Name: CALO, Michael John T.

Citation: Luego v. CSC

August 5, 1986

FELIMON LUEGO, petitioner-appellant, vs.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO, respondents-appellees.

Cruz, J.:

NATURE: Exact nature not stated. Action to question an order of the CSC in
an appointment protest

FACTS

Feb. 18, 1983 - Felimon LUEGO was appointed Administrative Officer II for the
Office of the Mayor, Cebu City by then-Mayor Florentino Solon.

The appointment was described as PERMANENT.

But the CSC approved it as TEMPORARY because of a protest filed by Felicula

TUOZO and another employee against Luegos appointment.

Mar. 22, 1984 CSC found that Tuozo was better qualified for the
Administrative Officer II position. Luegos appointment was revoked.

June 28, 1984 Then-Mayor Ronald Duterte appointed Tuozo to the position.

Luego filed the present petition to assail the CSC order revoking his
appointment.

ISSUE (HELD): W/N the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent

appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the
latter? (NO)

RATIO

LUEGOS APPOINTMENT WAS PERMANENT IN NATURE

OSG: Luegos appointment was temporary and could thus be withdrawn at

will. By accepting temporary appointment, Luego should be deemed to have
waived his security of tenure.

SC: While the OSG correctly stated the rule on temporary appointments, the
rule has no application here since Luegos appointment is PERMANENT.

The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the
character of the appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent" in
the space provided for in Luegos appointment paper (CS Form 33).

What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the
appointment itself. And what made the approval temporary was the fact that
it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the
verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position.

CSC NOT EMPOWERED TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF AN APPOINTMENT

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind of nature of the

appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of
the Civil Service Law.

When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws.

The approval is more appropriately called an attestation of the fact that the
appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named. Such
attestation is required merely as a check to assure compliance with Civil
Service laws. (In re Arcega)

The power of the CSC to approve and disapprove appointments under

Art. V, 9(h) of the old Civil Service Decree only pertains to the function of
the CSC to check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate
civil service eligibility or the required qualifications.

If the appointee has the qualifications, his appointment is approved if not, it

is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the
Commission when it acts on or as the Decree says, "approves" or
"disapproves" an appointment made by the proper authorities. In this respect
the provision is rather misleading.

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed

by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is
a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide.

EXCEPTION: When the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to

the approval of another office or body, e.g., the Commission on
Appointments. In such cases, the appointment is completed only after
confirmation or approval from the approving entity.

The CoA can even review the wisdom of the appointment and can refuse to
concur even of the appointee has all the requisite qualifications under the
law.

The CSC has no such power under the Civil Service Decree. Its authority is
limited to a non-discretionary one, i.e., to determine if the appointee meets
all the conditions required by the law.
CAB: By admitting that Luego and Tuozo were both qualified for the
Administrative Officer II position, the CSC has rendered itself functus officio.
It had nothing else to do but affirm the validity of Luegos appointment. CSC
had no authority to revoke Luegos appointment simply because it thinks
Tuozo is more qualified. That would constitute encroachment of the
discretion vested in the City Mayor.

Rule V, Section 91, of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies
is inapplicable because neither Luego nor Tuozo is next-in-rank. Moreover,
the rule is not absolute and the Civil Service Decree allows vacancies to be
filled by transfer of present employees, reinstatement, reemployment, or
appointment of outsiders who have the appropriate eligibility.

The political detachment of the civil service will be impaired if the security of
tenure clause in the

Constitution is emasculated and appointments in the civil service are

revoked and changed at will to suit the motivations and even the fancies of
whatever party may be in power.

DISPOSITION: Granted. Assailed CSC Order set aside.

The pertinent part provides: "whenever there are two or more employees
who are next-in-rank, preference shall be given to the employee who is most
competent and qualified and who has the appropriate civil service eligibility.

Citation: Leyson v Ombudsman

Facts:

1
On 7 February 1996 International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITTC), a
domestic corporation engaged in the lighterage or shipping business,
entered into a one (1)-year contract with Legaspi Oil Company, Inc. (LEGASPI
OIL), Granexport Manufacturing Corporation (GRANEXPORT) and United
Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNITED COCONUT), comprising the Coconut
Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) companies, for the transport of coconut oil in
bulk through MT Transasia. The majority shareholdings of these CIIF
companies are owned by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as
administrator of the CIIF. Under the terms of the contract, either party could
terminate the agreement provided a three (3)-month advance notice was
given to the other party. However, in August 1996, or prior to the expiration
of the contract, the CIIF companies with their new President, respondent
Oscar A. Torralba, terminated the contract without the requisite advance
notice. The CIIF companies engaged the services of another vessel, MT
Marilag, operated by Southwest Maritime Corporation.

