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Industrials: Another giant enters Indian T&D market Change, basis points
Infrastructure: Premium restructuring may not be enough; cancel and rebid 12-Sep 1-day 1-mo 3-mo
Top movers
Change, %
Best performers 12-Sep 1-day 1-mo 3-mo
HCLT IN Equity 1074.4 0.7 14.2 41.8
WPRO IN Equity 471.9 (0.7) 0.9 38.8
TCS IN Equity 1967.9 (1.3) 8.1 36.1
RCOM IN Equity 141.3 (1.8) 7.1 33.9
SESA IN Equity 183.5 (2.5) 34.8 31.4
Worst performers
MMTC IN Equity 53.2 (2.1) 3.0 (71.9)
FTECH IN Equity 217.4 18.1 28.3 (71.1)
UNBK IN Equity 119.1 1.1 (1.1) (42.7)
TPW IN Equity 73.6 0.8 (11.5) (41.1)
BOI IN Equity 165.8 (1.0) (7.7) (40.8)
For Private Circulation Only. FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT KOTAK SECURITIES RATING SYSTEM AND OTHER DISCLOSURES.
REFER TO THE END OF THIS MATERIAL.
Strategy.dot
INDIA
Strategy
INDIA SEPTEMBER 13, 2013
UPDATE
BSE-30: 19,782
Trade secrets. It may be too early to assume that Indias trade deficit and CAD problems
have been addressed based on low trade deficit figures for June-August 2013. Lower
gold imports over this period may simply reflect the temporary impact of the RBIs curbs
on gold-on-lease arrangements rather than a fundamental downshift in gold demand in
India. Also, granular data on exports for July-August 2013 (not yet available) would be
helpful in appreciating the sustainability of the recent strength in Indias exports.
QUICK NUMBERS
Too early to assume that gold imports are under control; consumption is key and not imports
Low gold imports in the past three months (see Exhibit 5) have helped reduce Indias trade deficit
to a more manageable US$11-12 bn per month. However, we are not sure if the reduction in gold
imports is permanent or a temporary phenomenon due to restrictions on gold-on-lease schemes
earlier available to the industry. Also, large imports in April-May may have obviated the need of
imports in subsequent months. We would rest easy if there is evidence of lower gold consumption
rather than of imports for a few months; a domestic transaction tax on gold will help significantly
in controlling the use of gold as a store of black money and reduce consumption considerably.
With the likely tapering of the US Feds bond buyback program, India may have to contend with Sanjeev Prasad
volatility in capital flows arising from global factors. Any hardening of yields globally will reduce sanjeev.prasad@kotak.com
Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1229
Indias appeal as a destination for short-term debt flows and render domestic efforts to attract
debt capital flows meaningless. We believe the focus should be on (1) curtailing CAD by cutting Akhilesh Tilotia
akhilesh.tilotia@kotak.com
out superfluous imports and (2) encouraging equity flows rather than financing the CAD through Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1139
debt flows. India has very low exposure to short-term foreign currency debt (excluding trade credit
Sunita Baldawa
and NRI deposits; see Exhibit 6) and it would be in Indias longer-term financial interest to avoid sunita.baldawa@kotak.com
the temptation of borrowing aggressively to finance a recalcitrant CAD. Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1325
For private Circulation Only. FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT KOTAK SECURITIES RATING SYSTEM AND OTHER DISCLOSURES, REFER TO THE END OF THIS MATERIAL.
Strategy India
20
10
-
(9.8)
(14.2) (12.2) (12.3) (10.9)
(10) (16.9) (15.5)
(18.1) (17.8) (20.0) (18.2)
(20)
Sep-12
Aug-12
Oct-12
Nov-12
Dec-12
Jan-13
Feb-13
Mar-13
Apr-13
May-13
Jun-13
Jul-13
Aug-13
Source: Ministry of Finance, Kotak Institutional Equities
Exhibit 2: Stress on the BOP expected to continue with wide CAD and volatile capital flows
India's balance of payments, March fiscal year-ends, 2011-14E (US$ bn)
2014E
2011 2012 2013 Oil@100 Oil@105 Oil@110
Current account (45.9) (78.2) (88.2) (67.9) (73.6) (79.3)
GDP 1,708 1,871 1,842 1,840 1,840 1,840
CAD/GDP (%) (2.7) (4.2) (4.8) (3.7) (4.0) (4.3)
Trade balance (130.6) (189.8) (195.7) (179.5) (185.2) (190.9)
Trade balance/GDP (%) (7.7) (10.3) (10.6) (9.8) (10.1) (10.4)
- Exports 250 310 307 308 310 312
- Imports 381 500 502 487 495 503
- oil imports 105 155 170 154 162 169
- non-oil imports 276 345 332 333 333 333
Invisibles (net) 85 112 107 112 112 112
- Services 49 64 65 71 71 71
- software 53 61 64 69 69 69
- non-software (4.4) 3.1 1.4 2.0 2.0 2.0
- Transfers 53 63 64 65 65 65
- Income (net) (17.3) (16.0) (21.5) (24.0) (24.0) (24.0)
Capital account 62.1 67.8 89.4 77.0 77.0 77.0
Percentage of GDP 3.7 3.7 4.9 4.2 4.2 4.2
Foreign investment 39.7 39.2 46.7 35.0 35.0 35.0
- FDI 9.4 22.1 19.8 20.0 20.0 20.0
- FII 30.3 17.2 26.9 15.0 15.0 15.0
- Equities 18.9 7.1 23.3
- Debt 10.5 9.8 4.3
Banking capital 5.0 16.2 16.6 17.0 17.0 17.0
- NRI deposits 3.2 11.9 14.8 12.0 12.0 12.0
Short-term credit 11.0 6.7 21.7 20.0 20.0 20.0
ECBs 12.5 10.3 8.5 8.0 8.0 8.0
External assistance 4.9 2.3 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Other capital account items (11.0) (6.9) (5.0) (5.0) (5.0) (5.0)
E&O (3.0) (2.4) 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Overall balance 13.1 (12.8) 3.9 9.1 3.4 (2.3)
Memo items
Average USD/INR 45.63 47.96 54.41 60.24 60.24 60.24
Average crude (US$/bbl) 85.1 111.7 108.2 100.0 105.0 110.0
Exhibit 3: Sustainability of the recent pick-up in exports will be important to manage the CAD
Yoy growth in imports and exports, March fiscal year-ends, 2013-14 (%)
15
Exports Imports
10
0
Aug-12
Oct-12
Nov-12
Dec-12
Jan-13
Feb-13
Mar-13
Apr-13
Sep-12
May-13
Jun-13
Aug-13
Jul-13
(5)
(10)
Exhibit 4: April-June 2013 data did not show any meaningful pick-up in the major export segments
India's major export items, March fiscal year-ends, 2013-14 (US$ bn)
8 7.2 7.5
6.8 6.9
7
5.7 5.5
6 5.3
5 4.5
4
3.1
3 2.5
2.0 2.2
2
1 0.7
0
Aug-12
Sep-12
Oct-12
Nov-12
Dec-12
Jan-13
Feb-13
Mar-13
Apr-13
May-13
Jun-13
Aug-13
Jul-13
Exhibit 6: India has very low exposure to short-term foreign currency debt
Components of short-term debt by residual maturity, 2013 (US$ bn)
Short-term Long-term
< 1 year 1-2 years 2-3 years > 3 years
1. Sovereign debt (long-term) 5.6 5.8 6.0 60.4
2. External Commercial Borrowings 21.0 19.7 23.6 80.3
3. NRI deposits 49.0 7.3 4.5 10.0
FCNR(B) 11.8 1.6 1.1 0.7
NR(E)RA 29.6 4.6 3.0 8.7
NRO 7.6 1.0 0.4 0.7
4. Short-term debt (Original maturity) 96.7
Total (1 to 4) 172.3 32.7 34.2 150.8
Memo Items
ST debt (Residual maturity, % of external debt) 44.2 8.4 8.8 38.7
ST debt (Residual maturity, % of Reserves) 59.0 11.2 11.7 51.6
Analysts meet highlights. Tech Mahindra reiterated its ambition to reach revenues of Price (`): 1,333
US$5 bn 2015 and expressed confidence that it would better industry growth in FY2014. Target price (`): 1,500
The company has taken several steps to strengthen core areas, such as greater emphasis
BSE-30: 19,997
on cross-sell of services, hiring of senior sales professionals and reorganization on the
enterprise side, to achieve near-term and longer-term objectives. While the company still
has a lot of work to do on the enterprise side, improved deal wins give us confidence
about the near term. Inexpensive valuations of 9.8X FY2015E EPS offer good upside.
We retain ADD with an increased target price of `1,500 (`1,430 earlier).
Tech Mahindra (TM) said it was confident of growing in line with or bettering industry growth on
an organic basis in FY2014 and FY2015. The recent depreciation of the Rupee against the US
Dollar offers TM comfort in keeping EBITDA margins at 20-21%. While management expectations
of organic growth in FY2014 appear stretched, recent deal wins offer the comfort of improved
growth trajectory. We forecast 7.2% organic revenue growth in FY2014.
The management also reiterated its stretched revenue target of US$5 bn by 2015. TM indicated
the path to this revenue target had been drilled down to unit-level targets though it did not wish
to share specifics. While inorganic initiatives will be an important element in achieving the
US$5 bn number, TM will not acquire just to bulk-up or meet a target. Instead acquisitions will
focus on (1) geographic expansion, (2) capabilities, especially in financial services, and (3) platforms.
TM is a leader in the telecom vertical and is confident of strong growth despite severe headwinds.
TM is structured around six pillars of differentiationend-to-end services in infrastructure
management, networks, enterprise, mobility, analytics and security. These service offerings can
address requirements of the entire CxO level. TM derives 32% of revenues from non-traditional
services in telcos. TM has taken several organic and inorganic measures to defend or increase its
lead; some of the inorganic ones are the acquisitions of HGS and Comviva. Kawaljeet Saluja
kawaljeet.saluja@kotak.com
Growth at inexpensive valuations; ADD Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1243
We believe TMs recent measures will help to drive revenue growth in the medium term and Rohit Chordia
rohit.chordia@kotak.com
organic revenue growth is likely to be in line with industry growth from FY2015. Rupee Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1397
depreciation will help to ease margin pressure of new-deal-ramp-up and business investments.
Shyam M.
The stock trades at 9.8X FY2015E earnings and offers reasonable upside. We maintain our ADD
shyam.m@kotak.com
rating with a 12-month forward target price of `1,500, valuing the company at 11X earnings. Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1470
For private Circulation Only. FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT KOTAK SECURITIES RATING SYSTEM AND OTHER DISCLOSURES, REFER TO THE END OF THIS MATERIAL.
Technology Tech Mahindra
` TM has revamped its sales structure with a separate sales force for each vertical in well
developed geographies like the US and the UK. In other areas like continental Europe,
APAC and the Middle East, TM has hired new sales leaders to drive improved new-deal
participation and wins. It has identified key accounts to focus on to drive improved
account mining.
` IMS contributes 17% of overall company revenues and TM draws heavily on its
experience in managing data centers and networks for large telcos. It expects the market
spend to grow in this area with focus largely on storage, networks and computing
capabilities.
Exhibit 1: Consolidated financials for Tech Mahindra, March fiscal year-ends (` mn), 2013-2016E
Rich multiples in a challenging environment. We met the management of Castrol Price (`): 319
India recently. The company is wary of contraction in margins due to sharp depreciation Target price (`): 230
of Rupee. While an imminent price hike may mitigate the loss of margins, it will not
BSE-30: 19,782
augur well for volumes given a subdued demand situation for lubricants in India. Rich
valuations reflect higher expectations, which may be difficult to meet in a challenging
macro-environment. We retain SELL rating with a TP of `230 (`240 previously).
` Price hike in the near term. The company is planning to increase prices of key products in the
automotive segment following some stability in Rupee exchange rate. The management is
expecting price hikes across the industry given that the competition is operating at relatively
lower margins (than Castrol), which leaves limited headroom against rising raw material costs.
