunday
or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be
extended up to the next working day for
prescription has automatically set in.
PEOPLE v BAYOTAS
(236 SCRA 239)
September 2, 1994
G.R. No. 102007
The Supreme Court held that the death of the
accused Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. The Court ruled that:
(1) death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon; (2)
the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict, such as law,
contracts, quasi-contracts or quasi-delicts; (3)
where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure; and (4) the private offended party
need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action for in such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case.
SERMONIA v CA
(233 SCRA 155)
June 14, 1994
G.R. NO. 109454
Petitioner, in contending that his criminal liability
for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription,
insists that since the second marriage contract
was duly registered with the Office of the Civil
Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration
makes it a matter of public record and
constitutes notice to the whole world. Hence,
the offended party is considered to have had
constructive notice of the subsequent marriage
as of 1975 and that prescription commenced to
run on the day the marriage contract was
registered. The Supreme Court held that unlike
in the case of real property, the principle of
constructive notice should not be applied in
regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into by the
offender in secrecy from the spouse of the
previous subsisting marriage and that a
bigamous marriage is generally entered into in
a place where the offender is not known to be
still a married person in order to conceal his
legal impediment to contract another marriage.
CABRAL V. PUNO
(70 SCRA 606)
April 30, 1976
G.R. No. L-41692
Petitioner was charged with the crime of
falsification (with a prescriptive period of 10
years) for allegedly forging a document that was
registered in the Register of Deeds on August
26, 1948. The complaint of respondent, filed on
September 24, 1974, was dismissed on the
ground of prescription since the respondent had
actual if not constructive notice of the alleged
forgery upon its registration in the Register of
Deeds.
Act No. 3326, As Amended
ZALDIVIA v
REYES (211
SCRA 277) July
3, 1992
G.R. No. 102342
The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to
the petitioner (quarrying for commercial
purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the
Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of
Rizal) commenced from its alleged commission
on May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with
Section 1 of Act No. 3326 and it was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30,
1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The
judicial proceeding that could have interrupted
the period was the filing of the information with
the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this
was done only on October 2, 1990, after the
crime had already prescribed.
PCGG v [of the] Revised Penal Code. In ruling against
DESIERTO
(527 SCRA 61)
July 9, 2007
G.R. No. 140231
The respondents were charged with violation of
R.A. No. 3019 (amending said law, Section 4,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 increased the
prescriptive period from 10 to 15 years), and the
applicable law in the computation of the
prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326,
which provides that "prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same not be
known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment". Records show
that the act complained of was discovered in
1992 and the complaint was filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman on April 5, 1995, or within
13
three (3) years from the time of discovery. Thus,
the filing of the complaint was well within the
prescriptive period of 15 years.
PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES
DEL CASTILLO v TORRECAMPO
(394 SCRA 221)
December 18, 2002
G.R. No. 139033
10 years after the petitioner was found guilty for
violating the Election Code (whereby he was
never apprehended and remained at large), he
filed before the trial court a motion to quash the
warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of
prescription of the penalty imposed upon him.
He based his claims on Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that the
period of prescription shall commence to run
from the date when the culprit should evade the
service of his sentence. The petition must be
denied since under Article 93, prescription shall
commence to run from the date the felon
evades the service of his sentence, which is
inapplicable in the case at bar since the
petitioner was never brought to prison and
cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
PANGAN v GATBALITE
(449 SCRA 144)
January 21, 2005
G.R. No. 141718
Petitioner, who failed to appear during the
promulgation of the decision in the MTC on
August 9, 1991, questioned his arrest on
January 24, 2000 on the ground that the same
was illegal since the straight penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor
prescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93
the petitioner, the Court held that the
prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of
the Revised Penal Code applies only to those
who are convicted by final judgment and are
serving sentence which consists of deprivation
of liberty. Hence, the period for prescription of
penalties begins only when the convict evades
service of sentence by escaping during the term
of his sentence.
PARDON BY OFFENDED PARTY
PEOPLE v
TADULAN (271
SCRA 233) April
15, 1997
G.R. No. 117407
The supposed pardon of the accused was
allegedly granted only by the mother (BBB)
without the concurrence of the offended minor,
AAA. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake
of argument that the initial desistance of the
said mother from taking any action against the
accused constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon
the authorities cited above, such pardon is
ineffective without the express concurrence of
the offended minor herself.
PEOPLE v LIM
(206 SCRA 176)
February 13, 1992
G.R. No. 95753
The accused, who was charged with the crime
of rape, insists that he was pardoned by the
offended party when she executed an Affidavit
of Desistance, stating that the rape case arose
out of a mere misunderstanding. The Supreme
Court did not agree and held that to warrant the
dismissal of the complaint, the victim's
retraction or pardon should be made prior to the
institution of the criminal action. Hence, the
alleged pardon could not be considered in his
favor since the Affidavit was executed after the
present case was filed.
PARDON BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
PEOPLE v
SALLE (250
SCRA 581)
December 4, 1995
G.R. No. 103567
The accused was granted conditional pardon,
but for the said pardon to take effect, he must
first withdraw his appeal. The conditional
pardon granted the said appellant shall be
deemed to take effect only upon the grant of
such withdrawal and in case of non-compliance
with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections must exert every possible effort
to take back into his custody the said accused,
for which purpose he may seek the assistance
of the Philippine National Police or the National
Bureau of Investigation.
PEOPLE v to enliven the entertainment held in their honor
BACANG (260
SCRA 44) July
30, 1996
G.R. NO. 116512
The conditional pardons were granted to
accusedappellants during the pendency of their
appeal. The Court held that such conditional
pardons are void since the conviction by final
judgment limitation under Section 19, Article VII
of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of
pardon, whether full or conditional, to an
accused during the pendency of his appeal from
his conviction by the trial court and any
application therefor, if one is made, should not
be acted upon or the process toward its grant
14
should not be begun unless the appeal is
withdrawn.
BOOK II (ARTICLES 114-365, RPC) AND
SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED SPECIAL LAWS
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
(ARTS. 114- 123)
TREASON
LAUREL v MISA
(77 Phil. 856)
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus
claiming that a Filipino citizen who adhered to
the enemy, giving the latter aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation, cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason for the
reasons that: (1) the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines and,
consequently, the correlative allegiance of
Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended;
and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty
over these Islands upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition and ruled that the
absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy
of their legitimate government or sovereign is
not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is
not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
government.
PEOPLE v PEREZ
(83 PHIL 314)
7 counts of treason were filed against Perez for
recruiting, apprehending and commandeering
numerous girls and women against their will for
the purpose of using them to satisfy the immoral
purposes of Japanese officers. The Supreme
Court held that his "commandeering" of women
to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or
was not treason even though the women and
the entertainment helped to make life more
pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit;
he was not guilty any more than the women
themselves would have been if they voluntarily
and willingly had surrendered their bodies or
organized the entertainment.
PEOPLE v ADRIANO
(78 PHIL 561)
Adriano was convicted for the crime of treason
for being a member of the Makapili, a military
organization established and designed to assist
and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces
in the Philippines in the said enemy's war
efforts and operations against the United States
and the Philippines. The Supreme Court in
upholding the conviction held that the mere fact
of having joined a Makapili organization is
evidence of both adherence to the enemy and
giving him aid and comfort and that being a
Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act.
Hence, it is not necessary, except for the
purpose of increasing the punishment, that the
defendant actually went to battle or committed
nefarious acts against his country or
countrymen.
PEOPLE v MANAYAO
(78 PHIL 721)
Manayao argues that he cannot be charged
with treason because he had already lost his
Filipino citizenship when he joined the Makapili,
having considered himself a member of the
Japanese armed forces. Manayao cannot
divest himself of his Philippine citizenship,
otherwise, his very crime would be the shield
that would protect him from punishment and
would essentially place himself beyond the arm
of our treason law.
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL
LAWS OF
THE STATE
ARBITRARY DETENTION
UMIL v RAMOS
(187 SCRA 311)
Subversion is a continuing crime. As such,
authorities, upon determination of probable
cause may execute a valid arrest pursuant to
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
PEOPLE v
BURGOS (144
SCRA 1)
When the accused is arrested on the sole basis
of a verbal report, the arrest without a warrant
under Section 6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful and
legal since the offense must also be committed
in his presence or within his view. It is not
enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime for an essential precondition
under the rule is that the crime must in fact or
actually have been committed first.
DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED
PERSONS
EXPULSION
VILLAVICENCIO v LUKBAN
(39 Phil 778)
The forcible taking of the women from Manila by
officials of that city, who handed them over to
15
other parties and deposited them in a distant
region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had
been imprisoned. There is no law expressly
authorizing the deportation of prostitutes to a
new domicile against their will and in fact Article
127 punishes public officials, not expressly
authorized by law or regulation, who compel
any person to change his residence.
SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY
OBTAINED
STONEHILL v DIOKNO
(20 SCRA 383)
Search warrant authorizing the seizure of books
and records showing all the business
transactions of certain persons regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal is
a general warrant which contravenes the
Constitution and the Rules of Court which
require that the things to be seized should be
particularly described.
BURGOS v CHIEF OF STAFF
(133 SCRA 800)
When the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive
materials, the application and/ or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating
with particularity the alleged subversive material
he has published or intending to publish since
mere generalization will not suffice. Also,
ownership is of no consequence and it is
sufficient that the person against whom the
warrant is directed has control or possession of
the property sought to be seized.
OFFENDING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
PEOPLE v BAES
68 Phil 203
Whether or not the act complained of is
offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, is a question of fact which must be
judged only according to the feelings of the
Catholic and not those of other faithful ones. It
is possible that certain acts may offend the
feelings of those who profess a certain religion,
while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of
those professing another faith.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
REBELLION, INSURRECTION, COUP D
ETAT
UMIL v RAMOS
(187 SCRA 85)
July 9, 1990
G.R. 81567

Being a member of the New Peoples Army, an
outlawed organization, is punishable.