On 11 March 1997 petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., Executive Vice President

of ITTC, filed with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance
case against respondent Oscar A. Torralba. The following is a summary of the
irregularities and corrupt practices allegedly committed by respondent
Torralba: (a) breach of contract - unilateral cancellation of valid and existing
contract; (b) bad faith - falsification of documents and reports to stop the
operation of MT Transasia; (c) manipulation - influenced their insurance to
disqualify MT Transasia; (d) unreasonable denial of requirement imposed; (e)
double standards and inconsistent in favor of MT Marilag; (f) engaged and
entered into a contract with Southwest Maritime Corp. which is not the owner
of MT Marilag, where liabilities were waived and whose paid-up capital is only
P250,000.00; and, (g) overpricing in the freight rate causing losses of
millions of pesos to Cocochem.
On 2 January 1998 petitioner charged respondent Tirso Antiporda, Chairman
of UCPB and CIIF Oil Mills, and respondent Oscar A. Torralba with violation of
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act also before the Ombudsman
anchored on the aforementioned alleged irregularities and corrupt practices.

On 30 January 1998 public respondent dismissed the complaint based on its

finding that

The case is a simple case of breach of contract with damages which should
have been filed in the regular court. This Office has no jurisdiction to
determine the legality or validity of the termination of the contract entered
into by CIIF and ITTC. Besides the entities involved are private corporations
(over) which this Office has no jurisdiction.

On 4 June 1998 reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint was denied.

Petitioners Contention:

Petitioner now imputes grave abuse of discretion on public respondent in

dismissing his complaint. He submits that inasmuch as Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. PCGG and Republic v.
Sandiganbayan have declared that the coconut levy funds are public funds
then, conformably with Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, corporations formed and
organized from those funds or whose controlling stocks are from those funds
should be regarded as government owned and/or controlled corporations. As
in the present case, since the funding or controlling interest of the
companies being headed by private respondents was given or owned by the
CIIF as shown in the certification of their Corporate Secretary, it follows that
they are government owned and/or controlled corporations. Corollarily,
petitioner asserts that respondents Antiporda and Torralba are public officers
subject to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.

Petitioner admits that his motion for reconsideration was filed out of time.
Nonetheless, he advances that public respondent should have relaxed its
rules in the paramount interest of justice; after all, the delay was just a
matter of days and he, a layman not aware of technicalities, personally filed
the complaint.

Respondents contention:

Private respondents counter that the CIIF companies were duly organized
and are existing by virtue of the Corporation Code. Their stockholders are
private individuals and entities. In addition, private respondents contend that
they are not public officers as defined under The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act but are private executives appointed by the Boards of Directors
of the CIIF companies. They asseverate that petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was filed through the expert assistance of a learned counsel.
They then charge petitioner with forum shopping since he had similarly filed
a case for collection of a sum of money plus damages before the trial court.

The Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the Ombudsman approved
the recommendation of the investigating officer to dismiss the complaint
because he sincerely believed there was no sufficient basis for the criminal
indictment of private respondents.
Issue: W/N there was grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman

Held: We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman.

COCOFED v. PCGG referred to in Republic v. Sandiganbayan reviewed the
history of the coconut levy funds. I These funds actually have four (4)
general classes: (a) the Coconut Investment Fund created under R. A. No.
6260; (b) the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund created under P. D. No.
276; (c) the Coconut Industry Development Fund created under P. D. No. 582;
and, (d) the Coconut Industry Stabilization Fund created under P. D. No.
1841.

The various laws relating to the coconut industry were codified in 1976. On
21 October of that year, P. D. No. 961was promulgated. On 11 June 1978 it
was amended by P. D. No. 1468 by inserting a new provision authorizing the
use of the balance of the Coconut Industry Development Fund for the
acquisition of "shares of stocks in corporations organized for the purpose of
engaging in the establishment and operation of industries x x x commercial
activities and other allied business undertakings relating to coconut and
other palm oil indust(ries)." From this fund thus created, or the CIIF, shares of
stock in what have come to be known as the "CIIF companies" were
purchased.

We then stated in COCOFED that the coconut levy funds were raised by the
State's police and taxing powers such that the utilization and proper
management thereof were certainly the concern of the Government. These
funds have a public character and are clearly affected with public interest.
In the present case, all three (3) corporations comprising the CIIF companies
were organized as stock corporations. The UCPB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the
shares of LEGASPI OIL, 91.24% of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85% of
the shares of UNITED COCONUT. Obviously, the below 51% shares of stock in
LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned or
controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to GRANEXPORT
and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite. Unfortunately,
it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his contentions. There
is no showing that GRANEXPORT and/ or UNITED COCONUT was vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in
nature unlike PETROPHIL in Quimpo. The Court thus concludes that the CIIF
companies are, as found by public respondent, private corporations not
within the scope of its jurisdiction.

With the foregoing conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other

issues raised by petitioner.