` Subdued outlook on volumes. Castrol maintained its subdued outlook on lubricant sales
volumes in the near term given (1) declining automobile sales and (2) slowdown in industrial
output. The management is also wary of potential loss in market share due to down-trading by
consumers given an inflationary environment.
We have reduced our CY2013-15E EPS estimates to `9.8, `10.3 and `11.4 from `10, `10.9 and
`12 to reflect (1) weaker exchange rate assumptions, (2) lower volumes, (3) higher realizations and
(4) other minor changes. We do not rule out downside risks to our generous assumptions(1) 2%
growth in volumes in CY2014-15E versus 4.7% yoy decline in 1HCY13 and (2) ~90 bps expansion
in EBITDA margins to 23.1% by CY2015E reflecting our assumption of increase in net realizations
to ~`80/liter in CY2014E versus `71/liter in 1HCY13.
Tarun Lakhotia
Retain SELL given rich valuations tarun.lakhotia@kotak.com
Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1188
We maintain our SELL rating on the stock with a revised target price of `230 (`240 previously)
based on 22X forward EPS. Expensive valuations at 31X forward EPS (see Exhibit 1) despite weaker Vinay Kumar
vinay.h.kumar@kotak.com
earnings profile (even on generous assumptions) as compared to FMCG companies (see Exhibit 2) Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1216
constrain us from taking a positive stance on the stock.
For private Circulation Only. FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT KOTAK SECURITIES RATING SYSTEM AND OTHER DISCLOSURES, REFER TO THE END OF THIS MATERIAL.
Castrol India Energy
Exhibit 1: Castrol stock is trading near its peak multiple at 31X forward earnings
12-month forward P/E for Castrol India
(X)
40
CSTRL 12-month forward P/E
35
30
25
Five-year average P/E
20
15
10
-
Jan-02
Jul-02
Jan-03
Jul-03
Jan-04
Jul-04
Jan-05
Jul-05
Jan-06
Jul-06
Jan-07
Jul-07
Jan-08
Jul-08
Jan-09
Jul-09
Jan-10
Jul-10
Jan-11
Jul-11
Jan-12
Jul-12
Jan-13
Jul-13
Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities estimates
Exhibit 2: Valuation summary of consumer sector companies, March fiscal year-ends, 2012-15E
Notes:
(a) Calendar year-ends; FY2012 represents CY2011.
Key assumptions
Exhibit 3 gives the key assumptions behind our earnings estimates. We discuss the same in
detail below.
` Volumes. We model ~2% yoy increase in sales volumes for CY2014-15E and a decline of
1.9% in CY2013E versus a decline of 4.7% yoy in 1HCY13 and 2% yoy in CY2012. The
decline in sales volume in the recent years presumably reflects loss of market share.
` Lubes prices. We model blended realization for lubes to increase by 4-5% in CY2013-
14E and ~2% in CY2015E.
` Exchange rate assumption. We have revised our exchange rate assumptions for
CY2013, CY2014 and CY2015 to `58.5/US$, `62.5/US$ and `62/US$ versus `56.75/US$,
`57.75/US$ and `57/US$ earlier.
Exhibit 4: Castrol has high leverage to exchange rate and raw material prices
Sensitivity of Castrol's earnings to key variables
Exhibit 5: Castrol: Profit model, balance sheet, cash model, calendar year-ends, 2009-15E (` mn)
Ratios (%)
RoAE 83.8 100.4 90.4 79.0 82.8 102.8 146.4
RoACE 84.1 100.6 88.2 79.3 80.9 103.1 146.8
Assumptions
Volume (mn litres) 204.5 219.1 208.7 203.9 200.1 204.1 208.2
Gross realization (Rs/lt) 113.3 124.8 142.9 153.1 160.4 167.0 170.3
Net realization (Rs/lt) 59.8 60.7 61.1 63.4 70.4 74.8 79.9
EBITDA margin (%) 24.8 26.5 22.1 19.9 21.2 21.8 23.1
FY2013 annual report analysis. In FY2013, Sunteck recorded its first year of positive Price (`): 310
cash flow from operations. This was a result of progressive collections from BKC Target price (`): 560
projects with no expenditure on land and low construction spends. Restructuring of
BSE-30: 19,782
select joint ventures (JVs) resulted in increase in medium-term commitments and in
incremental stake in its high-value projects. However, construction pick-up remains a
concern and has not matched its smart land acquisitions. We maintain a positive stance,
with a target price of `560.
Sunteck used its equity and structured debt raised (over FY2006-11) to acquire high-value (high
margin) projects in Mumbai (see Exhibit 2). These projects helped Sunteck to establish a strong
project portfolio in the Mumbai market. In FY2013, Sunteck did not spend on land acquisition
(versus expenditures each year over FY2006-12). This, along with the progressive collections made
from its residential projects, was used to pare secured debt raised in over FY2011-12. Debt
reduced by `1.6 bn in FY2013.
Sunteck restructured a few joint ventures (JVs) in FY2013. This resulted in (1) Sunteck letting go of
its stake in a project (Thane), (2) conversion of `2.75 bn worth of OCRPS into debt and (3) increase
in Suntecks stake in two high-value projects. This restructuring will increase expenditure related to
(a) approval-related expenses and (3) repayment of debt over the next three years. Expected
revenue recognition from four projects in FY2014 is also likely to result in over `2 bn of tax outgo.
Although we expect debt to increase in FY2014, we are confident about Suntecks growth as it
has a collections order-book of about `14 bn from area sold and over `62 bn of unsold stock in its
ongoing projects.
The MDA and chairmans address emphasize increase in employee strength in the construction
vertical. Sunteck needs to ramp up its slow constructionit completed only 0.23 mn sq. ft of
projects until March 2013. Sunteck recently strengthened its construction team by recruiting
industry experts. We expect the company to have a shortened project-monetization cycle in future.
Guidance from the chairmans address indicates completion of four projects in FY2014.
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Sunteck Realty Real Estate
Exhibit 1: No land acquisition in FY2013 resulted in reduction in debt from operating cash flows
Sunteck: Cash flow model, March fiscal year-ends, 2009-14E (` mn)
However, we expect cash flow from operations to be negative again in FY2014 and hence
lead to increase in debt with increased outgo on (1) approval costs, (2) repayment of Ajay
Piramal Group (APG) debt and (3) likely addition of the Goregaon (W) land parcel acquired
in FY2013 on books.
Certain JVs were restructured in FY2013. This resulted in increase in stake of Sunteck at its
BKC, Mumbai projects while it let go of its interest in the JV holding of a proposed project in
Thane. Also, certain Optionally Convertible Redeemable Preference Shares (OCRPS) allotted
to APG were converted into debt with a defined repayment schedule (see Exhibit 3). As per
the management, this debt has to be repaid over three years, with a minimum payment of
`375 mn in FY2014.
` Although minimal (as few projects under construction), debtors of `540 mn in FY2013
represent actual debtors (not from revenue recognized in the income statement). They
represent money called and not collected from buyers at the end of an accounting period.
Exhibit 4: Balance sheet remains well capitalized with a strong sales order book and high-margin projects
Sunteck: Balance sheet, March fiscal year-ends, 2009-13 (` mn)
Another giant enters Indian T&D market. Toshiba is set to enter the Indian T&D
equipment market through acquisition of Vijai Electricals Hyderabad facility for US$200
mn, with a long-term plan of adding more product, R&D capabilities and use it as a
manufacturing hub for global markets. In the near-term, market is crowded with weak
demand and excess supply, leading to margin pressure. While competition would
increase, it may not disturb recent stability in pricing as it is local mfg. based competition.
Toshiba to acquire Vijai Electricals facility; to enter a crowded Indian electrical equipment market
Toshiba Corp., Japan is set to acquire a major portion of Vijai Electricals T&D business with an aim
to enter the crowded space of the Indian electrical equipment manufacturing market. The
acquisition would help the company to enter the Indian market through an already established
manufacturing base. Toshiba also plans to expand it by integrating its own design and
manufacturing technologies for T&D systems, expanding into other product segments in power
electronics systems and railway power supply systems and use this facility as a manufacturing hub
for its international markets. While it would increase competition, it may possibly not disturb
recent stability in pricing as it is local mfg. based competition.
Vijai Electricals is a power and distribution transformer manufacturer with manufacturing facilities
in Hyderabad, Haridwar, Brazil and Mexico. It recorded revenue of about `13 bn in FY2012 (`18.8
bn in FY2011) based on Capital-line data. While most of the business is focused on distribution
transformers, Vijai also has capacity in the Extra High Voltage segment and switchgears.
The Indian electrical-equipment industry declined by 8% in FY2013 (6-7% growth in FY2012). The
decline was the first in the past 10 years according to industry data by IEEMA. The decline was
attributed to sluggish domestic demand, significant project delays and intense international
competition. The T&D equipment space had a market size of about `640 bn in FY2012 (declined
to about `590 bn in FY2013) primarily comprising transformers (19%), transmission lines and
conductors (23%), switchgear and control equipment (15%) and cables (28%).
PGCIL ordering activity remained relatively low in 1HFY14 after a slow FY2013 (declined 27% yoy
post adjusting for a large HVDC order last year) led by a decline in almost all segments.
While we note some moderation in international competition (especially in the equipment space,
based on market share), international players still have a meaningful market share (about 28% in
equipment orders). Also, international players continued to dominate the substation segment with
about 61% share in 1HFY14 (about 68% in FY2013).
Lokesh Garg
lokesh.garg@kotak.com
Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1496
Supriya Subramanian
supriya.subramanian@kotak.com
Mumbai: +44-20-79776918
Aditya Mongia
aditya.mongia@kotak.com
Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1453
For private Circulation Only. FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT KOTAK SECURITIES RATING SYSTEM AND OTHER DISCLOSURES, REFER TO THE END OF THIS MATERIAL.
India Industrials
While Toshibas joint venture with BHEL (for generation equipment) did not make significant
progress, the company this time plans to enter the Indian market through an already
established manufacturing base (rather than set up green-field facilities). Toshiba plans to
use the existing manufacturing base, expand it and integrate its own design and
manufacturing technologies for T&D systems. The company also plans to expand into other
products in the power electronics systems and railway power supply systems areas. Toshiba
aims to secure 20% market share within five years.
Apart from access to the Indian market, Toshiba plans to use this facility as a manufacturing
hub for its international markets.
Exhibit 1: Summary financial highlights of Vijai Electricals, March fiscal year-ends, 2003-12 (Rs mn)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Balance sheet
Share capital 79 79 79 79 874 909 909 909 909 909
Reserves & surplus 139 274 496 938 1,026 3,320 3,941 3,945 4,132 4,297
Networth 218 353 575 1,017 1,900 4,229 4,850 4,854 5,040 5,206
Total capital employed 1,030 1,051 1,446 2,056 4,979 8,574 11,642 13,789 12,357 13,305
Gross Block 416 761 872 1,103 1,356 1,829 4,106 5,368 6,002 6,328
Net working capital 479 461 718 1,209 2,936 4,479 6,044 7,840 6,314 7,345
Income statement
Net Sales 1,185 1,746 2,668 5,408 8,494 13,211 13,294 14,246 16,090 18,836 13,047
Operating expenses (943) (1,407) (2,250) (4,579) (6,943) (10,766) (11,592) (12,861) (14,667) (16,907) (13,153)
EBITDA 241 339 418 829 1,551 2,446 1,702 1,385 1,423 1,929 (106)
Other Income 18 29 69 74 131 186 300 324 475 109 210
Interest cost (95) (91) (78) (118) (239) (461) (829) (1,327) (1,342) (1,438) (1,848)
Depreciation (21) (27) (46) (55) (70) (94) (162) (278) (302) (330) (346)
PBT 143 250 363 730 1,373 2,077 1,011 105 254 270 (2,090)
Tax paid (8) (96) (123) (269) (475) (721) (363) (84) (51) (85) 79
PAT 135 154 240 461 898 1,356 648 21 203 185 (2,010)
Exhibit 2: Electrical equipment market declines for the first time in 10 years
Industry size of major T&D equipment, March fiscal year-ends, 2006-13 (Rs bn)
390
400
300
180
200
100
-
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
The industry decline was led by the transformers segment (declined by 26%) and the
capacitors segment (declined by 24%). All segments except the transmission segment
recorded a yoy decline in FY2013.
