G.R. No.

4349 September 24, 1908

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANICETO BARRIAS, defendant-appellant.
Ortigas & Fisher for appellant.
Attorney-General Araneta for appellee.
TRACEY, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila the defendant was charged within a violation of paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of
Customs, duly published in the Official Gazette and approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice. 1 After a demurrer to the complaint of the lighter Maude, he was
moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other
external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows:
No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other
adequate power.
Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the
discretion of the court.
In this court, counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that
if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation
of legislative power.
The Attorney-General does not seek to sustain the conviction but joins with the counsel for the defense in asking for the discharge of the prisoner on the first ground
stated by the defense, that the rule of the Collector cited was unauthorized and illegal, expressly passing over the other question of the delegation of legislative power.
By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively
harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as follows:
SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and
regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.
SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine
Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more
than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the
court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by
both.
Under this statute, which was not referred to on the argument, or in the original briefs, there is no difficulty in sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming
within the terms of section 5. Lighterage, mentioned in the Act, is the very business in which this vessel was engaged, and when heavily laden with hemp she was
navigating the Pasig River below the Bridge of Spain, in the city of Manila. This spot is near the mouth of the river, the docks whereof are used for the purpose of
taking on and discharging freight, and we entertain no doubt that it was in right sense a part of the harbor, without having recourse to the definition of paragraph 8 of
Customs Administrative Circular No. 136, which reads as follows:
The limits of a harbor for the purpose of licensing vessels as herein prescribed (for the lighterage and harbor business) shall be considered to include its
confluent navigable rivers and lakes, which are navigable during any season of the year.
The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region and each
a harbor requires peculiar use more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within the proper scope, are in their nature
police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power.
The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs Administrative
Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for
violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500.
This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question.
One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any
body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws
must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted can not
relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. (Cooley's Constitutional limitations, 6th
ed., p. 137.)
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality
of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. In the case of the United States vs. Breen (40
Fed. Phil. Rep. 402), an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make such rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect improvements of the
Mississipi River, and providing that a violation thereof should constitute a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the misdemeanor was declared not under the
delegated power of the Secretary of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant to him of power to prescribe rules for the use of canals. (U.S. vs.
Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a law authorizing him to require alteration of any bridge and to impose penalties for violations of his rules was held invalid, as vesting
in him upon a power exclusively lodged in Congress (U.S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 406.) The subject is considered and some cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of
the United States, in re Kollock (165 U.S. 526), which upheld the law authorizing a commissioner of internal revenue to designate and stamps on oleomargarine
packages, an improper use of which should thereafter constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court saying (p. 533):
The criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a
mere matter of detail. The regulation was in execution of, or supplementary to, but not in conflict with the law itself. . . .
In Massachusetts it has been decided that the legislature may delegate to the governor and counsel the power to make pilot regulations. (Martin vs. Witherspoon et al.,
135 Mass. 175).
In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company (88 Cal. 491), it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not
impose a penalty under statues authorizing them to do so, the court saying:
Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulation with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the
penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature.
Having reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned, and is sufficient to sustain this prosecution, it is unnecessary that we
should pass on the questions discussed in the briefs as to the extend and validity of the other acts. The reference to them in the complaint is not material, as we have
frequently held that where an offense is correctly described in the complaint an additional reference to a wrong statute is immaterial.
We are also of the opinion that none of the subsequent statutes cited operate to repeal the aforesaid section Act No. 1136.
So much of the judgment of the Court of First Instance as convicts the defendant of a violation of Acts Nos. 355 and 1235 is hereby revoked and is hereby convicted of
a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 25 dollars, with costs of both instances. So ordered.

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FACTS: Defendant Aniceto Barrias was charged in CFI with violations of par. 70 and 83 of Circular no. 397. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows: No
heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.
Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows: For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and
not more than P500, in the discretion of the court. Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it is unauthorized by section
19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void,
as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power. The complaint in this instance was framed with reference to sections 311 and 319 [19 and311] at No. 355 of the
Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos.1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235,
the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof,"
not exceeding a fine of P500. ISSUE: WON Collector of Customs can fix the penalty of a law? HELD: The answer is in the Negative. Although the Collector of
Customs can make and publish rules and regulations but it cannot make the duty of the legislature to fix the penalty of a certain law. It is in this case that it will be an
illegal delegation of power. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that
department to anybody or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the
laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a
duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind
of another.

11 Phil. 327 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies

In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate the business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business involving the
shipping of goods by use of lighters or cascos (small ships/boats). The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules to implement Act No. 1136.
Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it should not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the Collector promulgated Circular No.
397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually powered by bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of
Circular No. 397 because under said Circular, only steam powered ships should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the information against Barrias, it
was alleged that the imposable penalty against him should be a fine not exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court this was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which
provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of
the court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is entirely different from the penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a penalty
of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that time the peso-dollar exchange was more or less equal).
ISSUE: Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is valid.
HELD: No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty different from that specified by Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so, then in
effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to legislate penalties. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to
make laws cannot be delegated by that department to anybody or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only
by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high
prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its substitutes the
judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality
of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. The Collector cannot exercise a power
exclusively lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias should be penalized in accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No. 1136. In this case, the Supreme Court
determined that the proper fine is $25.00.

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Tuason and City Fiscal Diaz for the Government.
De Witt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria and La O, Orense and Belmonte, and Gibbs and McDonough for respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.

LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila
so that this court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs.
Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and
thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case (G. R. No.
41200). 1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the
respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.",
criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the
seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the length of
time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits presented, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934,
rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision
correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation. Upon appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to
seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration
and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on December 17, 1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant
thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November,
1936. This court, on November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration
or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial
court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is
2
innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of
Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same June 18, 1937.
Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution
also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the
Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its
applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or
otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on
the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution with a finding that "las pruebas no han establecido de unamanera concluyente la
culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos los hechos probados no son inconsistentes o incongrentes con su inocencia" and concludes that the herein respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by this court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation for
the reason that:
. . . Si este Juzgado concediera la poblacion solicitada por las circunstancias y la historia social que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de esta resolucion, que
hacen al peticionario acreedor de la misma, una parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias, podria levantarse indignada contra un
sistema de probacion que permite atisbar en los procedimientos ordinarios de una causa criminal perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya
recaidas al traer a la superficie conclusiones enteramente differentes, en menoscabo del interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto
judicial.
On July 3, 1937, counsel for the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention to file a motion
for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on July 13, 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for
reconsideration submitted on July 14, 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on July 31, 1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for
the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by thirty-three (thirty-four) attorneys had just been filed
with the trial court. Attorney Eulalio Chaves whose signature appears in the aforesaid motion subsequently filed a petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as
amicus curiae on the ground that the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng on the evening
of July 30, 1937, and that he signed the same "without mature deliberation and purely as a matter of courtesy to the person who invited me (him)."
On August 6, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of execution of the judgment of this court in said case
and forthwith to commit the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment.
On August 7, 1937, the private prosecution filed its opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae aforementioned, asking that a date be set for a
hearing of the same and that, at all events, said motion should be denied with respect to certain attorneys signing the same who were members of the legal staff of the
several counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng. On August 10, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for
intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on August 14, 1937. On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his
motion for execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved
for the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to
consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae
was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came to this court on extraordinary legal process
to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent
inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by this court on August 21, 1937.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:
I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under probation for the following reason:
(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it
is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila.
(2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be
construed to include the City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general
application because it is made to apply only to those provinces in which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation
officer.
(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a
probation officer as required by section 11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Officer willing to act for the City of Manila, said
Probation Officer provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same
Act.
II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless
acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he
had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that:
(1) His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act No. 4221 to the granting or denying of applications for probation.
(2) After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition for probation on June 28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment of its
rendition.
(3) No right on appeal exists in such cases.
(4) The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or change the same.
III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which
finding is not only presumptuous but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation of the respondent's oath of office
as ad interim judge of first instance.
IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the
application for probation, to commit his co-respondent to jail.
Petitioners also avers that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation further contends that Act No. 4221 of the
Philippine Legislature providing for a system of probation for persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is unconstitutional because it is
violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the laws because it confers upon the provincial
board of its province the absolute discretion to make said law operative or otherwise in their respective provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and improper
delegation to the provincial boards of the several provinces of the legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (section 8) in the Philippine Legislature and by the
Constitution (section 1, Art. VI) in the National Assembly; and for the further reason that it gives the provincial boards, in contravention of the Constitution (section 2,
Art. VIII) and the Jones Law (section 28), the authority to enlarge the powers of the Court of First Instance of different provinces without uniformity. In another
supplementary petition dated September 14, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila, in behalf of one of the petitioners, the People of the Philippine Islands, concurs for
3
the first time with the issues raised by other petitioner regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, and on the oral argument held on October 6, 1937, further
elaborated on the theory that probation is a form of reprieve and therefore Act. No. 4221 is an encroachment on the exclusive power of the Chief Executive to grant
pardons and reprieves. On October 7, 1937, the City Fiscal filed two memorandums in which he contended that Act No. 4221 not only encroaches upon the pardoning
power to the executive, but also constitute an unwarranted delegation of legislative power and a denial of the equal protection of the laws. On October 9, 1937, two
memorandums, signed jointly by the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General, acting in behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands, and by counsel for the petitioner, the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, one sustaining the power of the state to impugn the validity of its own laws and the other contending that Act No. 4221
constitutes an unwarranted delegation of legislative power, were presented. Another joint memorandum was filed by the same persons on the same day, October 9,
1937, alleging that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the laws and constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power and,
further, that the whole Act is void: that the Commonwealth is not estopped from questioning the validity of its laws; that the private prosecution may intervene in
probation proceedings and may attack the probation law as unconstitutional; and that this court may pass upon the constitutional question in prohibition proceedings.
Respondents in their answer dated August 31, 1937, as well as in their oral argument and memorandums, challenge each and every one of the foregoing proposition
raised by the petitioners.
As special defenses, respondents allege:
(1) That the present petition does not state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari or of prohibition.
(2) That the aforesaid petition is premature because the remedy sought by the petitioners is the very same remedy prayed for by them before the trial court
and was still pending resolution before the trial court when the present petition was filed with this court.
(3) That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the execution of judgment before the trial court, said trial court has acquired exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the same under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappealable.
(4) That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance to decide the question as to whether or not the
execution will lie, this court nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction while the Court of First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over the same upon
motion of herein petitioners themselves.
(5) That upon the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the
proceedings to this court, should not be tolerated because it impairs the authority and dignity of the trial court which court while sitting in the probation cases
is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."
(6) That under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve the question submitted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the present action
would not lie because the resolution of the trial court denying probation is appealable; for although the Probation Law does not specifically provide that an
applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of the Court of First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this jurisdiction that a final
order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is appealable to the superior court.
(7) That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng being appealable, the same had not become final and
executory for the reason that the said respondent had filed an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial within the requisite period of fifteen days,
which motion the trial court was able to resolve in view of the restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this court.lawphi1.net
(8) That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that the resolution of the trial court denying probation is not final and unappealable
when he presented his answer to the motion for reconsideration and agreed to the postponement of the hearing of the said motion.
(9) That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying probation is not appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the trial court, although it believed that the accused was entitled to probation, nevertheless
denied probation for fear of criticism because the accused is a rich man; and that, before a petition for certiorari grounded on an irregular exercise of
jurisdiction by the trial court could lie, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration specifying the error committed so that the trial
court could have an opportunity to correct or cure the same.
(10) That on hypothesis that the resolution of this court is not appealable, the trial court retains its jurisdiction within a reasonable time to correct or modify it
in accordance with law and justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercise either motu proprio
or upon petition of the proper party, the petition in the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration.
(11) That on the hypothesis that the resolution of the trial court is appealable as respondent allege, said court cannot order execution of the same while it is
on appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing because the doors of probation will be closed from the moment the accused commences to serve his
sentence (Act No. 4221, sec. 1; U.S. vs. Cook, 19 Fed. [2d], 827).
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the
petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon
the pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section 11 of Act No.
4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in addition, that the private prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the
validity of Act No. 4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from questioning the validity of the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be
attacked for the first time before this court; that probation in unavailable; and that, in any event, section 11 of the Act No. 4221 is separable from the rest of the Act. The
last memorandum for the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng was denied for having been filed out of time but was admitted by resolution of this court and filed anew on
November 5, 1937. This memorandum elaborates on some of the points raised by the respondents and refutes those brought up by the petitioners.
In the scrutiny of the pleadings and examination of the various aspects of the present case, we noted that the court below, in passing upon the merits of the application of
the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng and in denying said application assumed the task not only of considering the merits of the application, but of passing upon the
culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G.R. No. 41200.) Probation implies guilt be final judgment. While a
probation case may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court,
either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. As already
observed by this court in Shioji vs. Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the
privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior courts
demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the intergrated judicial system of the nation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel for the petitioners and the respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian knot and take up at
once the two fundamental questions presented, namely, (1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings; and (2) in
the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional. Considerations of these issues will involve a discussion of certain incidental questions raised by the parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain guiding principles is necessary. It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case;
i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp.
780-782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal
remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922]),
42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783);
and in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189;
72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines.
It has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97,
117), although there are authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute (mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg
[1931], 56 Phil., 234); and even on an application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case.
4
(12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as regards prohibition and certiorari.(Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed.,
1059; Bell vs. First Judicial District Court [1905], 28 Nev., 280; 81 Pac., 875; 113 A. S. R., 854; 6 Ann. Cas., 982; 1 L. R. A. [N. S], 843, and cases cited). The case of
Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, decided by this court twelve years ago was, like the present one, an original action for certiorari and prohibition. The constitutionality
of Act No. 2972, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was there challenged by the petitioners, and the constitutional issue was not met squarely by the
respondent in a demurrer. A point was raised "relating to the propriety of the constitutional question being decided in original proceedings in prohibition." This court
decided to take up the constitutional question and, with two justices dissenting, held that Act No. 2972 was constitutional. The case was elevated on writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States which reversed the judgment of this court and held that the Act was invalid. (271 U. S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059.) On the question
of jurisdiction, however, the Federal Supreme Court, though its Chief Justice, said:
By the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516, the Philippine supreme court is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with
courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such courts are exercising functions
without or in excess of their jurisdiction. It has been held by that court that the question of the validity of the criminal statute must usually be raised by a
defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. (Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192). But in
this case where a new act seriously affected numerous persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of actions, the Supreme
Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue to the act's validity promptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly administration of justice. The
court relied by analogy upon the cases of Ex parte Young (209 U. S., 123;52 Law ed., 714; 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 441; 14 Ann. Ca., 764;
Traux vs. Raich, 239 U. S., 33; 60 Law. ed., 131; L. R. A. 1916D, 545; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 7; Ann. Cas., 1917B, 283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61
Law. ed., 755; L. R. A. 1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024). Although objection to the jurisdiction was raise by demurrer to the
petition, this is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a decision on the merits. In view of the broad powers in prohibition granted
to that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the parties.
The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the
inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, p. 705.) The general rule, although there is a
conflict in the cases, is that the merit of prohibition will not lie whether the inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of which is
questioned, because in such cases the interior court having jurisdiction may itself determine the constitutionality of the statute, and its decision may be subject to review,
and consequently the complainant in such cases ordinarily has adequate remedy by appeal without resort to the writ of prohibition. But where the inferior court or
tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute. (50 C. J., 670; Ex
parte Round tree [1874, 51 Ala., 42; In re Macfarland, 30 App. [D. C.], 365; Curtis vs. Cornish [1912], 109 Me., 384; 84 A., 799; Pennington vs. Woolfolk [1880], 79
Ky., 13; State vs. Godfrey [1903], 54 W. Va., 54; 46 S. E., 185; Arnold vs. Shields [1837], 5 Dana, 19; 30 Am. Dec., 669.)
Courts of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings derived their jurisdiction solely from Act No. 4221 which prescribes in detailed manner the procedure for
granting probation to accused persons after their conviction has become final and before they have served their sentence. It is true that at common law the authority of
the courts to suspend temporarily the execution of the sentence is recognized and, according to a number of state courts, including those of Massachusetts, Michigan,
New York, and Ohio, the power is inherent in the courts (Commonwealth vs. Dowdican's Bail [1874], 115 Mass., 133; People vs. Stickel [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121
N. W., 497; People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; Weber vs. State [1898], 58 Ohio St., 616). But, in the leading case of Ex parte United
States ([1916], 242 U. S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A., 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court of the United States expressed
the opinion that under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension, and brushed aside the contention as to inherent judicial power
saying, through Chief Justice White:
Indisputably under our constitutional system the right to try offenses against the criminal laws and upon conviction to impose the punishment provided by
law is judicial, and it is equally to be conceded that, in exerting the powers vested in them on such subject, courts inherently possess ample right to exercise
reasonable, that is, judicial, discretion to enable them to wisely exert their authority. But these concessions afford no ground for the contention as to power
here made, since it must rest upon the proposition that the power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to do so. And the effect of
the proposition urged upon the distribution of powers made by the Constitution will become apparent when it is observed that indisputable also is it that the
authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of
executing the statute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve from the
punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs to the executive department.
Justice Carson, in his illuminating concurring opinion in the case of Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite (29 Phil., 265), decided by this court in
1915, also reached the conclusion that the power to suspend the execution of sentences pronounced in criminal cases is not inherent in the judicial function. "All are
agreed", he said, "that in the absence of statutory authority, it does not lie within the power of the courts to grant such suspensions." (at p. 278.) Both petitioner and
respondents are correct, therefore, when they argue that a Court of First Instance sitting in probation proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such
proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature.
It is, of course, true that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered on application for prohibition where the question has not been properly brought to the
attention of the court by objection of some kind (Hill vs. Tarver [1901], 130 Ala., 592; 30 S., 499; State ex rel. Kelly vs. Kirby [1914], 260 Mo., 120; 168 S. W., 746). In
the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by
the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon the question on the ground that the
private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and 762), and McGlue vs. Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742, 743), as authority for the
proposition that a court will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in defeating it because his rights are not
affected by its operation. The respondent judge further stated that it may not motu proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power
to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can
conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded on the assumption
that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore, the court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider the question solely
because it was not raised by a proper party. Respondents herein reiterates this view. The argument is advanced that the private prosecution has no personality to appear
in the hearing of the application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue
of constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a
statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court
depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons
interested in the effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by
the proper party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibitions. It is true that, as a general rule, the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial
court, it will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that the
general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should
be presented. (In re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be
raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a
court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the
case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., [1910], 136 ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W. 1108;
Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co., [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at
any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the
5
constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad,
supra. And on the hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the
constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General
and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying
that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set
aside. Of grater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of
an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]), 50
Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N. W. 426,
428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation,
alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law
officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was though, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a
statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction in void, where the jurisdiction of the court
depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested
in the effect to begin the statute. (12 C.J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper
party, it does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised a the trial, and if not raised in the trial
court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192, 193-195.) But we must state that
the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute
should be presented. (In re Woolsey [19884], 95 N.Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question
may be raised for the first time at any state of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. (12 C.J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the
duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised for first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision of
the case. (McCabe's Adm'x vs. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis, Cordage Co. [1908], 214 Mo. 685; 113 S. W.,
1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co. [1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an appellate
court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911], 175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the
constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong Eng. vs. Trinidad,
supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the
constitutional question here a point we do not now have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General
and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that
if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set
aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement
of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927]),
50 Phil., 259 (affirmed in Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the Philippines. In Attorney General vs. Perkings([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312; 41 N.W., 426,
428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General, instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to renew a mining corporation,
alleging that the statute under which the respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law
officer of the state to question the constitutionality of the statute was itself questioned. Said the Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.:
. . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law enacted by their representatives; that to an accusation by the
people of Michigan of usurpation their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate answer. The last proposition is true, but, if the
statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action under
it than if it had never been enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow . . . The
legislature and the respondents are not the only parties in interest upon such constitutional questions. As was remarked by Mr. Justice Story, in speaking of
an acquiescence by a party affected by an unconstitutional act of the legislature: "The people have a deep and vested interest in maintaining all the
constitutional limitations upon the exercise of legislative powers." (Allen vs. Mckeen, 1 Sum., 314.)
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original action (mandamus) was brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test the constitutionality
of a statute of the state. In disposing of the question whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of Kansas said:
. . . the state is a proper party indeed, the proper party to bring this action. The state is always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or
statutes is involved.
"It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not disregarded, and need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show
grounds of fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City 60 Kan., 518 [57 Pac., 118])." (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103
Pac., 839.)
Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General, or county attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what
sort of action he will bring to have the matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity (State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49
L.R.A., 662), by mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State vs. Dolley, 82 Kan., 533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under
its questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App., 319; 45 Pac., 122).
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W., 1006; State vs. S.H. Kress & Co. [1934], 155 S., 823; State vs.
Walmsley [1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91; State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co. of Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 211 N.Y., 295;
116 N.E., 1020; Bush vs. State {1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119 N.E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La., 837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited, the Supreme Court
of Luisiana said:
It is contended by counsel for Herbert Watkins that a district attorney, being charged with the duty of enforcing the laws, has no right to plead that a law is
unconstitutional. In support of the argument three decisions are cited, viz.: State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge of Tenth Judicial District (33 La.
Ann., 1222); State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor vs. Shakespeare, Mayor of New Orleans (41 Ann., 156; 6 So., 592); and State ex rel., Banking Co., etc. vs.
Heard, Auditor (47 La. Ann., 1679; 18 So., 746; 47 L. R. A., 512). These decisions do not forbid a district attorney to plead that a statute is unconstitutional if
he finds if in conflict with one which it is his duty to enforce. In State ex rel. Hall, District Attorney, vs. Judge, etc., the ruling was the judge should not,
merely because he believed a certain statute to be unconstitutional forbid the district attorney to file a bill of information charging a person with a violation
of the statute. In other words, a judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the question of constitutionality is tendered for decision,
and unless it must be decided in order to determine the right of a party litigant. State ex rel. Nicholls, Governor, etc., is authority for the proposition merely
that an officer on whom a statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the ground that he considers the statute
unconstitutional, and hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Banking Co., etc., is
authority for the proposition merely that executive officers, e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer, should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed
upon them by a statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.
It is the duty of a district attorney to enforce the criminal laws of the state, and, above all, to support the Constitution of the state. If, in the performance of
his duty he finds two statutes in conflict with each other, or one which repeals another, and if, in his judgment, one of the two statutes is unconstitutional, it is
6
 his duty to enforce the other; and, in order to do so, he is compelled to submit to the court, by way of a plea, that one of the statutes is unconstitutional. If it
were not so, the power of the Legislature would be free from constitutional limitations in the enactment of criminal laws.
The respondents do not seem to doubt seriously the correctness of the general proposition that the state may impugn the validity of its laws. They have not cited any
authority running clearly in the opposite direction. In fact, they appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the rule as stated is sound but that it has no application
in the present case, nor may it be invoked by the City Fiscal in behalf of the People of the Philippines, one of the petitioners herein, the principal reasons being that the
validity before this court, that the City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not authorized challenge the validity of the Act in its application
outside said city. (Additional memorandum of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8,. 10, 17 and 23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on
the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from nor assailing its validity. For
courts will pass upon a constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised
before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is
held void by the courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to the resolution of the instant case. For, ". . . while the court will
meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case
in which it arises, can be decided on other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11, 558; 2 Brock., 447. Vide, also Hoover vs. wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286,
287.) It has been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing Long
Sault Dev. Co. vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp., 454 [aff. 212 N.Y., 1: 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism 242 U.S., 272];
Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520; Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co., vs. Wisconsin R. Commn., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605),
as where the right of a party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C.J., p. 782, citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagrara F. Ins. Co., 131 La.,
513; 59 S., 972; Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N.E., 306). There is no doubt that the respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act
No. 4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its validity has
never before been passed upon by the courts; that may persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation; that some of them are
already on probation; that more people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a
period of about four years since his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the
instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. (Yu
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R.C.L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N.Y., 533; 101 N.E.,
442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616; Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N.W., 209, 211; 37 L.R.A. [N.S.] 489; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922],
43 Phil., 304.) In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation confronted us. We said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve
thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the public welfare
and for the advancement of public policy, we have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here
an extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this point was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States. A more
binding authority in support of the view we have taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised. Now for the main inquiry: Is the Act
unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the provisions of section
2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the fundamental lay. It
will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in
conflict therewith. This is of the essence of judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
An act of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the
courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself." (U.S.
vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before
the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must
be presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot
but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the governments. (6 R.C.L., p. 101.) Then, there is that
peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive.
It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too plain to require a citation of
authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned argument, called attention to the fact that the President of the Philippines had already expressed his
opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question was a foregone conclusion. Counsel,
however, reiterated his confidence in the integrity and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the President in his message dated September 1, 1937,
recommended to the National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation Act (No. 4221); that this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the
Nationality Assembly repealing the probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13, 1937,
much against his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is sufficient to observe in
this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons which he may deem proper for
taking such a step, but his reasons are not binding upon us in the determination of actual controversies submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive
should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time
pending determination in this court is a question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him under these
circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given
case. It if is ever necessary for us to make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is that we are independent of the Executive
no less than of the Legislative department of our government independent in the performance of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics,
indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty as we see it and as we understand it.
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
1. Section 21 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, otherwise known as
the Probation Act, vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is
now vested in the President of the Philippines. (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 6.) The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution differ in some respects. The adjective
"exclusive" found in the Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the
commission of the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In re Lontok [1922], 43 Phil., 293). The Governor-
General of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The
framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after
conviction". So, too, under the new Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the rule generally followed in the United
States (Vide Constitution of the United States, Art. II, sec. 2). The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but,"
says Blackstone, "after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged."
7
(Vide, Ex parte Wells [1856], 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421; Com. vs. Lockwood [1872], 109 Mass., 323; 12 Am. Rep., 699; Sterling vs. Drake [1876], 29 Ohio St.,
457; 23 am. Rep., 762.) The reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, Judgment on impeachment is not confined to mere "removal from office and
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government" (Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines) but extends to the whole
punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital punishment, perpetual banishment,
perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending upon the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and incapacity to hold office.
(Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant,
such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper. Amnesty may be granted by the President under the Constitution but only with the concurrence of
the National Assembly. We need not dwell at length on the significance of these fundamental changes. It is sufficient for our purposes to state that the pardoning power
has remained essentially the same. The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under the Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else.
". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given by the
legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning power, since no person properly
belonging to one of the departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution." (20 R.C.L.,
pp., , and cases cited.) " . . . where the pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature
can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof, . . ." (12 C.J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If
Act No. 4221, then, confers any pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and void. But does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced
was void. (Ex parte United States [1916], 242 U.S., 27; 61 Law. ed., 129; L.R.A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after
an exhaustive review of the authorities, expressed the opinion of the court that under the common law the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension and
that the right to suspend sentenced absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress
to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its Chief Justice: ". . . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing of the imposition
of penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation or such other means as the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial discretion as may be adequate to
enable courts to meet by the exercise of an enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to them for judgment, recourse must be had
Congress whose legislative power on the subject is in the very nature of things adequately complete." (Quoted in Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 6.) This
decision led the National Probation Association and others to agitate for the enactment by Congress of a federal probation law. Such action was finally taken on March
4, 1925 (chap. 521, 43 Stat. L. 159, U.S.C. title 18, sec. 724). This was followed by an appropriation to defray the salaries and expenses of a certain number of
probation officers chosen by civil service. (Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults, p. 14.)
In United States vs. Murray ([1925], 275 U.S., 347; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; 72 Law. ed., 309), the Supreme Court of the United States, through Chief Justice Taft, held
that when a person sentenced to imprisonment by a district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to
grant him probation even though the term at which sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the constitutionality of the probation Act was not
considered but was assumed. The court traced the history of the Act and quoted from the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of
Representatives (Report No. 1377, 68th Congress, 2 Session) the following statement:
Prior to the so-called Killitts case, rendered in December, 1916, the district courts exercised a form of probation either, by suspending sentence or by placing
the defendants under state probation officers or volunteers. In this case, however (Ex parte United States, 242 U.S., 27; 61 L. Ed., 129; L.R.A., 1917E, 1178;
37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 355), the Supreme Court denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentenced. In the same opinion the court
pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation powers in the future . . .
Since this decision was rendered, two attempts have been made to enact probation legislation. In 1917, a bill was favorably reported by the Judiciary
Committee and passed the House. In 1920, the judiciary Committee again favorably reported a probation bill to the House, but it was never reached for
definite action.
If this bill is enacted into law, it will bring the policy of the Federal government with reference to its treatment of those convicted of violations of its criminal
laws in harmony with that of the states of the Union. At the present time every state has a probation law, and in all but twelve states the law applies both to
adult and juvenile offenders. (see, also, Johnson, Probation for Juveniles and Adults [1928], Chap. I.)
The constitutionality of the federal probation law has been sustained by inferior federal courts. In Riggs vs. United States supra, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Fourth Circuit said:
Since the passage of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925, the questions under consideration have been reviewed by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth
Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the constitutionality of the act fully sustained, and the same held in no manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the
President. This case will be found to contain an able and comprehensive review of the law applicable here. It arose under the act we have to consider, and to
it and the authorities cited therein special reference is made (Nix vs. James, 7 F. [2d], 590, 594), as is also to a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Seventh Circuit (Kriebel vs. U.S., 10 F. [2d], 762), likewise construing the Probation Act.
We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in plain and unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact
probation laws, that a federal probation law as actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1928 and consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the
punishment of any and all penal offenses. This conclusion is supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542; L.R.A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac.,
698, the court said: "It is clearly within the province of the Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a minimum and
maximum punishment." And in State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S.C., 466; 33 L.R.A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The legislative
power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general assembly may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as
to the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal
[1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.) Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has
demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts particularly the trial courts large discretion in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is
believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict,
peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from imposing a sentence merely because, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts being allowed in such case to submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem proper (see art. 5, Revised Penal Code), in cases where both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law provides for a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such
circumstances to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of such compensation. (Art. 63,
rule 4, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Reguera and Asuategui [1921], 41 Phil., 506.) Again, article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to
determine, within the limits of each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the extent of the evil produced by the crime. In the imposition
of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any amount within the limits established by law, considering not only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but more
particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code.) Article 68, paragraph 1, of the same Code provides that "a discretionary penalty shall be
imposed" upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who has not acted without discernment, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed
by law for the crime which he has committed. Article 69 of the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete self-defense", i.e., when the crime committed is not
wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in
article 11 and 12 of the Code, "the courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of