Subversion like rebellion or insurrection is
perceived as a continuing offense and unlike
other so called common offenses i.e. adultery,
murder, arson, etc. which generally end upon
their commission, subversion and rebellion are
anchored on an ideological base which compels
the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness
and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized government is attained.
PEOPLE v LOVERDIORO
(250 SCRA 389)
November 29,
1995 G.R.
112235
In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion,
not murder, it becomes imperative for the courts
to ascertain whether or not the act was done in
furtherance of a political end. The political
motive of the act should be conclusively
demonstrated as it is not enough that the overt
acts of rebellion are duly proven otherwise if no
political motive is established and proved, the
accused should be convicted of the common
crime and not of rebellion.
PEOPLE v GERONIMO
(100 PHIL 90)
October 23, 1956
G.R. L-8936
Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in
the crime of rebellion solely because it was
committed simultaneously with or in the course
of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were
done for private purposes or profit, without any
political motivation, the crime would be
separately punishable and would not be
absorbed by the rebellion and the individual
misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to
constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive
acts and intent would be unrelated to each
other. The individual crime would not be a
means necessary for committing the rebellion,
as it would not be done in preparation or in
furtherance of the latter.
SEDITION
PEOPLE v UMALI
(96 PHIL 185)
November 29, 1954
G.R. L-5803
Where the purpose of the raid and acts of the
raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms,
were not exactly against the Government and
for the purpose of doing the things defined in
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code under
rebellion, but rather, by means of force and
intimidation, to inflict an act of hate or revenge
upon the person or property of a public official,
16
the crime committed is sedition. The raiders did
not even attack the seat of the local government
rather, the object was to attain by means of
force, intimidation, etc. one object, to inflict an
act of hate or revenge upon the person or
property of a public official.
PEOPLE v CABRERA
(43 PHIL 64)
March 6, 1922
G.R. 17748
Seventy-seven members of the Philippine
Constabulary who rose publicly and
tumultuously in order to attain by force and
outside of legal methods the object of inflicting
an act of hate or revenge upon the police of
the City of Manila were found guilty of the
crime of sedition as defined and punished by
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.
The Philippine Law on sedition (Act No. 292),
makes all persons who rise publicly and
tumultuously in order to obtain by force or
outside of legal methods any one of five
objects, including that of inflicting any act of
hate or revenge upon the person or property of
any official or agent of the Insular Government
or of a provincial or municipal government,
guilty of sedition. In order to be a violation of
paragraph 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292, it is
not necessary that the offender be a private
citizen and the offended party a public
functionary since the law makes no distinction
between the persons to which it applies.
PEOPLE v HADJI
(9 SCRA 252)
October 24, 1963
G.R. L-12686
The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment
of the common offenses of murder etc. as
distinct and independent acts separable from
sedition. Where the acts of violence were
deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion, the
same does not apply in the crime of sedition.
INCITING TO SEDITION
US v TOLENTINO
(5 PHIL 682)
March 6, 1906
G.R. L-1451
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the
play, in view of the time, place, and manner of
its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of
hatred and enmity against the American
people and the Government of the United
States. The principal object and intent of its
author was to incite the people of the
Philippines to open armed resistance to the
constituted authorities, and to induce them to
conspire together for the secret organization of
armed forces, to be used when the opportunity
present itself, for the purpose of overthrowing
the present Government and the setting up
another in its stead. The manner and form in
which the drama was presented at such a time
and under such conditions renders absurd the
pretense that it was merely or even principally
a literary or artistic production.
ESPUELAS v PEOPLE
December 17, 1951
G.R. L-2990
A published writing which calls our government
one of crooks and dishonest persons ("dirty")
infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators,
and which reveals a tendency to produce
dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with
the disposition to remain loyal to the
government, is a scurrilous libel against the
Government. The violent and provocative
statements made by the accused against the
state was neither constructive nor with reason.
It, instead, went beyond the ambit of criticism
legally permitted since it had the dangerous
tendency of appealing to the common mind
and suggesting or inciting rebellious
conspiracies and riots against the duly
constituted government.
MENDOZA v PEOPLE
(90 PHIL 524)
December 17 1951
G.R. L-2990
A published writing which calls our government
one of crooks and dishonest persons ("dirty")
infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators,
and which reveals a tendency to produce
dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the
disposition to remain loyal to the government, is
a scurrilous libel against the Government. Any
citizen may criticize his government and
government officials and submit his criticism to
the "free trade of ideas" but such criticism
should be specific and constructive, specifying
particular objectionable actuations of the
government. It must be reasoned or tempered
and not a contemptuous condemnation of the
entire government set-up.
VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
MARTINEZ v MORFE
(44 SCRA 22)
March 24, ___
G.R. L-34022
The members of the legislature are privileged
from arrest on civil process during the session
of that body, and for a reasonable time before
and after, to enable them to go to and return
from the same. Prosecution for a criminal
offense is excluded from this grant of immunity.
It would amount to the creation of a privileged
class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal
17
offense, they would be considered immune
during their attendance in Congress and in
going to and returning from the same.
ILLEGAL ASSOCIATION
PEOPLE v EVANGELISTA
(57 PHIL 372)
October 26, 1932
G.R. L-36277
The principal defense that the Communist Party
of the Philippines is not an illegal association in
that it preaches only a social but not an armed
revolution is obviously useless, since a mere
reading of the constitution of the Communist
Party will show that the purpose of such
association is to incite class struggle and to
overthrow the present government by peaceful
means or by armed revolution. Therefore, the
purpose of such association is to alter the social
order and to commit the crimes of rebellion and
sedition. An association having such an object
must necessarily be illegal.
PEOPLE v RODIL
(109 SCRA 306)
November 20 1981
G.R. L-35156
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that
the appellant knew because the victim, who
was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an
agent of a person in authority, he cannot be
convicted of the complex crime of homicide with
assault upon an agent of a person in authority
for the simple reason that the information does
not allege the fact that the accused then knew
that, before or at the time of the assault, the
victim was an agent of a person in authority.
Such knowledge must be expressly and
specifically averred in the information,
otherwise, in the absence of such allegation,
the required knowledge, like a qualifying
circumstance, although proven, would only be
appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance.
PEOPLE v TAC-AN
(182 SCRA 601)
February 26, 1990
G.R. 76338-39
The last paragraph of Article 152 shows that
while a teacher or professor of a public or
recognized private school is deemed to be a
"person in authority," such teacher or professor
is so deemed only for purposes of application of
Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in
authority), and 151 (resistance and
disobedience to a person in authority or the
agents of such person) of the Revised Penal
Code. A teacher or professor of a public or
recognized private school cannot be regarded
as a "public authority" within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code.
ILLEGAL POSSESION OF FIREARMS (PD
1866, AS
AMENDED BY RA 8294 AND RA 9516)
PEOPLE v
QUIJADA (259
SCRA 191) July
24, 1996
G.R. 115008-09
The killing of a person with the use of an
unlicensed firearm cannot serve to increase the
penalty for homicide or murder but rather, by
express provision of P.D. No. 1866, shall
increase the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm. When an accused is prosecuted for
homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal
possession of firearm, the constitutional bar
against double jeopardy will not apply since
these offenses are quite different from one
another, with the first punished under the
Revised Penal Code and the second under a
special law.
CELINO v CA
(526 SCRA 195)
June 29, 2007
G.R. 170562
When the other offense is one of those
enumerated under RA 8294, any information for
illegal possession of firearms should be
quashed because the illegal possession of
firearm would have to be tried together with
such other offense, either considered as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or
homicide, or absorbed as an element of
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted
coup d etat and conversely, when the other
offense involved is not one of those enumerated
under RA 8294, then the separate case for
illegal possession of firearm should continue to
be prosecuted. The constitutional bar against
double jeopardy will not apply since these
offenses are quite different from one another,
with the first punished under the Revised Penal
Code and the second under a special law.
DIRECT ASSAULT
PEOPLE v BELTRAN
(138 SCRA 521)
September 13, 1985
G.R. L-37168-69
Shooting the mayor and a policeman on duty is
attempted murder with assault. Considering that
Mayor Quirolgico is a person in authority and
Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a policeman who at
the time was in his uniform, and both were
performing their official duties to maintain peace
18
and order in the community, appellants are
guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.
PEOPLE v
DOLLANTES
(151 SCRA 592)
June 30, 1987
G.R. 70639
When a barangay Captain is in the act of trying
to pacify a person who was making trouble in
the dance hall, he is therefore killed while in the
performance of his duties. As the barangay
captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and
ordinances within the barangay and if in the
enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of
his people who thereafter treacherously slew
him, the crime committed is murder with assault
upon a person in authority.
JUSTO v COURT OF APPEALS
(99 PHIL 453)
June 28, 1956
G.R. L-8611
The character of person in authority is not
assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a
public official until he ceases to be in office.
Assuming that the complainant is not actually
performing the duties of his office when
assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence
of the crime of assault upon a person in
authority, so long as the impelling motive of the
attack is the performance of official duty.||| Also,
where there is a mutual agreement to fight, an
aggression ahead of the stipulated time and
place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise
would be to sanction unexpected assaults
contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play.
PEOPLE v RECTO
(367 SCRA ___)
October 17, 2001
G.R. 129069
The victim is considered a mere bystander even
if he is a Barangay Chief Tanod, an agent of a
person in authority, if he is not acting and had
no occasion to act in the performance of his
official duties. As such, the attacks on him do
not amount to direct assault.
RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO A
PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR THE AGENTS
OF SUCH PERSONS
VYTIACO v CA
(19 SCRA 744)
April 24, 1967
G.R. L-20246-48
The accused cannot be held liable when the
evidence shows that the Constabulary Soldier
was in civilian clothes, did not exhibit any badge
and simply identified himself verbally after the
petitioner had wrested his gun from him since
before a person can be held guilty of the crime
of resistance or disobedience to a person in
authority or the agent of such person it must be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused knew that the person he disobeyed or
resisted is a person in authority or the agent of
such person who is actually engaged in the
performance of his official duties. Moreover, the
refusal of petitioner to return the Constabulary
Soldier's gun was but a continuation of his
efforts to defend himself from whatever harm
that could come from.
DELIVERY OF PRISONERS FROM JAIL
ALBERTO v DELA
CRUZ (98 SCRA
406)
June 30, 1980
G.R. L-31839
The crime delivering prisoners from jail under
Article 156 is usually committed by an outsider
who removes from jail any person confined
therein or helps him escape and not by a jailer
of the province and by an assistant provincial
warden since if the offender is a public officer
who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is
liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner.
However in Article 223, it is necessary that the
public officer had consented to, or connived in,
the escape of the prisoner under his custody or
charge.
EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
TANEGA v MASAKAYAN
(19 SCRA 564)
February 28, 1967
G.R. L-27191
Prescription shall only begin to run when he
escapes confinement. When the accused is
never placed in confinement, prescription of
penalty will not run in his favor.
PEOPLE v ABILONG
(82 PHIL ___)
November 26, 1948
G.R. L-1960
Although destierro does not constitute
imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty,
though partial, in the sense that as in the
present case, the appellant by his sentence of
destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the
City of Manila. Thus, if a person sentenced to
destierro by virtue of final judgment and
prohibited from entering the City of Manila
enters said city within the period of his
sentence, he is guilty of evasion of sentence
under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code.
VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL PARDON
19
TORRES v GONZALES
(152 SCRA 272)
A convict granted conditional pardon with an
undertaking that he would not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines who is
recommitted should be convicted by final
judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or
crimes with which he was charged before the
criminal penalty for such subsequent
offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a
distinct and substantive felony, the parolee or
convict who is regarded as having violated the
provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted
and convicted by final judgment before he can
be made to suffer the prescribed penalty.
QUASI-RECIDIVISM
PEOPLE v DIOSO
October 23, 1964
G.R. L-38346-47
When the accused is a quasi-recidivist, having
committed the crime charged while serving
sentence for a prior offense, the maximum
penalty prescribed by law for murder is death,
regardless of the presence or absence of
mitigating or aggravating circumstance such as
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty or the
complete absence thereof.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
COUNTERFEITING
PEOPLE v KONG LEON
(48 O.G. 664)
The making of false coins of a foreign country is
punishable under Article 163, paragraph 3 of
the Revised Penal Code even if said country
has withdrawn the coins from circulation
therein.
FORGERY
DEL ROSARIO v PEOPLE
(3 SCRA 650)
Possession of genuine treasury notes of the
Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or
signs contained" in which had been erased
and/or altered, with knowledge of such erasure
and alteration, and with the intent to use such
notes of the Philippines, is punishable under
Art. 168 in relation to Art. 166, subdivision (1) of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, possession of
genuine treasury notes of the Philippine
Government where one of the digits of the
penultimate had been altered and changed from
9 so as to read 0 is punishable.
 FALSIFICATION
SIQUIAN v PEOPLE
(171 SCRA 223)
Falsification of public document is committed
when the accused issues a certification which
states that funds are available for the position to
which a person is appointed and the accused
knows that, in reality, the position itself does not
even exist and no funds had been appropriated
therefor. The existence of a wrongful intent to
injure a third person is not necessary when the
falsified document is a public document. In
falsification of public documents, the controlling
consideration is the public character of a
document and the existence of any prejudice
caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to
cause such damage becomes immaterial.
PEOPLE v VILLALON
(192 SCRA 521)
The charge of estafa thru falsification of a public
document has sufficient basis to exist in fact
and in law since falsification of a public
document may be a means of committing estafa
because before the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public,
official or commercial documents. The damage
to another is caused by the commission of
estafa and not by the falsification of the
document, hence, the falsification of the public,
official or commercial document is only a
necessary means to commit the estafa.
US v CAPULE
(24 PHIL 12)
January 2, 1913
G.R. L-7447
A person who, taking advantage of the occasion
when a power of attorney is presumably being
drawn up, prepares instead thereof, contrary to
the wishes of the interested parties and with
malice aforethought, an instrument of sale in his
own favor, using deceit as to the parties and the
witnesses, and afterwards induces a notary to
certify falsely that the supposed vendors
actually appeared and ratified such instrument,
is guilty of the falsification of a notarial or public
document.
PEOPLE v MANANSALA
(58 PHIL 796)
November 18, 1933
G.R. L-38948
When a person has in his possession a falsified
document and makes use of the same, the
presumption or inference is justified that such
person is the forger.
20
BERADIO VS CA
(103 SCRA 567)
The crime of falsification of public document
cannot be imputed to the accused when it is
found that no criminal intent to commit
falsification can be imputed on the accused who
in submitting daily time records not as a legal
obligation but as a matter of practice, made
entries therein that were not absolutely false but
had a color of truth and who had caused no
damage to the government, or to third parties
but on the contrary rendered service in the
interest of the public with proper permission
from the superiors.
LUAGUE v CA
(112 SCRA 97)
If the accused acted in good faith when she
signed her spouse's name to the checks and
encashed them to pay for the expenses of the
spouses last illness and burial upon the belief
that the accused is entitled to them and
considering that the government sustained no
damage due to such encashment, criminal
intent may not be ascribed, and the accused
should be acquitted to such crime.
PEOPLE VS SENDAYDIEGO
(81 SCRA 120)
If the falsification is resorted to for the purpose
of hiding the malversation, the falsification and
malversation are separate offenses. Thus,
where the provincial treasurer, as the custodian
of the money forming part of the road and
bridge fund, effected payments to his co-
accused for construction materials supposedly
delivered to the province for various projects
when in fact no such materials were delivered,
and to camouflage or conceal the defraudation,
the accused used six vouchers which had
genuine features and which appear to be
extrinsically authentic but which were
intrinsically fake, the crimes committed are not
complex but separate crimes of falsification and
malversation and the falsifications cannot be
regarded as constituting one continuing offense
impelled by a single criminal impulse.
USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENT
US v CASTILLO
(6 PHIL 453)
September 19, 1906
G.R. 2829
The Court held that the unexplained fact that
the accused altered a forged check which is
strong evidence tending to prove that the
accused either forged the check himself or
caused it to be forged when accompanied by
proof of other facts, which render it difficult to
understand how the check could have been
forged without the intervention of the accused,
is sufficient to sustain a conviction for forgery.
DAVA v PEOPLE
(202 SCRA 62)
G.R. 73
A blank form of the driver's license which is filled
up with personal data and the signature of the
registrar of the San Fernando LTC agency was
affixed therein, even if the same was simulated,
becomes a public document within the purview
of Articles 171 and 172.The driver's license
being a public document, proof of the fourth
element of damage caused to another person
or at least intent to cause such damage has
become immaterial since the principal thing
being punished is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth proclaimed
therein.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF FALSE BANK HOCK LIAN v REPUBLIC
NOTES (17 SCRA 188)
MARTINEZ v
PEOPLE (652
SCRA ___)
June 15, 2011
G.R. 194367
Possession of false treasury or bank notes
alone, without anything more, is not a criminal
offense since the possession must be with
intent to use said false treasury or bank notes.
Hence, the pieces of counterfeit bills allegedly
seized are not sufficient to show the element of
intent to use any of such forged or falsified
instruments, for there must be an overt act to
manifest such intent.
USURPATION
GIGANTONI v PEOPLE
(162 SCRA 158)
It is incumbent upon the prosecution to
establish by positive evidence the allegation
that an accused falsely represents himself. It is
essential to present proof that one actually
knows at the time of the alleged commission of
the offense that he is already dismissed from
the service.
An argument that it makes no difference
whether the accused was suspended or
dismissed from the service, for both imply the
absence of power to represent oneself as
vested with authority to perform acts pertaining
21
to an office to which he knowingly was deprived
of is correct only when an accused is charged
with Usurpation of Official Function but not if
one is charged with Usurpation of Authority.
ESTRADA v DESIERTO
(445 SCRA 655)
December 9, 2004
GR 156160
When a person who issued a notice has
obtained an authority to issue the same, for
instance being an officerin-charge of a
Philippine Government or agency, a charge for
Usurpation of Official Function does not apply.
In order for one to be held liable for Usurpation
of Official Function, there must be a clear
showing that the person being charged had
performed an act pertaining to any person in
authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any agency thereof, under
pretense of official position, and without being
lawfully entitled to do so.
USING FICTITIOUS NAME
CA 142 AS AMENDED BY RA 6085 (ACT
REGULATING THE USE OF ALIASES)
Aside from using one name, a person using
another name wherein no evidence is shown
that he was baptized with the latter name or that
he has been known by it since childhood or that
the court has authorized the use thereof may be
liable for Using a Fictitious Name.
LEGAMIA v IAC
(131 SCRA 478)
A woman who has been living with a married
man for almost 20 years, where the latter
introduced the woman to the public as his wife,
assumed the role of being a wife and the family
name of the man without any sinister purpose
or personal material gain in mind cannot be
held liable of the crime Using Fictitious Name.
The absence of sinister purpose or personal
material gain has removed the act from being a
crime herein mentioned.
PERJURY
DIAZ v PEOPLE
(191 SCRA 86)
A person who stated under oath in his
application to take a police examination that he
had never been convicted of any crime, when
as a matter of fact he has previous convictions,
committed perjury. The elements of the crime of
the crime of perjury are: 1) the accused made a
statement under oath or executed an affidavit
upon a material matter 2) that the statement or
affidavit was made before a competent officer
authorized to receive and administer oath 3)
accused made a willful and deliberate assertion
of falsehood 4) that a sworn statement or
affidavit containing the falsity is required by law
or made for a legal purpose.