180,000
160,000
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
-
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
The T&D equipment space had a market size of about `640 bn in FY2012 (which declined to
about `590 bn in FY2013) primarily comprising the transformers (19%), transmission lines
and conductors (23%), switchgear and control equipment (15%) and cables (28%)
segments.
Capacitors
Energy Meters 1%
4%
Rotating Machines Transformers
10% 19%
Cables
28% Transmission Line
& Conductors
23%
Switchgear &
Controlgear
15%
We note that most of the leading transformer manufacturers have overcapacity with
utilization levels of 55-65%.
Exhibit 6: Installed manufacturing capacity and production levels of key transformer companies in India, March fiscal year-ends, 2009-12
(MVA)
Overcapacity and sluggish demand led to a sharp decline in segment margins over the past
few years.
Exhibit 7: We note a sharp decline in transformer company margins over the past few years
EBIT margin trend of domestic transformer companies, March fiscal year-ends, 2008-1QFY14
16.0
12.0
8.0
4.0
-
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
1QFY13
2QFY13
3QFY13
4QFY13
2013
1QFY14
Note:
Companies included in computing the sector EBIT margin include Crompton's standalone power, Alstom
T&D, Voltamp Transformers and TRIL
Note that PGCIL had announced `161 bn of awards in FY2013, significantly lower than
`219 bn awarded in FY2012, despite ordering being supported by an `25 bn HVDC order to
Alstom Grid in 1QFY13.
(Rs bn)
200 182
Rs53 bn HVDC order
153
160
Rs25 bn HVDC order
120 102
93 92
80 69
49
42 37
40 30 28
-
1HFY09
2HFY09
1HFY10
2HFY10
1HFY11
2HFY11
1HFY12
2HFY12
1HFY13
2HFY13
1HFY14
Source: PGCIL, Kotak Institutional Equities
The overall 27% decline (adjusted for a large substation order) in 1HFY14 ordering was led
by (1) a sharp decline in tower and transmission line ordering (by over 38% yoy), (2) a dip in
substation ordering (by 22% yoy) after strong ordering in FY2013 and (3) continuing weak
equipment ordering (down 15% yoy despite a low base in FY2013).
-
Tower Conductor Equipment Substation
However international players still have a meaningful market share with about 28% of
PGCIL equipment orders being placed on international players in 1HFY14 (versus an average
of about 54% in FY2013). Further, international players continue to dominate the substation
segment, winning about 61% of PGCILs substation orders in 1HFY14 (about 68% in
FY2013).
Exhibit 9: PGCIL equipment and substation ordering on domestic and international players, March fiscal year ends, 2009-1HFY14
2009 2010 2011 2012 1Q13 2Q13 3Q13 4Q13 2013 1Q14 2Q14 1HFY14
Equipment (transformer, reactor and insulator) ordering
Domestic 11,056 20,116 9,577 12,307 1,389 726 1,349 1,142 4,606 1,067 2,614 3,681
Chinese/Korean 6,060 12,012 4,677 15,724 3,310 1,920 2,307 13 7,550 472 932 1,404
Others 32 73 0 0 0 0
JV 4,526 1,444 339 1,027 1,123 3,934 2,670 0 2,670
Total 17,116 32,127 14,286 32,629 6,143 2,986 4,683 2,278 16,090 4,210 3,546 7,756
Foreign share 35% 37% 33% 53% 61% 68% 56% 15% 54% 30% 26% 28%
Substation ordering
Domestic 25,315 19,300 37,882 23,846 2,517 4,013 5,403 5,530 17,463 2,712 2,621 5,333
China/Korean 3,027 556 2,209 7,496 687 1,427 9,610 7,233 944 8,177
Europe (ABB/Alstom T&D) 30,746 24,952 1,022 65 26,039 0 0 0
Others 748 748 0 0 0
JV 1,133 0 0 0 0
Total 25,315 22,327 69,184 27,188 35,714 5,035 6,155 6,957 53,861 9,945 3,565 13,510
Foreign share 0% 14% 45% 9% 93% 20% 12% 21% 68% 73% 26% 61%
Total equipment and substation ordering
Domestic 36,371 39,416 47,459 36,153 3,906 4,740 6,752 6,672 22,069 3,779 5,235 9,014
JV 0 0 0 5,659 1,444 339 1,027 1,123 3,934 2,670 0 2,670
Overseas 6,060 15,039 36,011 18,006 36,506 2,942 3,059 1,440 43,947 7,705 1,876 9,581
Total 42,430 54,454 83,470 59,818 41,856 8,021 10,838 9,235 69,950 14,155 7,111 21,266
Foreign Share 14% 28% 43% 33% 88% 38% 31% 19% 65% 60% 26% 49%
Exhibit 10: Market share break-up for equipment and substation PGCIL orders, March fiscal year-ends, 2010-1HFY14
Baoding
Crompton+JVs 12%
Siemens 15%
7%
ABB-ABB
Nanjing
Sweden JV
TBEA 7%
BHEL 12% TRIL/TRIL-ZTR JV
12% Hyundai Heavy
7% 10%
Industries
Zhejiang Alsom India
13% Zigong 1%
Crompton Crompton Sichuan6% 2%
37% 8% 5%
Others - Foreign Sichuan
Baoding Shandong
3% 4% 3%
8%
Substation orders
FY2012 - Rs27 bn
1HFY14- Rs13.5 bn FY2013 - Rs55 bn
Alstom Others Others
7% Pinggao 7% KEC EMC BHEL
Techno Electric 7%
3% 2% 2% 15%
15% BHEL ABB
8% Shyama 2% Hyosung
3% 4%
TBEA Alstom JV
11% Siemens 4%
Crompton 4%
7% L&T
Crompton 14%
Crompton 5%
4% Alstrom Grid
UK ABB
50% 7%
LT
12% Jyoti
Areva 12%
Hyosung 8%
25%
Pinggao Hyosung
New Northeast
25% Siemens
Kalptaru 6% Electric 8% Techno Electric
2% 9% 12%
Competitive intensity remained relatively limited in the tower/transmission line space (as
seen in 2HFY13, as well).
Exhibit 11: Market share break-up for equipment and substation PGCIL orders, March fiscal year-ends, 2010-1HFY14
EMCO Deepak
6% Kalptaru 10%
Bajaj Electricals 18% LT
7% 11%
Gammon Jyoti
Shyama 7% LT 9% Kalptaru
Larsen EMC 10%
7% 21% 14% 9%
Premium restructuring may not be enough; cancel and rebid may be the only
option. NHAI is exploring options to mobilize the otherwise inactive road sector with
several projects stuck/delayed. However, we believe premium restructuring (deferring of
premium payments) and substitution route may be ineffective due to several challenges
and ambiguities. Cancellation and re-bidding of projects may be the only way out
(industry expects several projects to come up for re-bidding in December). We note that
almost all (except nine out of 48) projects awarded by NHAI in FY2012 have made
little/no progress (even in case of relatively large players).
Replacement of original bidder through substitution route has not made a difference
The recent exit policy provided by NHAI to developers (concessionaires can sell equity stake in a
project irrespective of the stage of construction) has also failed to make a significant impact in
mobilizing the road sector as (1) it calls for formation of a new SPV instead of simply allowing
direct stake sale in the existing SPVwould involve additional cost, (2) it is unclear on whether tax
benefits would pass on to the new SPV and (3) there is reluctance from lenders to give approval.
Besides, developers opting for substitution are likely to exit at a loss, especially where the delays
are attributable to the concessionaire (aggressive bidding, incorrect project assumptions etc.).
Re-bidding perhaps the only way out; industry expects some projects to be re-bid by December
We believe cancellation and re-bidding of the delayed/stressed projects may perhaps be the only
way out (as (premium restructuring and substitution have several challenges and may be
ineffective). The industry still expects some projects to come up for re-bidding in 3Q/4Q FY2014
(feedback from companies such as IRB and Sadbhav suggest this). Good value-accretive contracts
with slightly lower competition may be positive for the industry and help to nurse itself back to Lokesh Garg
lokesh.garg@kotak.com
health.
Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1496
Little progress in most of FY2012 awards, even for large developers; awards sedate in FY2013 Supriya Subramanian
supriya.subramanian@kotak.com
Our analysis of NHAI data suggests that about a fifth of the projects awarded in FY2011 and most Mumbai: +44-20-79776918
projects awarded in FY2012 have made little or no physical progress. Out of 11 projects awarded
in FY2013 only two have been given a start date by NHAI. We note that even projects of several Aditya Mongia
aditya.mongia@kotak.com
leading developers (L&T and ITNL) have made no significant progress. NHAI awarded only about Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1453
1,100 kms in FY2013 against an initial target of about 7,500 kms.
For private Circulation Only. FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT KOTAK SECURITIES RATING SYSTEM AND OTHER DISCLOSURES, REFER TO THE END OF THIS MATERIAL.
Infrastructure India
` Substitution of original bidder. CCEA has recently given road developers the option to
exit from projects irrespective of the stage of completion (even during the construction
period) on approval from senior lenders and NHAI. Weaker developers can use this exit
option to sell their stakes in projects and use the resulting equity in other projects/fresh
bids.
NHAI is studying about 35 highway projects that have made little/no progress, out of which
23 are premium-based (with total premium payments of nearly Rs1 tn) and the rest are
based on viability grant funding. The projects are broadly categorized into four categories
(1) projects wherein the developers are prepared to make progress based on the original
bidding parameters as long as NHAI fulfills its obligations, (2) projects that need to be
terminated with a penalty in cases where the concessionaire has defaulted, (3) projects that
would be terminated and re-bid but without a penalty in cases where the concessionaire has
defaulted and NHAI has failed to meet its obligations and (4) projects in which
concessionaires may be willing to make progress with some changes to bidding conditions
(such as premium restructuring).
However, we believe this move may not be sufficient as it may not materially improve the
viability of projects (very aggressive premium bids). We have aimed to study the impact of
the premium restructuring of one of the largest road projects (which is stalled) on the net
value of the project. Based on the original bid terms and our traffic/tariff growth
assumptions we believe the project would have had a large negative equity value of over
Rs20 bn (equity value of +Rs8.7 bn based on the company traffic and tariff assumptions).
In our exercise, we assume no premium payments to NHAI for the first three years of the
project (during the construction period) and the deferred premium would be paid over the
remaining life of the project (discount rate of 10%). Our exercise reveals that even post this
restructuring the project is likely to have large (albeit slightly lower) negative value of Rs15
bn.
We also note that there remains ambiguity and difference of opinion related to the potential
terms of the premium restructuring. The proposal to restructure the premium of GMRs
Kishangarh-Udaipur road projects has resulted in difference of opinion between various
Government ministries. Some of these (as indicated in recent news flows) include:
` Road ministry suggested (1) penalty of 0.5% of project cost on the developer, (2) increase
in discount rate from 10% to 12% and (3) developers should submit a bank guarantee
for the deferred premium amount. NHAI has objected to these terms as it would again
make the project unviable and strain the balance sheets of the developers and hence
would not help to resolve the issue.
` Planning Commission insists on the cancellation and re-bidding route for GMRs project
versus NHAIs suggestion of premium restructuring.
` Law ministry was earlier (in May 2013) against the idea of premium restructuring, saying
it would not be legally or constitutionally feasible; though the ministry has since gone
back on its stance and said that the matter should be resolved between the finance
ministry, road ministry and NHAI.
Besides, developers opting for substitution are likely to exit at a loss, especially where the
delays are attributable to the concessionaire (aggressive bidding, incorrect project
assumptions). In such cases the new SPV would have to account for the likely penalty
payable on delayed completion (as per the original schedule) and lower toll collections.
