1.

Chavez vs JBC

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as
two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is
this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the
crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory
that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term
of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the
system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress,
it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress.

Issue:

1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been met in this case?

2. Is the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?

Held:

1. Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when
these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an
act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to
sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true
that a personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say
that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and
question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the
JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land.
A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the
Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the
positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the
composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for
a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative
of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that
the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a
JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its
composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative
from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It
enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and a representative of
Congress.

The use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal

and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of
the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one
(1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words
of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House
of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into
half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause
disorder and eventually muddle the JBCs voting process, especially in the event a tie is
reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise
mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to
expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to presume
that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word
Congress in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded
because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended
a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually
adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in
the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes

no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable
when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration
of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the
acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar
Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)

2. Jardeleza vs Sereno

Jardeleza vs Sereno
GR 213181 August 19, 2014
Full Text
Facts:
Following Justice Abads compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the application or
recommendations for the position left by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza, the incumbent Sol-Gen at
the time, was included in the list of candidates. However, he was informed through telephone call
from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 or the so-called unanimity rule against him. Generally, the rule is that an applicant is
included in the shortlist when s/he obtains affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of
the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked because an applicants integrity
is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available
on June 30, 2014 before the JBC during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.

Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its supervisory power and direct the JBC
to, among others, give Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written statements of his oppositors or
any documents in the JBC hearings, and to disallow CJ Sereno from participating in the voting
process for nominees on June 30, 2014.

During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and disclosed a confidential
information which, to CJ Sereno, characterized Jardelezas integrity as dubious. Jardeleza
demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying her objections and that he be
afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He also requested deferment of the JBC
proceedings, as the SC en banc has yet to decide in his letter-petition.
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included
in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist of 4 nominees. It was revealed later that
there were actually 5 nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be
included because of the invocation of the unanimity rule..

Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to
include him in the list of nominees on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave
abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify
for the position.

Political Law
Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in JBC proceedings
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not mean that an applicants
access to the rights afforded under the due process clause is discretionary on the part of JBC.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding
being a class of its own, the right to be heard and to explain ones self is availing. In cases where
an objection to an applicants qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither
contradicts the fulfillment of the JBCs duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on
its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process
supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the
truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and
capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the
rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the
side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an
exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the
shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This
consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per se, but
from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By
no means does the Court intend to strike down the unanimity rule as it reflects the JBCs policy
and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on
the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before
the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the
fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process. ##

Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case
Yes. Jardelezas allegations in his petitions merits the exercise of the Courts supervisory authority
over the JBC. Under Sec 8, Art VIII of the Constitution, the JBC shall function under the supervision
of the SC. It follows that such supervisory authority covers the overseeing of whether the JBC
complies with its own rules or not.

Issue 2: W/N a writ of mandamus is available against the JBC

No. The JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something.

Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that
is to be exercised and not that of the court.

Issue 3: W/N a writ of certiorari under Sec 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is available against the
JBC (which is not exercising quasi-judicial functions)
Yes. Under the expanded jurisdiction or expanded power of judicial review vested to the SC by the
1987 Constitution, a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or
instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. ##

3. Villanueva vs JBC

Villanueva vs JBC
GR 211833 April 7, 2015
Full Text

Facts:

After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva applied for the vacant
position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC however informed him that he was not
included in the list of candidates for such position because the JBCs long-standing policy requires 5
years of service as judge of first-level courts before one can apply as judge for second-level courts.
Before the SC, he assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction
the policy of JBC on the ground that it is unconstitutional and was issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Allegedly, the policy also violates procedural due process for lack of publication and non-
submission to the UP Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that
the policy should have been published because it will affect all applying judges.

On the other hand, one of the JBCs arguments was that the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot
issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
function.

Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is constitutional

Yes. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the
judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be
appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great
responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on
the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the
judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and
providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.

Issue 2: W/N JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in laying down such policy

No. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBCs
principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for
appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the
process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants qualifications. In carrying out its main
function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and
law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of
flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but
not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

Issue 3: W/N the violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution

No. The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification created by the challenged
policy satisfies the rational basis test.

Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience and those with
less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined in the assailed
policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The assailed criterion or consideration for
promotion to a second-level court, which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a
direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of
judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards requiring
that a member of the judiciary be of proven competence. In determining competence, the JBC
considers, among other qualifications, experience and performance.

Civil Law

Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published in the ONAR

No. The JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the
ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the
government. Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the Supreme Court, it is not covered
by the publication requirements of the Administrative Code.

Issue 2: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published

Yes. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative
rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect.
Exempted from requirement of publication are interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, and the
so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines
to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations exempted
from the publication requirement. It involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall
determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it
would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection
process involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to
serve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, naturally it follows that potential
applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to
prepare for and comply with them.

Jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus, by analogy,
publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to implement a
constitutional provision requiring proven competence from members of the judiciary.

Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are applicable to JBC (Remedial)

Yes. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach. Under
Rule 65, Sec 1(par 1), the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Consequently, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

Here, the JBC indeed does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither
acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or
quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria is necessary and
incidental to the exercise of the JBCs constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on
whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing and enforcing the said policy.

Issue 2: W/N the remedy of mandamus is proper in assailing the policy of the JBC

No. First, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by

mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC. Second, petitioner
has no clear legal right since there is no law that grants him the right of promotion to second-level
courts.

Issue 3: W/N the remedy of declaratory relief is proper

No. First, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition
specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of
applicants although he failed to meet JBCs five-year requirement policy. Again, no person
possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant
judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a
judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of
candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the
petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.

Second, the SC does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved. The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to BP 129, Sec 19, as amended by R.A. No. 7691.
The SC assumes jurisdiction over the petition only because of the Courts supervisory duty over the
JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power. But in any event, even if the Court will set
aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be dismissed. ##

Issue 4: W/N the Court may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over the JBC separate from the
exercise of its expanded jurisdiction over acts of grave abuse of discretion of government agencies

Brions Separate Concurring Opinion:

4. Funa vs Villar

FUNA VS. VILLAR

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA,

REYNALDO A. VILLAR
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of

Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the COA.

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during

the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated
as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and
appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11,
2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment.
He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the
appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his
office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in
this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold
on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman
accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would
argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to
February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when
he was appointed to that position.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated
February 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III,
signified his intention to step down from office upon the
appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his
position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma.
Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development
has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot
and academic.

Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of

Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant
case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and
academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the
mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo namely:

a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of
paramount public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or
not the following requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an
executive act obtain in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the
court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case

ISSUES:

a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that
body and after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year
term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations
imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1
(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution

HELD:

Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental

importance, since it obviously has far-reaching implications, and
there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar,
and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal
stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum
norm before the so-called non-traditional suitors may be extended
standing to sue, thusly:

a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of

public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
On the substantive issue:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years,
one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy
shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the
commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the
same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner)
or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited
reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.

The Court finds petitioners position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in
regarding the word reappointment as, in context, embracing any
and all species of appointment. The rule is that if a statute or
constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.

The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall

be appointed by the President for a term of seven years, and if he
has served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or
extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner
who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served
the full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the
Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven
years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of
Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to
prevent the president from dominating the Commission by
allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.

On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a
promotional appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as
the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years,
further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that
the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such
promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform
to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission
membership such that the aggregate of the service of the
Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be
appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years
so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission
prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that

explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner
to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated
circumstances or conditions.

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his

promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely
fresh 7- year termfrom February 2008 to February 2015given his
four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past
pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been
divergence of opinion as to the import of the word reappointment,
there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be
a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of
both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A
contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year
service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would
wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had,

under any circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman,
for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not
legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had
already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A
shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be
invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach
the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so
appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term
of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like
respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years
cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became
vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the
predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid
and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more
than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.

To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution, viz:

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional

commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of
the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of
seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the
full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as
this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by
the Constitution.

2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,

resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will
likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2),
Art. IX(D).

3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who

were appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the
entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the
Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission
under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for

less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position
of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the
predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further
that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court
clarifies that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to
Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an
appointment involving a movement to a different position or office
(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment
and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred
under the Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or

designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

6. Della Llana vs COA