MACHINATION IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS
OUANO v CA
(188 SCRA 799)
Once two persons have promised to share in a
property subject to an issue as a consideration
for one to refrain from taking part in the public
auction, and have attempted to cause and
succeeded in causing another bidder to stay
away from an auction in order to cause
reduction of the price of the property auctioned,
machination in public auctions under Art 185 of
the RPC has been committed. Causing another
bidder to stay away from the auction in order to
cause reduction of the price of the property
auctioned is an act constituting the crime of
machination in public auctions.
CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER
PROHIBITED DRUGS
PEOPLE v
LAGATA (396
SCRA ___)
June 25, 2003
G.R. 135323
Appellant's lack of knowledge of the contents of
the plastic bag becomes all the more credible
considering that when the NBI agents
conducted a test buy to validate the tip given to
them by their confidential informant, they relied
entirely on the information that a certain "Baby"
and "Chinggay" were selling "shabu." Moreover,
the testimony of the poseur-buyer becomes
material and indispensable when the appellant
denies having committed the prohibited act and
without the testimony of the poseur-buyer
especially if there are no other eyewitness to
the illicit transaction, the non- presentation of
the poseur buyer can be fatal to the case of
the prosecution, thus a hearsay.
PEOPLE v BONGCARAWAN
(384 SCRA 525)
The possession of dangerous drugs must be
with knowledge of the accused, or that animus
possidendi existed together with the possession
or control of such articles but the possession of
dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie
evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi
sufficient to convict an accused in the absence
of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession. Another is that the things in
possession of a person are presumed by law to
be owned by him and that to overcome this
22
presumption, it is necessary to present clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary.
PEOPLE v SUZUKI
(414 SCRA 43)
October 23, 2003
G.R. 120670
It bears stressing that mere possession of the
prohibited substance is a crime per se and the
burden of proof is upon appellant to show that
he has a license or permit under the law to
possess the prohibited drug. Here, appellant
failed to prove that he has a license to possess
the marijuana and so the Court held that such
possession constitutes prima facie evidence of
animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of any satisfactory
explanation.
PEOPLE v CHUA
(396 SCRA 657)
The crime under consideration is malum
prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or
good faith does not exempt appellants from
criminal liability. Mere possession of a regulated
drug without legal authority is punishable under
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
PEOPLE v CASIMIRO
(383 SCRA 390)
Failure to prove that the specimen of marijuana
examined by the forensic chemist was that
seized from the accused was fatal to the
prosecution's case. The prosecution failed to
prove the crucial first link in the chain of custody
when the prosecution witnesses admitted that
they did not write their initials on the brick of
marijuana immediately after allegedly seizing it
from accusedappellant outside the grocery
store but only did so in their headquarters and
the narcotics field test, which initially identified
the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not
conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at
the narcotics office; leading to a reasonable
doubt as to whether the item allegedly seized
from accused-appellant is the same brick of
marijuana marked by the policemen in their
headquarters and given by them to the crime
laboratory for examination.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
IMMORAL DOCTRINES, OBSCENE
PUBLICATIONS AND
EXHIBITIONS
PEOPLE v KOTTINGER
(45 PHIL 352)
Obscenity is something which is offensive to
chastity, decency or delicacy. The test to
determine the existence of obscenity is whether
the tendency of the matter charged as obscene
is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall.
PEOPLE v APARICI
(52 OG 249)
In a dark theater with stage dimly lit where a
person is swaying to and fro with the middle
part of her body, and dancing with her hips
swaying and sometimes raising her feet, the
Court provided that the test whether a particular
act is obscene is its tendency to deprave or
corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences, be they cultured or not.
PEOPLE v PADAN
(101 PHIL 749)
In an actual exhibition of a sexual act, preceded
by acts of lasciviousness, there can be no
redeeming features; in it there is no room for
art. It is clear and an unmitigated obscenity,
indecency and an offense to public morals and
causing as it does, nothing but lust and
lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence
especially on the youth of the land.
FERNANDO v CA
(510 SCRA 351)
December 6, 2006
G.R. No. 159751
To be held liable for obscenity, the prosecution
must prove that (a) the materials, publication,
picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the
offender sold, exhibited, published or gave
away such materials; that which shocks the
ordinary and common sense of men as an
indecency. A picture being obscene or indecent
must depend upon the circumstances of the
case, and that ultimately, the question is to be
decided by the judgment of the aggregate
sense of the community reached by it. It is an
issue proper for judicial determination and
should be treated on a case to case basis and
on the judges sound discretion.
CRIMES COMMITED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
RA 3019 AS AMENDED (ANTI GRAFT AND
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)
TRIESTE v SANDIGANBAYAN
(146 SCRA 508)
An official involved need not dispose of his
shares in a corporation as long as he does not
do anything for the firm in its contract with
another. The matter contemplated in Section
3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is the actual
intervention in the transaction in which one has
financial or pecuniary interest in order that
liability may attach.
23
MEJORADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
(151 SCRA 399)
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 refers to
any public officer. It makes no distinction or
qualification and specifies the acts declared
unlawful. A violation may occur when an officer
takes advantage of his position and divests
private parties of compensation they must
receive.
MALVERSATION
LABATAGOS v SANDIGANBAYAN
(183 SCRA 415)
When a collecting officer of a government
institution assigns his or her work to another
without the former being the one to
misappropriate a government fund or property
malversation may still be at hand. Malversation
consists not only in misappropriation or
converting public funds or property to ones
personal use but also by knowingly allowing
others to make use of them.
ILOGON v SANDIGANBAYAN
(218 SCRA 766)
An official custodian who fails to show
possession of a public fund or property may be
held liable for malversation. In malversation, all
that is necessary for conviction is proof that the
accountable officer had received public funds
and that he did not have them in possession
when demand therefore was made; no need of
direct evidence of personal misappropriation as
long as there is shortage in his account and that
it must be said that the return of the thing
malversed is not a defense.
INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF
PRISONERS
RODILLAS v SANDIGANBAYAN
(161 SCRA 347)
Failure to undertake necessary precautions take
for instance, allowing a prisoner to have lunch
with family when the former should be brought
to jail, failing to follow the prisoner in the
restroom or assigning someone to watch over
the former leading to the prisoners escape, will
make the officers act as a laxity or negligence
amounting to deliberate non-performance of
duty. A claim that there was no connivance with
the prisoner must fail considering that
connivance or giving ones consent to evasion
is a distinct crime from infidelity in the custody
of prisoner through negligence.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
(ARTICLES 246-266)
PARRICIDE
 PEOPLE v DALAG
(402 SCRA 254)
April 30, 2003
G.R. No. 129895
In the crime of parricide, the prosecution is
mandated to prove the following essential
elements: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the
deceased is the father, mother or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse. In
the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof
of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased would be the marriage certificate
which in this case, the prosecution was able to
present and prove together with all the essential
elements of parricide.
PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ
(612 SCRA 364)
February 11, 2010
G.R. No. 187683
In the case of a Parricide of a spouse, the best
proof of the relationship between the accused
and the deceased would be the marriage
certificate. In this case, the testimony of the
accused that he was married to the victim, in
itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the
testimony can be taken as an admission against
penal interest.
PEOPLE V JUMAWAN
(116 SCRA 739)
September 23, 1982
G.R. No. L-50905
Presentacion should have been accused of
parricide but since her relationship to the
deceased, as wife, is not alleged in the
information, she can be convicted of murder
only qualified by abuse of superior strength.
PEOPLE v TOMOTORGO
(136 SCRA 238)
April 30, 1985
G.R. No. L-47941
The fact that the appellant intended to maltreat
the victim only or inflict physical injuries does
not exempt him from liability for the resulting
and more serious crime of parricide. Appellant
is only entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
(Article 13 (3 Id).)
PEOPLE V GENOSA
(419 SCRA 537)
January 15, 2004
G.R. No. 135981
To appreciate battered woman syndrome (BWS)
as selfdefense, appellant must prove the
following: (1) each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized
24
at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner; (2) the final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of
the batterer must have produced in the battered
person's mind an actual fear of an imminent
harm from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save her
life; and (3) at the time of the killing, the batterer
must have posed probable -- not necessarily
immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter.
Under the existing facts of the present case,
however, not all of these elements were duly
established.
DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED
UNDER EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES
PEOPLE v
ABARCA (153
SCRA 735)
September 14,
1987 G.R. No.
74433
The provision in Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code that the accused shall kill any or
both of them immediately after surprising his
spouse and her paramour in the act of
intercourse does not say that he should commit
the killing instantly thereafter. Although about
one hour had passed between the time the
husband discovered his wife having sexual
intercourse with the victim and the time the
latter was actually shot, the shooting falls within
the provision as the death caused was the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming
the accused after chancing upon his spouse in
the basest act of infidelity.
PEOPLE v OYANIB
(354 SCRA 196)
March 12, 2001
G.R. Nos. 130634-35
To be relieved of any criminal liability, the
accused having admitted the killing must prove
that the death caused is the proximate result of
the outrage overwhelming him after chancing
upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Further,
he must have not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife nor consented to her
infidelity.
MURDER
PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ
(612 SCRA 738)
February 16, 2010
G.R. No. 188353
For the charge of murder to prosper, the
prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender
killed the victim, (2) through treachery, or by any
of the other five qualifying circumstances, duly
alleged in the Information. Generally, the
elements of murder are: 1. That a person was
killed. 2. That the accused killed him. 3. That
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Art. 248. 4. The
killing is not parricide or infanticide.
HOMICIDE
PEOPLE v PUGAY
(167 SCRA 439)
November 17, 1988
G.R. No. 74324
Having taken the can with the stinging smell of
flammable liquid from the engine of the Ferris
wheel and holding it before pouring its contents
on the body of the deceased, the accused knew
that the can contained gasoline. Clearly, he
failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to
avoid every undesirable consequence arising
from any act that may be committed by his
companions who at the time were making fun of
the deceased.