CCEA recently provided an option to project developers to present their case for exit from
projects to lenders and NHAI, which would take the final decision. This substitution
agreement (which was always a part of the model concession agreement) now makes the
process more liberal. Current concession agreement provides for the senior lenders (with the
approval of the NHAI) to substitute the existing concessionaire. Such a substitution could
have been involved in case of (1) financial default (delays of three months in servicing debt),
(2) concessionaire default (lender gets 270 days to substitute concessionaire) and (3) other
cases of breach of provisions of MCA.
The option given to developers to seek approvals for existing projects would help to
(1) create more liquidity for developers (can bid for new road projects), (2) give confidence
to lenders to finance new projects).
Industry expects rebids in 3Q/4Q FY2014; value accretive contracts with slightly lower
competition may help to revive the industry
The industry still expects some projects to come up for re-bidding in 3Q/4Q FY2014 (based
on feedback from several companies such as IRB and, Sadbhav Engineering).
The IRB management said several projects awarded by NHAI in 2012 were stuck on account
of clearances and unwilling developers (majority are stuck on the second count). With about
30 projects stuck which have not achieved financial closures, the management believes that
about 2,000 kms of projects could potentially come up for re-bidding in 3QFY14. Also, the
company expects 1,000-2,000 kms of fresh projects from NHAI hence expects 3,000-
5,000 kms to be bid out in 3Q/4Q FY2014.
Good value accretive contracts with slightly lower competition may be positive for the
industry and help it to nurse itself back to health.
Little/no progress in majority of FY2012 project awards, even with large developers
Even after more than a year of being won, projects awarded in FY2012 are yet to show
significant physical progress with only nine out of 48 projects having started construction
(data based on start date/completion by NHAI). We believe about half of the remaining 39
projects may be financially unviable and the remaining may be stuck for want of project
clearances. Our analysis of NHAI data also suggests that about a fifth of the projects
awarded in FY2011 and most of the projects awarded in FY2012 have made little or no
physical progress. Out of all the projects awarded in FY2013 (about 11 projects) only two
have been given a start date by NHAI.
Exhibit 2: Significant share of 2011 awards and almost all FY2012 awards remain inactive
Quantum of active NHAI projects, March fiscal year ends, 2009-13 (km)
(km)
7000
6,343 km
6000 1,078
5000 4,934 km
We note that even projects of several leading developers (L&T, ITNL etc.) have failed to make
any significant progress. The table below gives a list of all the projects awarded in FY2012
(highlighted rows indicate projects that received a start date from NHAI).
6000 5,083
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Source: NHAI, Kotak Institutional Equities
Even in terms of construction, NHAI has likely done only about 2,600 kms in FY2013 versus
an initial target of 3,000 kms.
(km)
3500
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
1H12
1H13
2H12
2H13
Source: NHAI, Kotak Institutional Equities
Exhibit 7: Phase-wise status of NHDP Phases III to VII (as of July 31, 2013)
L ength (Km s )
Under
Phas e Total C om plete im plem entation To be awarded
I Golden Quadilateral: 4-laning roads c onnec ting Mumbai-Delhi-Kolkata-Chennai 5,846 5,846 0
II NS EW Corridor - 4-L aning raods c onnec ting S ilc har-Porbandar and Kas hmir 7,142 6,159 611 372
III C onnec ting im portant touris t & religious plac es with urban c entres 12,109 5,611 4,813 1,685
IV 2-laning of les s important national highw ay s 14,799 285 4,130 10,384
V 6-laning of high dens ity c orridors in GQ, NSEW 6,500 1,584 2,496 2420
V I New ex pres s w ay c ons truc tion 1,000 1,000
V II Urban areas - ring roads etc . 700 21 20 659
S ARDP -NE 388 69 43 276
Total 48,484 19,575 12,113 16,796
Awarded during
Apr-13 - Apr-12- Apr-11 - May-10- Dec 09-
J ul-13 Mar-13 Mar-12 Mar-11 Apr10
I Golden Quadilateral: 4-laning roads c onnec ting Mumbai-Delhi-Kolkata-Chennai
II NS EW Corridor - 4-L aning raods c onnec ting S ilc har-Porbandar and Kas hmir 48 1 (26) 129
III C onnec ting im portant touris t & religious plac es with urban c entres 155 2,258 2,077 1,574
IV 2-laning of les s important national highw ay s 287 810 2,553 765 -
V 6-laning of high dens ity c orridors in GQ, NSEW 99 1,569 729 649
VI New ex pres s w ay c ons truc tion
V II Urban areas - ring roads etc . (2) 24
S ARDP-NE 112
Total 287 1,112 6,381 3,655 2,357
Normal monsoon positive, margins and NPLs are key monitorable. We continue
to see near-term challenges for auto finance NBFCs even as long-term prospects remain
intact. A strong monsoon will support auto sales (and consumption in general) in rural
India. However, sharp rise in interest rates and unmatched ALM profile will provide
downside risks to NIM. NPLs, though under control, have been higher than expected
and remain another monitorable. We retain ADD rating on Shriram Transport Finance
with a lower target price of `670 (from `760) and REDUCE rating on Mahindra Finance
with target price of `240 (unchanged); we await better entry points and clarity on asset
quality performance to get more assertive on Mahindra Finance.
In our recent meetings with Shriram Transport Finance and Mahindra Finance, the managements
highlighted their comfort on their growth target on the back of a normal monsoon. While auto
sales struggle to deliver growth, rural India will likely continue to drive superior performance.
We find downside risks to our NIM estimates (i.e. compression to near-term NIM will likely be
higher than expected) if liquidity remains under stressNBFCs remain apprehensive to pass on
rate hikes to their customers and/or banks increase base rate, thereby repricing the outstanding
bank borrowings of NBFCs. We model 20 bps decline in calculated NIM (excluding the benefit of
recent capital issuance) for MMFS in FY2014E and another 15 bps decline in FY2015E. We are
modeling average (calculated) NIM of 7.4% for STFC for the next few quarters, down from 7.9%
in FY2013.
We continue to believe that Mahindra Finance (MMFS) and Shriram Transport (STFC) are well-
placed to deliver 20%+ RoE over the medium term.
Await better entry points and clarity on NPL in MMFS. On the back of its diversified portfolio,
lower base and superior earnings in rural India, MMFS will likely deliver superior growth (18-20%
PAT CAGR, 23% CAGR in pre-tax profit before provisions) and higher profitability (~22% RoE) in
the medium term. While high near-term business growth (over 25%) differentiates MMFS from
other NBFCs and banks, we would monitor trends in NPLs and margins. At current valuations
(2.9X and 2.5X PBR FY2014E and FY2015E respectively), the stock is likely ignoring these risks. We
retain REDUCE rating on the stock with target price of `240. We will revisit our rating after getting
more comfort on the asset quality trends.
STFC: ADD on inexpensive valuations. We expect STFC to deliver 20% ROE and 15% PAT
growth (18% in pre-tax profit before provisions) over the next three years. While the high RoE
phase (25-30%) may be behind us, the turnaround in the CV cycle will likely boost ROEs to 22- Nischint Chawathe
23% on factoring normalization in credit costs. Current downturn in the CV cycle remains the key nischint.chawathe@kotak.com
concern on the stock. Besides, sharp rise in diesel prices and shift to a more stringent (90 dpd) Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1545
NPLs recognition norm remain an overhang. We reduce our target price to `670 (from `760) on M.B. Mahesh, CFA
assuming higher cost of equity (14.5% from 13.5%). At our target price, the stock will trade at mb.mahesh@kotak.com
Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1231
1.6X PBR 1-year forward.
Geetika Gupta
geetika.gupta@kotak.com
Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1160
For private Circulation Only. FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT KOTAK SECURITIES RATING SYSTEM AND OTHER DISCLOSURES, REFER TO THE END OF THIS MATERIAL.
NBFCs India
STFC is positive as well. A normal monsoon and likely bumper crop are expected to lead
to a higher movement of agriculture commodities, thereby improving prospects for LCVs
funded by Shriram Transport Finance. In light of challenges in the CV transportation, STFC
had envisaged a slow recovery at the beginning of the year. A normal monsoon implies that
steady improvement will be on track. The company has recently raised lending rates by 25-
50 bps. We expect loan growth to moderate to 19% yoy in March 2014 from 25% in June
2013. We expect STFC to deliver 17-18% loan growth over the medium term; improvement
in the CV cycle will provide upside to our estimates.
Exhibit 1: MMFS' NPLs have been high in years of large deficit in monsoon
Monthly deficit in monsoon and GNPL of MMFS in the following financial year-end, 2002-14
Rise in bank base rates is significant risk. We believe that rise in base rates by public
banks will put considerable pressure on NIM, and NBFCs will need to take considerable rate
hikes to maintain NIM. All outstanding loan assets of MMFS and STFC carry a fixed rate.
However, bank loans will get repriced immediately on rise in base rates. Long-term bank
loans comprise about 37% of Mahindra Finances borrowings as of March 2013 (as
compared to 17% for Shriram Transport). Thus, any rise in base rates will increase the
outstanding borrowing costs for 37% and 17% of MMFS and STFCs borrowings
respectively, thereby putting a higher pressure on NIM.
2012 2013
Borrowings 143,692 193,537
Short term borrowings 14,491 13,012
Current Maturities of long term borrowings 36,005 50,372
Other long-term borrowings 92,907 130,153
NCDs 24,782 31,474
Banks 51,403 70,819
Deposits 10,641 19,205
Tier II 5,101 5,941
Others 980 2,714
Source: Company
2012 2013
Borrowings 231,274 310,024
Short term borrowings 30,402 41,468
Current Maturities of long term borrowings 54,002 78,024
Other long-term borrowings 146,868 190,530
NCDs 70,990 95,114
Banks 34,857 51,860
Deposits 10,038 6,822
Tier II 30,437 31,283
Others 500 5,450
Source: Company
10.60
9.70
8.80
7.90
7.00
Sep-12
Nov-12
Dec-12
Oct-12
Jan-13
Feb-13
Mar-13
Apr-13
Jul-13
May-13
Jun-13
Aug-13
Sep-13
Source: Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities
High slippage in 1Q is a concern. MMFS reported 51% qoq rise in gross NPLs to 4.2% of
gross advances, compared to 3.0% in 4QFY13. While rise in NPLs during 1Q is a seasonal
trend, the qoq rise during 1QFY14 is the highest in past 7-8 years. This is more worrying in
light of a strong monsoon in CY2013 as compared to delay in monsoon in CY2012.
Management has highlighted that the focus this year will be on recoveries over high growth
and collections are expected to improve in 2HFY14. Some part of the losses is driven by the
CV portfolio, a segment in which the company is anyway slowing down. We model credit
costs at 1.7-1.8% of average assets from 1.4% in FY2013 and 1% in FY2012.
High write-offs at STFC. STFCs gross NPLs increased to 3.1% of loans in June 2013 from
2.7% in FY2011. Moreover, the write-offs over the past two years (FY2012 and FY2013)
were equal to gross NPLs (`11 bn). Consequently, the ratio of credit cost to average loans
increased to 2% of loans from 1.4-1.6% between FY2008 and FY2011. We continue to
model credit cost of 1.9% in our medium-term estimates. While the mining ban has driven
the rise in write-offs in FY2012, the ratio remains high even as the management has
highlighted that the impact of the episodic issues (mining portfolio) is fully factored inthis
remains a cause for concern. Turnaround in the CV cycle will reduce our provision estimates.
Exhibit 5: Mahindra Finance 1-year forward PER and PBR (X) Exhibit 6: Shriram Transport 1-year forward PER and PBR (X)
September 2007-September 2013 September 2007-September 2013
Rolling PER (X) (LHS) 20.0 Rolling PER (X) (LHS) 5.0
16.0 3.5
Rolling PBR (X) (RHS) Rolling PBR (X) (RHS)
16.0 4.0
13.6 2.9
4.0 0.5 - -
Sep-07
Mar-08
Sep-08
Mar-09
Sep-09
Mar-10
Sep-10
Mar-11
Sep-11
Mar-12
Sep-12
Mar-13
Sep-13
Sep-07
Mar-08
Sep-08
Mar-09
Sep-09
Mar-10
Sep-10
Mar-11
Sep-11
Mar-12
Sep-12
Mar-13
Sep-13
Source: Company, Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities Source: Company, Bloomberg, Kotak Institutional Equities
Exhibit 10: Shriram Transport Finance - income statement and balance sheet
March fiscal year-ends, 2011-16E (` mn)
India: Lumpy industrial production and sticky inflation. July IIP growth surprised on
the upside with the internals indicating a clear lumpiness in the capital goods data.