A brief note on private respondents' charge of forum shopping. Executive

Secretary v. Gordon is instructive that forum shopping consists of filing
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. It is readily apparent that the present charge will not prosper
because the cause of action herein, i. e., violation of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, is different from the cause of action in the case
pending before the trial court which is collection of a sum of money plus
damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of public respondent

Office of the Ombudsman of 30 January 1998 which dismissed the complaint
of petitioner Manuel M. Leyson Jr., as well as its Order of 4 June 1998 denying
his motion for reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Citation: Baluyot v Holganza

Facts: During a spot audit conducted on March 21, 1977 by a team of

auditors from the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) headquarters, a cash
shortage of P154,350.13 was discovered in the funds of its Bohol chapter.
The chapter administrator, petitioner Francisca S. Baluyot, was held
accountable for the shortage. Thereafter, on January 8, 1998, private
respondent Paul E. Holganza, in his capacity as a member of the board of
directors of the Bohol chapter, filed an affidavit-complaint before the Office
of the Ombudsman charging petitioner of malversation under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was docketed as OMB-VIS-CRIM-98-
0022. However, upon recommendation by respondent Anna Marie P.
Militante, Graft Investigation Officer I, an administrative docket for
dishonesty was also opened against petitioner; hence, OMB-VIS-ADM-98-
0063.

On February 6, 1998, public respondent issued an Order3 requiring petitioner

to file her counter-affidavit to the charges of malversation and dishonesty
within ten days from notice, with a warning that her failure to comply would
be construed as a waiver on her part to refute the charges, and that the case
would be resolved based on the evidence on record. On March 14, 1998,
petitioner filed her counter-affidavit,4 raising principally the defense that
public respondent had no jurisdiction over the controversy. She argued that
the Ombudsman had authority only over government-owned or controlled
corporations, which the PNRC was not, or so she claimed.

On August 21, 1998, public respondent issued the first assailed Order5
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. It further scheduled a clarificatory
hearing on the criminal aspect of the complaint and a preliminary conference
on its administrative aspect on September 2, 1998. Petitioner received the
order on August 26, 1998 and she filed a motion for reconsideration6 the
next day.

Issue: W/N Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
controversy since the PNRC is allegedly a private voluntary organization.

Held:

We dismiss the petition.

Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the controversy since the PNRC is allegedly a private voluntary
organization. The following circumstances, she insists, are indicative of the
private character of the organization: (1) the PNRC does not receive any
budgetary support from the government, and that all money given to it by
the latter and its instrumentalities become private funds of the organization;
(2) funds for the payment of personnel's salaries and other emoluments
come from yearly fund campaigns, private contributions and rentals from its
properties; and (3) it is not audited by the Commission on Audit. Petitioner
states that the PNRC falls under the International Federation of Red Cross, a
Switzerland-based organization, and that the power to discipline employees
accused of misconduct, malfeasance, or immorality belongs to the PNRC
Secretary General by virtue of Section "G", Article IX of its by-laws.
She threatens that "to classify the PNRC as a government-owned or
controlled corporation would create a dangerous precedent as it would lose
its neutrality, independence and impartiality . . . .

Clearly then, public respondent has jurisdiction over the matter, pursuant to
Section 13, of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman
Act of 1989", to wit:

Sec. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in
ever case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service
by the Government to the people.11

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against

petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Citation: MPSTA v Sec. of Education

Facts:

The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-called
"mass action" undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them
members of the petitioning associations in both cases, on September 17,
1990 to "dramatize and highlight" the teachers' plight resulting from the
alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time
and again been brought to the latter's attention.

The petition in G.R. No. 95590 alleges in great detail the character and
origins of those grievances as perceived by the petitioners, and the attempts
to negotiate their correction; these are more briefly, but quite adequately
and with no sacrifice of relevant content, set forth in the petition in G.R. No.
954451, portions of which are quoted hereunder without necessarily
affirming their objective truth or correctness:

3. Together with other teachers embracing the Teachers and Employees

Consultative Council (TECC) and the Alliance of Concerned Teachers, the
petitioners, in accordance with their Constitution and By-Laws, resolved to
engage in mass concerted actions, after peaceful dialogues with the heads of
the Department of the Budget and Management, Senate and House of
Representatives in public hearings as well as after exhausting all
administrative remedies, to press for, among other things, the immediate
payment of due chalk, clothing allowances, 13th month pay for 1989 arising
from the implementation of the Salary Standardization Law, the recall of
DECS Order 39 s. 1990 directing the oversizing of classes and overloading of
teachers pursuant to the cost-cutting measures of the government, the
hiring of 47,000 new teachers to ease the overload of existing teachers, the
return of the additional 1% real property taxes collected by local government
units to education purposes to be administered by the Local School Boards,
and consequent recall of DBM Circulars Nos. 904 and 9011 and local budget
circular No. 47 consistent with RA 5447 and the new Constitution mandating
that education shall enjoy the highest budgetary priority in the national
budget, and other equally important demands; The dialogues and
conferences initiated by the petitioners and other teacher organizations were
as early as March 14, 1989, March 14, 1990, April 23, 1990, May 28, 1990,
June 5, 1990, September 3, 1990 and September 14, 1990 with the Civil
Service Commission, the Senate and House of Representatives, Department
of Budget and Management and the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, but all these did not result in the granting of the demands of the
petitioners, leaving them with no other recourse but to take direct mass
action such as the one they engaged in three weeks ago.