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION
PEOPLE v
SALUFRANIA
(159 SCRA 401)
March 30, 1988
G.R. No. L-50884
That the accused boxed his pregnant wife on
the stomach which caused her to fall and then
strangled her is not sufficient proof to show
intent to cause an abortion. Thus, the accused
should not be held guilty of the complex crime
of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but the
complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional
Abortion.
MUTILATION
AGUIRRE v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
(547 SCRA 431)
March 3, 2008
G.R. No. 170723
Mutilation under the first paragraph of Article
262 of the Revised Penal Code requires (1) that
there be a castration, that is, mutilation of
organs necessary for generation and (2) that
the mutilation is caused purposely and
deliberately to deprive the offended party of
some essential organ for reproduction. In this
present petition, the bilateral vasectomy done
on Larry could not have amounted to the crime
of mutilation because though undeniably,
vasectomy denies a man his power of
reproduction, such procedure does not deprive
him, "either totally or partially, of some essential
organ for reproduction."
RAPE
25
PEOPLE v ORITA
(184 SCRA 105)
March 3, 2008
G.R. No. 170723
For the consummation of rape, perfect
penetration is not essential. Entry of the labia or
lips of the female organ without rupture of the
hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to
warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the
female organ because although the offender
has commenced the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, not all acts of execution
was performed.
PEOPLE v
CASTRO (196
SCRA 679)
May 6, 1991
G.R. No. 91490
Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen and
laceration of the vagina are not essential for the
offense of consummated rape as entry, to the
least extent, of the labia or lips of the female
organ is sufficient. Thus, the victim's remaining
a virgin does not negate rape.
PEOPLE v ACHAS
(595 SCRA 341)
August 4, 2009
G.R. No. 185712
The absence of external signs or physical
injuries on the complainants body does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape.
This is because hymenal laceration is not an
element of the crime of rape, albeit a healed or
fresh laceration is a compelling proof of
defloration.
PEOPLE v CRUZ
(595 SCRA 411)
August 4, 2009
G.R. No. 186129
Most important in a prosecution for statutory
rape is to prove the following elements: 1. that
the accused had carnal knowledge with a
woman; and (2) that the woman was below 12
years of age. These elements were sufficiently
established during trial and were not rebutted
by the defense with any solid evidence to the
contrary.
PEOPLE v MANGALINO
(182 SCRA 329)
February 15,
1990 G.R. No.
79011
In statutory rape, proof of intimidation or force
used on the 12 year old victim, or lack of it is
immaterial. Further, the absence of penetration
due to the one-centimeter diameter of the
victims hymen is also inconsequential for proof
of entrance of the male organ within the labia or
pudendum of the female organ is sufficient to
warrant conviction.
PEOPLE v ERINIA
(50 PHIL 998)
January 20, 1927
G.R. No. L-26298
The crime of rape may be committed upon child
of the age of 3 years and 11 months.
PEOPLE V
ATENTO (196
SCRA 357) April
26, 1991
G.R. No. 84728
The accused was held guilty under paragraph 3
of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code even if
the circumstances of force and intimidation or of
the victim being deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious are absent. If sexual intercourse
with a victim under twelve years of age is rape,
then it should follow that carnal knowledge with
a seventeen-year old girl whose mental
capacity is that of a seven year old child would
constitute rape.
PEOPLE v PORAS
(612 SCRA 624)
February 16,
2010 G.R. No.
177747
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
the appellant succeeded in inserting his fingers
in AAAs vagina, this act still would not suffice to
convict the appellant of rape because in 1994,
the insertion of one or more fingers into a
womans vagina without her consent did not
constitute rape. It was only in 1997 that the law
on rape expanded to include this act.
DE CASTRO v FERNANDEZ
(515 SCRA 682)
February 14,
2007 G.R. No.
155041
Petitioner insists that a finger does not
constitute an object or instrument in
contemplation of RA 8353. The insertion of
ones finger into the genital of another
constitutes rape through sexual assault.
Hence, the prosecutor did not err in charging
petitioner with the crime of rape under Article
266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE v
FUNESTO (655
SCRA 357)
August 3, 2011
G.R. No. 182237
26
Jurisprudence firmly holds that the force or
violence required in rape cases is relative; it
does not need to be overpowering or
irresistible; it is present when it allows the
offender to consummate his purpose. In this
case, the appellant employed that amount of
force sufficient to consummate rape.
PEOPLE v
MIRANDILLA
(654 SCRA 761)
July 27, 2011
G.R. No. 186417
The sweetheart theory as a defense however,
necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first
element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the
prosecution the burden to prove only force or
intimidation, the coupling element of rape.
PEOPLE v MADSALI
(611 SCRA 596)
February 4, 2010
G.R. No. 179570
Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to
death threats does not affect the credibility of
the complainant, nor can it be taken against her
such as in this case when BBB explained that
she did not immediately report the abduction,
rape, and detention of her daughter to the
authorities because Egap threatened to kill
AAA, who was then in his custody. The charge
of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay
was unreasonable and unexplained.
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY
AND
SECURITY (ARTICLES 267-292)
KIDNAPPING AND ILLEGAL DETENTION
PEOPLE v MUIT
(568 SCRA 251)
October 8, 2008
G.R. No. 181043
The elements of the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention are the following: (a)
the accused is a private individual; (b) the
accused kidnaps or detains another, or in any
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the
act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d)
the commission of the offense, any of the four
circumstances mentioned in Article 267 is
present. The totality of the prosecutions
evidence in this case established the
commission of kidnapping for ransom with
homicide.
PEOPLE v
GUTTIEREZ (658
SCRA ___ )
October 3, 2011
G.R. No. 168552
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the
actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled
with the intent of the accused to effect it. It
includes not only the imprisonment of a person
but also the deprivation of his liberty in
whatever form and for whatever length of time.
It involves a situation where the victim cannot
go out of the place of confinement or detention,
or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move.
PEOPLE V TOMIO
(202 SCRA 77)
September 30, 1991
G.R. No. 74630
Even granting for the sake of argument that, in
effect, there was created a simple loan contract
between appellants and Mr. Nagao, as asserted
by appellant Tomio Maeda, the deprivation of
the former's liberty until the amount shall have
been fully "paid" to them, is still kidnapping or
illegal detention for ransom.
PEOPLE V LIM
(190 SCRA 706)
The fact of detention which is an essential
element in the kidnapping was not clearly
established as there was no showing that there
was actual confinement or restriction on the
person of the offended party. The two minors
voluntarily entered the appellant's residence
and there is no indication that one of the minors
was locked up, physically restrained of her
liberty or unable to communicate with anyone.
PEOPLE V PADICA
(221 SCRA 362)
Where the taking of the victim was incidental to
the basic purpose of killing, the crime is only
murder and this is true even if before the killing,
the victim was taken from one place to another.
From the acts of the accused, it cannot be
inferred that the latter's purpose was actually to
detain or deprive the victims of their liberty and
the fact alone that ransom money was
demanded did not per se qualify the crime to
kidnapping in the absence of other elements.
PEOPLE v RAMOS
(297 SCRA ___ )
October 12, 1998
G.R. No. 118570
Actual restraint of the victim's liberty was
evident from the moment she was forcibly
prevented by accused-appellant from going to
work at MERALCO and taken instead against
her will to Bulacan. Further, no other logical
meaning can be ascribed to the victim's
statement to that "she needed P200, 000.00
27
immediately otherwise she might not be able to
go home anymore," other than that the money
was intended as ransom, i.e., as consideration
for her release from captivity.
KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE
TO RETURN A MINOR
PEOPLE v TY
(263 SCRA 754)
May 12, 1978
G.R. No. L-32529
What is actually punishable is not the
kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate
failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to
restore the latter to his parents or guardians.
Said failure or refusal, however, must not only
be deliberate but must also be persistent as to
oblige the parents or the guardians of the child
to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain
custody.
GRAVE THREATS
REYES v PEOPLE
(27 SCRA 686)
March 28, 1969
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529
The demonstration led by petitioner against the
complainant in front of the main gate of the
naval station; the fact that placards with
threatening statements were carried by the
demonstrators; their persistence in trailing
Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and
the demonstration conducted in front thereof,
culminating in repeated threats flung by
petitioner in a loud voice show that the threats
were made with deliberate purpose of creating
in the mind of Hallare the belief that the threat
would be carried into effect. Indeed, Hallare
became so apprehensive of his safety that he
sought the protection of Col. Monzon therefore,
the appellate court was correct in upholding
petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave
threats.
CALUAG v
PEOPLE (580
SCRA 575)
March 4, 2009
G.R. No. 171511
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts
to a crime which may or may not be
accompanied by a condition. Considering the
mauling incident which transpired earlier
between petitioner and Julias husband,
petitioners act of pointing a gun at Julias
forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to
inflict serious physical injury on her person
which constituted grave threat.
 GRAVE COERCION
TIMONER v PEOPLE
(125 SCRA 830)
November 25, 1983
G.R. No. L-62050
Grave coercion is committed when "a person
who, without authority of law, shall by means of
violence, prevent another from doing something
not prohibited by law or compel to do something
against his will, either it be right or wrong." In
the case at bar, the Mayor is not guilty of grave
coercion as the element that the restraint made
by the Mayor upon complainant, the owner of
the barbershop considered as a public
nuisance, was not made under authority of law
or in the exercise of a lawful right, is absent.
LEE v CA
(201 SCRA 405)
September 6, 1991
G.R. No. 90423
There is nothing unlawful when petitioner
demanded that the private respondent return
the proceeds of the check accompanied by a
threat to file criminal charges. Her lengthy stay
in the bank and return of money was not due to
petitioners threat but to show good faith. The
most telling proof of the absence of intimidation
was the fact that the complainant refused to
sign the promissory note in spite of the alleged
threats of the petitioner.