August CPI inflation, as expected, continued to be high and sticky and almost
unchanged from July levels. With the RBIs focus firmly on the macroeconomic stability
front, we see little reason for the RBI to focus much on the IIP release. Though the
general perception is that the RBI needs to lower interest rates to support growth, we
maintain that upside risks to inflation, uncertainty arising out of Feds move and
domestic election phase preclude any predetermined bias on lower interest rates.
CPI inflation at 9.52% remained close to July 2013 levels of 9.64%. As expected, there has not
been any significant abatement in food prices which has led to inflation remaining high and sticky.
Vegetable price inflation was at 26.5% compared to 16.1% in July 2013 and 20.8% in August
2012. We note that inflation in other items such as services sector components has also failed to
soften. Core inflation remained at 8.2%, in line with July levels.
Though markets have been cheering the drop in trade deficit, we will continue to be cautious on
dropping the concerns on CAD. Most of the improvement in the trade deficit has been due to
lower gold imports. We believe that lower gold import has been due to adjustment to higher
imports in April and May and some impact due to the RBIs import restriction. Exports growth has
picked up even as we would wait to see a sustained pick-up in exports volume given (1) global
growth improvement is yet to prove its sustainability and (2) exports likely showing a lagged
impact from the depreciation in Rupee. While the indications are for lower CAD in FY2014, we
expect it to be close to US$75 bn (or CAD/GDP at 4%).
Indranil Pan
RBI does not have room for lower rates indranil.pan@kotak.com
Mumbai: +91-22-6659-6354
For the RBI the key data release today would be the retail inflation as it is expected to continue to
focus on macro and exchange rate stability. Growth is unlikely to attain any priority from the RBI Suvodeep Rakshit
suvodeep.rakshit@kotak.com
soon with the perception that the North Block should undertake proper measures to enhance the Mumbai: +91-22-6634-1409
growth potential of the economy. Keeping in view the risks of (1) Fed tapering, (2) election-related
Madhavi Arora
uncertainty and (3) upside pressures on inflation, the RBI is unlikely to let go of its hawkish stance. madhavi.arora@kotak.com
Mumbai: +91-22-6783-6116
10
6
Jan-12
Feb-12
Mar-12
Apr-12
May-12
Jun-12
Jul-12
Sep-12
Nov-12
Dec-12
Nov-13
Dec-13
Aug-12
Oct-12
Jan-13
Feb-13
Mar-13
Apr-13
May-13
Jun-13
Jul-13
Aug-13
Sep-13
Oct-13
Jan-14
Feb-14
Mar-14
60
65
40
55
20
45
0
35
(20)
(40) 25
Aug-00
Aug-01
Aug-02
Aug-03
Aug-04
Aug-05
Aug-06
Aug-07
Aug-08
Aug-09
Aug-10
Aug-11
Aug-12
Aug-13
Source: CEIC, Kotak Economic Research
Feb-08
Aug-08
Feb-09
Aug-09
Feb-10
Aug-10
Feb-11
Aug-11
Feb-12
Aug-12
Feb-13
Aug-13
Automobiles
Amara Raja Batteries 302 ADD 51,500 809 171 16.8 19.5 21.4 33.3 16.4 9.3 18.0 15.4 14.1 10.7 9.3 8.0 4.9 3.9 3.2 0.8 1.3 1.4 30.4 28.1 25.1 310 2.8 1.2
Apollo Tyres 64 REDUCE 32,287 507 504 12.2 16.6 16.0 49.5 36.5 (3.5) 5.3 3.9 4.0 3.8 2.9 2.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.0 19.7 22.0 17.6 64 (0.1) 8.9
Ashok Leyland 14 ADD 36,185 568 2,661 0.5 (0.9) 1.1 (74.5) (265.0) 224.5 25.1 (15.2) 12.2 9.0 14.7 6.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 4.4 (3.3) 3.7 12.6 (6.7) 8.2 18 32.4 1.8
Bajaj Auto 1,979 BUY 572,636 8,994 289 105.2 117.9 137.8 1.3 12.1 16.9 18.8 16.8 14.4 13.9 12.9 11.2 7.1 5.8 4.8 2.3 2.4 2.8 43.2 38.2 36.6 2,100 6.1 13.3
Bharat Forge 258 SELL 61,235 962 237 11.3 14.1 16.6 (35.2) 25.1 17.8 22.9 18.3 15.6 10.3 9.0 7.9 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.3 1.1 1.3 13.5 11.3 12.5 220 (14.7) 1.9
Exide Industries 128 ADD 108,375 1,702 850 6.2 7.6 8.6 13.4 23.0 14.1 20.7 16.9 14.8 13.7 11.5 10.3 3.2 2.8 2.5 1.3 1.5 1.7 16.1 17.6 17.8 135 5.9 2.2
Hero Motocorp 2,010 ADD 401,417 6,305 200 106.1 115.8 145.6 (10.9) 9.2 25.7 19.0 17.4 13.8 15.1 12.2 9.3 7.4 5.8 4.6 3.0 1.7 2.5 44.0 39.3 38.8 2,000 (0.5) 13.4
Mahindra & Mahindra 813 BUY 456,903 7,176 562 58.0 56.8 65.1 17.7 (2.1) 14.5 14.0 14.3 12.5 10.2 10.2 8.8 3.0 2.6 2.3 1.7 2.1 2.4 24.4 20.3 20.4 1,000 23.0 22.2
Maruti Suzuki 1,321 SELL 399,018 6,267 302 79.2 91.7 102.8 39.9 15.8 12.2 16.7 14.4 12.8 9.7 8.0 6.4 2.1 1.9 1.7 0.6 0.8 0.9 13.9 13.7 13.7 1,360 3.0 15.6
Motherson Sumi Systems 216 BUY 126,920 1,993 588 7.6 12.7 17.6 71.2 67.9 38.5 28.6 17.0 12.3 9.5 7.1 5.2 5.5 4.2 3.1 0.9 1.8 2.4 26.8 33.5 29.4 250 15.8 1.4
Tata Motors 333 ADD 1,072,991 16,852 3,218 30.7 43.5 49.7 (31.1) 41.4 14.4 10.8 7.7 6.7 5.7 4.3 3.8 2.7 2.0 1.5 0.6 27.5 30.1 25.7 375 12.5 44.6
Automobiles Neutral 3,319,467 52,135 (11.0) 26.0 12.1 14.1 11.2 10.0 8.1 6.6 5.6 3.2 2.5 2.1 1.4 1.1 1.5 22.4 22.7 21.0
Banks/Financial Institutions
Andhra Bank 53 ADD 29,854 469 560 23.0 16.9 20.9 (4.1) (26.7) 24.1 2.3 3.2 2.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 9.4 6.9 8.5 16.2 10.7 12.2 60 12.5 1.9
Axis Bank 1,020 ADD 477,290 7,496 468 110.7 113.0 130.2 7.8 2.1 15.2 9.2 9.0 7.8 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.8 1.8 2.1 18.5 15.0 15.3 1,200 17.7 63.2
Bajaj Finserv 574 BUY 91,351 1,435 159 103.4 76.4 90.6 9.1 (26.1) 18.5 5.6 7.5 6.3 1.2 1.0 0.9 2.4 2.4 2.4 25.7 14.6 15.2 825 43.7 0.7
Bank of Baroda 521 REDUCE 219,941 3,454 423 106.0 84.8 104.9 (12.7) (20.0) 23.7 4.9 6.1 5.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 4.1 3.3 4.1 15.6 11.1 12.5 600 15.3 15.3
Bank of India 166 ADD 98,893 1,553 597 46.1 47.1 57.0 (1.1) 2.2 21.1 3.6 3.5 2.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 6.0 6.2 7.5 12.9 11.8 13.0 180 8.6 5.7
Canara Bank 225 REDUCE 99,520 1,563 443 64.8 38.5 68.9 (12.5) (40.6) 78.9 3.5 5.8 3.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 5.8 5.3 5.3 12.1 6.7 11.3 250 11.3 7.4
City Union Bank 42 BUY 22,878 359 539 6.0 6.4 7.1 (13.0) 7.4 10.7 7.1 6.6 6.0 1.4 1.1 1.0 2.1 2.2 2.5 22.3 18.7 17.3 60 41.3 0.2
Corporation Bank 270 BUY 41,309 649 153 93.8 81.4 104.7 (7.7) (13.2) 28.5 2.9 3.3 2.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 7.4 6.4 8.3 16.1 12.4 14.4 300 11.0 0.3
Development Credit Bank 45 BUY 11,218 176 250 4.1 5.5 6.2 78.3 33.7 13.6 11.0 8.2 7.2 1.2 1.1 0.9 11.6 13.4 13.3 55 22.6 1.1
Federal Bank 297 BUY 50,736 797 171 49.0 37.7 54.9 7.9 (23.0) 45.6 6.1 7.9 5.4 0.8 0.8 0.7 3.0 2.3 3.4 13.9 9.7 13.0 400 34.9 3.2
HDFC 814 ADD 1,259,425 19,781 1,546 31.4 36.4 41.4 12.3 16.1 13.8 26.0 22.4 19.7 5.0 4.5 4.0 1.5 1.8 2.0 22.0 21.2 21.5 800 (1.8) 55.5
HDFC Bank 634 REDUCE 1,508,433 23,691 2,379 28.3 35.4 44.7 28.4 25.4 26.2 22.4 17.9 14.2 4.2 3.6 3.0 0.9 1.1 1.4 20.3 21.4 22.7 625 (1.4) 45.5
ICICI Bank 951 BUY 1,097,339 17,235 1,154 72.2 74.3 79.4 28.7 3.0 6.9 13.2 12.8 12.0 1.7 1.6 1.5 2.1 2.3 2.5 13.1 12.3 12.2 1,110 16.7 79.5
IDFC 95 BUY 143,447 2,253 1,512 12.1 13.5 15.0 18.1 10.9 11.6 7.8 7.0 6.3 1.0 0.9 0.8 2.7 2.8 3.1 14.2 14.1 14.1 150 58.1 22.4
India Infoline 49 ADD 14,951 235 304 9.2 9.8 11.2 102.9 5.7 14.9 5.3 5.0 4.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 6.2 3.4 3.9 15.1 14.8 14.8 60 22.1 0.2
IndusInd Bank 397 BUY 207,632 3,261 523 20.3 23.0 28.4 18.3 13.3 23.4 19.6 17.3 14.0 2.8 2.5 2.2 0.8 0.9 1.1 18.3 15.4 16.4 430 8.3 19.3
ING Vysya Bank 494 ADD 91,345 1,435 185 39.6 33.6 44.0 30.2 (15.0) 30.9 12.5 14.7 11.2 2.0 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.2 14.6 10.9 11.3 600 21.4 0.8
J&K Bank 1,176 REDUCE 57,019 896 48 217.6 216.9 194.7 31.4 (0.3) (10.2) 5.4 5.4 6.0 1.2 1.0 0.9 4.3 4.2 3.8 23.6 20.0 15.8 1,180 0.4 1.4
Karur Vysya Bank 325 ADD 34,839 547 107 51.3 48.1 62.6 9.7 (6.4) 30.2 6.3 6.8 5.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 4.3 3.7 4.8 19.0 15.8 18.2 380 16.9 0.6