8
exemption present or lacking." And, in case the commission of what are known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.)
Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is deducted form the entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases
expressly mentioned (art. 29); the death penalty is not imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years of age, or where upon appeal or revision of the case
by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133,
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3); the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following
the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of age (art. 83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after
final sentence has been pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the personal penalty during
the period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue harshness of the penal laws is more clearly demonstrated in various other enactments, including
the probation Act. There is the Indeterminate Sentence Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act No. 4225, establishing a system of
parole (secs. 5 to 100 and granting the courts large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as amended provides; "hereafter, in imposing a
prison sentence for an offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same." Certain classes of convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded from the operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted
the Juvenile Delinquency Law (Act No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559. Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act
have become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of the Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act No. 99 of
the National Assembly. In this Act is again manifested the intention of the legislature to "humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular
cases of the penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after due hearing and after
investigation of the particular circumstances of the offenses, the criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The Legislature has in reality decreed that
in certain cases no punishment at all shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of probation are faithfully observed. It this be so, then, it cannot be said
that the Probation Act comes in conflict with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and reprieves, because, to use the language of the Supreme Court of
New Mexico, "the element of punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong, while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and within the
limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure and conduct of criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing to do." (Ex
parte Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S.E., 843), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia probation statute against the
contention that it attempted to delegate to the courts the pardoning power lodged by the constitution in the governor alone is vested with the power to pardon after final
sentence has been imposed by the courts, the power of the courts to imposed any penalty which may be from time to time prescribed by law and in such manner as may
be defined cannot be questioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose. Some cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power to suspend the
operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive. (In re Webb [1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27
L.R.A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N.W., 177; 9 Am. Crim., Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summerfield vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev., 150; 182 Pac., 927; Ex parte
Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla. Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L.R.A. [N.S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac., 650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill, 287; 67
N.E., 23; 63 L.R.A., 82; 95 Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parte Shelor [1910],
33 Nev., 361;111 Pac., 291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St. Rep., 175; 30 S. E. 858; State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D.,
630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571; States vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James [1925; C. C. A., 9th], 7 F. [2d], 590; Archer vs. Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567; Riggs. vs. United States [1926;
C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs. States [1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re
Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530; 265 Pac., 392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac., 874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425;
Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo [1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133 S. E.,
843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E., 1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859; St. Hillarie, Petitioner [1906], 101
Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle [1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs. Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn., 529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court
[1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A. [N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H.,
402; 74 Atl., 875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parte Bates [1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A. 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People vs. ex
rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Session [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36 N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907], 55 Misc.,
639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928; People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y. Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49; Re Hart [1914], 29 N.
D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State
vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L.R.A., [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. States [1854],34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn.,
100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558; Baker vs. State [1913],70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998; Cook vs. State [1914], 73
Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S. W., 573; King vs. State [1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890;
Clare vs. State [1932], 122 Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136 A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S.E., 460;
State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393; 396.) We elect to
follow this long catena of authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a system of
probation however characterized. State ex rel. Tingstand vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R., 393), deserved particular mention. In that case,
a statute enacted in 1921 which provided for the suspension of the execution of a sentence until otherwise ordered by the court, and required that the convicted person
be placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer during the term of such suspension, on such terms as the court may determine, was held constitutional and as not
giving the court a power in violation of the constitutional provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of the state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini [1912], 18
Cal App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are actually district and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In People ex rel.
Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y., 288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the Court of Appeals of New York said:
. . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons, as understood when the constitution was adopted, are totally distinct and
different in their nature. The former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a part of the executive power. The suspension of the
sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain
and become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender. It releases
the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It
removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
(Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4 Wall., 333; 18 Law. ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20 Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S., 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law.
ed., 442.)
The framers of the federal and the state constitutions were perfectly familiar with the principles governing the power to grant pardons, and it was conferred
by these instruments upon the executive with full knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the constitution were used to express the authority
formerly exercised by the English crown, or by its representatives in the colonies. (Ex parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power
was understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to grant reprieves
and pardons should abrogate, or in any degree restrict, the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal courts has so long maintained.
The two powers, so distinct and different in their nature and character, were still left separate and distinct, the one to be exercised by the executive, and the
9
 other by the judicial department. We therefore conclude that a statute which, in terms, authorizes courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in
certain cases after conviction, a power inherent in such courts at common law, which was understood when the constitution was adopted to be an ordinary
judicial function, and which, ever since its adoption, has been exercised of legislative power under the constitution. It does not encroach, in any just sense,
upon the powers of the executive, as they have been understood and practiced from the earliest times. (Quoted with approval in Directors of Prisons vs.
Judge of First Instance of Cavite [1915], 29 Phil., 265, Carson, J., concurring, at pp. 294, 295.)
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire punishment
which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act provides
that the probation may be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision only after the period of probation shall have been terminated
and the probation officer shall have submitted a report, and the court shall have found that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation. The
probationer, then, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court; and, he may be rearrested
upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when rearrested, may be committed to prison to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. (Secs. 2,
3, 5 and 6, Act No. 4221.)
The probation described in the act is not pardon. It is not complete liberty, and may be far from it. It is really a new mode of punishment, to be applied by the
judge in a proper case, in substitution of the imprisonment and find prescribed by the criminal laws. For this reason its application is as purely a judicial act
as any other sentence carrying out the law deemed applicable to the offense. The executive act of pardon, on the contrary, is against the criminal law, which
binds and directs the judges, or rather is outside of and above it. There is thus no conflict with the pardoning power, and no possible unconstitutionality of
the Probation Act for this cause. (Archer vs. Snook [1926], 10 F. [2d], 567, 569.)
Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass vs. State ([1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615;41 L. R. A. [N. S.],
1144; 150 S. W., 162), is relied upon most strongly by the petitioners as authority in support of their contention that the power to grant pardons and reprieves, having
been vested exclusively upon the Chief Executive by the Jones Law, may not be conferred by the legislature upon the courts by means of probation law authorizing the
indefinite judicial suspension of sentence. We have examined that case and found that although the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the probation statute of
the state in terms conferred on the district courts the power to grant pardons to persons convicted of crime, it also distinguished between suspensions sentence on the
one hand, and reprieve and commutation of sentence on the other. Said the court, through Harper, J.:
That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves is settled by the decisions of the various courts; it
being held that the distinction between a "reprieve" and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain,
whereas a suspension is for an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7
Words & Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be hold in conflict with the power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of punishment, for a
commutations is not but to change the punishment assessed to a less punishment.
In State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237 Pac., 525), the Supreme Court of Montana had under consideration the validity of the adult
probation law of the state enacted in 1913, now found in sections 12078-12086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held the law valid as not impinging upon the
pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Holloway, the court said:
. . . . the term "pardon", "commutation", and "respite" each had a well understood meaning at the time our Constitution was adopted, and no one of them was
intended to comprehend the suspension of the execution of the judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 12078-12086. A "pardon" is an act of grace,
proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640); It is a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So.,
816), a forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law, 326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71). "Commutation" is a
remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.] 789; 12 Am. Rep., 563;
Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A "reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time (4 Blackstone's
Commentaries, 394), a postponement of execution (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary suspension of execution (Butler vs. State,
97 Ind., 373).
Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a statute similar to our section 12078 has been determined; but the same objections have been
urged against parole statutes which vest the power to parole in persons other than those to whom the power of pardon is granted, and these statutes have been
upheld quite uniformly, as a reference to the numerous cases cited in the notes to Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,558, reported in L. R. A.,
1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary
sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the
power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926],
14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)
2. But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive and is not for that reason void, does section 11 thereof constitute, as
contended, an undue delegation of legislative power?
Under the constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive
and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of popular will. Each
has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
The power to make laws the legislative power is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the
Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by
delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non
delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a
principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as
an enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences, p. 66.)
The classic statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere
but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled
maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the
Constitution itself is charged. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibilities
by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those to which
alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias
[1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. (U. S. vs.
Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by immemorial
practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs.
Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a
cardinal principle of our system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the central authorities; and hence while
the rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of the municipalities exercising local self government has never been held to
trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribed local regulations,
10
according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same
principle, Congress is powered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same
relation to Congress as a municipality or city to the state government. (United States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11
Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195 U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also sustained the delegation of
legislative power to the people at large. Some authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy
[1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442; Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the question of whether or not a state has ceased to be republican in form because of its
adoption of the initiative and referendum has been held not to be a judicial but a political question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56
Law. ed., 377; 32 Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon with favor by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions
of the more conservative courts has been pretty well drawn. (Opinions of the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan vs. Portland
[1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative power may be
delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law
authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and
wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could be authorized
to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower
than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office. (Emphasis ours.)
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In
the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to
authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See
and cf. Compaia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34 Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a
certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C.
L., pp. 177-179.)
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in
their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to administrative and
executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to
administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the presence or absence of a
standard or rule of action or the sufficiency thereof in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the standard
is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay
down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. (See Schecter
vs. United States [1925], 295 U. S., 495; 79 L. ed., 1570; 55 Sup. Ct. Rep., 837; 97 A.L.R., 947; People ex rel. Rice vs. Wilson Oil Co. [1936], 364 Ill., 406; 4 N. E.
[2d], 847; 107 A.L.R., 1500 and cases cited. See also R. C. L., title "Constitutional Law", sec 174.) In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the
exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We
do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial
boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter,
supra, is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its
own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other
words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied
in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of
any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.
"The true distinction", says Judge Ranney, "is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can
be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. [1852]; 1 Ohio St., 77, 88. See also, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec 68.) To the same effect
are the decision of this court in Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan ([1917], 36 Phil., 547); Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro ([1919],39 Phil.,
660) and Cruz vs. Youngberg ([1931], 56 Phil., 234). In the first of these cases, this court sustained the validity of the law conferring upon the Governor-General
authority to adjust provincial and municipal boundaries. In the second case, this court held it lawful for the legislature to direct non-Christian inhabitants to take up their
habitation on unoccupied lands to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In the third case, it was held proper for the legislature to
vest in the Governor-General authority to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition of the importation of the foreign cattle, such prohibition to be raised "if the
conditions of the country make this advisable or if deceased among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands."
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with the simple transference of details of execution or the promulgation by executive or administrative
officials of rules and regulations to carry into effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own decisions would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908],
11 Phil., 327; U.S. vs. Molina [1914], 29 Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394; Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S.
vs. Gomez [1915], 31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
It is connected, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on
certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L., 116, 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme Court of the United State ruled that the legislature
may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise.(Vide, also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31 L. R. A.,
112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as
the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. (Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of
North Milwaukee [1896], 93 Wis., 616; 97 N.W., 1033; 33 L.R.A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906], 129 Wis., 120; 108 N.W., 210; Field vs. Clark [1892], 143 U.S., 649; 12
Sup. Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the
complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX; Laski, "The Mother of
Parliaments", foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4, pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July, 1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147,
152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the
United States in the following language speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: "The principle which permits the legislature to
provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time
this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it its duty
to do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different of no action at
all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what
11
the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol.
II, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York [1883], 109 U.S., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an Act as a declaration
of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it
may designate." (See, also, 12 C.J., p. 864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal., 343, 258.) The legislature, then may provide that a
contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has arisen. But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not
made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the
entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not
investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule, limited by no principle of expendiency announced
by the legislature. It may take into consideration certain facts or conditions; and, again, it may not. It may have any purpose or no purpose at all. It need not give any
reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of a probation officer. This is a matter which rest entirely at its pleasure. The fact that at
some future time we cannot say when the provincial boards may appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers and thus put the law into operation in the
various provinces will not save the statute. The time of its taking into effect, we reiterate, would yet be based solely upon the will of the provincial boards and not upon
the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than legislature itself.
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some
jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. Thus, section 28, article I of the Constitution of Texas
provides that "No power of suspending laws in this state shall be exercised except by the legislature"; and section 26, article I of the Constitution of Indiana provides
"That the operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by authority of the General Assembly." Yet, even provisions of this sort do not confer absolute power of
suspension upon the legislature. While it may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law, a law may not be suspended
as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular
localities. In Holden vs. James ([1814], 11 Mass., 396; 6 Am. Dec., 174, 177, 178), it was said:
By the twentieth article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of this commonwealth, it is declared that the power of suspending the laws, or the
execution of the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the
legislature shall expressly provide for. Many of the articles in that declaration of rights were adopted from the Magna Charta of England, and from the bill of
rights passed in the reign of William and Mary. The bill of rights contains an enumeration of the oppressive acts of James II, tending to subvert and extirpate
the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of the kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and
suspending the laws, and the execution of the laws without consent of parliament. The first article in the claim or declaration of rights contained in the statute
is, that the exercise of such power, by legal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the tenth section of the same statute it is further declared
and enacted, that "No dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or part thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be held void and of no effect,
except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute." There is an implied reservation of authority in the parliament to exercise the power here mentioned;
because, according to the theory of the English Constitution, "that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere," is intrusted to