4. On September 14, 1990, the petitioners and other teachers in other cities
and municipalities in Metro Manila, staged a protest rally at the DECS
premises without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to
negotiate the granting of demands. No response was made by the
respondent Secretary of Education, despite the demonstration, so the
petitioners began the ongoing protest mass actions on September,
17,1990. ...

September 17, 1990 fell on a Monday, which was also a regular school day.
There is no question that the some 800 teachers who joined the mass action
did not conduct their classes on that day; instead, as alleged in the petition
in G.R. No. 95590, 4 they converged at the Liwasang Bonifacio in the
morning whence they proceeded to the National Office of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sport (DECS) for a whole-day assembly. At about 1:00
o'clock p.m., three representatives of the group were allowed to see the
respondent Secretary of Education who "brushed aside their grievances,"
warned them that they would lose their jobs for going on illegal and
unauthorized mass leave. Upon leaving said respondent's presence, they
were handed an order directing all participants in the mass action to return
to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS
officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did
not comply and to hire their replacements.
On the record, what did happen was that, based on reports submitted by the
principals of the various public schools in Metro Manila, the respondent
Secretary of Education had filed motu proprio administrative complaints
against the teachers who had taken part in the mass actions and defied the
return-to-work order on assorted charges like grave misconduct, gross
neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, absence without
official leave, etc., and placed them under 90-day preventive suspension.
The respondents were served copies of the charge sheets and given five (5)
days to submit answer or explanation. Later, on October 8, 1990, the
respondent Secretary constituted an investigating committee of four (4) to
determine and take the appropriate course of action on the formal charges
and designated the special prosecutors on detail with the DECS to handle
their prosecution during the formal hearings.

On October 11, 1990, the respondent Secretary of Education rendered the

first of his now questioned decisions on the administrative complaints. In
Case No. DECS 90-002, he found twenty (20) respondent teachers guilty of
the charges preferred against them and dismissed them from office, effective
immediately. 8 In the other investigations that followed and as of December
3, 1990, 658 teachers were dismissed, 40 were suspended for one (1) year,
33 for nine (9) months, and 122 for six (6) months; 398 were exonerated. 9

Earlier, on September 19, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 95445 had filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 18, a petition 10 for
prohibition, declaratory relief and preliminary mandatory injunction to
restrain the implementation of the return-to-work order of September 17,
1990 and the suspension or dismissal of any teacher pursuant thereto and to
declare said order null and void. Issuance ex-parte of a temporary restraining
order was sought, but seeing no compelling reason therefor, the Regional
Trial Court instead set the application for preliminary injunction for hearing,
and heard the same, on September 24, 1990. Thereafter and following the
submission of memorandums by the parties, said Court rendered judgment
declaring the assailed return-to-work order valid and binding, and dismissing
the petition for lack of merit. 11

Issue: W/N public teachers can go on strike

Held:

The Court has not since been presented with any consideration of law or
established fact that would impair the validity of these postulates or preclude
continued reliance thereon for the purpose of resolving the present petitions
on their merits.

The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the petitioners have a
right to strike, which it is clear they do not, however justifiable their reasons,
nor whether or not there was in fact such a strike, it being equally evident
from the pleadings that there was, and there being no dispute about this.
What therefore, is brought before the Court is the question of whether or not
any rights of the petitioners under the due process clause of the Constitution
as it applies to administrative proceedings were violated in the initiation,
conduct, or disposition of the investigations complained of.

Indeed, what the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 proclaim about denial of due
process being their "paramount complaint" ... "central to their prayer for
interlocutory relief' 20 could as well be said of the merits of their main cause
as of their plea for a restraining order pendente lite or a preliminary
injunction.

There are, however, insuperable obstacles to the Court's taking up that issue
and resolving it in these cases. Said issue is not ripe for adjudication by this
Court in the exercise of its review jurisdiction; and this, for the obvious
reason that it is one of fact. The petitions and subsequent pleadings of the
petitioners allege facts and circumstances which, it is claimed, show denial
of due process, citing as supposedly "representative samples" among others:
(a) that teachers were dismissed on the sole basis of unsworn reports of their
principals and without evidence of their alleged failure to obey the return-to-
work order; (b) that the charge sheets failed to specify the particular charges
or offenses allegedly committed; (c) that some teachers were not furnished
sworn complaints, and others were suspended without any formal charges;
(d) that teachers who attempted to return within a reasonable time after
notice of the return-to-work order were not accepted back; and similar
allegations.

It is not for the Court, which is not a trier of facts, as the petitioners who
would now withdraw correctly put it, to make the crucial determination of
what in truth transpired concerning the disputed incidents. Even if that were
within its competence, it would be at best a monumental task. At any rate,
the petitioners cannot-as it seems they have done lump together into what
amounts to a class action hundreds of individual cases, each with its own
peculiar set of facts, and expect a ruling that would justly and correctly
resolve each and everyone of those cases upon little more than general
allegations, frontally disputed as already pointed out, of incidents supposedly
"representative" of each case or group of cases.