LIC Housing Finance 181 BUY 91,396 1,435 505 20.3 23.9 28.3 11.9 17.9 18.5 8.9 7.6 6.4 1.5 1.3 1.1 2.2 2.6 3.1 16.8 17.4 18.0 240 32.6 14.1
L&T Finance Holdings 67 SELL 115,661 1,817 1,715 4.3 4.5 5.1 60.3 5.3 14.9 15.9 15.1 13.1 2.1 1.8 1.6 14.1 12.8 13.0 60 (11.0) 2.2
Magma Fincorp 72 BUY 13,737 216 190 6.5 10.2 12.3 100.6 55.6 21.0 11.1 7.1 5.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.5 2.2 2.7 10.1 12.7 14.0 125 72.9 0.1
Mahindra & Mahindra Financial 268 REDUCE 152,145 2,390 568 15.5 19.1 21.6 28.6 22.9 13.0 17.2 14.0 12.4 3.5 3.0 2.6 1.4 1.7 1.9 23.8 22.4 21.6 230 (14.1) 9.3
Muthoot Finance 117 NR 46,456 730 397 28.2 29.9 34.9 17.3 6.1 16.7 4.2 3.9 3.4 1.2 0.9 0.7 3.4 3.8 4.5 31.2 26.2 23.7
Oriental Bank of Commerce 163 ADD 57,016 895 350 45.5 26.7 43.2 16.3 (41.3) 61.8 3.6 6.1 3.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 4.7 3.3 5.4 10.7 6.9 10.2 170 4.4 3.9
PFC 125 BUY 164,323 2,581 1,319 33.5 33.6 38.2 45.6 0.3 13.7 3.7 3.7 3.3 0.7 0.7 0.6 5.6 5.6 6.4 19.8 17.2 17.2 185 48.5 9.4
Punjab National Bank 494 REDUCE 174,687 2,744 353 134.3 114.1 140.0 (6.7) (15.0) 22.6 3.7 4.3 3.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 5.5 4.6 5.7 16.5 12.3 13.7 600 21.4 12.4
Reliance Capital 338 ADD 83,288 1,308 246 26.9 23.4 28.5 27.5 (13.0) 21.7 12.6 14.5 11.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 2.4 2.1 2.5 5.9 4.9 5.8 505 49.3 29.9
Rural Electrification Corp. 191 ADD 188,740 2,964 987 38.7 44.3 47.6 35.3 14.6 7.5 4.9 4.3 4.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 4.3 4.2 4.9 23.7 22.8 20.7 270 41.3 6.0
Shriram City Union Finance 920 NR 53,611 842 58 80.2 98.3 118.7 22.6 22.6 20.7 11.5 9.4 7.8 2.4 1.9 1.6 1.1 1.4 1.7 22.3 22.5 22.0 0.5
Shriram Transport 551 ADD 122,861 1,930 223 61.0 67.8 80.2 8.2 11.2 18.2 9.0 8.1 6.9 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.7 2.0 20.6 19.3 19.4 760 38.0 5.1
State Bank of India 1,658 ADD 1,134,395 17,817 684 206.2 173.0 206.4 18.2 (16.1) 19.3 8.0 9.6 8.0 1.5 1.4 1.2 2.8 2.6 2.7 15.4 11.5 12.5 1,975 19.1 78.2
Union Bank 119 ADD 71,078 1,116 597 36.0 29.6 36.4 11.5 (17.6) 22.9 3.3 4.0 3.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 6.7 5.5 6.8 15.0 10.8 12.2 150 25.9 6.9
India Daily Summary - September 1
Yes Bank 281 REDUCE 100,845 1,584 359 36.3 31.3 38.8 31.0 (13.7) 23.9 7.8 9.0 7.2 1.7 1.5 1.3 2.1 1.8 2.3 24.8 18.5 19.1 300 6.7 54.1
Banks/Financial Institutions Cautious 8,127,658 127,653 17.3 (3.0) 19.2 9.6 9.9 8.3 1.6 1.5 1.3 2.3 2.3 2.6 16.7 14.9 15.9
Cement
ACC 1,027 REDUCE 193,019 3,032 188 73.7 55.4 63.4 29.1 (24.9) 14.5 13.9 18.6 16.2 8.4 10.0 7.9 2.4 2.3 2.1 3.4 2.3 2.3 19.5 13.5 14.2 1,140 11.0 6.6
Ambuja Cements 181 SELL 275,322 4,324 1,522 10.3 8.0 10.0 32.8 (22.4) 24.8 17.5 22.5 18.1 9.8 13.0 11.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 1.5 1.5 2.4 17.8 12.8 15.0 155 (14.3) 9.5
Grasim Industries 2,505 ADD 229,895 3,611 92 272.4 280.3 314.3 (5.6) 2.9 12.2 9.2 8.9 8.0 7.1 5.3 4.5 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.4 13.6 12.4 12.5 3,000 19.8 3.2
India Cements 49 ADD 15,021 236 307 6.8 5.3 8.4 (24.4) (21.4) 58.5 7.2 9.2 5.8 4.1 4.2 3.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 4.4 5.4 5.5 5.2 4.0 6.0 70 43.1 1.1
Shree Cement 3,887 SELL 135,423 2,127 35 307.0 311.6 324.1 92.3 1.5 4.0 12.7 12.5 12.0 8.3 7.2 7.0 3.6 2.9 2.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 33.3 25.8 22.0 3,950 1.6 1.1
UltraTech Cement 1,759 REDUCE 482,241 7,574 274 101.3 88.6 111.0 13.4 (12.5) 25.3 17.4 19.9 15.8 10.7 10.6 8.5 2.8 2.5 2.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 18.9 14.9 16.2 1,650 (6.2) 6.6
Cement Cautious 1,330,920 20,903 16.2 (10.5) 17.8 14.0 15.6 13.3 8.5 8.2 6.9 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.4 15.3 12.4 13.0
12-Sep-13 Mkt cap. shares EPS (Rs) EPS growth (%) PER (X) EV/EBITDA (X) Price/BV (X) Dividend yield (%) RoE (%) price Upside 3mo
Company Price (Rs) Rating (Rs mn) (US$ mn) (mn) 2013 2014E 2015E 2013 2014E 2015E 2013 2014E 2015E 2013 2014E 2015E 2013 2014E 2015E 2013 2014E 2015E 2013 2014E 2015E (Rs) (%) (US$ mn)
Consumer products
Asian Paints 439 SELL 420,609 6,606 959 11.6 12.1 14.0 12.7 4.1 16.1 37.8 36.3 31.2 23.9 21.3 18.4 11.9 10.1 8.6 1.0 1.2 1.4 36.3 31.5 31.4 380 (13.3) 8.5
Bajaj Corp. 263 BUY 38,734 608 148 11.3 13.7 16.3 39.4 20.4 19.1 23.1 19.2 16.1 21.5 17.1 13.7 8.0 7.1 6.3 2.5 3.1 3.8 26.4 32.7 34.9 320 21.9 0.6
Colgate-Palmolive (India) 1,219 SELL 165,762 2,603 136 36.5 39.4 45.7 11.3 7.9 16.0 33.4 30.9 26.7 24.6 22.2 19.0 35.5 28.4 25.9 2.3 2.5 2.9 107.4 97.8 97.9 1,275 4.6 2.6
Dabur India 170 ADD 295,857 4,647 1,743 4.4 5.4 6.4 19.0 21.8 18.4 38.5 31.6 26.7 30.3 24.7 20.8 13.9 11.2 9.0 0.9 1.2 1.4 40.0 39.2 37.4 180 6.0 5.0
GlaxoSmithkline Consumer 4,762 SELL 200,289 3,146 42 103.8 122.7 145.3 20.7 18.1 18.4 45.9 38.8 32.8 39.9 34.7 29.2 14.7 12.5 10.8 0.9 1.2 1.5 34.9 34.9 35.4 3,900 (18.1) 2.0
Godrej Consumer Products 848 REDUCE 288,676 4,534 340 20.3 23.6 29.5 20.4 16.2 25.1 41.9 36.0 28.8 31.5 25.7 20.1 8.2 6.9 5.8 0.6 0.7 0.8 22.6 22.3 23.7 760 (10.4) 4.5
Hindustan Unilever 626 SELL 1,354,374 21,272 2,163 15.4 15.9 17.4 28.1 3.3 9.6 40.7 39.4 35.9 33.4 30.1 25.8 54.8 40.4 32.9 3.0 1.7 1.9 103.1 110.4 95.7 530 (15.4) 36.6
ITC 337 ADD 2,679,146 42,079 7,962 9.3 10.9 12.9 19.0 16.9 18.0 36.1 30.8 26.1 25.6 21.5 18.2 11.4 10.2 9.1 1.5 1.9 2.3 36.1 36.7 38.5 375 11.4 45.9
Jubilant Foodworks 1,067 SELL 70,693 1,110 66 19.9 24.1 33.0 21.7 21.1 36.8 53.5 44.2 32.3 29.1 22.7 16.8 16.4 12.6 9.7 925 (13.3) 5.7
Jyothy Laboratories 144 ADD 23,841 374 166 1.2 5.0 8.3 (55.9) 307.9 67.5 117.8 28.9 17.2 23.2 14.5 11.2 3.7 3.4 3.0 1.7 0.9 1.6 200 39.3 0.5
Marico 214 REDUCE 138,186 2,170 645 5.6 7.4 8.6 8.0 31.1 16.2 38.1 29.1 25.0 23.6 19.5 16.4 6.9 5.8 4.9 0.2 0.7 1.0 18.3 20.3 20.2 215 0.3 1.3
Nestle India 4,986 SELL 480,774 7,551 96 110.8 124.1 145.6 11.1 12.0 17.3 45.0 40.2 34.2 26.6 22.4 19.4 24.5 19.2 15.4 1.0 1.2 1.4 71.6 60.2 54.9 4,200 (15.8) 1.8
Speciality Restaurants 124 BUY 5,807 91 47 5.0 5.5 6.8 1.8 10.2 24.3 24.8 22.5 18.1 15.5 14.0 10.9 2.0 1.9 1.7 11.6 8.5 9.7 160 29.3 0.0
Tata Global Beverages 151 ADD 93,224 1,464 618 6.3 7.6 8.6 14.8 20.1 13.4 23.8 19.8 17.5 14.0 11.5 10.0 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.8 2.2 8.4 9.5 10.2 165 9.5 6.2
Titan Industries 232 REDUCE 205,522 3,228 888 8.2 9.0 10.2 20.9 10.1 13.5 28.3 25.7 22.7 19.2 17.9 14.7 10.4 8.2 6.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 42.3 35.7 32.5 250 8.0 16.5
United Breweries 815 SELL 215,451 3,384 264 6.5 9.3 14.0 36.2 42.3 51.1 124.8 87.7 58.0 47.5 34.2 25.7 15.1 13.4 11.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 12.0 15.7 20.5 700 (14.1) 6.3
United Spirits 2,562 BUY 372,344 5,848 145 9.4 53.3 75.5 (30.8) 465.3 41.7 271.7 48.1 33.9 32.1 24.8 19.2 6.1 4.2 3.8 0.3 0.2 0.3 8.3 10.4 11.8 2,800 9.3 55.0
Consumer products Cautious 7,049,288 110,716 17.2 20.9 18.4 41.2 34.1 28.8 27.5 23.3 19.5 12.2 10.2 9.0 1.5 1.5 1.8 29.5 30.0 31.1
Constructions
NCC 19 ADD 4,991 78 257 2.4 2.2 2.4 74.2 (11.0) 12.2 8.0 8.9 8.0 5.6 6.3 6.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 3.1 5.1 5.1 2.6 2.2 2.5 45 131.4 0.5
Sadbhav Engineering 57 BUY 9,712 153 171 4.9 5.4 9.2 (47.3) 9.4 71.0 11.5 10.6 6.2 10.4 5.5 4.1 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.1 8.6 7.9 12.0 160 182.4 0.4
Construction Cautious 23,176 364 (62.7) 74.1 93.0 21.5 12.4 6.4 6.2 5.6 5.0 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.7 2.1 1.8 2.9 5.3
Energy
Aban Offshore 228 RS 9,942 156 44 38.6 81.1 97.4 (43.5) 110.2 20.0 5.9 2.8 2.3 7.4 6.8 6.0 0.3 0.4 0.3 1.6 2.2 2.2 6.4 15.1 14.8 0.9