the parliament: 1 Bl. Com., 160.
The principles of our government are widely different in this particular. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can
only exercise what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of the power in question would be equally oppressive to
the subject, and subversive of his right to protection, "according to standing laws," whether exercised by one man or by a number of men. It cannot be
supposed that the people when adopting this general principle from the English bill of rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to bestow by
implication on the general court one of the most odious and oppressive prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. It is manifestly contrary to the first
principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which
are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like
circumstances are exempted.
To illustrate the principle: A section of a statute relative to dogs made the owner of any dog liable to the owner of domestic animals wounded by it for the damages
without proving a knowledge of it vicious disposition. By a provision of the act, power was given to the board of supervisors to determine whether or not during the
current year their county should be governed by the provisions of the act of which that section constituted a part. It was held that the legislature could not confer that
power. The court observed that it could no more confer such a power than to authorize the board of supervisors of a county to abolish in such county the days of grace
on commercial paper, or to suspend the statute of limitations. (Slinger vs. Henneman [1875], 38 Wis., 504.) A similar statute in Missouri was held void for the same
reason in State vs. Field ([1853, 17 Mo., 529;59 Am. Dec., 275.) In that case a general statute formulating a road system contained a provision that "if the county court
of any county should be of opinion that the provisions of the act should not be enforced, they might, in their discretion, suspend the operation of the same for any
specified length of time, and thereupon the act should become inoperative in such county for the period specified in such order; and thereupon order the roads to be
opened and kept in good repair, under the laws theretofore in force." Said the court: ". . . this act, by its own provisions, repeals the inconsistent provisions of a former
act, and yet it is left to the county court to say which act shall be enforce in their county. The act does not submit the question to the county court as an original question,
to be decided by that tribunal, whether the act shall commence its operation within the county; but it became by its own terms a law in every county not excepted by
name in the act. It did not, then, require the county court to do any act in order to give it effect. But being the law in the county, and having by its provisions superseded
and abrogated the inconsistent provisions of previous laws, the county court is . . . empowered, to suspend this act and revive the repealed provisions of the former act.
When the question is before the county court for that tribunal to determine which law shall be in force, it is urge before us that the power then to be exercised by the
court is strictly legislative power, which under our constitution, cannot be delegated to that tribunal or to any other body of men in the state. In the present case, the
question is not presented in the abstract; for the county court of Saline county, after the act had been for several months in force in that county, did by order suspend its
operation; and during that suspension the offense was committed which is the subject of the present indictment . . . ." (See Mitchell vs. State [1901], 134 Ala., 392; 32
S., 687.)
True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from those applicable to other localities and, while recognizing the force of the principle
hereinabove expressed, courts in may jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the vote of the people. (6 R.C.L., p. 171.) But
option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under different circumstances.
"They relate to subjects which, like the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the running at large of cattle in the highways, may be differently regarded in different
localities, and they are sustained on what seems to us the impregnable ground, that the subject, though not embraced within the ordinary powers of municipalities to
make by-laws and ordinances, is nevertheless within the class of public regulations, in respect to which it is proper that the local judgment should control." (Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., p. 148.) So that, while we do not deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely local concern
in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that which treats of
criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221.
True, the statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being
vested with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether
or not the law should take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation of
the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The
validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil.,
259; 12 C. J., p. 786.)
It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration
and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular
government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives
12
of the people and that these representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by
particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Ga., 23; Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35
Off. Gaz., 1317.) But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of power and one of these time-honored limitations is that, subject to
certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void.
3. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws
(Act. III, sec. 1 subsec. 1. Constitution of the Philippines.)
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and
subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
10464; Perley vs. North Carolina, 249 U. S., 510; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 357; 63 Law. ed., 735.) Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the
laws in a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. (Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co. [1902], 184, U. S., 540; 22
Sup. Ct., Rep., 431; 46 Law. ed., 679.) Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and nor
made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. (Finely vs. California [1911], 222 U. S., 28; 56 Law. ed., 75; 32 Sup. Ct. Rep., 13; Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry Co. vs. Ellis [1897],
165 U. S., 150; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep., 255; Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) The classification, however, to be reasonable must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class. (Borgnis vs. Falk. Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327, 353; 133 N. W., 209; 3 N. C. C. A., 649; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.], 489; State vs.
Cooley, 56 Minn., 540; 530-552; 58 N. W., 150; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.[1911], 220 U. S., 61, 79, 55 Law. ed., 369, 377; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 337; Ann.
Cas., 1912C, 160; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. vs. Clough [1917], 242 U.S., 375; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 144; 61 Law. ed., 374; Southern Ry. Co. vs. Greene [1910], 216 U.
S., 400; 30 Sup. Ct. Rep., 287; 54 Law. ed., 536; 17 Ann. Cas., 1247; Truax vs. Corrigan [1921], 257 U. S., 312; 12 C. J., pp. 1148, 1149.)
In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily
the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the
necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in
the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in
one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also
possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no
inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the
provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act. Neither will
there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer which is the
situation now and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the
municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the probation officer. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while
inequality may result in the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever
may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be
sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score,
but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that
account bad. We see no difference between a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of
unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions. (By analogy, Chy Lung vs. Freeman [1876], 292 U. S., 275; 23 Law. ed., 550; Henderson
vs. Mayor [1876], 92 U. S., 259; 23 Law. ed., 543; Ex parte Virginia [1880], 100 U. S., 339; 25 Law. ed., 676; Neal vs. Delaware [1881], 103 U. S., 370; 26 Law. ed.,
567; Soon Hing vs. Crowley [1885], 113 U. S., 703; 28 Law. ed., 1145, Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],118 U. S., 356; 30 Law. ed., 220; Williams vs. Mississippi [1897],
170 U. S., 218; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 583; 42 Law. ed., 1012; Bailey vs. Alabama [1911], 219 U. S., 219; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145; 55 Law. ed., Sunday Lake Iron Co. vs.
Wakefield [1918], 247 U. S., 450; 38 Sup. Ct. Rep., 495; 62 Law. ed., 1154.) In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in
operation (General Oil Co. vs. Clain [1907], 209 U. S., 211; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 475; 52 Law. ed., 754; State vs. Clement Nat. Bank [1911], 84 Vt., 167; 78 Atl., 944; Ann.
Cas., 1912D, 22). If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. (6 R. C. L. p. 372; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3; 3 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 18; 27 Law. ed., 835; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, supra; State vs. Montgomery, 94 Me., 192; 47 Atl., 165; 80 A. S. R., 386; State vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N. W.,
1104; 36 A. S. R., 948; 19 L. R. A., 858.) Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in
other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year and have probation during that year and thereafter decline
to make further appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here
indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the
guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand". (Brewer, J. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Ellis [1897], 165 U. S., 150 154; 41 Law. ed., 666; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
255.)lawph!1.net
Great reliance is placed by counsel for the respondents on the case of Ocampo vs. United States ([1914], 234 U. S., 91; 58 Law. ed., 1231). In that case, the Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed the decision of this court (18 Phil., 1) by declining to uphold the contention that there was a denial of the equal protection of the
laws because, as held in Missouri vs. Lewis (Bowman vs. Lewis) decided in 1880 (101 U. S., 220; 25 Law. ed., 991), the guaranty of the equality clause does not
require territorial uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by
General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent
enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first
instance of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the prosecuting attorney, after a due
investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against him in proper form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision
indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney although not in the form had in the provinces was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of
Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of the city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
Reliance is also placed on the case of Missouri vs. Lewis, supra. That case has reference to a situation where the constitution of Missouri permits appeals to the
Supreme Court of the state from final judgments of any circuit court, except those in certain counties for which counties the constitution establishes a separate court of
appeals called St. Louis Court of Appeals. The provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is the constitution that makes the apportionment of
territorial jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.
Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the reasons already stated, the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act should be avoided.
In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only where an
unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional
features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process. (Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J. Law., 649, 662; 63 L. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted
in Williams vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U.S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed., 287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913],
25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the well-established rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following language:
. . . where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the valid, may stand
and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be in so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislative
would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N.
13
 E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446; Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss., 739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. (Pearson vs. Bass. 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions must be
eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature. (State vs. A. C. L. R., Co.,
56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969; Harper vs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794; Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540,
565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A., N. S., 1135; State vs. Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The language used in
the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will, independently
of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L. R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also,. U. S., vs.
Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759; Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U. S., 601, 635; 39 Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6
R.C.L., 121.)
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act applicable only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the
salaries of probation officers were inoperative on constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may be enforced. We should be inclined to
accept the suggestions but for the fact that said section is, in our opinion, is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section
what would be left is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial result
of that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent
entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided
for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces.
The Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now
appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation
officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.
Section 2 of the Acts provides that the probation officer shall supervise and visit the probationer. Every probation officer is given, as to the person placed in probation
under his care, the powers of the police officer. It is the duty of the probation officer to see that the conditions which are imposed by the court upon the probationer
under his care are complied with. Among those conditions, the following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
That the probationer (a) shall indulge in no injurious or vicious habits;
(b) Shall avoid places or persons of disreputable or harmful character;
(c) Shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officers;
(d) Shall permit the probation officer to visit him at reasonable times at his place of abode or elsewhere;
(e) Shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of the probation officer concerning his conduct or condition; "(f) Shall endeavor to be
employed regularly; "(g) Shall remain or reside within a specified place or locality;
(f) Shall make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved parties for actual damages or losses caused by his offense;
(g) Shall comply with such orders as the court may from time to time make; and
(h) Shall refrain from violating any law, statute, ordinance, or any by-law or regulation, promulgated in accordance with law.
The court is required to notify the probation officer in writing of the period and terms of probation. Under section 4, it is only after the period of probation, the
submission of a report of the probation officer and appropriate finding of the court that the probationer has complied with the conditions of probation that probation may
be definitely terminated and the probationer finally discharged from supervision. Under section 5, if the court finds that there is non-compliance with said conditions, as
reported by the probation officer, it may issue a warrant for the arrest of the probationer and said probationer may be committed with or without bail. Upon arraignment
and after an opportunity to be heard, the court may revoke, continue or modify the probation, and if revoked, the court shall order the execution of the sentence
originally imposed. Section 6 prescribes the duties of probation officers: "It shall be the duty of every probation officer to furnish to all persons placed on probation
under his supervision a statement of the period and conditions of their probation, and to instruct them concerning the same; to keep informed concerning their conduct
and condition; to aid and encourage them by friendly advice and admonition, and by such other measures, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by court as may
seem most suitable, to bring about improvement in their conduct and condition; to report in writing to the court having jurisdiction over said probationers at least once
every two months concerning their conduct and condition; to keep records of their work; make such report as are necessary for the information of the Secretary of
Justice and as the latter may require; and to perform such other duties as are consistent with the functions of the probation officer and as the court or judge may direct.
The probation officers provided for in this Act may act as parole officers for any penal or reformatory institution for adults when so requested by the authorities thereof,
and, when designated by the Secretary of Justice shall act as parole officer of persons released on parole under Act Number Forty-one Hundred and Three, without
additional compensation."
It is argued, however, that even without section 11 probation officers maybe appointed in the provinces under section 10 of Act which provides as follows:
There is hereby created in the Department of Justice and subject to its supervision and control, a Probation Office under the direction of a Chief Probation
Officer to be appointed by the Governor-General with the advise and consent of the Senate who shall receive a salary of four eight hundred pesos per annum.
To carry out this Act there is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of fifty thousand pesos to be
disbursed by the Secretary of Justice, who is hereby authorized to appoint probation officers and the administrative personnel of the probation officer under
civil service regulations from among those who possess the qualifications, training and experience prescribed by the Bureau of Civil Service, and shall fix
the compensation of such probation officers and administrative personnel until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act.
But the probation officers and the administrative personnel referred to in the foregoing section are clearly not those probation officers required to be appointed for the
provinces under section 11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers referred to in section 10 above-quoted are to act as such, not in the
various provinces, but in the central office known as the Probation Office established in the Department of Justice, under the supervision of the Chief Probation Officer.
When the law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make reports to the court (secs. 1 and 4); that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit
the probationer (sec. 2; sec. 6, par. d); that the probationer shall report to the "probationer officer" (sec. 3, par. c.), shall allow "the probationer officer" to visit him (sec.
3, par. d), shall truthfully answer any reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his conduct or condition (sec. 3, par. 4); that the court shall
notify "the probation officer" in writing of the period and terms of probation (sec. 3, last par.), it means the probation officer who is in charge of a particular probationer
in a particular province. It never could have been intention of the legislature, for instance, to require the probationer in Batanes, to report to a probationer officer in the
City of Manila, or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct,
to instruct him concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such other functions as are assigned to him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course possible. But this
would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is
not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we decline
to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose not even to save a statute from the doom
of invalidity.
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to
make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the purposes of this Act", is
to be applied, among other things, for the salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to receive such compensations as the
Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act". It was the intention of the legislature to empower the Secretary of
Justice to fix the salaries of the probation officers in the provinces or later on to include said salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of
P50,000 appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the amount
can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial notice of the fact that there are 48 provinces in the
Philippines and we do not think it is seriously contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central office, there can be in each province, as
14
intended, a probation officer with a salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this a correct, the contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is
complete is an impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that in our case there can be a system of probation in the provinces without
probation officers.
Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern
criminologist call the "individualization of the punishment", the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the circumstances of his particular case. It
provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It is believed that, in any cases, convicts may be reformed and their development
into hardened criminals aborted. It, therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of
reform. (United States vs. Murray [1925], 275 U. S., 347 357, 358; 72 Law. ed., 309; 312, 313; 48 Sup. Ct. Rep., 146; Kaplan vs. Hecht, 24 F. [2d], 664, 665.) The
Welfare of society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely incidental. But while we believe that probation is commendable as a system
and its implantation into the Philippines should be welcomed, we are forced by our inescapable duty to set the law aside because of the repugnancy to our fundamental
law.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have endeavored to consider the different aspects presented by able counsel for both parties, as well in their memorandums as in their
oral argument. We have examined the cases brought to our attention, and others we have been able to reach in the short time at our command for the study and
deliberation of this case. In the examination of the cases and in then analysis of the legal principles involved we have inclined to adopt the line of action which in our
opinion, is supported better reasoned authorities and is more conducive to the general welfare. (Smith, Bell & Co. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136.) Realizing the
conflict of authorities, we have declined to be bound by certain adjudicated cases brought to our attention, except where the point or principle is settled directly or by
clear implication by the more authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States. This line of approach is justified because:
(a) The constitutional relations between the Federal and the State governments of the United States and the dual character of the American Government is a
situation which does not obtain in the Philippines;
(b) The situation of s state of the American Union of the District of Columbia with reference to the Federal Government of the United States is not the
situation of the province with respect to the Insular Government (Art. I, sec. 8 cl. 17 and 10th Amendment, Constitution of the United States; Sims vs. Rives,
84 Fed. [2d], 871),
(c) The distinct federal and the state judicial organizations of the United States do not embrace the integrated judicial system of the Philippines
(Schneckenburger vs. Moran [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 1317);
(d) "General propositions do not decide concrete cases" (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York [1904], 198 U. S., 45, 76; 49 Law. ed., 937, 949) and, "to
keep pace with . . . new developments of times and circumstances" (Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co. vs. Western Union Tel. Co. [1899], 96 U. S., 1,
9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec. 1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view existing local
conditions and environment.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He
then elevated to the Supreme Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion for
new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular
Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the granting of
probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a
supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of
several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability
and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its
province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the
affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial
fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The
Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now
appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation
officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the probation system.