This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme Court,
especially when numerous parties desparately situated as far as the facts are
concerned gather under the umbrella of a common plea, and generalization
of what should be alleged with particularity becomes unavoidable. The
petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings
but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein,
see those proceedings through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to
the Civil Service Commission; or if, pending said proceedings, immediate
recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary because the
respondent Secretary or those acting under him or on his instructions were
acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion,
to apply, not directly to the Supreme Court, but to the Regional Trial Court,
where there would be an opportunity to prove the relevant facts warranting
corrective relief.

Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper order of recourse

through the judicial hierarchy; they by-pass the rungs of the judicial ladder at
the peril of their own causes.

WHEREFORE, both petitioners are DISMISSED, without prejudice to any

appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil
Service Commission on the matters complained of. The motions to withdraw,
supra, are merely NOTED, this disposition rendering any express ruling
thereon unnecessary. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Citation: Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association

vs.

Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989

Facts:

The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the
unionsdemands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed
before the courtaction for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a
temporary restrainingorder pending the resolution of the application for
preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the
courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that
the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter
since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The Social Security System
contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil
Servicelaws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not
covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners
from striking.

Issue:

Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.

Ruling:

The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice

provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct
peacefulconcerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O
No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to
any legislation that may be enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum
Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that
prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by
government employees enjoinsunder pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employeesfrom staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the
absence of any legislation allowing government employees tostrike they are
prohibited from doing so.
Citation: Bitonio, Jr. v COA

FACTS: Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio Jr., petitioner, was appointed Director IV

of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and
Employment. He was designated by Acting Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of the
Department of Labor and Employment to be the DOLE representative to the
Board of Directors of Philippine Economic Zone Authority. Due to his
designation, he receives per diems from PEZA for every meeting he
attended. On July 31, 1998, COA, the respondent, disallowed the payment
due to the principle established in Civil Liberties case stating that Cabinet
members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to
their primary office and to receive compensation therefore is
unconstitutional.

On November 24, 1998, the petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration to
the COA on the following grounds:

The SC Resolution dated August 2, 1991 on the motion for clarification2 filed
by the Solicitor General modified its earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union
case which limits the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries
2 The clarification was the Courts action on the motion for clarification filed in Civil Liberties Union v.The
Executive Secretary, and revises the main opinion promulgated on February 22, 1991 (194 SCRA 317)
totally invalidating Executive Order No. 284 dated July 25, 1987 (whose questioned Section 1 states:
Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in
addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not
apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the
Chairman.). The clarifying dictum now considered Executive Order No. 284 partly valid to the extent that
it included in its coverage other appointive officials aside from the members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, with the dispositive part of the clarificatory resolution of
August1, 1991 stating: WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are
GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void insofar as it allows a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary to hold other positions in the government and government-
owned and controlled corporations.
and their assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary,
Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other appointive officials below
the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition;

Section 11 of RA No. 7916 provides the legal basis for the movant to receive
per diem. Said law was enacted in 1995, 4 years after the Civil Liberties
Union case became final. In expressly authorizing per diems, Congress
should be conclusively presumed to have been aware of the parameters of
the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties Union case.

The motion was denied by COA, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received
by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings
as representative of the Secretary of Labor.

RULING: YES. The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely
by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since
the Secretary is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional
office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who
sat on behalf of the Secretary. We cannot allow the petitioner who sat as
representative of the Secretary of Labor in PEZA to have a better right than
his principal. The contention that RA 7916 as a legal basis has no merit since
such law was amended by RA 8748 where provisions in conflict with the law,
specifically the payment of per diem, was deleted.
Citation: Cayetano vs. Monsod

FACTS:

COMELEC QUALITIFACTION: member of the Philippine Bar who have been

engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.

No jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as legal qualification

to an appointive office.

Practice of Law: render services requiring knowledge and application of legal

principles and technique to serve interest of another with consent.

i. Not limited to appearing in court, advising and assisting in conduct of

litigation but embraces preparation of pleadings and other papers, legal
instruments of all kinds and giving of all legal advice to clients.

ii. Not limited to conduct of cases in court.

iii. Considering practicing law, when engages in business of advising

person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law or
appears in a representative capacity.

iv. Requires application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and

experience.

MONSOD NOMINATED BY PRES. CORY AQUINO AS COMELEC CHAIRMAN.

Opposed because did not practice law for 10 years.

i. Assumed office as chairman

ii. Been paying professional license fee as lawyer for more than 10 years.

iii. Worked for his fathers firm after graduating from UP; operations officer
in World Bank Group; chief executive officer and business conglomerate
MERALCO; legal and economic consultant; secretary-general and chairman
NAMFREL.

Issue

1. Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of

Chairman of the COMELEC.

2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse

of discretion in confirming Monsods appointment.

Held

1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in courtIn general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill. In general, a practice of law requires a
lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court.

A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: . . . for

valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than 10 years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the
Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution. The
power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it is so
vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the
SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA.