Bharat Petroleum 304 BUY 219,672 3,450 723 36.6 32.1 35.6 99.2 (12.2) 10.8 8.3 9.5 8.5 6.3 6.4 6.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 3.6 3.2 3.5 14.5 11.6 11.8 440 44.8 7.6
Cairn india 319 ADD 609,940 9,580 1,910 63.1 61.9 60.1 51.7 (1.9) (2.9) 5.1 5.2 5.3 4.1 3.8 3.7 1.3 1.1 0.9 3.6 3.8 3.8 24.8 22.4 18.6 370 15.9 11.0
Castrol India 319 SELL 157,666 2,476 495 9.0 9.8 10.3 (4.4) 7.9 5.8 35.2 32.7 30.9 24.4 22.2 20.7 27.0 25.7 41.4 2.2 2.5 2.7 79.0 80.6 102.8 230 (27.9) 0.6
GAIL (India) 309 ADD 392,087 6,158 1,268 35.5 30.0 31.9 16.5 (15.6) 6.4 8.7 10.3 9.7 5.9 6.5 5.9 1.5 1.3 1.2 3.1 2.9 3.2 17.2 12.9 12.4 380 22.9 6.4
GSPL 50 ADD 28,135 442 563 9.6 9.5 8.1 2.6 (0.8) (14.9) 5.2 5.3 6.2 3.4 3.3 3.4 0.8 0.7 0.7 2.0 2.0 3.2 17.6 14.9 11.2 75 50.0 0.4
Hindustan Petroleum 183 ADD 62,124 976 339 24.8 12.2 21.6 (7.6) (50.8) 77.4 7.4 15.0 8.5 8.0 10.0 7.7 0.4 0.4 0.3 4.6 2.1 3.8 4.7 2.2 3.9 240 31.0 4.0
Indian Oil Corporation 229 ADD 554,908 8,715 2,428 16.8 12.8 27.8 (48.8) (23.8) 116.7 13.6 17.8 8.2 10.0 9.1 5.4 0.9 0.9 0.8 2.7 3.3 6.5 6.2 4.4 9.5 250 9.4 2.0
Oil India 448 BUY 269,371 4,231 601 59.7 53.9 63.1 4.1 (9.6) 17.0 7.5 8.3 7.1 3.0 3.0 2.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 6.7 6.1 7.1 15.9 13.5 14.7 650 45.1 3.7
Infrastructure
Adani Port and SEZ 129 BUY 260,554 4,092 2,017 8.0 9.7 12.7 47.3 20.9 30.1 16.1 13.3 10.2 15.8 9.8 7.7 4.0 3.0 2.4 0.9 1.3 1.6 28.2 25.7 26.0 180 39.4 4.1
Container Corporation 688 ADD 134,166 2,107 195 72.3 52.9 60.0 7.1 (26.9) 13.4 9.5 13.0 11.5 10.0 9.1 7.6 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 15.8 15.5 15.7 780 13.4 0.7
GMR Infrastructure 18 RS 69,479 1,091 3,892 (1.8) (0.6) (0.7) (56.2) 67.2 (19.6) (10.1) (30.7) (25.7) 17.6 9.2 6.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 (9.3) (3.2) (3.9) 2.3
Gujarat Pipavav Port 45 BUY 21,634 340 483 1.5 3.0 3.1 29.7 96.3 2.6 29.3 14.9 14.5 12.3 10.5 9.2 1.8 1.6 1.4 7.6 13.5 11.0 60 34.1 0.2
IRB Infrastructure 74 BUY 24,562 386 332 16.7 16.7 16.4 11.1 (0.4) (1.8) 4.4 4.4 4.5 5.9 6.4 6.1 0.7 0.6 0.5 5.4 5.4 5.4 17.4 14.2 11.9 140 89.4 4.2
Infrastructure Cautious 510,394 8,016 19.5 38.4 19.6 20.4 14.7 12.3 13.4 8.9 6.8 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.6 9.5 11.5 12.4
Media
DB Corp 251 BUY 46,072 724 183 11.9 14.8 17.7 7.9 24.6 19.3 21.1 16.9 14.2 11.9 9.6 8.0 4.5 4.0 3.6 2.2 2.8 3.6 22.3 24.9 26.6 300 19.4 0.4
DishTV 45 ADD 48,181 757 1,064 (1.4) (0.2) 0.9 (33.9) 82.1 457.2 (33.4) (186.0) 52.1 10.0 9.0 7.4 (29.8) (25.7) (31) 1.1 113.0 14.8 (54) 65 43.5 4.1
Eros International 137 ADD 12,596 198 92 16.7 20.4 23.8 1.5 22.0 16.5 8.2 6.7 5.8 5.7 4.7 4.0 1.3 1.1 0.9 16.7 17.2 16.7 150 9.2 0.5
Jagran Prakashan 83 BUY 26,265 413 316 4.5 5.9 7.7 (20.2) 31.0 30.8 18.4 14.1 10.8 9.4 7.7 6.2 3.2 3.0 2.8 4.2 4.8 5.4 18.0 21.9 26.7 130 56.5 0.2
Sun TV Network 390 REDUCE 153,711 2,414 394 18.0 21.0 24.6 2.3 16.9 17.1 21.7 18.5 15.8 13.5 11.4 9.7 5.3 4.8 4.5 2.6 3.1 4.1 26.5 28.1 30.2 440 12.8 7.0
Zee Entertainment Enterprises 224 REDUCE 212,753 3,341 950 7.6 8.9 10.7 25.6 17.3 21.0 29.6 25.2 20.8 20.6 16.8 13.7 4.3 4.0 3.9 0.8 1.0 1.1 15.3 16.8 19.2 230 2.7 10.0
Media Neutral 528,828 8,306 6.5 26.5 25.1 25.9 20.4 16.3 13.0 10.8 8.9 4.2 3.8 3.5 1.6 2.0 2.7 16.1 18.7 21.7
Metals & Mining
Coal India 285 BUY 1,799,848 28,268 6,316 27.5 28.6 32.0 18.1 4.3 11.6 10.4 9.9 8.9 6.0 4.9 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 4.9 5.1 5.7 37.2 33.2 32.3 370 29.8 12.1
Hindalco Industries 111 REDUCE 212,959 3,345 1,915 15.8 12.0 14.0 (10.9) (24.0) 16.6 7.0 9.3 7.9 8.8 8.5 6.9 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 9.0 6.3 7.0 105 (5.6) 14.7
Hindustan Zinc 130 ADD 549,250 8,627 4,225 16.4 15.5 16.6 24.2 (5.0) 6.5 7.9 8.4 7.8 5.2 4.4 3.5 1.7 1.5 1.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 23.5 18.9 17.5 160 23.1 2.3
Jindal Steel and Power 239 ADD 223,090 3,504 935 31.1 26.7 28.1 (26.6) (14.1) 5.2 7.7 8.9 8.5 7.0 8.3 6.7 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 14.9 11.2 10.7 275 15.2 16.1
JSW Steel 624 SELL 150,820 2,369 242 32.9 74.3 76.6 (46.2) 126.1 3.0 19.0 8.4 8.1 5.7 5.6 5.2 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.2 8.3 8.1 550 (11.9) 12.9
National Aluminium Co. 33 REDUCE 84,533 1,328 2,577 2.3 2.1 3.0 (31.2) (9.9) 43.2 14.3 15.8 11.1 4.0 5.3 4.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 5.0 4.4 6.2 31 (5.5) 0.2
NMDC 124 BUY 490,235 7,700 3,965 16.0 14.7 15.5 (13.3) (8.1) 5.2 7.7 8.4 8.0 3.8 4.2 3.8 1.8 1.6 1.5 5.7 5.7 5.7 24.4 20.2 19.4 150 21.3 5.7
Sesa Goa 183 ADD 159,437 2,504 869 26.2 25.8 22.4 (15.4) (1.8) (13.2) 7.0 7.1 8.2 43.9 36.4 40.5 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.3 (0.7) (0.8) 165 (10.1) 14.7
Tata Steel 303 ADD 294,094 4,619 971 3.4 23.1 27.7 (86.9) 574.5 20.2 88.5 13.1 10.9 7.2 6.2 6.4 0.9 0.8 0.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 0.9 6.4 7.4 290 (4.2) 32.1
Metals & Mining Neutral 3,964,266 62,263 (3.1) 2.3 9.0 9.6 9.4 8.6 6.5 6.1 5.4 1.6 1.4 1.3 3.7 3.8 4.1 16.3 15.3 15.1
Pharmaceutical
Apollo Hospitals 868 SELL 120,799 1,897 139 21.4 27.6 33.4 35.7 28.7 21.2 40.5 31.5 26.0 20.8 16.9 13.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 0.6 0.8 1.0 11.3 13.3 14.6 850 (2.1) 3.7
Biocon 339 ADD 66,891 1,051 198 15.5 19.6 24.2 (9.2) 26.5 23.1 21.8 17.2 14.0 12.0 9.5 8.2 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 20.5 13.9 15.6 335 (1.0) 3.2
Cipla 438 ADD 351,800 5,525 803 17.8 18.4 21.9 27.1 3.4 19.3 24.6 23.8 20.0 16.4 15.3 12.2 3.9 3.4 2.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 15.6 15.5 15.7 450 2.7 9.6
Cadila Healthcare 663 ADD 135,678 2,131 205 32.0 34.1 45.7 0.4 6.5 34.0 20.7 19.4 14.5 16.8 14.9 11.3 4.5 3.8 3.2 1.1 1.2 1.6 23.3 21.2 24.1 800 20.7 1.4
Divi's Laboratories 995 ADD 131,963 2,073 133 45.4 51.9 59.9 12.9 14.5 15.4 21.9 19.2 16.6 15.9 13.8 11.3 5.3 4.5 3.8 1.5 1.7 1.9 26.0 25.4 25.0 1,040 4.6 3.0
Dr Reddy's Laboratories 2,247 BUY 381,571 5,993 170 96.3 111.3 133.1 14.6 15.6 19.6 23.3 20.2 16.9 15.7 13.3 11.2 5.2 4.3 3.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 24.0 23.5 23.3 2,450 9.0 12.7
GlaxoSmithkline Pharmaceuticals 2,402 SELL 203,619 3,198 85 81.4 84.5 97.5 9.7 3.8 15.5 29.5 28.4 24.6 22.6 21.6 18.1 10.1 9.3 8.4 2.1 2.3 2.5 28.5 34.2 36.0 1,820 (24.2) 0.8
Glenmark Pharmaceuticals 543 ADD 147,061 2,310 271 22.7 27.5 33.7 3.7 21.1 22.7 23.9 19.8 16.1 17.2 13.6 11.6 5.3 4.6 3.7 0.4 0.4 0.4 23.8 25.1 25.9 570 5.0 3.6
Lupin 866 ADD 387,214 6,082 447 29.5 35.3 41.8 52.3 19.4 18.7 29.3 24.6 20.7 18.3 15.4 12.6 7.4 5.9 4.8 0.5 0.7 0.8 28.6 27.0 25.9 850 (1.9) 16.9
Ranbaxy Laboratories 457 BUY 193,102 3,033 423 21.8 (2.5) 18.3 217.7 (111.5) 824.9 20.9 (181.2) 25.0 11.3 24.2 14.9 4.7 4.9 2.7 26.5 (2.6) 13.8 350 (23.3) 20.6
Sun Pharmaceuticals 557 SELL 1,153,317 18,114 2,071 14.5 23.3 22.5 16.3 60.7 (3.4) 38.3 23.9 24.7 21.3 16.1 15.9 6.9 6.4 5.3 0.9 1.1 1.3 20.1 27.8 23.5 450 (19.2) 18.9
Pharmaceuticals Attractive 3,273,014 51,406 40.4 15.6 18.6 28.5 24.6 20.8 17.8 15.6 13.4 5.6 5.0 4.1 0.8 0.9 1.1 19.8 20.2 19.7
Real Estate
DLF 149 ADD 265,626 4,172 1,780 4.3 4.2 9.7 (40.5) (2.9) 132.7 34.8 35.8 15.4 18.9 13.8 10.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.3 0.7 0.7 2.7 2.6 5.7 255 70.9 24.6
HDIL 43 NR 17,891 281 419 1.7 11.0 14.3 (91.0) 528.0 30.4 24.4 3.9 3.0 8.4 7.3 6.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.7 4.3 5.4 9.3
Oberoi Realty 172 BUY 56,374 885 328 14.5 20.0 25.8 9.2 37.5 29.2 11.8 8.6 6.7 7.8 5.4 3.5 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 12.1 14.7 16.3 290 68.9 0.5
