The Life of the Person

Richard Ostrofsky
(February, 2002)
The concept of a person – what it means to be one – varies greatly from one
culture to another. For us, the person is theoretically a self-interested agent:
a locus of desires, interests, powers and rights, free to “pursue happiness” in
any manner he chooses except as restricted by law. But we should see that
this conception of personhood is not universally shared. Other peoples have
understood the person very differently – as an extrusion and/or instantiation
of the tribe, a locus of debts and obligations, a soul facing the judgment of
God, a player of roles, or just “a face to meet the faces that one meets.”
The stories told of what it means to be a person vary greatly, but the
issues that underlie these stories seem to be much the same everywhere.
Centrally, there is an issue of coherence: We cannot deal with each other as
bundles of desire and impulse, liable to do anything at all at any moment.
We need to rely on each other, and (in our own interests) make ourselves
reliable to others, and this skill of presenting a coherent, intelligible face to
the world is one of that children very early begin to learn. Impulses need to
be controlled; claims need to be asserted and justified; promises need to be
kept; “face” needs to be defined, presented and maintained. From society’s
viewpoint, there must be limits on acceptable behaviour and also sanctions
against transgression. I don’t think there has ever been a human society that
did not value what we call integrity in some form or other, whatever the
local sense of its specific features.
The life of the person unfolds as the history of his or her attempts – as
body, mind and spirit – to maintain and enjoy a system of nourishing
connections to other persons, and to the world at large. Probably the most
important thing to know about any person is how his or her attachment
system works. We might think of this system as a metaphorical umbilical
cord, connecting him to the world and to life. The primary locus of
attachment is, of course, the body itself, but will include attachments of the
spirit, and of the mind as well – a language, a culture, an ideology, and so
forth. Our differing attachment systems are, indeed, the primary vehicles of
individuality. They include our personal memories and thus, our life
histories of education and experience. They include our patterns of
livelihood, friendship, sexual gratification, and all our other strategic
connections and alliances. They include the strategies learned in childhood
for obtaining attention and care from care providers, and for relating to
other people. My point is: The individual person is not to be conceived as a
bundle of arbitrary passions and tastes, but rather as an embedded being,
constrained by tenancy in a human body, and then by a whole gamut of
commitments of spirit and mind. Far from being a completely free self-
creator, a human foetus cannot grow to term in utero without a literal
umbilical cord. Throughout life, neither infant, child nor adult can thrive
without a kind of metaphorical umbilicus providing the material and
psychic nutrients of a human existence. Any person will feel anxiety or
panic when this lifeline is threatened; and will have acquired a repertoire of
behaviours aimed at sustaining, augmenting and defending its flow of
satisfactions.
The idea that people may be conceived primarily in terms of their
attachment systems affords a basis for moral and aesthetic criticism both of
their personal relationships and of prevailing social arrangements. Which
kinds of meanings do these make available to the individual, and which do
they deny? How nutritious is its diet of satisfactions? How reliable is it? At
what price, and with how much injustice are its goods available?
Unlike classical liberal thought, which steadfastly refuses to call the
market game into question, this line of thought raises a whole series of
difficult questions regarding the value to individuals of their participation
and encapsulation by market society. It will ask whether this society offers
its children an acceptable life, a prosperous and balanced life, a life of
meaningful activity. It will ask whether the goods it offers are worth their
price in human effort and expenditure of natural resources. It will ask to
whom it offers these goods. It will ask whether the goods are offered on just
and acceptable terms. In short, it will if the society offers human beings a
life worth living, and whether it can continue to do so for the generations to
come?