Citation: Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo Pacificador

Due Process impartial and competent court

FACTS:

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be
members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier
complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud,
tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and
intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same
complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the
provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On
June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately
convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the
case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation
made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been
made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had
seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election
must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of
the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of
Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but
the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb
1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then
moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of
Javiers death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of
Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor.
The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster
that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that
his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They
should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who
shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go
to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will
not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance

with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for
equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a
court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already
made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to
make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script.
There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his
conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed,
on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Canicosa v COMELEC

Facts:

Ricardo Boy Canicosa and Severino Lajara were candidates for Mayor in
Calamba, Laguna during the 8 May 1995 elections. Lajara was proclaimed
winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

On 15 May Canicosa filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Declare Failure of

Election and to Declare Null and Void the Canvass and Proclamation because
of alleged widespread frauds and anomalies. However, the COMELEC en banc
dismissed the petition on the ground that the allegations therein did not
justify a declaration of failure of election.

Issue: W/N a COMELEC division should have first heard the petition before
deciding on it en banc on a motion for reconsideration.

Held: NO. Section 3, Article IX-C applies only when the COMELEC acts in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions and not when it merely
exercises purely administrative functions. Moreover, it is expressly provided
in Rule 27, Section 7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that any party
dissatisfied with the ruling of the board of canvassers shall have a right to
appeal to the COMELEC en banc. Questions as to whether elections have
been held or whether certain returns were falsified or manufactured and
therefore should be excluded from the canvass do not involve the right to
vote. Such questions are properly within the administrative jurisdiction of
COMELEC, hence, may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC en banc
without having to pass through any of its divisions.

There are only three instances where a failure of election may be declared:
namely:

The election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes;

The election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or

After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes.

The question of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters involves the
right to vote which is not within the power and authority of COMELEC to rule
upon. The determination of whether one has the right to vote is a justiciable
issue properly cognizable by our regular courts.

It is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers that the

COMELEC is mandated to hear and decide cases first by Division and then,
upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it is
jurisdictional.
 The COMELEC exercises direct and immediate supervision and control over
national and local officials or employees, including members of any national
or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government
required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. Its
power to direct supervision and control includes the power to review, modify,
or set aside any act of such national and local officials. It exercises
immediate supervision over the members of the boards of election
inspectors and canvassers. Its statutory power of supervision and control
includes the power to revise, reverse, or set aside the action of the boards,
as well as to do what the boards should have done, even if questions relative
thereto have not been elevated to it by an aggrieved party, for such power
includes the authority to initiate motu proprio or by itself such steps or
actions as may be required pursuant to law.

Citation: Aruelo, Jr. v CA

GR No. 107852 October 20, 1993

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:chanrobles virtual law library

1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under- privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

FACTS:

(1) Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992
elections for the office of the Vice- Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas,
Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won over Aruelo by a margin of four votes,
such that on May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
him as the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan.

(2) On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition docketed as SPC No. 92-130, seeking to annul
Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of "fraudulent alteration and
tampering" of votes in the tally sheets and the election returns.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion by declaring that

Gatchalians answer with counter- protest and counterclaim was timely filed

HELD:

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No. Petitioner filed the
election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are
governed by the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the
regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of
particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC.
Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides: Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except
Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the
Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases
cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction. It must be noted that
nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that
motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests
or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts. Constitutionally
speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain
pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme
Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

RATIO:
An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival
candidates for an office. Over and above the desire of the candidates to win,
is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the people. For
this reason, it is a well-established principle that laws governing election
protests must be

liberally construed to the end that the popular will, ex pressed in the election
of public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated

Citation: National Press Club v. COMELEC

207 SCRA 1-March 5, 1992

Ponente: Feliciano

consolidated petitions, with the common question: the constitutionality of

11(b), of RA6646

Petitoners: representatives of mass media which are prevented from

selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; 2 candidates
for office (1 national, 1 provincial) in the coming May 1992 elections;
taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election
issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. (I will refer to
these folks as Petitoners (P))
Facts: Petitioners argument:

That 11(b), of RA6646 invades and violated the constitutional guarantees

comprising freedom of expression;

That the prohibition imposed by 11(b) amounts to censorship, because it

selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal
sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based
election or political propaganda during the election pd. of 1992;

That the prohibition is in derogation of medias role, function and duty to

provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant
to election issues;

That 11(b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those
appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of
radio and tv broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the
quantity or volume of info concerning candidates and issues in the election,
thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to info and opinion.

Issue: WON 11(b) of RA 6646 has gone beyond the permissible supervision
or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional
repression of freedom of speech & freedom of the press

SC says: Nope. It has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision
or regulation of media operations during election periods.

Ratio:

The assailed statute

The statutory text the P want to strike down as unconstitutional is 11(b) of

RA 6646, aka the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
 Section 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda-in addition to the forms
of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, it shall be unlawful;

(b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television

station, other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to
sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other
political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90
and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer, or personality who is candidate for any elective
public office shall take a leave of absence from his work as such during the
campaign period.