Prestige Estates Projects 126 BUY 44,170 694 350 8.2 13.1 17.1 224.5 60.9 30.1 15.4 9.6 7.4 10.9 7.0 5.7 1.6 1.4 1.2 11.7 15.6 17.4 200 58.5 0.7
Sobha Developers 272 BUY 26,639 418 98 22.1 23.2 36.5 5.4 4.7 57.5 12.3 11.7 7.4 7.2 7.2 5.4 1.2 1.2 1.0 2.6 1.8 1.8 10.5 10.2 14.6 500 84.1 0.8
Sunteck Realty 310 BUY 18,566 292 60 0.7 76.5 25.4 29.1 11,307 (66.8) 461.5 4.0 12.2 428.4 3.1 5.3 3.8 2.0 1.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 64.3 15.2 560 80.9 0.1
Real Estate Cautious 459,494 7,217 (34.4) 79.5 43.9 24.4 13.6 9.4 14.5 9.3 7.4 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.1 0.7 0.7 3.8 6.3 8.4
India Daily Summary - September 1
12-Sep-13 Mkt cap. shares EPS (Rs) EPS growth (%) PER (X) EV/EBITDA (X) Price/BV (X) Dividend yield (%) RoE (%) price Upside 3mo
Company Price (Rs) Rating (Rs mn) (US$ mn) (mn) 2013 2014E 2015E 2013 2014E 2015E 2013 2014E 2015E 2013 2014E 2015E 2013 2014E 2015E 2013 2014E 2015E 2013 2014E 2015E (Rs) (%) (US$ mn)
Technology
HCL Technologies 1,074 REDUCE 762,789 11,980 710 56.9 75.7 81.0 64.7 33.0 7.0 18.9 14.2 13.3 12.6 9.4 8.4 5.8 4.0 3.2 1.1 1.3 1.5 33.7 31.6 26.8 960 (10.6) 19.0
Hexaware Technologies 126 REDUCE 36,978 581 293 11.2 12.9 12.9 22.8 15.4 0.3 11.3 9.8 9.7 8.6 6.4 5.9 3.1 2.7 2.4 4.8 5.1 5.1 29.5 29.5 26.4 125 (0.8) 6.6
Infosys 3,066 ADD 1,751,827 27,514 571 164.9 178.7 212.0 13.3 8.4 18.6 18.6 17.2 14.5 13.3 11.6 9.3 4.6 3.9 3.3 1.5 2.1 2.5 27.2 24.6 24.8 3,400 10.9 54.6
Mindtree 1,060 ADD 44,526 699 42 81.7 103.5 116.8 53.2 26.8 12.8 13.0 10.2 9.1 9.0 7.5 6.2 3.4 2.7 2.1 1.1 1.5 1.7 29.8 29.1 26.2 1,150 8.5 0.9
Mphasis 439 SELL 92,497 1,453 211 37.6 36.2 40.1 (3.7) (3.6) 10.6 11.7 12.1 11.0 8.7 8.8 7.7 2.1 2.0 1.8 3.9 4.1 4.6 19.1 16.7 17.2 400 (8.9) 0.7
Polaris Financial Technology 116 REDUCE 11,555 181 100 20.1 18.8 19.4 (3.0) (6.6) 3.3 5.8 6.2 6.0 2.9 2.8 2.4 0.9 0.8 0.7 3.5 3.7 3.9 15.5 13.3 12.5 115 (0.8) 1.3
TCS 1,968 ADD 3,851,574 60,493 1,957 71.2 91.7 105.5 31.1 28.7 15.1 27.6 21.5 18.7 20.7 15.4 13.2 9.4 7.6 6.2 1.1 1.9 2.1 37.9 39.2 36.8 2,100 6.7 42.1
Tech Mahindra 1,311 ADD 306,331 4,811 234 101.9 125.0 136.3 16.7 22.6 9.0 12.9 10.5 9.6 9.2 7.2 6.4 4.5 3.3 2.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 36.3 32.4 26.7 1,500 14.4 23.5
Wipro 472 REDUCE 1,162,290 18,255 2,463 24.9 30.1 33.8 9.9 20.8 12.3 18.9 15.7 14.0 13.2 10.6 9.0 4.1 3.4 2.9 1.5 1.7 1.9 21.6 23.8 22.6 470 (0.4) 17.0
Technology Attractive 8,020,366 125,968 23.2 21.6 13.9 21.5 17.7 15.5 15.4 12.2 10.4 5.9 4.8 4.0 1.3 1.8 2.1 27.5 27.2 25.8
Telecom
Bharti Airtel 329 ADD 1,313,569 20,631 3,997 6.0 10.5 18.2 (46.6) 75.4 73.2 54.8 31.3 18.0 8.1 6.7 5.6 2.6 2.2 2.0 0.3 0.3 1.1 4.5 7.6 11.6 375 14.1 26.3
Bharti Infratel 155 ADD 292,482 4,594 1,889 5.3 7.9 8.9 23.3 48.8 12.4 29.2 19.6 17.5 7.4 6.1 5.4 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.5 2.2 2.7 6.3 8.5 9.2 170 9.8
IDEA 164 BUY 540,090 8,483 3,303 3.1 6.8 9.9 39.8 121.0 46.7 53.4 24.2 16.5 11.2 7.5 6.0 3.8 3.3 2.8 0.4 7.4 14.6 18.4 195 19.3 16.6
Reliance Communications 141 SELL 291,643 4,581 2,064 3.3 7.9 7.3 (27.5) 143.5 (8.2) 43.4 17.8 19.4 10.3 7.8 7.7 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.4 5.5 4.8 80 (43.4) 43.7
Tata Communications 179 BUY 51,129 803 285 (29.4) (7.0) 5.0 (5.5) 76.3 171.5 (6.1) (25.7) 36.0 7.8 5.8 5.1 3.6 3.5 3.2 (45.0) (13.8) 9.3 220 22.6 1.9
Telecom Attractive 2,488,913 39,091 (39.1) 162.1 48.2 69.6 26.6 17.9 8.8 6.9 5.9 2.2 2.0 1.8 0.5 0.5 1.0 3.2 7.4 10.1
Utilities
Adani Power 35 SELL 100,230 1,574 2,872 (9.0) (9.4) (1.3) (2,023.1) (4.0) 86.6 (3.9) (3.7) (27.9) 45.4 19.9 10.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 (41.7) (63.7) (9.1) 30 (14.0) 2.6
CESC 320 REDUCE 39,917 627 125 34.3 34.5 38.1 57.6 0.7 10.5 9.3 9.3 8.4 10.6 9.4 7.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 2.2 2.1 2.4 6.7 6.3 6.6 340 6.4 1.3
JSW Energy 42 ADD 68,552 1,077 1,640 6.7 7.6 6.6 232.1 13.6 (12.8) 6.2 5.5 6.3 6.0 4.4 4.4 1.1 0.9 0.8 18.5 18.3 13.6 50 19.6 1.7
Lanco Infratech 6 RS 13,560 213 2,223 (4.7) (6.0) 4.5 (790.4) (28.6) 174.6 (1.3) (1.0) 1.4 14.7 13.4 5.9 0.4 0.5 0.4 (24.2) (41.9) 33.3 0.5
NHPC 18 ADD 217,723 3,420 12,301 1.9 2.0 2.2 (22.4) 2.7 12.1 9.2 8.9 8.0 9.5 8.6 6.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 3.9 3.0 3.4 7.9 7.5 8.0 23 29.9 1.4
NTPC 139 BUY 1,149,830 18,059 8,245 13.0 13.5 14.2 20.8 3.6 5.4 10.7 10.3 9.8 9.9 8.8 8.1 1.4 1.3 1.2 4.8 2.9 3.1 14.0 13.3 12.8 160 14.7 9.7
Power Grid 99 BUY 458,343 7,199 4,630 9.1 9.6 11.0 28.7 5.8 13.9 10.9 10.3 9.0 10.8 9.9 8.4 1.7 1.6 1.4 2.8 3.0 3.4 16.9 16.1 16.5 135 36.4 7.4
Reliance Infrastructure 374 BUY 98,321 1,544 263 70.9 62.1 65.3 17.5 (12.4) 5.2 5.3 6.0 5.7 9.2 7.0 7.1 0.4 0.4 0.3 2.0 3.0 3.0 11.0 9.8 8.7 710 89.9 21.6
Reliance Power 68 SELL 190,047 2,985 2,805 3.6 3.9 3.8 16.7 8.8 (3.4) 18.8 17.3 17.9 23.9 32.4 22.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 5.6 5.8 5.3 75 10.7 13.8
Tata Power 77 BUY 189,322 2,973 2,468 4.0 5.3 5.8 (12.9) 33.1 8.6 19.1 14.4 13.2 9.0 6.8 6.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.6 7.4 9.5 9.6 92 19.9 4.9
Utilities Attractive 2,525,846 39,671 1.7 1.0 31.5 12.9 12.8 9.7 11.2 9.8 8.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 3.3 2.4 2.6 9.0 8.5 10.3
Others
Carborundum Universal 106 BUY 19,901 313 187 5.7 8.8 13.7 (50.7) 53.7 56.3 18.6 12.1 7.7 9.3 6.5 4.5 1.7 1.5 1.3 0.9 1.4 2.2 10.3 14.4 19.2 180 69.5 0.0
Coromandel International 223 SELL 63,207 993 283 15.3 14.9 17.6 (32.5) (2.1) 17.4 14.6 14.9 12.7 13.0 9.3 8.4 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.1 17.8 17.1 17.8 150 (32.8) 0.3
Havells India 623 REDUCE 77,710 1,221 125 33.4 36.8 41.0 6.0 10.4 11.5 18.7 16.9 15.2 12.3 10.3 9.3 5.2 4.2 3.5 1.2 1.3 1.4 33.3 27.6 25.2 625 0.4 4.1
Notes:
(a) For banks we have used adjusted book values.
(b) 2012 means calendar year 2011, similarly for 2013 and 2014 for these particular companies.
(c) EV/Sales & EV/EBITDA for KS universe excludes Banking Sector.
(d) Rupee-US Dollar exchange rate (Rs/US$)= 63.67
60%
Percentage of companies within each category for which
Kotak Institutional Equities and or its affiliates has provided
50%
investment banking services within the previous 12 months.
BUY. We expect this stock to deliver more than 15% returns over the next 12 months.
ADD. We expect this stock to deliver 5-15% returns over the next 12 months.
REDUCE. We expect this stock to deliver -5-+5% returns over the next 12 months.
SELL. We expect this stock to deliver <-5% returns over the next 12 months.
Other definitions
Coverage view. The coverage view represents each analysts overall fundamental outlook on the Sector. The coverage view will consist of one of the following
designations: Attractive, Neutral, Cautious.
Other ratings/identifiers
NR = Not Rated. The investment rating and target price, if any, have been suspended temporarily. Such suspension is in compliance with applicable
regulation(s) and/or Kotak Securities policies in circumstances when Kotak Securities or its affiliates is acting in an advisory capacity in a merger or strategic
transaction involving this company and in certain other circumstances.
RS = Rating Suspended. Kotak Securities Research has suspended the investment rating and price target, if any, for this stock, because there is not a sufficient
fundamental basis for determining an investment rating or target. The previous investment rating and price target, if any, are no longer in effect for this stock
and should not be relied upon.
NA = Not Available or Not Applicable. The information is not available for display or is not applicable.
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