FACTS:-

The criminal case, People v. Cu Unjieng was filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Manila,with HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor.-

The CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to an indeterminate penaltyranging from four years and two months of
prision correccional
to eight years of
prison mayor.
(Jan. 8, 1934)-

Upon appeal, it was modified to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of
prison correccional
to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of
prison mayor
, butaffirmed the judgments in all other respects.-
15
Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial whichwere all denied on December 17, 1935. Final judgment was entered on
Dec. 18, 1935. He filedfor certiorari to the Supreme Court but got denied on Nov 1936. The SC subsequently denied Cu
Unjiengs petition for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsider
ation or new trial,then remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of judgment.-

Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court, under the provisions of Act4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. He states he is innocent of the
crime; he has nocriminal record; and that he would observe good conduct in the future.-

CFI Manila Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing for probation on April 5, 1937.-

HSBC questioned the authority of Vera to hold such hearings and assailed the constitutionalityof the Probation Act since it violates the equal protection of laws and
gives unlawful andimproper delegation to provincial boards.-

Section 11 of Art 4221 states that the act shall only be applied in those provinces wherein theprobationary officer is granted salary not lower than provincial fiscals by
respective provincialboards.-

The City Fiscal of Manila files a supplementary petition affirming issues raised by HSBC, arguingthat probation is a form of reprieve, hence Act 4221 bypasses this
exclusive power of the Chief Executive.-

Hence this petition in the Supreme Court.ISSUES:1.

Whether or not the constitutionality of Act 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings;2.
If in the affirmative, whether or not Act 4221 is constitutional based on these three grounds:a.
It encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executiveb.
It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powerc.
It denies the equal protection of the lawsHELD/RATIO:1.
Yes. Constitutional questions will not be determined by the courts unless properly raised andpresented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the
case, lis mota.Constitutionality issues may be raised in prohibition and certiorari proceedings, as they may alsobe raised in mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus
proceedings. The general rule states

G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL
BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.
Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco.

CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband.
The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under
Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the
POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial
expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an
opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are
essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure
would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas
employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section
4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer
relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and
Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such employment. 2
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas
worker but a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees
Compensation Commission.
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in
Japan in 1985.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including
employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is described as "any person working or who has worked
overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen" 4 or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local
employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it
is not disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a
foreign country. 6
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his
death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over
overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797. 7 The second is its payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for
Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."

16
Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent's signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas
contract worker Vitaliano Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own previous acts, that the petitioner and
the Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international
flights, are not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its shipping articles to the POEA for processing,
formalization and approval or to contribute to the Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the
employees of the PAL cannot under the definitions given be considered seamen nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became
effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino
seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court.
10
The petitioner claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done
so as required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to
adopt and use this employment contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment contract effective that date." In the second
place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the
State. 11
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no
authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same
as the format adopted by the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the
discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate Court 12 which annulled Executive Order No.
626, this Court held:
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive
order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of
the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the officers must observe when they make
their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what
criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in
their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within banks
that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to
do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. 14
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power
because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the
observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have
the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by
the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without
challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient
standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest" in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v.
CIR 16 "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few
cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v.
United States. 20
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00
funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas
Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract
of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that
Section C. Compensation and Benefits.
1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of:
a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers
b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master electrician
c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.

17
 2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits
which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ...
3. ...
c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount
not exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses.
The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows:
Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.
All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund)
shall be granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the
employment contract approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be
enjoyed by the seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance with such laws.
The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class, consistently with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the
Constitution for the protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest.
One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been denied due process because the same POEA that issued
Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic
powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret
and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the
Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted
as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case
of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations 21 are observed.
Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the
Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life should have more in law.
When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the
sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his
cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal
partner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so
ordered.

FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.

RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may
be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by
the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he
will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1
ISSUE:

W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers

18
HELD:

SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.

In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even
with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may
be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have
the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the power of subordinate legislation.