11(b) of RA 6646 should be taken together with Sections 90 & 92 of BP 881

aka Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. (for the full text, see p. 7)

90 refers to the Comelec space- space in the newspaper to be

allocated equally and impartially to all the candidates within the area of
coverage, free of charge

92 refers to the Comelec time air time in radio and tv to be

allocated equally and impartially to all the candidates within the area of
coverage, free of charge.

Objective of the statute

Objective of 11(b)-to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich

and poor candidates by preventing the rich from enjoying undue advantage
offered by huge campaign war chests.

It prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time for campaign or
other political purposes except to Comelec.
90&92 of the OEC on the other hand, require the Comelec to procure
Comelec space and Comelec time to be allocated to all candidates for free.

No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective

sought to be secured by 11(b) of RA 6646 in relation to 90&92 of the OEC.

The objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like

ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between
the economic elite and the rest of the society.

It is important to note, that the objective, is not only a legitimate one, it has
also been given constitutional status by the terms of Art. IX(C)(4) of the 1987
Consti.

Art. IX-C, Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits
for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its
subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, and equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

Anent Constitutionality of 11(b)

The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Cosnti to supervise or

regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the
operation of media of communication and info.
The fundamental purpose of such supervision or regulation has been
spelled out in the Consti as the ensuring of equal opportunity, time, and
space, and the right to reply, as well as uniform and reasonable rates of
charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with public info
campaigns and forums among candidates.

It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which
enshrines the freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of the
press3, has to be taken in conjunction with Art. IX (C) (4) which may be seen
to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period, i.e.
during election pd.

The rights of free speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are
not the only important and relevant values even in the most democratic of
polities.

In our own society, equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office,
without regard to ones financial capacity, is clearly an important value.

One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Art. II, 26, Consti,
is the egalitarian demand that the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law.

The technical effect of Art. IX(C)(4) of the Consti, may be seen to be that no
presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or
regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing
equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such
supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free
speech and free press.

Supervision and regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely

conceivable without accompanying limitations.

3 Art. III, Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
Thus the time-honored rule: A statute is presumed to be constitutional and
that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of
clearly and convincingly proving that assertion.

It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of speech

and freedom of the press of 11(b) is circumscribed by certain important
limitations:

11(b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. It is

limited to election periods.

11(b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis shows that it purports to

apply only to the purchase and sale, incl. purchase and sale disguised as a
donation, of print space and air time for campaign purposes or other political
purposes.

It does not purport in any way to restrict reporting by newspapers or radio or

tv stations of news or newsworthy events relating to candidates, their
qualifications, political parties and govt programs.

It does not restrict commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by

reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. with respect to candidates, their
qualifications, etc.

This is what distinguishes this case from Sanidad v. Comelec-

There, the provision prohibiting columnists, commentators or announcers
from campaigning for their candidate was declared by SC as unconstitutional
because nothing in the consti gave Comelec the power to regulate their acts,
as they are not franchise holders nor candidates.

It does not prohibit purchase by or donation to the Comelec of print space or

air time. And Comelec is required to allocate the same equally and
impartially to all the candidates.
 Re apprehension on possibility of abuse: Angara v.
Electoral Commission: the possibility of abuse is no argument against the
concession of power or authority involved, for there is no power or authority
in human society that is not susceptible of being abused.

If the Comelec fails to do its duty (procure print space or

air time), then candidates can seek judicial relief.

In Summary, 11(b)

Does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion, or commentary about
candidates, their qualifications, and platforms and promises

Does not authorize any intervention and much less control on the content of
the normal operations of the media

Does not prohibit Comelec from procuring print space and air time for the
candidates.

Whatever limitation 11(b) entails bears a clear and reasonable connection

with the objective set out in Art. IX(C)(4) and Art. II(26) of the Consti.

Anent Cruzs assigned flaw-that it still does not restrict the rich candidate
from spending on other campaign activities.

A regulatory measure that is less than perfectly comprehensive or which

does not completely obliterate the evil sought to be remedied, is not for that
reason alone constitutionally infirm.

The Consti does not, and cannot exact perfection in governmental regulation.
All it requires, in accepted doctrine, is that the regulatory measure under
challenge bear a reasobable nexus with the constitutionality sanctioned
objective.

Anent invasion of privacy

Plus, super daming paid campaigns constitute invasion of privacy of the

general electorate. Kaya daw ok lang to control especially the rich who can
afford to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements.

The right of the general listening and viewing public to be free form such
intrusions and their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of
the candidates to advertise themselves.

Held: Petitions DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Citation: Flores VS COMELEC

Facts:

The petitioner, Roque Flores, was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as

having received the highest number of votes for kagawad in Brgy. Poblacion,
Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay pursuant to Sec 5 RA 6679.
He was voted punong barangay during the elections, a separate position as
that of Kagawad. The private respondent, Nobelito Rapisora, protected the
result and filed a protect before the MCTC Tayum. He argued that the ballot,
which only indicated Flores, should be declared stray votes and should not
be divided equally to them. In his defense, the petitioner argued that in
accordance with the Omnibus Election Code, the 4 questioned votes should
be entitled to him under the equity of the incumbent rule, which states that if
there are 2 or more candidates with the same full name and one of them is
an incumbent and the ballot is written only on such full name, the vote is
counted in favor of the incumbent. The lower court sustained the contention
of the private respondent and subsequently declared him as the punong
barangay. Hence this petition. The petitioner argued that by not following the
rule stated, he is deprived of his right to equal protection of the law since he
is also an incumbent punong barangay running for election, thereby he
should be entitled by the rule.