UNJUST VEXATION
PEOPLE v REYES
(60 PHIL 369)
The disturbance or interruption of any ceremony
of a religious character under the old Penal
Code was denounced by article 571 and was
punished by arrest from one to ten days and a
fine ranging from 15 to 125 pesetas. But this
article was omitted from the Revised Penal
Code and the offense, if any was committed by
the appellants, is denounced in Article 287 as
an "unjust vexation" and punished by arresto
menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos or
both.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
(ARTICLES 293-332)
ROBBERY
NAPOLIS v COURT OF APPEALS
(43 SCRA 301)
February 28,
1972 G.R. No. L-
28865
It is more plausible to believe that Article 294
applies only where robbery with violence
28
against or intimidation of person takes place
without entering an inhabited house, under the
conditions set forth in Article 299 of the Revised
Penal Code. When the elements of both
provisions are present, the crime is a complex
one, calling for the imposition as provided in
Article 48 of the Code of the penalty for the
most serious offense, in its maximum period,
which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal
in its maximum period.
PEOPLE v
BIRUAR (130
SCRA 513)
July 25, 1984
G.R. Nos. L-32202-04
In this case, the accused, after committing the
crime of robbery in band in the house of
Gorgonio Mosende, went to the neighboring
house of George Kalitas where they committed
the crimes of Arson and Robbery with Homicide
and Physical Injuries. Obviously, the rule
enunciated in People v De Leon cannot be
made applicable since the herein accused
performed different acts with distinct purposes
which resulted in juridically independent crimes.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
PEOPLE v MANGULABNAN
(99 PHIL 992)
September 28, 1956
G.R. No. L-8919
In order to determine the existence of the crime
of robbery with homicide, it is enough that a
homicide would result by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery and it is immaterial that
the death would supervene by mere accident
provided that the homicide produced by reason
or on occasion of the robbery inasmuch as it is
only the result obtained, without reference or
distinction as to the circumstances, causes,
modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime, that has to be taken
into consideration.
PEOPLE v CALIXTO
(123 SCRA 369)
The appellants committed robbery in band with
homicide despite the fact that Cuevas was one
of them and not a robbery victim, an innocent
bystander or a stranger because Article 294 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code says so.
PEOPLE v
QUINONES (183
SCRA 747)
March 28, 1990
G.R. No. 80042
There is no crime of robbery with multiple
homicide under the Revised Penal Code thus
the charge should have been for robbery with
homicide only regardless of the fact that three
persons were killed in the commission of the
robbery. In this special complex crime, the
number of persons killed is immaterial and does
not increase the penalty prescribed in Article
294 of the said Code.
ROBBERY WITH RAPE
PEOPLE v DINOLA
(183 SCRA 747)
March 22, 1990
G.R. No. L-54567
If the intention of the accused was to commit
robbery but rape was also committed even
before the robbery, the crime of robbery with
rape is committed however, if the original
design was to commit rape but the accused
after committing rape also committed robbery
because the opportunity presented itself, the
criminal acts should be viewed as two distinct
offenses. In the case at bar, after the
complainant was raped by the accused, the
latter threatened to kill her if she did not give
watch on her wrist to him and forcibly took it
from her. Hence, the accused was convicted for
two crimes of rape and robbery.
PEOPLE v MORENO
(220 SCRA 292)
January 25, 2002
G.R. No. 140033
Accused Juan Moreno, who took no part in the
rape, is guilty of robbery only under Article 294,
No. 5 of the Revised Penal Code but as to
appellant Reynaldo Maniquez, who had raped
Mary Ann Galedo, he should be guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with rape,
under Article 294, No. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.
ROBBERY WITH PHYSICAL INJURIES
PEOPLE v
SALVILLA (184
SCRA 671) April
26, 1990
G.R. No. 86163
It is not a defense that appellant and his co-
accused had no opportunity to dispose of the
personalities taken. From the moment the
offender gained possession of the thing, even if
the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the
same, the unlawful taking is complete.
ROBBERY IN BAND
PEOPLE v APDUHAN
(24 SCRA 798)
August 30, 1968
29
G.R. No. L-19491
The circumstance of band is a qualifying
circumstance only in robbery punished by
subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of Article 294 and a
generic aggravating circumstance in robbery
with homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, and
lesiones graves resulting in insanity, imbecility,
impotency or blindness. Hence, if robbery with
homicide is committed by a band, the indictable
offense would still be "robbery with homicide"
under Article 294(1) and not
robbery with homicide in band."
ROBBERY WITH USE OF FORCE UPON
THINGS
PEOPLE V JARANILLA
(55 SCRA 563)
February 22, 1974
G.R. No. L-28547
One essential requisite of robbery with force
upon things under Articles 299 and 302 is that
the malefactor should enter the building or
dependency where the object to be taken is
found. In the instant case, the chicken coop
where the six roosters were taken cannot be
considered a building within the meaning of
Article 302, thus, it cannot be said that the
accused entered the same in order to commit
the robbery by means of any of the five
circumstances enumerated in Article 302.
ANTI-FENCING LAW (P.D. 1612) AND ITS
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS
DIZON-PAMINTUAN v
PEOPLE (234
SCRA 63) July 11,
1994
G.R. No. 111426
The elements of the crime of fencing are: 1. A
crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2.
The accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses,
keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which
has been derived from the proceeds of the said
crime; 3. The accused knows or should have
known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4.
There is, on the part of the accused, intent to
gain for himself or for another.
RAMON TAN v PEOPLE
(313 SCRA 220)
August 26, 1999
G.R. No. 134298
The crimes of robbery and theft, on the one
hand, and fencing on the other, are separate
and distinct offenses thus, the State may
choose to prosecute the accused either under
the Revised Penal Code or Presidential Decree
No. 1612, although the preference would seem
inevitable considering that fencing is malum
prohibitum, and Presidential Decree No. 1612
creates a presumption of fencing and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value
of property. Further, the law on fencing does not
require the accused to have participated in the
criminal design to commit, or to have been in
any wise involved in the commission of, the
crime of robbery or theft.
ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972
(R.A. NO. 6539), AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO.
7659
PEOPLE v DELA
CRUZ (183
SCRA ___ )
March 29, 1990
G.R. No. 83798
The crime committed is Carnapping with
Homicide. Carnapping is defined under RA No.
6539 as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter's consent, or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things." The same law prescribes the
penalty of life imprisonment to death when the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the
carnapping.
IZON v PEOPLE
(107 SCRA ___)
August 31, 1981
G.R. No. L-51370
Under the Anti-Carnapping law, any vehicle
which is motorized using the streets which are
public, not exclusively for private use, comes
within the concept of motor vehicle. Thus,
stealing a motorized tricycle running in droves
along public highways going to the north like
Baguio City is a crime falling under the Anti-
Carnapping law and not a crime of simple
robbery punishable under the Revised Penal
Code.
THEFT
VALENZUELA v
PEOPLE (525
SCRA __ ) June
21, 2007
G.R. No. 160188
The elements of theft as provided for in Art. 308
of the Revised Penal Code are (1) that there be
taking of personal property; (2) that said
property belongs to another; (3) that the taking
30
be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking
be done without the consent of the owner; and,
(5) that the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.
PEOPLE v GULINAO
(180 SCRA ___)
December 4, 1989
G.R. No. 82264-66
Gulinao should have been convicted of the
crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code and not robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation of a person
under par. 5, Article 294 since the taking of the
ring of Dr. Chua was merely an afterthought.
The force employed in the killing of Dr. Chua
has no bearing on the taking of his ring.
SANTOS v PEOPLE
(181 SCRA ___ )
January 29, 1990
G.R. No. 77429
The principal distinction between the theft and
estafa is that in theft, the thing is taken while in
estafa, the accused receives the property and
converts it to his own use or benefit. However,
there may be theft even if the accused has
possession of the property such as when he
was entrusted only with the material or physical
(natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his
misappropriation of the same constitutes theft,
but if he has the juridical possession of the
thing, his conversion of the same constitutes
embezzlement or estafa."
QUALIFIED THEFT
EMPELIS v IAC
(132 SCRA ___ )
September 28,
1984 G.R. No. L-
66136
The stealing of coconuts when they are still in
the tree or deposited on the ground within the
premises is qualified theft but when the
coconuts are stolen in any other place, it is
simple theft. In the case at bar, petitioners
committed only frustrated qualified theft
because although they were seen carrying
away fifty coconuts while they were still in the
premises of the plantation, they were not able to
carry the coconuts away from the plantation due
to the timely arrival of the owner.
ESTAFA THROUGH UNFAITHFULNESS OR
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE
SADDUL v CA
 (192 SCRA ___)
December 10, 1990
G.R. No. 91041
The accused was acquitted of the crime of
estafa with abuse of confidence for the following
reasons: (1) Saddul received the spare parts
from AFP in trust for Land Rover which
authorized him to sell; (2) Saddul sold them in
accordance with the authority given to him; (3)
AMPI or Cuevas not being the owner of the
property incurred no loss and suffered injury on
account of Saduls retention of proceeds and;
(4) no demand for return was made by AMPI or
Cuevas who knew that the spare parts are to be
sold for the account of Land Rover.
ESTAFA THROUGH FALSE PRETENSES,
FARUDULENT ACTS OR MEANS
PEOPLE v MONTANER
(656 SCRA ___ )
August 31, 2011
G.R. No. 184053
The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1)
the post-dating or issuance of a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time
the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of
funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to
the payee.
PEOPLE v ONG
(204 SCRA ___)
December 20, 1991
G.R. No. 93849
In the crime of estafa by postdating or issuing a
bad check, deceit and damage are essential
elements of the offense and have to be
established with satisfactory proof to warrant
conviction. In the present case, the prosecution
failed to prove that the accused-appellant had
such knowledge with respect to the subject
checks that he indorsed.
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. BLG. 22),
PLUS ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-
2000 RE: PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF B.P.
22 AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO.
13-2001 RE:
CLARIFICATION OF ADMIN. CIRCULAR NO.