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

G.R. No. 111812 May 31, 1995

DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the
age of 55 years.
Sometime in May 1991, 1 Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that
he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to
this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" 2 issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this
"Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-
legible initial with the following date "2/28/91."
Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-
XI"), informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action [should] be taken on this matter."
In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:
Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of
which is hereunder quoted:
Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained the service,
except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador [M.] Rabor as Utility Worker in that office, is already non-
extend[i]ble. 3
Accordingly, on 8 August l991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for work
effective August 16, 1991." 4
Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated 14 August 1991, asking for extension of his services in the City Government until he "shall
have completed the fifteen (15) years service [requirement] in the Government so that [he] could also avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given to employees of
the Government." The extension he was asking for was about two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and very able to perform the duties and functions
of [his] position as Utility Worker," Rabor sought "extension of [his] service as an exception to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President." 5 This
request was denied by Director Cawad on 15 August 1991.
Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29 January 1992 seeking reconsideration of the decision of Director Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the
President referred Mr. Rabor's letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission on 5 March 1992.
In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service Commission dismissed the appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the action of Director Cawad
embodied in the latter's letter of 26 July 1991. This Resolution stated in part:
19
 In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be allowed to continue rendering services as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) year
service requirement under P.D. 1146.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part:
1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years service requirement for
retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of not exceeding one (1) year.
Considering that as early as October 18, 1988, Rabor was already due for retirement, his request for further extension of service cannot be given
due course. 6 (Emphasis in the original)
On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-594 of the Civil Service Commission this time invoking the Decision of this Court in
Cena v. Civil Service Commission. 7 Petitioner also asked for reinstatement with back salaries and benefits, having been separated from the government service effective
16 August 1991. Rabor's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Commission.
Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the Office of the Mayor, Davao City, again requesting that he be allowed to continue rendering service to the
Davao City Government as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement under P.D. No. 1146. This request was once more denied by
Mayor Duterte in a letter to petitioner dated 19 May 1993. In this letter, Mayor Duterte pointed out that, under Cena grant of the extension of service was discretionary
on the part of the City Mayor, but that he could not grant the extension requested. Mayor Duterte's letter, in relevant part, read:
The matter was referred to the City Legal Office and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, in the advent of the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Cena vs. CSC, et al. (G.R. No. 97419 dated July 3, 1992), for legal opinion. Both the City Legal Officer and the Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission are one in these opinion that extending you an appointment in order that you may be able to complete the fifteen-year
service requirement is discretionary [on the part of] the City Mayor.
Much as we desire to extend you an appointment but circumstances are that we can no longer do so. As you are already nearing your 70th
birthday may no longer be able to perform the duties attached to your position. Moreover, the position you had vacated was already filled up.
We therefore regret to inform you that we cannot act favorably on your request. 8 (Emphases supplied)
At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a Letter/Petition dated 6 July 1993 appealing from Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 and from
Mayor Duterte's letter of 10 May 1993.
The Court required petitioner Rabor to comply with the formal requirements for instituting a special civil action of certiorari to review the assailed Resolution of the
Civil Service Commission. In turn, the Commission was required to comment on petitioner's Letter/Petition. 9 The Court subsequently noted petitioner's Letter of 13
September 1993 relating to compliance with the mentioned formal requirements and directed the Clerk of Court to advise petitioner to engage the services of counsel or
to ask for legal assistance from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 10
The Civil Service Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its comment on 16 November 1993. The Court then resolved to give due course to the
Petition and required the parties to file memoranda. Both the Commission and Mr. Rabor (the latter through PAO counsel) did so.
In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls squarely within the ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission. 11
Upon the other hand, the Commission seeks to distinguish this case from Cena. The Commission, through the Solicitor General, stressed that in Cena, this Court had
ruled that the employer agency, the Land Registration Authority of the Department of Justice, was vested with discretion to grant to Cena the extension requested by
him. The Land Registration Authority had chosen not to exercise its discretion to grant or deny such extension. In contrast, in the instant case, the Davao City
Government did exercise its discretion on the matter and decided to deny the extension sought by petitioner Rabor for legitimate reasons.
While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old, the Court considers that it must reexamine the doctrine of Cena and the theoretical and policy underpinnings
thereof. 12
We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena.
Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July 1987. He reached the compulsory retirement age of
sixty-five (65) years on 22 January 1991. By the latter date, his government service would have reached a total of eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days.
Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena requested the Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to
extend his service to complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No.
1146. If Cena's request were granted, he would complete fifteen (15) years of government service on 15 April 1994, at the age of sixty-eight (68) years.
The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission on whether or not Cena's request could be granted considering that Cena was covered by
Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, Series of 1990. On 17 October 1990, the Commission allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his service from 22 January 1991 to
22 January 1992 under its Memorandum Circular No. 27. Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without success. He then came to this Court, claiming that he
was entitled to an extension of three (3) years, three (3) months and twenty-four (24) days to complete the fifteen-year service requirement for retirement with full
benefits under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.
This Court granted Cena' s petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992. Speaking through Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court held that a government employee who has reached
the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of government service required under Section 11
(b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government service for such period of time as may be necessary to
"fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement. The Court also held that the authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one vested in the
head of the agency concerned. Thus the Court concluded:
Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) and Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner
Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government to complete the fifteen-year service so that he may retire with full
benefits under Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146. 13 (Emphases supplied)
The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its
entirety:
Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who
(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;
(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and
(3) is separated from the service.
(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with
at least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall he allowed to continue in the service to
completed the fifteen (15) years. (Emphases supplied)
The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has often been invoked in respect of retirement statutes:
Being remedial in character, a statute granting a pension or establishing [a] retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in
favor of persons intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that
efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced. 14 (Citations omitted)
While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension
of service that may be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age.
The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, which should be quoted in its entirety:
TO : ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT- OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS.
SUBJECT : Extension of Service of Compulsory Retiree to Complete the Fifteen Years Service Requirement for Retirement Purposes.
20
 Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 90-454 dated May 21, 1990, the Civil Service Commission hereby adopts and promulgates the following
policies and guidelines in the extension of services of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement
purposes:
1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for
retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.
2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for
retirement who entered the government service at 57 years of age or over upon prior grant of authority to appoint him or
her, shall no longer be granted.
3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement of retirement shall be
filled not later than three (3) years prior to the date of compulsory retirement.
4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree who meets the minimum number of years of service for
retirement purposes may be granted for six (6) months only with no further extension.
This Memorandum Circular shall take effect immediately. (Emphases supplied)
The second administrative issuance Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President, dated 14 June 1988 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, this Office has been. receiving requests for reinstatement and/or retention in the service of employees who have reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, despite the strict conditions provided for in Memorandum Circular No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as
amended.
WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more strictly to the law providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 years
and, in extremely meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond the age of 65 years to six (6) months only.
WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 or on the retention in the service of officials or employees who have
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service,
except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.
All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations, are
hereby enjoined to require their respective offices to strictly comply with this circular.
This Circular shall take effect immediately.
By authority of the President
(Sgd.)
CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Executive Secretary
Manila, June 14, 1988. 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and,
secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.
We turn first to the Civil Service Commission's Memorandum Circular No. 27. Medialdea, J. wrote:
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the
principle that administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of
the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977,
79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office,
L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). . . . . The rule on limiting to one the
year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but has less than fifteen (15)
years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relationship
or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a
mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum No. 27, took a very narrow view on the question of what subordinate rule-making
by an administrative agency is permissible and valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted with this Court's earlier ruling in People v. Exconde, 17 where Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes said:
It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to standards that the law prescribes. 18
(Emphasis supplied)
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 19 the Court, in sustaining the validity of a MECS Order which established passing a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as a prerequisite for eligibility for admission into medical schools in the Philippines, said:
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical
Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970])
The standards may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The Standard
though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as
a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained in Calalang v.
William is "safe transit upon the roads."
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of
medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle. 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied)
In Edu v. Ericta, 21 then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the abstract and very general nature of the standards which our Court has in prior case law upheld as sufficient for
purposes of compliance with the requirements for validity of subordinate or administrative rule-making:
This Court has considered as sufficient standards, "public welfare," (Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547
[1917]); "necessary in the interest of law and order," (Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 [1919]); "public interest," (People v. Rosenthal, 68
Phil. 328 [1939]); and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the case," (International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 17 Phil. 602
[1940]). 22 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if
the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations.
It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that
makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably; demanded is a showing that the
21
delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is
appropriately applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.
We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the present Civil Service law found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order
No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by both
statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination of many provisions of the present civil service law.
Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987 Administrative Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Sec. 12 Powers and Functions. The [Civil Service] Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and
effective personnel administration in the government;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the development and retention of a qualified and competent work force in the public
service;
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of service beyond
retirement age;
xxx xxx xxx
(17) Administer the retirement program for government officials and employees, and accredit government services and evaluate qualifications for
retirement;
xxx xxx xxx
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such other functions as may be provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27.
In doing so, the Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient,
responsive and effective personnel administration in the government." 23 It was also discharging its function of "administering the retirement program for government
officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement."
In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code with providing leadership and assistance "in the development and retention of
qualified and efficient work force in the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the "enforcement of the constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement
and the regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement of government officials and employees" (Section 16 [14]).
We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable
relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in
human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons. The policy considerations which guided the
Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of service allowable for compulsory retirees, were summarized by Grio-Aquino, J. in her dissenting
opinion in Cena:
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one
(1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a
younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified
young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government examination but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees"
who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they may
qualify for old-age pension. 24 (Emphasis supplied).
Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something that is, in itself, quite appropriate. At the same time, however, we are bound to note that
there should be countervailing stress on the interests of the employer agency and of other government employees as a whole. The results flowing from the striking down
of the limitation established in Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and inequitable," as suggested by Mme. Justice Grio-Aquino in her
dissenting opinion. An employee who has rendered only three (3) years of government service at age sixty-five (65) can have his service extended for twelve (12) years
and finally retire at the age of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the significance of the general principle of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65) very close to the
vanishing point.
The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel administration and management in the Civil Service, are aggravated when Cena is
considered together with the case of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission. 25 Toledo involved the provisions of Rule III, Section 22, of the Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which prohibited the appointment of persons fifty-seven (57) years old or above in government service without prior approval
of the Civil Service Commission. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 provided that a person fifty-seven (57) years of age may be appointed to
the Civil Service provided that the exigencies of the government service so required and provided that the appointee possesses special qualifications not possessed by
other officers or employees in the Civil Service and that the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees of the Civil Service. Petitioner
Toledo was appointed Manager of the Education and Information Division of the Commission on Elections when he was almost fifty-nine (59) years old. No authority
for such appointment had been obtained either from the President of the Philippines or from the Civil Service Commission and the Commission found that the other
conditions laid down in Section 22 of Rule III, CSRPAP, did not exist. The Court nevertheless struck down Section 22, Rule III on the same exceedingly restrictive view
of permissible administrative legislation that Cena relied on. 26
When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very strange results follow. Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age
may be appointed to the government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of his service for the next fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age seventy-
nine (79). The net effect is thus that the general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65) years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes
unenforceable. That general statutory policy may be seen to embody the notion that there should be a certain minimum turn-over in the government service and that
opportunities for government service should be distributed as broadly as possible, specially to younger people, considering that the bulk of our population is below
thirty (30) years of age. That same general policy also reflects the life expectancy of our people which is still significantly lower than the life expectancy of, e.g., people
in Northern and Western Europe, North America and Japan.
Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more
specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum
Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or
disallow extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of government service;
this discretion is, nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President dated 14 June 1988. It will be noted from the text
quoted supra (pp. 11-12) that the text itself of Memorandum Circular No. 65 (and for that matter, that of Memorandum Circular No. 163, also of the Office of the
President, dated 5 March 1968) 27 does not purport to apply only to officers or employees who have reached the age of sixty-five (65) years and who have at least fifteen
(l5) years of government service. We noted earlier that Cena interpreted Memorandum Circular No. 65 as referring only to officers and employees who have both
reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) and completed the fifteen (15) years of government service. Cena so interpreted this Memorandum Circular
22
precisely because Cena had reached the conclusion that employees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but who have less than fifteen (15) years of
government service, may be allowed such extension of service as may be needed to complete fifteen (15) years of service. In other words, Cena read Memorandum
Circular No. 65 in such a way as to comfort with Cena's own conclusion reached without regard to that Memorandum Circular. In view of the conclusion that we today
reached in the instant case, this last ruling of Cena is properly regarded as merely orbiter.
We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 is fully compatible with Office of the President's Memorandum
Circular No. 65; this question must be reserved for detailed analysis in some future justiciable case.
Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case, we believe and so hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992
dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed.
ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

RABOR V. CSC (1995)

"It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the
latter may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason
that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in
carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes." [18] (Italics supplied)
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators,
L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969,
29 SCRA 350). x x x. The rule on limiting to one year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years,
but has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no
relationship or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of
carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146." [16]

The Facts:
Sometime in May 1991,[1] Alma D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that
he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to
this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" [2] issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this
"Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-
legible initial with the following date "2/28/91."

In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City. Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:

"Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which
is hereunder quoted:
'Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely
meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.'

IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador [M.] Rabor as Utility Worker in that office, is already non-
extend[i]ble."[3]

Accordingly, on 8 August 1991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop
reporting for work effective August 16, 1991."[4]

Decision:

We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable
relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law.

"Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1)
give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the
latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various
government examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by 'extendees' who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their
government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension." [24] (Italics supplied

Applying now the results of our reexamination of the instant case, we believe and so hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the
appeal of petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed.

ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 03-9-02-SC November 27, 2008

RE: ENTITLEMENT TO HAZARD PAY OF SC MEDICAL AND DENTAL CLINIC PERSONNEL.