Issue: Was the petitioner considered an incumbent to be entitled under the

rule?

Held: No. Under the new rule Resolution 2022- A passed by the Comelec,
Barangay Captains who filed their candidacy for the office of Kagawad, which
is another office, shall be deemed resigned in their former office. In his filing
of candidacy, it stated that he is running for kagawad and not as a punong
barangay. Thus, pursuant to the resolution, he deemed to resign his position
as punong barangay when he filed for his candidacy as a kagawad. The rule
cannot thus then be applied to the petitioner since pursuant to the
resolution, he is not considered as an incumbent punong barangay, he is not
within the same class as that of the incumbents. The court cannot sustain
the argument of the petitioner that since RA 669 speaks of 7 candidates for
kagawad, the foremost of them is the punong barangay, he should be
regarded as running for the same office.
Garces v CA

FACTS:

Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del

Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar
Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte.

Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of

office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did not request
for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations
to assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so because of a
Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador
Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office as the same is not
vacant.

Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service

Department, with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on
construction of polling booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R.
Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte which Garces interpreted to mean as
superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued
occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his
appointment to Liloy.

Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and
Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize
respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that
the appointments of Garces be cancelled.

Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the
same was rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution,
and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be
raised only on certiorari before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC,
else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution
contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.

RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo
warranto is the proper remedy, and (2) that the cases or matters referred
under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of
elections.

CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?

HELD:

No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.

Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:

Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members

any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission
itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.

This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the
COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELECs resolution that triggered
this Controversy.

The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something

within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election
dispute. The settled rule is that decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC
that may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A
are those that relate to the COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers involving elective regional, provincial and city officials.

In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an appointee

to occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the
operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not
an elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.

To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative
questions that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests
with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions.

*Petition denied
Citation: Philippine Airlines v COA

Facts:

PAL is a domestic corp, engaged in the air transport business.

Majority of stocks are GSIS owned

Usually, PAL would use a system of bidding to get fuel

60% of fuel purchases awarded to the lowest bidder

40% to second lowest bidder

Petron, Caltex, Shell were usual bidders

COA told PAL to stop the bidding and only get from Petron

Based on DO 19 requiring GOCC to only get from Petron

PAL sought reconsideration, saying DO 19 should not include PAL because:

Bidding ensured the best fuel price

Petron alone might not be sufficient for PALs fuel needs

COA denied. Told PAL to just negotiate with Petron. Hence, petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not DO 19 should cover PAL

Held:

SC ruled that:

DO 19 really included PAL (GSIS owns stocks)

HOWEVER, COA committed GADALEJ in not exempting PAL

The reasons that PAL gave were really persuasive. They had more weight
than the policy enunciated in DO 19. It was COAs duty to exempt PAL
because not exempting PAL would lead to unnecessary spending the very
evil sought to be prevented by the creation of COA

Department Order 19 required all GOCCs to get their fuel from Petron. In the
case of PAL v. COA, COA ordered PAL to follow DO 19

The very evil sought to be avoided in the creation of the COA the irregular,
excessive or unconscionable expenditures of the government. Thus, it has
the power and the duty to exempt certain branches from any regulation if,
obedience to it would lead to those kinds of excessive expenditures.

Citation: NHC v COA

Facts:

The Philippine Government forged an agreement on financial cooperation

with the Republic of Germany. The agreement involved the Republic of the
Philippines as Borrower and the National Housing Authority (NHA) as
Project Sponsor, and the Kreditanstalt Fur Weidaraufbau (KWF) as the
lender, for the Urban Housing Dagat-Dagatan Project II.

However, despite all the negotiations and contracts, the Urban Housing
Dagat-Dagatan Project II was not completed as scheduled. Thus an extension
of the contract was made since the NHA did not appear to have much choice.
Several extensions were made which triggered the difficulties experienced
by NHA.

Issue:

WON the COA has authority to disallow a duly entered contract and
substitute its own judgment or disposition in lieu of the decision of the
management or governing body of government entities
Decision:

The COA has been enshrined by the government with powers to "promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds
and properties." It has been recognized in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. COA,
that COA has authority to disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures.

The nature of the terminal phase of the Dagat-Dagatan project does not
require the expertise of a foreign consultant and that the finishing stage
merely requires simple advisory services that can be undertaken by NHA or
DPWH in-house technical staff or at the most a local consultant. Our
Constitution prohibits unnecessary expenses of public funds. The postulates
of our Constitution are not mere platitudes, which we should honor only in
rhetorics but not in reality. The power to contract a foreign loan does not
carry with it the authority to bargain away the ideals of our Constitution.