12-2000;
AND P.D. NO. 1689 (INCREASING THE
PENALTY FOR CERTAIN FORMS OF
SWINDLING OR ESTAFA)
DOMAGSANG v CA
(347 SCRA 75)
December 5,
2000 G.R. No.
139292
31
B.P. Blg. 22 or "Bouncing Checks Law,"
enumerates the elements of the crime, to wit:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any
check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that
at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor
of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.
NIERRAS v DACUYCUY
(181 SCRA 1)
January 11, 1990
G.R. Nos. 59568-76
Deceit and damage are essential elements in
Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, but
are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check
that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption
of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he
issued the same without sufficient funds and
hence punishable which is not so under the
Penal Code.
VACA v CA
(298 SCRA ___ )
November 16, 1998
G.R. No. 131714
While it may be true that it was the company's
accountant who actually prepared the rubber
check, petitioners in this case cannot pretend
ignorance of the insufficiency of funds since
they are the owners and officers of the
company. The testimony of petitioner Nieto that
after the check in question was dishonored, he
instructed their company accountant to prepare
a replacement check belies petitioners' claim
that they had no hand in the preparation of
checks and shows that petitioners were in
control of the finances of the company.
PEOPLE v
NITAFAN (207
SCRA ___)
April 6, 1992
G.R. Nos. 81559-60
Acts involving the violation of trust receipt
agreements occurring after 29 January 1973
(date of enactment of P.D. 115) would make the
accused criminally liable for estafa under
paragraph 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) pursuant to the explicit
provision in Section 13 of P.D. 115. The failure,
therefore, to account for the P114,884.22
balance in 1980 or during the effectivity of P.D.
115. makes the accused-respondent criminally
liable for estafa.

LIM LAO v CA
(274 SCRA 472)
June 20, 1997
G.R. No. 119178
The fact that petitioner was a signatory to the
checks that were subsequently dishonored
merely engenders the prima facie presumption
that she knew of the insufficiency of funds, but it
does not render her automatically guilty under
B.P. 22. The trial court itself found that no
personal notice of dishonor to petitioner Lina
Lim Lao was made by the drawee bank hence,
the prima facie presumption that she knew
about the insufficiency of funds cannot apply.
IDOS v CA
(296 SCRA ___)
September 25,
1998 G.R. No.
110782
When there was no consideration whatsoever
for the issuance of the check such as when the
subject check was issued merely to evidence
complainant's interest in the partnership and
was not intended to apply on account or for
value and when the check was issued without
actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds,
there is no violation of BP 22. Further, the
failure of the complainant or by the drawee
bank to send a notice of dishonor to the
petitioner precludes any finding of prima facie
evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
WONG v CA
(351 SCRA 100)
February 2, 2001
G.R. No. 117857
When private respondent deposited the checks
157 days after the date of the checks, the
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds was lost. But such knowledge could still
be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence
such as in this case, the trial court found that
petitioner made reassurance that he would
issue new checks but failed to do so, was duly
notified of the dishonour of the checks and
failed to make arrangements for full payment
within five (5) banking days thereof.
OTHER DECEITS
VILLAFLOR V CA
(192 SCRA 680)
Appellant was guilty of fraudulent
misrepresentation when, knowing that the car
was then owned by the Northern Motors, Inc.,
still told the complainant that the car was
actually owned by him for purposes of and at
the time he obtained the loan from the latter.
Indubitably, the accused was in bad faith when
32
he obtained the said loan under such deliberate
pretenses.
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
TAGUINOD v PEOPLE
(659 SCRA ___)
October 12, 2011
G.R. 185833
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief
under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code
are: (1) That the offender deliberately caused
damage to the property of another; (2) That
such act does not constitute arson or other
crimes involving destruction; (3) That the act of
damaging anothers property be committed
merely for the sake of damaging it.
CABALLES V DAR
(168 SCRA 247)
December 5, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
The private respondent cannot be held
criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting
the banana trees because, as an authorized
occupant or possessor of the land, and as
planter of the banana trees, he owns said crops
including the fruits thereof. Thus, an essential
element of the crime of malicious mischief,
which is "damage deliberately caused to the
property of another," is absent because the
private respondent merely cut down his own
plantings.
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
(ARTICLES 333-334, 336-346)
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
PEOPLE v
FONTANILLA
(23 SCRA 127)
June 28, 1968
G.R. No. L-25354
While deceit is an essential element of ordinary
or simple seduction, it does not have to be
proved or established in a charge of qualified
seduction. It is replaced by abuse of
confidence. Under Art. 337 of the Revised
Penal Code, the seduction of a virgin over
twelve and under eighteen years of age,
committed by any person in public authority,
priest, house servant, domestic guardian,
teacher, or any person who, in any capacity,
shall be entrusted with the education or custody
of the woman seduced is "constitutive" of the
crime of qualified seduction even though no
deceit intervenes or even when such carnal
knowledge was voluntary on the part of the
virgin.
BABANTO v ZOSA
(120 SCRA 834)
 February 28, 1983
G.R. No. L-32895
The complaint alleged that the accused abused
his position as a policeman; that Leonida
Dagohoy was of the tender age of 13; and that
the accused had carnal knowledge of the
complainant. However, there is no allegation
that the complainant was a "virgin". Although it
may be true that virginity is presumed if the girl
is over 12 and under 18 years of age, is
unmarried and of good reputation, the accused
charged with rape cannot be convicted of
qualified seduction for failure to allege virginity
in the complaint which is an essential element
of the same.
PEREZ v CA
(168 SCRA 236)
November 29, 1988
G.R. No. L-80838
There are similar elements between
Consented
Abduction and Qualified Seduction, namely: (1)
that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that
she must be over twelve (12) and under
eighteen (18) years of age. However,
Consented Abduction, in addition to the two
common elements, requires that: (1) the taking
away of the offended party must be with her
consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the
offender, and, (2) the taking away of the
offended party must be with lewd designs while
Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the crime
be committed by abuse of authority, confidence
or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual
intercourse with the woman.
ABDUCTION, FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
WITH RAPE
PEOPLE v spouse could not yet be presumed dead
ALBURO (184
SCRA 655)
April 26, 1990
G.R. No. 85822
The Court is not persuaded by the theory that
appellant and Evelyn were sweethearts
because if they were, surely, Evelyn would not
have jeopardized their relationship by accusing
him of having deflowered her and, on top of it
all, filing a criminal charge against him.
Moreover, appellant was not able to present any
convincing evidence to substantiate his claim
like love letters, notes and other symbols of
affection.
PEOPLE v
GODINES (196
SCRA 765) May
7, 1991
G.R. No. 93410
33
A medical examination is not an indispensable
element in a prosecution of rape. Further, the
defense of alibi cannot prosper because the
distance between the alleged whereabouts of
the appellants at the time of the commission of
the crime and the scene of the crime itself may
be easily negotiated by ordinary means and in
light of the positive identification of the accused
as the authors of the crime.
PROSECUTION OF PRIVATE OFFENSES
PILAPIL v IBAY-
SOMERA (174
SCRA 653) June
30, 1989
G.R. No. 80116
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted
except upon a sworn written complaint filed by
the offended spouse. Private respondent, being
no longer the husband of petitioner for having
obtained a valid divorce decree in Germany,
had no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
(ARTICLES 347-352)
BIGAMY
TEVES v PEOPLE
(656 SCRA 307)
August 24, 2011
G.R. No. 188775
The elements of bigamy are as follows: 1. That
the offender has been legally married; 2. That
the marriage has not been legally dissolved, or
in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent
according to the Civil Code; 3. That he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage
which has all the essential requisites for validity.
NOLLORA v PEOPLE
(657 SCRA 330)
September 17,
2011 G.R. No.
191425
The circumstances in the present case satisy all
the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally
married to Pinat; (2) Nollora and Pinats
marriage has not been legally dissolved prioir to
the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora
admitted the existence of the second marriage
to Geraldino; and (4) Nollora and Geraldinos
marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity except for lack of capacity of Nollora
due to his prior marriage.
PEOPLE v ARAGON
(100 PHIL 103)
 February 28, 1957
G.R. No. L-10016
A subsequent marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of his first spouse is
illegal and void from its performance, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable
marriages.
MERCADO V TAN
(337 SCRA ___ )
August 1, 2000
G.R. No. 137110
The fact that petitioner subsequently obtained a
judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage after having contracted the second
marriage was already immaterial since the
crime had already been consummated. By
contracting a second marriage while the first
was still subsisting, he committed that acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
MORIGO v PEOPLE
(422 SCRA 376)
February 6, 2004
G.R. No. 145226
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the petitioner and
Lucia Barrete were never married "from the
beginning." Thus, when petitioner contracted
marriage with Maria Jececha, no bigamy was
committed since the first element of existence
and the validity of the first marriage is lacking.
TENEBRO v CA
(422 SCRA ___ )
February 18,
2004 G.R. No.
150758
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted
during the subsistence of petitioner's valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioner's marriage to
Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner's
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity
of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability
for bigamy.
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED
AGAINST PROVISION OF THE LAW
COSCA v PALAYPAYON
(237 SCRA 249)
September 30, 1994
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721
The Revised Penal Code provides that
"(p)riests or ministers of any religious
34
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who
shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony shall be punished in accordance with
the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is
within the province of the prosecutorial
agencies of the Government.
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
(ARTICLES 353-364)
LIBEL
ALCANTARA v PONCE
(517 SCRA 74)
February 28, 2007
G.R. No. 156183
The crime of libel, as defined in Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code, has the following
elements: (1) imputation of a crime, vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance; (2) publicity
or publication; (3) malice; (4) direction of such
imputation at a natural or juridical person, or
even a dead person and (5) tendency to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the
person defamed.