23
 RES OLUTIO N
TINGA, J.:
This administrative matter pertains to the latest of the spate of requests of some of the members of the Supreme Court Medical and Dental Services (SCMDS) Division
in relation to the grant of hazard allowance.
In the Court's Resolution1 of 9 September 2003, the SCMDS personnel were declared entitled to hazard pay according to the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7305,2 otherwise known as The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers. The resolution paved the way for the issuance of Administrative Circular No. 57-2004 3 which
prescribed the guidelines for the grant of hazard allowance in favor of the SCMDS personnel. Now, eleven members of the same office: namely, Ramon S. Armedilla,
Celeste P. Vista, Consuelo M. Bernal, Remedios L. Patricio, Madonna Catherine G. Dimaisip, Elmer A. Ruez, Marybeth V. Jurado, Mary Ann D. Barrientos, Angel S.
Ambata, Nora T. Juat and Geslaine C. Juan-question the wisdom behind the allocation of hazard pay to the SCMDS personnel at large in the manner provided in the
said circular.
Administrative Circular No. 57-2004 (the subject Circular) initially classified SCMDS employees according to the level of exposure to health hazards, as follows: (a)
physicians, dentists, nurses, medical technologists, nursing and dental aides, and physical therapists who render direct, actual and frequent medical services in the form
of consultation, examination, treatment and ancillary care, were said to be subject to high-risk exposure; and (b) psychologists, pharmacists, optometrists, clerks, data
encoders, utility workers, ambulance drivers, and administrative and technical support personnel, to low-risk exposure. 4 Accordingly, employees exposed to high-risk
hazards belonging to Salary Grade 19 and below, and those belonging to Salary Grade 20 and above, were respectively given 27% and 7% of their basic monthly
salaries as hazard allowances; whereas employees open to low-risk hazards belonging to Salary Grade 20 and above, and Salary Grade 19 and below, were respectively
given 5% and 25% of their basic monthly salaries as hazard allowances.5 This classification, however, was abolished when the Department of Health (DOH)-after
reviewing the corresponding job descriptions of the members of the SCMDS personnel and the nature of their exposure to hazards-directed that they should all be
entitled to a uniform hazard pay rate without regard for the nature of the risks and hazards to which they are exposed. 6 The dual 25% and 5% hazard allowance rates for
all the members of the SCMDS personnel were retained.
In their Letter7 dated 21 January 2005 addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., eleven of the SCMDS personnel concerned-who claim to be doctors with
salary grades higher than 198 and who allegedly render front-line and hands-on services but receive less hazard allowance allocations than do those personnel who do
not directly deliver patient care-lamented that the classification and the rates of hazard allowance implemented by the subject Circular seemed to favor only those
belonging to Salary Grade 19 and below, contrary to the very purpose of the grant which is to compensate health workers according to the degree of exposure to hazards
regardless of rank or status. They believe that the grant must be based
not on the salary grade but rather on the degree of hazard to which they are actually exposed; thus, they asked for a reexamination of the subject Circular. 9
However, even before the request could be acted upon by the Court, Secretary Francisco Duque III issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0011 10 on 16 May
2006. The administrative order prescribes amended guidelines in the payment of hazard pay applicable to all public health workers regardless of the nature of their
appointment. It essentially establishes a 25% hazard pay rate for health workers with salary grade 19 and below but fixed the hazard allowance of those occupying
positions belonging to Salary Grade 20 and above to P4,989.75 without further increases.11 In view of this development, some of the SCMDS personnel concerned,12 in
another Letter dated 19 December 2007 and addressed to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, suggesting that the subject Circular be amended to conform to A.O. No. 2006-
0011, and that they accordingly be paid hazard pay differentials accruing by virtue thereof.13
SCMDS Senior Chief Staff Officer Dr. Prudencio Banzon, Jr. indorsed the letter to Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer Atty. Eden Candelaria (Atty.
Candelaria).14 On 15 January 2008, Atty. Candelaria issued a Memorandum15 finding merit in the request to amend the subject Circular because A.O. No. 2006-0011
suggests more equitable guidelines on the allocation of hazard allowances among health workers in the government. 16 Accordingly, she recommended that: (a) the
classification as to whether employees are exposed to high or low-risk hazard, as found in the Circular, be abolished and instead replaced by the fixed rates provided in
A.O. No. 2006-0011; and that (b) the payment of the adjusted hazard allowance be charged against the regular savings of the Court. 17
In its Resolution18 dated 22 January 2008, the Court referred Atty. Candelaria's memorandum to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO) and to the Office of
the Chief Attorney (OCAT) for comment.
The OCAT posits that the subject Circular may not be amended in accordance with A.O. No. 2006-0011 and in the manner the personnel concerned desire because, first,
the mechanics of payment established by the administrative order is of doubtful validity; and second, the said administrative order has not been duly published and
hence not binding on the Court. 19 It also points out that the administrative order does not conform to Section 21 of R.A. No. 7305 in which the rates of hazard pay are
clearly based on salary grade.20
The FMBO advances a contrary position. It maintains that the subject Circular may be amended according to the terms of A.O. No. 2006-0011 inasmuch as the latter
could put to rest the objection of the personnel concerned to the allegedly unreasonable and unfair allocation of hazard pay. Additionally, it recommends that once the
amendment is made, the hazard allowances due the SCMDS personnel be charged against the savings from the regular appropriations of the Court. 21
This Court has to deny the request because the subject Circular cannot be amended according to the mechanism of hazard pay allocation under AO No. 2006-0011
without denigrating established administrative law principles.
Essentially, hazard pay is the premium granted by law to health workers who, by the nature of their work, are constantly exposed to various risks to health and safety. 22
Section 21 of R.A. No. 7305 provides:
SEC. 21. Hazard Allowance.-Public health workers in hospitals, sanitaria, rural health units, main health centers, health infirmaries, barangay health stations,
clinics and other health-related establishments located in difficult areas, strife-torn or embattled areas, distressed or isolated stations, prison camps, mental
hospitals, radiation-exposed clinics, laboratories or disease-infested areas or in areas declared under state of calamity or emergency for the duration thereof
which expose them to great danger, contagion, radiation, volcanic activity/eruption, occupational risks or perils to life as determined by the Secretary of
Health or the Head of the unit with the approval of the Secretary of Health, shall be compensated hazard allowances equivalent to at least twenty-five percent
(25%) of the monthly basic salary of health workers receiving salary grade 19 and below, and five percent (5%) for health workers with salary grade 20 and
above.
The implementing rules of R.A. No. 7305 likewise stipulate the same rates of hazard pay. Rule 7.1.5 thereof states:
7.1.5 Rates of Hazard Pay
a. Public health workers shall be compensated hazard allowances equivalent to at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the monthly basic salary of health
workers receiving salary grade 19 and below, and five percent (5%) for health workers with salary grade 20 and above. This may be granted on a monthly,
quarterly or annual basis. x x x
In a language too plain to be mistaken, R.A. No. 7305 and its implementing rules mandate that the allocation and distribution of hazard allowances to public health
workers within each of the two salary grade brackets at the respective rates of 25% and 5% be based on the salary grade to which the covered employees belong. These
same rates have in fact been incorporated into the subject Circular to apply to all SCMDS personnel. The computation of the hazard allowance due should, in turn, be
based on the corresponding basic salary attached to the position of the employee concerned.
To be sure, the law and the implementing rules obviously prescribe the minimum rates of hazard pay due all health workers in the government, as in fact this is evident
in the self-explanatory phrase "at least" used in both the law and the rules. No compelling argument may thus be offered against the competence of the DOH to
prescribe, by rules or orders, higher rates of hazard allowance, provided that the same fall within the limits of the law. As the lead agency in the implementation of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7305, it has in fact been invested with such power by Section 35.23 Be that as it may, the question that arises is whether that power is broad
enough to vest the DOH with authority to fix an exact amount of hazard pay accruing to public health workers with Salary Grade 20 and above, deviating from the 5%
monthly salary benchmark prescribed by both the law and its implementing rules.
The DOH possesses no such power.
Fundamental is the precept in administrative law that the rule-making power delegated to an administrative agency is limited and defined by the statute conferring the
power. For this reason, valid objections to the exercise of this power lie where it conflicts with the authority granted by the legislature. 24
24
A mere fleeting glance at A.O. No. 2006-0011 readily reveals that the DOH, in issuing the said administrative order, has exceeded its limited power of implementing the
provisions of R.A. No. 7305. It undoubtedly sought to modify the rates of hazard pay and the mechanism for its allocation under both the law and the implementing
rules by prescribing a uniform rate-let alone a fixed and exact amount-of hazard allowance for government health workers occupying positions with salary grade 20 and
above. The effect of this measure can hardly be downplayed especially in view of the unmistakable import of the law to establish a scalar allocation of hazard
allowances among public health workers within each of the two salary grade brackets.
Section 1925 of R.A. No. 7305 recognizes, for its own purposes, the applicability of the provisions of R.A. No. 6758 26 (The Salary Standardization Act of 1989) in the
determination of the salary scale of all covered public health workers. Telling is this reference to the scalar schedule of salaries when viewed in light of the fact that
factoring in the salaries of individual employees and the applicable uniform rate of hazard allowance would yield different results which, when charted against each
other, would also bear the scalar schedule intended by the law.
The object, in other words, of both the law and its implementing rules in providing a uniform rate for each of the two groups of public health workers is to establish a
scalar allocation of the cash equivalents of the hazard allowance within each of the two groups. A scalar schedule of hazard pay allocation within the Salary Grade 20
and higher bracket can indeed be achieved only by multiplying the basic monthly salary of the covered employees by a constant factor that is 25% as the fixed legal
rate. Even without an express reference to the scalar schedule of salaries under R.A. No. 6758, it can nevertheless be inferred that R.A. No. 7305, by mandating a fixed
rate of hazard allowance for each of the two groups of health workers, intends to achieve the same effect.
Hence, it can only be surmised that the issuance of AO No. 2006-0011 is an attempt to amend the rates of hazard allowance and the mechanism for its allocation as
provided for in R.A. No. 7305 and the implementing rules because it has the effect of obliterating the intended discrepancy in the cash equivalents of the hazard
allowance for employees falling within the bracket of Salary Grade 20 and above. Without unnecessarily belaboring this point, the Court finds that the administrative
order violates the established principle that administrative issuances cannot amend an act of Congress. 27 It is void on its face, but only insofar as it prescribes a
predetermined exact amount in cash of the hazard allowance for public health workers with Salary Grade 20 and above.
Indeed, when an administrative agency enters into the exercise of the specific power of implementing a statute, it is bound by what is provided for in the same
legislative enactment28 inasmuch as its rule-making power is a delegated legislative power which may not be used either to abridge the authority given by the Congress
or the Constitution or to enlarge the power beyond the scope intended.29 The power may not be validly extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for its
just and reasonable execution. 30 In other words, the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out
the provisions of a law, inasmuch as the power is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. 31 Therefore, such rules and regulations must not be
inconsistent with the provisions of existing laws, particularly the statute being administered and implemented by the agency concerned, 32 that is to say, the statute to
which the issuance relates. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as
with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it.33
It must be stressed that the DOH issued the rules and regulations implementing the provisions of R.A. 7305 pursuant to the authority expressly delegated by Congress.
Hence, the DOH, as the delegate administrative agency, cannot contravene the law from which its rule-making authority has emanated. As the clich goes, the spring
cannot rise higher than its source.34 In this regard, Fisher observes:
x x x The often conflicting and ambiguous passages within a law must be interpreted by executive officials to construct the purpose and intent of Congress.
As important as intent is the extent to which a law is carried out. President Taft once remarked, "Let anyone make the laws of the country, if I can
construe them."
To carry out the laws, administrators issue rules and regulations of their own. The courts long ago appreciated this need. Rules and regulations "must be
received as the acts of the executive, and as such, be binding upon all within the sphere of his legal and constitutional authority. Current law authorizes the
head of an executive department or military department to prescribe regulations "for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the
distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property.
These duties, primarily of a "housekeeping" nature, relate only distantly to the citizenry. Many regulations, however, bear directly on the public. It is here
that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policymaking
that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and
regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. Agency rulemaking must rest on authority granted directly or indirectly by
Congress.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, although an administrative agency is authorized to exercise its discretion in the exercise of its power of subordinate legislation, nevertheless, no similar
authority exists to validate an arbitrary or capricious enactment of rules and regulations. 36 Rules which have the effect of extending or conflicting with the authority-
granting statute do not represent a valid exercise of rule-making power but constitute an attempt by the agency to legislate. 37 In such a situation, it is said that the
issuance becomes void not only for being ultra vires but also for being unreasonable.38 The law therefore prevails over the administrative issuance.39
The Court takes notice of the fact that the enactment of R.A. No. 7305 has touched off, within the public health service sector, a surge of negative sentiments regarding
the alleged inequitableness and unfairness of the law-particularly the provisions thereof relating to the allocation of hazard allowances. Certainly, the DOH can be
reasonably expected to respond to the well-meaning clamor of the public health workers; but while indeed the DOH is entitled to a certain amount of hegemony over
the statutes which it is tasked to administer, it nevertheless may not go far beyond the letter of the law even if it does perceive that it is acting in the furtherance of the
spirit of the law.40
A final note. Just as the power of the DOH to issue rules and regulations is confined to the clear letter of the law, the Court's hands are likewise tied to interpreting and
applying the law. In other words, the Court cannot infuse vitality, let alone a semblance of validity, to an issuance which on its face is inconsistent with the law and
therefore void, by adopting its terms and in effect implementing the same-lest we otherwise validate an undue exercise by the DOH of its delegated and limited power
of implementation. Suffice it to say that questions relative to the seeming unfairness and inequitableness of the law are matters that lie well within the legitimate powers
of Congress and are well beyond the competence of the Court to address.
In light of the foregoing, there appears to be no more necessity to discuss the issue of the non-publication of A.O. No. 2006-0011.
WHEREFORE, the request of the Supreme Court Medical and Dental Services Division to amend Administrative Circular (A.C.) No. 57-2004 according to the
provisions of Department of Health Administrative Order No. 2006-0011 is DENIED. The Court DIRECTS that the payment of hazard allowance in favor of the
personnel concerned be made in accordance with A.C. No. 57-2004.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
The SC medical and dental services division was entitled through hazard pay through RA 7305 also known as the Magna Carta for Public Workers. This paved the way
for the issuance Of Administration Circular no. 57
2004 which prescribed the guidelines of thegrant of hazard allowance in favor of the SCMDS personnel. The circular initially classified SCMDS employees according
to levels of exposure to health hazards and not on salary grades alone. But DOH abolished the classification and declared that a uniform hazardpay rate should be given
without regard for the nature of the risks and hazards to which they are exposed. Thus, SMBS personnelrequested that the hazard pay must be granted.
Issue: Does the DBM have authority to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court personnel on matters of compensation?
Ruling:The role of the DBM is supervisorial in nature. Itsman duty is to ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits, and other incentives to be given to
officials and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws. Thus,its authority to review SC issuances is relative to the court
personnel on matters of compensation is very limited, circumscribed as it isby the constitution. Fiscal autonomy makes freedom from outside controls pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 3.The court in its ruling hasto deny the request because the subject circular cannot be amended according to the mechanism of hazard pay
allocation under AO2006 0011.

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