DIAZ v PEOPLE
(523 SCRA 194)
May 25, 2007
G.R. No. 159787
For an imputation to be libelous, the following
requisites must be present: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must
be given publicity; and (d) the victims must be
identifiable. Absent one of these elements, a
case for libel will not prosper.
GONZALES v ARCILLA
(203 SCRA 609)
November 18, 1991
G.R. No. L-27923
"Mang-aagaw ng asawa ng may asawa," even if
translated as "one who grabs another's
husband," does not necessarily mean an
adulteress but at most, it may imply that the
person to whom it is addressed is a "flirt, a
temptress, or one who indulges in enticing other
husbands." Hence, it is more of an imputation of
a vice, condition or act not constituting a crime.
Further, the phrases "tibihon," "putang ina,"
"walang hiya," and "patay gutom" do not impute
the commission of a crime but were uttered to
impute a condition, defect, status or vice
intended to cause dishonor, discredit or
contempt on the offended party.
SAZON v CA
(255 SCRA 692)
March 29, 1996
G.R. No. 120715

The test to determine the defamatory character
of words was satisfied in the case at bench
because the words and phrases "mandurugas,"
"mag-ingat sa panlilinlang," "matagal na tayong
niloloko," "may kasamang pagyayabang," "ang
ating pobreng super kulit." "patuloy na
kabulastugan," "mastermind sa paninirang puri,"
etc are indisputably defamatory for they impute
upon the private complainant a condition that is
dishonorable and shameful, since they tend to
describe him as a swindler and/or a deceiver.
VASQUEZ v CA
(314 SCRA 460)
September 15,
1999 G.R. No.
118971
Petitioner was able to prove the truth of his
charges against the barangay official while the
prosecution failed to prove not only that the
charges made by petitioner were false but also
that petitioner made them with knowledge of
their falsity or with reckless disregard of
whether they were false or not. If the
defamatory matter either constitutes a crime or
concerns the performance of official duties, and
the accused proves the truth of his charge, he
should be acquitted.
BRILLANTE v CA
(440 SCRA 541)
October 19, 2004
G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571
In the cases at bar, it was proven that Brillante
uttered defamatory statements during the press
conference attended by some fifty journalists
and caused the open letter which explicitly
referred to reprehensible acts allegedly
committed by Binay, Prudente and their
associates, such as the use of goons to
threaten Binay's opponents in the election and
the plotting of Syjuco's assassination, to be
published in several newspapers.
ALONZO v CA
(241 SCRA 51)
February 1, 1995
G.R. No. 110088
There was no publication when Atty. Balasabas,
a third person to whom the private respondents
entrusted the documents with the request that
he give them to their counsel, read the
complaint against Dr. Velasco and the report of
the petitioner attached thereto. Where the
plaintiff himself communicated or by his acts
caused the communication of the libelous
35
matter to a third person, there was no
actionable publication.
BUATIS v PEOPLE
March 24, 2006
G.R. No. 142509
The element of publication in libel is present in
this case when petitioner's subject letter-reply
itself addressed to respondent states that the
same was copy furnished to all concerned, its
contents were dictated to his secretary and was
found in the mailbox, open, not contained in an
envelope thus, open to public. Such publication
had already created upon the minds of the
readers a circumstance which brought discredit
and shame to respondent's reputation.
NEWSWEEK v IAC
(142 SCRA 171)
May 30, 1986
G.R. No. L-63559
The disputed portion of the news article which
refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to
be libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola as a
sugar planter as it merely stated that the victim
had been arrested by members of a special
police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola,
the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report,
referring as it does to an official act performed
by an elective public official, is within the realm
of privilege and protected by the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and press.
MERCADO v CFI
August 25, 1982
G.R. No. L-38753
A libel prosecution must survive the test of
whether or not the offending publication is
within the guarantees of free speech and free
press.
BULLETIN PUBLISHING v NOEL
(167 SCRA 255)
November 9, 1988
G.R. No. 76565
No libel has been committed because the
published work alleged to contain libelous
statements is not founded on the late Amir
Mindalano or his family and appears simply
expository in character, matter-of-fact, and
unemotional in tone and tenor, without any
evidence of malevolent intent, either on the part
of the author or the publisher of the article.
Further, personal hurt or embarrassment, even
if real, is not automatically equivalent to
defamation; community standards not personal
or family standards are the basis for evaluating
a publication claimed to be defamatory.
SANTOS v CA
(203 SCRA 110)
October 21, 1991
G.R. No. L-45031

Publication of a complaint, being a true and fair
report of a judicial proceeding, made in good
faith and without comments or remarks, is
privileged and comes under
Item 2 of Article 354.
BORJAL v CA
January 14, 1999
G.R. No. 126466
The doctrine of fair comment means that
while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false because every
man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed, malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a
public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may
be actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition.
FLOR v PEOPLE
(454 S 440)
March 31, 2005
G.R. No. 139987
Where the issue of cash advances against the
coffers of the provincial government was a
major political topic in that locality at that time, it
was clearly a legitimate topic to be discussed
not only by the members of the media but by
public as what was involved was the
dispensation of taxpayers money. The
inference that the accused media men drew
from the note given by their source that the
governor prodded some of the provincial
government officials to take out cash advances
may have been false but the same does not
warrant a conviction for libel nor support a claim
for damages.
AGUSTIN v PAMINTUAN
(467 SCRA 601)
August 22, 2005
G.R. No. 164938
Under the old rule, the offended party could
harass the accused in a libel case by laying the
venue of the criminal action in a remote or
distant places. To obviate controversies as to
the venue of the criminal action from written
defamation, the complaint or Information should
contain allegations as to whether the offended
party was a public officer or a private individual
at the time the offense was committed, and
where he was actually residing at that time.
Whenever possible, the place where the written
defamation was printed and first published
should likewise be alleged.
FERMIN v PEOPLE
March 28, 2008
36
G.R. No. 157643
Proof adduced during the trial showed that
accused was the manager of the publication
without the corresponding evidence that, as
such, he was directly responsible for the
writing, editing, or publishing of the matter
contained in the said libelous article. Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code, however, includes
not only the author but also the person who
prints or published it. Thus, proof of knowledge
or participation in the publication of the
offending article is not required.
SLANDER
GONZALES v ARCILLA
(203 SCRA 609)
November 18, 1991
G.R. No. L-27923
Slander is oral defamation while libel is
defamation in writing. In both, there is a public
and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.
BALITE v PEOPLE
(18 SCRA 280)
September 30,
1966 G.R. No. L-
21475
Defamatory words constitute either grave or
light slander depending not only upon their
sense and grammatical meaning, judging them
separately, but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, antecedents or
relationship between the offended party and the
offender, which might tend to prove the intention
of the offender at the time. In the case at bar,
the statements of the accused, alluding to the
offended party that he has sold the union, he
has swindled the money of the members, he
received P6,000.00; he is engaged in
racketeering and enriching himself with
capitalist; he has spent funds of the union for
his own personal use are serious and insulting,
and no amount of sophistry will take them out of
the compass of grave oral defamation.
REYES v PEOPLE
(27 SCRA 686)
March 28, 1969
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529
The words, "Agustin, putang ina mo" is a
common enough expression in the dialect that
is often employed, not really to slander but
rather to express anger or displeasure. In the
instant case, it should be viewed as part of the
threats voiced by appellant against Agustin
Hallare, evidently to make the same more
emphatic.
VICTORIO V CA
(173 SCRA 645)
May 3, 1989
G.R. Nos. L-32836-37
Appellant-petitioner admitted having called Atty.
Vivencio
Ruiz, kayabang, tunaw na utak, swapang,
and "estapador", which attributes to the latter
the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting
imputation. Defamatory words uttered
specifically against a lawyer when touching on
his profession are libellous per se.
INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR
BETGUEN v MASANGCAY
(238 SCRA 475) Article 364 of
the Revised Penal Code defines "intriguing
against honor" as any intrigue which has for its
principal purpose to blemish the honor and
reputation of a person. This felony undoubtedly
falls under the coverage of crimes involving
moral turpitude, the latter term having been
defined as "an act of baseness, vileness,
depravity in the private and social duties which
a man owes his fellow man, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man
and man, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty and good morals."
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (ARTICLE 365)
CARILLO v PEOPLE
(229 S 386)
Petitioner anesthesiologist when summoned
could not be readily found and when he finally
appeared at 10:30 in the evening, he was
evidently in a bad temper, commenting critically
on the dextrose bottles before ordering their
removal, a circumstance indicative that he was
not disposed to attend to this unexpected call,
in violation of the canons of his profession that
as a physician, he should serve the interest of
his patient "with the greatest of solicitude, giving
them always his best talent and skill." In the
crime of simple negligence, the gravamen of the
offense is the failure to exercise the diligence
necessitated or called for the situation which
was not immediately life-destructive but which
culminated, in the present case, in the death of
a human being three (3) days later.
QUIZON v JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
(97 PHIL. 342)
Damage to property through reckless
negligence is not a variant of malicious
mischief. Malicious mischief, as used in sec.
87, par. 6, of the Judiciary Act, has exclusive
reference to the willful and deliberate crimes
described in Arts. 327 to 331 of the Revised
Penal Code and to no other.
PEOPLE v FALLER
(67 Phil. 529)
Under an information for malicious damage to
anothers property, the accused may be
convicted of the crime of damage through
reckless imprudence.
GAN v COURT OF APPEALS
(165 SCRA 378)
Under the emergency rule, one who suddenly
finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence. Applying the above test to the case
at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the
crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in
Homicide because there was no evidence
presented that would tend to prove that
petitioner did have sufficient time to reflect on
the consequences of her instant decision to
swerve her car to the light without stepping on
her brakes.
PEOPLE v BUAN
(22 SCRA 1383)
The exoneration of Jose Buan, by the Justice of
the Peace (now Municipal Court) of Guiguinto,
Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, prevents his
being prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in the Court of
First Instance of the province, where both
charges are derived from the consequences of
one and the same vehicular accident, because
the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.
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